

**MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES TO  
THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION  
OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION  
AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL  
MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION**

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**FINAL REPORT  
SEVENTH MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES**

**Geneva, 18-22 September 2006**

The Final Report of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction consists of two parts and six annexes as follows:

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## **PART I**

### **ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE SEVENTH MEETING**

#### **A. Introduction**

1. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction provides in Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 2, that: “The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:

- (a) The operation and status of this Convention;
- (b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
- (c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
- (d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
- (e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
- (f) Decisions relating to submissions of States parties as provided for in Article 5”;  
and,

Meetings subsequent to the First Meeting of the States Parties “shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference”.

2. At the 29 November–3 December 2004 First Review Conference, the States Parties agreed to hold annually, until the Second Review Conference, a Meeting of the States Parties which will regularly take place in the second half of the year, and, to hold the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties in Croatia from 28 November to 2 December 2005. At the Sixth Meeting, the States Parties agreed to hold the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties in Geneva from 18 to 22 September 2006.

3. To prepare for the Seventh Meeting, in keeping with past practice, at the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention a provisional agenda, provisional programme of work, draft rules of procedure and draft cost estimates were presented. Based upon discussions at that meeting, it was the sense of the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that these documents were generally acceptable to the States Parties to be put before the Seventh Meeting for adoption.

4. To seek views on matters of substance, the President-Designate convened informal meetings in Geneva on 17 July 2006 and 4 September 2006 to which all States Parties and interested organizations were invited to participate.

5. The opening of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties was preceded on 18 September 2006 by a ceremony at which statements were delivered by Ms. Teresa Gambaro, Australia's Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Special Representative on Mine Action,

Ambassador Anton Thalmann, Deputy Secretary of State, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland and Ms. Song Kosal, landmine survivor and youth advocate.

## **B. Organization of the Seventh Meeting**

6. The Seventh Meeting of the States Parties was opened on 18 September 2006 by Ms. Dijana Plestina of Croatia, on behalf of the President of the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties. Ms. Plestina presided over the election of the President of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties. The Meeting elected by acclamation Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia as its President in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure.

7. At the opening session, a message was delivered to the meeting on behalf of the Secretary General of the United Nations. In addition, the following addressed the meeting: Mr. Philip Spoerri, Director of International Law and Cooperation, International Committee of the Red Cross; Ms. Margaret Arach Orech, Ambassador of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines; and, Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

8. At its first plenary meeting on 18 September 2006, the Seventh Meeting adopted its agenda as contained in Annex I to this report. On the same occasion, the meeting adopted its rules of procedure as contained in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/3\*, the estimated costs for convening the Seventh Meeting as contained in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/4, and its programme of work as contained in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/2\*.

9. Also at its first plenary meeting, Afghanistan, Belgium, Guatemala, Japan, Jordan, Slovenia, Switzerland and the United Republic of Tanzania were elected by acclamation as Vice-Presidents of the Seventh Meeting.

10. The Meeting unanimously confirmed the nomination of Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland as Secretary-General of the Meeting. The Meeting also took note of the appointment by the United Nations Secretary-General of Mr. Tim Caughley, Director of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, as Executive Secretary of the Meeting, and the appointment by the President of Mr. Kerry Brinkert, Manager of the Implementation Support Unit, as the President's Executive Coordinator.

## **C. Participation in the Seventh Meeting**

11. Ninety-six States Parties participated in the meeting: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Romania, Senegal, Serbia,

Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

12. One State that had ratified or acceded to the Convention, but for which the Convention had not yet entered into force, participated in the Meeting as observers, in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention and rule 1, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure of the Meeting: Brunei Darussalam.

13. Two signatories that have not ratified the Convention participated in the Meeting as observers, in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention and rule 1, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure of the Meeting: Indonesia and Poland.

14. A further twenty-five States not parties to the Convention participated in the Meeting as observers, in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention and rule 1, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure of the Meeting: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Cuba, Egypt, Finland, India, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic and United Arab Emirates.

15. In accordance with Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention and rule 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Rules of Procedure, the following international organizations and institutions, regional organizations, entities and non-governmental organizations attended the Meeting as observers: European Commission, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, League of Arab States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Sovereign Military Order of Malta, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

16. In accordance with Article 11, paragraph 4, of the Convention and rule 1, paragraph 4, of the rules of procedure, the following other organizations attended the Meeting as observers: Cleared Ground Demining, Cranfield University Resilience Centre, International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), James Madison University Mine Action Information Center (JMU) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD).

17. A list of all delegations to the Seventh Meeting is contained in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/INF.2.

#### **D. Work of the Seventh Meeting**

18. The Seventh Meeting held eight plenary sessions from 18-22 September 2006 and one informal session on 20 September 2006. The first one and a half plenary sessions featured the general exchange of views under agenda item 10. Delegations of nineteen States Parties, five observer States and four observer organizations made statements in the general exchange of views or otherwise made written statements of a general nature available.

19. At its third through eighth plenary sessions, the Meeting considered the general status and operation of the Convention, reviewing progress made and challenges that remain in the pursuit of the Convention's aims and in the application of the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009. In this regard, the Meeting warmly welcomed the Geneva Progress Report 2005-2006, as contained in Part II of this report, as an important means to support the application of the *Nairobi Action Plan* by measuring progress made during the period 2 December 2005 to 22 September 2006 and highlighting priority areas of work for the States Parties, the Co-Chairs and the Convention's President in the period between the Seventh and the Eighth Meetings of the States Parties.

20. At its eighth plenary session, the Meeting noted the Director of the GICHD's report on the activities of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU), contained in Annex V to this report. States Parties expressed their appreciation to the GICHD for the manner in which the ISU is making a positive contribution in support of the States Parties' efforts to implement the Convention.

21. Also at its eighth plenary session, the States Parties again recognized the value and importance of the Coordinating Committee in the effective functioning and implementation of the Convention and for operating in an open and transparent manner. In addition, the Meeting again noted the work undertaken by interested States Parties through the Sponsorship Programme, which continues to ensure widespread representation at meetings of the Convention.

22. Also at its eighth plenary session, the Meeting considered matters pertaining to reporting under Article 7 of the Convention. All States Parties were encouraged to place a continued emphasis on ensuring reports are submitted as required by forwarding reports to the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. In addition, States Parties took note of improvements made by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in ensuring access to reports via the Internet.

23. Also at its eighth plenary session, the Meeting considered the submission of requests under Article 5 of the Convention. The President notified the Meeting that she had not been informed that any state wished to make such a request at the Seventh Meeting. The Meeting took note of this.

24. Also at its eighth plenary session, the Meeting considered the submission of requests under Article 8 of the Convention. The President notified the Meeting that she had not been informed that any state wished to make such a request at the Seventh Meeting. The Meeting took note of this.

25. At its informal session, the Meeting discussed proposals made by the President, Canada and Guatemala, as contained in Annexes II, III and IV to this report, concerning process issues related to considering requests for extensions in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention.

### **E. Decisions and Recommendations**

26. At its final plenary session, pursuant to consultations undertaken by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, the Meeting agreed to set the dates of the 2007 meetings of the Standing Committees from 23-27 April and identified the following States Parties as the Standing Committee Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs until the end of the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties:

- (i) Mine Clearance, Mine-Risk Education and Mine-Action Technologies: Chile and Norway (Co-Chairs); Canada and Peru (Co-Rapporteurs);
- (ii) Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration: Austria and Sudan (Co-Chairs); Cambodia and New Zealand (Co-Rapporteurs);
- (iii) Stockpile Destruction: Algeria and Estonia (Co-Chairs); Lithuania and Serbia (Co-Rapporteurs);
- (iv) General Status and Operation of the Convention: Argentina and Italy (Co-Chairs); Germany and Kenya (Co-Rapporteurs).

27. Also at its final plenary session, the States Parties recalled the obligations set out in Article 5 of the Convention and discussed a process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extension to Article 5 deadlines as outlined in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.3. The States Parties recalled their commitment in *Nairobi Action Plan* Action #27 to strive to ensure that few, if any States Parties, would feel compelled to request an extension. They further recalled that the Convention allows States Parties to seek an extension to their mine destruction deadline should they be unable to meet it. It was acknowledged that despite their best efforts, it was possible that some States Parties would seek an extension to their deadlines. In view of this, the States Parties decided:

- (i) to reaffirm their obligation to ensure the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention and as reflected in *Nairobi Action Plan* Action #27;
- (ii) to establish a process for the preparation, submission and consideration of requests for extension to Article 5 deadlines;
- (iii) that requesting States Parties are encouraged, as necessary, to seek assistance from the Implementation Support Unit in the preparation of their requests;
- (iv) that States Parties in a position to do so should assist States Parties to fulfil their Article 5 obligations in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 4 of the Convention, and recall the relevance of *Nairobi Action Plan* Action #44 in this regard;

- (v) to work further on the voluntary template contained in APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.4, proposed as the basis to facilitate preparation and assessment of extension requests, with a view to its finalisation by the conclusion of the 2007 intersessional meetings, so to enable its voluntary implementation until its formal adoption at the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties.
- (vi) to strongly encourage States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions to append their national demining plans to their extension requests;
- (vii) to encourage States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions to submit their request to the President no fewer than nine months before the Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference at which the decision on the request would need to be taken;
- (viii) that the President, upon receipt of an extension request, should inform the States Parties of its lodgement and make it openly available, in keeping with the Convention's practice of transparency;
- (ix) that the President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees, jointly prepare an analysis of the request indicating, *inter alia*: clarifications of facts sought and received from the requesting State; demining plans for the extension period; resource and assistance needs and gaps;
- (x) that, in preparing the analysis, the President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees and the requesting States Party should cooperate fully to clarify issues and identify needs;
- (xi) that in preparing the analysis, the President, Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, in close consultation with the requesting State, should, where appropriate, draw on expert mine clearance, legal and diplomatic advice, using the ISU to provide support;
- (xii) that the President, acting on behalf of the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, should submit the analysis to the States Parties well before the MSP or Review Conference preceding the requesting State's deadline.
- (xiii) to encourage all States Parties in a position to do so to provide additional, earmarked funds to the ISU Trust Fund to cover costs related to supporting the Article 5 extensions process.

28. The States Parties also decided to adopt the model declaration in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.5, as contained in Annex IV, as a voluntary means to report completion of Article 5 obligations.

29. Also at its final plenary session, in recalling the offer made by Jordan at the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties to host and preside over the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties, the Meeting agreed to designate His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Zeid of Jordan President



of the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties (8MSP) and decided to hold the 8MSP in Jordan the week of 18-22 November 2007.

#### **F. Documentation**

30. A list of documents of the Seventh Meeting is contained in Annex VI to this report. These documents are available in all official languages through the United Nations Official Documents System (<http://documents.un.org>).

#### **G. Adoption of the Final Report and conclusion of the Seventh Meeting**

31. At its final plenary session, on 22 September 2006, the Meeting adopted its draft report, contained in documents APLC/MSP.7/2006/CRP.2 and APLC/MSP.7/2006/CRP.2/Add.1 as orally amended, which is being issued as document APLC/MSP.7/2006/5.

## PART II

### ACHIEVING THE AIMS OF THE NAIROBI ACTION PLAN: THE GENEVA PROGRESS REPORT 2005-2006

#### Introduction

1. The *Nairobi Action Plan (NAP)*, adopted by the States Parties at the First Review Conference, lays out a comprehensive framework for the period 2005-2009 for achieving major progress towards ending, for all people and for all time, the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. In doing so, it provides the States Parties with guidance in fulfilling their Convention obligations.
2. The purpose of the *Geneva Progress Report (GPR)* is to monitor and support application of the *NAP* by measuring progress made between the Sixth and Seventh Meetings of the States Parties.<sup>1</sup> The report also highlights priority areas of work for the States Parties, the Co-Chairs and the President between the Seventh and the Eighth Meetings of the States Parties. It builds upon the 2004-2005 *Zagreb Progress Report (ZPR)* and is the second in a series of annual progress reports before the 2009 Second Review Conference.

#### I. Universalizing the Convention

3. Since the Sixth Meeting of States Parties (6MSP), instruments of ratification were deposited by **Ukraine** on 27 December 2005, by **Haiti** on 15 February 2006, by the **Cook Islands** on 15 March 2006 and by **Brunei Darussalam** on 24 April 2006. There are now **151 States** which have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. The Convention has entered into force for 150 of these States<sup>2</sup>. (See APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix I).
4. Forty-four (44) States have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention. Among these states are some that produce, use, transfer and/or maintain large stockpiles of anti-personnel mines. And some are considering developing new kinds of anti-personnel mines. For instance, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has reported that since the 6MSP three States not parties – Myanmar, Nepal and Russian Federation – have made new use of anti-personnel mines. Some States not parties are mine-affected and could benefit from the Convention's cooperation and assistance provisions if they acceded to the Convention. In addition, among these 44 States are three States that signed the Convention: Indonesia, the Marshall Islands and Poland.
5. Since the 6MSP, States Parties have promoted adherence to the Convention by States not parties. The President of the 6MSP wrote to all States not parties encouraging them to ratify or accede to the Convention as soon as possible. Canada, in addition to coordinating the Universalization Contact Group, held military-to-military dialogues with India and Pakistan. On the margins of the 6MSP and the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees, New Zealand

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<sup>1</sup> Specifically, the period covered by this report is 2 December 2005 to 22 September 2006.

<sup>2</sup> The Convention enters into force for Brunei Darussalam on 1 October 2006.

and Jordan convened regional universalization discussions for the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, respectively. Other States Parties have regularly raised ratification of or accession to the Convention with States not parties.

6. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines held youth workshops in Egypt and Lebanon, sent high-level delegations to Brunei, Egypt, India and Lebanon, and led a delegation to Poland. Its country campaign in Nepal played a leading role in convincing Nepal's government and Maoist groups to include a commitment to refrain from landmine use in a code of conduct agreed upon during peace talks in May 2006. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) promoted adherence to the Convention, particularly among signatory States and in South Asia. The United Nations (UN) recorded in its 2006-2010 inter-agency mine action strategy that it will continue to promote full adherence to the Convention. The Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the GICHD's Director provided relevant information to help States not parties make informed decisions on acceptance of the Convention.

7. The European Union's (EU) commitment of support to the destruction of Ukraine's stockpiled anti-personnel mines was critical in facilitating Ukraine's entry into the Convention. The EU was called upon to act with respect to bringing into the Convention Finland and Poland, the only EU member States that have not ratified or acceded to the Convention. The Organization of American States (OAS) continued to play an important role in universalization. The OAS's General Assembly adopted a resolution on 6 June 2006 urging its member States that have not yet done so to ratify or consider acceding to the Convention.

8. States Parties and other actors, including the ICBL and its member organizations, the ICRC, the UN, and the OAS General Assembly, have advocated the end to use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines by armed non-State actors. Switzerland has further pursued its efforts to promote a discussion on the role of States in implementing *NAP Action #46*. Several States Parties and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) expressed their support and/or made financial commitments to the Geneva Call for its work to engage armed non-State actors and promote their adherence to the Convention's norms. The Geneva Call has obtained further signings of its *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban on Anti Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action* since the 6MSP. With respect to one of these signings, one State Party noted with concern that the Geneva Call proceeded in a manner not consistent with paragraph 17 of the Zagreb Progress Report which states:

"Also in this context, as rights and obligations enshrined in the Convention and commitments in the *Nairobi Action Plan* apply to States Parties, some States Parties are of the view that when engagement with armed non-state actors is contemplated, States Parties concerned should be informed, and their consent would be necessary in order for such an engagement to take place."

9. According to the ICBL, armed non-State actors in 10 States (Burundi, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russian Federation and Somalia) have made new use of anti-personnel mines since the 6MSP. The ICRC reminded States Parties that assuring respect for the Convention's norms by all parties to an armed conflict, be it of international or not of an international character, is a humanitarian necessity if civilians are to be spared the devastating effects of anti-personnel mines. The ICRC also recalled the provisions of the

1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols according to which the application of international humanitarian law “shall not affect the legal status” of the parties to the conflict.

*Priorities for the period leading to the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties*

10. States Parties must turn their commitment to universalization into action in accordance with *NAP* Actions #1 to #8, particularly given the extent of the challenges that remain. States not parties should continue to be approached on a case specific basis. And pending their adherence to the Convention, they should be encouraged to participate as observers in Convention meetings and to implement voluntarily the Convention’s provisions. While voluntary compliance with provisions of the Convention may be recognized as first steps towards ratification of or accession to it, such steps should not be used to postpone formal adherence.

## **II. Destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines**

11. Since the 6MSP, Ukraine – which possesses stockpiled anti-personnel mines – ratified the Convention. And **Democratic Republic of the Congo** and **Latvia** reported fulfilment of their stockpile destruction obligations. Hence twelve States Parties have indicated the obligation to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines remains relevant for them: Afghanistan, Angola, Belarus, Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Guyana, Serbia, Sudan, Turkey and Ukraine. One of these States Parties indicated during the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that it may seek an extension for destroying its stockpiles. Yet the Convention does not permit such extensions. Timelines for States Parties to complete stockpile destruction in accordance with Article 4 are in APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix II.

12. One hundred and thirty nine (139) States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention no longer hold stocks of anti-personnel mines, either because they never did or because they have completed their destruction programmes. States Parties have destroyed more than 38 million stockpiled mines. But for a small number of States Parties, stockpile destruction remains relevant and several challenges remain.

13. Some States Parties are emerging from years of conflict and may not know the extent of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in areas under their jurisdiction. In some instances, these States Parties may not have control over all such areas. For two States Parties, the destruction of vast numbers of the PFM-1 type mine remains a challenge. For some, the sheer volume of mines that must be destroyed presents difficulties. In addition, all 12 relevant States Parties are challenged by the obligation to destroy their stocks “as soon as possible”.

14. Two States Parties (Ethiopia and Guyana), have not yet reported, as required, the number and types of stockpiled anti-personnel mines under their respective jurisdiction or control. Bhutan, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia and Sao Tome and Principe have not provided an initial Article 7 report to confirm the assumption that they do not hold stocks.

15. States Parties continued to discuss their commitment to report, in accordance with Article 7 and through informal means, discoveries of previously unknown stockpiles found after

stockpile destruction deadlines have passed. And they reaffirmed the need to destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority (*NAP* Action #15). It was suggested that Form G of the Article 7 reporting format could be amended to facilitate reporting. Others suggested that Form G in its current format seems sufficient to handle these situations.

16. While the responsibility to destroy stockpiled anti-personnel mines rests with each State Party, the Convention calls for others to assist. In most instances States Parties can fulfil Article 4 obligations with their resources. But it was again noted that the Convention community must respond to appeals for technical or other assistance, in accordance with Article 6 paragraph 5 of the Convention and as committed to in *NAP* Actions #13 and #14.

17. The *ZPR* recorded the need to raise awareness of the need to destroy stockpiled mines belonging to armed non-State actors that have committed to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines. The Geneva Call reported the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines in Western Sahara by a signatory to its *Deed of Commitment*. In another case the Geneva Call reported possession of stockpiled anti-personnel mines and a related request for assistance in their destruction. The Geneva Call, the Danish Demining Group and the UNDP are assessing the situation.

*Priorities for the period leading to the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties*

18. All States Parties must act to comply with their deadlines. States Parties that have a relatively high level of economic development should display leadership in destroying their stockpiles as soon as possible. All other States Parties fulfilling Article 4 obligations need to have a clear plan to ensure compliance with their deadlines. The seven States Parties that have not reported their stockpile status as required under Article 7 should do so.

### III. Clearing mined areas

19. **Guatemala, Suriname and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia** formally reported that they had fulfilled their Article 5 obligations. This brings to seven the number of States Parties that have indicated fulfilment of their Article 5 obligations. There remain **45 States Parties** which have indicated that the mine clearance obligations of Article 5 remain relevant for them: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Timelines for these States Parties to destroy or ensure the destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas in accordance with Article 5 are in Part II - Annex III.

20. It was recalled that, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, States Parties must “make every effort to identify all areas under (their) jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced” and undertake “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under (their) jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of (the) Convention for (a

particular) State Party.” It was noted that the Convention does not contain language requiring each State Party to search every square metre of its territory to find mines. But the Convention does require the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas which a State Party has made every effort to identify. Moreover, it was noted that oft-used terms like “mine-free,” “impact-free,” and “mine-safe” do not exist in the Convention text and are not synonymous with Convention obligations.

21. It was emphasised that clearance of all mined areas in accordance with Article 5 is part of the Convention’s overall comprehensive approach to ending the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines – “for all people, for all time.”<sup>3</sup> Clearance of anti-personnel mines can have a humanitarian impact, assist development, further the disarmament goal of the Convention and help solidify peace and build confidence.

22. Despite clarifications made at the 6MSP, continuing ambiguity on mine clearance was evident in 2006. At the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, at least two States Parties referred to their end-state under Article 5 obligations as “impact-free” or having no new victims, terms which are neither in the Convention nor consistent with Convention obligations. At least one State Party indicated its intention to emplace *permanent* markings of minefields. This implied that such markings would not be an interim measure and that anti-personnel mines in such mined areas would not be destroyed as required by the Convention.

23. Given the urgent need to fulfil Article 5 obligations, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies and others highlighted *NAP* paragraph 4 and the high expectations for ensuring implementation of Article 5. They recalled that successfully meeting the deadlines for clearing mined areas is the most significant challenge before the Second Review Conference. Meeting this challenge will require intensive efforts by mine-affected States Parties and those in a position to assist them. They recalled that States Parties agreed in *NAP* Actions #17 and #27 to “intensify and accelerate efforts to ensure the most effective and most expeditious possible fulfilment of Article 5 paragraph 1 mine clearance obligations in the period 2005-2009” and to “strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3-6 of the Convention.”

24. The Co-Chairs of Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies encouraged all States Parties fulfilling Article 5 obligations to provide clarity on **national demining plans**, progress made, work that remains, and factors that may impede fulfilling their obligations in a 10 year period in May 2006. Thirty-five (35) of 45 relevant States Parties provided information, some with more clarity than ever before. But few of these States Parties indicated that they have a plan to fulfil their obligations by their deadlines. Some emphasised that completion in a 10-year period was contingent upon sufficient resources being made available.

25. Of the 45 States Parties that have indicated they must fulfil obligations under Article 5 of the Convention, 9 have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are consistent with Article 5 obligations and the ten-year deadline set by the Convention. Five (5)

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<sup>3</sup> *Nairobi Action Plan* (APLC/CONF/2004/5, Part III), Introduction.

have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are not consistent with Article 5 obligations and/or the ten-year deadline set by the Convention. Eleven (11) States Parties have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are unclear regarding consistency with Article 5 obligations and/or the ten-year deadline set by the Convention. Eight (8) States Parties have indicated that efforts are underway to establish a national demining plan / programme or to acquire the necessary information to do so. Twelve (12) States Parties have not provided details on a national demining plan/ programme. Immediate action must be taken by several States Parties to develop and implement national demining programmes with a view to meeting their deadlines. A table on the status of demining plans/programmes is in APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix IV. A summary of the clarity in implementing Article 5 provided at the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies can be found in document APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.2, which was presented to the 7MSP by the Standing Committee's Co-Chairs, Jordan and Slovenia.

26. Important advances in the understanding of **identifying mined areas** were made in 2006. In particular, the GICHD and the UN developed risk management approaches that focus on maximizing techniques for releasing rapidly previously suspect land thereby enabling more efficient deployment of demining assets to mined areas. In one UN mine action programme, such methodologies resulted in 50 per cent of suspect hazardous areas being determined to not contain mines. In Cambodia, methodologies have been established to cancel, with confidence, suspect hazardous areas. Non-governmental organizations are undertaking resurvey work to cancel large areas previously considered to contain anti-personnel mines. These advances suggest that the challenges faced by many States Parties may be less than previously thought and that efforts to fulfil Convention obligations can proceed in a more efficient manner. They also suggest that some Landmine Impact Surveys may have dramatically overstated the extent of the problem faced.

27. The Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies initiated a discussion on possible **requests for extensions of deadlines** to comply with Article 5 obligations at the May 2006 meeting. Issues considered included timelines, scope and format of extension requests, review procedures and decision-making process. Work on this issue continued with a view to actions being taken at the 7MSP.

28. ICBL and UNICEF reported a growing number of mine clearance programmes now include a community liaison component to reduce risks to civilians from mined areas awaiting clearance as called for in the ZPR. Community liaison is increasingly integrated by clearance operators as a standard component of their programmes in three States Parties (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia and Mauritania). And some community liaison has been recorded in 10 State Parties (Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Sudan and Thailand). It was also noted that some States Parties, including Cambodia and Senegal, have made concrete efforts to develop community liaison projects as part of peace-building and development programmes.

29. UNICEF, in partnership with GICHD, produced 12 guidebooks to provide advice, tools and guidance to States Parties and others to undertake mine risk education programmes compliant with International Mine Action Standards. ICRC, in cooperation with National Red

Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is reducing the impact of mines and explosive remnants of war using preventive mine action activities that include, in addition to incident data gathering and mine risk education, providing safe alternative to communities until clearance can take place.

30. According to ICBL and UNICEF, no mine risk education activities were recorded in several States Parties where communities may be at risk. It was noted that while States Parties are obliged under Article 7 paragraph 1(i) to provide information on “the measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all (mined areas),” the information is often insufficient and in some instances non-existent.

31. Important efforts on **mine action technologies** were undertaken consistent with the *NAP*’s guidance with respect to the right of States Parties, as indicated in Article 6 paragraph 2, “to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention.” These efforts included a technology workshop for field practitioners convened by UNMAS and GICHD in February 2006. Croatia held a symposium involving 26 States and international organizations in April 2006. And Belgium convened a mine action technologies experts’ group meeting on the margins of the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies.

32. Mine action technology experts drew several conclusions from their work in 2006. First, the greatest challenge rests with introducing enough appropriate existing technology into national demining programmes with economic realities being the chief limiting factor. Secondly, training, life cycle costs, modifications to an organizational structure and maintenance programme and rewriting standard operating procedures are often overlooked when introducing a new technology. Thirdly, many national demining programmes, if adaptable, well-managed, and have a clear plan, could benefit from the introduction of new technologies. And finally, information to convince mine action operators of the advantages of using machines and new technologies often exists but is not shared or widely available.

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33. States Parties implementing Article 5 which have not yet done so should act in accordance with *NAP* Actions #17 to #22 to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control, develop national plans consistent with Convention obligations and achieve progress in implementing such a plan. As well, these States should act to significantly reduce risks to populations, and make their priorities and needs for assistance known to other States Parties and/or international and non-governmental organizations. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies should promote the need for a high degree of clarity in the implementation of Article 5. States Parties in a position to do so should continue to comply with their obligations to provide assistance for mine clearance and mine risk reduction education in accordance with Article 6.2 of the Convention. And States Parties should work cooperatively to establish practical approaches to assist them in developing and considering requests for extensions submitted in accordance with Article 5.



#### IV. Assisting the victims

34. The Final Report of the First Review Conference provided a clear framework to develop mine victim assistance. Three statements are particularly relevant: The States Parties emphasized that “the call to assist landmine victims should not lead to victim assistance efforts being undertaken in such a manner as to exclude any person injured or disabled in another manner.” They stated that “assistance to landmine victims should be viewed as a part of a country’s overall public health and social services systems and human rights frameworks.” And, they highlighted that “providing adequate assistance to landmine survivors must be seen in a broader context of development and underdevelopment.”<sup>4</sup>

35. The Report also stressed that greater emphasis must be placed on fulfilling responsibilities to landmine victims by the **24 States Parties** that have indicated that they hold ultimate responsibility for significant numbers of landmine survivors. These States Parties are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. As noted in the *NAP*, “these States Parties have the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.”<sup>5</sup>

36. Guided by the conclusions drawn at the First Review Conference and *NAP* Actions #29 to #39, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration continued work to assist the 24 relevant States Parties to set objectives for fulfilling their victim assistance responsibilities in the period 2005-2009. Particular effort was made to overcome the following challenges:

- (i) Few of the 24 relevant States Parties had responded with specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound objectives (*SMART*) in 2005, and some had failed to spell out what is known or not known about the status of victim assistance;
- (ii) In some instances demining officials led efforts to develop victim assistance objectives with little interaction with those responsible for health and social services; and,
- (iii) In some instances preparation of victim assistance objectives had not taken broader national plans into consideration.

37. The Co-Chairs recognized that overcoming these challenges required intensive work, on a national basis, with as many of the relevant States Parties as possible, while providing some support to all 24 of these States Parties. The Co-Chairs invited the 24 relevant States Parties to provide updates on their efforts at the May 2006 meeting of the Standing Committee – sixteen (16) did so. With assistance provided by Switzerland, the ISU extended its services to provide *process support* to these States Parties. *Process support* has included one-on-one

<sup>4</sup> *Review of the operation and status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction*, APLC/CONF/2004/5, Part II, paragraphs 66 - 67.

<sup>5</sup> *Nairobi Action Plan*, APLC/CONF/2004/5, Part III, paragraph 5.

meetings with relevant officials to raise awareness and stimulate inter-ministerial coordination. A further component was outreach to relevant international and other organizations. And where appropriate, inter-ministerial workshops were held to bring together relevant actors to discuss and consolidate improvements on objectives and the development of plans. The ISU undertook specialized support visits to Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Tajikistan and Yemen in 2006. It provided some advice to all 24 relevant States Parties.

38. The aim of *process support* is to enable those States Parties with good objectives to develop good plans, to help those with unclear objectives develop more concrete objectives, and to assist those least engaged in developing objectives and plans in 2005, to get engaged. Significant progress was made in strengthening objectives and developing or revising plans in Afghanistan, Albania, Guinea-Bissau, Tajikistan, and Yemen, with the engagement of relevant ministries and other actors in 2006. Relevant ministries are developing and implementing plans of action in other relevant States Parties, including in Thailand and Uganda.

39. The Co-Chairs' efforts to advance national planning and objective-setting through **inter-ministerial coordination** showed that these are challenging tasks for States Parties. Responses by the 24 States Parties to the 2005 Co-Chairs' questionnaire revealed a lack of communication and coordination between ministries and with other stakeholders. Afghanistan, as Co-Chair and leading by example, launched an initiative to enhance inter-ministerial coordination to produce *SMARTer* objectives and a national plan of action to meet the needs of landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities. The plan was elaborated at a workshop in August 2006, with participants from relevant ministries and the disability sector. Afghanistan intends to share this experience with relevant States. Tajikistan also elaborated a plan of action during an inter-ministerial workshop in April 2006.

40. In response to *NAP* Action #29, which in part calls for enhanced **emergency care** of landmine victims, the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, in consultation with a number of non-governmental and international organizations, developed *seven key points* for first responders and paramedics in providing medical first aid to mine injured people. The points are basic first-aid actions and can benefit an entire community in responding to injuries resulting from any cause. The Co-Chairs recommended that their *seven key points* be included in mine risk education programmes, where appropriate, as an efficient way to promote their use. ICRC published a manual, *First Aid in Armed Conflicts and in Other Situations of Violence*, which aims to improve emergency care of victims of mines and armed conflict by first responders.

41. In response to *NAP* Action #32, which calls for support in the **socio-economic reintegration** of mine victims, the Co-Chairs supported a Handicap International study to identify good practices for the economic integration of mine survivors and other persons with disabilities, with particular regard to access to financing and the use of micro credit. The results of the study were presented to the 7MSP.

42. ICBL, with the support of Switzerland and the Landmine Survivors Network, produced two reports, *Providing Comprehensive and Efficient Prosthetic and Orthotic Services in low-income settings* and *Supporting Prosthetic and Orthotic Services in low-income settings* in 2006. These contributed to *NAP* Action #30, which encourages organizations that specialise in

**physical rehabilitation** to develop guidelines for the implementation of prosthetic and orthotic programmes.

43. With Australia's assistance, ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance through its member organizations, Standing Tall Australia and Handicap International, produced the report *Landmine Victim Assistance in 2005: Overview of the Situation in 24 States Parties*. This is the second annual report in a series aimed at **monitoring progress** in implementation of victim assistance commitments (*NAP* Action #37).

44. In keeping with Actions #38 and #39 of the *Nairobi Action Plan*, which call on States Parties and relevant organizations to continue to ensure effective integration of mine victims in the work of the Convention and an effective contribution in all relevant deliberations by health, rehabilitation and social services professionals, at least 9 States Parties included relevant victim assistance specialists in their delegations to the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees and at least 11 landmine survivors participated in these meetings, including two who were members of States Parties' delegations.

45. Efforts continued since the 6MSP to strengthen the normative framework that protects and ensures respect for the rights of persons with disabilities including landmine survivors through the participation by many States Parties and interested organizations in the ongoing drafting of an international convention on the rights of persons with disabilities.

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46. Despite advances since the 6MSP, States Parties need to deepen understanding of commitments made in the *NAP* and the work of the Standing Committee among relevant officials and experts working on disability issues at the national level. The involvement in the work of the Convention by health care, rehabilitation or disability rights experts must be strengthened. States Parties and relevant organizations must do more to ensure that landmine survivors are effectively involved in national planning and contribute to deliberations that affect them.

47. States Parties need to ensure efficient and effective use of resources, particularly where capacity and resources to develop and implement objectives and national plans are limited. Better collaboration between mine action centres and relevant ministries and other key actors in the disability sector is essential.

## **V. Other matters essential for achieving the Convention's aims**

### **A. Cooperation and assistance**

48. The Resource Mobilisation Contact Group focused its efforts in 2006 on the efficient and effective use of resources within all aspects of Convention implementation. Drawing on discussions at the 6MSP and in May 2006, Contact Group Coordinator, Norway, conducted consultations with key operational actors. An unambiguous message of these consultations was that for high levels of funding to be maintained, stakeholders will demand confirmation that

investments are resulting in concrete progress toward fulfilling Convention obligations, with more land released quickly, fewer new victims and more effective victim assistance.

49. Key issues identified since the 6MSP by the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group include the following:

- (i) Past Landmine Impact Surveys may have overstated or misrepresented the geographical extent of the mine problem. Therefore priority should be given to investments that realign or update existing survey data with realities, using tools aimed at determining actual mined areas needing clearance.
- (ii) Investments in clearance capacity should focus on States Parties' abilities to meet their Article 5 obligations.
- (iii) Investments in victim assistance should focus on immediate life-saving capacities in mine-affected areas and on long-term support for survivors. Such investments need to be measured in the life spans of the survivors. They should focus on reinforcing existing health and rehabilitation capacities.
- (iv) Investments in clearance and survivor assistance capacities must be done in a manner that reinforces existing and nascent local structures and national institutions, rather than establishing externally funded mine action entities. This is crucial to ensure national ownership and to facilitate more efficient use of resources. Local civil society has a key role in identifying these resources and in holding national and international operators accountable for their actions.
- (v) Investments in mine action must be based on the premise that each State Party in the process of fulfilling Article 5 obligations finds itself in a specific situation. Actions must primarily be designed to meet specific circumstances. While global guidelines should be employed to maximise safety and outputs, they must not constrain sound local responses.

50. Canada and GICHD hosted dialogues in December 2005 and May 2006 on **linking mine action and development**, pursuant to *NAP* Action #47 to encourage the international development community to play a significantly expanded role in mine action. The May meeting concluded that a continuing mechanism should be set up to sustain efforts to integrate mine action and development cooperation where this is feasible and appropriate. Hence, the Linking Mine Action and Development Contact Group was established. The Group's immediate aim is to develop practical guidelines and tools to facilitate integration of mine action and development in complementing existing dedicated mechanisms. Canada, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, GICHD and UNDP promoted the link between mine action and development in the programme of work of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2007-2008. These efforts aim to enhance policy and practical guidelines for DAC members on the inclusion of mine action in security and development policies.

51. Guatemala, as Co-Chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, highlighted **multiparty cooperation**, in line with *NAP* Action #50 which

calls for efforts to identify new and non-traditional sources of support for activities to implement the Convention. Guatemala highlighted the value of cooperation between (a) a State Party implementing Article 5, (b) a State Party that has developed capacity through its experience in implementing Article 5, or that is willing to offer human and material resources relevant for implementation of Article 5, (c) a donor, and (d) an international or regional organization that can facilitate cooperation. The Organization of American States and States Parties in the Americas have shown leadership in multiparty cooperation, most recently through assistance to Suriname in complying with its Article 5 obligations.

52. The importance of a two-track approach to cooperation on **victim assistance** was again noted. Such an approach involves assistance provided by or through specialized organizations in which assistance specifically targets landmines survivors and other war wounded, and assistance in the form of integrated approaches in which development cooperation aims to guarantee the rights of all individuals, including persons with disabilities. While many States Parties have provided information on efforts regarding the former, very little has been provided to indicate efforts that will ultimately benefit landmine survivors are being undertaken through integrated development cooperation.

53. The Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD has reaffirmed that **stockpile destruction** activities can be recognized as Official Development Assistance (ODA). Despite this, few States Parties have provided assistance to those requiring it for the purpose of stockpile destruction.

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54. The Resource Mobilisation Contact Group should continue to develop a programme of work that places a clear focus on mine action efficiency and effectiveness. The Contact Group should continue to be guided by needs on the ground and ensure all relevant voices are heard in dialogues on this matter.

55. Efforts should be made to follow-up on various points contained in *NAP* Actions #40 to #50 which have not received sufficient attention since the First Review Conference. States Parties should ensure that mine clearance and victim assistance are part of national development plans and where appropriate, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, UN Development Assistance Frameworks, and Country Assistance Strategies. They should highlight progress in the development of national capacities. And they should clarify how States Parties' roles on decision making bodies of multilateral development organizations can support States Parties that require assistance in fulfilling Article 5 and other obligations.

**B. Transparency and the exchange of information**

56. Since the 6MSP, initial transparency reports were submitted by Latvia and Vanuatu. Hence, seven States Parties have not yet provided an initial Article 7 report: Bhutan, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guyana, and Sao Tome and Principe.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Ukraine is required to submit an initial transparency report as soon as practicable and, in any event, not later than 28 November 2006; Haiti not later than 28 January 2007; the Cook Islands not later than 28 February 2007; and Brunei Darussalam not later than 30 March 2007.

57. In terms of compliance with Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Convention, annual Article 7 reports for 2006 were provided by all states with the exception of the following 43 States Parties: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Comoros, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Jamaica, Kiribati, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda and Uruguay. As of 22 September 2006, the overall reporting rate in 2006 stood at 66 percent<sup>7</sup>.

58. The 6MSP re-emphasised that reporting in accordance with Article 7 is particularly important for States Parties in the process of fulfilling key obligations or which have retained anti-personnel mines under Article 3. As of 22 September 2006:

- (i) Of the 12 States Parties which, as of the close of the 6MSP, still had to destroy stockpiled mines in accordance with Article 4, each provided transparency information on this matter as required in 2006 covering the previous calendar year with the exception of the following: Ethiopia, Guyana and Serbia.
- (ii) Of the 45 States Parties which, as of the close of the 6MSP, still had to clear mined areas in accordance with Article 5, each provided transparency information on this matter as required in 2006 covering the previous calendar year with the exception of the following: Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Niger, Serbia and Uganda.
- (iii) Of the 76 States Parties which, as of the close of the 6MSP, had not yet reported on legislation in the context of Article 9, each provided transparency information on this matter as required in 2006 covering the previous calendar year with the exception of the following: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Latvia, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
- (iv) Of the 75 States Parties which, as of the close of the 6MSP, had reported that they had retained mines for reasons permitted under Article 3, each provided transparency information on this matter in 2006 with the exception of the following: Botswana, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Honduras, Malawi, Mali, Serbia, Togo and Uruguay. Two States: Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo stated that a decision concerning mines retained under Article 3 is pending. An update on the numbers of mines retained and transferred for permitted reasons is in APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix V.

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<sup>7</sup>The annual transparency reporting rate is acquired by dividing the number of States Parties that provided a report in a particular year by the number of States Parties that were required to provide a report in a particular year.

59. At the 6MSP, the States Parties amended the transparency reporting format to provide, in Form D, the opportunity to volunteer information in addition to what is minimally required on mines retained for reasons permitted under Article 3 pursuant to *NAP* Action #54. Nine (9) States Parties used the amended reporting format to provide such information. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation invited States Parties to volunteer relevant information on mines retained under Article 3 to make use of this forum. Seventeen (17) States Parties did so at the Standing Committee's meeting. An overview of information volunteered is in APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix V.

60. States Parties may share information beyond what is minimally required through the Article 7 reporting format's Form J. Since the 6MSP, the following 44 States Parties have made use of Form J as a voluntary means of reporting: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea Bissau, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe. Of these, the following 30 States Parties used Form J to report on assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, France, Germany, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Senegal, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen and Zimbabwe.

61. The Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention provided an opportunity, pursuant to *NAP* Action #55, for an exchange of views on implementation of Articles 1, 2 and 3 on 12 May 2006. Three States Parties spoke on Articles 1, 2 and/or 3. Two States Parties shared views on other aspects of implementation.

62. Since the 6MSP, Poland provided a voluntary transparency report sharing information on all pertinent matters mentioned in Article 7. In addition Morocco provided on a voluntary basis some of the information required in Article 7, although it did not submit information on stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

63. Consistent with *NAP* Action #58, some States Parties, regional or other organizations arranged voluntarily regional and thematic conferences and workshops to advance implementation of the Convention. In addition to those already mentioned, Trinidad and Tobago held a workshop on the role of the Caribbean Community in pursuing the aims of the Convention in June 2006. Argentina and ICRC held a seminar on international humanitarian law which included as one its objectives the promotion of the application of the *NAP* in August 2006.

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64. States Parties must continue to or improve as appropriate their compliance with Article 7 obligations, particularly those States Parties that are destroying stockpiled mines, clearing mined areas, retaining anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 3, and/or undertaking measures in accordance with Article 9.

### C. Preventing and suppressing prohibited activities, and facilitating compliance

65. Since the 6MSP, five additional States Parties (Albania, Chad, Croatia, Peru and Senegal), including one that had previously indicated that it considered existing laws to be sufficient, reported having adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations. One State Party – Greece – reported existing laws to be sufficient. There are now 51 states that have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations. An additional 26 reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient. Seventy-four (74) States that have ratified or acceded to the Convention have not yet reported having adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations or that they consider existing laws to be sufficient. None of the four States newly ratified or acceded to the Convention has reported actions taken in accordance with Article 9. An overview of implementation of Article 9 is in APLC/MSP.7/2006/5, Part II, Appendix VI.

66. Since the 6MSP, the States Parties remained committed to work together to facilitate compliance under the Convention. In addition, since the 6MSP, no State Party submitted a request for clarification to a Meeting of the States Parties in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 2, nor has any proposed that a Special Meeting of the States Parties be convened in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 5. As well, the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) continued fulfilling the UN Secretary General's responsibility to prepare and update a list of names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts designated for fact finding missions authorized in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 8. Since the 6MSP, 21 States Parties – Argentina, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Chile, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Germany, Guyana, Italy, Kenya, Panama, Republic of Moldova, Spain, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, Zambia and Zimbabwe – provided updated information for the list of experts.

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67. Recalling the commitment States Parties made in *NAP* Actions #59 to #62, States Parties need to ensure development and adoption of appropriate legislative and other measures in accordance with Article 9 of the Convention. States need to include penal sanctions for prohibited activities, to integrate the Convention's prohibitions and requirements into their military doctrine, and to report on these matters as required under Article 7. Since the First Review Conference, few States Parties have reported adopting such measures. States Parties requiring assistance in this area should draw on support available from ICRC and other actors.

### D. Implementation support

68. The **Coordinating Committee** met six times to prepare for and assess the outcome of the Intersessional Work Programme and to coordinate the work of the Standing Committees with the work of the Meeting of the States Parties since the 6MSP. The Coordinating Committee continued to operate in an open and transparent manner with summary reports of each meeting made available to all interested parties on the web site of the GICHD.

69. With respect to the **Intersessional Work Programme**, at the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees there were over 550 registered delegates representing 97 States Parties,



18 States not parties and numerous international and non-governmental organizations. These meetings featured discussions on the implementation of key provisions of the Convention and on assuring that cooperation and assistance would continue to function well. The meetings were again supported by GICHD. Interpretation services were provided through voluntary contributions by the European Commission and Canada.

70. In 2006, the **Implementation Support Unit (ISU)** of the GICHD continued to assist States Parties to implement the Convention's obligations and objectives. The ISU supported the President, the President-Designate, the Co-Chairs, the Contact Group Coordinators, the Sponsorship Programme donors group and individual States Parties with initiatives to pursue the aims of the *Nairobi Action Plan*. In addition, through the provision of professional advice, support and information services, the ISU assisted individual States Parties in addressing various implementation challenges.

71. The continuing operations of ISU were assured by voluntary contributions by the following States Parties since the 6MSP: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Slovenia and Turkey. ISU enhanced its available services in 2006 by providing victim assistance *process support* to the inter-ministerial coordination efforts of States Parties that have reported the responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims through project funding provided by Switzerland.

72. UNDDA, Australia and Switzerland, with the assistance of ISU, made arrangements for the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties. The States Parties continued to use **Contact Groups** on universalization, Article 7 reporting and resource mobilization. As noted, Canada established a new Contact Group on Linking Mine Action and Development in order to pursue in more focused manner various aspects of the *NAP*.

73. The **Sponsorship Programme** continued to ensure participation in the Convention's meetings by States Parties normally not able to be represented at these meetings by relevant experts or officials. In advance of the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees, the programme's Donors' Group invited 42 States Parties to request sponsorship for up to 64 delegates to provide updates on Convention implementation. Thirty-five representatives (29 States Parties) were sponsored to attend the May meetings. The programme's Donors' Group invited 45 States Parties to request sponsorship for up to 69 delegates to attend the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties. 47 representatives of 32 States Parties were sponsored to attend the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties.

74. Sponsorship of States Parties' delegates also assisted in the application of *NAP* Action #39, to include health and social service professionals in deliberations. Nine (9) relevant States Parties accepted the Donors' Group offer of support at the May 2006 meetings. And 16 relevant States Parties took advantage of the Donors' Group offer of support for participation by such a professional in the 7MSP.

75. The Sponsorship Programme also contributed to the aims of universalization, with the Donors' Group having offered sponsorship to 10 States not parties for the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees and 10 States not parties for the 7MSP. Five States not parties accepted this offer in May 2006, with each providing an update on its views on the Convention at the

8 May meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention. Four States not parties accepted this offer for the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties.

76. The continuing operations of the Sponsorship Programme were assured in 2006 by contributions to the Sponsorship Programme from the following States Parties since the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties: Australia and Belgium.

Appendix I

## STATES THAT HAVE RATIFIED OR ACCEDED TO THE CONVENTION

STATE	DATE OF FORMAL ACCEPTANCE	DATE OF ENTRY-INTO-FORCE
<b>Afghanistan</b>	11 September 2002	1 March 2003
<b>Albania</b>	29 February 2000	1 August 2000
<b>Algeria</b>	9 October 2001	1 April 2002
<b>Andorra</b>	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Angola</b>	5 July 2002	1 January 2003
<b>Antigua and Barbuda</b>	3 May 1999	1 November 1999
<b>Argentina</b>	14 September 1999	1 March 2000
<b>Australia</b>	14 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>Austria</b>	29 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Bahamas</b>	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Bangladesh</b>	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Barbados</b>	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>Belarus</b>	3 September 2003	1 March 2004
<b>Belgium</b>	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Belize</b>	23 April 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Benin</b>	25 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Bhutan</b>	18 August 2005	1 February 2006
<b>Bolivia</b>	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	8 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Botswana</b>	1 March 2000	1 September 2000
<b>Brazil</b>	30 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>Brunei Darussalam</b>	24 April 2006	1 October 2006
<b>Bulgaria</b>	4 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Burundi</b>	22 October 2003	1 April 2004
<b>Cambodia</b>	28 July 1999	1 January 2000
<b>Cameroon</b>	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
<b>Canada</b>	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
<b>Cape Verde</b>	14 May 2001	1 November 2001
<b>Central African Republic</b>	8 November 2002	1 May 2003
<b>Chad</b>	6 May 1999	1 November 1999
<b>Chile</b>	10 September 2001	1 March 2002
<b>Colombia</b>	6 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Comoros</b>	19 September 2002	1 March 2003
<b>Congo</b>	4 May 2001	1 November 2001
<b>Cook Islands</b>	15 March 2006	1 September 2006
<b>Costa Rica</b>	17 March 1999	1 September 1999
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
<b>Croatia</b>	20 May 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Cyprus</b>	17 January 2003	1 July 2003
<b>Czech Republic</b>	26 October 1999	1 April 2000
<b>Democratic Republic of the Congo</b>	2 May 2002	1 November 2002
<b>Denmark</b>	8 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Djibouti</b>	18 May 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Dominica</b>	26 March 1999	1 September 1999

<b>STATE</b>	<b>DATE OF FORMAL ACCEPTANCE</b>	<b>DATE OF ENTRY-INTO-FORCE</b>
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
<b>Ecuador</b>	29 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>El Salvador</b>	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	16 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Eritrea</b>	27 August 2001	1 February 2002
<b>Estonia</b>	12 May 2004	1 November 2004
<b>Ethiopia</b>	17 December 2004	1 June 2005
<b>Fiji</b>	10 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>France</b>	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Gabon</b>	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Gambia</b>	23 September 2002	1 March 2003
<b>Germany</b>	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Ghana</b>	30 June 2000	1 December 2000
<b>Greece</b>	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
<b>Grenada</b>	19 August 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Guatemala</b>	26 March 1999	1 September 1999
<b>Guinea</b>	8 October 1998	1 April 1999
<b>Guinea Bissau</b>	22 May 2001	1 November 2001
<b>Guyana</b>	5 August 2003	1 February 2004
<b>Haiti</b>	15 February 2006	1 August 2006
<b>Holy See</b>	17 February 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Honduras</b>	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Hungary</b>	6 April 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Iceland</b>	5 May 1999	1 November 1999
<b>Ireland</b>	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
<b>Italy</b>	23 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>Jamaica</b>	17 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Japan</b>	30 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Jordan</b>	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>Kenya</b>	23 January 2001	1 July 2001
<b>Kiribati</b>	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Latvia</b>	1 July 2005	1 January 2006
<b>Lesotho</b>	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
<b>Liberia</b>	23 December 1999	1 June 2000
<b>Liechtenstein</b>	5 October 1999	1 April 2000
<b>Lithuania</b>	12 May 2003	1 November 2003
<b>Luxembourg</b>	14 June 1999	1 December 1999
<b>Madagascar</b>	16 September 1999	1 March 2000
<b>Malawi</b>	13 August 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Malaysia</b>	22 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>Maldives</b>	7 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Mali</b>	2 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Malta</b>	7 May 2001	1 November 2001
<b>Mauritania</b>	21 July 2000	1 January 2001
<b>Mauritius</b>	3 December 1997	1 March 1999
<b>Mexico</b>	9 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Moldova</b>	8 September 2000	1 March 2001
<b>Monaco</b>	17 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>Mozambique</b>	25 August 1998	1 March 1999

<b>STATE</b>	<b>DATE OF FORMAL ACCEPTANCE</b>	<b>DATE OF ENTRY-INTO-FORCE</b>
<b>Namibia</b>	21 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Nauru</b>	7 August 2000	1 February 2001
<b>Netherlands</b>	12 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>New Zealand</b>	27 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>Nicaragua</b>	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>Niger</b>	23 March 1999	1 September 1999
<b>Nigeria</b>	27 September 2001	1 March 2002
<b>Niue</b>	15 April 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Norway</b>	9 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Panama</b>	7 October 1998	1 April 1999
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	28 June 2004	1 December 2004
<b>Paraguay</b>	13 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>Peru</b>	17 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Philippines</b>	15 February 2000	1 August 2000
<b>Portugal</b>	19 February 1999	1 August 1999
<b>Qatar</b>	13 October 1998	1 April 1999
<b>Romania</b>	30 November 2000	1 May 2001
<b>Rwanda</b>	8 June 2000	1 December 2000
<b>Saint Kitts and Nevis</b>	2 December 1998	1 June 1999
<b>Saint Lucia</b>	13 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</b>	1 August 2001	1 February 2002
<b>Samoa</b>	23 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>San Marino</b>	18 March 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>	31 March 2003	1 September 2003
<b>Senegal</b>	24 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Serbia</b>	18 September 2003	1 March 2004
<b>Seychelles</b>	2 June 2000	1 December 2000
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	25 April 2001	1 October 2001
<b>Slovakia</b>	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
<b>Slovenia</b>	27 October 1998	1 April 1999
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	26 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>South Africa</b>	26 June 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Spain</b>	19 January 1999	1 July 1999
<b>Sudan</b>	13 October 2003	1 April 2004
<b>Suriname</b>	23 May 2002	1 November 2002
<b>Swaziland</b>	22 December 1998	1 June 1999
<b>Sweden</b>	30 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>Switzerland</b>	24 March 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Tajikistan</b>	12 October 1999	1 April 2000
<b>Tanzania, United Republic of</b>	13 November 2000	1 May 2001
<b>Thailand</b>	27 November 1998	1 May 1999
<b>The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</b>	9 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	7 May 2003	1 November 2003
<b>Togo</b>	9 March 2000	1 September 2000
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	27 April 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Tunisia</b>	9 July 1999	1 January 2000
<b>Turkey</b>	25 September 2003	1 March 2004
<b>Turkmenistan</b>	19 January 1998	1 March 1999

<b>STATE</b>	<b>DATE OF FORMAL ACCEPTANCE</b>	<b>DATE OF ENTRY-INTO-FORCE</b>
<b>Uganda</b>	25 February 1999	1 August 1999
<b>Ukraine</b>	27 December 2005	1 June 2006
<b>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</b>	31 July 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Uruguay</b>	7 June 2001	1 December 2001
<b>Vanuatu</b>	16 September 2005	1 March 2006
<b>Venezuela</b>	14 April 1999	1 October 1999
<b>Yemen</b>	1 September 1998	1 March 1999
<b>Zambia</b>	23 February 2001	1 August 2001
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	18 June 1998	1 March 1999

## Appendix II

### DEADLINES FOR STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF FULFILLING ARTICLE 4 OBLIGATIONS

	2003					2004					2005					2006					2007					2008					2009					2010																
State Party	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J
Afghanistan																																																				
Angola																																																				
Belarus																																																				
Burundi																																																				
Cyprus																																																				
Ethiopia																																																				
Greece																																																				
Guyana																																																				
Serbia																																																				
Sudan																																																				
Turkey																																																				
Ukraine																																																				

### Appendix III

## DEADLINES FOR STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF FULFILLING ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATIONS

[illegible]



## Appendix IV

### THE STATUS OF NATIONAL DEMINING PLANS / PROGRAMMES<sup>1</sup>

States Parties that have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are consistent with Article 5 obligations and the ten-year deadline set by the Convention			States Parties that have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are not consistent with Article 5 obligations and / or the ten-year deadline set by the Convention			States Parties that have provided details on national demining plans / programmes which are unclear regarding consistency with Article 5 obligations and /or the ten-year deadline set by the Convention			States Parties that have indicated that efforts are underway to establish a national demining plan / programme or to acquire the necessary information to do so			States Parties that have not provided details on national demining plans / programmes		
State Party	Date of entry into force	Article 5 deadline for clearance	State Party	Date of entry into force	Article 5 deadline for clearance	State Party	Date of entry into force	Article 5 deadline for clearance	State Party	Date of entry into force	Article 5 deadline for clearance	State Party	Date of entry into force	Article 5 deadline for clearance
Afghanistan	1-Mar-03	1-Mar-13	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Colombia	1-Mar-01	1-Mar-11	Algeria	1-Apr-02	1-Apr-12	Burundi	1-Apr-04	1-Apr-14
Albania	1-Aug-00	1-Aug-10	Cambodia	1-Jan-00	1-Jan-10	Croatia	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Angola	1-Jan-03	1-Jan-13	Congo	1-Nov-01	1-Nov-11
Chile	1-Mar-02	1-Mar-12	Chad	1-Nov-99	1-Nov-09	Denmark	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Argentina	1-Mar-00	1-Mar-10	DRC	1-Nov-02	1-Nov-12
Cyprus	1-Jul-03	1-Jul-13	Eritrea	1-Feb-02	1-Feb-12	Ecuador	1-Oct-99	1-Oct-09	France	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Greece	1-Mar-04	1-Mar-14
Jordan	1-May-99	1-May-09	Thailand	1-May-99	1-May-09	Ethiopia	1-Jun-05	1-Jun-15	Senegal	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Niger	1-Sep-99	1-Sep-09
Mozambique	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09				Guinea Bissau	1-Nov-01	1-Nov-11	Sudan	1-Apr-04	1-Apr-14	Serbia	1-Mar-04	1-Mar-14
Nicaragua	1-May-99	1-May-09				Malawi	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Swaziland	1-Jun-99	1-Jun-09	Rwanda	1-Dec-00	1-Dec-10
Zambia	1-Aug-01	1-Aug-11				Mauritania	1-Jan-01	1-Jan-11	United Kingdom	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09	Tunisia	1-Jan-00	1-Jan-10
Zimbabwe	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09				Peru	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09				Turkey	1-Mar-04	1-Mar-14
						Tajikistan	1-Apr-00	1-Apr-10				Uganda	1-Aug-99	1-Aug-09
						Yemen	1-Mar-99	1-Mar-09				Vanuatu	1-Mar-06	1-Mar-16
												Venezuela	1-Oct-99	1-Oct-09

<sup>1</sup> States Parties that have provided details on national demining plans / programmes” are defined as those which have provided clarity in Article 7 reports, through the presentation of a national demining plan or through an update to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies on actions they are taking to fulfil Article 5 obligations.

Appendix V

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES REPORTED RETAINED OR TRANSFERRED BY THE  
STATES PARTIES FOR REASONS PERMITTED UNDER ARTICLE 3, AND, A  
SUMMARY OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THESE STATES  
PARTIES

**Table 1. Anti-personnel mines reported retained in accordance with Article 3<sup>1</sup>**

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Afghanistan	1,076	1,887	Afghanistan indicated that, in addition to the 1,076 mines reported in 2005, UNMACA retained 505 more mines from a stockpile destruction in November 2005 and the Monitoring and Evaluation training Agency, a former implementing partner of the MAPA handed over another 306 mines that had been used for training purposes to UNMACA in 2005 after its training programme ceased.
Algeria	15,030	15,030	
Angola	1,390	1,460	
Argentina	1,680	1,596	Argentina reported that mines are retained by the navy for anti-personnel mines destruction training activities, more specifically to train marines engineers in destruction techniques. The development of an annual training programme will lead to the destruction of the 610 remaining mines retained by the navy by 2012. In 2005, 70 mines were used by the navy for training purposes. The army retains mines to develop an unmanned vehicle for the detection and handling of mines and explosives. Development of this vehicle started on 1 March 2004 and is half complete. The vehicle is currently at the stage of assembling. During 2005 no mines were destroyed for this project. Mines are also retained by the Institute of Scientific and Technical Research of the Armed Forces to test charges for the destruction of UXO/mines. In 2005, 14 mines were destroyed in the testing grounds.
Australia	7,395	7,266	Australia reported that stock levels will be regularly reviewed and assessed, that only a realistic training quantity is held, and that stocks in excess of this figure will be destroyed on an ongoing basis. In addition, Australia stated that training is conducted by the School of Military Engineers.
Bangladesh	15,000	14,999	
Belarus	6,030	6,030	

<sup>1</sup> This table contains only those States Parties which have not, in 2006 or previously, reported in accordance with Article 7 zero (0) as the number of anti-personnel mines retained in accordance with Article 3.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Belgium	4,176	3,820	Belgium reported that in 2005, at the Engineering School, 18 mines were used to educate Officers, NCOs and privates as EOD personnel and that 338 mines were used for the training of Engineer Combat Units in demining and mine awareness.
Benin		30	
Bhutan <sup>2</sup>			
Bosnia and Herzegovina <sup>3</sup>	2,755	17,471	
Botswana <sup>4</sup>			
Brazil	16,125	15,038	Brazil reported that retained mines are for training to allow the Brazilian Armed Forces to participate adequately in international demining activities. In addition, it indicated that the Brazilian Army decided to keep these anti-personnel mines for the training of demining teams up to 2019.
Bulgaria	3,676	3,676	<p>Bulgaria informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that so far retained mines had been used for training the engineer scientists participating in missions abroad and to study their destructive effect and develop technologies for PFM detection.</p> <p>The engineer specialists, officers and NSOs of the Bulgarian Armed Forces are trained on issues related to anti-personnel mines identification, demining and anti-personnel mines destruction at the Defence Staff College, the National Military University and at the Engineer Units of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.</p> <p>Training is oriented towards awareness of the tactical and technical features of mines, awareness of and application techniques for demining minefields left after military operations during peacekeeping operations, defusing single mines and anti-personnel mines used as a component of improvised explosive device.</p>
Burundi <sup>5</sup>			

<sup>2</sup> Bhutan has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

<sup>3</sup> In 2005, Bosnia and Herzegovina indicated that 433 of the mines reported under Article 3 were fuse-less and that the total of Article 3 mines was higher than previously reported because the number included the mines kept by demining companies which had not been previously reported.

<sup>4</sup> In its report submitted in 2001, Botswana indicated that a "small quantity" of mines would be retained. No updated information has since been provided.

<sup>5</sup> In its reports submitted in 2005 and 2006, Burundi indicated that the decision concerning mines retained is pending.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Cameroon <sup>6</sup>	3,154		
Canada	1,907	1,857	<p>Canada reported that it retains live anti-personnel mines to study the effect of blast on equipment, to train soldiers on procedures to defuse live anti-personnel mines and to demonstrate the effect of landmines. For example, live mines help determine whether suits, boots and shields will adequately protect personnel who clear mines. The live mines are used by the Defence department's research establishment located at Suffield, Alberta and by various military training establishments across Canada. The Department of National Defence represents the only source of anti-personnel mines which can be used by Canadian industry to test equipment.</p> <p>Canada did not use anti-personnel mines for destructive research and development or testing and evaluation in 2005. Existing stock was used for testing of mine detection equipment, specifically 2 metal detector arrays at the request of end users. Canada is planning to test 2 more metal detector arrays and to use live mines for testing of personal protective equipment in 2006.</p> <p>Canada also reported 135 anti-personnel mines transferred from Afghanistan to train Canadian soldiers with anti-personnel mines they are currently facing in Afghanistan. 50 anti-personnel mines (M14) were destroyed to stay within the 2000 anti-personnel mines limit set by the Minister of National Defence.</p>
Cape Verde <sup>7</sup>			

<sup>6</sup> In its report submitted in 2005, Cameroon reported the same 3,154 mines under Article 4 and Article 3.

<sup>7</sup> Cape Verde has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Chile <sup>8</sup>	5,895	4,574	<p>Chile reported that its retained anti-personnel mines were under the control of the army and the navy. In 2005, training courses in detection, disposal, and destruction of anti-personnel mines were organized for deminers, 25 participated in a first course at the School of Military Engineers of the Army and 10 participated in a second course at the Arica Demining Unit. A humanitarian demining training was carried out for the demining unit of the navy. In 2005, a total of 29 retained mines were destroyed in capacity building activities for 43 deminers.</p> <p>Chile plans to use another 300 mines in 2006 in the course of its training activities. These activities include courses in detection, disposal, and destruction of anti-personnel mines for the Azapa and Punta Arenas Engineering Battalions, a demining course for the Atacama Engineering Battalion.</p>
Colombia	886	886	
Congo	372	372	
Croatia	6400	6,236	<p>Croatia reported that in 2005, during testing and evaluating of demining machines on the test polygon in Cerovec, CROMAC-CTDT Ltd. used and destroyed 164 mines. These mines were used to test the following machines: excavator “MT-01”, working tools – machine “MINE-WOLF”, working tools – machine “M-FV 1200”, machine “M-FV 2500/580”, machine “MVR-01”, machine “MV-10”, excavator “ORKA”. Croatia estimated that 175 anti-personnel mines would be needed in 2006.</p>
Cyprus	1,000	1,000	<p>Cyprus informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that the retained mines were used by the National Guard for the training of conscripts. Training included tracing techniques, reconnaissance, clearance and destruction of anti-personnel mines. After the completion of training all anti-personnel mines were collected and stored in specially designed warehouses. Cyprus indicated that the mines might be used for testing new means and systems for tracing and detecting anti-personnel mines.</p>

<sup>8</sup> In a verbal note dated 29 June 2006, Chile indicated that it had destroyed 1,292 mines previously retained under Article 3, bringing the total number of retained mines down to 4,574.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Czech Republic	4,829	4,829	Although no mines were used for training in 2005 and although there are no specific action plan on how to use the retained mines, the principle is to use them for EOD/engineer units training to detect and destroy anti-personnel mines.
Democratic Republic of the Congo <sup>9</sup>			
Denmark	1,989	60	Denmark reported that tripwires and tripwire device had been removed from Danish Claymore Mines and were replaced by electric detonators. Mines can now only be activated on command. Denmark reported that its retained mines are used as follows: a demonstration of the effects of anti-personnel mines is given to all recruits during training; during training of engineer units for international tasks, instructors in mine awareness are trained to handle anti-personnel mines; and, during training of ammunition clearing units, anti-personnel mines are used for training in ammunition dismantling.
Djibouti	2,996		
Ecuador	2,001	2,001	
El Salvador	96	96	
Equatorial Guinea <sup>10</sup>			
Eritrea <sup>11</sup>	9		
Ethiopia <sup>12</sup>			
France	4,455	4,216	France reported that its retained mines were used to: 1) test mine detection devices, including the "Mine Picker", a mine detection robot developed by Pegase Instrumentation and the MMSR-SYDERA system. 2) to assess the anti-personnel mine threat, 3) to test protective anti-personnel boots, 4) to test mine clearance devices and 5) to test destructive devices, amongst them a radio-controlled exploder aimed at enabling the destruction of unexploded munitions, including mines, in situ or in a blast hole.

<sup>9</sup> In its report submitted in 2006, the Democratic Republic of the Congo indicated that the decision concerning mines retained is pending.

<sup>10</sup> Equatorial Guinea has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

<sup>11</sup> In its report submitted in 2005, Eritrea indicated that the mines retained under Article 3 were inert.

<sup>12</sup> Ethiopia has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Germany	2,496	2,525	Germany informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that since the management of the anti-personnel mines pool started at the Federal Armed Forces (FAF) Technical Centre 91, about 550 retained mines were used primarily for the proof of the protecting measures of vehicles of the FAF and the test and evaluation of Mechanical Assistance Clearance Equipment for the FAF and the International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining community.
Greece	7,224	7,224	
Guinea Bissau <sup>13</sup>		109	Guinea Bissau indicated that the 109 retained anti-personnel mine are retained by the armed forces of Guinea Bissau, 100 of which do not contain detonators or explosive. These mines are retained to train military deminers regarding how mines work and in recognition training.
Guyana <sup>14</sup>			
Honduras <sup>15</sup>		815	Honduras informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that 11 M-4 type mines had been destroyed in training in 2005. Plans for use of retained mines include: training of engineering staff to support demining work in countries affected by mines, and training to deal with the reported presence of mines in Honduras.
Ireland	85	77	
Italy	806	806	
Japan	6,946	5,350	Japan reported that it consumed 1,596 mines during the reporting period for education and training in mine detection and mine clearance, and for the development of mine detectors and mine clearance equipment.
Jordan	1,000	1,000	
Kenya <sup>16</sup>		3,000	
Latvia <sup>17</sup>	21	1,301	
Luxembourg	956	956	
Malawi <sup>18</sup>	21		

<sup>13</sup> In its reports submitted in 2004 and 2005, Guinea Bissau indicated that it would retain a very limited number of AP mines.

<sup>14</sup> Guyana has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

<sup>15</sup> No updated information was provided by Honduras in 2005. In 2004, Honduras reported retaining 826 mines.

<sup>16</sup> No updated information was provided by Kenya in 2005. In 2004, Kenya reported retaining 3,000 mines.

<sup>17</sup> Information provided in 2005 was volunteered in a report submitted by Latvia prior to it acceding to the Convention.

<sup>18</sup> In its reports submitted in 2005, Malawi indicated that mines reported as retained under Article 3 are in fact “dummy” mines.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Mali <sup>19</sup>	600		
Mauritania <sup>20</sup>	728	728	Mauritania informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that of the 728 mines retained, 85 are held in training centres and 643 will be used for training activities as well once the mines held in training centres will have been destroyed.
Moldova <sup>21</sup>	249	0	<p>Moldova informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that since Moldova does not have the capacity to develop mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques, all retained anti-personnel mines were used exclusively to prepare military personnel from the Moldovan Armed Forces' Engineers and Peacekeeping Battalions, as well as from Infantry Battalions. No mines were destroyed during training activities. Training has been conducted by the Engineers Support Department of the Ministry of Defence.</p> <p>In the period 1 January 2005– 31 April 2006, 38 deminers and 600 soldiers have been trained at the "Bulboaca Training Center" of the Ministry of Defense. These 38 deminers were prepared specifically for participation in the peacekeeping and stabilizing missions abroad. Eleven of them were directly engaged last year in demining and clearing activities in Iraq as part of the Stabilization International Forces. In July, 2006, another 9 deminers will be deployed in Iraq for the same purposes.</p> <p>Provided that in the immediate future non-conventional training (like anti-personnel mine simulators and other relevant computer programmes) will be used instead of the conventional one, the Moldovan Government has decided very recently to destroy in 2006 all retained landmines.</p>
Mozambique	1,470	1,319	
Namibia	6,151	3,899	

<sup>19</sup> Although the number reported in the Final Report of the First Review Conference for 2004 was 900, it included 300 anti-tank mines. Hence, the actual number of anti-personnel mines retained by Mali is 600.

<sup>20</sup> In its reports submitted in 2005 and 2006, the mines reported by Mauritania under Article 3 were also reported under Article 4.

<sup>21</sup> On 4 September 2006, Moldova indicated that between 19 May and 8 June 2006 it destroyed its 249 remaining antipersonnel mines previously retained under Article 3.



State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Netherlands	3,176	2,878	The Netherlands informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that the training programmes for which the retained mines are used consist of instructing all military personnel in mine awareness, how to act in a mined area and what to do to safely get out. This training forms part of the basis of every military instruction in the Netherlands, and are intensified prior to all troop deployments. Annually around 7,000 military receive the initial training on awareness. Moreover 450 military engineers are being trained annually to defuse or destruct anti-personnel mines, and to clear mined minefields and other mined areas. In addition, the Netherlands indicated that it retains mines for technical development. The research conducted is aimed at the development of new and improved detection and clearance technologies, as well as simulation mines. The Netherlands does not have yet such simulation mines at its disposal, but plans to replace part of the currently retained mines by simulations when possible.
Nicaragua	1,040	1,021	Nicaragua reported that a total of 19 mines were destroyed in training during the reporting period. 5 PPMI-SR11 mines were destroyed in November 2005 during a humanitarian demining training course. In addition, 14 PMN mines were deactivated, their explosive parts being removed (charge and detonator), with the aim of using them for retraining and verification of detectors used in the front lines of operations. These mines can be considered destroyed or unusable, since the removed parts were destroyed and can no longer be restored in their technical capacity to function as anti-personnel mines.
Niger	146	146	
Peru	4,024	4,012	
Portugal	1,115	1,115	
Romania	2,500	2,500	
Rwanda <sup>22</sup>	101	101	
Sao Tome and Principe <sup>23</sup>			
Serbia	5,000		
Slovakia	1,427	1,427	

<sup>22</sup> Rwanda has indicated that the 101 mines declared under Article 3 had been uprooted from minefields to be retained for training purposes.

<sup>23</sup> Sao Tome has not yet submitted a transparency report in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Slovenia	2,994	2,993	One (1) mine was destroyed during the reporting period by the 14 <sup>th</sup> Engineering Battalion of SAF for educational reasons.
South Africa	4,388	4,433	South Africa reported that of the 4 323 anti-personnel mines retained by Defence-Tek, 6 were used for development and training techniques during 2005. Another 116 anti-personnel mines are kept by the South African Police Service (SAPS) Explosive Unit, Head of Bomb Disposal and Research. The SAPS has indicated that all POMZ 2M mines are empty, with the exception of the Shrapnel No 2, PRB series and the J-69 have been deactivated. Shrapnel No 2 anti-personnel mines are command wires initiation only. 3 anti-personnel mines were used for training by the SAPS and one was rendered safe for training purposes. South Africa reported additional mines retained to be used in accordance with Article 3 as a result of the completion of criminal investigations.
Spain	2,712	2,712	Spain reported that from the 4,000 anti-personnel mines retained in accordance with Article 3, 1,288 anti-personnel mines were used for research and training in demining techniques at the International Training Centre for Demining.
Sudan <sup>24</sup>	5,000	10,000	
Suriname	150	150	
Sweden	14,798	14,402	Sweden reported that in 2005, 56 Truppmina 10 type mines, 328 mines without fuses and 331 Truppmina type 49 B mines, were used for the training of personnel.
Tajikistan	255	225	In 2005, Tajikistan destroyed 30 mines during mine clearance training and demolitions training for survey teams and manual clearance teams. The mines destroyed included 10 PMN, 10 POMZ 2 and 10 OMZ - 72. More mines will be destroyed in 2006 to train 150 staff of the national mine action programme and 12 mine detecting dogs.
Thailand	4,970	4,761	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia <sup>25</sup>	4,000	0	

<sup>24</sup> In its report submitted in 2006 Sudan reported for the first time both the anti-personnel mines retained by the Government of National Unity (5,000) and by the Government of Southern Sudan (5,000).

<sup>25</sup> The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia indicated that on 10 July 2006, it destroyed its 4,000 mines previously retained under Article 3.

State Party	Mines reported retained		Additional information volunteered by the State Party
	2005	2006	
Togo <sup>26</sup>			
Tunisia	5,000	5,000	
Turkey	16,000	15,150	
Uganda	1,764		Uganda informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that retained mines had been used for mine detection, clearance and destruction training and to provide refresher training to army engineers conducting EOD response operations. In addition a 3-week pre-deployment training for humanitarian mine detection, clearance and EOD was given to 20 army engineers seconded to the Office of the Prime Minister/Mine Action Centre.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1,937	1,795	
United Republic of Tanzania	1,146	1,146	<p>The United Republic of Tanzania informed the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that 369 anti-personnel mines are retained to train troops and 777 are for the APOPO project. This project trains sniffer rats to detect explosives. It has about 250 mine detection rats (MDR) bred and trained by 77 staff and produced 18 MDR teams currently carrying out operations in Mozambique.</p> <p>The APOPO Project has used 44 of the 777 retained, so the United Republic of Tanzania currently retains 1,102 anti-personnel mines. Since the Great Lake Region countries have committed to utilise MDR in their humanitarian demining efforts, the Tanzanian Government plans to increase the number of trained MDR to respond to the demand from these countries.</p>
Uruguay <sup>27</sup>			
Venezuela	4,960	4,960	
Yemen	4,000	4,000	
Zambia	3,346	3,346	
Zimbabwe	700		Zimbabwe reported that retained mines will be used during training of Zimbabwe's troops and deminers in order to enable them to identify and learn how to detect, handle, neutralise and destroy the mines in Zimbabwean minefields.

<sup>26</sup> No updated information was provided by Togo in 2005. In 2004, Togo reported retaining 436 mines.

<sup>27</sup> No updated information was provided by Uruguay in 2005. In 2004, Uruguay reported retaining 500 mines.

**Table 2. Anti-personnel mines reported transferred in accordance with Article 3<sup>a</sup>**

<b>State</b>	<b>Mines reported transferred</b>	<b>Additional information</b>
Canada	135	Transferred from Afghanistan for training and development.
Italy	8	No transfer outside of Italian territory. These 8 mines have been transferred to the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in ISPRA (Italy).
Mozambique	151	151 Mines belonging to PAD have been destroyed, as the Accelerated Demining Programme ended in June 2005.
Nicaragua	60	46 mines transferred by the Army to UTC to train mine detecting dogs and 14 inert mines transferred to the Engineering Corps to calibrate mine detectors and train demining units.
Tajikistan	80	Transferred from the storage facilities of the Force Structures of the Republic of Tajikistan to the engineer units of the Ministry of Defence in December 2005. These mines were revealed and eliminated by the Force Structures as a result of fight against crime.

<sup>a</sup> This table includes only those States Parties that reported mines transferred in accordance with Article 3 since the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties.

Appendix VI

## THE STATUS OF LEGAL MEASURES TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE TO ARTICLE 9

States Parties which have reported that they have fulfilled Article 9 legislative requirements			States Parties which have not yet reported having either adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 legislation or that existing laws are sufficient		
<i>A. States Parties which have reported that they have adopted legislation in the context of Article 9 obligations</i>					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Albania</li> <li>▪ Australia</li> <li>▪ Austria</li> <li>▪ Belarus</li> <li>▪ Belgium</li> <li>▪ Belize</li> <li>▪ Bosnia and Herzegovina</li> <li>▪ Brazil</li> <li>▪ Burkina Faso</li> <li>▪ Cambodia</li> <li>▪ Canada</li> <li>▪ Chad</li> <li>▪ Colombia</li> <li>▪ Costa Rica</li> <li>▪ Croatia</li> <li>▪ Czech Republic</li> <li>▪ El Salvador</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Estonia</li> <li>▪ France</li> <li>▪ Germany</li> <li>▪ Guatemala</li> <li>▪ Honduras</li> <li>▪ Hungary</li> <li>▪ Iceland</li> <li>▪ Italy</li> <li>▪ Japan</li> <li>▪ Liechtenstein</li> <li>▪ Luxembourg</li> <li>▪ Malaysia</li> <li>▪ Mali</li> <li>▪ Malta</li> <li>▪ Mauritius</li> <li>▪ Monaco</li> <li>▪ New Zealand</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Nicaragua</li> <li>▪ Niger</li> <li>▪ Norway</li> <li>▪ Peru</li> <li>▪ Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</li> <li>▪ Senegal</li> <li>▪ Seychelles</li> <li>▪ South Africa</li> <li>▪ Spain</li> <li>▪ Sweden</li> <li>▪ Switzerland</li> <li>▪ Trinidad and Tobago</li> <li>▪ Turkey</li> <li>▪ United Kingdom</li> <li>▪ Yemen</li> <li>▪ Zambia</li> <li>▪ Zimbabwe</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Afghanistan</li> <li>▪ Angola</li> <li>▪ Antigua and Barbuda</li> <li>▪ Argentina<sup>1</sup></li> <li>▪ Bahamas</li> <li>▪ Bangladesh</li> <li>▪ Barbados</li> <li>▪ Benin</li> <li>▪ Bhutan</li> <li>▪ Bolivia</li> <li>▪ Botswana</li> <li>▪ Brunei Darussalam</li> <li>▪ Burundi</li> <li>▪ Cameroon</li> <li>▪ Cape Verde</li> <li>▪ Chile</li> <li>▪ Comoros</li> <li>▪ Congo</li> <li>▪ Cook Islands</li> <li>▪ Côte d'Ivoire</li> <li>▪ Cyprus</li> <li>▪ Democratic Rep. of the Congo</li> <li>▪ Djibouti</li> <li>▪ Dominica</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Dominican Rep.</li> <li>▪ Ecuador</li> <li>▪ Equatorial Guinea</li> <li>▪ Eritrea</li> <li>▪ Ethiopia</li> <li>▪ Fiji</li> <li>▪ Gabon</li> <li>▪ Gambia</li> <li>▪ Ghana</li> <li>▪ Grenada</li> <li>▪ Guinea</li> <li>▪ Guyana</li> <li>▪ Haiti</li> <li>▪ Jamaica</li> <li>▪ Kenya</li> <li>▪ Latvia</li> <li>▪ Liberia</li> <li>▪ Madagascar</li> <li>▪ Malawi</li> <li>▪ Maldives</li> <li>▪ Mauritania</li> <li>▪ Mozambique</li> <li>▪ Namibia</li> <li>▪ Nauru</li> <li>▪ Nigeria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Niue</li> <li>▪ Panama</li> <li>▪ Paraguay</li> <li>▪ Philippines</li> <li>▪ Qatar</li> <li>▪ Rwanda</li> <li>▪ Saint Kitts and Nevis</li> <li>▪ Saint Lucia</li> <li>▪ San Marino</li> <li>▪ Sao Tome and Principe</li> <li>▪ Serbia</li> <li>▪ Sierra Leone</li> <li>▪ Solomon Islands</li> <li>▪ Sudan</li> <li>▪ Suriname</li> <li>▪ Swaziland</li> <li>▪ Thailand</li> <li>▪ Timor-Leste</li> <li>▪ Togo</li> <li>▪ Turkmenistan</li> <li>▪ Uganda</li> <li>▪ Ukraine</li> <li>▪ Uruguay</li> <li>▪ Vanuatu</li> <li>▪ Venezuela</li> </ul>
<i>B. States Parties which have reported that they consider existing laws to be sufficient in the context of Article 9 obligation</i>					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Algeria</li> <li>▪ Andorra</li> <li>▪ Bulgaria</li> <li>▪ Central African Republic</li> <li>▪ Denmark</li> <li>▪ Greece</li> <li>▪ Guinea Bissau</li> <li>▪ Holy See</li> <li>▪ Ireland</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Jordan</li> <li>▪ Kiribati</li> <li>▪ Lesotho</li> <li>▪ Lithuania</li> <li>▪ Macedonia, FYR of</li> <li>▪ Mexico</li> <li>▪ Moldova</li> <li>▪ Netherlands</li> <li>▪ Papua New Guinea</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Portugal</li> <li>▪ Romania</li> <li>▪ Samoa</li> <li>▪ Slovakia</li> <li>▪ Slovenia</li> <li>▪ Tajikistan</li> <li>▪ Tanzania</li> <li>▪ Tunisia</li> </ul>			

<sup>1</sup> Argentina indicated that administrative measures were taken by the Government to address the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines, in particular within its armed forces, by a change in the military ordinance and doctrine. Additionally, Argentina indicated on 4 September 2006 that the National Commission on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law will present a new draft law that will complete the existing legislation with regards to penal sanctions.

Annex I

AGENDA OF THE SEVENTH MEETING

(As adopted at its first plenary meeting on 18 September 2006)

1. Official opening of the Meeting.
2. Election of the President.
3. Brief messages delivered by or on behalf of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Jody Williams, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the President of the Council of the Foundation of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the Secretary General of the United Nations.
4. Adoption of the agenda.
5. Adoption of the Rules of Procedure.
6. Adoption of the budget.
7. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Meeting and of other officers.
8. Confirmation of the Secretary-General of the Meeting.
9. Organization of work.
10. General exchange of views.
11. Consideration of the general status and operation of the Convention:
  - (a) Clearing mined areas;
  - (b) Assisting the victims;
  - (c) Destroying stockpiled anti-personnel mines;
  - (d) Universalizing the Convention;
  - (e) Other matters essential for achieving the Convention's aims:
    - (i) Cooperation and assistance;
    - (ii) Transparency and the exchange of information;
    - (iii) Preventing and suppressing prohibited activities and facilitating compliance;
    - (iv) Implementation Support.
12. Informal discussions on matters concerning the implementation of Article 5.
13. Consideration of matters arising from / in the context of reports submitted under Article 7.
14. Consideration of requests submitted under Article 5.

15. Consideration of requests submitted under Article 8.
16. Date, duration and location of the next Meeting of the States Parties.
17. Any other business.
18. Consideration and adoption of the final document.
19. Closure of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties.

Annex IITOWARDS THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF  
ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

1. States Parties have consistently reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling the mine clearance obligations under Article 5 at the first Review Conference. In particular, they committed to 'strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 5, paragraphs 3 to 6 of the Convention' (*Nairobi Action Plan* Action #27 refers).

2. Nevertheless, the Convention allows States Parties to seek an extension to their mine destruction deadline if they are unable to meet it (Article 5, paragraph 3). There are 45 States Parties for which mine clearance deadlines fall due from 2009. And despite their best of efforts to meet their deadlines, it is possible that some will seek extensions.

3. States Parties have highlighted the need to ensure an effective and efficient process for handling these requests. The process should operate cooperatively and transparently, in the spirit of the Convention. It must contribute to realising the full implementation of the Convention.

4. The first Article 5 deadlines fall due before the likely date of the 2009 Review Conference. So decisions on extensions may need to be taken at the Meeting of the States Parties (MSP) in 2008 should any State Party with a 2009 deadline request one. States Party requesting extensions will need to begin work on requests even earlier to satisfy the obligations under Article 5. Accordingly, there is a need to clarify, and decide as appropriate, key elements of an extensions process at the Seventh MSP. Such action, which would not extend, alter or add to obligations under the Convention, will ensure the system is operational by the 2008 MSP.

5. As States Parties have noted, work on an extensions process should not be seen as an alternative to fulfilling Article 5 obligations. Rather, development of a process is a pragmatic acknowledgment that some States Parties, despite their best efforts, will require an extension and States Parties must be in a position to respond to that request in a timely manner. It is in the interests of all mine-affected populations, States Parties and our Convention that efforts to fulfill Article 5 mine clearance obligations continue. Further, extensions are not an automatic right. They will only be granted on the basis of an informed decision by States Parties.

*Extension request content and format*

6. The Convention lays down some clear guidelines on the content of extension requests in Article 5, paragraph 4:



“4. Each request shall contain:

- a) The duration of the proposed extension;
- b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
  - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
  - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
  - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
- c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
- d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.”

7. States Parties are strongly encouraged to illustrate how the extension period will contribute to the meeting of Article 5 obligations. To this end, States Parties are strongly encouraged to provide information on their national demining plan, including resource needs, for the extension period. Additionally, concerned States Parties agreed to provide information relating to resources they themselves have contributed to fulfil their Article 5 obligations. (*Nairobi Action Plan* Action #22 refers).

8. It is the responsibility of the requesting State Party to provide all information relevant to their request, drawing on assistance as necessary. States Parties should, as necessary, seek assistance from the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in the preparation of their requests. States Parties in a position to do so should assist states requesting an extension to fulfill their Article 5 obligations in accordance with Article 6-4 of the Convention (*Nairobi Action Plan* Action #44 is also relevant in this regard). International and non-government organizations are strongly encouraged to provide assistance where they are in a position to do so.

9. The President’s consultations revealed strong support for elaboration of a common template for extension requests to assist States Parties seeking an extension to fulfill the information requirements of Article 5, paragraph 4. This would be in line with the precedent of States Parties’ decision to adopt a common template to better facilitate provision of information as required by Article 7. The President expresses appreciation for Canada’s work to elaborate a template.

**It is proposed that the 7MSP:**

- (i) **Consider a voluntary template to facilitate extension requests; and**
- (ii) **strongly encourage States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions to append their national demining plans to their extension requests.**

*Submission of extension requests*

10. According to Article 5, paragraph 3 of the Convention, States Parties “may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference...”. In reality, this timing provides little scope for States Parties to fulfill their obligation to assess requests in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 5. Depending on the number of requests in any one year, States Parties may need to consider concurrently more than one request at a MSP or Review Conference. Timely submission of requests would ease this assessment burden by ensuring all issues were clarified before such a meeting. And it would better ensure other vital issues received due attention at the MSP or Review Conference.

11. States Parties may also need time to identify and clarify issues relating to the request, including a requesting States Party’s resource needs. In turn, a requesting State Party may use this work to revise its request before States Parties vote on it. Such work would be undertaken in the cooperative spirit of the Convention. It would provide States Parties a better basis for making informed decisions. And it should help ensure requesting States Parties have in place clear strategies for meeting their goals during an extension period.

**It is proposed that the 7MSP:**

**Encourage States Parties seeking Article 5 extensions to submit their request to the President no fewer than nine months before the Meeting of the States Parties or Review Conference at which the decision on the request would need to be taken.**

*Reviewing and assessing extension requests*

12. In accordance with Article 5, paragraph 5, the MSP or Review Conference shall assess extension requests. States Parties need to determine whether the period of extension being sought is appropriate. In doing so, Article 5, paragraph 5 states that States Parties shall take “into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4 (of Article 5)...”. In carrying out this obligation, the States Parties may benefit from a review of the requests. Moreover, a review of a request provides an opportunity for a requesting State Party to clarify aspects of its request, including identifying resource requirements.

**It is proposed that the 7MSP agree that:**

- (i) The President, upon receipt of an extension request, should inform the States Parties of its lodgment and make it openly available, in keeping with the Convention practice of transparency;**
- (ii) the President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees, jointly prepare a review of the request indicating, *inter alia*: Clarifications of facts sought and received from the requesting State; demining plans for the extension period; resource and assistance needs and gaps;**
- (iii) in preparing the review, the President and the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees and the requesting States Party should cooperate fully to clarify issues and identify needs;**
- (iv) in preparing the review, the President, Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs should draw on expert mine clearance, legal and diplomatic advice, using the ISU to acquire necessary expertise and to otherwise provide support;**
- (v) the President, acting on behalf of the Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs, should submit the review to the States Parties well before the MSP or Review Conference preceding the requesting State's deadline.**

*Deciding an extension request*

13. The States Parties, having assessed an extension request shall “decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period”, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 5. This process for receiving, assessing and deciding extension requests should apply to consideration of requests submitted in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 6.

*Costs*

14. To the extent that this process for the review, assessment and deciding of extension requests imposes additional costs on the ISU, these shall be met through voluntary contributions from States Parties. In this regard, States Parties should recall their commitment to provide funding for mine action in accordance with *Nairobi Action Plan* #45.

**It is proposed that the 7MSP:**

**Encourage all States Parties in a position to do so to provide additional, ear-marked funds to the ISU Trust Fund to cover costs related to supporting the Article 5 extensions process.**

*Declaration of completion of Article 5 obligations*

15. Statements by States Parties that they have successfully completed their Article 5 obligations are a key measure of the success of Article 5. Statements made to date vary in form, content and place of submission. An increasing variety of statements of completion could promote uncertainty over fulfillment of this central Convention obligation. A basic standard for declarations of completion of Article 5 obligations could provide greater clarity and certainty to all States Parties that the objectives of Article 5, namely the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in identified mined areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control, have been met. The States Parties are encouraged to use the draft declaration prepared by Guatemala and the ICRC as the basis of their consideration of a standard declaration at the 7MSP.

**It is proposed that the 7MSP:**

**Adopt a standard declaration as a voluntary means to report completion of Article 5 obligations.**

Annex III

PROPOSED TEMPLATE FOR ASSISTING STATES PARTIES IN REQUESTING  
AN EXTENSION UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION

STATE \_\_\_\_\_  
PARTY:

POINT OF \_\_\_\_\_  
CONTACT: (Name, organization, telephone, fax, email)

**Background**

Article 5.1 requires each State Party “to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.” Related to this paragraph is the provision in Article 5.3 which states that “if a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to 10 years.” Article 5.4 proceeds to indicate what each request shall contain. The following template has been prepared to assist States Parties for use on a voluntary basis in providing pertinent information in its request for an extension of its deadline.

**Form A: The duration of the proposed extension**

Article 5.4 (a) states that each request shall contain ... the duration of the proposed extension.

<b>Date of entry into force</b>	
<b>Date ten years after entry into force</b>	
<b>Proposed end date of extension period*</b>	

\* The proposed end date should be the minimum required but must not be more than ten years after the date indicated in the second row.

**Please attach the national demining plan for the period of the extension sought, including details on how the progress estimated in Table D.1 is expected to be achieved. This should include details on the institutions/agencies responsible for preparing, endorsing and implementing the national demining plan, the assets that will be deployed, the costs of these assets and annual measures of progress**

**Form B: A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension****(i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes**

Article 5.4 (b) (i) states that each request shall contain a detailed explanation for the proposed extension, including the preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programmes.

*Table B.1. Preparation of work conducted under national demining programmes  
Identification of areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in  
which anti-personnel mines were/are known to be emplaced*

Note: States Parties, particularly those with a large number of mined areas, may wish to append the detailed information called for in Tables B.1 to B.4 in another form as an annex to the extension request. States Parties may wish to append a map displaying mined areas.

Name of area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were/are known to be emplaced <sup>1</sup>	Means used to identify and record this area as an area in which anti-personnel mines were known to be emplaced <sup>2</sup>	Date area identified as an area in which anti-personnel mines were known to be emplaced	Location of area <sup>3</sup>	Total area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines <u>were/are</u> known to be emplaced <sup>4</sup>
				Total:

<sup>1</sup> A new row should be added for each area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were/are known to be emplaced.

<sup>2</sup> Means may include, for example, general surveys, Landmine Impact Surveys, technical surveys, the use of existing maps, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Geographic coordinates, if known, should be indicated.

<sup>4</sup> This could be presented, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc.

*Table B.2. Status of work conducted to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were known to be emplaced*

Note: States Parties, particularly those with a large number of mined areas, may wish to append the detailed information called for in Tables B.1 to B.4 in another form as an annex to the extension request. States Parties may wish to append a map displaying mined areas.

Name of area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were/are known to be emplaced <sup>5</sup>	Total area in which the State Party destroyed or ensured the destruction of all anti-personnel mines contained within <sup>6</sup>	Means used to destroy or ensure the destruction of all emplaced anti-personnel mines, and to assure quality <sup>7</sup>	Number of anti-personnel mines destroyed	Number of other explosive ordnance destroyed <sup>8</sup>
	Total:		Total:	Total:

<sup>5</sup> A row should be included for each area listed in Table B.1.

<sup>6</sup> This could be denominated, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc. The same type of denomination should be used as in Table B.2.

<sup>7</sup> This may include a description of the standards used in demining a particular area and the steps taken to ensure quality.

<sup>8</sup> While it is clear that the Convention applies only to anti-personnel mines, States Parties may wish to report on other ordnance found and destroyed as part of a national demining effort.

*Table B.3. Remaining work to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known to be emplaced*

Note: States Parties, particularly those with a large number of mined areas, may wish to append the detailed information called for in Tables B.1 to B.4 in another form as an annex to the extension request. States Parties may wish to append a map displaying mined areas.

Name of area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were/are known to be emplaced <sup>9</sup>	Area in which the State Party must still destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines contained within <sup>10</sup>	Area in which anti-personnel mines are still known be emplaced which <u>have been</u> perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians	Area in which anti-personnel mines are still known be emplaced which <u>have not been</u> perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians	Estimated date for destroying or ensuring the destruction of all anti-personnel mines contained within this area
	Total	Total	Total	

Remarks:

<sup>9</sup> A row should be included for each area listed in Table B.1 in which all anti-personnel mines have not yet been destroyed.

<sup>10</sup> This could be denominated, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc. The same type of denomination should be used as in previous tables.



*Table B.4. Areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced*

Note: States Parties, particularly those with a large number of areas in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced, may wish to append the detailed information called for in Tables B.1 to B.4 in another form as an annex to the extension request. States Parties may wish to append a map displaying mined areas.

Name of area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced <sup>11</sup>	Estimated size of the area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced <sup>12</sup>	Basis for the suspicion that the area may contain anti-personnel mines	Area in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced which <u>have been</u> perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians <sup>13</sup>	Estimated area in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced which <u>have not been</u> perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians <sup>14</sup>	Estimated date for determining whether mined areas indeed exist in the area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced
	Total:		Total:	Total:	

<sup>11</sup> A row should be included for each area under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are suspected to be emplaced.

<sup>12</sup> This could be denominated, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc.

<sup>13</sup> This could be denominated, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc.

<sup>14</sup> This could be denominated, for example, in square metres, hectares, etc.

*Table B.5. National planning structure*

Type of planning structure	Date of establishment	Ministry responsible	Number of staff	Responsibility for prioritization of mine action tasking (Y/N)

**(ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines**

Article 5.4 (b) (ii) states that each request shall contain a detailed explanation for the proposed extension, including the financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines (in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control).

*Table B.6.1. Financial means made available since entry into force to conduct work under national demining programmes*

Year: <sup>15</sup>										
Financial resources made available by the State Party										
Financial resources made available by actors other than the State Party										
Totals:										
Remarks:										

<sup>15</sup> A column should be included for each year beginning with the year when the Convention entered into force for the State Party until the present year.

*Table B.6.2. Financial resources required and/or available to conduct work under national demining programmes during the period covered by the extension request*

Year: <sup>16</sup>										
Financial resources committed by the State Party										
Financial resources committed by actors other than the State Party										
Totals:										
Remarks:										

*Table B.6.3. National mine clearance expertise employed in the demining programme of the State Party for the destruction of all anti-personnel mines since entry into force*

Name of mine clearance organization	Type of mine clearance organization <sup>17</sup>	Numbers of organizations	Numbers of demining teams	Status of teams (operational, non-operational)	Supplementary information
		Total:	Total:		
Remarks:					

<sup>16</sup> A column should be included for each year beginning with the first year when extension would be in effect until the last year when the extension would be in effect.

<sup>17</sup> e.g. civilian, military, non-for profit, commercial, etc.

*Table B.6.4. National mine clearance expertise expected to be employed in the demining programme during the period covered by the extension request*

Name of mine clearance organization	Type of mine clearance organization <sup>18</sup>	Numbers of organizations	Numbers of demining teams	Status of teams (operational, non-operational)	Supplementary information
		Total:	Total:		

Remarks:

*Table B.6.5. National explosive ordnance disposal expertise employed in the demining programme since entry into force<sup>19</sup>.*

Name of organization	Type of organization <sup>20</sup>	Numbers of organizations	Numbers of EOD teams	Status of teams (operational, non-operational)	Supplementary information
		Total:	Total:		

Remarks:

<sup>18</sup> e.g. civilian, military, non-for profit, commercial, etc.

<sup>19</sup> While it is clear that the Convention applies only to anti-personnel mines, the use and availability of explosive ordnance disposal expertise is relevant as it provides considerable additional demining capacity when employed in that role.

<sup>20</sup> e.g. civilian, military, non-for profit, commercial, etc.

*Table B.6.6. National explosive ordnance disposal expertise expected to be employed in the demining programme during the period covered by the extension request<sup>21</sup>*

Name of organization	Type of organization <sup>22</sup>	Numbers of organizations	Numbers of EOD teams	Status of teams (operational, non-operational)	Supplementary information
		Total:	Total:		

Remarks:

*Table B.6.7. International personnel with explosive ordnance disposal expertise engaged to conduct work under national demining programmes during the period covered by the extension request<sup>23</sup>*

Name of organization	Type of organization <sup>24</sup>	Numbers of organizations	Numbers of EOD teams	Status of teams (operational, non-operational)	Supplementary information
		Total:	Total:		

Remarks:

<sup>21</sup> See footnote 20.

<sup>22</sup> e.g. civilian, military, non-for profit, commercial, etc.

<sup>23</sup> See footnote 20.

<sup>24</sup> e.g. civilian, military, non-for profit, commercial, etc.

*Table B.7. Mine clearance equipment in the inventory to support work under national demining programmes during the period covered by the extension request*

Date of acquisition	Organization responsible for inventory	Detector type held	Total number of detectors	Percentage serviceable	Supplementary information	
			Total:	Total:		
Date of acquisition	Organization responsible for inventory	Personal protective equipment type held	Personal protective equipment sets	Percentage serviceable	Supplementary information	
			Total:	Total:		
Date of acquisition	Organization responsible for inventory	Mechanical equipment type held	Numbers of equipment held	Percentage serviceable	Number of operators	Supplementary information
			Total:	Total:	Total:	
Date of acquisition	Organization responsible for inventory	Number of dog teams operational	Number of dogs teams in training	Dog age profile	Supplementary information	
		Total:	Total:			
Remarks:						

Article 5.4 (b) (iii) states that each request shall contain a detailed explanation for the proposed extension, including circumstances which may impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas.

Table B.8. Impeding circumstances

*These may include: the original scope of the challenge; lack of control over areas under the State Party's jurisdiction; environmental factors, climatic factors; geographic factors; unusual technical challenges; degree of financial resources made available by the State Party; degree of financial resources made available by actors other than the State Party in response to appeals made by the State Party; timely establishment of national demining programmes.*

[illegible]



**Form C: The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the proposed extension**

Article 5.4 (c) states that each request shall contain the humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the proposed extension.

*Table C.1. Humanitarian implications – victims*

*These may include: number of individuals injured or killed by anti-personnel mines.*

Year <sup>1</sup> :										
Civilians injured										
Civilians killed										
Military injured										
Military killed										
Total										

*Table C.2. Humanitarian implications – refugees and internally displaced persons*

*These may include: the estimated number of refugees and internally displaced persons whose return is impeded by the existence of areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or are suspected to be emplaced.*

Refugees	Internally displaced persons	Total

Remarks:

<sup>1</sup> A column should be included for each year beginning with the year when the Convention entered into force for the State Party until the present year.

*Table C.3. Social and economic implications*

*These may include: estimated number of people and communities currently affected; estimated economic cost associated with loss of productive land; impact on national development goals.*

Implication	Estimate	Basis for this estimate	Supplementary information

Remarks:
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*Table C.4. Environmental implications*

Mined Area	Implication	Supplementary information

**Form D: Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension**

Article 5.4 (d) states that each request shall contain any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

*This may include: a year-by-year plan of the suspected mined area which will be released through technical survey and demining; a year-by-year plan of the mined areas and suspected mined areas which will be perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilian until anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed; a year-by-year plan of the productive land to be released; estimated economic benefit associated with the release of productive land; estimated number of communities that will still be affected by areas.*

*Table D.1. Progress expected during the period covered by the proposed extension*

Year <sup>1</sup>										

*Table D.2. Projected resource requirements during the period covered by the proposed extension*

Year										
Total projected financial requirements										
Financial commitment of the State Party										
Requirements for resources from international financial institutions										
Requirements for financial resources from other external actors										

Article 6.1 states “In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.” Article 6.4 states “Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities.

<sup>1</sup> Include a column for every year covered by the proposed extension.

Annex IVPROPOSED VOLUNTARY DECLARATION OF COMPLETION OF ARTICLE 5  
OBLIGATIONS**Background**

1. Statements by States Parties that they have successfully completed their Article 5 obligations are a key measure of the success of Article 5. Statements made to date vary in form, content and place of submission. An increasing variety of statements of completion could promote uncertainty over fulfillment of this central Convention obligation. A basic standard for declarations of completion of Article 5 obligations could provide greater clarity and certainty to all States Parties that the objectives of Article 5, namely the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in identified mined areas under the State Party's jurisdiction or control, have been met.

2. Language for declaring completion has been elaborated by Guatemala and the ICRC. It is proposed that the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties adopt this standard declaration as a voluntary means for States Parties to report completion of Article 5 obligations.

**Proposed voluntary declaration of completion**

*State declares that it has destroyed ensured the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines were known or suspected to be emplaced, in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention. State declares that it completed this obligation on date.*

In the event that previously unknown mined areas are discovered after this date, State will:

- (i) report such mined areas in accordance with its obligations under Article 7 and may voluntarily share such information through any other informal means such as the Intersessional Work Programme, including the Standing Committee meetings;
- (ii) ensure the effective exclusion of civilians in accordance with Article 5; and
- (iii) destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in these mined areas as a matter of urgent priority, making its needs for assistance known to other States Parties, as appropriate.

## Annex V

### REPORT ON THE FUNCTIONING OF THE IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT DECEMBER 2005-SEPTEMBER 2006

#### BACKGROUND

1. At the Third Meeting of the States Parties (3MSP) in September 2001, the States Parties endorsed the President's Paper on the Establishment of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) and mandated the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to establish the ISU. The 3MSP also encouraged States Parties in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions in support of the ISU. In addition, the States Parties mandated the President of the 3MSP, in consultation with the Coordinating Committee, to finalise an agreement between the States Parties and the GICHD on the functioning of the ISU. The GICHD's Foundation Council accepted this mandate on 28 September 2001.

2. An agreement on the functioning of the ISU was finalised between the States Parties and the GICHD on 7 November 2001. This agreement indicates i.a. that the Director of the GICHD shall submit a written report on the functioning of the ISU to the States Parties and that this report shall cover the period between two Meetings of the States Parties. This report has been prepared to cover the period between the Sixth Meeting of the States Parties (6MSP) and the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties (7MSP).

#### ACTIVITIES

3. The Nairobi Action Plan, adopted by the States Parties at the First Review Conference on 3 December 2004, complemented by the Zagreb Progress Report, continued to provide the ISU with clear and comprehensive direction regarding the States Parties' priorities. Following the 6MSP, the ISU provided the President, the Co-Chairs, the Contact Group Coordinators and the Coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme with thematic food-for-thought to assist them in their pursuit of the priorities identified by the 6MSP. This helped enable the Coordinating Committee to hold a successful day-long retreat on 30 January 2006 at which time the general framework for intersessional work in 2006 was elaborated.

4. The ISU provided ongoing support to the President, the Co-Chairs, the Contact Group Coordinators and the Coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme in the achievement of the objectives they set for 2006. This involved the provision of advice and support, assisting with preparations for and follow-up from the May 2006 meetings of the Standing Committees, and making recommendations to the Sponsorship Programme's Donors' Group on drawing a closer link between administering sponsorship (enabling attendance) and supporting effective substantive contributions (enabling participation).

5. Certain Co-Chairs and Contact Group Coordinators again launched ambitious initiatives and the ISU responded accordingly. This was particularly the case with respect to the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance who sought to build upon the efforts of their predecessors by assisting the 24 most relevant States Parties in inter-ministerial efforts to enhance victim assistance objective setting and planning. Through project funding provided by Switzerland, the ISU established the temporary position of *victim assistance specialist* in order to provide process support to these 24 States Parties.

6. In 2006, victim assistance *process support* involved one-on-one meetings with officials from relevant ministries to raise awareness of the matter and to stimulate inter-ministerial coordination, outreach to relevant international and other organizations, and, inter-ministerial workshops to bring together all relevant actors to discuss and consolidate improvements on objectives and the development of plans. In 2006, the ISU undertook *process support* visits to Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Tajikistan and Yemen, and, provided some form of advice to all 24 relevant States Parties.

7. The ISU's mandate states in part that the rationale for the unit is based on the support provided by the ISU being "critical to ensure that all States Parties could continue to have direct responsibility and involvement in the management and direction of the implementation process." On this basis, the ISU continually examines how it can support implementation and participation needs of States Parties that have special needs. In 2006, one group of States Parties with special needs which was identified was small States. Many of these States Parties face unique implementation challenges related to their size and limited resources as well as challenges in ensuring a practical level of participation in the overall operations of the Convention. In response, the ISU drafted a *Small States Strategy* which sees the ISU working to enable small States Parties to identify and put in place practical, common-sense and cost-effective ways to support implementation and participation. Phase I of the application of the *Small States Strategy* involved the ISU supporting Trinidad and Tobago in convening a 29-30 June 2006 workshop on the role of the Caribbean Community in the pursuit of the aims of the Convention.<sup>1</sup>

8. Providing advice and information to individual States Parties on implementation matters continued to be a central feature of the work of the ISU. In particular, perhaps due to the priority States Parties have placed on the implementation of Article 5 during the period 2005 to 2009, the ISU received an increasing number of requests for advice or support with respect to the mine clearance obligations contained within this Article. Responses by the ISU included support to one State Party in convening technical workshop on the implementation of Article 5 and preparations for a support visit to another State Party which is scheduled to take place in October 2006. The ISU also responded to numerous other requests for implementation support each month in addition to responding to requests for information from States not parties, the media, and interested organizations and individuals.

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<sup>1</sup> See [www.apminebanconvention.org/smallstates](http://www.apminebanconvention.org/smallstates).

9. The ISU provided its traditional substantive and organizational support to the President-Designate of the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties, working closely with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA). In addition, the ISU provided support to the presumed host and presidency of the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties, in part by hosting for a one-week period in June 2006 an expert from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

10. The ISU continued to collect a large number of pertinent documents for the Convention's Documentation Centre, which is maintained by the ISU as part of its mandate. The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Documentation Centre currently contains over 5,000 records and continues to be used by States Parties and other interested actors as an important source of information on the Convention. In addition, in 2006 the ISU continued to expand the content on the GICHD's web site concerning the Convention and its implementation.<sup>2</sup>

11. In 2006, the ISU was requested by those with an interest in other issue areas to learn from the experience of implementation support in the context of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. This has included inquiries made and information provided or presentations given to those interested in the Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme of Action, the Biological Weapons Convention, Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

## FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

12. As indicated in the President's Paper on the Establishment of the Implementation Support Unit and the agreement between the States Parties and the GICHD, the GICHD created a Voluntary Trust Fund for activities of the ISU in late 2001. The purpose of this fund is to finance the on-going activities of the ISU, with the States Parties endeavouring to assure the necessary financial resources.

13. In accordance with the agreement between the States Parties and the GICHD, the Coordinating Committee was consulted on the 2006 ISU budget.<sup>3</sup> The 2006 ISU budget was distributed to all States Parties by the 6MSP Presidency along with an appeal for voluntary contributions.

14. In accordance with the agreement between the States Parties and the GICHD, the Voluntary Trust Fund's 2005 financial statement was independently audited by PriceWaterhouseCoopers. The audit indicated that the financial statement of the Voluntary Trust Fund had been properly prepared in accordance with relevant accounting policies and the applicable Swiss legislation. The audited financial statement, which indicated that the 2005 expenditures of the ISU totalled CHF 434,925, was forwarded to the Presidency, the Coordinating Committee and donors.

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<sup>2</sup> See [www.apminebanconvention.org](http://www.apminebanconvention.org).

<sup>3</sup> Basic infrastructure costs (e.g. general services, human resources, accounting, conference management) for the ISU are covered by the GICHD and therefore not included in the ISU budget.

**Contributions to the ISU Voluntary Trust Fund<sup>4</sup>**  
**1 January 2005 to 6 September 2006**

	Contributions received in 2005 (CHF)	Contributions received in 2006 <sup>5</sup> (CHF)
Albania		1,000
Australia	38,572	123,084
Austria	70,840	
Belgium	23,094	38,493
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2,560	
Burundi		600
Canada	57,137	53,660
Chile	24,300	18,150
Cyprus		2,700
Czech Republic	38,010	
Estonia		1,500
Germany		10,850
Hungary	12,700	12,500
Iceland	1,300	
Ireland	53,100	
Italy	61,600	
Lithuania	5,345	
Luxembourg	23,100	
Malaysia		2,642
Malta		750
Mexico	12,300	
Netherlands	7,000	32,000
Nigeria	2,460	3,630
Norway	108,962	
Philippines		1,300
Slovenia		6,496
South Africa		5,305
Turkey	1,200	1,250
Total contributions	CHF 544,380	CHF 315,910

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<sup>4</sup> All amounts in CHF.

<sup>5</sup> As of 6 September 2006.



Annex VI

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE SEVENTH MEETING OF THE STATES PARTIES

<b>SYMBOL</b>	<b>TITLE</b>	<b>PRESENTED BY</b>
APLC/MSP.7/2006/1*	Provisional Agenda	Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention
APLC/MSP.7/2006/2*	Provisional Programme of Work	Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention
APLC/MSP.7/2006/3*	Draft Rules of Procedure for the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties	Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention
APLC/MSP.7/2006/4	Estimated costs for convening the Seventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction	Secretariat
APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.1 and Corr.1	Report on the functioning of the Implementation Support Unit, November 2005 – September 2006	Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.2, Add.1 and Add.2	Achieving the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan: The Geneva Progress Report 2005-2006	President-Designate
APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.3	Towards the full implementation of Article 5	President

APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.4	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction – Proposed template for assisting States Parties in requesting an extension under Article 5	Canada
APLC/MSP.7/2006/L.5	Proposed voluntary declaration of completion of Article 5 obligations	Guatemala
APLC/MSP.7/2006/R.1 (English/French/Spanish only)	List of Qualified Experts – Provided by the States Parties under Article 8, paragraph 9, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction	Secretariat
APLC/MSP.7/2006/INF.1 (English only)	List of States Parties that have submitted their reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 7 of the Convention	Secretariat
APLC/MSP.7/2006/INF.2 (English Only)	An Action Plan to Universalise and Implement the Mine Ban Convention	President
APLC/MSP.7/2006/INF.3 (English/French/Spanish only) and Corr.1 (English only)	List of Participants	Secretariat
APLC/MSP.7/2006/CRP.1 (English only)	Requests for Observer Status in accordance with Rule 1.4	President
APLC/MSP.7/2006/CRP.2 and Add.1	Draft Final Report	Secretariat
APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.1 (English/French/Spanish only)	Provisional List of Participants	Secretariat

APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.2 (English only)	Information provided by States Parties on the implementation of Article 5 in the context of questions posed by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies	Jordan and Slovenia
APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.3 (English only)	Declaration of Completion	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
APLC/MSP.7/2006/MISC.4 (English only)	Turkey's Views on Universalisation of the Mine Ban Convention and the Complementary Role of Non-governmental Organisations	Turkey

The above documents are available in all official languages through the Official Document System of the United Nations at <http://documents.un.org> and the official website of the APLC as part of the website of the United Nations Office at Geneva at <http://www.unog.ch/disarmament/>.

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