



*President:* Mr. Lazar MOJSOV (Yugoslavia).

**AGENDA ITEM 8**

**General debate (continued)**

1. Mr. TUENI (Lebanon): Mr. President, for me to add my congratulations to the many so far expressed is probably now superfluous. I merely want to say how much your presence in the Chair has contributed towards a greater confidence of the smaller nations in the outcome of the debate and in its course, and to add, if I may, that you have conducted our proceedings with great wisdom and with such concern for all of us here present.

2. For the past two weeks, this august Assembly has been the forum for one of the most vital debates, if not the most vital debate, in the history of mankind. Leaders and representatives of all the nations, large and small, have come here, not to present an abstract testimony to peace, but to submit concrete proposals for the creation of new and effective machinery that will render peace possible—peace through disarmament, an endeavour, a dream, that we are constantly reminded is now over 50 years old.

3. To those of us coming from countries, such as mine, that are still suffering from the ravages of war, this debate conveys a different sense of urgency, more particularly because this is a people's debate. Indeed, rarely have any of the proceedings of this Organization acquired such a democratic dimension. It was a people's movement, a people's revolt, that forced the debate and gave it its present format of emergency. Everywhere, in cities, in villages, in churches, in universities, on battlefields and also in the streets—not excluding the streets of New York City—people, simple people, have shown a tremendous interest in what we say and a grave concern for what we may decide.

4. The democratic dimension is further dramatized by the apocalyptic vision of total destruction now presented to us as a mathematical probability, an image of a universal Hiroshima, so horrible that even if some form of life or portion of the universe should survive it would certainly not be worth the investment in war or in victory.

5. It is not a coincidence nor an accident that a session of the General Assembly on disarmament has been pressed for by the non-aligned Member States, which represent the vast majority of the people of the world, for they are conscious of their strange destiny—that they may some day become the innocent victims of a nuclear holocaust, which, though they are a majority, they are unable to prevent.

6. These countries are also the disinherited and the poor. They are the dispossessed, victims of rivalries in which they are the objects, the dispensable commodities, rivalries that they are unable even to restrain.

7. In this context, it was only natural that the initiators of the debate, the non-aligned countries, should have established as their main thesis this "triangular link", an organic link between détente, disarmament and development.

8. Unfortunately, however, the dialectics of events and of history have carried us away from the principles set by the Belgrade conference of the non-aligned countries in 1961. We are now living in an international environment much less favourable to their achievement. Détente has yielded, or is progressively yielding, to a renewal of confrontation and cold war. Disarmament itself has become a step towards escalation, wherein new weapons are thrown into the race and the security of the armed has become a greater issue than the security of the unarmed. As for development, it appears now more elusive every day, every year, not only because of the over-consumption of arms—which is itself economically regressive—but because also of the destruction of what was already developed and constructed and progressing. This is, in reality, where we now stand in respect to the forging of the "triangular link".

9. I would also add in great candour that since Belgrade and before, since Bandung, many of our initial concepts and ideals have been tested without significant advance or major impact on the creation of secure and peaceful international relations. People are still dying, everywhere, in every part of the globe, but more particularly in the non-aligned countries. "Zones of peace" have not been free of "limited" and "fragmented" wars, both internal as well as external, numerous and continuing, and always revolutionary.

10. There have been more "new wars" than peaceful settlements of old wars. "Nuclear-weapon-free zones" have not been immune to the development of nuclear options, and these options have often been the result of the convergence of two factors—artificial over-industrialization and an illicit connexion with super-Power politics. The very concept of non-alignment, let alone that of the third world, can hardly be used today without some qualification, for within the non-aligned world the wars of today are fought by the poor with the weapons of the rich and the powerful, whereas past colonial wars were waged by the rich and the powerful, striving for the exploitation of the poor.

11. The discovery of more natural resources and the new "balance of wealth" have led some of the underdeveloped countries to race to acquire arms, despite their poverty—a poverty that is hardly disguised by apparent signs of wealth. In fact, such wealth is only a financial illusion that masks social poverty and great economic as well as political frailty.

12. This political frailty has led to the strangest mirages everywhere, to a search for security and an assertion of independence through armaments that ignores the fact that the more one arms, in a socio-economic vacuum, the more one becomes dependent on the very sources of supply; so much so that countries and peoples have become toys in an arms bazaar, their fate sometimes made contingent upon the exploitation of discarded or obsolete equipment by international cartels of equivocal political character.

13. Moreover, the problematic wars of the underdeveloped world are not only inconclusive, but they fail even to produce what some wars have produced in the developed world: the technological break-throughs which led at least to some industrial progress.

14. May I be permitted now to address myself to the practical aspects of the debate, where the Assembly is seeking to achieve some substantive progress. The working papers and statements submitted by various delegations lead to three main propositions that constitute a "programme of action" within the United Nations.

15. The components of this programme can be summarized as follows: first, the creation of a new instrument of disarmament negotiations, with the necessary infrastructure to study, to observe, to detect and to implement; secondly, the creation of a world disarmament authority with executive power; thirdly, the formation of a permanent international peace-keeping force supplemented by a greater articulation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

16. My delegation will support such a programme of action as will rally a consensus of the Member States. I would have had nothing to add beyond this expression of support had events in my country, Lebanon, not compelled the United Nations to undertake its most recent peace-keeping operation against tremendous odds that we all pray will be overcome.

17. For the proof has been given, tragically, that a peace-loving nation, such as Lebanon, can be turned into an everyman's land, into an arena for everyone's war and everyone's revolution as well, so much so that it has been left with one of two choices, both suicidal: either explosion or invasion. Yet, when challenged by an international concern for its independence, for its sovereignty, for the pursuance of its historic mission, a country may cease to be questionable, may refuse to be dispensable or negotiable, and may seek, with international support, a renaissance of its identity, feeling secure that it does not have to sacrifice its liberties for the sake of mere survival.

18. Lebanon is also a patent example of how much a peace-loving country can suffer when an aggressive State, such as Israel, seeks to block development, and to destabilize a whole region—the Arab world—which would otherwise have experienced a peaceful and harmonious evolution, creating even greater possibilities for the fulfilment of the aspirations of its peoples.

19. The price Lebanon is paying is made a greater burden by the fact that a "Lebanese question" was born out of the Palestinians' plight, their Diaspora, and out of the Arab-Israeli wars. Its solution has become more and more closely linked to a just and comprehensive settlement of the whole Middle Eastern crisis.

20. Rarely, in a different context, could such a demand be placed upon the United Nations. Yet, while stressing this reality, my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to say how much recent events in Lebanon have inspired greater confidence in the international community and in the ability of the world Organization to carry the burden of its responsibilities.

21. The present situation leads me to express some reservations as to the validity today of certain principles which may have been relevant when the historic debate on disarmament began half a century ago, but which now appear slightly *dépassé*.

22. First and foremost, we believe that, whereas we are putting greater emphasis on nuclear disarmament, our main preoccupation should be with conventional weapons, for it is with these conventional weapons that wars are being waged so widely and with such ferocity.

23. Secondly, we believe that we must reassess the obligation of the world Organization, by virtue of its Charter, to guarantee territorial integrity in an operative, permanent manner.

24. Thirdly, it is our view that we should have the intellectual and political honesty to admit that our present procedures of negotiation, persuasion and condemnation have all fallen short of a capability to ensure international peace and security. The time has come to envisage a new effective, executive role for the world Organization, commensurate with its responsibility, which will transform it into an operational instrument not of a problematic disarmament, but of a practical peace, a real peace.

25. This Assembly has heard very bold propositions. We have witnessed the President of a country offering to disarm completely as a gesture and as an example of good faith, but also as an act of faith in peace and an act of hope for international security. His earnest appeal, shared by many others, is a testimony to the fact that nuclear disarmament, hypothetical as it is, may lessen the danger of a world war, but it will never prevent the local wars that are tearing our societies apart.

26. With the spread of local wars, the balance of terror becomes a universal state of terror, not to say a universal state of international terrorism, which small nations feel

deeply in their minds and souls, and which destroys the elementary freedom from fear that they have always prized most in their struggle for liberty and self-determination.

27. The time may have come to restate, to explore again, and—why not?—to implement an old political idea: positive neutrality, a concept which, if renovated today, in the light of recent experience, if made applicable to present conditions, may inject new life into our community.

28. For the smaller nations, neutrality as an international option should become a guarantee of peace, as well as the road to stability, freedom and progress. So far, neutrality has been, in its traditional forms, a privilege of the few, of developed and wealthy nations, such as Switzerland, Sweden or Austria, which have been able to assert, protect and often defend their neutrality.

29. The new concept of international neutrality which we are proposing is one that will be applicable to countries where external conflicts have projected and may still project into internal divisions, and where internal structures inevitably project into external as well as civil wars.

30. Such a neutrality we know can only be established and guaranteed by the United Nations, which should then assume a new responsibility—that of providing international shelter for the weak against the powerful, for the poor against the rich, for the under-developed against the over-developed, for the peace-loving against the aggressive.

31. It is also evident that such a concept of neutrality may be susceptible to a certain form of internationalization. Indeed, we think it is, because it reflects the real significance, the purpose, the meaning behind such proposals in the programme of action as the creation of a permanent peace-keeping force, or a world disarmament authority.

32. One can then envisage the following strategy, to be realized gradually or all at once, in the States or nations seeking international neutrality.

33. First, there should be an enhanced international presence in those countries. There should be a multiplication of United Nations agencies, of international institutions, political, but preferably social, economic and cultural, with a local as well as a regional scope. This will create a greater perception of international peace in the country and a greater international concern for the fate of that country. There will be a knitting of international life into the national fabric of society, thus stimulating development and progress. A new social and political pattern may then be born, where the national and the international will blend to such a degree that the international vocation will become the national character and the national purpose. Within this framework, internal contradictions will be progressively and easily resolved.

34. Secondly, defence will have to be assured by international peace-keeping forces. Hence, national security will cease to be a national obsession. There will no longer be a constant search for more arms in one country which neces-

sarily leads to a diminished sense of security in another. Nor will there be this massive, wasteful investment of human and natural resources in arms, which is always counter-productive and often self-destructive.

35. Thirdly, because of the presence of international forces, a new pattern of democratic government will emerge and develop. For, such has been our obsession with arms, and so spellbound are we by wars, that many of us often forgot that the military are only an instrument of defence, not the masters and lords of society. Seeking government and power as a substitute for war, when necessary, the new strange form of militarism that emerged led to failure in both defence and politics. In an internationally guaranteed, neutral polity, national armies will remain only as tools of local security, but they will also, if and when necessary, play a capital role in social integration, as well as in economic development and reconstruction, thereby contributing to the prosperity of the new islands of peace and havens of liberty.

36. Allow me to conclude by reminding this Assembly of an anniversary relevant to this debate, yet very sad indeed. Today is 5 June, a date which this Organization should always remember since, 11 years ago, it marked the beginning of a very strange and very tragic war.

37. I am not merely referring to the 1967 Israeli invasion of Egypt and Syria, with the subsequent occupation of Sinai, the Golan Heights and what was left of Palestine, namely, Gaza and the West Bank. Rather, 5 June should be remembered in the history of the United Nations, whenever peace-keeping is discussed, as the one date that recalls the difficult and delicate role of United Nations troops, when inadequately utilized, in a context of super-Power confrontation through a regional war.

38. Since 1967, the regional war conveniently referred to as "The Middle East Question" has developed beyond the stage of possible containment, let alone crisis management. In fact, it has developed into a perpetual state of crisis, punctuated by a series of wars, the latest of which was the invasion of my country, Lebanon.

39. If there is a lesson to be learned from the 5 June anniversary, in the special perspective of disarmament, it would be the following—that international guarantees, as well as peace settlements, when negotiated within the United Nations, yet without an adequate United Nations executive authority, soon become a prolongation of war through the very process of peace.

40. The 5 June war, both in its origins and in its multi-dimensional consequences, is a clear case of regional confrontation, where the super-Powers have, through armaments, taken the local parties as hostages, subjecting national aspirations almost totally to the imperatives of the international game.

41. It is probably premature to seek the judgement of history on the conditions that led to the withdrawal of the peace-keeping forces on the eve of 5 June 1967. Yet, the consequences have been of such a magnitude that they cannot be ignored in any debate on peace-keeping and dis-

armament. Ever since that time, the United Nations should have been conscious that it could not hope to deliver real peace, if it did not wield real international power, not only the power of those who use the United Nations, but the power of those who need the United Nations. For there are nations whose very survival depends on the international Organization, whereas there are others who find it always possible, nay, even sometimes convenient, to place themselves in a position of strength, superior to that of the international community.

42. This is the meaning, the real meaning of our present debate. And this, and nothing else, is the meaning of what we, the smaller nations, are now hoping for the world Organization, when we speak of an effective independent authority in the field of disarmament. Such a role should transcend super-Power interests and super-Power rivalries, through a permanent peace-keeping force, subject to no other will save the interest of peace, justice and international order, breeding, in turn, a new socio-economic order where there will be both a vertical and horizontal recycling of wealth, resources and money.

43. All this may seem very Utopian. It probably is. But what international or cosmic achievement in this very field did not seem Utopian when first proposed? Is not our very yearning for peace natural, yet Utopian as well? And what about our constant aspiration to international justice, and to equality in self-determination and in the exercise of liberty?

44. All through this debate there has been a great sense of unreality. One feels that even the hardest realities—destruction, tragedies, bloodshed, catastrophes, cataclysms—have all been reduced to statistical abstractions. We have been intellectually exercising with those abstractions while the dynamics of war have continued their course.

45. This should not be so, and must not be so. For the time has come when peace will also have its own dynamic and will enforce its own laws of determinism. It will be forever irreversible if it finds its objective expression in the programme of action we have met here to decide upon.

46. For to aim at instant total disarmament is not only Utopian but probably obstructive to partial disarmament, be it regional, multilateral, bilateral or simply unilateral.

47. Yet a mere declaration of neutrality, heard and guaranteed by the international community, may also be for the smaller nations the first significant step on the long road to perpetual peace.

48. Such historic pragmatism should be our ultimate message.

49. Mr. SHEVEL (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*interpretation from Russian*): Mr. President, let me add to the many congratulations that have been extended to you the congratulations of the Ukrainian SSR on your election to the important post of President of this special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. We are all convinced that you will successfully fulfil your important and responsible tasks.

50. The discussion at this special session of the General Assembly on disarmament has convincingly demonstrated that the major and most urgent task, the solution of which would serve the interests of détente and general peace and thus the vital interests of all the people of our planet, remains to curb the arms race and to make a start on real disarmament.

51. Even given all the significance of other specific problems of the world of today, no task is more important or more closely affects the fate of everyone on earth than the task of achieving genuine disarmament. Halting the arms race would mean adopting a course that would reduce the threat of a world nuclear conflict. To reverse the course of the arms race would be to complete the process of setting our feet firmly on the true road to a radical elimination of this threat.

52. It is precisely now, when the world situation has been conditioned by the advent of détente that it has become feasible to begin work on a solution to this difficult and complex problem. It is therefore clear that all States should aim at success for this special session, because there is no people that would not wish for the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

53. The burden of the arms race is becoming intolerable for the peoples of the world. To some degree all countries, big and small, developed and developing, have become involved in it. It threatens the survival of mankind and is a heavy burden for the peoples, curbing their progress towards social progress and well-being.

54. The documents prepared for this session quite rightly indicate that disarmament would make it possible to divert major resources to peaceful purposes—that is, to raising the level of personal consumption of goods and services; increasing capital investments in new enterprises and equipment; expanding housing construction; improving the life of town dwellers; considerably improving education, health services and social welfare; and developing science and culture. I doubt whether there is any country not faced with such problems of economic and social development.

55. Our Soviet socialist State spends on defense precisely the amount necessary for reliable security and for defending together with fraternal socialist countries the achievements of socialism. But our peoples have a tremendous desire to divert the funds now being drained from peaceful development to constructive purposes. Precisely this desire has dictated the consistent efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to achieve genuine disarmament measures up to and including general and complete disarmament. Socialism and peace are inseparable. This was reaffirmed again in a recent statement by Mr. Brezhnev, when he pointed out that “for us the defence of peace is the defence of socialism; it is the defence of a bright future for the whole of mankind”.

56. Along with the socialist countries, there is a broad front of peace-loving States working for disarmament. It includes those countries that have been overcoming their backwardness, which they have inherited from the colonial

past. That has already been demonstrated by the discussion at this session.

57. Who, then, is opposing the peace-loving peoples so resolutely fighting for disarmament?

58. The arms race is being stimulated by the sinister alliance of militarists and monopolists who earn tremendous profits from the production of armaments. It has become routine to refer to this alliance as the military-industrial complex.

59. It is the active efforts of this same militarist complex which may lead us to a new escalation in arms development over the next few decades. A striking example of its influence is the recent decision of NATO countries on a further build-up of armaments and the reluctance of certain circles to renounce once and for all their plans to manufacture the neutron weapon and deploy it in Western Europe. The neutron bomb is a weapon aimed primarily against man. Not only is it monstrous in its very nature, but it might become the real trigger of a nuclear war.

60. There already exist signs that American plans for the manufacture of the neutron bomb have been stimulating interest in that type of weapon in other States too, primarily members of NATO. This is doing a great deal to undermine the already difficult task of bringing about mutual reduction of the level of nuclear armaments in order to avert a nuclear catastrophe. And this is happening at the very time when here at this session representatives of NATO countries are making peace-loving speeches in favour of disarmament.

61. The plans for the manufacture of the neutron weapon and for its introduction into military arsenals are being opposed, in a mighty wave of protest by the peoples of the world including the Ukrainian people. The imperialists and their ideological bards are attempting to represent the mass opposition to the neutron weapon as a kind of propaganda campaign. It will not work. The mighty movement of protest against the neutron weapon is to be explained primarily by the fact that peace-loving peoples prize highly their right to life. The people of the Ukraine, for instance, in the last war lost one out of every six inhabitants—or five million persons, and therefore they are not in the least moved by propagandistic considerations but rather by the desire to ensure that right for present and future generations. Failure to heed the voice of protest of the peoples of the world against the manufacture of the neutron weapon would be to assume grave responsibility in the face of history.

62. Of course, the opponents of disarmament exist not only on the American continent, but in Europe and Asia as well. And everywhere they are doing their best to hinder the attainment of agreements on practical measures to limit armaments and to bring about disarmament, and are attempting to swell the tide of fear and hostility, while mounting lying, anti-Soviet, anti-socialist campaigns.

63. This is confirmed by the fact, for example, that one such source is responsible for constantly issuing slanderous fabrications and preaching the ominous doctrine of the in-

evitability of war. That source is responsible for attempts to instil among the peoples of the world a mood of scepticism and fatalism and thus weaken their will to fight for détente and for disarmament. Meanwhile, the newly-emerged champion of the medium-sized and small countries, hiding behind the smoke-screen of the so-called struggle against hegemonism, is intensively building up its military potential, making territorial claims against neighbouring States, attempting to ignite hotbeds of internal conflict and playing off neighbouring countries one against the other. It is no wonder that this vicious policy enjoys the support of the so-called "hawks" in the West, since it helps them in their attempts to frustrate progress towards disarmament and the deepening of détente and to maintain conflict situations in the world.

64. I should like to stress here that the further consolidation of détente which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as other peace-loving countries and realistic forces, have striven for at so high a cost is inconceivable so long as the arms race is not curbed and a start made on real disarmament. It is precisely here, in this most important area, that a radical issue is being decided—the question of how the international climate will develop. And this battle is being waged here and now.

65. The world socialist community is placing all its power and prestige in the scales on the side of disarmament, right up to general and complete disarmament and the further normalization of relations among States, and for lasting peace on earth.

66. As representatives will recall, in his statement on 25 April this year, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, put forward a programme for the implementation, over the course of a specific limited period of time, of a number of important measures for the purpose of bringing about the total cessation of the further quantitative and qualitative growth of the armaments and armed forces of States having major military potential, in an effort to create conditions for the subsequent reduction of those arms and armaments [*see A/S-10/11*].

67. These measures, as we know, provide for the cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons, the cessation of the manufacture and the prohibition of all other types of weapons of mass destruction, a cessation of the development of new types of conventional weaponry of great destructive capacity, and a renunciation of the expansion of armies and the build-up of conventional armaments on the part of States permanent members of the Security Council and countries which have military agreements with them.

68. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, has submitted to this special session of the General Assembly the proposals of the Soviet Union on practical ways to halt the arms race [*A/S-10/AC.1/4*].

69. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR, along with other delegations, whole-heartedly supports the realistic

proposals and constructive measures set forth in that important document and urges an early start of the required business-like discussions on the subject along the lines indicated in order to achieve the break-through in disarmament so long awaited and ardently hoped for by the peoples of the world.

70. It should be emphasized that concrete and realistic proposals on the organization and substance of talks on halting the nuclear arms race have thus been submitted for the consideration of the special session. They take into account many ideas advanced at previous sessions as well as in the course of the current session of the General Assembly during its debate on nuclear disarmament. Provision has been made, for instance, for a phased, stage-by-stage process of nuclear disarmament. It has also been proposed—and this is highly important—that agreement be reached among individual nuclear Powers on the extent to which each would be involved in the process of nuclear disarmament at each given stage, taking into account the differences in the levels of their military nuclear potential. Indeed, have not some representatives spoken out in this very hall against nuclear disarmament on the grounds that the nuclear States do not have, as they have alleged, equal nuclear potential? The raising of this question in the document submitted for consideration at this special session by the Soviet Union has made it possible to overcome that obstacle to the start of the negotiations and to their subsequent progress.

71. Apart from that, it is imperative to arrive at an agreement on ways to achieve in practice a cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, to proceed to a phased reduction of their stockpiles, and ultimately to maintain the existing balance of forces while constantly lowering the level of nuclear might. This last point reflects a general principle for the conduct of disarmament negotiations—namely, the principle of not harming the security of any of the parties participating in such agreements. Strict observance of that principle, and the renunciation of attempts to obtain unilateral advantages are the overriding conditions for the effectiveness and viability of the negotiations and of the agreements to be arrived at. We wish to stress this in the clearest possible fashion, since a number of statements made at this session contained absolutely unrealistic proposals to the effect that individual States should implement measures of unilateral disarmament irrespective of their security interests or the existing balance of forces.

72. We wish to emphasize also that nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with making the principle of the non-use of force the rule in international life. As we know, the draft treaty on that subject is now before the United Nations,<sup>1</sup> and a decision of the General Assembly also exists in this connexion [*resolution 31/9*]. Without such a combination, any potential aggressor could resort, by way of provocation, to the use of conventional weapons. Several representatives have already pointed to the inadmissibility of such situation.

73. The General Assembly has already considered the proposal that States should undertake bilateral or multilateral measures to prevent the risk of nuclear war. According to that proposal, for instance, all States should act in such a way as to prevent the outbreak of situations conducive to military confrontations, while nuclear States should exercise restraint in their relations with each other and demonstrate a willingness to settle their differences through negotiation. It is clear that it would also be extremely useful for all nuclear Powers to conclude agreements on the prevention of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. These and a number of other proposals were set out in the draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, submitted by the Soviet delegation to the thirty-second session of the General Assembly.<sup>2</sup> The Ukrainian delegation believes that the basic elements of that draft resolution should be reflected in the final document of this special session of the General Assembly, because they are directly linked with its agenda, with the purposes which it is the task of this session to work for.

74. An important measure for averting the threat of nuclear war is the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. Everybody recognizes the danger to peace which might exist with the emergence of nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel and South Africa, countries which have unleashed some serious conflicts. Even that very prospect alone cannot justify the position of those States, including a number of developing countries, which for various reasons are opposed to international measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, asserting that they are discriminatory in character and that they hinder the peaceful application of nuclear energy. In this matter, wisdom and judiciousness should be displayed and it should be understood that the uncontrolled transfer of nuclear materials intensifies the danger of their being used for military purposes, thus encouraging those who are showing a drift towards the possession of nuclear weapons and hiding behind the backs of others in their attempts to use their nuclear possibilities for the carrying out of aggressive policies. That is precisely the pattern of behavior of Israel and South Africa, two countries which are cooperating with each other in the nuclear field.

75. An important statement has been made by the Soviet Union at this session [*5th meeting*] to the effect that it will never use nuclear weapons against those States which have renounced the manufacture and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories. No less important is the Soviet proposal to reach agreement on the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where they do not exist at present. We believe that such an agreement would be a step towards a situation in which in the future such weapons would be entirely withdrawn from the territories of other countries and we call upon other nuclear Powers to adopt the same attitude and follow the example of the Soviet Union.

76. Many speakers here have pointed to the importance

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 124, document A/31/243, annex.*

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid., Thirty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 127, document A/32/242, annex II.*

of the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR notes with satisfaction that, thanks to the important initiatives of the Soviet Union in this field, there is a real possibility of bringing to a successful conclusion the talks between the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom on the total and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

77. It has long been necessary, of course, once and for all to eliminate chemical weapons, as has been done with biological weapons. The Ukrainian SSR has been taking an active part during regular sessions of the General Assembly in the preparation of draft resolutions designed to bring about the earliest possible agreement in this important area. The appeal to accelerate talks on this subject should in our view be reflected in the document to be adopted by this special session.

78. Now, within the framework of talks on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, which are being carried on with the participation of experts, the possibility has been glimpsed of concluding a separate agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons. That is good, but such an agreement could not replace a treaty the parties to which would undertake not to develop new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In our view such a treaty also is needed.

79. In the circumstances of political détente there is now an opportunity to solve one more important problem—the cessation of the development of new types of conventional weapons of great destructive power and the renunciation of the expansion of armies and of the build-up of conventional weapons in the possession of States permanent members of the Security Council and of countries linked to them by military agreements. Those measures relate to conventional weapons, but the proposal of those measures, incidentally, repudiates the slanderous accusations of those who assert that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are not striving for a cessation of the conventional arms race. The present special session of the General Assembly should provide new momentum for talks in that area also, an area which affects the interests of all the peoples of the world without exception because, as we know, 80 per cent of world military expenditure is accounted for by conventional weapons.

80. We should like also to draw attention to the fact that the new types of conventional weapons with great destructive capability which are appearing quite often possess the same characteristics as certain types of weapons of mass destruction; it is therefore entirely timely that the new proposal of the Soviet Union should seek to bring about agreement on the cessation of the development of such weapons.

81. Unfortunately, the proposal for the reduction of military budgets, made as long ago as at the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly,<sup>3</sup> has been drowned in a

flood of rhetoric and scholastic hair-splitting about the structure of budgets, their comparability and so on. It seems to us that the new proposal of the Soviet Union that States possessing major economic and military potentials, primarily countries which are permanent members of the Security Council, should reach agreement on the reduction by each of them of their military budgets, not in percentage terms but in absolute terms. That would make it practically possible to proceed to the reduction of military budgets and the release of resources for purposes of development.

82. It has already been pointed out at this session that negotiations are now in progress on questions of disarmament, including talks relating to central Europe. Thus there has come into existence and into operation a certain machinery of discussion. We consider that basically that machinery has stood the test and we are against proposals which would lead to its breaking up or unjustified modification.

83. Together with a number of other States Members of the United Nations, the Ukrainian delegation attaches particular importance to the convening of a world disarmament conference, a universal forum which could adopt binding decisions, which would necessarily be put into effect, rather than recommendations. We note with satisfaction that the proposal of the countries of the socialist community on the convening of a world disarmament conference has created a favourable atmosphere for the convening of this present session. We hope that the special session will consider most attentively the question of the timing of a world disarmament conference.

84. Under the new Constitution adopted in April of this year by the Ukrainian SSR, the faithfulness of our Republic to the principles of peace-loving Leninist foreign policy and its desire to achieve general and complete disarmament have become elevated to the rank of a State principle.

85. Speaking in his constituency on 4 April last, Mr. Shcherbitsky, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, stressed the need persistently and actively to conduct a foreign policy designed to strengthen the bases for general peace on earth and to ensure conditions for peaceful labour of the Soviet people.

86. Our people will do everything in their power to bring a halt to the arms race and reverse its course, to embark upon disarmament and to eliminate the threat of a new war, not only for the present generation but also for future generations.

87. Permit me to express my conviction that the work of this special session of the General Assembly and the co-operation of all delegations present will guarantee the successful performance of this highly important task, in which all countries and all peoples of our planet have such a vital interest.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes, agenda item 102, document A/9191.

88. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the Prime Minister of Australia. I have great pleasure in welcoming His Excellency the Right Honourable Malcolm Fraser, and in inviting him to address the General Assembly.

89. Mr. FRASER (Australia): Mr. President, this special session, under your distinguished leadership, has already given grounds for hope that a more realistic and practical approach to disarmament is under way.

90. It was once thought that if only men of goodwill could come together and express their common desire for peace, peace would be achieved almost overnight. It was even thought that if only we did not speak of the harsh realities of conflict, our minds would become more receptive to peace.

91. Experience has taught us that nations will not lay down their arms or abandon their ambitions simply in the name of idealism. Too often nations seek peace—but only on their own terms. Too often they want to negotiate—but only on their terms. Too often they want settlement—but only on their terms. Plainly, idealism is not enough. Indeed, idealism severed from reality is futile and sometimes dangerous. Too often the high hopes of past decades have turned to the ashes and blood of war.

92. The problems that confront us are of enormous magnitude. The task of achieving an effective and significant measure of global disarmament is daunting. The spectre that haunts us today is a world armed as it has never been before. Its inventory of weapons exceeds the total sum of all weaponry employed in human history. Tragically, responsible Governments throughout the world feel compelled to spend vast sums on arms. Some countries spend far more on arms than can be justified for their legitimate defence requirements. Once this occurs, the defence apparatus becomes entrenched as a strong vested interest and such an integral part of the national economy that significantly reducing it would cause grave problems of economic and social adjustment.

93. One fact is certain: the forces militating against arms control are powerful.

94. We cannot hope to begin to dismantle the world's military apparatus unless we address our minds to the causes which nourish and sustain it: the notion that increased military spending inevitably provides greater national security regardless of the objective facts; the narrow self-interest and ambition which nations can pursue—reckless of the tension and conflict which that may generate; the quest for national status which still motivates the actions of States; attempts to exploit the weaknesses of smaller States; the attempt to expand a nation's influence over other States, under the cloak of ideology—regardless of the damaging competition with other Powers which results. Above all, there is the pervasive mistrust and suspicion that haunts nations and the fear that that creates. The suspicion and fear which turn nations to increase their armaments frequently stem from the military policies of others. A sudden expansion of arms, an unexpected concentration of military forces, the growth in a country's mil-

itary capacity in excess of perceived defence needs—all these produce suspicion and counteraction.

95. Another potent source of suspicion and fear is economic insecurity, economic uncertainty; fear about security of access to markets or essential sources of supply; unequal world trading arrangements; the exclusion of groups, of categories of nations from fair trade; and poverty and deprivation in large areas of the world. All these are in themselves a fertile breeding ground for tension and conflict. We cannot ignore these historic and present sources of concern and fear. Our disarmament efforts will come to nothing if we do not work to eradicate these economic causes of discontent. The multilateral trade negotiations this year and the negotiations over the common fund will provide opportunities to advance our common cause. Failing that, we shall have missed the opportunity to resolve economically based tension and discord.

96. The circumstances that fuel the fears and suspicions of nations and damage their relations are infinite. Together they conspire to create a lack of confidence in a system of international security that can relate the differences among nations so as to avoid the outbreak or the threat of war.

97. I do not minimize the difficulties that face this special session. But it is inconceivable that the world should become so indifferent to its fate that it does not try to remove the causes of conflict and to control the production and deployment of nuclear and of conventional arms. There are so many pressing national needs, so many unrealized aspirations, that conscience and reason demand that this waste of resources cease. The significance of this special session is that it recognizes that disarmament is a matter for political leadership, for political will and determination and common commitment and dedication. The very fact that the United Nations is assembled for this session entitles us to assume that we share a common determination to bring arms and military spending under control.

98. We know that war, the threat of war, anarchy and terrorism know no frontiers; that no nation, however favourably placed, can afford to stand aside from the quest for international peace and security. That is why Australia takes an active interest in arms control and disarmament. Like other middle-sized and smaller Powers, Australia's fate can be decided by the contest between the major Powers. We place the highest value on our independence, our territorial integrity, our individuality—as I am sure we all do. Separately, middle-sized and small Powers are in no position to decide global issues of war or peace. But collectively we can do much to foster a climate of international co-operation and practical arms control.

99. Australia believes that the realistic approach to disarmament lies in the step-by-step development of arms control. It is essential at each step that all who are affected should feel their security is—at the very least—not weakened. Otherwise, the prospects for effective arms control will be destroyed. But we should not limit ourselves merely to preserving a precarious *status quo*. We must aim at increasing the security of nations. Concentrating on disarmament techniques and mechanics is important—but it

is not enough. We must confront the underlying political and economic anxieties and suspicions which impel nations to arm themselves. For only if the causes of international tension are removed can there be any realistic hope of achieving a meaningful and long-lasting reduction in arms. A practical agenda for world disarmament should therefore start from the premise that it is essential to increase mutual confidence and trust among nations.

100. It is accordingly natural that in this session our main aim is to agree on a practical and realistic programme of action for arms control and disarmament. The first focus of this programme must be on issues of nuclear arms control. The avoidance of nuclear war is an imperative of mankind.

101. My Government's position is clear and unequivocal. We oppose further escalation of the nuclear arms race. We oppose the spread of nuclear weapons. Even if we could depend on the technology of terror, delicately balanced between the super-Powers, to prevent a nuclear holocaust, our mutual interdependence and the growing scarcity of essential resources make manifest the futility of uncontrolled expenditures on nuclear weapons.

102. Spurred by this realization, nations have commenced the slow and deliberate process of negotiation to limit the production, distribution and use of these weapons. Through this step-by-step process, nuclear- and non-nuclear-weapon States alike have come to accept that they have a common interest in limiting nuclear weaponry and that carefully negotiated limits need not put at risk any nation's security.

103. We now need to build on the partial test-ban treaty of 1963,<sup>4</sup> the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and the first agreements in 1972 between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. We now need to create an environment which further limits nations' capacity to acquire nuclear weapons—indeed, which removes any incentive to possess them. Progress must be made in three interrelated areas. First, the nuclear-weapon Powers must take effective action to limit and reduce their nuclear arsenals. Secondly, there must be an end to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments. Thirdly, the international non-proliferation system must be strengthened.

104. We are dealing here with difficult and interrelated balances of national interest. Progress in one area of nuclear arms control can be negated if other essential areas are neglected. Australia believes that all three objectives are realistic and attainable. This special session can give a real impetus towards reaching a consensus on nuclear arms control by identifying the conditions that can generate a well-founded confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, and between the nuclear-weapon States themselves.

105. The first area in which further progress needs to be made is that of the strategic arms limitation talks. The aim of the talks to limit and then reduce the nuclear armaments of the super-Powers, while preserving the strategic nuclear balance, is in the interests of us all. Without progress, the prospect of checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be prejudiced, for some States are unwilling to abandon the option of possessing nuclear weapons until the super-Powers reduce their arsenals. And so long as conventional weapons are maintained at present levels nuclear weapons form an essential element of the over-all strategic balance.

106. Against this background, any prospect of instability, caused by one party gaining at the expense of the other, would damage the fundamental premises of co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would also gravely impair international confidence in the strategic arms limitation talks, and set back the total prospects for nuclear arms control. As confidence in these negotiations grows, it will open the door to reductions in nuclear arsenals. We hope that, ultimately, the talks will open the way for negotiations involving all nuclear-weapon States. This must necessarily be a lengthy and continuing negotiating process.

107. An urgent and more immediately achievable objective is the cessation of nuclear weapons testing in all environments, by all States. It is to be regretted that we do not yet have a comprehensive test-ban treaty and that even the partial test ban treaty has yet to receive universal support. At successive sessions of the General Assembly, Australia has pressed for a broad consensus against all nuclear tests, and at last year's session we sponsored the first single resolution adopted by the Assembly supporting a comprehensive test ban [*resolution 32/78*]. This was an important expression of international opinion. It should not be ignored; it should now be translated into concrete measures.

108. Australia welcomes the current negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and looks to their early and successful conclusion. There can be no question that such an agreement would be a barrier both to the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and to the further spread of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty would put any country initiating, or continuing, nuclear testing at the risk of isolation and international censure. The treaty would be reinforced by an international agreement to halt production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons. We believe this should be the subject of early discussion among nuclear-weapon States and be included in the programme of action.

109. The third essential element in nuclear arms control is preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional countries, and that involves the security of all of us. Proliferation triggers further proliferation, causing increased instability and increased risk for all of us.

110. How do we halt the spread of nuclear weapons? Again, a difficult and careful process of international negotiations is required in order to find ways to stop prolifer-

<sup>4</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43).

ation while protecting legitimate interests. We need to create treaty obligations and, with them, the world opinion which will effectively deter the acquisition of such weapons, and prevent nuclear materials being diverted from peaceful purposes.

111. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has been the essential first step towards the achievement of these goals. Whatever its imperfections, it is the only comprehensive international instrument directed against proliferation. Adherence to it represents an essential test of the commitment of non-nuclear Powers to non-proliferation. Over 100 States are now parties to the Treaty, and Australia urges its universal acceptance. The treaty rests on a three-way bargain, and each element of the bargain must be honoured—by nuclear-weapon Powers making progress towards nuclear disarmament; non-nuclear-weapon Powers not acquiring nuclear weapons; and all countries co-operating in the peaceful development of nuclear energy under effective safeguards. At the same time, those States renouncing nuclear weapons need assurances that this will not jeopardize their security.

112. There is concern whether Security Council resolution 255 (1968) sufficiently protects non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation treaty against the threat or the use of nuclear weapons. In Australia's view, such assurances should be further developed and strengthened. We therefore welcome recent undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States relating to the non-use of nuclear weapons. We commend the statement by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom that his country is prepared to take part, with other nuclear Powers, in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear States [*14th meeting*].

113. There is also a need to assure non-nuclear-weapon States of access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. If world energy requirements are to be met, and economic and social development promoted, nuclear power for peaceful purposes is essential. Our challenge is to find ways in which nuclear energy can be further developed without compromising non-proliferation objectives. Australia is closely involved.

114. First, my Government decided last year to proceed with the further mining and export of Australian uranium to provide, at reasonable prices, supplies of uranium fuel to countries that need them. Because of our concern for non-proliferation we have decided that our uranium exports to non-nuclear-weapon States will be limited to those which are parties to the non-proliferation treaty and therefore comply with requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and which abide by the terms of special bilateral treaties.

115. Secondly, we are participating actively in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation which was launched last year. This study is specifically addressed to the problem of developing nuclear energy in ways consistent with non-proliferation objectives. It could result, for example, in the international control of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle.

116. Australia believes that by these actions we can contribute to a climate of confidence which will foster stable nuclear trade and closer international co-operation on nuclear matters. Our basic concern is to assure all nations, including those which are not parties to our uranium sales contracts, that our uranium and any material derived from it will be used only for peaceful purposes. It is better to have confident nuclear co-operation and trade under effective safeguards than to have these exchanges crippled by suspicion and fear. We look to the further evolution of co-operative arrangements that are essential to trust and a safer nuclear world.

117. While we have made some modest advance with nuclear arms control, the outcome of efforts to limit conventional arms has been disappointing. In fact, the level of conventional armaments continues to escalate.

118. It is in the building of well-founded trust and confidence that real hope lies of slowing and reversing the growth of conventional arms levels. We need approaches which, while limited and specific in scope, are practical, achievable, and contribute to security at lower levels of armaments.

119. There have been proposals put forward for reductions in military budgets. Australia in principle supports such reductions carried out in ways which would not be destabilizing or create new tensions.

120. There is the need to overcome the practical problems of defining and measuring military expenditures and establishing machinery for verifying compliance with any agreed reductions. All this requires thorough examination, and my Government has recently informed the Secretary-General that we are willing to submit our defence budget for analysis as part of a pilot project on military budgets. Any significant reductions in military budgets could release substantial resources for economic and social development where they are sorely needed.

121. We support the proposal of the Nordic countries that the Secretary-General undertake a major study of all aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development [*A/S-10/1, vol. V, document A/AC.187/80*].

122. Australia sees value in regional approaches to arms control. These can contribute to stability. The Association of South-East Asian Nations' advocacy of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality has had impact and has lessened the possibility of competition for influence in that region by major Powers.

123. The concept of an Indian Ocean zone of peace, and the current discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on mutual military limitations in the Indian Ocean, are further examples of a regional approach.

124. Any agreements reached between the super-Powers must enhance security provided by existing alliances and arrangements, otherwise they will have the effect of increasing suspicions and exacerbating tensions.

125. Effective verification is needed to provide the necessary foundation of confidence on which any arms control or disarmament must rest. Controls without verification would be meaningless. The precise requirements and means for verification will depend upon the nature and scope of the agreement in question. But the objectives are clear.

126. Verification must protect the security of States accepting agreed limitations; provide reasonable confidence that a case of non-compliance would be quickly detected; deter to the maximum extent possible any breach of agreed conditions; and provide mechanisms to deal with possible breaches or circumvention. To the extent that verification can be brought under international control, that will further increase confidence.

127. A number of proposals have been put forward to advance the cause of verification. I note the proposal by the President of France for the establishment of an international satellite observation agency [*3rd meeting*]. That is an interesting idea that warrants constructive consideration.

128. Adequate arrangements for verification are indispensable to a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this instance, identifying small underground tests is the greatest problem. In view of our geographical position and expertise, Australia would be well placed to participate in monitoring such a treaty by seismic means. We would obviously co-operate to achieve these objectives.

129. A major task of this special session is to review the effectiveness of the existing international disarmament machinery. The present mechanisms have evolved over the years and in the new situations we face they need to be made both more effective and more representative. The special session should seek to build on the expertise of existing disarmament bodies.

130. In Australia's view the basic three-tier structure should be retained: the First Committee of the General Assembly should remain as a consultative and deliberative forum with over-all responsibility for international disarmament efforts; the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be retained, under that or another name, for negotiating specific multilateral agreements; and the United Nations Disarmament Centre should carry out the secretariat functions. Each of those bodies, however, needs modification.

131. In the case of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, while its basic character should be retained as a compact but representative negotiating body, with a defined membership, continuing to work by consensus, we should seek five basic changes. Those changes would enable the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to strengthen its role in the period of intensified activity which we hope will follow this session.

132. First, it should enjoy the full confidence of the international community including all the nuclear-weapon Powers. A major weakness of the Conference has been the

absence from its deliberations of two of those Powers. We would like to see that redressed.

133. Secondly, it should have a membership reflecting a wider spread of geographical, political and security interests. The structure and membership of the Conference have been too closely tied to the European context, and a modest increase in its existing membership would result in a more representative body. That could be achieved by including States from outside Europe which have demonstrated an active interest in arms control and disarmament questions. For its part, Australia stands ready to participate in a reformed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

134. Thirdly, while we recognize the special obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, we believe that the Conference or its successor should not be subject to their overriding will and that some changes in the existing co-chairmanship arrangements would be appropriate.

135. Fourthly, the links of the Conference with the General Assembly should be strengthened to make it more responsive to a broader range of views.

136. And, fifthly, greater opportunities should exist for non-Member States to participate in working groups and other appropriate meetings.

137. Many States have considerable expertise in particular areas of arms control and disarmament which should be used to the greatest extent possible.

138. Australia also believes that the United Nations Disarmament Centre should be strengthened. In addition to its secretariat function, it has an important role to play in increasing public awareness and understanding of arms control and disarmament questions.

139. Ultimately, it is the absolute right of sovereign Governments to defend their peoples. It is the obligation of sovereign Governments to do so. A realistic disarmament agenda must recognize that simple premise. National sovereignty is vital to the Governments here assembled. None the less, in the new world for which we strive, we must not drive that concept to the excesses of former years. We are too close to each other to be immune from the effects of one another's actions. Rules of behaviour do not diminish—they enhance and expand national sovereignty, for they reinforce your freedom and mine.

140. We cannot conduct our disarmament negotiations in isolation. What we do here is part of a broader international agenda to reduce the causes of suspicion and tension among nations, to enhance confidence in the international mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes between States, to strengthen mediation, to encourage the rule of law between nations, to abandon aggressive ideology and to outlaw man's inhumanity.

141. Many disarmament proposals could be implemented immediately, and by so doing, we could establish the confidence required for further and more substantial steps to-

wards disarmament. Can we not now achieve a comprehensive ban by all States on nuclear explosions, a responsible second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, and a more effective non-proliferation régime?

142. Relief from the oppressive menace of accidental or intentional nuclear war should encourage all States to reduce their dependence on weapons which are conventional but whose sophistication and expense constantly grows.

143. Can we not look to justice, to the rule of law between States, to a step-by-step approach which can progressively release resources for the well-being and advancement of the human race? A great many things are within our grasp if we can, by our action, earn trust—and learn to trust.

144. When history is written of our time, will we be known as men who secured a safe world, or ones who failed to understand or grasp the necessities of our time?

145. The PRESIDENT: On behalf of the General Assembly I wish to thank the Prime Minister of Australia for the important statement he has just made.

146. Mr. FISCHER (German Democratic Republic):<sup>5</sup> Mr. President, allow me to offer you my congratulations on your election to your responsible office and to wish you much success. I am most pleased to do so since the German Democratic Republic is linked by friendly ties with your country. My greetings also go out to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, whose personal dedication to the objectives of this session is well known.

147. It is for the first time in its history that the General Assembly is devoting a special session to matters of disarmament. The German Democratic Republic values this as an expression of the growing awareness that arms limitation and disarmament have become the critical issue in international relations.

148. Since the founding of the United Nations, the Charter has determined the Organization's immutable objective: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. The United Nations is the forum for exchanging views on basic issues and main trends of international developments, including disarmament. Sincerity compels us to note that the potential of the United Nations for resolving this question of all questions is far from having been exhausted. The special session reflects the desire of the peoples that effective measures should now be taken so that they may live in peace and not perish in a nuclear war. As a matter of fact, putting an end to the insanity of the arms drive and proceeding to disarmament is the most urgent task of the present time. The fate of the present and future generations depends on its resolution. This places the greatest responsibility on all States. The time has come to accept this responsibility and to prove one's determination to do so.

<sup>5</sup> Mr. Fischer spoke in German. The English version of his statement was supplied by the delegation.

149. Jointly with the other States of the socialist community, the German Democratic Republic pursues the objective of implementing general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We would, no doubt, get closer to a world without arms if this session were to succeed, first in initiating practical steps towards putting an end to this fateful arms race; secondly, in agreeing on basic guidelines that the further process of arms limitation and disarmament is to follow; thirdly, in defining the common objectives and principles to govern negotiations on disarmament; and, fourthly, in paving the way towards the calling of a world disarmament conference, which is the forum that can take binding decisions.

150. Such objectives will have the support of the German Democratic Republic. To achieve them, we are ready to co-operate with all forces. A halt to armament and gradual disarmament are definitely in the national interest of the people of our Republic, and there are good reasons why this should be so. What has been created through the workmen's diligence and by gifted brains must never again perish in the flames of war, but must serve a peaceful tomorrow where everyone can go about his work without insecurity, where children can grow up untroubled and where the young will know about the terrors of war only from history books.

151. As a socialist State, we need peace and disarmament so as to be able to build an efficient economy and to ensure the social and cultural advance of our people. As a socialist State, we work for peace, because men can prosper only in peace in socialism. Effective arms limitation and disarmament may release substantial means also benefiting the peaceful development of our country. This would open up for us additional opportunities for peaceful and mutually beneficial international co-operation.

152. We are serious about the pledge we made when our State was founded almost 30 years ago, and which we reaffirmed to the international public on the occasion of our admission to membership of this world Organization, that is, to do everything to ensure that a war shall never again start from German soil.

153. To keep the lessons of the war—its horrors and sufferings—alive in the minds of present and future generations, as has been demanded from this rostrum, is, in our view, essential in educating people in the spirit of international peace and understanding.

154. The German Democratic Republic is situated at the boundary line of the world's two most powerful military groupings. A military conflict in central Europe, no matter whether fought with conventional or with nuclear weapons, would have incalculable consequences. We therefore stand for both global and regional measures to limit armed forces and armaments.

155. The shift from the cold war to détente initiated in the early 1970s has markedly improved relations between States having different social systems. Détente is beneficial, and therefore it must continue to determine international developments. Its effect is, however, seriously hampered by the arms race. Unless we succeed in overcoming

the contradiction between political détente and military armament, the achievements gained so far can only be jeopardized.

156. How much longer can mankind afford to squander vast resources and potential on purposes that threaten its very existence? Karl Marx, the world-renowned German scholar, said that, economically, military expenditure was tantamount to a nation's putting part of its capital down the drain. The arms race today is a barrier to the satisfaction of mankind's elementary needs. Still worse, the arms race has reached a stage where it poses a threat to human life.

157. The terrifying figures that point to the growing scope of military spending have meanwhile been referred to from this rostrum more than once. These figures are self-explanatory, but they still give only a rough impression of the actual burden weighing on mankind. The arms race makes all well-springs of wealth on this earth run dry. It cripples the world's economy and slows down the progress of all humanity.

158. The developing countries are particularly hard hit. Centuries of colonial oppression have left the peoples of these countries a heritage that is onerous enough. Let me mention just underdevelopment and exploitation, backwardness and hunger, disease and illiteracy. Even part of the means being wasted on armaments would aid them. It is our conviction that disarmament is inseparably linked with economic development in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

159. The more broadly realistic measures of arms limitation and disarmament are agreed, the greater will be the possibilities of providing the developing countries with additional means of resolving their problems. This also meets the striving of these States for equal economic rights and a restructuring of international economic relations on democratic lines.

160. The arms race has today seized the whole world. It can therefore not be for the big Powers alone to stop it. As it affects all, it is a matter of concern to all and can be ended only through an effort by all. Armaments bring no benefit to the German Democratic Republic nor to the other socialist countries. On the contrary, they have to withhold resources from their national economies in order to ensure the reliable protection of the peaceful work of their peoples. We could really set those resources to better use. It is obvious that the arms race is whipped up by those who profit from it. It is being stepped up by those who accept neither the political nor the territorial realities.

161. While this forum has been discussing measures to end the arms race, another meeting has been held, within earshot, so to speak, at which some speakers were the same as at this session, and which has taken decisions on a long-term programme of stepped-up armament.

162. The socialist States have come to this forum with a constructive programme of arms limitation and disarmament. It takes account of what is at present feasible and necessary. To demand "all or nothing" is certainly no

good counsel in politics. This is true especially for a subject that is as complex and relevant to all States as disarmament.

163. The prevention of nuclear world war is the cardinal task of our time. This will hardly be denied by anyone. Priority should therefore be given to an agreed ban on the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and to the reduction of their stockpiles.

164. The neutron weapon is the sword of Damocles of our days. Its production and deployment in Western Europe, first, would increase the danger of nuclear war. Secondly, the neutron weapon is an offensive weapon for mass destruction, the use of which would in any event be also directed against the civilian population. And thirdly, its manufacture and deployment would work against non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

165. The propaganda machine of the advocates of the neutron weapon has left nothing undone to deceive the public in order to justify plans for neutron weapons. In this it has failed, a fact that is proved by the world-wide mass movement. In this movement the peoples are defending the supreme human right, the right to life.

166. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has stated it would forgo manufacturing the neutron weapon if the United States of America would do the same. This is the most practical proposal conceivable, an unmistakable statement, and hence a political decision.

167. Moreover, a project is on the negotiating table for a world-wide prohibition of the production, storage, stationing and use of the neutron weapon.<sup>6</sup> Who will accept responsibility vis-à-vis the peoples and evade what life dictates?

168. To call for a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons in no way means to underestimate the importance of other partial measures. One of them is an agreement on the general and complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The German Democratic Republic takes the view that even an interim agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom could be conducive to this end. Complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests requires the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a comprehensive participation of all the other States would be appropriate.

169. In the context of their concept for an end to the arms race there remain on the agenda the proposals that the Warsaw Treaty States made at the Belgrade meeting with a view to strengthening military détente in Europe. I single out here the proposal that the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe undertake in a treaty not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.

<sup>6</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-third Session, Supplement No. 27, vol. II, document CCD/559.*

170. Of the utmost significance is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We suggest that the special session of the General Assembly reaffirm its universality. The German Democratic Republic also supports efforts towards establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. It is significant that the Soviet Union has signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>7</sup>

171. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in no way impedes the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The German Democratic Republic is a party to this Treaty. Our experience indicates that the Treaty does promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Anyone who maintains otherwise is obviously pursuing other ends.

172. In this context there has been alarming news of the intention of the South African racist régime to get hold of nuclear weapons. The ninth special session of the Assembly on Namibia demanded immediate action to prevent that. To begin with, the Security Council could oblige all States to refrain from nuclear co-operation with South Africa. The racist régime should be called upon to forgo the manufacture of nuclear weapons. We think it is the duty of this forum to declare that the United Nations is not going to tolerate any nuclear armament of the aggressive racist régime. We call attention to the fact that the State of Israel, which the United Nations has characterized as an aggressor, also seeks to become a nuclear-weapon Power.

173. We categorically oppose the manufacture and use of weapons which can each kill thousands or even millions of people by radiation, concussion or other modes of action. Heightened attention should therefore be given to conventional arms which tend to turn into means of mass destruction.

174. Agreement could and should immediately be reached on ceasing the development of new types of conventional weapons with vast destructive capacity. The Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council, and those which have military agreements with them, should agree to refrain from increasing their conventional arsenals. It would also be necessary to agree that armed forces should not be enlarged.

175. For almost five years negotiations have been under way at Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe. Although the socialist States have been patient and made a great number of compromise proposals, there has been no result so far, because the participating NATO countries have insisted on arrangements that would give them unilateral military advantage. How can this be successful? Only with a realistic approach of all parties can speedy progress be achieved in the Vienna talks. We expect an appropriate decision to be taken at long last.

176. Security for the peoples also requires the dismantling of imperialist military bases in various parts of the

world. The demand of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that all foreign troops, together with their nuclear and conventional armaments, be withdrawn from South Korean soil is legitimate.

177. One of the sweeping measures against the danger of war would be the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force. The German Democratic Republic considers that the preparation of such a treaty is urgent. Recourse to any kind of arms in international relations must no longer be possible. Such an obligation in a universal treaty is of crucial importance to the security of all States, no matter whether they are great or small, what kind of social system they have, or what their military capability is.

178. All experience shows how important it is to determine the basic principles of arms limitation and disarmament. The German Democratic Republic therefore feels that such principles should be agreed upon at this special session. The particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States is beyond all doubt. Their active and constructive participation in negotiations on nuclear disarmament is a *sine qua non*. Application of the principle of equal and undiminished security, and the commitment of all States to contribute to the efforts towards disarmament are, of course, indispensable. We are pleased to note that agreement is emerging in efforts to work out these important principles. We feel that it is significant that the same holds good for the nature of control measures.

179. The cardinal point of all efforts for disarmament is political; disarmament requires today and first of all political will on the part of Governments. If such will exists, it cannot be so difficult to find appropriate bodies and mechanisms, and it will then be for experts to work out binding international agreements.

180. The approximate military equilibrium between East and West is to be maintained on the basis of the principle of equal security at a lower level; that is, the existing military balance with fewer soldiers and weapons. That is not difficult. One must really want it, and not merely talk about it or even take action to the contrary.

181. Post-war developments have shown that results can be achieved. Along with important bilateral agreements, a greater number of universal treaties have been concluded in recent years on partial measures of arms limitation and disarmament. The German Democratic Republic would be gratified if further States were to accede to the existing conventions. Paraphrasing a saying of Bertolt Brecht, one might say that disarmament is the simple thing that is hard to do: simple—provided one really wants disarmament; hard—as an immense number of different and frequently divergent interests have to be accommodated. It is encouraging to note that it has been made clear from this rostrum that the prevention of a new world war is a matter that most States have at heart. But in one speech, blind with anti-Sovietism, there was talk of the inevitability of war, with allegations that preparations for it need to be made. It is obvious that in speaking so, the authors want to justify their own aggressive demeanour against peaceable nations. But world public opinion cannot be deceived.

<sup>7</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 326.

182. The process of disarmament has got under way, and this has furnished evidence that the restriction and elimination of material means of warfare are possible. This is borne out by the progress that has been achieved in the current negotiations on the second agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

183. We indulge neither in optimism nor in pessimism; rather we want a matter-of-fact appreciation of what has been achieved. And is it not true that the arms race has been limited, to the benefit of all peoples, at least in some fields? It is evident that this is not sufficient. International developments have a terrific momentum, especially the arms drive. This is compelling enough to give up the leisurely pace in negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. Disarmament negotiations are lagging behind the rapid arms drive. Must it be like that? Not at all. No people has ever received the slightest benefit from armament.

184. That is the reason the Soviet proposals, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, substantiated before this session, have had a broad resonance in the German Democratic Republic and are whole-heartedly supported by its Government. These proposals show ways and possibilities for a genuine solution to the really complex disarmament problems.

185. The results we hope this body will achieve would no doubt create propitious conditions for a world disarmament conference. Such a conference can obviously not be replaced by any other forum. Therefore, the German Democratic Republic deems its early convening indispensable.

186. I assure representatives that the German Democratic Republic will continue to take part in all work leading to disarmament in good faith and to the best of its abilities, as it has done in the past.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*