

nuclear weapons can constitute a positive contribution to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons,

*Bearing in mind* paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>74</sup> in which it urged the nuclear-weapon States to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Noting* that the five nuclear-weapon States have recognized the significance of action to meet the concerns of the great majority of States, which have not sought to acquire or develop, alone or with others, any nuclear explosive devices,

*Recalling* that each of the five nuclear Powers has stated its willingness to take action to affirm its support for and to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

*Taking note* of the various proposals and suggestions made in this regard,

1. *Notes* the statements that the nuclear-weapon States have made on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the use of nuclear weapons;

2. *Welcomes* the report of the Committee on Disarmament,<sup>75</sup> in which it reported on the initial consideration of and negotiation on effective international arrangements further to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States;

3. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts at its session in 1980 with a view to reaching agreement on such arrangements and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session of the items entitled "Strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States" and "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons";

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States".

*97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979*

### 34/87. General and complete disarmament

#### A

#### CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION PROHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* the resolution of the Commission for Conventional Armaments of 12 August 1948, which defined weapons of mass destruction to include atomic explosive weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above,

*Recalling* its resolution 2602 C (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,

<sup>74</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>75</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1).*

*Recalling* paragraph 76 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>76</sup> in which it is stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons,

*Convinced* that such a convention would serve to spare mankind the potential dangers of the use of radioactive materials to cause destruction, damage or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such material and thereby contribute to strengthening peace and averting the threat of war,

1. *Welcomes* the report of the Committee on Disarmament with regard to radiological weapons<sup>77</sup> and, particularly, its stated intention to continue at its session in 1980 consideration of proposals for a convention banning those weapons;

2. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to proceed as soon as possible to reach agreement, through negotiation, on the text of such a convention and to report to the General Assembly on the results achieved for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

*97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979*

#### B

#### CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 33/91 B of 16 December 1978 on confidence-building measures,

*Desiring* to eliminate the sources of tension by peaceful means and thereby to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world,

*Stressing again* the importance of the statement contained in paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly<sup>78</sup> that it is necessary, in order to facilitate the process of disarmament, to take measures and to pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

*Recognizing* the need and urgency of first steps to diminish the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or from misinterpretations of military activities,

*Reaffirming* its conviction that commitment to confidence-building measures could contribute to strengthening the security of States,

*Aware* that there are situations peculiar to specific regions which have a bearing on the nature of confidence-building measures feasible in those regions,

*Convinced* that the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, can play an important role in creating

<sup>76</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>77</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1), sect. III.E.*

<sup>78</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

conditions which are conducive to the consideration of confidence-building measures,

*Recognizing* that a minimum of trust among States in a region would facilitate the development of confidence-building measures,

*Taking note* of the views and experiences of Member States submitted to the Secretary-General<sup>79</sup> in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 33/91 B,

1. *Recommends* that all States should continue to consider arrangements for specific confidence-building measures, taking into account the specific conditions and requirements of each region;

2. *Decides* to undertake a comprehensive study on confidence-building measures, taking into account the answers received by the Secretary-General<sup>79</sup> and relevant statements made at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts<sup>80</sup> appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a progress report on the work of the group of governmental experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

5. *Invites* States which have not yet done so to respond to the request of the Secretary-General in accordance with paragraph 2 of resolution 33/91 B and to acquaint the group of experts with their views and experiences through the Secretary-General;

6. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session the item entitled "Confidence-building measures".

97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979

### C

#### NON-STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF STATES WHERE THERE ARE NO SUCH WEAPONS AT PRESENT

*The General Assembly,*

*Conscious* that a nuclear war would have devastating consequences for the whole of mankind,

*Recalling* its resolution 33/91 F of 16 December 1978, in which it called upon all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, and on all non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories to refrain from any steps which would directly or indirectly result in the stationing of such weapons on their territories,

*Bearing in mind* the clearly expressed intention of many States to prevent the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories,

*Considering* that the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would constitute a step towards the larger objective of the subsequent complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of other States, thus contributing to the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, leading eventually to the total elimination of nuclear weapons,

1. *Believes* it necessary to examine possibilities for an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to this end to call upon all States to transmit to him their opinions and observations regarding the possibility of concluding the agreement mentioned in paragraph 1 above and to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

3. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present".

97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979

### D

#### PROHIBITION OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 33/91 H of 16 December 1978, in which it requested the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its implementation of the proposals contained in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>81</sup> to consider urgently the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration,

*Noting* that the agenda adopted by the Committee on Disarmament includes the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" and that the agenda for 1979 included the item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament",<sup>82</sup>

*Recalling* the proposals and statements made in the Committee on Disarmament during the consideration of those items,

*Considering* that the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion and transfer of stocks to peaceful uses would be a significant step towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race,

*Considering* that the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would also be an important measure in facilitating the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices,

*Requests* the Committee on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on the item entitled "Nuclear weapons in all aspects", to pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to keep the General Assembly informed of the progress of that consideration.

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<sup>79</sup> A/34/416 and Add.1 and 2.

<sup>80</sup> Subsequently referred to as the Group of Governmental Experts on Confidence-building Measures.

<sup>81</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>82</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27 and Corr.1), para. 20.*

## E

STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS  
RELATING TO THE PROCESS OF DISARMAMENT

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the field of disarmament,

*Recalling with satisfaction* the measures taken as a result of its tenth special session to revitalize existing disarmament machinery and appropriately to constitute forums for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character,

*Noting* that the growing disarmament agenda and the complexity of the issues involved, as well as the more active participation of a large number of Member States, create increasing demands on United Nations management of disarmament affairs for purposes such as the promotion, substantive preparation, implementation and control of the process of disarmament,

*Recalling* the recommendation of the Disarmament Commission, adopted on 8 June 1979,<sup>83</sup> that the requirements of an institutional and procedural nature should be examined in order to facilitate the disarmament process and to ensure implementation of disarmament agreements, including the relevant proposals referred to in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly<sup>84</sup> or made elsewhere,

*Convinced* that a comprehensive study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament would be desirable in providing for carefully considered decisions regarding the organization, functions and structure required to meet current and future needs in the disarmament process,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts,<sup>85</sup> to carry out a comprehensive study assessing current institutional requirements and future estimated needs in the United Nations management of disarmament affairs and outlining possible functions, structure and institutional framework that could meet those requirements and needs, including legal and financial implications, and formulating recommendations for possible later decisions on the matter;

2. *Recommends* that the Secretary-General, in carrying out this study, should seek the views of Member States, for the benefit of the experts, on some key issues, such as desirable functions, structure and institutional framework of United Nations management of disarmament affairs;

3. *Invites* all Governments to co-operate with the Secretary-General so that the objectives of the study may be achieved;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a final report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

*97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979*

## F

## STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 2602 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, 2932 B (XXVII) of 29 November 1972,

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement No. 42 (A/34/42), sect. IV, para. 19.

<sup>84</sup> Resolution S-10/2.

<sup>85</sup> Subsequently referred to as the Group of Governmental Experts to Study the Institutional Arrangements relating to the Process of Disarmament.

3184 A and C (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, 3261 C (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3484 C (XXX) of 12 December 1975, 31/189 A of 21 December 1976 and 32/87 G of 12 December 1977,

*Reaffirming* its resolution 33/91 C of 16 December 1978, in which it, *inter alia*:

(a) Reiterated its satisfaction with the solemn declarations made in 1977 by the heads of State of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in which they stated that they were ready to endeavour to reach agreements which would permit starting the gradual reduction of existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons and moving towards their complete and total destruction, with a view to a world truly free of nuclear weapons,

(b) Recalled that one of the disarmament measures deserving the highest priority, included in the Programme of Action set forth in section III of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly,<sup>86</sup> was the conclusion of the bilateral agreement known as SALT II, which should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of and qualitative limitations on strategic arms,

(c) Stressed that in the Programme of Action it was established that, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility,<sup>87</sup>

*Noting* that the SALT II agreement—which bears the official title “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms”—was finally signed on 18 June 1979 and that its text, together with the texts of the Protocol to the Treaty and of the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms, both signed on the same day as the Treaty, and that of the joint communiqué, also issued on 18 June 1979, is reproduced in a document of the Committee on Disarmament,<sup>88</sup>

1. *Shares the conviction* expressed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms that early agreement on the further limitation and further reduction of strategic arms would serve to strengthen international peace and security and to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war;

2. *Notes* that it has not been possible for the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) to go beyond certain limitations which, taken together, permit considerable increments, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the levels of the nuclear arsenals existing at present;

3. *Welcomes* the agreement reached by both parties with a view to:

(a) Continuing to pursue negotiations, in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security, on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation;

(b) Endeavouring in such negotiations to achieve, *inter alia*, the following objectives:

(i) Significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms;

<sup>86</sup> Resolution S-10/2, para. 52.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 48.

<sup>88</sup> See CD/53/Appendix III/Vol. I, document CD/28.

- (ii) Qualitative limitations on strategic offensive arms, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms;

4. *Trusts that:*

(a) The Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II) will enter into force at an early date in accordance with the provisions of article XIX thereof, inasmuch as it constitutes a vital element for the continuation and progress of the negotiations between the two States possessing the most important arsenals of nuclear weapons;

(b) Such negotiations, intended to achieve, as soon as possible, agreement on further measures for the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, will begin promptly after the entry into force of the Treaty, as provided for in article XIV thereof, with the objective of concluding well in advance of 1985 the new agreement which will replace the Treaty and which is usually referred to as SALT III;

5. *Trusts also* that the two contracting States will implement all the above-mentioned agreements and provisions and do their utmost in order that the SALT III agreement may constitute an important step towards the final goal described by their respective heads of State as that of achieving the complete and total destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and ensuring the establishment of a world free of such weapons;

6. *Invites* the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly;

7. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session an item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks".

97th plenary meeting  
11 December 1979

### 34/88. Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling once again* the affirmation in the Charter of the United Nations of the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to this end to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security,

*Stressing again* the importance of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, and recalling the principles proclaimed in the Final Document of that session,<sup>89</sup>

*Convinced* that there is an urgent need for active and combined efforts further to intensify the comprehensive implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at the tenth special session and that, to this end, a continuing and sustained effort by all States, in a more co-ordinated manner and on the basis of world-wide co-operation in the interests of security and peace, is essential,

*Recalling* the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-

tion among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>90</sup> in which the General Assembly proclaimed the duty of all States to pursue in good faith negotiations for the early conclusion of a universal treaty on general and complete disarmament and to strive to adopt appropriate measures to reduce international tensions and strengthen confidence among States,

*Stressing* the inalienable right of every nation and every human being to live in peace, free from the threat of war, in freedom and independence, as was solemnly reaffirmed by the General Assembly in the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace,<sup>91</sup> the strict observance of which is in the highest interests of mankind and is an essential prerequisite for its full development,

*Conscious* that a dynamic development of détente in all spheres of international relations throughout the world would contribute to the achievement of the aims of disarmament,

*Deeply disturbed* by the fact that international peace and security of peoples continue to be threatened by the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, and the accumulation of stockpiles of highly destructive weapons and that, at the same time, the continuation of the arms race conflicts with the interest of the economic development and the social and spiritual progress of mankind,

*Noting*, in particular, that the arms race is incompatible with and contrary to the efforts directed towards the establishment of the new international economic order,

*Stressing* the fact that the Governments of all countries, particularly of nuclear-weapon States, bear a historic responsibility for eliminating war from human life, primarily through the adoption of effective and decisive disarmament measures aimed at the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

*Noting* that special responsibility for achieving general and complete disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and for averting nuclear war rests with all States possessing nuclear weapons and other militarily significant States,

*Proceeding* from the principle that effective, constructive and continuing co-operation among all States based on mutual confidence and political will, irrespective of their social system and level of economic development, is essential for the achievement of disarmament and the attainment of its goals,

*Convinced* that such co-operation must be demonstrated, developed and intensified in mutual contacts and in any forum where States conduct negotiations on disarmament, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament, in order that the aims of the negotiations may be achieved as speedily as possible,

*Convinced also* that such co-operation must express a common determination by States to bring about a decisive shift in disarmament negotiations and, at the same time, must be sustained by the creation of a favourable atmosphere of trust in relations among States,

*Bearing in mind* the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in promoting the uniting of efforts and the establishment of co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems,

<sup>89</sup> Resolution 2625 (XXV), annex.

<sup>91</sup> Resolution 33/73.

<sup>88</sup> Resolution S-10/2.