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*President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).*

**AGENDA ITEM 85**

**The situation in the Republic of the Congo  
 (*concluded*)\***

1. The PRESIDENT: Some representatives have asked to explain the votes they cast at the last meeting at which this item was discussed. For that purpose, I call first on the representative of the Soviet Union.
2. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to make the following statement in connexion with the votes taken on the draft resolutions—votes which have terminated the lengthy discussion on the question of the Congo at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly.
3. In the first place, as shown by the entire course of the discussion of the question of the Congo during the second half of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly, the overwhelming majority of delegations agree that the situation in the Republic of the Congo is still unsettled, despite the fact that the question has already been under active discussion for more than nine months in the highest organs of the United Nations, and despite the fact that the Organization is conducting operations on an unprecedented scale in the Congo itself.
4. Most delegations also agree that Belgian interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo is the primary cause of the crisis in that country.
5. In point of fact, even Belgium's immediate allies cannot now explicitly deny its responsibility for events in the Congo. This is natural enough, for the Belgian colonialists are acting so shamelessly that they are making the true nature of the policy of colonialism plain to the whole world and are thus also exposing their own allies to the judgement of world public opinion.
6. In these circumstances, the General Assembly might have been expected to be in a position to adopt the

twenty-one-Power draft resolution [*A/L.339 and Add.1-5*], which contains a specific demand for the withdrawal, within a strictly defined period, of all Belgian personnel from Congolese territory. The setting of a definite period for the withdrawal of all Belgian personnel was fully justified, as was the warning that sanctions would be applied to Belgium in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in the event of failure to comply with the Assembly's decision, for Belgium is systematically disregarding the decisions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly concerning the cessation of its interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. It was precisely for this reason that the Soviet delegation voted, together with many other countries, against all amendments and modifications that would have weakened this draft resolution, and reduce it to the level of yet another appeal or exhortation to the aggressor.

7. But the overt and covert allies of the Belgian colonialists—allies who pay lip-service to normalization of the situation in the Congo and are even prepared occasionally to reprove their friends for excessive lack of restraint in Africa—solidly supported amendments to the draft resolution that once again provide Belgium with a means of evading compliance with the Assembly's decision. It is indeed worth taking a look to see who, in particular, voted against fixing a time-limit for the withdrawal of Belgian personnel from the Congo. It was Portugal, France, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Spain, and the United States, together with all the other countries of NATO, SEATO and CENTO.

8. The same situation recurred in the voting on the provision in the twenty-one-Power draft resolution regarding the possible use of sanctions against Belgium. Some votes were cast against the draft resolution even in its weakened form. Who cast these votes? Belgium, Portugal, South Africa, the Netherlands. Comment on the composition of the vote against the draft resolution is superfluous.

9. The following point also merits attention. Although such countries as the United States of America voted, earlier, in favour of the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961<sup>1</sup> calling for the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo, on this occasion they opposed fixing a definite time-limit for the withdrawal of such personnel in the Assembly resolution. It was apparently easier to vote for immediate withdrawal than for withdrawal within a definite and precisely fixed time-limit. This is easy to understand, if we remember how flexibly Mr. Hammarskjöld interprets the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. One may hazard a guess as to how long a period the word "immediate" will cover in the present instance.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.*

\* Resumed from 985th meeting.

10. The position of the Western Powers and their supporters is essentially to advocate, in words, a solution of the problem of the Congo in the interests of the Congolese people, but, in deeds, to give a free hand to the aggressor waging a fight against the Congolese people.

11. All this is reminiscent of the position the Western Powers also took in the vote on the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [A/4502] at the fifteenth session of the General Assembly. At that time, too, these same Western Powers, while paying lip-service to freedom and independence of all peoples and boasting of their liberal traditions, came into the open and formed a united front against the adoption of a document directly obligating them to give practical effect to the lofty words they so glibly pronounced from this rostrum.

12. Over and over again one is provided with convincing evidence that the Western Powers pay only lip-service to the independence of the colonial peoples, but in practice, they have been, and are continuing, the old policy of oppression. Recent events in Cuba are further proof of this.

13. The twenty-one-Power draft resolution was gravely weakened by the deletion of a specific time-limit for the withdrawal of Belgian personnel and of a warning to Belgium regarding sanctions. But the Soviet delegation voted in favour of the proposal, for even in this form it still contains certain positive features. In particular, it makes the important statement—I quote from the third preambular paragraph of the resolution:

“... that the central factor in the present grave situation in the Congo is the continued presence of Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisors and mercenaries in total disregard of repeated resolutions of the United Nations” [A/L.339].

It also reasserts the demand for the withdrawal of all such personnel from the Congo.

14. The Soviet delegation is, of course, aware that this resolution may in fact meet the fate of all earlier resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, especially the resolution of the Security Council of 21 February 1961: But this example is quite sufficient to provide convincing evidence of a simple truth. So long as the fate of resolutions directed against the colonialists remains subject to the sole discretion of Mr. Hammarskjöld, a true servant of the colonialists, all these resolutions will remain mere scraps of paper.

15. Almost two months have passed since the last resolution on the Congo was adopted by the Security Council. Piles of documents have been produced and circulated, but the basic demand made in this resolution—for the immediate withdrawal of all Belgian personnel from the Congo—has not been met. Worse still, even the influx of new contingents of punitive forces into the country has not been halted.

16. It will be seen from an official United Nations document published a few days ago [S/4790, dated 14 April 1961<sup>2</sup>] that centres recruiting mercenaries for despatch to the Congo are continuing to operate in a number of European countries, in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia, that all these recruitment centres are under the same management, situated at

Brussels, that the mercenaries are being trained in the Congo itself by Belgians and that finally, the so-called “Compagnie internationale” is being actively used for punitive operations against the Congolese.

17. It will be seen from other recently published official documents of the United Nations, for instance, document S/4789 of 14 April 1961,<sup>3</sup> that the importation of arms into the Congo to equip the terrorist gangs has not been halted either, and that in this case the United Nations Command is acting merely as an observer and, to some extent, as a recording agency, as it did in the past.

18. It is typical that the aircraft referred to in document S/4789 (which, incidentally, belonged to the Federal Republic of Germany) was detained by United Nations forces after, and not before, it had been unloaded at Kolwezi (Katanga).

19. Thus, the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 has unfortunately brought about no change in the actual situation in the Congo. In the hands of Mr. Hammarskjöld and his henchmen in the Congo, the United Nations forces have been, and still are, an instrument serving a dual purpose: the first being to prevent active operations by the national forces against the colonialists, and the second, to help the colonialists in their struggle against the national forces. This is precisely what the situation is, no matter what the supporters of Mr. Hammarskjöld may say from this rostrum.

20. In the second place, apart from the question of the withdrawal of Belgian personnel from the Congo, there is another question about which a certain measure of unanimity has become apparent in the Assembly. This is the question of convening the Congolese Parliament.

21. Virtually throughout the debates on the situation in the Republic of the Congo, little objection, if any, has been made to the demand that the Congolese Parliament should be convened. It is true that several shades of opinion are to be found in the statements on the subject, but their general trend is nevertheless in favour of convening the Congolese Parliament as soon as possible. Furthermore, many delegations have specifically stated that, since the request for the convening of Parliament has already been put forward several times in resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, but has not so far been met, the General Assembly resolution should on this occasion set a definite time-limit within which Parliament should be convened.

22. It was for these reasons that the Soviet delegation submitted its own draft resolution, providing for the convening of the Congolese Parliament within a specified period. It has been contended that this draft resolution marks a departure by the Soviet Union from its previous position on the question of the Congo. This contention is incorrect and very far from the truth. The Soviet draft resolution [A/L.341] was not intended to set out the whole position of the Soviet Union on the question of the Congo. A position that has been repeatedly stated both here, in statements before the General Assembly, and in documents circulated to Members of the United Nations. This particular draft resolution had a more limited purpose—to supplement the twenty-one-Power draft resolution and thus to establish a foundation for a mutually acceptable

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1961, document S/4790.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, document S/4789.

decision by the Assembly on the question of the Congo, admittedly within the context of a minimum programme, but nevertheless a programme that would ensure a reorientation towards the effective normalization of the situation in that country.

23. All those who genuinely desire that the Congolese people should at long last be given an opportunity to express their own will voted for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union. The votes against this draft resolution, the contents of which are extremely clear, were mainly cast by the bloc of the colonialists and the countries that support them.

24. Thus, in this instance, too, the allies of Belgium, who press for the democratic development of the country and for observance of the parliamentary traditions about which they often speak so eloquently from this rostrum, took evasive action when it was a question of putting those words into practice. It is perfectly obvious why they did so. No matter how imperfect the parliamentary machinery of the Republic of the Congo may be, it is none the less the only representative institution of this African State, and the colonialists do not wish to deal with such a representative institution.

25. In the third place, the voting on the draft resolutions, and especially on the Soviet draft resolution, showed that while there is a measure of agreement in the Assembly with regard to the assessment of the causes of the Congo crisis, which is fraught with extremely dangerous consequences, there are still serious differences of opinion about the ways and means of resolving it.

26. Unfortunately, there are also considerable differences of opinion on this point among the countries of the African-Asian group which are actively concerned with the question of the Congo. Thus, some representatives of these countries attempt to counter the demand for the convening of Parliament by proposing the holding of a conference, or series of conferences, of so-called "de facto leaders". In discussing this proposal, it would be naïve not to take account of the hard fact that most of those now acting in the role of "de facto leaders" reached their position by a usurpation of power, in which they were abetted by the colonialists. Some of these "leaders", if such they may be called, have demonstrated their anti-national character by their participation in the organization and execution of the conspiracy against Mr. Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, in punitive operations against their own people and other similar activities.

27. One simple fact suffices to show the nature of the Leopoldville régime, for instance: the representative of that régime in the Assembly voted on Saturday against the withdrawal of Belgian personnel from the Congo. It would scarcely be possible to go any further.

28. Consequently, to substitute a collection of such "leaders" for the Congolese Parliament would be to help a clique of usurpers, of creatures of the colonialist lackeys, to maintain their hold on power in the Congo. Therein lies the political significance of all the appeals to abandon the idea of convening Parliament in favour of an assembly of "de facto leaders", no matter what attempts may be made to whitewash the deal being proposed to us, a deal advantageous only to the colonialists, but not at all to the Congolese people itself. For it should be obvious to everyone that, in the final analysis, it is not the leaders, but the people who count. The people alone is the supreme judge of its

own affairs; the people alone has the right to decide its own fate, the fate of its own country.

29. This is why the Soviet delegation not only advocates the convening of Parliament and opposes any attempt to facilitate the conspiracy of the Belgian lackeys, who have seized power against the will of Parliament, but also opposes attempts to couple the demand for the convening of Parliament with a directive that Parliament should take up the question of reviewing the constitutional structure of the Congo. Such an attempt was made in the seventeen-Power draft resolution [A/L.340 and Add.1-4 and Add.3/Corr.1], and we voted resolutely against it.

30. The Soviet delegation also voted against a number of other provisions of the seventeen-Power draft resolution and against the draft resolution as a whole. It did so for the reasons it explained earlier in discussing this draft resolution. Since the seventeen-Power draft resolution was not amended and its sponsors did not respond to the Guinean delegation's call for fully justified amendments, it retained all its inherent defects.

31. In view of the fact that the seventeen-Power draft resolution was adopted, we consider it necessary to stress the Soviet delegation's firm opinion that this resolution cannot ensure a solution of the Congo problem in the interests of the Congolese people. The approval of the report of the so-called Conciliation Commission, which has itself admitted its inability effectively to discharge its mission and whose report contains a number of harmful and dangerous recommendations, the proposal that the Congolese Parliament, if it convenes, should first consider the reorganization of the country and the appointment of still another Commission of Conciliation—all this is in the last analysis of advantage only to the colonialists, especially if it is borne in mind that most of the sponsors of the seventeen-Power resolution openly pressed for support of the Tananarive resolutions, which were prompted by the colonialists.

32. It is highly significant that, while the sponsors of the seventeen-Power draft resolution paid lip-service to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Congo, they made no reference to that point in the draft resolution itself, just as they failed to mention the necessity of maintaining the political independence of the Congo. Furthermore, some of them could not even bring themselves to vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, which specifically stated that no actions leading to a violation of the unity, political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo can be allowed.

33. In the fourth place, the grounds for the Soviet delegation's vote on all draft resolutions submitted for the consideration of the Assembly have been in strict conformity with the position the Soviet Union has adopted from the very outset of the Belgian aggression in the Congo.

34. The Soviet Government considered and still considers that it is, above all, necessary for the most resolute steps to be taken to halt this aggression. This means that all Belgian personnel must be immediately withdrawn from the territory of the Congo and that sanctions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations must be applied to Belgium, which has shown an utter disregard of the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. In addition, the Congolese people must be protected from new crimes

perpetrated by the gangs of Tshombé and Mobutu, which have organized and carried out repressive measures against the national leaders of the Congolese. The ringleaders of the terrorist gangs must be arrested and rendered harmless. The implementation of these measures will make the United Nations operations in the Congo superfluous and will bring about conditions in which the Congolese people will be able to settle their own domestic affairs themselves.

35. The Congolese people must be delivered from all forms of foreign interference, including the interference being carried on under the flag of the United Nations. At the same time, help and support must be given to the lawful Government of the country, headed by the successor of Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Mr. Antoine Gizenga, which has appealed to all States of the world for aid in re-establishing peace, order, unity, legality and the integrity of the Republic of the Congo.

36. The Soviet Government attaches exceptional importance to the question of the reorganization of the structure of the United Nations in such a way that authority is no longer exercised solely by the Secretary-General, who at present reflects the interests of the colonial imperialist Powers.

37. We considered, and still consider, that Mr. Hammarskjöld should vacate the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations, for it is impossible to acquiesce in a situation in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations is a man who has sabotaged the decisions of the highest organs of this international Organization and has even sullied himself by complicity in the murder of national Congolese leaders.

38. The Soviet delegation strongly urges that these proposals should be carried into effect, since they are dictated by life itself. Their soundness has been demonstrated by the entire course of events in the Congo, by the entire course of the discussion of the Congo problem in the United Nations. The Assembly's inability to take action that would effectively ensure the settlement of one of the major international crises is a misfortune for this Organization. It represents a weakness in the United Nations and provides further convincing proof of the need for a radical reorganization of its structure. Without such a reorganization, the United Nations will remain powerless in the face of grave international problems; it will continue to be an obedient tool in the hands of the colonialists and to provide a screen for their policy which constitutes a danger to peace.

39. Although the General Assembly has proved incapable of taking a decision that would have facilitated a radical solution of the Congo problem and took, instead, a decision that may even cause a serious deterioration in the situation and prejudice the national interests of the Congolese people, this does not relieve the peace-loving States of their responsibility for peace in Africa, for peace throughout the world.

40. The decision of the Security Council regarding the need to safeguard the political independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo and regarding the immediate withdrawal of the aggressors from that country still remains fully in effect. Those Members of the United Nations who are genuinely interested in a peaceful solution of the Congo problem will comply with these basic provisions, which correspond to the interests of the Congolese people.

41. For its part, the Soviet Union, together with the other peace-loving countries, will exert every effort to provide the people of the Congo with all the conditions necessary for peaceful, independent development and for economic well-being, and to ensure the restoration of peace and security in the heart of Africa.

42. The liberation of the Congolese people from the yoke of the colonialists is inevitable. Although the United Nations is still being prevented by the efforts of the colonialists from accelerating the attainment of the national aspirations of the Congolese people, the colonialists cannot halt this process, even though, for the time being, they are still in a position to utilize this international Organization for their own selfish aims.

43. Life develops according to its own laws, and these laws are operating against the colonialists. The last word will be spoken by the Congolese people itself.

44. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am sorry indeed to have to take time from the deliberations of the General Assembly, but one or two observations made by the representative of the Soviet Union make it necessary for me to reply. The representative of the Soviet Union saw fit to repeat all the previous accusations against the Secretary-General. I have already replied. I will not discuss them now and I can easily take them; but he went much further, and that is the point which calls for a reply.

45. He said again that the 21 February resolution<sup>4</sup> of the Security Council has not been implemented, and he found that natural in view of the fact that implementation was in the hands of the Secretary-General. First of all, let us note that if it is, it is at the request of the Security Council and of the General Assembly, recently repeated by this General Assembly on Saturday [985th meeting], in a vote to which the representative of the Soviet Union did not refer.

46. Moreover, what are the facts? The fact is, first, that implementation of this resolution has, as I have said before in the Assembly, been carried out in very intimate and close co-operation with the Advisory Committee on the Congo. The composition of this Advisory Committee is well known to the Assembly. Further, negotiations concerning implementation of part A, paragraph 2, to which the representative of the Soviet Union attaches special importance, have been carried out in Brussels by Ambassador Sahbani of Tunisia, and in Leopoldville by Mr. Gardiner of Ghana and Mr. Nwokedi of Nigeria.

47. My Special Representative in the Congo is still Mr. Dayal, and acting for him is Mr. Abbas of Sudan. You also know the composition of the Command. The Commander is an Irishman; the Deputy Commander is an Ethiopian. All these people are now called acolytes of the colonialists, and that is the reason why I take the floor. That is the point on which it is my duty as Secretary-General to protest.

48. In order to prove his case, this time the representative of the Soviet Union referred to two recent reports. He did so in a way which I think is significant. He referred to the report<sup>5</sup> on certain interrogations of mercenaries whom we had detained. He did not see

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1961, document S/4790.

in that report any sign of the fact that we take vigorous action against mercenaries. He saw only a sign of the fact that there are mercenaries. Likewise, he referred to the reports<sup>6</sup> on our impounding a German aircraft. He saw in that not any sign of our intervening in the spirit of the resolutions, but only a sign of the fact that there has been some arms running.

49. Those who have studied the case of the German aircraft may have observed that it went from Fort Lamy to Kolwezi in Katanga. We have at present some 15,000 men in the Congo over a territory which, as you know, is five times as large as France. We cannot be, and we are not, at all air strips, and for that reason I think that there can be no accusation against us if this aircraft, coming from outside the Congo, landed there without our being able to impound it at the time of unloading. It was impounded on its way back, when it happened to pass a point where we were represented.

50. In considering the whole question of the implementation of the resolutions, I think it would be appropriate to make a distinction between demands, authority and means. I believe that all through the history of the Congo operation demands have gone far beyond authorization and authorization far beyond means. That is the only comment I would like to make on the new complaints.

51. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I am grateful for this opportunity in explanation of vote to say a few words on the resolutions adopted on Saturday last [985th meeting], particularly as on that date other urgent duties necessitated my absence from New York and made it impossible for me to be present at the voting. The three resolutions adopted are intended to complete one another in the sense of implementing the resolutions of the Security Council, and more particularly, the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961.<sup>7</sup>

52. Resolution 1599 (XV), which calls for the prompt evacuation of all Belgian forces and other foreign elements and mercenaries was more than necessary in order that the paramount duty of the United Nations of establishing law and order in the Congo would not be countered and hampered by the presence of foreign elements outside the United Nations. We voted for this resolution. The paragraph about the time-limit to ensure prompt evacuation did not get the required two-thirds majority, but it may be hoped, however, that such evacuation will no longer be delayed, in the interests of a peaceful solution in the Congo.

53. This resolution in its purport is directed also to the Congolese authorities, whose duty, in conformity with the Security Council resolution, is to proceed to the evacuation of such foreign elements and mercenaries from the Congo.

54. It is very encouraging to read in the newspapers today's news, which shows a signal progress towards a peaceful solution of the problem by the agreement reached between the United Nations representatives and the Leopoldville authorities for implementing the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961, and evacuating foreign, military and other elements outside the United Nations. This first step of the Congolese co-operation with the United Nations in implementing

those resolutions will lead, as we hope, to a better understanding and co-operation between the Congolese leaders themselves, and we look forward to their meeting together at a conference and coming to an understanding in order that the unity, the security and the political integrity of the Congo may be saved.

55. With regard to resolution 1600 (XV), this is also in conformity with the spirit of the Security Council resolutions, and it forms a necessary complement to the previous one by aiming at forestalling attempts at a military solution of the problem, and at preventing the introduction of arms by urging the release of prisoners and the convening of Parliament and provincial assemblies and also deciding on the appointment of a Commission of Conciliation which is very important in order that the work of conciliation may proceed. My delegation voted also for this resolution.

56. The third resolution [1601 (XV)] which provides for prompt investigation into the tragic circumstances of the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues, is also in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961. This resolution is important not only from the viewpoint of the situation in the Congo but also from the broader aspect of our duties towards political morality. The circulation of the original draft resolution came rather late, and because of this and the lack of instructions, my delegation had to abstain from voting. However, our position on the matter has been made perfectly clear from our intervention during the debate, when, referring to "the series of political crimes, culminating in the murder of . . . Patrice Lumumba", we stated:

"The task of carrying out an immediate and impartial investigation into the death of Patrice Lumumba and his colleagues and punishing those responsible, as provided in the Security Council resolution, should be consistently pursued." [980th meeting, para. 25.]

This was our attitude on the subject, and the same is our attitude to all cases of political murder and crime, which must be emphatically condemned, investigated and punished, so that world public opinion may be satisfied and such crime stamped out as a means of obtaining political advantage.

57. We believe that no opportunity should be lost in emphasizing the need for placing moral principle first in the approach to all aspects of world problems. The rapid progress of science has made this an imperative. The deeper meaning of the recent scientific achievement of the Soviet Union, which made it possible for man to move into outer space and circle the earth in less than ninety minutes, is essentially a moral one. It should make the smallness of our globe stand out in relief, as well as the vastly important common dangers and common interests that should bind together the whole of mankind. This achievement should be seen as an urge towards the brotherhood of man and—I want particularly to emphasize this—induce support for this great world Organization, the United Nations, which is humanity's first step towards that great goal. Let us hope that a new and broader spirit of co-operation will prevail among all Member States when the sixteenth session of the General Assembly convenes in a few months.

58. The PRESIDENT: I give the floor to the representative of the Congo (Leopoldville), who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, S/4789.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4741.

59. Mr. CARDOSO (Congo, Leopoldville) (*translated from French*): The representative of the Soviet Union has just asserted that our delegation voted against the withdrawal of the Belgians. In order to remove forthwith this slur which has been cast upon us, we propose to recall what we said before the vote on the twenty-one-Power draft resolution [A/L.339 and Add.1-5].

60. Firstly, with regard to the mercenaries, we stated: "It is obvious that the mercenaries should get out, and the earlier the better." [985th meeting, para. 157.]

61. With regard to the voting we would recall that we voted, as is shown by paragraph 194 of the verbatim record of the 985th meeting, for the following part of paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution:

"Decides that all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under United Nations Command, and mercenaries, shall be completely withdrawn and evacuated."

I repeat that we voted for that part of the draft resolution. This was only a reminder and I thank the President for providing me with the opportunity to give it.

62. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): We have spoken at length and frequently on the question of the Congo, and normally I should have nothing to add to what we said about the draft resolution which we urged the Assembly to adopt and which the Assembly did us the honour to approve. I refer to the draft resolution which was contained in document A/L.340.

63. There were a few amendments suggested to our draft, and we did not vote in favour of these. One was contained in document A/L.342. We had no essential disagreement about the powers of the Head of State, but only our draft represented the maximum measure of agreement that could be reached among the sponsors, and we could not disturb that agreement. That was the reason why we found this amendment unacceptable.

64. Then there was the draft resolution, sponsored by twenty-one Powers, which would require the Belgians to quit within twenty-one days, failing which certain penal action would be taken. The Assembly, as you will recall, disapproved of the time-limit and the threat of penal action. Shorn of these provisions, we thought that the resolution would do more harm than good, as the urgency stressed in the earlier Security Council resolutions would be vitiated by this truncated resolution, and it would cause a misunderstanding of the wish of the General Assembly about foreigners quitting the Congo. For that reason, we could not support that draft resolution.

65. We also abstained on the draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union, because we thought that the draft resolution that we ourselves were supporting, to a large extent achieved the purpose that was intended by the Soviet Union. In fact, our draft resolution went beyond that purpose, because it also offered assistance to the leaders of the Congo in settling their political problems in their Parliament.

66. We must remember that a political constitution is an instrument for the good governance of a country, but the supreme purpose is good governance and the consequent happiness and well-being of a people. So, whether it be the *Loi fondamentale* or a law greater

or smaller in its dimensions, it must be subordinate to the peace and tranquillity of the Congo.

67. I should like to say a word in conclusion. We feel that the Assembly and the Security Council have done what they could regarding the situation in the Congo. But it would be appallingly naïve to think that this gives us sufficient cause for satisfaction. The real satisfaction would lie in the manner in which this legislation is put into action.

#### AGENDA ITEM 16

#### Election of six members of the Economic and Social Council (*concluded*)\*

68. The PRESIDENT: In connexion with this matter, I should like to make the following statement: I understand from the delegations concerned that since this matter was last before the Assembly, it has been the subject of conversations, as a result of which an agreement has been reached concerning the deadlock which exists in regard to this vacancy on the Economic and Social Council.

69. The Western European group is prepared to agree that if Belgium and India decide not to press their candidatures at this session of the Assembly, and another European candidate is elected now, then the Western European group will be prepared to support two candidates from among the members of the Asian-African group at next autumn's election for the seats now occupied by Afghanistan and Spain. I have been informed by the delegations of Belgium and India that this arrangement is agreeable to them. In keeping with this understanding, the candidature of Italy has been presented for the existing vacancy on the Economic and Social Council.

70. Strictly speaking, the Assembly should now proceed to a restricted ballot in connexion with the vacancy, a ballot restricted to Belgium and India; but in view of the fact that neither Belgium nor India is any longer a candidate at the present session, in keeping with the understanding to which I have just referred, I now invite the Assembly, which of course is the master of its own procedure, to proceed to an unrestricted ballot for the vacancy. If this course is agreeable, I now ask the Assembly to proceed to an unrestricted ballot for the remaining vacancy on the Economic and Social Council.

*At the invitation of the President, Mr. Erik W. Svenningsen (Denmark) and Mr. Kifla Wodajo (Ethiopia) acted as tellers.*

*A vote was taken by secret ballot.*

|                           |    |
|---------------------------|----|
| Number of ballot papers:  | 98 |
| Invalid ballots:          | 0  |
| Number of valid ballots:  | 98 |
| Abstentions:              | 4  |
| Number of Members voting: | 94 |
| Required majority:        | 63 |
| Number of votes obtained: |    |
| Italy .....               | 81 |
| China .....               | 4  |
| Cyprus .....              | 4  |
| India .....               | 4  |
| Portugal .....            | 1  |

\* Resumed from the 981st meeting.

*Having obtained the required majority, Italy was elected a member of the Economic and Social Council.*

71. The PRESIDENT: It may be useful if I endeavour to clarify at this point the application of rule 140 of the rules of procedure in regard to the election which has just taken place. As Members of the Assembly will recall, rule 140 of the rules of procedure provides that the term of office of members of the Councils shall begin on 1 January following their election by the General Assembly and shall end on 31 December following the election of their successors. On 20 December 1960, during its fifteenth session, the General Assembly elected five members to the Economic and Social Council and then decided to postpone until its resumed fifteenth session election of the member to fill the sixth vacancy on the Economic and Social Council. Members of the Assembly will agree, I am sure, that there should be no distinction between the terms of office of this newly elected member and the other five members elected in the early part of the session, for all six members were elected to fill vacancies occurring on 31 December 1960. Accordingly, I take it to be the sense of the Assembly that the term of office of Italy, which has just been elected a member of the Council, should be regarded as dating from 1 January 1961. If there is no objection, we shall take that as being the decision of the Assembly.

*It was so decided.*

#### **Organization of work**

72. The PRESIDENT: At this point I might perhaps intervene to say that, as Members of the Assembly who were present in the First Committee this morning will be aware, the First Committee expressed a desire to meet again this evening and authorized the Chairman of the Committee to speak to me and inform me of the Committee's wish, expressing the hope that the plenary Assembly would not meet at the same time as the First Committee. Since then I have had an opportunity of conversation with the Chairman of the First Committee and, subject to the agreement of the Assembly, I would propose that the plenary meeting of the Assembly which had been fixed for this evening should not be held, so as to enable the First Committee to proceed with its work. If this is agreeable, the First Committee will meet at 8.30 this evening, and the plenary meeting of the Assembly which had been scheduled for 8.30 this evening will not be held. In the absence of any objection, it will be so ordered.

*It was so decided.*

#### **AGENDA ITEM 20**

##### **Admission of new Members to the United Nations (continued)**

73. The PRESIDENT: I call on the representative of the United Arab Republic on a point of order.

74. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (*translated from French*): Under rule 76 of the rules of procedure, I move the adjournment of the debate on the item under discussion, namely, the admission of new Members to the United Nations.

75. The question of the admission of new Members is an academic and theoretical one, for it is largely dependent upon a favourable recommendation by the Security Council. The question may be raised again

in the Security Council, which will itself settle the problem. Moreover, we also have to deal with the question of Angola, which is an important one. There have been disturbances in that territory. Our immediate consideration of the problem is an urgent necessity. There are other matters, too, above all the question of Cuba, the gravity of which is beyond dispute. In these circumstances, my delegation proposes that debate on the item relating to the admission of new Members be adjourned and that the following item, namely the situation in Angola, be taken up immediately.

76. The PRESIDENT: The adjournment of the debate has been moved by the representative of the United Arab Republic under the provisions of rule 76 of the rules of procedure. In accordance with that rule, in addition to the proposal of the motion, only two representatives may speak in favour of the motion and two against it, after which the motion is at once put to the vote of the Assembly.

77. Mr. IGNACIO-PINTO (Dahomey) (*translated from French*): I would gladly have supported the proposal of the representative of the United Arab Republic that discussion of the question of the admission of Mauritania be adjourned. I am fully aware that the Assembly has important matters to discuss and, in particular, that such questions as Angola and Cuba should be given our closest attention.

78. However—and here I would appeal to your consciences—it would be wrong to defer examination of the question of the admission of a new Member solely on the grounds that the question is “academic and theoretical”. Are we really to be the pawns of procedural manoeuvrings when it is simply a matter of saying yes to what is right and no to what is out of order? I personally find it somewhat amazing that, ever since last December, we have continued to debate points of procedure in order to decide whether or not it is right to admit to an august assembly such as this a nation which has attained independence. The Assembly is agreed that all the conditions laid down in the Charter, even those relating to the attainment of independence, have been met. This is clear from the records of the First Committee on the subject: after a long debate it was deemed better, in view of the unequivocal nature of the matter, not to adopt any draft resolution.

79. In these conditions, is it to be taken that Mauritania is not a nation in the accepted meaning of that word? It is for you to prove it. Remember that there are peoples watching you, that at this very hour many members of the Assembly are telling us that we must not trifle with its authority. We must take care not to make it appear to the world that there are two ways of judging things here, depending upon whether one is weak or strong. For my part, it would be a very bitter pill if, out of eight ex-West African countries formerly under colonial oppression—I can say this without fear, for I have done my share in the fight for that independence—only one, Mauritania, despite the fact that it has gone through the same difficulties and has nothing to reproach itself for, had to remain at the door.

80. You will decide as you please; but my delegation is against such a proceeding. An African State cannot be admitted through the service entrance. Make your choice, and we, in my country, will then be able to see what we stand for here. But let me say that we are toying dangerously with the fate and destiny of the

Assembly. The Mauritanian case is extremely important. Are you incapable of asserting your will, despite the fact that the independence of Mauritania has been virtually recognized by more than sixty-one of the States represented here? If so, why do you have representatives in Mauritania? What kind of a game are we playing? We express our respects and our sympathy to an independent State, and our hopes for its prosperity, yet here we are not even capable of voting the admission of that State to the United Nations. What road are we on? Tomorrow yet another pretext will be found.

81. That is why we, together with certain other delegations, ask you quite simply to consult your consciences, remembering the decision taken by the First Committee [*see A/4594*]. We ask you to act in such a way that Mauritania can be admitted here with its head held high. That is why, on behalf of my delegation, I oppose any adjournment of the debate on this item. The vote will take place, each one will accept his responsibility, and all those who recognized Mauritania when they sent their congratulations or dispatched their delegations will then be able to show that they have the courage of their convictions.

82. The PRESIDENT: One representative having spoken against the motion, one other representative is entitled to speak against it and two in favour of it. I call on the next speaker, who is the representative of Niger.

83. Mr. DJERMAKOYE (the Niger) (*translated from French*): Ever since last December public opinion throughout Africa has been focused on the General Assembly of the United Nations. Will it at last admit an independent African State which has been recognized by a very large number of countries? That is the question which is on the lips of all Africans.

84. We know that subversive manoeuvres aimed at setting this problem aside during the present session have been and are still being carried on by those whose conscience in this matter is uneasy. We wish to state solemnly that we can unmask these manoeuvres, wherever they take place, and that we shall not hesitate to draw the necessary conclusions in order to meet the will of the African peoples and the needs of justice and peace.

85. As everyone here knows, it is our ambition and our ideal that the great human family should be enlarged as soon as a candidate agrees to recognize the Charter governing that family. Our ideal has been given adequate expression from this rostrum. We are against colonization and annexation in any form. We would be unfaithful to our principles if we were to support all manner of claims, regardless of where they come from, once the will of a nation has been freely and firmly expressed. Mauritania, an independent country recognized as such by a large number of nations, a country accepted as a member by several international organizations, deserves also to take its place beside us in this Assembly.

86. The USSR delegation has submitted amendments [*A/L.336*] to the eleven-Power draft resolution [*A/L.335*], amendments designed to ensure that the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations should be examined at the same time as the admission of Mauritania. My delegation has no objection to the two problems being linked provided that both States

concerned provide guarantees of their independence and agree to abide by the Charter of the United Nations.

87. We shall therefore vote in favour of the Soviet amendment and will oppose any manoeuvre aimed at adjourning discussion of this matter.

88. The PRESIDENT: Two representatives may now speak in support of the motion to adjourn the debate on this subject.

89. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): There is no doubt that some acerbity has already been produced in the Assembly as a result of the motion which has been proposed. My delegation is of the opinion that this matter is of such importance that possibly it would be wise for those concerned not to press the issue for the time being, but to talk about it perhaps in the corridors and see whether some amicable solution as to timing can be reached. We make this appeal because there are so many issues involved in the present case. There is, on the one hand, the question of independence of Mauritania. There is the question of the admission of the Republic of Mauritania. As we all know, Members of this Assembly were admitted in the first instance by a vote of the Security Council. From that point of view, then, my delegation is strongly of the view that no useful purpose would be served by pressing the issue in the Assembly, which will only pass a resolution which is innocuous in character, but which will not in fact bring about the result which may be desired.

90. It is in the light of this understanding that I want to appeal to all Members to realize that if time is allowed, so that proper consideration can be given to this matter, the Security Council in its wisdom may possibly change the vote which it cast last time and an amicable solution to this problem may be arrived at. It is only in this spirit that I am appealing to all concerned not to press this matter and in fact to adjourn the debate and allow all of us to talk about it peacefully.

91. Mr. SUBASINGHE (Ceylon): My delegation can well understand the feelings of the representative of Dahomey and the representative of Niger. We very much appreciate the strong feeling they have toward Mauritania and we appreciate their desire to have Mauritania admitted as a Member as early as possible. But it will also be appreciated that during the fifteenth session we have admitted a very substantial number of new Members and they were all admitted unanimously. It is the view of my delegation that when a new Member is admitted, if we can attain unanimity or at least near-unanimity, that is the most desirable condition in which a new Member can be admitted. But whether we like it or not, whether we agree with that view or not, unfortunately there is a strong division of opinion on the matter we are now considering.

92. Furthermore, if we refer to the eleven-Power draft resolution [*A/L.335*] and the amendments to it proposed by the Soviet Union [*A/L.336*], I think we can see the real issue that is before us. It was not possible to obtain agreement in the Security Council when this proposal was first made in September. If time is allowed, it is possible that some agreement may be arrived at whereby, perhaps at the beginning of the next session, we may be able to welcome Mauritania almost unanimously and give it a very warm reception here. I do not know—but it may be possible.

93. Therefore, in the view of my delegation, it would be most appropriate to postpone this question and allow

certain discussions, as suggested by the representative of Ghana, to take place. I therefore support the proposal made by the representative of the United Arab Republic.

94. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with the provisions of rule 76, I now propose to put to the vote of the Assembly the motion of the representative of the United Arab Republic that the debate on this item of the agenda should be adjourned.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Nigeria, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.*

*In favour:* Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ceylon, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nepal.

*Against:* Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Cameroun, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Federation of Malaya, Finland, France, Gabon, Greece, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger.

*Abstaining:* Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Togo, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela, Austria, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iran, Ireland, Laos, Liberia, Mexico.

*The motion was rejected by 45 votes to 30, with 18 abstentions.*

95. The PRESIDENT: Accordingly, the Assembly will proceed with its discussion of agenda item 20.

96. Mr. GALLIN-DOUATHE (Central African Republic) (*translated from French*): It will be recalled that the delegation of the Central African Republic is one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution [A/L.335] of 18 December 1960, which it submitted to the General Assembly with the delegations of Cameroun, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta, and which requested the Security Council to take note again of the candidature of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

97. Since, on 4 December 1960, eight members of the Security Council voted in favour of a draft resolution<sup>8</sup> recommending the admission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania to membership in the United Nations, and since no recommendation was made to the General Assembly because of the opposition of a permanent member, the Mauritanian problem again figures on the agenda of the second part of the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

98. I do not wish to take up too much of the time of the Members of the Assembly; however, certain things which have already been said in the First Committee on the Mauritanian problem need to be repeated, and this is what I should like to do with the President's permission.

99. We all know that, on 20 August 1960, the Moroccan Government handed the French Embassy a note setting forth its claims with regard to Mauritania; on the same day, Morocco submitted, through its representative to the United Nations, a request for the inclusion of the Mauritanian problem in the agenda of the fifteenth regular session of the General Assembly [*see A/4445*]. In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, an explanatory memorandum accompanied the request. On 14 September 1960, the representative of Morocco submitted an addition [A/4445/Add.1] to the first explanatory memorandum.

100. These two steps were the official continuation of a campaign conducted initially by a few political theorists to influence Moroccan opinion and endorsed for the last two years by the Rabat Government.

101. The Rabat Government based its pretensions on historical and legal arguments, according to which Mauritania is a Moroccan land, and contested the political evolution of Mauritania towards independence.

102. What is the value of these arguments? It is this question which my delegation would like to try to answer, of course with the permission of the Assembly, since, I repeat, we do not wish to abuse its kind attention.

103. Mauritania has never been part of Morocco. The Moroccan Government claims that Mauritania has always been an integral part of the Kingdom of Morocco and that it was France which, under the protectorate system, had artificially separated it.

104. From the historical point of view, the history of the Sahara shows that Morocco, although it organized, for example in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, certain fruitless expeditions across Mauritania, has never exercised its sovereignty over the country.

105. Although the sultans from time to time took advantage of the rivalry between the local populations to try to exert indirect influence in those regions, they have never been able to establish effective and durable authority over any portion of the country. Certain Moorish chiefs have thus sometimes received letters of investiture from the sultans, but they considered them as allies and not as their sovereigns, and they always refused to pay them the Koranic tithe, which is the mark of sovereignty in Islamic countries.

106. Furthermore, the claims of Morocco are not based on any historic right, especially if one considers that, as far as sovereignty is concerned, the decisive factor is not indirect presumptions deduced from former events, but ancient evidence relating directly to possession.

107. From the legal point of view, the Moroccan thesis, according to which Mauritania belonged to Morocco until the beginning of the twentieth century, is contradicted, firstly, by the Hispano-Moroccan Treaties of 28 May 1767 (art. 38), of 1 March 1799 (art. 22) and of 20 November 1861 (art. 38), all three dealing with commercial relations between Morocco and Spain. Oued Noun (Assaka) is expressly specified therein as the limit beyond which the sovereignty of the Sultan does not extend.

108. In addition, several conventions and agreements between France and Morocco concluded before the Protectorate—at a period when the sultans enjoyed

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Fifteenth year, Supplement for October, November and December 1960, document S/4567/Rev.1.

complete independence—clearly confirm that the Sahara and Mauritania are outside Moroccan sovereignty.

109. This is the case with certain provisions of the Treaty of Lalla-Marnia, of 18 March 1845, and of the Agreements of 20 July 1901 and 20 April 1902 concerning the Sahara; they show that Morocco recognized France's complete freedom to exercise its authority there. The first article of the Agreement of Algiers of 20 April 1902 states:

"The French Government shall establish its authority and ensure peace in the regions of the Sahara, and the Moroccan Government, its neighbour, shall assist it as far as it is able."<sup>9</sup>

110. By article 10 of the Agreements of 4 March 1910, which relate to Chaouia, the Moroccan Government undertook to prevent aid being given to the enemies of France in the Sahara and to instruct the Moroccan authorities in Sous and Oued Noun (Assaka) to suppress the smuggling of arms in those regions.

111. When it was completely independent, before 1912, Morocco never made the slightest protest or reservation against French internal legislation applicable to Mauritania, or against the signing by France of any international act concerning that country.

112. Under the Franco-Spanish Convention of 27 November 1912, Spain and France fixed the border between southern Morocco and Rio de Oro. This Convention was advantageous for Morocco, since it gave it the province of Tarfaya (ex-Spanish southern Morocco), whereas the traditional border was Oued Dra. Although this Convention was ratified by Morocco, an application of the provisions of the Treaty of Fez of 30 March 1912, the Moroccan Government is today questioning its validity.

113. To support its argument, the Moroccan Government has used a sentence from one of the letters exchanged on the subject of the Convention between France and Germany of 4 November 1911. This text is worded as follows:

"I am glad to note this assurance and to add that Germany will remain outside any private agreements which France and Spain may conclude on the subject of Morocco, on the understanding that Morocco comprises all that part of North Africa between Algeria, French West Africa and the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro."<sup>10</sup>

114. It is quite clear that the aim of this Agreement was simply to make a statement of the political intentions of Germany in a geographical area defined in very general terms. It is impossible to draw therefrom an argument with any legal value for fixing the frontiers of Morocco.

115. However, the argument used by Morocco defeats its own purpose, for this text clearly shows that Mauritania, which had since 1904 been administratively part of French West Africa, was not under the sove-

<sup>9</sup> See Heinrich Triepel, *Nouveau Recueil général de Traités*, continuation of the large *Recueil* of G. Fr. de Martens, Leipzig, Dieterich publishing house, 1909, third series, vol. I, p. 30.

<sup>10</sup> Extract from a letter, dated 4 November 1911, addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire to the Ambassador of the French Republic at Berlin. See Heinrich Triepel *Nouveau Recueil général de Traités*, continuation of the large *Recueil* of G. Fr. de Martens, Leipzig, Dieterich publishing house, 1913, third series, vol. VI, pp. 323 and 324.

reignty of Morocco; in fact, then as now, they had no common frontier.

116. What should be deduced from this? Simply that the action of the Moroccan Government was designed to prevent Mauritania from enjoying the right of peoples to self-determination.

117. The Moroccan Government claims that the changes in the administrative and political situation which have occurred in Mauritania not only prejudice the result of the negotiations on the question of the frontiers, but also are contrary to the deeply-rooted aspirations of the Mauritanian people, who have on several occasions expressed the "wish to rejoin the Moroccan community".

118. In this connexion, it is useful objectively to recall the exact nature of the measures taken by France.

119. On 31 March 1957, the Mauritians were asked to elect their representatives to the Territorial Assembly by universal suffrage. On 28 September 1958, at the referendum, a very large majority of them (302,018 "yes", that is 94 per cent of the votes, against 19,126 "no") voted for the participation of Mauritania in the Community which was to be established. On 28 November 1958, the Mauritanian Assembly proclaimed the "Islamic Republic of Mauritania"; it then drew up a constitution which was unanimously adopted on 22 March 1959. On 17 May 1959, the Mauritians elected their National Assembly by universal suffrage and, in June 1959, a new Government was set up in accordance with the Constitution. This Government decided, in agreement with its National Assembly, that the independence of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania would be proclaimed on 28 November 1960. With that end in view, agreements for the transfer of power were concluded and bills approving these agreements were submitted to the respective Parliaments of the two States.

120. Thus, Mauritania must be considered as a politically organized State, endowed, according to a democratic programme, with the attributes of sovereignty.

121. France was therefore justified in rejecting the claims of Morocco concerning the annexation of Mauritania.

122. In establishing itself in this territory, at the end of the nineteenth century and during the twentieth century, France was acting in accordance with the international treaties which it had signed, in particular with Morocco. Since the conquest, it has enjoyed open, effective and continued possession of the area and has made possible the latter's development and advancement. During this period, the Mauritanian peoples have been guided towards freedom to administer themselves and to manage their own affairs democratically.

123. The claims of Morocco are in contradiction with the principles embodied in the United Nations Charter, namely, the right of peoples to self-determination (Article 1, paragraph 2) and the obligation to refrain from the threat against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State (Article 2, paragraph 4).

124. The delegation of the Central African Republic therefore considers that the Mauritanian question, included in the agenda of the General Assembly, is of an unusual and paradoxical nature in the annals of the United Nations. It amounts to considering, during 1960, the "Year of Africa", a delicate problem which need not have been raised if common sense had prevailed. It involved the claims of Morocco, an African, inde-

pendent and sovereign country, over Mauritania, which is also an autonomous African country and which was to join us in the great family of the United Nations.

125. My country, the Central African Republic, which was yesterday a colonized country and is now an independent and sovereign State, as you can see for yourselves, could not remain indifferent to the claims of Morocco over Mauritania, since those two States may logically be linked by certain ethnic, linguistic and religious affinities but are not, necessarily, politically linked by tenuous historic or geographical considerations at a time when the wind of the emancipation of the colonial peoples is blowing across Africa. This is the unusual aspect of the Mauritanian question.

126. The aim of our speech in the First Committee [1113th meeting] was therefore to impart to this Committee the fresh views of my Government and its people on the distressing problem raised by the Mauritanian question. As you know, these opinions—and I think that a certain courage is needed to recall them—are clear and precise. Whatever the value of the arguments put forward by Morocco, there could be no question of the annexion of all or part of Mauritania to the Moroccan community before the Islamic Republic of Mauritania attained national sovereignty.

127. Furthermore, according to certain arguments, it was rather Mauritania which, by an irony of history, could have laid claims to Morocco, because Morocco—as is asserted—was at one time dominated by the Almoravides. Fortunately, I do not think that Mauritania is nurturing any expansionist ambition.

128. In any case, in the opinion of the delegation of the Central African Republic, it is not logical or right to speak of any territorial claims in this atomic age. All continents would then witness an outbreak of such claims, which would historically be nonsense, or at any rate manifestly ridiculous.

129. This is the paradoxical aspect of the Mauritanian question raised in the First Committee, an aspect which has, moreover, been emphasized by certain speakers in forceful terms.

130. What is the most urgent objective set in 1960, the "Year of Africa"? Is it not the progressive guidance of the colonized peoples along the shining road of freedom, independence and national sovereignty by the colonizing peoples? The majority of the latter, with an objective devotion, to which heartfelt tribute should be paid, have honestly accomplished the noble mission entrusted to them.

131. In view of this, how can another African people, which is equally attached to justice and freedom and has had the privilege of being included in the great family of the United Nations, dare to obstruct this inevitable evolution dictated by the history of Africa?

132. Spiritual ties may certainly exist between the Moroccan people and the Mauritanian people. Linguistic, cultural or religious affinities may even strengthen these sentimental bonds. Similarly, it is conceivable that the two countries may to a certain extent complement each other economically. But the delegation of the Central African Republic considered that these factors should not compromise the forward progress of Mauritania, which wanted its independence. Action contrary to the legitimate aspirations of Mauritania would have been equivalent to adopting the attitude of an elder brother, who, under the pretext of strong affection, opposes the marriage of his younger brother, claiming that the

resulting separation would grieve him. In reality, the younger brother, when he comes of age, may leave the family roof to set up his own home, in order to enjoy that moral, material and social independence which is the prerogative of all freedom-loving people.

133. Mauritania should therefore have been left free to set up its own home in complete independence and in complete sovereignty, since Mauritania had come of age, thanks to the education and training received from the loyal and upright colonizing country.

134. These were the opinions voiced by the Central African Republic in the First Committee on the Mauritanian problem. The position of my country was in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, to which we have all freely and solemnly subscribed without reservations.

135. Mauritania is, unfortunately, as we have just noted, the last State in the Community to gain independence. Could Morocco, a country for which my country has much friendship, because we have many Moroccans living among us, and which is a profoundly religious and tolerant country, decently oppose the accession of Mauritania to independence?

136. As can be seen from the report of the First Committee [A/4594], at the 1117th meeting, on 25 November 1960, the representative of Libya submitted a draft resolution, sponsored by Indonesia, Jordan and Libya, to the effect that the General Assembly should reaffirm the principle of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Member States and recommend that France and Morocco enter into negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful solution of the problem in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.

137. At the same meeting, Afghanistan submitted amendments to this draft resolution, suggesting that in paragraph 2 of the draft resolution the words "France and Morocco" should be replaced by "the parties concerned", and that a third operative paragraph should be added suggesting that the General Assembly should recommend the parties concerned, for a just and peaceful solution of the problem, to respect the right of the people of Mauritania to self-determination, as ascertained by a referendum, free from any influence, under the auspices of the United Nations.

138. At the 1118th meeting of the First Committee, on 26 November 1960, the representative of Afghanistan withdrew his amendments and submitted other amendments suggesting that the second preambular paragraph of the draft resolution should be deleted and that paragraph 2 should be amended. These amendments were accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution and were incorporated in a revised draft resolution, suggesting that the General Assembly, having examined the question of Mauritania, should reaffirm the principle of respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Member States and recommend that the parties concerned enter into negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful solution of the problem on the basis of the right of self-determination.

139. At the same meeting, India submitted an amendment, suggesting that paragraph 2 of the revised draft resolution should be replaced by a text to the effect that the General Assembly expressed the hope that the parties concerned would reach a peaceful solution of the problem on the basis of the right of self-determination. The Indian amendment was withdrawn by

its sponsor; it was reintroduced by the representative of Iraq. Submitted, therefore, by Iraq, this amendment was rejected by 39 votes to 31, with 25 abstentions. As was to be expected, my delegation voted against the amendment of Iraq.

140. On a motion by India, later accepted by Indonesia, Jordan and Libya, the revised draft resolution was withdrawn and not put to the vote. The First Committee therefore had no recommendation to make to the General Assembly on the question entitled "The problem of Mauritania".

141. On 28 November 1960, Mauritania proclaimed its independence and entered upon the international scene as a free and sovereign State.

142. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania subsequently made an application to the United Nations, of which it wished to become a Member, in accordance with the provisions of the San Francisco instruments.

143. On 4 December 1960, a draft resolution<sup>11</sup> recommending the admission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania was unfortunately vetoed by a permanent member of the Security Council. This ninety-first veto arbitrarily closed the door of the United Nations to the new Mauritanian Republic, and this is no secret for anyone. On what arguments did the Soviet Union—which was the State concerned—base its hostile attitude towards the admission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania?

144. The Soviet Union invoked military agreements which, according to it, exist between France and the Republic of Mauritania. However, what the Soviet delegation forgot—or rather pretended not to know—is the fact that Mauritania gained its independence free from any commitment towards France, in the same way as the Central African Republic, which I have the honour to represent here.

145. The Soviet Union invoked the debate in the First Committee where, according to the USSR delegation, there had been certain signs of hesitation about the recognition of the independence of Mauritania, a contention which has just been refuted by the representative of Dahomey, who stated that an overwhelming number of States recognized Mauritania as a free and independent State by sending their representatives to the independence celebrations. However, the Soviet Union pretended to forget the fact that, because the Committee had not dared to pursue the debate further, discussion had suddenly been discontinued and the draft resolution previously submitted had been withdrawn.

146. The USSR delegation supported what it called the rights of Morocco, rights which, according to it, are recognized by the Soviet Union. It pretended to forget, however, that it had not raised any objection to the admission of the eleven States which were linked with France by ties similar to those uniting Mauritania with France.

147. No, the attitude of the Soviet Union, in our opinion, was based on motives which no delegation of good faith can fail to discern. Furthermore, a careful reading of the summary record of the 911th meeting of the Security Council proves this without any doubt. The Council was discussing the case of the Mongolian

People's Republic. My delegation strongly deplored the special treatment inflicted by the Soviet Union on the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. My delegation, as the representative of Upper Volta had stated in the General Assembly [954th meeting], strongly regretted that attempts are made "to turn this problem into another factor in the cold war" and that "the blows intended to fall on the Western world's back should be inflicted on Africa's" through the Islamic Republic of Mauritania. My delegation associates itself with its colleague from Upper Volta in requesting certain Powers to give up this idea "of holding countries as hostages for haggling deals".

148. As is known, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is a democratic country. It is also a peace-loving State. It is prepared to maintain relations of friendship and co-operation with all its neighbours. Peopled by 650,000 inhabitants, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania is a good example of peaceful cohabitation between the different races which compose it and live on its 1,100,000 square kilometres.

149. Immediately after its accession to national sovereignty, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania gave its solemn undertaking to accept the obligations of the United Nations Charter; it is capable of fulfilling them, since it has sufficient will to do so.

150. My delegation, which noted with profound disappointment the veto of the Soviet Union, therefore agrees with the representative of the United States, Mr. Barco:

"This action of the Soviet Union displays the cynicism of a country which in the General Assembly calls for the immediate end to one kind of colonial rule, but which comes here [in the Security Council] in the middle of the night to stab in the back the newest of the independent countries."<sup>12</sup>

151. My delegation believes that this stab in the back of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania has been inflicted as a result of a misunderstanding, and that this misunderstanding can and must be dispelled.

152. The point at issue is the case of the Mongolian People's Republic. My delegation is quite prepared to vote for the admission of Mongolia to the United Nations, since we need a family which increases from day to day. Thus, by unanimously adopting—I address myself to you, Members of the Assembly—the draft resolution [A/L.335] which is submitted for your approval, you will not only endorse the effective independence of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania—an effective independence which Mauritania has gained in peace and friendship with France—but you will also prove once again that the radical abolition of colonialism also means opening wide the door of the United Nations to new States, to States which are independent and sovereign and, in addition, peace-loving.

*Mr. Matsudaira (Japan), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

153. Mr. CHARLOT (Chad) (*translated from French*): By speaking in this debate, Chad is fulfilling a sacred duty towards a brother country, firstly because we are discussing the independence of a colonized people and also because of the many special affinities linking Chad with Mauritania. Chad, which is a Saharan and Moslem country like Mauritania, has

<sup>11</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, fifteenth year, Supplement for October, November and December 1960, document S/4567/Rev.1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, fifteenth year, 911th meeting, para. 249.

followed the same cycle of development that has resulted in its now being a Member of this Assembly.

154. It would be regrettable for many reasons if, at the time when the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and several African States are gaining independence or beginning to take part in international life, the annexation designs of a brother country stifled the new Mauritanian State and turned this question into a problem which should never have existed and which is today disturbing the conscience of all of those who, faithful to the emancipation of peoples, intend to preserve brotherly relations with Morocco.

155. In fact, as an eminent Chief of State has realized, the essential in the search for inter-African unity and co-operation is to respect the personality of the States of that continent. We recall that a country adjacent to mine was for a long time claimed by its powerful neighbour to the north. At the time, the problem caused much ink to flow and created enormous difficulties between two brother countries compelled by circumstances to live and co-operate together. Learning a lesson from these difficulties, the eminent Chief of State, in order to put an end to them and open a new era of brotherly co-operation, solemnly broke with all the past of claims and designs of annexation, thus recognizing a situation of fact. Since that time, the two countries have lived in perfect harmony in the mutual respect of each other's sovereignty.

156. I venture to hope that the States present here will be inspired by this example and cease to give their support to the maintenance of a situation comparable in many respects to their own history of the past few years.

157. The State which has the honour today to request its admission to your ranks is not making any territorial claim and is merely asking to live in peace with all the countries of the world in general and its neighbours in particular.

158. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania is a republican, democratic, indivisible and social State. It guarantees to all freedom of conscience, and the right to practise the religion of one's choice; it provides for all its nationals without distinction equality before the law. The Islamic Republic of Mauritania proclaims its full and entire adherence to the universal human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed by the United Nations Charter. Mauritania, which has already made its debut in international life, is capable of assuming all the obligations inherent in the status of State Member of the United Nations. It is also, I am convinced, prepared to do so.

159. My delegation therefore strongly supports the candidature of the young Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

*The meeting rose at 6 p.m.*