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President: Mr. Frederick H. BOLAND (Ireland).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (continued)

1. Mr. KHEIR (Sudan): I am anxious to assure the Assembly that in contributing these comments here, or in adopting certain stands during our discussions in the Committees, the delegation of the Republic of the Sudan is animated by a keen desire to promote peace and international co-operation. Our reaction and our positions derive solely from loyalty to convictions and principles of objectivity and non-alignment which have always been our guiding star and our source of inspiration. We believe that the practical manifestation of this policy is the eradication of all the causes of the cold war which endanger the fate of humanity at large.

2. The people and the Government of the Sudan cherished high hopes that the Summit Conference which was to have been held in Paris in May 1960 would be a sign of "rapprochement" and understanding leading towards easing the tension and removing the warlike eruptions which contaminate the atmosphere of peace. Unfortunately these hopes were short-lived, but we still look forward to the future with optimism and faith. In no period of history has the world been so in need of understanding as it is now. The whole existence of mankind and civilization is at stake. A spark may lead to a conflagration devastating all.

3. The present session will ever remain a landmark in the history of the United Nations. The admission of the newly independent States, which was the outcome of the wave of liberation in Africa and the close of a chapter of imperialism and domination, is indeed a historic occasion, and a great move towards the universality of this Organization. It has never happened before that fifteen States have in one year gained their independence and become Members of the United Nations. Therefore, to us, members of the independent African States, this is a memorable

gathering. We welcome most heartily our new brothers from Africa and Cyprus and wish them every success. Africa is no longer a dark continent. This light which has illuminated the greater part of the continent will have no artificial boundaries and no force can resist its diffusion. The newly independent States, I am sure, will be a dynamic force in this international organ, enhancing its position and prestige, maintaining the spirit of the Charter and furthering the cause of justice, peace and security.

4. The delegation of the Republic of the Sudan would like to stress the role the United Nations is playing and can play in this field. We voice our firm trust in the capacity of the United Nations to lead the world out of its political, economic and social difficulties and to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to establish conditions under which justice and human dignity are maintained and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, peace and prosperity. Such noble purposes and principles are clearly stated in Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter.

5. Despite almost fifteen years of continued negotiations on the question of disarmament, it still remains the most difficult and most threatening problem facing the world today. The issue has been further complicated, one year after another, by the production and stockpiling of larger quantities of the materials needed for a nuclear war, the development of modern weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery through outer space, threatening the total annihilation of mankind and civilization.

6. Reviewing the development towards achieving international peace and putting an end to the armaments race, we noted last year with satisfaction the General Assembly unanimously expressing the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general disarmament be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time [resolution 1378 (XIV)]. Earlier this year our hopes were pinned on the discussions of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, which was stopped without yielding the expected results.

7. We do not intend to go into the causes that led to the failure of the Summit Conference and to the discontinuation of the discussions in Geneva. We do not intend either to analyse the details of the differences between the major Powers regarding disarmament. Whether at present or on previous occasions the major Powers have repeatedly declared a firm desire for peace and disarmament and that none of them would be first in bringing about a world catastrophe.

8. The dangers of the armaments race are too obvious to be stressed or reviewed by the delegation of the Republic of Sudan. The consequences of an armed conflict would be fatal to all of us without

exception. The world would be better off if the huge sums spent on armaments could be made available for technical assistance and economic advancement of the less developed countries of the world. With this continual threat of the armaments race, no nation can disregard the dangers to its existence and attend to the pursuit of the happiness and welfare of its people.

9. Therefore, we sincerely hope, in view of the urgency of the problem, that continued efforts will be made for the earliest possible resumption of negotiations to achieve a constructive solution of the question of general and complete disarmament, together with an effective international control.

10. We genuinely believe that all of us here share the same love of peace and security, and that we all wish to save the coming generations from the panics and disasters of a devastating war. But the cause of peace cannot be served effectively through the United Nations when one-fourth of the world's population is unrepresented. We are convinced, therefore, that representation of the People's Republic of China not only would be a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and Government but would surely enhance the effectiveness of the Organization. Today the United Nations can rightly pride itself on securing the effective participation of most countries of the world. A good number of these have already recognized and established relations with the People's Republic of China. We sincerely hope that the General Assembly will find it possible to reconsider this question.

11. As an African country, the Sudan has been greatly concerned with the grave events that are taking place in that continent, as well as with the problems which its peoples are facing. These events, disturbing as they may have been, have helped to bring together the independent African States in an effort to realize their common aspirations and objectives and to lend a helping hand to those unfortunate members of the community who are still striving to shake off the remnants of foreign domination and assert their full independence. However, African society is being subjected to unjust and outmoded philosophies which can no longer stand up to the new consciousness and political awakening of the African people.

12. One of the tragedies of human dignity and self-respect is the "apartheid" policy of the Union of South Africa, a policy which has received the condemnation of world public opinion. "Apartheid" is abominable. It must be defeated, not on South Africa's account only but on account of us all. My Government has already taken a clear stand on this matter, and, acting on the resolutions passed by the Conferences of Independent African States, we have boycotted South Africa—its goods and its economy—and made a small donation to the victims of this action. Nevertheless, we are still prepared to take further measures to defeat the immoral policies of "apartheid".

13. But the Union of South Africa's contempt for Africans goes beyond its own boundaries. South West Africa is a ward of the international community. That did not save it from the unnatural, unwarranted policies of the Union of South Africa. We shall be falling in our responsibilities if we do not make it

known to the world that a country which has caused so much misery to its own nationals is hardly fit to help others. The Union of South Africa must cease to administer South West Africa, and the United Nations must take over for a specific period and prepare the country for independence in a manner worthy of its high ideals and achievements.

14. Another part of Africa, the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville), is being torn by turmoil and unrest. Our desire is, and has always been, to safeguard the national independence and the territorial integrity of that country and to bring about the disappearance of any form of external interference whatsoever in its domestic affairs. Upon this issue my Government will never compromise. The structure of the government and the personnel of that government are questions for the Congolese themselves to decide, according to their own free will.

15. We support the work started, maintained and still being done by the United Nations under the supervision of the Secretary-General, in whom we have full confidence. This confidence in the United Nations and the commendation of its actions were given clear expression in the third resolution of the meeting of African Foreign Ministers¹ in Leopoldville under the presidency of Mr. Lumumba. The United Nations should undertake this international obligation until the voice of the Congo, as a free and independent Member State of this Organization, is heard from this rostrum. We object to any intervention, whether military, political, or in any guise or shape, outside the framework of the United Nations. The Congolese issue should be absolutely insulated from any unilateral action and, in particular, from the effects of the cold war.

16. With the President's permission, I now turn to the question of Algeria, the familiar tragedy which the United Nations has had before it for six years now, and for which the United Nations has so far failed to find a satisfactory solution in conformity with the Charter.

17. When I spoke from this rostrum on 1 October 1959 [817th meeting] I did not dwell at any length on this greatest catastrophe of the day, because I had then perceived a ray of hope radiating from General de Gaulle's declaration of 16 September 1959 in which he solemnly recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. I contented myself then with a candid appeal to the conscience of France and to the descendants of the French revolution to solve the Algerian problem in conformity with the United Nations Charter and on the basis of the principles of "liberty, equality, fraternity"—fundamental principles, we believe, in the life of every French man and woman.

18. A year has now passed since I spoke to you. It was a cruel year for Algeria, and a most distressing year for the human conscience everywhere. The war in Algeria is raging more furiously than before. Loss of life—whether it be French or Algerian—is mounting with every day that passes. More than one-fourth of the population of Algeria is held in prisons and internment camps where it is subjected to the most cruel and humiliating treatment. This last aspect

¹/ Conference of Independent African States, held at Leopoldville, from 25 to 30 August 1960.

of this inhuman war was shockingly revealed in a report of the International Committee of the Red Cross published in December 1959, and was the subject of a strong protest addressed to the Secretary-General by twenty African and Asian Members of the United Nations on 10 February 1960.

19. This was the tragic result of the French Government's not abiding by President de Gaulle's recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination. The behaviour of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic since President de Gaulle's declaration of 16 September 1959 has consistently been characterized by a sense of responsibility, political maturity, statesmanship and peaceful intentions.

20. In its declaration of 28 September 1959, in response to General de Gaulle's declaration, it agreed with the French position that the right of self-determination should be the basis for a solution of the Algerian problem. It also agreed with the French Government that recourse to universal suffrage as a means of determining the political future of Algeria cannot be had without the return of peace. They asked only for an opportunity to discuss with France the political and military conditions for the cease-fire and the conditions and guarantees for the application of the principle of self-determination. This was a natural demand. But, from what has transpired during the year since President de Gaulle's declaration, France seems to insist that any discussions regarding the cease-fire or regarding the conditions and modalities of any meeting between France and representatives of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic should be unilaterally decided by France. We have ample proof of this from what took place at Melun between 25 and 29 June 1960. The conditions and modalities of a meeting between French and Algerian delegations were described by a former French Prime Minister, Mr. Mendès-France, as "conditions so humiliating that they were equivalent to a demand for capitulation".

21. But the valiant Algerian people, who have fought so long and so courageously for an honourable cause, will not capitulate to the weight of French armour, because they have right on their side and right will ultimately win. France is not likely to win a military victory in Algeria, and if it does, it will not be a victory of the brave.

22. The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic has always given proof of its peaceful intentions and of its belief in a negotiated settlement of this tragic conflict that has lasted only too long. In spite of the disappointment handed out to them at Melun, their Foreign Minister, Mr. Belkacem Krim, affirmed on 10 August 1960, "We are ready to re-open negotiations with the French Government at any time". Thus the choice lies with the French Government—either to continue a policy of war and colonial domination or to accept the principle of real negotiation.

23. We believe that the United Nations has a responsibility which it cannot lightly abdicate. The French argument that the Algerian issue is an internal matter and outside the competence of the United Nations is a cruel delusion. This argument cannot be accepted while a brutal war goes on with all its ugly consequences and while thousands of people lose

their lives every week. The claim of the French Government that Algeria is part and parcel of Metropolitan France is a farce by any standard of logical reasoning. Algeria is a separate entity historically, ethnologically and geographically. If the French argument had been applied to former dependent territories none of them would have been here with us in this Assembly. This is a consideration basic to a happy solution of the Algerian question, and we strongly urge the French Government to revise its thinking in this regard.

24. As further evidence of good will and as further proof of its love of peace, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic is asking the United Nations that consultations of the Algerian people take place by means of a referendum organized and controlled by the United Nations, and it is our earnest hope that the United Nations will not fail it again.

25. While speaking on Algeria, I have emphasized the responsibility of the United Nations for finding a just solution to the problem. The United Nations has also an equally great responsibility towards another problem, that of Palestine and the Palestine Arab refugees. The United Nations particular responsibility in this case stems from the fact that the problem was of its own creation, resulting from the fateful resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 which decreed the partition of Palestine against the will of its people. When we consider that at the time of the adoption of that resolution the Arabs accounted for two-thirds of the entire population of Palestine, we realize that that decision was not only unconscionable but also illegal, since it contravened the principle of self-determination of peoples, a principle consecrated in the Charter.

26. The Palestine refugee problem is not a normal refugee problem of the type with which our century is familiar. It is the problem of an entire nation uprooted from its ancestral land and consigned to torturous and undignified exile. It is a tragedy without parallel in modern times. Well over a million Arab refugees—a highly prolific population—have for over twelve years now been living in the frustration and agony of camp life, with no security in life except the United Nations ration card and nothing to sustain them but a hope of return to their homes, their fields and their orange groves across the border, which they see but cannot reach. As the Director of UNRWA said in his report to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly:

"Of all the refugees the young people reaching maturity are, without doubt, facing the most distressing plight... each year some 30,000 young people reach maturity with little hope of earning a living or establishing homes in a normal way."
[A/4213, para. 10.]

Will the United Nations allow this tragedy to continue and gain greater dimensions as time marches on?

27. An approach to the solution of this problem based on a recognition of the so-called political realities of the situation is a disguised support of aggression and therefore is totally unacceptable to my Government. The situation in which the Palestine Arabs find themselves today is the result of gross injustice and a flagrant breach of the dictates of the Charter. Until 14 May 1948, Palestine as a

whole was under a League of Nations Mandate. According to the principles of the Charter and the Mandate under which Palestine was administered, it was the duty of the United Nations to see to it that the people of Palestine exercised in freedom their right to shape their own political destiny before the termination of the Mandate. What happened in the case of the Palestine Arabs was that their fate was decided for them by others acting from motives repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Charter.

28. Any solution, therefore, which ignores the original facts of the problem is void and cannot be accepted by my Government. Any search for a just solution should start at the point where the wrong was committed, that is to say, immediately before the termination of the Mandate on 14 May 1948.

29. The refugee problem, since its inception, has always had a profound effect on the maintenance of peace and security in the turbulent Middle East. All the incidents and turmoil that have been plaguing that area in the last thirteen years can directly or indirectly be traced back to the persistence of this problem. In this connexion I may pertinently quote the Director of UNRWA who, in his report to the fourteenth session of the General Assembly, had this to say:

"It is no exaggeration to state that every aspect of life and human endeavour in the Near East is conditioned and complicated by the Palestine refugee problem. Its psychological, political and social repercussions are of no less significance than its economic and humanitarian aspects. Any solution of the Palestine refugee problem must take these aspects into account." [*Ibid.*, para. 11.]

Therefore, we believe that there will be no real peace in the Middle East unless a just and satisfactory solution of the Arab refugee problem is found.

30. In bringing to the notice of the General Assembly issues that are continuing to cause tension in our world, our delegation cannot fail to mention the tense situation obtaining in some part of the Arab world, with specific reference to Oman. We are keenly desirous that efforts should be made to achieve the aspirations of the people of those areas and that their right to self-determination should be respected. We believe that the cause of peace and the maintenance of friendly relations will be served if approaches consistent with the spirit and letter of the Charter are brought to the settlement of the issues involved.

31. One of the direct causes of the present international tension and disharmony, in our view, is the division of the world into very rich and very poor, into very highly industrialized countries and producers of primary products with very primitive economies and into those nations with skills and technical abilities and potentialities and those with no skills and little knowledge or know-how. It is very distressing to see that this gap is growing in magnitude and dimension, and that despite the years of prosperity in Europe and America there has been no significant movement of capital to the poor countries, nor has there been any substantial increase in the level of assistance to the under-developed countries. It is our earnest belief and hope that serious efforts

will be made to strengthen and broaden the basis of the participation of the less developed countries in international trade. This could be done by effective co-operation and consultation among nations, and by the method of multilateral trade and payments.

32. The Sudan is a great believer in free trade. Our commercial set-up has been built on a strong tradition of liberal trade policies. We adhere to a multilateral pattern of trade and payments regardless of political divisions, and with no preferential treatment or discrimination against countries or commodities, in the belief that it is the best way for the expansion of world trade and prosperity. With this background in mind, we are bound to view with great concern any development of regional economic groupings that are designed to use trade as a political weapon or that are restrictive and discriminatory. We should like to voice our sincere hope that such groupings as the European Common Market and the European Free Trade Association will not only concern themselves with the expansion of trade and payments within their groups, but that they will also implement all policies that strengthen and broaden international trade and economic co-operation. It is our belief that world economic co-operation can contribute a great deal toward the achievement of international peace and stability.

33. The latest report of the Economic and Social Council [A/4415] makes it clear that the responsibility for policies of economic growth are not exclusively a national concern but indeed a collective one. In this world of interdependence, no country can afford to stay in isolation. It is hoped that the recognition of this fact will provide us all with an increased awareness that there is an international responsibility for raising standards of living in the under-developed areas.

34. We should not let the opportunity of this historic fifteenth session of the General Assembly pass without noting with emphasis and with a sense of real urgency the crucial importance of the fact that the eyes of the world are now focused on the African continent. We must all appreciate the magnitude of the political, economic and social problems which we and our newly independent sister African States have to face and solve before we can play our full part in the community of nations in the establishment of lasting peace and prosperity. It is a fact of history that no under-developed country can hope to solve its problems unaided. My delegation submits that the sooner we are helped by the community of nations to help ourselves, the better it will be for mankind.

35. We believe that the United Nations has a vital role to play in Africa, and we regret the fact that it entered the African field much later than it entered other regions. It is therefore only just and reasonable that Africa's share in the new and uncommitted funds of the United Nations should be such as to redress the balance in the allocation of funds. The Africans are facing all sorts of complex problems while suffering a serious shortage of trained administrators, technicians and professionals. Africa very badly needs the right weapons with which to fight its militant enemies of poverty, ignorance and disease. The peoples of Africa are struggling for a better life in larger freedom and are anxiously hoping to receive international co-operation and understanding

in this struggle. So they look forward to receiving assistance in all fields, assistance which does not spring from a sense of charity or one that is motivated by the self-interest of the donor, but assistance that man extends to man in a true spirit of brotherhood and partnership. This should be done in good time, before the African States, faced with their urgent problems, take decisions of policy which are expedient in the short run but detrimental to their balanced economic growth and development.

36. It gives me great pleasure to see that the central theme of the discussion in thirtieth session of the Economic and Social Council held at ministerial level was General Assembly resolutions 1414 (XIV) and 1415 (XIV) recognizing the necessity of United Nations assistance to newly independent and emerging countries, with special emphasis on those in Africa. There was no dissident voice regarding the necessity and urgency of dealing with this problem, and means of realizing these aims that must be provided immediately. The recent events in the Congo and the speedy action taken by the United Nations have lent great strength to the arguments for such assistance.

37. The Sudan delegation to the thirtieth session of the Economic and Social Council had the honour to present, on behalf of twelve countries, a resolution^{2/} which was carried without any opposition, that the OPEX programme be placed on a permanent basis and be given a larger budget to expand its useful and constructive activities.

38. In concluding my statement, let me entertain the hope that the deliberations of this historic session of the General Assembly will not go down in the record as mere expectations and wishful thinking of expressions of good intention. That is not what we have gathered here for. Let us translate the words into deeds, the intentions into meaningful actions and the premises into facts of history.

LETTER DATED 29 SEPTEMBER 1960 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF GHANA, THE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA, THE PRESIDENT OF INDONESIA, THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE PRESIDENT OF YUGOSLAVIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (A/4522) (continued)*

39. The PRESIDENT: I would ask the Assembly to turn its attention now to the second item to be discussed today, which is the draft resolution submitted by Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, contained in document A/4522, and the amendment submitted by Australia [A/L.316].

40. I would draw the attention of the Assembly also in connexion with this item to document A/4529, which contains a letter dated 4 October 1960 from the chairman of the delegation of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General.

41. Mr. FAWZI (United Arab Republic): On behalf of the delegations of Ghana, India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, I ask leave to inform the Assembly that in a further effort for unanimity the draft resolution [A/4522] sponsored

by these delegations is by them made to read as follows in its last paragraph:

"Expresses the hope that, as a first step, the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renew their contacts interrupted recently, so that their declared willingness to find solutions of the outstanding problems by negotiation may be progressively implemented."

42. Mr. MENZIES (Prime Minister of Australia): As I am making my maiden speech in the Assembly, I would have preferred to deal with the five-nation draft resolution [A/4522] as now amended, and the Australian amendment [A/L.316] against the background of a general survey of the world's peace problem. However, I propose, with the kind tolerance of the representatives, to address myself to that survey this afternoon. This morning I will confine my attention to the draft resolution and, in particular, to the amendment, which I now move in the terms which have been circulated.

43. I think it is necessary for me to say something about the amendment. It was not tabled in any capricious way. I saw the draft resolution for the first time on the afternoon of Friday 30 September, having arrived here from Australia that morning, and I devoted some thought to it over the weekend. I have no substantial quarrel or, indeed, any quarrel of any kind, with the first three provisions of the draft resolution. It is only in relation to the final paragraph that I have thought fit to register a dissenting opinion. Let me say at once that nobody can more warmly appreciate the high motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution than I do.

44. They felt, no doubt, that it would be a bad thing if all the Heads of State and Heads of Government who are here departed from the Assembly without leaving behind some visible evidence in the shape of a decision. They believed, no doubt, that the people of the world would be disappointed and perhaps disillusioned if we all departed and nothing at all emerged. They therefore introduced this draft resolution and part of its purpose, as it has been explained to me, was to try to take advantage of the presence in North America at the same time of President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Khrushchev. But if I believe, as I do, that the effect of the resolution, if adopted, would be undesirable, then I am bound to say so.

45. The President of Indonesia, himself, in his speech on the afternoon of 30 September, had reservations even about a four-Power summit conference. I recall that he said:

"Those four great Powers alone cannot decide the questions of war and peace. More precisely, perhaps, they have the power to disrupt the peace, but they have no moral right to attempt, singly or together, to settle the future of the world."
[880th meeting, para. 56.]

46. But at the end of his speech he submitted a draft resolution, the end clause of which was that the Assembly should request not four leaders, but two—the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—to renew their contacts

^{2/} Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 1, resolution 768 (XXX).

*Resumed from the 883rd meeting.

and to find, if they can, the beginnings of solutions of outstanding problems.

47. But I do not desire to rest upon a mere debating point. It is of the first importance to say something about the draft resolution itself, and to explain why I, for one, find it so unsatisfactory. Why does the draft resolution end by suggesting a conference of two leaders? I would recall representatives to the events of May 1960. There was to be a Summit Conference in Paris. Nobody could seriously have expected that out of a single conference there could come either peace for the world or, by some sudden stroke, a settlement of most of the issues which vex the world. But I shall always believe that there were many millions of people all around the world who felt that the Paris Conference might serve to create some atmosphere of hope, might lead the way to a settlement of one or two problems and so nourish that hope.

48. To take one example, many of us have thought that the discussions about nuclear tests could have been brought within reach of finality. After all, the great nuclear Powers were not so widely separated on this issue that some effective lead could not have been given. But the Paris Summit Conference failed even to begin, because the leader of the Soviet Union would not participate. I have my own view about his stated reasons, but at this moment I do not desire to debate them. The material and relevant fact was that the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France promptly made a statement in which they said:

"They regret that these discussions, so important for world peace, could not take place. For their part, they remain unshaken in their convictions that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the use or threat of force, but by peaceful means through negotiation. They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future."

These words deserve emphasis. This is what three leaders said as far back as May 1960, and nothing that has happened would give rise to any expectation that they have changed their minds.

49. I think it will be agreed that the statement that I have read was a fair enough proposition, good-tempered and tenacious in the cause of peace. Should it be rejected now? If we have now reached a point in our discussions when we feel that talks of this kind should proceed, why should we not say so? Why should we, by adopting the five-Power draft resolution, dismiss the United Kingdom and France from what I may call the first act?

50. Mr. Nehru himself has frankly stated that there are serious limits to the usefulness of bilateral talks. But what I would wish to know is, whether any valid reason can be advanced for supposing that in some way the President of the United States was the stumbling block, and that therefore in any renewed discussions he should be the one leader of what I call for this purpose the Western world to be brought under persuasion or pressure.

51. Let me say at once that I have no desire to trench upon American domestic politics, which I understand are warming up outside as the winter comes on. But nobody in the world could honestly

doubt that the President of the United States is passionately devoted to peace. The cause of peace and the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations have profoundly and memorably characterized his terms of office.

52. But there is another aspect of the matter which I believe to be important and to which I think, with respect, inadequate attention has been given by those who framed the draft resolution. It is a very well known Communist technique, quite visible in many countries and most clearly visible in my own, to seek to describe the drama of the world's problems in terms in which the two antagonists are the United States and the Soviet Union, with all the rest of us presumably as insignificant onlookers—and, if not insignificant, at least, presumably, indifferent. This is in reality a dangerous fallacy. I do not for one moment accuse the sponsors of the draft resolution of intending to give currency to that fallacy. But I do venture to say to them, with unfeigned respect, that in this sadly troubled world the real conflict of ideas, and perhaps of even more than ideas, is between the authoritarian doctrines and practices of Communism and those other systems of government to which most of us subscribe, in which free men, whether freed yesterday or many years ago, practise or hope to govern themselves in an atmosphere of individual freedom.

53. Is the United Kingdom, a nation with such a magnificent contribution in our own time to freedom and self-government, to be omitted from summit talks? Is France, whose place in the history—indeed, the revolutionary history—of individual liberty is clear, to be omitted?

54. My point is that to narrow the issues down to matters which may, in an initial sense, be discussed by the Heads of two Governments is to put the world's problem out of perspective. It is for this reason that I have myself put forward, on behalf of Australia, an amendment to the resolution—an amendment which takes up the initial clauses, to which we subscribe, but which goes on to recall our minds to the abortive Summit Conference in Paris and to the hopes which many millions of people had entertained that that Conference might at least have been a door to a more spacious chamber in international relations. My own view, and the view of my country, is that we should encourage the resumption of these summit talks.

55. No doubt, a meeting at the summit cannot be arranged quickly or without preparation. We shall have to feel our way forward, and a way may be found. But it will not be found in the next few days, and I doubt whether it can be found by trying to rush at it. The Australian amendment reflects what I believe is the view of a majority here, that we should try to recapture the hope that was offered to us in the early part of this year when we were moving toward a summit meeting.

56. I am not so foolish as to believe that a meeting of the four great Powers could solve all or many of our problems. Indeed, there are great matters, enormous matters, falling within the responsibility of the United Nations, which cannot be delegated to a few. But there are some which we have all recognized to be, in a special way, the concern of the four great Powers, and which therefore merit their

particular consideration. There are clearly others of grave general import, such as disarmament, which require the close and constructive consideration of a number of nations in the interests of all, and which do not lend themselves to settlement by a large assembly. It is a reflection of this kind which makes many of us believe that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament should promptly resume its deliberations. But all good things must have a beginning. I am one of those who feel that a meeting of the four leaders at the summit could, if approached in a true spirit of co-operation and genuine desire for peace, make a very fine beginning.

57. But to narrow a meeting of the four into a meeting of two means, to my mind, the attaching—of unstated reasons—of special responsibility to two nations alone. As a practical aside, if one is permitted such a luxury, I think it permissible to ask whether we believe that the events of the last four days have persuaded us that there is a genuine hope of useful bilateral talks.

58. As to the terms of the amendment, the general effect clearly is to widen the projected list of participators in the conference from two to four. I have, in fact, taken the occasion to quote, as representatives will recall, the statements made by three of the leaders at Paris. This is a matter of record and we all ought to have it in mind. But I would not regard it as vital to my amendment. The amendment would remain in substance, conveying the point that I am trying to make, whether that reference to the statement was in or out. Nor am I very much concerned about the details of drafting; there may be many amendments for all I know. My main purpose is to avoid, if I can, the perpetuation of the notion that the world conflict is between the United States and the Soviet Union.

59. Before I conclude, I offer this observation in all humility to my colleagues old and new. We are not here primarily as debaters but as representatives of the deepest hopes of our people. We should serve mankind very badly if we became so absorbed by movements and counter-movements and negotiations in and out of this hall that we forgot that the vital vested interest in our deliberations and our actions is that of those who regard the possibility of future armed conflict with horror, and whose daily prayer is for peace.

60. Mr. NKRUMAH (President of Ghana): I have asked for the floor in order to explain my position on the amendment [A/L.316] proposed by Australia to the draft resolution [A/4522] submitted by Ghana, India, Indonesia, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. This draft resolution was produced as a result of great deliberation and consultation among a number of Heads of State. We have seen fit to introduce it in the Assembly not only because we know that there has been a deterioration in international relations which threatens the world with grave consequences, but also because we are convinced that the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have a special responsibility as regards lessening the present tension.

61. I am sure that everybody in this great hall knows that there has been a chain of events which has led to the present world tension. Need I recall

the breakdown of the Geneva talks on disarmament or the failure of the Summit Conference in Paris? Is it necessary for the General Assembly to enquire into the causes of the failure of these meetings? No. No useful purpose will be served now by apportioning blame or praise. We here in this Assembly should not complicate matters.

62. That is why our draft resolution concerns itself with drawing attention to the present world tension and with requesting the two leaders of the two great Powers to renew contact in order that a solution may be found to the problems which are militating against the peace of the world.

63. Whether we like it or not the key to war and peace is in the hands of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But then, the balance of the world's moral strength lies within these very walls of this Assembly hall. The world wants peace. Africa wants peace. Asia wants peace. And I presume Europe and America want peace.

64. Therefore, for the sake of the peace of the world, let the head of the United States and the Soviet Union come together. It does not matter where. It may be in the centre of the Atlantic or in the middle of the Baltic Sea. This world Organization is looking to the two giant nations to pave the way for peace. Humanity demands that every effort should be made to avoid war. The fate of mankind hangs precariously on the question of disarmament.

65. It is vitally important that the United States Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics establish firm contacts to allow the world to heave a sigh of relief. Even if they agree merely to meet it would at least break the ice and pave the way for the resumption of talks at the diplomatic level which could be followed possibly by a summit conference. But the important thing is that the two Heads of Government would have met and would have broken the ice.

66. The amendment which has been proposed by Australia, unfortunately, misses the point of our draft resolution. In any case, the Australian amendment is not an amendment; it is a new draft resolution which would only bedevil the issue before us. By accepting the Australian draft resolution we should be heaping tension upon tension; it is precisely this kind of manoeuvre that makes it difficult for us to face the great issues of our time. I am sure that if the amendment was withdrawn it would help the work of the General Assembly enormously.

67. On behalf therefore of the sponsors of our draft resolution, I appeal to the representative of Australia, my good friend, to withdraw the amendment. By doing so he will help us in our attempt to promote the cause of peace. If, however, the amendment is pressed to a vote then we, the co-sponsors and our supporters, will not accept it and will vigorously support the five-Power draft resolution.

68. Mr. SHUKAIRY (Saudi Arabia): I have asked for the floor with a great deal of hesitation. The five-Power draft resolution [A/4522], introduced by Mr. Sukarno and presented by Mr. Nehru [880th meeting], scarcely calls for explanation, but it was precisely because of the so-called amendment

[A/L.316] tabled by the representative of Australia that we felt compelled to take part in the debate.

69. In the first place, let me stress with all the force at my command that the five-Power draft resolution could hardly provoke any genuine disagreement or raise any serious objection. I say "genuine" and "serious", for if we are here in the United Nations to disagree without reason and without logic, there is really very little that can be done. Let me, therefore, ask at the outset: what is this draft resolution of the five Powers now standing before the Assembly? It is upon examination of the nature of the matter before us that we can best judge where we stand and where we should stand. Hence the question arises: what is the nature of the five-Power draft resolution?

70. The draft resolution as worded requests, as a first and urgent step, that President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Khrushchev should renew their contacts. This is the gist of the draft resolution pure and simple. I say "pure and simple" not as a rhetorical phrase, but as a real statement of fact.

71. The draft resolution—and I would remind the Prime Minister of Australia of this—makes no decision, adjudicates no matter; neither does it resolve any contested issue nor take sides one way or the other. The draft resolution proclaims no priority and pronounces no precedents. It leans neither to the West nor to the East; it is against neither one nor the other. It is a well-balanced draft resolution, fair to all and courteous to all. I can even say that it scarcely is a draft resolution in form; it is simply a request couched in the gentlest and most courteous of words. Were it not for the stipulation of our rules of procedure, there would be no need to describe such a request as a formal draft resolution.

72. In substance also, the draft resolution is, technically speaking, not a draft resolution. It is a request for renewed contacts. Call it what you will—negotiations, talks, contacts or what not—the draft resolution is simply a measure to meet the present international situation. This is an axiom of international dealings.

73. I need hardly remind the General Assembly and the representative of Australia that a request for renewed contacts between Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev is a Charter course towards a Charter objective. Indeed, the first words of the United Nations Charter state that our first objective is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. It is our children and our children's children who are the succeeding generations specified in the introductory words of the Charter. Thus, there is nothing new in the draft resolution; there is nothing alien to the Charter. The draft resolution seeks only to apply the Charter to a particular situation; in fact, it paraphrases the provisions of the Charter. It stands to reason, therefore, that this draft resolution discloses nothing that could make it a bone of contention. As a matter of fact, the substance of the draft resolution could scarcely admit of a negative vote, unless some of us here in the United Nations have the courage to vote against the provisions of the Charter.

74. So much for the merits of the five-Power draft resolution. But what about the motives? No doubt a draft resolution—any draft resolution—must be judged by its motives. As far as those motives can be inferred from the contents of the draft resolution, or the policies of its authors, the authors are too well known by the international community to call for identification. The five leaders who have sponsored this draft resolution are the Big Five of the uncommitted world and well known for their policies of positive and active neutrality. This is a still more valid reason for their draft resolution to recommend itself to the Assembly. The draft resolution does not seek any national objective; it does not aim to secure any personal glorification. Its aim transcends all national aspirations or personal glories. It is simply designed to break a deadlock, to release tension, to "air-condition" the cold war and to start genuine negotiations that will attack the issues of war and peace.

75. Having pronounced myself on the five-Power draft resolution, its merits and its motives, permit me for a moment to say a word or two to the representative of Australia with regard to the Australian amendment,

76. The Australian amendment is not lacking in background; it is not without strategy and tactics. Unlike the five-Power draft resolution, the Australian amendment represents a one-sided approach—and I say that with all due respect. Let me say outright that not only is it a Western proposal in sponsorship, but it is part and parcel of a Western strategy. I am not here to affront the Western Powers or to attempt to blemish their record. This is not my intention in making this observation. On the contrary, I simply desire to stress the conclusion, the irresistible conclusion, that the Australian proposal is in favour of a summit conference on Western terms. But the summit is not a summit of the Western Powers. If it is to be conceived as a Western summit, the matter would not be before us at the United Nations, nor would Western terms be of concern to us. Let me remind the Assembly that we in the United Nations are concerned with a summit that is shaped according to terms which are equitable and just to all, and not according to terms to be introduced in the United Nations by the Western Powers alone.

77. It is a fact of which we have taken cognizance that the President of the United States has been good enough to address a letter [A/4529] to the five neutral leaders stating his views with regard to the five-Power draft resolution. Judging from the text of the communication, its lines and what is between those lines, we can justifiably assume that the United States does not support the five-Power draft resolution. Although couched in the most courteous words, the statement of the President of the United States can be taken as a rejection of the five-Power resolution. This conclusion, I submit, is fully warranted and fully justified.

78. It is permissible at this stage, however, to observe that the position of the United States was not a unilateral thinking or action. It is no secret that the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and Australia had conferred with President Eisenhower on this matter before the reply of President Eisenhower was released.

79. Thus—and this is the point I am making—it becomes glaringly obvious that the proposal of Australia is only designed to combat the five-Power draft resolution. And let me speak frankly and plainly; this Australian proposal is not an initiative issue; it is a counter action intended to defeat, to obstruct and to arrest the initiative initially taken by the five leaders of positive neutrality. Thus, in cause and in effect the Australian proposal is intended as a tactical move; or, to be more precise, as a device to brush the five-Power draft resolution from the table of the Assembly.

80. But why follow such a course? Why should the five-Power draft resolution be defeated? It is an innocent draft resolution, motivated by innocence. It discloses no violation of the Charter and no breach of the accepted traditions or practices of the United Nations. It shows no bias, neither does it inflict any prejudice, to call for its defeat.

81. Let us, on the other hand, pause for a moment to examine the Australian draft resolution. I say "the Australian draft resolution" because in fact it is not an amendment. A proposal is only known to be a draft resolution or an amendment, not by its title but by its pattern, by its nature. This is a draft resolution which stands on its own. It is not an amendment, and those ideas cannot be introduced to the Assembly under the guise of the title of an amendment. The intelligence of the Assembly cannot be ignored in this manner.

82. In the main, the Australian draft resolution suffers from a serious and dangerous flaw—a serious defect. In its operative part, the Australian draft resolution urges that a meeting of the four great Powers should be held at the earliest practicable date. I underline "the earliest practicable date".

83. The five-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, requests Mr. Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev, as a first urgent step, to renew their contacts. A sense of urgency is highlighted in the five-Power draft resolution.

84. In the Australian proposal, the sense of urgency is entirely absent. Indeed, the idea of the earliest practicable date is planted in the Australian draft resolution. Of course, all actions should be taken at the earliest practicable date; but this dangerous phrase "earliest practicable date" could defeat the very objectives of the summit. The necessity of a summit meeting is not contested. We are at one; we are all unanimous on this count. It is the question of the urgency which is the issue of the moment.

85. The Australian proposal has advocated that which does not need to be advocated, and has failed to place the emphasis where it belongs. As a matter of fact, the general pattern of the Australian proposal is the same pattern that has been so far stumbling from one failure into another. The summit, with a four-Power composition, has proved to be a failure. I am afraid that with such a composition continuing, we are bound to face failure in perpetuity. A four-Power meeting, with three on one side and the fourth on the other, will not lead to agreement, but will consolidate disagreement.

86. A sense of the majority against the minority has brought about the collapse of the previous summit meetings. To avoid destroying a future summit

meeting, we must destroy these phenomena of majority and minority.

87. The Australian proposal concentrates on, and consecrates this imbalance. The five-Power draft resolution, on the other hand, establishes a balance built on equilibrium, the absence of which has caused all summit meetings to suffer in the past.

88. The Australian proposal also closes the door in the face of a new force emerging in this world of ours. The Australian proposal is conceived in terms of the post-war era of 1945, when nobody existed except the victors, except the major Powers.

89. But times have changed. The two continents of Asia and Africa have come to the international stage; the United Nations membership has doubled; the United Nations of 1960 is very different from the United Nations of 1945.

90. The Australian draft resolution simply ignores the emergence of that new force. The matter, as we see it, however, is not one of courtesy or representation. The African-Asian countries—or, to put it more precisely, the non-committed States—have a great contribution to make to any summit meeting, being what they are, and detached from military alliances. From this position of moral strength they can bring pressure to bear on the major Powers, which have up to the present moment been unable to agree, to make them agree.

91. Since the end of the war—and this is no secret to reveal—the major Powers have warred amongst themselves behind closed doors on each and every problem of world-wide significance. It is high time for another force to break through to the summit, to help in the great mission of making peace.

92. Unlike the Australian proposal, the five-Power draft resolution leaves the door open for the establishment of a summit of this nature. On the other hand, the five-Power resolution neither expressly nor by implication contains any condition for the renewal of contacts.

93. The wording of the Australian proposal admits conditions of all sorts. We know by now that both giants have set conditions for themselves before they can meet. Mr. Eisenhower had many conditions in mind, including, *inter alia*, the release of the two United States fliers. Mr. Khrushchev, for his part, is pressing for an apology regarding the activities of United States planes over the territory of the Soviet Union.

94. We must say outright that we cannot support either party in their conditions. Without going into the merits, we must say that this is no time for conditions. World peace should not be conditional upon an apology, no matter how grave the underlying incidents may be. Neither should the liberty of the two United States flyers, no matter how precious their freedom may be, become an impediment in the way of direct negotiations. The peace of the world admits of no conditions. The peace of the world demands that the two giants meet immediately. This is no time for apologies or anything of that nature.

95. There is one last point which remains to be clarified. I refer to the United States elections and the fact that President Eisenhower is vacating his post in the White House. This point does not constitute

an advantage for the Australian amendment or a disadvantage for the five-Power draft resolution. We know it to be a fact that on the issue of war and peace the basic fundamentals of United States policy would not be changed no matter what were the results of the United States elections, no matter who occupied the White House. Nevertheless, in meeting Mr. Khrushchev, President Eisenhower could be aided by both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kennedy. There is nothing against that idea, and the five-Power draft resolution does not preclude such a course.

96. In conclusion, let me appeal to the Assembly to respond to the cry of the moment and to live up to the urgency of the day. Lastly, let us rise to the responsibilities of our time. In the present situation we must not waste our time in wrangling, manoeuvres, and so forth. No matter what form it may take—whether that of a draft resolution or that of an amendment—our unanimous decision should call upon the two great giants to meet, and to meet without delay. This is the worthy course which the Assembly should follow at this session, a worthy course leading to a worthy aim: peace with justice.

97. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal): We welcome the initiative of the five leaders drawn from three continents of the world in putting forward the joint draft resolution [A/4522], which, in our opinion, is very timely and represents what the Assembly can and must do to meet the deepening crisis in the world and to check the recent drift of events towards what appears to us to be certain disaster.

98. In itself the adoption of the draft resolution might not solve any major problems, but it would, we have no doubt, constitute a step in the right direction. I have asked to speak merely in order to say a few words in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Ghana, India, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia.

99. The draft resolution itself is simple and self-explanatory. It has no ulterior purpose or motive. It merely reflects the anguish and concern of the peoples of the world at the deterioration in the state of relations between the two great Powers on which rests such a great responsibility for peace, disarmament and the reduction of tension in the world. The draft resolution merely seeks to facilitate contact between the leaders of these two great countries with a view to creating a favourable atmosphere for the eventual solution by negotiation of outstanding problems.

100. Both the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have expressed their willingness to engage in serious negotiations for the settlement of disarmament and other outstanding political problems. Hence it cannot be said that the sponsors of this draft resolution are seeking to bring any unfavourable pressure to bear on either side to renew their contacts, which were so unfortunately interrupted, to the dismay and disappointment of the peoples all over the world.

101. The adoption of this draft resolution by the General Assembly is desirable from yet another point of view. After all, it is not only the great Powers that have the responsibility for peace and the solution of political problems in the world. In

view of the present aggravation of relations between the two great Powers, if the United Nations General Assembly felt helpless and found itself unable to take any constructive measure, even in the direction of promoting a peaceful climate for future negotiations, it would certainly fail in its duties and obligations towards all the peoples of the world.

102. The draft resolution is not at all partisan in character. Quite rightly, it does not seek to apportion to either side the blame for the deterioration in the state of international relations. It truly embodies the sense of the deepening crisis in the world today and, as I have said, demands the least that can be done as a first necessary step. We hope and believe that the draft resolution will commend itself to unanimous acceptance by the General Assembly.

103. We regret to say that we are not in a position to appreciate or endorse the amendment [A/L.316] to the draft resolution proposed by Australia. As has been pointed out by speakers who have preceded me in this discussion, the amendment is not an amendment in the normal sense of the word. Those of us, however, who are familiar with our rules of procedure are well aware of the fact that under rule 92 anything can be interpreted as an amendment. That rule states: "... A motion is considered an amendment to a proposal if it merely adds to, deletes from or revises part of that proposal". As I have said, under that rule anything can be regarded as an amendment. To say the least, the Australian amendment represents a rather negative approach to this urgent problem and smells a little too much of the cold war. Its preamble not only refers to the ill-fated Summit Conference which was to take place in Paris on 17 May 1960, but, what is still more unfortunate, seeks to incorporate merely one side of the cause for its failure, thereby making the amendment difficult of acceptance by the other side.

104. While no one objects to a meeting of the Heads of Government of the four great nations, permanent members of the Security Council, with a view to making a material contribution to the general work of the United Nations for peace, the Australian amendment, if adopted, would have the effect of shifting the emphasis from the resumption of contacts between the two leaders of the two great Powers by reviving the memory of the ill-fated Summit Conference, which, in our view, should be treated as a closed chapter in international relations so that a new beginning may be made in the direction of creating a proper climate for fruitful negotiations among the big Powers in the future.

105. Everyone must realize that even an early summit meeting cannot take place unless contacts are immediately resumed between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In these circumstances we can regard the Australian amendment only as an attempt to complicate the issue by raising the question of a summit meeting—although, of course, the possibility of such a meeting is not ruled out by anyone.

106. The representative of India, while speaking on the draft resolution a few days ago [880th meeting], made it amply clear that it was not the intention of the sponsors to belittle the importance of the other two permanent members of the Security Council,

which two members were also to take part at the Paris Summit Conference. Moreover, contacts between leaders of these two Governments with the leaders of the Soviet Union have not been interrupted at all.

107. In the light of the above situation, we feel that the five-Power draft resolution points to the only right step in the direction of reducing tension and of creating a more favourable climate for negotiations among the big Powers in the future, while the Australian amendment seeks to negate both the spirit and the purpose of the five-Power draft resolution.

108. Under these circumstances, we cannot support the Australian amendment, and we request the General Assembly to accept the five-Power draft resolution as it stands, and vote against the amendment if it is pressed to a vote.

109. Mr. NEHRU (India): I should like right at the beginning to say that I welcome the small amendment to the five-Power draft resolution [A/4522], which was proposed by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic. This amendment makes no effective change, but I think it is a happier way of putting forward the idea contained in the draft resolution.

110. Some three or four days ago, when it was my privilege to put forward this draft resolution from five nations before the Assembly [880th meeting], I expressed the hope that it would be unanimously accepted. It did not seem to me reasonably possible that any member of this Assembly could object to that draft resolution. It is simple. It is straightforward. There is nothing contained in it against this person or that person or this group or that group. But it does represent a strong desire, a passionate desire, to get things moving. It does represent the feeling that this Assembly should not sit by helplessly watching, paralysed, as if it could not act. It represented something to do—not much, maybe; but it might come to something.

111. Nothing can be worse than this Assembly arriving at a stage where it cannot move and can only deliver speeches about general problems. Therefore, it was with considerable surprise that I received the next day or the day after the amendment submitted by Australia [A/L.316]. I read it with care. I found some difficulty in understanding it. I read it again. And the more I read it the more surprised I was that any member of the Assembly should have put this forward as an amendment.

112. I venture to place before this Assembly my reasons for this. First of all, it seemed to me, quite patently, that it had nothing to do by way of amending the proposition which we had put forward. It is not an amendment. Perhaps I do not know the rules of this Assembly, but it is not an amendment. The Prime Minister of Australia, in his speech, made it quite clear that it is not an amendment, although he may call it so. Therefore, it is not an amendment.

113. It may be, of course, a separate draft resolution in some form or another. It might have been brought forward and considered by the Assembly. Of course, if it was so considered, I would have much to say about it and against it; but, anyhow, it might have been considered separately. It is not an amendment to this draft resolution which the five nations have put forward. I could not understand this departure

from the normal workings of the Assembly. I could not quite understand what meaning lay behind this so-called amendment.

114. I have the greatest respect for the Prime Minister of Australia, more especially for his keen mind and ability. I wondered if that keen mind and ability had not tried to cover up, with a jumble of words, something which had no meaning at all—or the wrong meaning. So I was particularly keen and anxious to listen to the Prime Minister of Australia in order that he might throw some light on this aspect of this question which I had failed to understand. And I listened to him with great care. And the more I listened the more confused I grew. And the more I listened the more I realized that there is no substantive idea in this motion, but some idea of just dislike of what the five-nation draft resolution had suggested. Why dislike it? That, I could not understand.

115. He said, clearly, that he dissented from the last paragraph of that draft resolution—a very big paragraph, a very innocuous one; nevertheless, a paragraph with very considerable meaning. In fact, the whole draft resolution led up to that; the rest is a preamble. Therefore, he dissented from the very basis of this draft resolution. He came forward with his amendment to it, and he said that the effect of this draft resolution, if carried, would be undesirable. I wondered if I had understood him correctly or if I had made some mistake in regard to what he said. Why, I ask the Prime Minister, from any point of view, from any approach, could the adoption of this draft resolution possibly be undesirable? I have given thought to this matter, and I am quite unable to understand this reasoning. Therefore, it must be undesirable from some point of view of which I am not aware. It must be undesirable from some point of view which has nothing to do with this draft resolution. That is the conclusion I arrived at.

116. I would put to the Assembly, with respect and without meaning offence: is this rather trivial way of dealing with this not only important but vital question which is shaking the world—the question of world conflict and how to avoid it—rendered proper, by calling it an amendment of the resolution? I submit that we are discussing—although we are using simple words here—very important matters, matters affecting this Assembly, matters affecting the world.

117. The Prime Minister, in his argument, talked about a conference. Why does our draft resolution suggest a meeting or a conference? I would beg him to read the draft resolution again and again, because he has failed to understand it. It does not necessarily suggest a conference or a meeting. It suggests a renewal of contacts.

118. Then again, he asked, why should two people meet? Why should not four meet? Why dismiss the United Kingdom and France? Why omit them from summit talks? These are quotations which I took down when he was speaking. Why all this? he asked. Well, simply because there is no "why?" about it—because nobody is dismissing anybody, or pushing anybody out, or suggesting it. He has again missed the point of the draft resolution and has considered, possibly, that there is some kind of, shall I say, secret motive behind this. I really regret that any such idea should have gone abroad.

119. The draft resolution was put forward in all good faith for the purposes named in it, and to suspect it of some secret device to push somebody out, or not to pay adequate respect to some country, is not fair of the honourable gentleman. Indeed, I greatly regret to say that the Prime Minister of Australia has done very little justice to himself in proposing this amendment or in making the speech he did. And I am sure that the Assembly will not look at this matter from the superficial points of view which the Prime Minister put forward, but will consider it from the basic point of view which is of the highest importance to the Assembly and to the world.

120. Let us look at this amendment, which I think is not an amendment. The wording is interesting. It says:

"Recalling that a Conference between the President of the United States of America, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was arranged to take place in Paris on 17 May 1960,"

now note the words

"in order that these four leaders should examine matters of particular and major concern for their four nations,".

It is a private matter between the four nations, according to the Prime Minister of Australia. What has the Assembly to do with it? Then, this amendment says:

"Believing that much benefit for the world could arise from a co-operative meeting of the Heads of Government of these four nations in relation to those problems which particularly concern them,".

Now this is a very extraordinary idea to put before the Assembly—that is, that these matters, these so-called summit meetings and the rest, are private concerns of the four eminent dignitaries, Heads of State or Prime Ministers, of these four countries. Where does the Assembly come in? Where do all of us who happen to be in the outer darkness come in?

21. The Prime Minister of Australia then said that we, the sponsors of this draft resolution, had fallen into some communist trap which was aimed at describing the world as being divided up, or as dealing with two great protagonists and ignoring the world.

122. What the communist technique may be in regard to this matter I am not aware. It may be like this, it may not be: I am not particularly concerned with these techniques. But it seems to me that the Prime Minister of Australia's technique is obvious. It is, "There are these four great Powers"—whom we respect, of course, whom we honour—"so leave it to them. What business has the Assembly to deal with these matters? It is obvious—his amendment says so. Now surely this kind of thing, this idea, this approach, cannot, should not, must not be accepted.

123. When we suggested that these two distinguished Heads of great States should renew contacts it was not with an idea that they should discuss the affairs

of the world and finalize them. I, personally, would not agree to any finalization of these matters with two Powers, or four Powers or ten Powers. Only the Assembly should finalize them. But it is true that, in dealing with these tremendous questions, it is convenient and desirable for matters to be discussed in small groups and—more particularly in a question such as disarmament—by some of the countries which have most to disarm. Most of the people sitting here have nothing to disarm, or practically nothing, although we are greatly interested in the disarmament of others so that war may not break out and destroy the world.

124. So that it is right that two Powers, or four Powers, or ten committees or commissions may consider these matters quietly—not always making speeches at each other, as is done in the Assembly, but from a constructive point of view. That is all right—but remembering always that in a matter of this magnitude no group of Powers, however big, can dispose of the destiny of the world.

125. But that appears to be the idea in the mind of the Prime Minister of Australia, and because he has that idea that four Powers should dispose of this he was, naturally and rightly, somewhat irritated at the idea that only two Powers should do so. Well, it is not my intention that any two Powers, or four or six or more, should do so. Therefore, I should like to disabuse him of this wrong opinion that he has in his mind.

126. My difficulty in dealing with this amendment is that it proceeds, I imagine, from some kind of basic suspicion that there is a trick. The Prime Minister cannot put his finger on what the trick is, but there must be a trick because the idea has not come from him or his group. That kind of thing may sometimes happen. Personally, I am rather innocent of the working of the Assembly. I do not know if the member who come here often play these tricks on each other. But certainly I can assure the Prime Minister, with all earnestness, that there is no trickery in this draft resolution. However, there is something which I would like him to appreciate, and that is that there is passion in this draft resolution. It is not a question of words. The Prime Minister said—and I was happy to hear it—that he prayed daily for the avoidance of armed conflict. I earnestly hope that his prayers will have effect, and that all our prayers will have effect. But even prayers require some action and we meet here not merely to pray—although prayer is good—but for action, to give a lead to the world, to induce people, to request people, to urge people to act in a particular way, and sometimes to push people to act in a particular way. That is the only thing we can do.

127. And this draft resolution that we have ventured to put before the Assembly, in its simple form of words, represented that passion and that conviction that something must be done, or that, at any rate, the beginnings of something must take place so that it might take effect later on. Above all, it seemed to us that for the Assembly to meet, with members coming here from the four corners of the earth, and to avoid discussing this matter was a confession of helplessness and of paralysis of a great Organization, which was intolerable. I submit that it would be an intolerable position that the Assembly could

not deal with these matters because some people were angry with each other.

128. Now, anger may be justified; nevertheless, it cannot override the major considerations that we have to deal with. We realize that this draft resolution cannot lead us into the path of a solution, cannot lead even to a basic consideration of these problems. As things are, we must recognize the facts, and the facts are that this cannot be done at this stage. But what we were concerned with was the hope that this glacier, as it were, that had come to surround us, might be pushed a little or might be made to melt here and there, so that in the future discussions could take place at suitable times. At the present moment they cannot. Let us be frank about it: this great country, the United States, is engaged in a great election and it is not convenient for it—I quite recognize that—to enter into these basic talks. That is true. But even now, if nothing is done to arrest the process of deterioration, then it can become more difficult even at a later stage to have those talks. That is a fact to be borne in mind. Therefore we suggested that this small but highly important step might be taken as an urgent move towards the renewal of contacts. Remember that.

129. We think we were perfectly right. Let us consider what the effect would be if the advice of the Prime Minister of Australia were to be followed. It would mean—the amendment says so quite clearly—that this renewal of contacts would not take place, that the negative view prevails and that we should wait for some future occasion, which obviously is a fairly distant occasion now, for some kind of summit conference to be held. Now, I am in favour of a summit conference, but I realize, and the Assembly realizes, that it cannot be held in the next few months. Therefore, we should have to wait and spend our time, presumably, in daily prayer that this might take place and that war might be avoided.

130. I submit that this position is not only a completely untenable position, but it verges on absurdity, and I am surprised that a man of the high ability of the Prime Minister of Australia should put it forward. Also, this amendment, I regret to say, does have a tinge of the cold war approach, and it is obvious that if we are to seek solutions for these mighty problems it is not through such approaches that we shall do so. Charge and counter-charge, accusation and counter-accusation—we have had plenty of them and perhaps we shall go on having them. But the fact remains that if we are to deal with serious questions it is not by accusing each other or by bringing counter-accusations in reply. We are out to achieve something, and if we want to achieve something we have to recognize facts as they are and deal with the problem as it is. We cannot merely satisfy ourselves by making charges and counter-charges.

131. There is, I feel—though I hope I am wrong—some of this cold war approach in the so-called

amendment of Australia. I am anxious, therefore, that this draft resolution that has been sponsored by the five nations should be adopted—adopted unanimously, or, if not unanimously, nearly unanimously. Not to adopt it would be a dangerous thing from the point of view of the objectives we have and those for which the United Nations stands, from the point of view of creating some kind of disengagement, some kind of "détente" in this matter—the beginnings of it, at least; not a solution—a solution will come later—but some little movement in the right direction. It would be dangerous, it would be harmful, it would be wholly unjustifiable not to pass it. Therefore it should be passed, and I still hope that the Prime Minister of Australia will realize that his amendment is not what he apparently imagined it to be, and that it is a harmful amendment which shows a certain lack of care as to what should or should not happen. The amendment would say that we should let months pass and then those four great countries can meet together and possibly renew their charges and counter-charges. Now, that is not good enough. Even we of the humbler countries, without vast armies and nuclear weapons, may sometimes unburden our hearts, I hope; and if we cannot unburden our hearts and our minds in the Assembly, what are we to do? Are we just to be shepherded into this group or that group and say what we are told to say here and there, and not be allowed even to express our innermost feelings? I do submit that this kind of approach would not be right, for any of us.

132. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic has moved a small amendment. We would not object to small amendments if they bettered the draft resolution and if the purpose of the draft resolution remained and was not distorted and changed completely into something entirely the opposite of it. Therefore, I beg again to press for the adoption of this draft resolution if not unanimously then nearly unanimously.

133. The PRESIDENT: An amendment to the five-Power draft resolution has been submitted this morning by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic and is at present being circulated. Delegations may wish to have an opportunity of considering this amendment before continuing the debate. I propose, therefore, to adjourn this meeting now. The question is, however, when the Assembly would like to resume its consideration of this matter. There is a full list of speakers in the general debate for this afternoon. As delegations are aware, however, a night meeting of the Assembly has been scheduled for 8.30 this evening. The Assembly may possibly wish to continue and conclude its consideration of this present matter as the first item on the agenda of its night meeting. Unless I hear any objection I shall assume that the Assembly will proceed in this manner.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.