



## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations : report of the First Committee (A/2067) . . . . .	379

*President* : Mr. Luis PADILLA NERVO (Mexico).

**Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations : report of the First Committee (A/2067)**

[Agenda item 67]

*Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee (A/2067).*

1. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : The Assembly has before it the draft resolution proposed by the First Committee. The text will be found in the report. There is also a draft resolution proposed by the USSR delegation, which appears in document A/2068.

2. We shall vote first on the First Committee's draft resolution.

*The draft resolution was adopted by 40 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.*

3. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*) : I propose that explanations of votes on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union should be given before the vote is taken. It was possibly right, in the case of the First Committee's draft resolution which has just been put to the vote, that such explanations should have been given afterwards since that resolution is concerned principally with general procedure and the method by which the Soviet Union's proposals will be examined by the United Nations. But the Soviet Union's draft resolution refers to a series of general questions and questions of principle and in dealing with those questions, explanations of votes should in my opinion, be given before the draft resolution is put to the vote, as the arguments that delegations may wish to put forward are of political importance.

4. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : There are various speakers on the list who have asked to explain their votes. The first is the representative of Yugoslavia.

5. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*) : The General Assembly is called upon today to vote, in plenary meeting, on a draft resolution different from those which are usually submitted to it, in the sense that the draft is not concerned with a particular subject related to a specific topic. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union deals in its eight paragraphs with almost as many different subjects which are unrelated to one another except for the fact that they are questions which we have hitherto vainly tried to solve and that they are poisoning the international atmosphere.

6. During the discussion in the First Committee, the sponsors of the draft resolution said—and they will undoubtedly repeat it here today—that all the subjects are related to the general problem of peace. We may well ask what important international questions are not related to peace. The delegation of the Soviet Union has merely made a selection from the multitude of items on our agenda, and plainly it has been guided in its selection by propaganda considerations. It has assembled the questions with regard to which the Government of the USSR thinks it has discovered slogans likely to strike the imagination of the uninformed. Atomic bombs—prohibition; conventional armaments—one-third reduction; Korea—armistice on the 38th parallel, and so on.

7. I said that the slogans are intended for the uninformed. Those who are better informed know that the Soviet Union has for years resisted and continues to resist any form of effective control of the measures which would be taken following the prohibition of the atomic weapon and that its acceptance today of permanent control is still equivocal since the draft resolution does not talk of permanent control but rather of a permanent right of control, a formula which Mr. Vyshinsky has not deciphered for us.

8. Let us take another example, that of Korea. The USSR draft proposes an armistice on the 38th parallel. Anyone who is in the slightest degree familiar with the problem of Korea knows that the Security Council appealed to the belligerent parties to cease fire on the parallel at a date which everyone remembers since it was the date of the outbreak of hostilities, 25 June 1950, and that the Government of the Soviet Union, which was not ignorant of these events, turned a deaf ear to it, both then and during the months that followed.

9. Another slogan, the emptiest of them all, that calling for a one-third reduction of conventional armaments by the great Powers, will have very little success not only with the well informed but with any thinking man or woman for it is easy to see that if it were carried out it would merely consolidate the superiority of the USSR army over other armies and more particularly over the armies of the so-called western Powers.

10. There is another slogan, that of the five-Power peace pact. This slogan is perhaps the least easy to see through. Some whose goodwill is not open to doubt may say, why shall the "Big Five" not sign a document in which they would solemnly declare, for example, that they would never resort

to war against each other. To that question one must answer that a solemn promise of that kind would be tantamount to a promise given by each of the great Powers never to use its armed forces to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a third State not a great Power. If a great Power went to the assistance of a victim of aggression on the part of another great Power, it would be in danger of violating the new five-Power pact.

11. That was the significance of many of the great Powers agreements made during the inter-war period with the declared purpose of averting the threat of immediate war. For example, the Hoare-Laval agreement in which Laval acted as Mussolini's agent was to remove the danger of war between France and England and Mussolini's Italy in connexion with Ethiopia. The agreement, as everyone knows, provided for the cession of a substantial area of Ethiopian territory to Italy. There is no need to dwell on the Munich agreement in which Czechoslovakia was sacrificed, ostensibly to the cause of peace.

12. Another example of the same type of agreement was the agreement between Molotov and von Ribbentrop when peace was preserved at the expense of Poland and the Baltic States.

13. What must be stressed is that it was not only the middle-sized States which were sacrificed to the alleged cause of peace, the supreme goal, but that the great Powers which stooped to such dishonourable bargaining themselves became the victims of their own turpitude. Once you begin to share the skin of others, the process is endless; the portion received is never sufficient to satisfy an appetite that grows by what it feeds on. From this point of view, the last agreement of the kind, that between Molotov and von Ribbentrop, is the most significant. In that agreement, the partners shared eastern Europe between them. But the arrangements seem not to have been sufficiently precise with regard to Bulgaria, other points such as the Dardenelles and various other territories. We all know what the sequel was.

14. I shall be told: You are making insinuations; we have never said that a five-Power pact would contain a clause saying that the "Big Five" would never in any circumstances take up arms against one another. From the formal point of view, the objection will be correct; the USSR representative has never said that. What is more, the representatives of the Soviet Union have said simply nothing whatever about the pact. They have never said what their famous five-Power pact would contain in the way of clauses, public annexes, secret annexes, separate protocols and so on.

15. But this suspicious silence is an additional reason for misgiving. What is this proposed pact intended to do? What is the obscure purpose which is carefully not revealed? What, as the USSR Government sees it, would be the role of the five Powers on the one hand and on the other of the remaining Powers which, according to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, would subsequently accede to the pact? What machinery, what new organs is it intended to propose under the pact?

16. We do not know. One thing, however, is certain. A text that we might all sign, which could be signed by the sixty Member States of the United Nations, a text containing all the principal provisions of the Charter directly related to the question of peace, including such provisions as the territorial inviolability of all States, great and small, the sovereign equality of all States, their right to individual or collective self-defence, the duty of all States Members to participate in collective action on behalf of the victim of aggression, and so on, stated as clearly as they are in the Charter, would undoubtedly not be found in the proposed Moscow-style pact. If that was the intention of the USSR

Government, it could at any time propose a draft resolution of that kind here and we would adopt it unanimously or we would all sign it as a special convention. If that is not the course they have chosen, it is because they have in view something else than the provisions of the United Nations Charter. That is why, until we have absolutely conclusive proof to the contrary, we shall consider that the intention of the pact is a division of the world into so-called spheres of influence which, in fact, would be spheres of control, and that consequently, the pact, like the Munich agreement, would be the forerunner of a new world war.

17. The Yugoslav delegation will, therefore, vote against the draft resolution of the Soviet Union as being dangerous to the peace.

18. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Under the rules of procedure I am not allowed, as representative of the USSR, to speak at length at this stage on the USSR draft resolution. I cannot however refrain from saying a few words, without touching on the actual substance of the question, with reference to the statement just made by the representative of Yugoslavia.

19. The fact that the Yugoslav representative slandered the Soviet Union need occasion us no surprise. Such are the tactics and such is the bounden duty of every traitor who deserts one camp to join another. It would have been surprising if the Yugoslav representative had spoken with more honesty than he did.

20. The tripartite draft resolution submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom and France amounts in fact to a proposal to refer to the Disarmament Commission the proposals contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation. It is argued that these proposals require careful study in the Disarmament Commission, but that is, of course, an entirely fictitious reason, designed only to evade an open, public, comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of our proposals.

21. When a similar question arose in the First Committee, the United Kingdom and France together with the United States gravely argued that it was impossible to refer their proposals to the Disarmament Commission. At that time they clearly realized the impossibility of such a step and adduced every possible argument to force their proposals to be considered in the First Committee, and after that in the General Assembly, before being referred to the Disarmament Commission.

That was in fact done. The policy of preventing the Committee from considering the substance of a similar proposal and from taking any decision on our proposals, of making it approve merely a draft resolution referring the matter to the Disarmament Commission can only be described as double-dealing. The real purpose of this double-dealing is to prevent any substantive discussion in the First Committee of the highly important proposals contained in the USSR draft resolution, proposals which are designed to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and goodwill among the nations.

23. It is proposed that we refer paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive to the Disarmament Commission. What in fact are those paragraphs? The supreme importance of the proposals contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of the draft resolution is unmistakable. Even those who have done everything in their power to ignore our proposals, or in any event to cast every possible doubt on them or minimize their importance, have been unable to deny that.

24. The first of these proposals, in paragraph 3, provides that the General Assembly should consider "the use of atomic weapons, as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people, to be at variance with the conscience and honour of peoples and incompatible with membership of the United Nations", and should proclaim "the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously".
25. That disposed of one of the most serious objections which has hitherto been advanced against us, and which has been claimed by the very sponsors of the tripartite draft resolution to preclude any agreement on this supremely important question.
26. The United Kingdom and the United States representatives have argued on any and every occasion that the General Assembly must take measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations. Why then do they now prevent any discussion of our draft resolution and the adoption of a corresponding decision by the General Assembly?
27. It must be obvious to any impartial person, who is concerned for the maintenance of peace and honestly desires the elimination of the present tension in international relations, that there are absolutely no grounds for relegating the General Assembly to the background, or for preventing it from discharging its responsibility for the settlement of this important question, as is now being done. This is all the more inadmissible when it is remembered that the adoption of the USSR proposals would open the way to the possibility of an agreed settlement of the most important question before us. Indeed, that was the reaction and the attitude to our proposals of a number of delegations in the First Committee, as of all progressive people throughout the world, nay, of all peace-loving peoples.
28. But that is precisely what the governments which carry weight in the United Nations and their delegations, particularly those of the United States and the United Kingdom, do not want. All these facts show that they are not interested in the prohibition of atomic weapons or in strict international control; they are not interested in the reduction of armaments, in the termination of the Korean war, in the establishment of good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies, in the removal of the international tension which at present exists throughout the world, and in the conclusion, lastly, of an important peace pact between the five Powers open to all other Powers, large or small. And that provides still further proof of the sanderous nature of the Yugoslav representative's allegation that a five-Power pact would be directed against the small Powers.
29. Such is the real object of the decision, adopted in the First Committee by the bloc headed by the United States which dominates the United Nations, to refer our draft resolution to the Disarmament Commission, in the hope that it will be pigeon-holed there, in the hope that, as in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments, they will be able in the Disarmament Commission to dispose of our proposals once and for all and bury them so that they never see the light again.
30. And yet the USSR draft resolution proposes important measures such as the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, a measure which we demand at once because every day, week and month, let alone every year that we lose means an even more vigorous and decisive advance towards war at a time when instead of following that road to disaster we should be barring the way to it through firm and resolute action by the concerted forces of the United Nations.
31. Our draft resolution includes important proposals: the immediate reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers; the appeal to the Governments of all States to consider at a world conference, to be convened at the earliest possible date and in any case not later than 15 July 1952, the question of the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments; the question of practical measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control; and the recommendation in the name of the General Assembly that all States should submit complete official data on the situation of their armaments and armed forces, including data on atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories. It includes too the important proposal for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ which should have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis without, of course, interfering in the domestic affairs of States, a reservation deplored by the colonial Powers. Lastly, it includes the important provision which I have already mentioned: the proposal for the conclusion of a peace pact, an exceptionally important agreement which all other peace-loving States are called upon to join.
32. But the group of Powers in the United Nations, the members of the Atlantic bloc headed by the United States of America and supported by a number of other States which follow the bloc, have done everything in their power to prevent the General Assembly from taking decisions on these important questions.
33. The discussions in the First Committee showed that we have been faced here with an agreed plan on the part of the delegations of certain States which, following in the wake of the United States policy of aggression, neither seek nor wish to achieve any settlement of these important problems of international politics. Yet unless these problems are solved there can be no relaxation of the present international situation; no effective measures towards removing the threat of a new war, no genuine steps to strengthen international peace and security.
34. As we saw during the discussions and the voting in the First Committee on the tripartite and the USSR draft resolutions, the USSR proposals have again been opposed by the representatives of those very countries which, in and out of season, everywhere proclaim their love of peace, and attempt to pass themselves off as supporters of peace. This is clearly borne out by the draft resolution which they forced through the First Committee.
35. The representatives of those countries have thereby exposed the policy followed by their Governments as a policy having nothing in common with an effort towards peace or the removal of the threat of a new war. If they really were against war, if they fought for peace in deeds and not in words, they should have supported the Soviet Union's proposals for peace, for the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the great Powers, for the holding, in any case not later than 15 July 1952, of a world conference on the reduction of armaments, for the termination of the war in Korea, and for the prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control. However, they rejected all these proposals, behind a smoke-screen of phrases about peace, for they themselves are in fact pursuing aggressive ends and planning for the preparation of a new war.

36. This session of the General Assembly has once again showed, as the head of the USSR Government, Stalin, stated at the beginning of 1951 when he exposed the aggressive plans of the reactionary governments, that the policy of the United States and the other Atlantic bloc countries is designed to deceive their peoples and force them to accept their aggressive plans, and to drag them once again into a new war. Those are the reasons which force the bloc headed by the United States to oppose our recommendations which are aimed at strengthening peace and averting the threat of a new war.

37. But despite all these reactionary intrigues, the forces of peace are constantly growing and gaining strength. We are firmly convinced that there is not a single part of the world where the cause of peace is not cherished in the hearts of millions and millions of people; where the word "war" is not uttered with hatred and execration by all honest men and women. Whatever the resistance offered by the aggressive forces in a number of countries to the great struggle of all peace-loving peoples against the threat of a new war, the Soviet Union will steadfastly pursue its peace policy, a policy of preventing war and preserving and strengthening peace.

38. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (*translated from French*): The explanation of my delegation's vote which I wish to make concerns both draft resolutions before the General Assembly today, to the extent to which both concern disarmament.

39. The French delegation, of course, voted in favour of the draft resolution of the three Powers, including France, given in the First Committee's report. The reasons for that vote, which are the same as those for which the draft resolution was submitted, have already been stated in detail before the Committee. I shall only return to them so far as is strictly necessary to correct certain interpretations placed on them by Mr. Vyshinsky.

40. In supporting the draft resolution the French delegation did not criticize the USSR proposals. It did not challenge them. It has not at any time refused to examine them. It has not therefore been able at any time to act in a manner contrary to the views expressed by any of its members in earlier or recent discussions.

41. Mr. Vyshinsky made a great deal of his new proposals. My delegation, speaking on the USSR draft resolution, confined itself to remarking upon those points in the draft resolution which differed from the positions recently adopted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on disarmament, and upon such of those differences as were new in comparison with the more familiar USSR arguments. Thus it showed that, in connexion with atomic weapons, the simultaneous entry into force of prohibition and control was the concept upheld by the delegation of the USSR in 1948, 1949 and 1950. With regard to continuing inspection, it pointed out that agreement on that formula would only be fully valuable if there were concurrent agreement on the machinery and scope of the inspection. This aspect of the matter will, I think, be adequately described by saying that according to some views the scope is atomic energy, and that according to others it covers weapons alone.

42. If the results obtained in the last two discussions on disarmament under different headings are reckoned up, it will be found that agreement has been reached on the constitution of a single disarmament commission, competent to deal with atomic as well as conventional armaments, and on the subsequent convening of a world disarmament conference. It will also be found that some reconciliation of views has appeared to be possible on the relations between

inspection and control, and on the nature of the inspection. That is a notable advance and should be greeted as such.

43. However, we must also note after hearing Mr. Vyshinsky's speech on the 17th of this month in the First Committee [*493rd meeting*], that this reconciliation of views in the terms in which they are expressed in no way prejudices the substance of the matter. With regard to this, which is of course the inspection machinery and the scope of control, the difficulties still subsist.

44. If, therefore, certain invitations in the Soviet Union's draft resolution have been favourably received, it is because they indicate that we may hope for further reconciliation. It is in order to determine the value of these indications, to test the possibilities of such reconciliation, that the authors of the three-Power draft resolution have proposed to refer to the Disarmament Commission—a single commission, the creation of which Mr. Vyshinsky himself recently proposed—that part of the USSR draft resolution which deals with disarmament. It seems to us that if the concessions of which the delegation of the Soviet Union made so much are not a mere verbal display, the Soviet Union should be glad that they are to come before a body which will be able to examine them as carefully, methodically and discreetly as the subject demands.

45. I shall say nothing of the reasons for which the French delegation voted against the other parts of the USSR draft resolution. They have been set forth clearly enough on various occasions to be known now to all.

46. Mr. EBAN (Israel): The resolution of the First Committee on which we have just voted came before us as a consequence of the proposals of the Soviet Union [*A/2068*]. The stubborn deadlock in the disarmament question is the most vivid symbol of the crisis which has clouded international relations since the end of the Second World War. Any movement towards agreement on this question will, therefore, be welcomed with ardent relief by the peoples of the world. The fact that the Soviet Union's proposal contains a modification of its previous position merits for it the close and careful examination of the Disarmament Commission which the General Assembly has set up with the unanimous consent of all Members of the United Nations. The delegation of Israel has therefore voted in favour of the resolution of the First Committee which recommends such examination.

47. The General Assembly in its resolution of 11 January 1952 has already charged the Disarmament Commission with the task of considering any proposals or plans for control which may be put forward involving either conventional armaments or atomic energy. Thus the submission of these plans to the Disarmament Commission does not, in the view of my delegation, imply any reflection at all on the significance of the plans.

48. We have given careful thought to the desire of the Soviet Union to have its proposal substantively examined and considered at this session. However, a brief examination of these suggestions reveals the need for a more detailed inquiry. My delegation, for example, has argued at every recent session of the General Assembly that the prohibition of atomic weapons, even with adequate international control, would advance the cause of peace only if it were certain that the use of conventional armaments could simultaneously be controlled. It is true, as the USSR draft resolution says, that the use of atomic weapons as weapons of aggression is at variance with membership of the United Nations; but so also is the aggressive use of non-atomic weapons, many of which are deadly and horrifying enough in their destructive capacity. By prohibiting

the use of one weapon and leaving the others uncontrolled, we are merely changing the balance of military power and clearly not affecting the prospects of peace. The aggressive use of the atomic weapon is not in a different moral or legal category from the aggressive use of other weapons of destruction. My delegation therefore continues to question the utility of any agreement with regard to the atomic weapon without a simultaneous agreement regarding conventional armaments.

49. Moreover, an increase of armaments in the world is the result and not the cause of international tension. Therefore, a solution of some of the political conflicts which divide the world and generate ill will and fear is of more fundamental importance than a discussion of disarmament as though it were some separate and technical subject. There is a clear inter relation of the atomic question with the problem of conventional armaments and both issues have meaning in the context of political relations. There is thus much work to be done before the USSR proposals can be finally appraised, and it is prudent to transfer that discussion to the Disarmament Commission. In recommending the proposals of the Soviet Union for sympathetic study in the Disarmament Commission, my delegation is constrained to adopt a negative attitude to two suggestions among those which were thus submitted together with the disarmament clause of the USSR draft resolution. The first relates to Korea and the second invites us to comment on the North Atlantic Treaty.

50. My delegation has never ceased to hope for an early cease-fire and an armistice in Korea. It is evident, however, that this aim can best be achieved through the success of the armistice negotiations now proceeding at Panmunjom. The General Assembly should not cause any disruption of that process by reaching its own conclusions or arrangements. For example, the armistice conference should decide, if it has not already decided, on the demarcation line and on arrangements for the withdrawal of troops, and it would be imprudent for the General Assembly to run counter to such agreements or to influence them. It is unfortunate and instructive that since the Korean question became a subject of discussion in the General Assembly little further progress has been made in the armistice talks. We hope that with the end of the discussion in the General Assembly the armistice negotiations will regain their momentum. It is thus out of deep concern for an armistice and not out of indifference to it that my delegation will vote against any specific recommendation by the General Assembly on matters which must be settled in the final phase of the armistice conference.

51. Finally, we see no reason to declare that the North Atlantic Treaty is aggressive or incompatible with membership in the United Nations. Israel is one of the few States in the Near East without troops of another State on its soil, and it is the only State in that area which does not participate in an organization created largely for the purpose of expressing and maintaining a hostile attitude against a Member of the United Nations. We therefore express a detached and objective view when we assert that the establishment and existence of bases have the consent of the States concerned and that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty, especially the United States, have given frequent and impressive testimony in the United Nations of their deep desire to maintain world peace, to resist aggression and to respect the sovereignty of States.

52. Thus, in voting for the First Committee's resolution my delegation hopes that the discussion of the USSR proposals in the Disarmament Commission will open up new procedures and enable the great Powers to collaborate

and lift the burden of fear which lies heavy upon the hearts of the people of the world. The Charter is itself a universal peace pact, and it is by the effective functioning of this pact rather than by new proclamations of peace that our Organization will fulfil its duty to the peoples of the United Nations and to the destiny of mankind.

53. Mr. GROSS (United States of America) : During the debate in the First Committee on this item, the USSR representative, in reply to certain questions which had been addressed to him by members of the Committee in serious efforts to elicit information concerning some of the points raised in the USSR draft resolution, rather indignantly asked whether we of the First Committee were supposed to be in school. No doubt the question was ironical, but it can also be taken seriously. In a sense we are all at school, a hard and bitter school in which we are learning day after day the nature of the threat which confronts us and the lessons we must learn if we are to build the peace which the world wants. All of us who are free and who mean to be free are in that school.

54. The debate in the First Committee was good schooling. We learned that the Soviet Union is concerned about the progress which the North Atlantic community is making in its efforts to defend itself. We learned from listening once again to the many falsehoods of the representative of the Soviet Union how right we were in taking earlier a decision, which the USSR representative chose to ignore, to defer for the time being our consideration of political questions referring to Korea. We learned that the Soviet Union is not easily rebuffed, and that the representative of the Soviet Union introduced once again a proposal for a five-Power peace pact which for three years in a row the General Assembly has rejected by large votes.

55. My delegation has voted in favour of the draft resolution approved by the First Committee which refers to the Disarmament Commission paragraphs 3 through 7 of the USSR draft resolution. The United States delegation believes that the Disarmament Commission is the proper place to seek to answer the many questions which the proposals of the Soviet Union bring to mind. The United States Government for its part, as I stated before the Committee, will make important proposals in the Disarmament Commission designed to put into effect the principles set forth in the General Assembly resolution [A/L.25]. In particular, we shall make proposals on disclosure and verification. We hope that other governments will do the same and we also hope that the Soviet Union will explain its proposals and will join in the effort of the Disarmament Commission to develop comprehensive plans for the regulation, limitation and a balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. We shall examine with care any new proposals which may be made for the prohibition of the atomic weapon through the effective international control of atomic energy, bearing in mind the General Assembly's resolution which declares that unless a better or no less effective system is devised, the United Nations plan should continue to serve as the basis for the international control of atomic energy.

56. My delegation will vote against the other provisions of the USSR draft resolution. Paragraph 1 attacks the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the creation of overseas bases. Both these activities are entirely defensive in nature and both rest upon the free consent of all parties involved. They are responses to the challenge to peace presented by the very nation which now asks the General Assembly to declare these activities, in their words, "incompatible with membership of the United Nations". This, in our view,

is an effort to abolish the principle of self-defence which the Charter itself recognizes.

57. We shall also vote against paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution which would confuse and delay the armistice negotiations in Korea. We want these negotiations to succeed. All that is needed is sincerity and good faith on the other side. Debates here cannot provide a substitute for that good faith. It may be that the representative of the Soviet Union does not really expect the world any longer to take seriously his abuse and invective, but surely he cannot believe that the negotiations are aided when he calls the United Nations representatives cannibals? After an armistice the General Assembly could at once concern itself with the future of Korea, with the political effort to move towards the United Nations objective of a unified, democratic and independent nation, and with the economic effort to bind up the wounds inflicted on the Republic of Korea by the North Korean and Chinese communist aggression.

58. In conclusion, we shall vote against paragraph 8 of the USSR draft resolution which proposes peace again the conclusion of a five-Power peace pact. We continue to believe that what the world needs are not new pacts for peace but new acts for peace.

59. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) (*translated from Russian*): The Polish delegation will vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union as that draft resolution proposes concrete and effective measures against the threat of a new world war and for strengthening peace and friendship among the nations.

60. The Polish delegation has fully supported the USSR proposal and will vote for it. It has, furthermore, voted against the three-Power draft resolution, firmly repudiating that proposal, which makes no constructive effort to solve the problem, but is, on the contrary, a mere procedural manoeuvre to conceal from world public opinion the hostile attitude of the United States and its associates towards the prohibition of the atomic bomb and the reduction of armaments.

61. The General Assembly has two courses before it: the course of realistic and positive action proposed by the Soviet Union on the one hand, and on the other, the course proposed by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom and France. That course is also zealously supported by the representative of Mr. Tito's régime who has attempted by every means in his power, including slander and provocation, to divert us from the purpose which the United Nations must serve, namely, to maintain peace and to ensure lasting international co-operation. In fact he has done his very utmost to divert us from the path of peace and security among the nations. That is not at all surprising. The Americans pay for such slander, though the price is a poor one.

62. The Polish delegation supports the concrete USSR proposals which could reduce international tension and help to a great extent to remove many differences and disputes. The USSR draft resolution offers a clear and concrete solution to such important problems as that of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control over that prohibition, as well as the reduction of armaments, whereas the three-Power proposal was merely a clever manoeuvre to deprive the General Assembly of the possibility of adopting any concrete decision on problems of such importance to the cause of peace.

63. In spite of the goodwill displayed by the Soviet Union and in spite of the conciliatory proposals which have been so forcefully presented both in the draft resolu-

tion of the Soviet Union and in the speech made by the head of the USSR delegation, Mr. Vyshinsky, the three Powers are evincing no desire to depart by a single step from their previous stands, but are stubbornly persisting in a course contrary to the interests of peace and international security. The cynicism of the three-Power proposal is particularly emphasized by the fact that those same States which objected to the draft resolution of the Polish delegation at the time when that delegation, in order not to tie the hands of the Disarmament Commission, introduced a compromise draft resolution to the effect that all proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments should be referred to that Commission, have now decided to refer the USSR proposals to the Commission, without any recommendation of the General Assembly.

64. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Acheson, stated a few days ago at a Press conference that he did not want control and that the only solution of the problem acceptable to the United States would be the transfer of ownership of all atomic energy production to an international trust, which would, in effect, be an American trust, as contemplated by the Baruch plan. Apparently Mr. Acheson has not yet learned the lessons referred to here by the previous speaker, Mr. Gross, and that is further borne out by the fact that Mr. Acheson, as is now known, failed to support Mr. Gross when he spoke on new United States proposals on the disarmament question. It is true that Mr. Gross assures us today that those proposals will be submitted nevertheless, but it is not easy to know whom to believe, the representative of the United States here at the General Assembly or the Secretary of State of the United States, that is to say the leader of the foreign policy of the United States of America. The statement by Mr. Acheson at the Press conference proves once again that the United States does not intend to accept prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of continuing effective international control to enforce that prohibition.

65. We shall vote for the USSR draft resolution because it characterizes participation in an aggressive military coalition such as the Atlantic bloc and the building of military bases on foreign territories as being incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

66. At the same time the draft resolution of the Soviet Union calls for a five-Power pact. The Polish delegation sees in the conclusion of such a pact a guarantee for the strengthening and continued development of peace and international relations.

67. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the proposal of the Soviet Union, which is directed towards the earliest possible cessation of hostilities in Korea, shows the way to the solution of one of the most important problems confronting the General Assembly. We consider that the United States and its collaborators, in opposing even the discussion of that question, have revealed their true intentions, the purpose of which is to continue the war in Korea.

68. The Polish delegation considers the USSR proposal to be indivisible and is convinced that the acceptance of all its points would undoubtedly considerably reduce international tension.

69. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines): It is the considered view of the Philippine delegation that the multiple proposals made by the delegation of the Soviet Union in its draft resolution do not show sufficient indication of genuine intentions on its part to make concessions to reach a compromise on the issues which divide the world. They

are essentially repetitions of questions already considered and acted upon by appropriate organs of the United Nations, and therefore need not be considered anew by the General Assembly at this time.

70. Relative to the vital issue of atomic energy my delegation supports the view that the prohibition of atomic weapons should be conditional upon the effective operation of a foolproof system of inspection and control of atomic energy. The USSR proposals for an unconditional prohibition to take effect simultaneously with the institution of international control, which shall include continuing inspection, does not meet this position.

71. We, however, associate ourselves with the Western Powers in their attitude that any proposal for the international control of atomic energy and the reduction of armaments should be given the consideration that it deserves, to allay the anxiety of mankind in the face of the persistent threat of a new world war. The General Assembly has recently established the Disarmament Commission to undertake precisely that task.

72. My delegation therefore has supported the draft resolution put forward by France, the United Kingdom and the United States to refer the USSR proposals to the Commission for appropriate action, and will vote against the USSR draft resolution. In doing so my delegation hopes most sincerely that the USSR proposals contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive may be found by the Commission to be constructive and to advance to some degree the cause of peace.

73. The draft resolution of the Soviet Union is ostensibly designed to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations. Nothing can more effectively combat the threat of a new world war than for that threat to be withdrawn by the country from which it comes. The threat of a world war comes from the Soviet Union, from its expansionist policy carried out either through internal subversion or direct aggression. The threat of war must cease. The Soviet Union must discontinue its policy, and nothing can more effectively strengthen peace and friendship among the nations than for the Soviet Union to lift the "iron curtain" which isolates it from the rest of the world. If the communist system is as wonderful as we are led to believe it is, then let us have a look at it as they are free to have a look at our own system. This is the truth. There is nothing that can strengthen friendship and peace among the nations more effectively than the free and constant inter-course among peoples. The Soviet Union must abandon its policy of subversion and aggression: that is the best method to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations.

74. Mr. HRSEL (Czechoslovakia) (*translated from Russian*): The Czechoslovak delegation warmly supports the USSR draft resolution on measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations, and will vote for it.

75. This draft resolution is designed to achieve in practice the objectives proclaimed in the fundamental Articles of the Charter, the objectives of peace and security. It is a genuine manifestation of the traditional peaceful policy of the USSR; it contains in comprehensive and closely inter-connected form all the problems for which we must urgently find solutions at the present time.

76. The USSR draft resolution in the first place calls upon the General Assembly to declare participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation of military bases

in foreign territories incompatible with membership of the United Nations. This demand is an expression of the USSR's tireless struggle against violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. At the present time the United States of America is endeavouring to include definitely and unmistakably aggressive blocs under its own leadership in the United Nations, which was established for the purpose of maintaining peace and security. It is thus trying to substitute in the United Nations the principle of aggression and war for the principle of peace and co-operation. The United States representatives have been unable either in the First Committee or in this General Assembly to refute the evidence of the aggressive character of the North Atlantic Treaty.

77. The appeal in the USSR draft resolution to the General Assembly to adopt a resolution which would promote the immediate cessation of the criminal war in Korea expresses the desires of all the peoples of the world. The protraction of the United States aggression in Korea under cover of the United Nations flag is a blot upon this Organization. It is therefore our prime duty, in common humanity, to ensure that the General Assembly promotes the establishment of peace in Korea.

78. The USSR draft resolution calls on the General Assembly to proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and their use as weapons of aggression and of the mass destruction of people. It makes it clearly and definitely understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control must be put into effect simultaneously, since only thus can immediate agreement be achieved on this question. The USSR has also compromised on the matter of establishing mutual understanding with regard to the nature of the control to be instituted to ensure observance and implementation of the prohibition of atomic weapons, and of the decisions concerning the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The USSR is therefore endeavouring to establish a proper system of guarantees to ensure compliance with the General Assembly's decisions, and is giving the international control organ the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis, with the legitimate proviso that it will not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States.

79. The proposed reduction by the Powers of their armaments and armed forces by one-third in one year will have rapid and positive results. This was elucidated during the debate in the First Committee. The statement made by the Yugoslav representative today on this question and on that of the peace pact is a repetition of the old slander uttered by the enemies of the USSR, foremost among whom are now the rulers of the Yugoslav people.

80. The USSR proposals constitute clear evidence of an honest effort to solve the fundamental questions of peace and security. The proposal for the convening of a world conference both by States Members of the United Nations and by non-member States, and the generous initiative seen in the appeal for the conclusion of a peace pact between the five great Powers, constitute yet another link in the endless chain of evidence that the USSR is striving tirelessly for true co-operation between all nations, great and small.

81. The Czechoslovak delegation is wholly convinced that agreement between the great Powers is possible on the basis of the USSR proposals, and that the prime requisite for the conclusion of such an agreement is the immediate declaration of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, which would restore lasting international confidence and represent a great contribution to the cause of maintaining and strengthening peace.

82. These are the reasons why the Czechoslovak delegation supports the USSR draft resolution and will vote for it. For these same reasons it voted against the proposals submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

83. Mr. BELLEGARDE (Haiti) (*translated from French*): I want to state as briefly as possible why the Haitian delegation has voted for the text submitted by the First Committee.

84. Speaking in the discussion in the First Committee, I recalled the memory of the great warrior whom France and the free world have recently lost, General de Lattre de Tassigny, who has been posthumously created Marshal. I mentioned by way of illustration the life and death of General de Lattre. He had been ailing for a long time, but had neglected to look after himself. He suffered only the symptoms of his disease to be treated, because he placed the fulfilment of the mission entrusted to him by his country above the care of his health.

85. I cited the death of Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny to illustrate my contention, with regard to disarmament, the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, that we were practising symptomatic medicine, that is to say, we were attacking the symptoms rather than the cause. The atomic weapon is not the cause of the present tension. There were wars before the discovery of the atomic weapon. We had the World War of 1914-1918; the atomic weapon did not then exist. There was the war of 1939; still the atomic weapon did not exist. Hence, it cannot logically be maintained that the existence of the atomic weapon is the cause of the present tension. One must look elsewhere, further afield, for those causes.

86. In committee, I maintained that the evil plaguing us today is the evil of fear. We are afraid. And it is because the peoples are afraid that they are arming to resist the threat of war, a threat which exists independently of the atomic weapon. At the outset of the General Assembly's present session, I maintained that these causes must be discovered. The formation of the Atlantic bloc is obviously not the cause of the tension, as has been asserted here. It is one of its effects. No one would make preparations for defence who did not feel himself threatened. Peoples like the French, British, Dutch, Belgians and Norwegians would not accept the huge sacrifices asked of them in the name of preparation for defence unless they felt themselves threatened. That threat exists and we must find those responsible for it. We tried to point them out and brought upon ourselves a torrent of abuse. Abuse, however, rebounds off our shoulders because, although elsewhere it may lead to the gallows, in the free world it does not have that effect. That is why we shall not even reply.

87. We find that a state of tension exists, that we must use all our goodwill to avert the war which is threatening us and which would be catastrophic, above all if the weapons available were used; that would be universal suicide, total world destruction. Such total destruction can be to no one's advantage, neither to the Soviet Union's nor to Great Britain's, neither to that of the United States, nor to that of the other States associated in the North Atlantic Treaty.

88. For that reason, we have constantly asked the USSR representatives for something more than promises, something more than peace declarations, because—I have said it before and repeat it now—suspicion exists side by side with fear. We do not trust one another. That is the truth. I don't wish to name those who inspire this mistrust; I prefer to remain impartial. There is no confidence on

either side and until it is restored there will be no friendship among the peoples. There must be reliance upon the signature of a State, the word of a statesman. There must not be the feeling that statements conceal the secret weapon that is to be used. The consequence of that fear is that those who have stockpiles of atomic weapons are unwilling to forego them so long as they are uncertain that such or other weapons will not be used against them.

89. That is the trust that must be restored. A representative of a tiny country, one that has no interest in war, appeals to all representatives assembled here, to those of the Soviet Union like the rest, to use their utmost endeavours to restore trust between the peoples and destroy the fear that makes men arm for self-defence.

90. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The Anglo-American group within the United Nations, the kernel of which are the countries of the aggressive Atlantic bloc headed by the United States of America, has resorted to every form of pressure to prevent the General Assembly from considering the USSR draft resolution.

91. The United States, with some of its associated delegations, reached an agreement to that end and manoeuvred its own draft resolution into the First Committee, which, instead of discussing the substance of the USSR proposals, has recommended that they should be referred to the so-called Disarmament Commission. By this manoeuvre the Anglo-American bloc hopes to keep away from world public opinion the Soviet Union's important proposals, which bear directly on the easing of the existing tension in international relations and constitute a serious measure for the removal of the threat of a new world war. It also hopes to dispose of the USSR proposals by endlessly dragging out their discussion and if possible finally burying them in the Disarmament Commission, where it is sure of a majority.

92. That is what the United States has been doing for the past few years in the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments with all the proposals put forward by the Soviet Union.

93. That is why the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc have been trying persistently to have their proposals, the so-called "three-Power" draft resolution, considered not in the Disarmament Commission, as we suggested, but directly by the First Committee and the General Assembly. At the time they tried to justify their objections by asserting that the Commission could not consider fundamental questions without definite instructions from the First Committee.

94. Mr. Gross announced again today that the United States intends to submit to the so-called Disarmament Commission what he called some important proposals. Let us assume for a moment that Mr. Gross is speaking the truth, although, as the Polish representative rightly said, he has been clearly disavowed by Mr. Acheson. Why then, are these—I stress the word—"important" proposals, as Mr. Gross calls them, not now being presented to the General Assembly for consideration? Why are the United States representatives anxious to submit these "important" proposals to the Commission, although they have previously insisted on fundamental, also important, proposals being considered by the General Assembly?

95. Should it not be assumed that if these proposals of which Mr. Gross spoke were ever presented they would be similar to those contained in the empty "three-Power" resolution, which, as a large portion of the United States Press has rightly described it, is a propaganda trick, intended

to distract attention from the really important proposals contained in the USSR draft resolution and thus to pigeon-hole these in the Commission ?

96. Is it not surprising, now that the General Assembly is considering not the United States but the USSR draft resolution, that the First Committee should have adopted a decision clearly contrary to the earlier views of the Anglo-American bloc and should have voted to refer these proposals to the Disarmament Commission ?

97. Naturally we protest most vehemently against this unjustifiable and unprincipled decision of the First Committee, which has refused to discuss the substance of the USSR proposal, thereby giving an advantage to the Anglo-American draft resolution, known as the "three-Power" resolution, over the USSR draft resolution on "measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations".

98. The position taken by the United States, United Kingdom and French delegations at the General Assembly's present session has again shown that the United States and its partners in the Atlantic bloc are unwilling to allow either the prohibition of the atomic weapon or the establishment of an international control to enforce such a prohibition. Hypocritically and falsely asserting their willingness to agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the United States representatives and the delegations belonging to their bloc in the United Nations have pretended that the adoption of such a decision has been prevented by the stubbornness of the USSR. They have asserted that the obstacle to agreement on prohibition has been the attitude of the Soviet Union that prohibition of the atomic weapon must be effected before the establishment of international control and that inspection implementing that control must operate on a periodic basis. If, they said, the Soviet Union would agree to prohibition of the atomic weapon when the control organ was established and began to operate, and would accept the proposal that inspection should be organized not on a periodic but on a continuing basis, there would then be no obstacle to prohibition of the atomic weapon. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR quoted word for word statements to this effect made by Messrs. Jessup, Lloyd, Moch, Belaunde and others during the discussion in the First Committee on the "three-Power draft resolution".

99. The Government of the Soviet Union, for the sake of removing obstacles to a positive solution of such an important question as the proclamation by the General Assembly of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, went beyond its earlier proposals and expressed its readiness to agree that, independently of a declaration by the General Assembly of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, such prohibition should be put into effect simultaneously with control over its enforcement. The Government of the Soviet Union also agreed to accept a system of inspection on a continuing basis.

100. The greater part of the European, British and United States Press and a number of government and public figures of the United States and European countries have generally admitted that these Soviet proposals have made possible agreement on prohibition of the atomic weapon. Even the *Washington Post*, a newspaper close to United States Government circles, was compelled to admit a few days ago that the USSR draft resolution was received favourably by the broad masses of the American people.

101. Only the representative of the Titoite Government of Yugoslavia permitted himself to repeat once again the slander which these turncoats and deserters to the other camp unsuccessfully disseminate about the Soviet Union.

Shamelessly distorting the facts, he ventured to call the pacific proposals of the Soviet Union "dangerous to the cause of peace". Not even the most zealous opponent of the USSR proposal among the participants in the Atlantic bloc has dared to utter such a cynical and naked slander. The lackey has outstripped his masters. The peoples of the world are by no means as ill-informed and simple-minded as the Titoite rulers of Yugoslavia obviously imagine them to be.

102. Almost 600 million people have now demanded the conclusion of a peace pact between the great Powers. During the debates which have been taking place in the General Assembly for more than two months now on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of the atomic weapon, without the results for which the peoples of the world are hoping, 35 million people have added their signatures to this demand. Only insolent young Titoites can babble of these demands as a propaganda slogan. But of course nothing else can be expected of such liars.

103. The clear and precise position of the Soviet Union in this most important question of prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing strict international control over the enforcement of that prohibition, the solution of which millions of people in various parts of the world hope for and demand, has knocked out of the hands of the Anglo-American aggressive bloc a weapon of slander against the Soviet Union and has unmasked the lying propaganda alleging the unwillingness of the USSR Government to come to an agreement on control over the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

104. Whatever the gentlemen from the Philippines and Haiti may say in their continual, interminable and tedious repetition of worn out, long since refuted, unfounded and slanderous fabrications concerning the policy of the Soviet Union, the clear and precise position of the USSR Government demonstrates the sincerity of the intentions of the Soviet Union and its preparedness to come to agreed decisions on measures to combat the threat of a new world war, and above all on the question of prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing strict international control.

105. The delegation of the Soviet Union and the delegations of countries friendly to it have completely unmasked in their statements at the present session of the General Assembly the real intentions of the Anglo-American warmongers, who are trying to camouflage the armaments race and the expansion of production of atomic weapons with talk of prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control. By refusing to examine in the General Assembly the USSR proposals on prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of such prohibition, the Anglo-American group in the United Nations has completely given away its aggressive aims.

106. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will vote for all the items in the USSR draft resolution on "Measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations", and for the draft resolution as a whole. It has voted against the resolution of the First Committee bearing the same title.

107. Mr. LLOYD (United Kingdom) : The United Kingdom is as anxious as any one else to remove the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations, and our vote upon these resolutions is guided not by propaganda but by our view as to whether a particular resolution furthers those ends. We believe that the USSR draft resolution does not further those ends. We believe that the tripartite resolution does.

108. The representative of Poland referred to the USSR draft resolution as containing concrete proposals to reduce tension. If we start with paragraph 1 alone, we see in it an attack upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Now all the arguments with regard to that have already been set out, and ample assurances have been given as to the defensive purpose of that organization. Mr. Vyshinsky says that those assurances are a smoke-screen to conceal aggressive intentions. Let me say again and again that the intentions of the United Kingdom are not aggressive. It is inconceivable that we should bear the present burdens of defence and rearmament unless we were convinced that they were necessary to avert a threat to our survival. Mr. Vyshinsky's accusations against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are without foundation, and, if I may say so, are examples of the Soviet failure to understand the psychology of the free world, and that itself is a major cause of the present suspicion and tension.

109. Then with regard to Korea: in Mr. Vyshinsky's own speeches he has referred to airfields, prisoners of war and matters like that, and that I submit shows that to accept his proposals with regard to Korea would be to transfer the armistice negotiations from Korea to Paris. That in our view would delay the conclusion of an armistice. In our view, it has already delayed progress of the armistice negotiations. If that is not Mr. Vyshinsky's purpose, then let Soviet influence be brought to bear where it can be most effective, namely, with the Chinese and North Korean military commanders; and if they show genuine willingness to get results there will be no lack of response from the United Nations Command, and as soon as an armistice has been concluded the question of a political settlement must come without delay to the United Nations.

110. So far as paragraphs 3 to 7 of the USSR draft resolution are concerned, we welcomed the fact that the Soviet Union put forward proposals which it said would help to bridge the gap, and we promised to examine those proposals in good faith. I mentioned in a previous speech certain ambiguous phrases like "in effect", "in operation", "beginning to function" and phrases like that, and I said that further elucidation should be sought. That contention of mine seemed to me to be proved to be right by Mr. Vyshinsky's second speech in the First Committee [493rd meeting], from which I was certainly not at all clear as to what was the meaning to be attributed to the terms which he used, as to whether he did, in fact, mean that control was to be in working operation before the two declarations were to be made. I think the obscurity—and I have read the relevant passage in his speech more than once—of that passage shows how right we were to be cautious about this new formulation of an old position.

111. I still say that his new formula may be an advance and we shall certainly examine it in the hope that it is an advance. With regard to control and the word "continuing", Mr. Vyshinsky, in his second speech, talked of British imperialists putting their feet on the table and not liking to be prevented from interfering in the domestic affairs of others. That, of course, is just a piece of the kind of abuse we have been seeking to avoid in these matters. The point is not that Britain or British interests should interfere or that any one nation should interfere in the domestic affairs of another, but that this instrument of international control should be made capable of functioning effectively.

112. When the representative of Czechoslovakia said, a moment or two ago, that, of course, there must be no interference with internal affairs, that again shows how wise we were to be cautious about these new formulas,

because unless there is some interference in the internal affairs of nations it is quite impossible for any instrument of international control to be effective. I thought that remark of the representative of Czechoslovakia was an indication that this new formula may, in fact, not amount to very much progress.

113. Our position is quite clear. We want peace, we want disarmament. We are not prepared to make an agreement confined to one particular weapon. We want it to include all arms and all armaments. We maintain that there can be no effective disarmament until an efficient international control organization is in working operation, armed with powers adequate to see that paper agreements are implemented in fact. We maintain that control of atomic weapons can only be effective if there is also control of all forms of atomic energy. I think that those three principles which I have just enunciated have the support of the great majority of the nations in this Assembly.

114. We have put forward certain suggestions to the Disarmament Commission about ways to achieve those principles in practice, about proceeding by stages, about criteria, and about other matters which obviously are technical matters. It may be that the USSR proposals help towards those same objectives. It may be that the contrary is the case. But we have not pronounced judgment upon them now. We propose to examine them, in spite of everything that has been said, and we propose to examine them in good faith, because I hope it will be obvious to any one from what I am saying that great matters of technical detail are concerned in a proper consideration of the practical working out of the phases which I have described. Any such technical examination, any such detailed examination, is surely much better carried out in the Disarmament Commission than in a forum such as this.

115. The resolution of the three Powers was I think described by the representative of Poland as a cunning manoeuvre. Well, I would remind those who feel that there is any truth in that of Mr. Vyshinsky's proverb of looking in a mirror. In fact, these proposals of the Soviet Union have had a very much more friendly welcome from us than any of ours have ever met with from the Soviet Union. I say again that we shall examine them in good faith and give them that detailed consideration which I think they deserve, and we fervently hope that they may indeed constitute an attempt to lessen the gap which is between us.

116. Finally, with regard to the question of a peace pact, surely the Charter of the United Nations is in itself the most solemn peace pact of all. Another pact between the five Powers, it seems to me, would add nothing to the Charter but might well weaken its authority. I would submit to this Assembly that the way to get peace is first of all to remove the existing threats to peace, help to stop the hostilities in Korea, assist in the work of this Disarmament Commission, co-operate within this Organization to lessen tension and to settle disputes, and, above all, to stop the flood of abuse and vilification which is now poisoning the field of international affairs. If we can do these things and if the Soviet Union change its attitude and co-operate in all and each of these tasks, then, indeed, we can and we will combat the threat of a new world war and strengthen peace and friendship among the nations.

117. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would like to explain its vote on the matter under discussion.

118. Two draft resolutions have been submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly at this plenary

meeting. One is the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union and the other that submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, which was approved by a majority in the First Committee and has been adopted today by the General Assembly.

119. The draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the USSR on "measures to combat the threat of a new world war and to strengthen peace and friendship among the nations" is a programme of serious measures designed to avert the threat of a new world war and safeguard international peace and security; measures the sole and entire purpose of which is the solution of precisely those problems with which the United Nations is faced in its responsibility of defending peace.

120. Hundreds of millions of ordinary people throughout the world are raising their voices with unparalleled force in a mighty protest against the preparation of a new war, and are demanding that the governments of their countries take decisive and consistent action to strengthen peace, avert the threat of a new war and safeguard international security. Only by adopting the proposals of the Soviet Union would we be acting in accordance with the will of the peoples; only thus can we strike a decisive blow against the plans for the preparation of a new war and contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security.

121. It is no secret that the peoples of the world are firmly demanding the conclusion of a peace pact. If the sixth session of the General Assembly really wants to fulfil its obligations, we must call upon the five great Powers, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and China, to begin negotiations with a view to the consideration and peaceful settlement of all international problems and the conclusion of a peace pact.

122. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR has already pointed out in the First Committee that the chief cause of the mounting international tension is the aggressive policy of the North Atlantic bloc headed by the United States of America. Mr. Lloyd, the representative of the United Kingdom, who spoke before me, tried to prove here that the North Atlantic Treaty is not an aggressive, but a purely defensive alliance. But the facts and the behaviour of the countries concerned testify to the contrary. Let me adduce only one fact by way of illustration.

123. Efforts are at present being made to knock together a "European" army, the strength and basis of which is to be a West German army of *revanche*.

124. As reported on 4 July 1951 by Mr. Kuh, the Washington correspondent of the *Chicago Sun-Times*, the Bonn Government has submitted to the United States, the United Kingdom and France a plan for the creation of German armed forces numbering 400,000 men. It is no secret, and has been reported in the Press throughout the world, that a general staff headed by fascist generals has already been established and is preparing a strategic plan for the conduct of a war against the USSR and the peoples' democracies.

125. The French newspaper *Le Figaro* reported on 18 January—yesterday—that according to *The New York Times* of 17 January 1952 the French, British and American Governments have agreed to allow western Germany a tactical air force of more than a thousand aircraft by the summer of 1954. Mr. Lloyd was completely silent on that subject here. Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands are reported to have agreed in principle to

this plan, the details of which, it is said, have already been approved.

126. The French newspaper *Combat* reported on 18 January 1952 that the plan for the organization of a "European" army is now ready and that the basic political obstacles have already been removed. It seems, the newspaper reports, that the principle of a European community possessing a common army and a common budget has been finally approved. Thus a West German regular army is being reconstructed, the expression "European" army being no more than a screen concealing the creation of a German army of *revanche*.

127. By their efforts to surround the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies with a ring of military bases, by their frantic armaments race and by the way in which they are poisoning people's minds with the venom of war propaganda, the rulers of the United States are revealing themselves as the instigators of a new war, despite the zealous efforts made here to demonstrate their innocence by the representatives of such countries as Haiti, the Philippines and Titoist Yugoslavia. These and other aggressive acts by the United States of America and its partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization bear witness to the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty is an instrument for the outright and direct preparation of an aggressive war—not a defensive war—against all peace-loving peoples, and primarily against the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies. That is why we protest against the North Atlantic Treaty.

128. In the interests of agreement with the United States, the United Kingdom and France on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of strict international control, the USSR delegation has introduced in its new revised draft resolution a proposal that the General Assembly should proclaim "the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, it being understood that the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of international control shall be put into effect simultaneously". The delegation of the Soviet Union has made a further effort in its draft resolution to achieve agreement on international control by the provision that "the international control organ shall have the right to conduct inspection on a continuing basis; but it shall not be entitled to interfere in the domestic affairs of States". As everyone knows, the USSR has always been in favour of strict and effective international control. All the Soviet Union's proposals on this matter have without exception been intended to ensure strict observance of the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons, to ensure full and honest compliance with that decision by means of strict international control.

129. In pursuance of its peaceful foreign policy the Soviet Union is interested in the removal of all obstacles to a settlement of the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons. With those ends in view, the USSR delegation submitted its new proposals, which completely eliminate any possibility of continuing to resort to reservations of all kinds in order to obstruct the achievement of agreement at the sixth session of the General Assembly on the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the institution of strict international control. These clear, simple and effective proposals are intelligible to all. I wish only to affirm with all the emphasis at my disposal that the adoption of the USSR proposals on the prohibition of atomic weapons would be of inestimable significance in averting the threat of a new war and strengthening peace throughout the world.

130. The measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces proposed by the USSR delegation are of

enormous significance for the cause of peace. It is recommended in the proposals of the Soviet Union that the five permanent members of the Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, should reduce the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the time of the adoption of the resolution by one-third during a period of one year from the date of its adoption. If the General Assembly adopts this recommendation on the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the world conference will have to consider on a broader basis, and with the participation of all the States in the world, specific questions arising from those recommendations and affecting all the participants in the conference.

131. That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR fully supports the USSR delegation's proposals in their entirety, and will vote for the USSR draft resolution.

132. As for the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that its authors, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have demanded the adoption of the American plan for the control of atomic energy, a plan which, as is well known, does not provide for the prohibition of atomic weapons. Fearing to reject them outright here, they have asked that paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of the Soviet Union's resolution should be referred to the Disarmament Commission so that they may then be pigeon-holed by that body.

133. That is why the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR voted against that draft resolution.

134. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We have come to the end of the list of speakers who wished to explain their vote. We now have to vote on the USSR resolution [A/2068]. Before proceeding to the vote I would point out to the Assembly that paragraph 11 of the report of the First Committee states that the First Committee "decided ...that no vote should be taken on paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/698)", since those paragraphs were the ones which the Committee decided to refer to the Disarmament Commission.

135. The Assembly has just adopted the draft resolution of the First Committee, paragraph 1 of the operative part of which says: "*Decides* to refer to the Disarmament Commission the proposals contained in paragraphs 3 to 7 inclusive of document A/C.1/698...". The Assembly has therefore taken a decision in respect of those paragraphs of the USSR draft resolution [A/2068]<sup>1</sup>. It would therefore appear sufficient to put to the vote paragraphs 1, 2 and 8 of the USSR proposal. If there is no objection, we shall vote on paragraph 1.

136. Mr. EL-PHARAONY (Egypt): We request a separate vote on sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution.

137. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): A separate vote has been requested on sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution. We shall vote on paragraph 1 of the USSR draft resolution.

*Paragraph 1 was rejected by 45 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions.*

138. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall vote first on sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution.

*Sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 2 was rejected by 35 votes to 5, with 10 abstentions.*

139. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): We shall vote on sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 of the USSR draft resolution.

*Sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 was rejected by 31 votes to 7, with 11 abstentions.*

140. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I now put to the vote paragraph 8 of the USSR draft resolution.

*Paragraph 8 was rejected by 31 votes to 11, with 11 abstentions.*

*The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.*

<sup>1</sup> The text of document A/C.1/698 is identical with that of document A/2068.