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*President : Mr. Luis PADILLA NERVO (Mexico).*

**Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter : report of the Collective Measures Committee : report of the First Committee (A/2049).**

[Agenda item 18]

*Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee, presented the report of that Committee (A/2049) and then spoke as follows :*

1. Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee : In presenting this report may I call attention to the fact that draft resolution B stresses that it is a basic task of the United Nations to secure and strengthen international peace and security. The Security Council is called upon to find measures which might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations and the establishment of friendly relations between countries. People all over the world will wish the Security Council success in this so vital endeavour to uphold our peace and security.

2. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Several representatives have asked to speak in order to explain their votes. The first on my list is the representative of Brazil, who wishes to explain his vote before the vote is taken.

3. Mr. MUNIZ (Brazil) : I wish to state, very briefly, the reasons for which Brazil voted in favour of the draft resolution approved by the First Committee on 8 January. We view the approval of the recommendations contained therein as a further development of a programme of collective security which represents, in our opinion, the most constructive work so far attempted by the United Nations for the advancement of the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to the cause of international peace and security.

4. Peace enforcement is one of the fundamental principles of the Charter. For reasons which are well known, the United Nations, despite its many efforts, has been prevented from implementing its peace enforcement system. General Assembly resolution 377 (V), entitled "Uniting for peace" was the first step towards ending the impasse in which the United Nations found itself in this matter. Under this resolution the General Assembly assumed the

right and the duty to recommend and organize resistance to aggression whenever the Security Council was unable to discharge its primary responsibility.

5. The Collective Measures Committee, composed of representatives of fourteen countries, outlined a series of measures, political, economic and military, together with principles of co-ordination of the action of States in the application of these measures which were to be available to the United Nations should its responsible organs decide to organize resistance against aggression.

6. The programme outlined in the draft resolution of the First Committee was inspired by the experience gained by the United Nations in resisting aggression in Korea, but it supersedes the peculiarities of any concrete instance and aims at the establishment of a general system of peace enforcement to be applicable to any future emergency. The text submitted by the First Committee is based on the report of the Collective Measures Committee [A/1891] and, on many important points, it benefited greatly from amendments and clarifications submitted by delegations during the discussions which took place in the First Committee. The wide interest shown during those discussions, which was demonstrated by the significant speeches delivered at the time, and the number of constructive ideas and suggestions offered, as well as the overwhelming majority which supported the draft resolution, are the best evidence that our efforts have created a wide area of agreement among Member States. After all, a plan of peace enforcement, no matter how perfect, depends in the last analysis for its application on the will of the Member States and on their interest in implementing it. The limitations which are necessarily incorporated in the draft resolution do not represent any weakening of the plan. The overwhelming support in favour of the programme shows clearly that the collective enforcement of peace meets with the wide approval of Member States. This is what matters.

7. Although the General Assembly is not adopting the report as a whole, we are confident that the principles and premises which underlie its conclusions will continue to deserve the utmost attention and consideration on the part of the governments of all peace-loving States. Time will show that this experience will not be lost, that this first systematic study of collective peace enforcement presented in this report will provide a safe and sound basis for further developments, and that the Security Council or the General Assembly will find a proper guidance and inspiration in

is text if the Organization is confronted with any attempt to impose political solutions through the use of force. The endorsement and recognition now given to the principles and main ideas of the report are the best terms of reference for the continuation of the work of the Collective Measures Committee. I am sure that that committee will be able to carry out its tasks in the same spirit of mutual understanding of different viewpoints as it has shown until now, and within the letter and the spirit of resolution 377 (V) and the draft resolution now submitted by the First Committee for our approval.

8. The report of the Collective Measures Committee and the draft resolution approved by the First Committee contain general ideas and suggestions for a peace enforcement system based on the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the principles which any true system of peace enforcement should follow, namely, that it should be as nearly universal as possible, not directed against any country or group of countries, but against the aggressor, and that it should be sufficiently flexible in order to be applicable to varying circumstances and various forms of aggression.

9. It was clearly demonstrated during the debate in the First Committee that we do not consider the collective enforcement of peace as an end in itself, nor as a panacea for the complex problems of today. Such a system presupposes the existence of well-established machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, which must be utilized to the fullest before any application of force is considered. The systems of collective security and of peaceful settlement of disputes are thus intimately correlated. Without well-developed machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security might be unwise. On the other hand, the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, no matter how perfect, is likely to receive no attention from the aggressor if he thinks that he will not be confronted by the alternative of the organized resistance of the peace-loving countries. The same interrelationship exists between the limitation of armaments and collective security. Collective security facilitates the conclusion of agreements designed to limit armaments. On the other hand, a programme for the limitation of armaments makes possible a better organization of peace enforcement. By endeavouring to organize a collective security system, therefore, we are preparing the ground for the task of the United Nations of the limitation of armaments and armed forces.

10. The problem of peace enforcement, therefore, contains many inter-connected elements which must be taken into account in the over-all pattern of an orderly community. The solution to this problem is a step towards the achievement of an ever-growing and prosperous community of nations. In that respect the ideal of peace enforcement is only a negative one. It must become a positive ideal with the object of creating a more interdependent community of nations imbued with a greater sense of solidarity and a greater sense of justice, equality and the opportunity for development within the reach of every member of the community of nations.

11. For the reasons I have stated, and speaking on behalf of a country whose historical evolution has manifested continual faith in the benefits of international collaboration and in the peaceful settlement of disputes, I do not hesitate in recommending the adoption of this first attempt to endow the United Nations with a set of principles and methods designed to organize the collective action of peace-loving countries against an aggressor. We have no doubt about the value of this effort, neither do we doubt the sincerity

of our intention to work for peace. The overwhelming majority of the Member States feel likewise. That is why this programme for a genuine collective security system gives rise to a new hope. In implementing it, the United Nations will fulfil the purposes of the Charter, the obligations of which have been freely and willingly accepted, and will fulfil one of the most important needs of the present generation.

12. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*): I am going to ask those representatives who wish to explain their votes and who have not placed their names on the list, to be so good as to do so. At the same time, I should like to say that although I realize that, on such an important item as this, representatives might like to make lengthy statements, I shall again request them, since the Assembly has already decided not to re-open the discussion and since they have had an opportunity in the First Committee to speak as long as they wish, to be brief in explaining their votes and to keep within the agreed time-limit of seven minutes.

13. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia): The First Committee is submitting today to the plenary meeting a report about its work concerning item 18 of the agenda of the sixth session of the General Assembly. This report also contains two draft resolutions which the First Committee approved and which it today submits to the plenary meeting for consideration.

14. It sometimes happens that the contents of a book does not correspond to its title. If we compare today the content of draft resolution A, contained in the report of the First Committee, with the title of the programme to which it relates, that is, "Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter", we must come to the conclusion that the content of the book does not correspond to its title. The title of the book in this case speaks of the maintenance and strengthening of international peace and security. The content of the book, however, consists of aggression of the United States and imperialism of the Anglo-American bloc.

15. The Czechoslovak delegation has already explained in detail in the First Committee its negative attitude and its rejection of the so-called eleven-Power draft resolution which it voted against. This resolution is today being presented to the General Assembly as draft resolution A. My delegation will vote against it upon this forum of the United Nations.

16. Allow me to summarize briefly the reasons for this position of my delegation. Draft resolution A is based on the illegal resolution 377 (V) of the General Assembly, and the substance of it contains the recommendations of the so-called Collective Measures Committee which, having been established under the above-mentioned illegal resolution 377 (V), is an illegal body. The Czechoslovak and other delegations proved at the fifth session of the General Assembly, and now again at the present session, that the illegality of resolution 377 (V) arose from the fact that, contrary to the provisions of the Charter, it transfers to the General Assembly jurisdiction which was given exclusively to the Security Council.

17. The recommendations contained in draft resolution A do not contribute in any way to the maintenance of peace in the world, to its strengthening, and to the maintenance of international security. On the contrary, the purpose of these recommendations is to hide behind the flag of the United Nations the aggressive policy of the United States and the preparation for aggressive war against the countries of peace: the Soviet Union and the countries of the people's



democracies. The same thing happened in the case of American aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. These recommendations are intended to support the aggression of the United States, to help Anglo-American imperialism unleash a new world war, to transform the organization of the United Nations into an American instrument of war, and to drag into the military adventures of the United States all those countries which are not yet members of the United Nations. The recommendations contained in draft resolution A have nothing in common with one of the principal objectives of the United Nations, which is the maintenance of peace and international security, and have nothing in common with the aims and principles of the Charter of this Organization. These recommendations, which speak hypocritically of the objectives and principles of the Charter, are in reality aimed against it. They are in deep contradiction with it and violate it grossly. These recommendations are aimed against peace and they undermine international security. They are contrary to the principle of the development of friendly relations among nations for the purpose of the maintenance and strengthening of peace. They are directed against the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council and are in contradiction with the jurisdiction of that organ as well as of the General Assembly.

18. The Czechoslovak delegation, true to the objectives and principles of the Charter, cannot agree with recommendations which are contrary to the Charter and which violate it. The Czechoslovak delegation, representing the peace-loving and peace-building Czechoslovak people, rejects the draft resolution which threatens peace and international security and will vote against it.

19. The initiator of draft resolution B is the delegation of a country which systematically follows and defends the policy of international security and which is an ardent defender of peace, the delegation of the Soviet Union. The resolution recommends that the Security Council should convene a periodic meeting to consider what measures can ensure the removal of the present tension existing in international relations and the establishment of friendly relations between countries. My delegation supports this draft resolution and will vote for it.

20. At the same time the Czechoslovak delegation supports the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Soviet Union [A/2050]. This proposal based on the Charter of the United Nations and on its principles, is a great contribution to the maintenance of peace and international security because it recommends the abolition of the illegal Collective Measures Committee whose whole work threatens this peace and security. The Czechoslovak delegation welcomes the draft resolution of the Soviet Union and will vote in favour of it.

21. Mr. COSTA DU RELS (Bolivia) (*translated from Spanish*): The Bolivian delegation voted in the First Committee for the draft resolution now before the Assembly while abstaining on certain points for reasons which I shall explain.

22. We admitted and acknowledged, for excellent reasons, that if the Security Council fails to fulfil its primary duty of maintaining peace and finding the appropriate solution of the problems submitted for its consideration, it is essential in those circumstances to provide the General Assembly with all the necessary powers to preserve peace.

23. Although no one fails to realize the juridical implications of the question, the adoption of appropriate measures is a matter of such urgency in certain cases that it should be considered as a problem of public safety. The maintenance of peace is more important than certain sophistries

which only serve passing political interests or unwarrantable hegemonic ambitions that should be subordinated to and made to subserve the common interest and the fundamental duty of co-operation and mutual assistance between nations.

24. While the duty to maintain peace by the adoption of collective security measures is equally incumbent upon everyone, it must be acknowledged that that equality is relative, since inevitably there are in practice varying degrees of power. Accordingly, the contribution of each country necessarily depends upon its capacity. If the United Nations desires to make use of the potentialities of each Member in defence of peace, it is in duty bound to endeavour to strengthen those potentialities beforehand.

25. Countries which, although potentially strong, are economically weak, cannot be asked to provide immediate military co-operation without first being offered real opportunities and means of strengthening their economy as a whole and promoting their industrial development. Those countries do not ask for purely military aid to raise the general level of their defence potentialities. They ask for a fair and equitable economic stimulus which will enable them to develop their national capacities, raise the standard of living of their peoples and create such conditions as will ensure their future contribution to the common defence, on the basis of a healthy economy rather than an unhealthy concentration on armaments.

26. At the signing of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the Government of my country, through its representative, outlined its principles, to which I now desire to refer. The representative of Bolivia said: "We accept the obligation of mutual defence consciously and deliberately. We do so in order to safeguard our own independence, but we cannot avoid giving some thought to the means needed to sustain a system which will require a great deal of effort. Consequently, we consider that the examination of the economic side of the question is a matter of undeniable urgency. We cannot underestimate the importance of matters such as the fixing of the prices of strategic raw materials, which are the basis of a sound economy... We are exporters of raw materials, and that entails a permanent weakening of our sources of production".

27. A country where a large proportion of the main exports is dependent on the official import monopoly of its chief buyer has a limited co-operative capacity; the imposition of an unfair price would result in the disequilibrium of its balance of payments, uncontrolled inflation, and serious social and political evils. The decrease in its sources of foreign exchange would, by restricting imports of articles of primary necessity, have the direct effect of lowering the subsistence level and standard of living of the people.

28. At Rio de Janeiro, Bolivia, jointly with Colombia and Mexico, proposed the calling of a conference to study the economic aspects of collective defence. The result was the invitation to a conference at Buenos Aires, which unfortunately has not yet been able to meet. Such a conference would undoubtedly have paved the way for the establishment of fair and well-balanced economic agreements to meet all circumstances and the achievement of understanding on all kinds of agreements, without raising difficulties which might be detrimental to the higher interests of the parties.

29. Thus, Bolivia, at the present time, is faced with a certain non-comprehension and even with unilateral action on the part of United States buyers with regard to the placing of its tin production. Those difficulties would undoubtedly not have arisen if the Buenos Aires conference

had taken place and had provided the opportunity of adopting appropriate regulating principles.

30. In expressing a similar point of view before this General Assembly, the Bolivian delegation is pursuing a logical course in the interpretation of its duties with regard to collective responsibility as laid down in the United Nations Charter and in regional undertakings.

31. Bolivia has desired, through my intermediary, to draw the attention of this Assembly to the direct relationship between the co-operation of States, within the framework of collective measures for the preservation of peace, and the appropriate development of their economy. The case of Bolivia is not an isolated one. Its position is shared by almost all the Latin-American countries and by many others.

32. Economic capacity is the *sin qua non* of any worthy co-operation in carrying out the principles of the Charter. Such co-operation demands that an understanding in defence of the most important political interests should take precedence over the defence of purely commercial interests in the policy of certain great Powers.

33. In conclusion, in voting in favour of a resolution which involves political and military obligations, I fulfil my duty, on behalf of the Bolivian Government, of making those reservations which are the direct consequence of the ideas I have briefly put forward, and which may be summarized in the following sentence: The consolidation of political security requires first of all the consolidation of economic security.

34. Mr. COHEN (United States of America): The Government and the people of the United States of America attach great importance to draft resolution A which the First Committee has recommended to the General Assembly to continue our efforts to advance along the road to collective security under the Charter. Draft resolution A reaffirms the essential principles of the "Uniting for peace" resolution [377 (V)] of last year. Like the "Uniting for peace" resolution it recognizes the authority of the General Assembly and the obligations of individual Members under the Charter to take action to maintain peace and security when the Security Council fails to act because of the veto. The Charter is clear that action directed by the Security Council cannot be frustrated by a minority of small States. The Charter is equally clear that action recommended by the General Assembly cannot be thwarted by a small minority of States, large or small.

35. Draft resolution A recognizes that the Collective Measures Committee's report constitutes a constructive contribution to the development of an effective collective security system under the Charter, and the draft resolution directs that the work of that committee should be continued for another year. The draft resolution also recommends further action upon the part of individual States to maintain themselves in a state of readiness to participate in the collective security system of the United Nations. The resolution further recognizes the mutual supporting relationship which exists, and should be developed, between the United Nations and other international arrangements and agencies. The United Nations system is stronger when it is reinforced by the combined defensive strength of States which have joined together for their own security. It is requisite in today's troubled world, and coincident with the principles of our Charter, for States to co-operate in defensive arrangements. So long as States remain faithful to their obligations under the Charter, such arrangements can only serve the purposes of the Charter.

36. My Government regards its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the Organization of American States as giving added strength and support to the United Nations system and to the principles of the Charter. Such arrangements are not intended to compete with or to impair the authority of the United Nations. By relating all such arrangements expressly to the universal collective security system, as draft resolution A proposes, we help to ensure that such arrangements will be employed in the service of the principles of the Charter and will not degenerate into mere military alliances involving force or the threat of force for the achievement of narrow purposes inconsistent with the Charter.

37. The programme which we, in this Assembly, are embarked upon is designed to be universal in its application; it is not directed against any State or group of States. A vote for the draft resolution is not a vote for the alliance of any one group of States against any other group of States. A vote for the draft resolution is a reaffirmation of the solidarity and readiness of all law-abiding States to assist one another in upholding the principles of the Charter and in resisting aggression. No verbal dialectics can conceal the true purpose or significance of this draft resolution. The Government and the people of the United States are convinced that the paramount interest of all law-abiding States is the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter. We hope that the time is not far distant when the Soviet Union will see that its own best interest, and also the interests of its own people in peace and the observance of the principles of the Charter, are served by the development of an effective United Nations collective security system, and that the Soviet Union also will lend its active support to the work.

38. The resolution on disarmament which this General Assembly has just adopted [358th meeting] reaffirms the desire that the United Nations should develop an effective collective security system to maintain the peace and that the armed forces of the world be reduced in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter. A programme of collective security and a programme of disarmament are not contradictory but on the contrary are complementary. If States are assured that in case of aggression they will not stand alone, they will need fewer arms for their own self-defence. Progress in disarmament facilitates progress in collective security, and progress in collective security makes easier progress in disarmament. The two march together. Disarmament and collective security are the two great enterprises to which this Assembly has dedicated itself.

39. A programme of collective security is not intended to be a substitute for the pacific settlement of disputes. On the contrary, my Government regards pacific settlement and collective measures as inseparable parts of collective security under the Charter. If all law-abiding States are ready to preserve the peace, with force if necessary, States will be less likely to attempt to solve conflicts of national interests by force and will devote themselves more energetically to finding means of peaceful settlement.

40. As we advance towards the goal of collective security and disarmament, uncounted resources and energies that now must be expended for security can be released, in the words of our Charter, for the pursuit of "social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom".

41. My Government opposed in the First Committee, and will oppose here, the original USSR draft resolution which called for the immediate holding of a periodic meeting of the Security Council to consider first among



measures to reduce international tension the question of an armistice in Korea. No country is more eager than my own to see a speedy conclusion of an armistice in Korea. Our soldiers are fighting and dying there. The commanding General of the United Nations forces in Korea is under instructions to omit no step, consistent with the security of the forces of the United Nations and the Republic of Korea, to expedite the speedy conclusion of an armistice. We are deeply concerned that nothing should be done to disrupt or to delay the negotiations now proceeding in Korea. We do not believe that a settlement of the military issues involved in the armistice will be facilitated by opening up for debate the political issues involved in the peace settlement. We do not believe that the transfer of the armistice negotiations or the concurrent discussion of the armistice problems in the Security Council, a forum where the Soviet Union has the veto, will expedite agreement. My Government, on the other hand, has always been prepared to discuss in the Security Council, and in other appropriate forums, measures to reduce international tension. The people of the United States are eager to see a reduction in those tensions, which threaten their peace and their security, but we do not wish to see high-level conferences convened as a sounding board for harangues which might aggravate and not reduce the dangers of war. We are for solemn and serious discussions where all parties seek in good faith honest agreement. Whenever the members of the Security Council believe that tensions can be reduced by the holding of periodic meetings, we believe that such meetings should be held.

42. We joined with Brazil, France, and the United Kingdom in an amendment to the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in the First Committee to this effect, and we hope that the draft resolution, as so amended and approved by the Committee, will be adopted here. We hope that the Soviet Union will co-operate with other members of the Security Council to make possible and fruitful the holding of periodic meetings in accordance with this draft resolution and the Charter, but we all know that, as long as the Soviet Union makes no effort to reach unanimity with other Members and exercises without restraint its power of veto, no progress can be made and the Security Council cannot function effectively.

43. No Government and no people, however, would welcome a change in the Soviet attitude more than would the Government and people of the United States. My Government will continue to strive in the Security Council, in the Assembly, and in all other appropriate forums for peace and security for ourselves and for all mankind.

44. Mr. BARANOVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The plenary meeting of the General Assembly has before it draft resolutions A and B of the First Committee on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security, and the USSR delegation's draft resolution on the same subject contained in document A/2050.

45. Draft resolution A was approved following the report of the Collective Measures Committee, which was set up at the last session of the General Assembly in violation of the Charter and despite the well-founded objections of a number of delegations, including that of the Ukrainian SSR.

46. In the First Committee we voted against the draft resolution which has become draft resolution A, and which appears erroneously under the title "Methods... to maintain and strengthen... peace and security" since this resolution has no bearing on that task. From start to finish this draft resolution has no other purpose than to justify preparations for and instigation of a new war. The draft resolution is

intended to suggest to aggressive States the course of action they should take in the war being prepared by the Atlantic bloc.

47. We must again point out that this draft resolution, purporting to deal with methods for the maintenance of peace, in reality serves the purpose of undermining the Security Council still further and of facilitating the use without hindrance of the United Nations by the United States of America for the achievement of its strategic plans.

48. Draft resolution A of the First Committee develops the thesis of the resolution, entitled "Uniting for peace" and, in contravention of the United Nations Charter, confirms the assumption by the General Assembly of functions relating to the maintenance of peace and security, for which the Charter makes the Security Council chiefly responsible. The draft resolution is thus directly aimed at the elimination of the Security Council and its illegal replacement by the General Assembly and other bodies, which, as the report of the Collective Measures Committee indicates, are later to be set up within the United Nations.

49. Instead of directing the Organization's efforts into a search for methods for the settlement of outstanding questions between States by peaceful agreement, the draft resolution sees the only method of maintaining peace in the application of so-called collective measures which, as was sufficiently clear from the hypocritical "Uniting for peace" resolution adopted at last year's session of the General Assembly, mainly consist in the application of military sanctions.

50. Lastly, in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, the draft resolution prolongs the illegal existence of the Collective Measures Committee for a further year.

51. For these reasons the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will vote against draft resolution A on methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security.

52. Although draft resolution B, which bears the same title, is a version of the USSR delegation's draft resolution considerably abridged by the First Committee, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will nevertheless vote for it, since it upholds and confirms one of the most important provisions of the United Nations Charter, namely that the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security rests with the Security Council. This is the highly important principle which has been the target of the repeated attacks of the Anglo-American bloc. We shall vote for draft resolution B for the further reason that, even in its present form, it recommends the Security Council to convene periodic meetings, which have not so far been called on a single occasion, to consider what measures might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations.

53. Recognizing that lasting peace and international security can only be achieved on the basis of the principles underlying the United Nations Charter, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR gives its full support and sympathy to the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the USSR in document A/2050. That draft resolution makes what we consider to be a perfectly proper demand for the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee, which is merely a convenient screen for the aggressive designs of the Atlantic bloc decked out in the guise of collective measures. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR will therefore vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union.

54. Mr. AL GHOUSSEIN (Yemen) : In a few words I shall try to explain the position of my delegation. The delegation of Yemen will vote as a whole in favour of the draft resolution entitled "Methods which might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter", submitted by the eleven Powers.

55. This position of my delegation has been guided mainly by the acceptance of the amendment submitted by Yemen and other Arab States which now figures as paragraph 10 of draft resolution A. It reads : "Recognizes that nothing in the present resolution shall be construed to permit any measures to be taken in any State without the free and expressed consent of that State."

56. My delegation would, however, like to put it on record that in view of the fact that Yemeni forces are needed for internal security it abstained and will abstain now from voting on paragraph 2 of the operative part of draft resolution A, which reads :

"Recommends to Member States that, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution 377 (V), each take such further action as is necessary to maintain within its national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available, in accordance with its constitutional processes and to the extent to which in its judgment its capacity permits it to do so, for service as a United Nations unit or units without prejudice to the use of such elements in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter and without prejudice likewise to internal security."

57. Mr. CORDOVA (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*) : The Mexican delegation will vote on the draft resolution on collective measures on the understanding that the Organization of American States as a regional body does not thereby incur any new obligation, even of a moral character, and that it continues to be governed by the principles specifically laid down in the United Nations Charter, the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

58. As I stated on behalf of my delegation when the eighth paragraph of the preamble and paragraph 6 of the operative part of draft resolution A were voted upon in the First Committee, the Mexican Government recognizes in the application of enforcement measures the absolute precedence of its regional obligations over commitments possibly arising out of recommendations which might be approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations for the implementation of measures of collective security.

59. Consequently, my delegation does not consider that the contribution which the Organization of American States would be able and would decide to make to this international Organization may in any way be automatic. Moreover, the priority of regional obligations in regard to those of a universal character is clearly apparent from paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution which, by repeating the wording of the "Uniting for peace" resolution [377 (V)], expressly recommends that when the United Nations has recourse to the adoption of collective measures, it does so without prejudice to any system of collective self-defence and to the regional agreements recognized in Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter.

60. Still less is it possible to interpret in any other way resolution No. II of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, which was held in Washington almost a year ago. This

document, which was prepared at a special meeting held for the purpose of defining the attitude of the American regional organization in an emergency situation, establishes in the first place the duty of ensuring the collective defence of the continent through the said Organization of American States and, once that fundamental duty has been fulfilled, of co-operating within the United Nations for the prevention and suppression of aggression in other parts of the world.

61. The Organization of American States cannot and must not lose its authority within the regional sphere, which constitutes its own natural field of action. Our organization constitutes the true culmination of the ideals of peaceful co-existence in the American continent which, for over half a century, has safeguarded the relations among the American Republics and inspired their policy with a spirit of brotherhood and peace. In this way, the Organization of American States contributes to the security of the whole world and fulfils the lofty mission of offering to man a land of liberty and a favourable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations, as laid down in the preamble to its constitutive Charter.

62. In that spirit, my delegation will, at this plenary meeting, vote for the First Committee's entire joint draft resolution on collective measures.

63. Mr. BIRECKI (Poland) (*translated from French*) : The Polish delegation considers that the continuance of the Collective Measures Committee would be another arbitrary measure affecting the fundamental activity of the United Nations, which is the maintenance of international peace and security. The Acheson plan was the first in that series of arbitrary measures taken in defiance of the fact that Chapter VII of the Charter clearly defines the role of the Security Council, the only organ empowered to decide on the military, economic and political sanctions to be enforced in order to resist aggression and organize the armed forces of the United Nations.

64. The Polish delegation will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to abolish the Collective Measures Committee. That draft resolution makes it possible to put an end to the situation created by the United States in furtherance of its desire to convert the United Nations into a tool of its aggressive policy. The Soviet Union's proposal enables the United Nations to settle collective security questions in accordance with the Charter, through the only organ competent in that field, the Security Council.

65. The functions of the Security Council are defined very clearly in the thirteen Articles of Chapter VII of the Charter under the heading : "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression". The General Assembly is not once mentioned in the thirteen Articles of that Chapter. That fact demonstrates the cavalier attitude taken towards the Charter in the report of the Collective Measures Committee and in the draft resolution advocating its adoption.

66. The principle of the unanimity of the great Powers in the Security Council was established in order to safeguard international peace and security and effectively combat aggression. The United States Government, by suggesting and submitting illegal proposals aimed at by-passing the principle of unanimity, reveals its aggressive purposes in the United Nations. For example, I may mention the United States aggression against the Korean people and the organization of aggressive conspiracies such as the Atlantic Pact and other aggressive agreements concluded in all parts of the world under the aegis of the United States and directed against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies.



67. In the First Committee, the Polish delegation voted in favour of the USSR draft resolution to convene without delay a periodic meeting of the Security Council "to consider what measures might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations" and, in the first place, to consider the question of peace in Korea.

68. The propaganda slogans of those who, both in the First Committee and in this plenary meeting today, have contended that the United Nations should remain aloof from the Korean question and not attempt to resolve any aspect of it, can deceive no one. The truth is that the United States Government wishes to conceal from the Security Council and from world opinion the unprecedented methods it is employing in the armistice negotiations, methods which are contrary to the elementary principles of international law and international conventions. In the meantime, the American aggressors continue to destroy Korea. Thousands of men are dying because, for the American monopolists, as has been openly declared in writing in the United States, peace in Korea would be disastrous. The USSR proposal might have enabled the Security Council to help bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea. The United States position renders that action impossible.

69. In the First Committee, the Polish delegation voted against the amendment whereby the Security Council itself would decide when it was advisable to convene periodic meetings, because it feels that the amendment would make it perfectly possible for the United States delegation to postpone at will the date of those meetings, whereas it is essential that they should be held now.

70. On the other hand, the Polish delegation will vote in favour of the USSR draft resolution as amended because the preamble stresses the responsibility and competence of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the Charter, and because it maintains the principle—albeit in terms too vague—of periodic meetings of the Security Council which will make possible the examination, on a high enough level, of measures likely to improve the international situation and preserve world peace.

71. General LAVAUD (Haiti) (*translated from French*): The delegation of Haiti will vote in favour of the draft resolution on collective measures, which it regards as an important step towards the organization of an effective system of collective security. In so doing, it is acting in conformity with the policy of uniting for peace faithfully followed by the Haitian Government.

72. The organization of a system of collective security powerful enough to discourage any attempt at aggression or to halt aggression where it breaks out is the best instrument for peace which can be found in the present world situation. When a nation inspired by a lust for dominion and conquest knows in advance that its criminal plan of attack against its weaker neighbour will encounter immediate and overwhelming resistance, it reflects on the disastrous consequences to itself which its rash act will have. Similarly, in a society where justice is organized, an individual who might be led into committing theft or murder stops himself from descending the downward slope of crime because he knows that there are police ready to arrest and judges to try him.

73. Those who oppose the organization of a system of collective security on the ground that it might provoke instead of preventing war, forget that a mere declaration of peace unaccompanied by sanctions has no real significance. We had the Briand-Kellogg Pact which was the occasion

for a moving ceremony here in Paris itself, but fell into complete oblivion the day after it was signed. That solemn pact did not prevent Hitler from unleashing on the world the bloodiest war in history.

74. The Republic of Haiti is deeply devoted to peace, domestic peace as well as regional peace and world peace, for it is only in peace that it can develop its material resources to the maximum and make the best use of its human resources. It is closely associated with the inter-American system set up by the Organization of American States. That Organization, by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, established on a solid groundwork an effective system for the defence of the western hemisphere in which our twenty-one Republics live.

75. The conventions and resolutions of Bogota in 1948 set up or strengthened a system of inter-American co-operation in all fields: political, legal, economic, cultural and military. The Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held at Washington in March and April 1951 affirmed its fidelity to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and promised the fullest support to the United Nations in maintaining international order and defending peace with justice. This consultative meeting, consisting of responsible representatives of the twenty-one Governments of America, adopted a resolution No. II, the terms of which are almost identical with those of the resolution on collective measures which we are considering.

76. The delegation of Haiti has thus abided loyally by its Government's earlier undertakings in giving its warmest approval to the draft resolution on collective measures submitted by the First Committee.

77. We may add that the Republic of Haiti has even begun to give effect to that resolution, in accordance with the resolution entitled "Uniting for peace" [377 (V)] adopted in November 1950, since the Army General Staff has already prepared plans for future co-operation, according to the standards to be agreed upon for joint action in case of need.

78. Mr. KISELYOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution on "collective measures" approved by the First Committee. This draft resolution is a plan to replace the Security Council by the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies such as the Collective Measures Committee.

79. For the United States of America and the countries supporting it, the Security Council, the guiding principle of which in solving problems of international peace and security is the principle of unanimity, long ago became an obstacle to the realization of their aggressive policy. Attempts have therefore been and are being made to find a way round the principle of unanimity and to replace the Security Council by the General Assembly and other bodies, in which questions of war and peace would be settled by a mechanical majority of votes on the orders of the United States of America.

80. The proposals in paragraphs 2 and 3 of draft resolution A which we are discussing and which has been approved by the First Committee, recommending States Members of the United Nations to take the action necessary to maintain within their national armed forces elements intended for use as United Nations military units, and also steps to provide assistance and facilities to United Nations armed forces engaged in collective military measures, is nothing less than a gross violation of the United Nations Charter

and in particular of Chapter VII, which lays down that States Members of the United Nations shall make armed forces available exclusively to the Security Council by special agreement. Such armed forces are to be placed under the direction of the Military Staff Committee, which is subordinate to the Security Council.

81. The draft resolution before us grossly violates the United Nations Charter. The "collective measures" system in the draft resolution differs from the collective measures system laid down in the United Nations Charter, by which primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world is conferred upon the Security Council. In drawing up their proposals the authors of the draft resolution have been guided, not by the United Nations Charter, but by considerations and interests which bear no relation to the Charter, which are in fact the aggressive interests of United States policy, by the desire to militarize the entire United Nations and transform it into an appendage to the North Atlantic Treaty.

82. The draft resolution submitted to us is intended to legalize the aggressive activities of the United States not only in Korea but also henceforward in any other place under the United Nations banner. The draft resolution by-passes the Security Council and by so doing violates the most fundamental principle of the United Nations, the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This is an attempt to legalize aggressive activities and, in the interests of United States ruling circles, to give them the appearance of international "collective measures". The adoption of this draft resolution would mark a further stage in the gradual transformation of the United Nations into an instrument for unleashing a new war.

83. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers draft resolution A before us entirely unacceptable and will vote against it.

84. Draft resolution B omits the most important proposals contained formerly in the original USSR draft resolution. As we know, that draft resolution recommended, with complete justification, the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee. Paragraph 2 of the operative part of the draft resolution recommended that the Security Council should call without delay—I stress the words "without delay"—a periodic meeting under Article 28 of the Charter to consider measures to remove the present international tension and the establishment of friendly relations between countries. The same paragraph also proposed that the periodic meeting should examine in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring the armistice negotiations in Korea to a successful conclusion. These proposals, however, were not approved.

85. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers that the adoption of the USSR draft resolution recommending the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee would do much to remove the present international tension and would be an important step towards strengthening the peace and security of nations.

86. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR will vote for the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union.

87. In addition, the Byelorussian delegation will vote for draft resolution B submitted by the First Committee, even though that part is not entirely satisfactory. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR is assuming that this draft resolution may in some way assist the Security Council to adopt measures which might lead to a reduction of international tension and the establishment of friendly relations between countries.

88. Mr. PALAR (Indonesia): My delegation will abstain from voting on the eleven-Power draft resolution [*draft resolution A*], but this does not mean that we are not in agreement with a large part of that draft resolution. On the contrary, given other circumstances, we certainly would, with several reservations, vote for the draft resolution, since it is a direct consequence of the "Uniting for peace" resolution, which established the Collective Measures Committee, and for which my delegation voted.

89. We shall abstain from voting for the following reasons. In the First Committee the great Powers have already clearly demonstrated that they consider the results of the debates on collective measures and the adoption or rejection of the eleven-Power draft resolution of such importance that, in our opinion, voting for or against this draft resolution would be tantamount to taking sides in the struggle and further dividing the great Powers, drawing the line of demarcation even more clearly. This would be in direct conflict with our declared intention to follow the path of mediation and conciliation between the opposing parties. That is why my delegation will abstain from voting on the eleven-Power draft resolution.

90. We shall vote for the USSR draft resolution as amended [*draft resolution B*], because here is a meeting of minds between the opposing parties.

91. There is one thing which we are determined to oppose, however, and that is any efforts which might be made to persuade the United Nations to apply collective measures to hinder or stop the development of dependent areas and peoples into free nations.

92. Mr. MACAPAGAL (Philippines): As one of the States which participated in the work of the Collective Measures Committee, the Philippines is happy to give its support to a draft resolution which constitutes another milestone in our progress towards a system of collective security. In its entirety, the eleven-Power draft resolution constitutes a distinct step forward in the fulfilment of one of the basic purposes of the United Nations as laid down in the Charter, that is, the establishment of a system of collective security. As long as there are power-hungry men who forget the clear lesson of history that aggression does not pay, the interests of the world community require that a system of collective security be devised to protect all nations of peace and goodwill.

93. Draft resolution A, which was approved by an overwhelming majority in the First Committee, attempts to accomplish two vital objectives within the realistic framework of existing safeguards for the maintenance of international peace and security. It is based on the recognition of the existence of aggression, both actual and potential. It is also based on the recognition of the fact that, in order to confront this menace, the international community has only the most primitive means at its disposal at the present time.

94. Draft resolution A proposes two remedies which are to be pursued simultaneously. First, it urges Member States to take every step within their power, and in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to place themselves in readiness to contribute to any United Nations effort to repel aggression. Secondly, the draft resolution, by extending the term of the Collective Measures Committee, makes it possible for further studies to be made in the field of collective security. Thus, it assures that progress shall be made on both the short and the long-term aspects of collective security.

95. In supporting this draft resolution, my delegation reaffirms its view that, although the Charter of the United Nations confers upon the Security Council the primary



responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, such responsibility is not exclusive. Responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security also lies in the General Assembly, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence on the part of Member States, as laid down in Article 51 of the Charter, particularly when the Security Council defaults in the discharge of its primary responsibility.

96. The United Nations is a living organism, drawing its life and breath from the Charter. The implementation and interpretation of the Charter, therefore, must take due account of the needs of the growing organism so that it may be responsive to the changing times. It is in this light that my delegation will vote for the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union, as amended, which makes reference to the primary responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security, and which also recommends the convening of periodic meetings of the Security Council whenever such meetings will truly serve a useful purpose.

97. My country has a strong faith in the desirability and efficacy of an international system of collective security. As a member of the Collective Measures Committee, my delegation will bear resolutely and with fidelity its share of the burden and responsibility of laying the foundations of an edifice where man can seek shelter in peace and security.

98. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I want first of all to apologize to the President for not asking in time for permission to speak. I did not hear him say that there were no more speakers on his list. Otherwise, of course, I should have asked to speak before he began his statement.

99. During the consideration in the First Committee of the matter now under discussion, the delegation of the USSR protested against the proposals contained in the draft resolution submitted by the eleven delegations headed by the United States of America, because it was its profound conviction, a conviction that had been tested by a most careful analysis of every point in the draft and confirmed by numerous facts at the USSR delegation's disposal, that this resolution is not in accordance with the functions, purposes and principles of our Organization as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

100. In making a detailed analysis of this draft resolution in the First Committee, we tried to demonstrate that although the draft resolution contains numerous references to the Charter, and although even the preamble zealously quotes various separate provisions of the Charter dealing with effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and for the repression of acts of aggression and the removal of the threat of such aggression, nevertheless, the measures proposed in the draft resolution are really in no way calculated either to remove threats to the peace or to strengthen peace, but are intended to serve purposes that are diametrically opposed thereto.

101. The delegation of the Soviet Union is not, was not and will not be able to support such a draft resolution, which, under the guise of measures for the defence of peace and against aggression, really sets out a programme that is intended to assist in the preparation of a new war. Although they are called "collective measures" and refer to the high and noble purposes of the defence of peace, these measures really run counter to the interests of the peoples and threaten the independence of States.

102. Surely that was quite clear today, only a short time ago, from the speech, for example, of the representative of

Bolivia, who ventured to speak from this high rostrum about the difficulties experienced by Bolivia, which, as he expressed it, has fallen into the clutches of the American buyers of Bolivian tin; or, as we should say, into the clutches of the American monopolies. Surely this is attested by his statement, to which he added that such a situation—about which he ventured, despite the extent of his dependence on American capital, to state from this rostrum what we have heard—exists not only in Bolivia but in many other Latin-American countries as well. I take leave to add to what the representative of Bolivia said in this respect that such a situation exists not only in many Latin-American countries, but in many countries in all parts of the world to which the United States of America extends its economic, political, and above all military control and influence.

103. All these facts reveal even now the true nature of the so-called collective measures for the defence of peace, especially when it is remembered that countries like Bolivia and a number of other Latin American countries which are under constant observation consider it necessary to give warning here of the danger which compels them to refrain from supporting various points, the most substantial points, in this draft resolution on so-called collective measures.

104. I am bound to say that the draft resolution of the eleven delegations as finally approved and submitted to the General Assembly differs considerably from the draft resolution as it existed in its original form. The eleven-Power draft resolution was intended to bind the States Members of the United Nations by engagements in obvious contradiction to their sovereign rights and political independence. These attempts in the original draft resolution, though concealed by an artificial phraseology, encountered the resistance of a number of delegations which submitted amendments representing considerable, and I would say, radical, changes in the meaning and nature of the eleven-Power draft resolution that had been prepared under the obvious influence and pressure of the delegation of the United States of America.

105. It was quite obvious that the sole purpose of the whole draft resolution was to make better use of the countries in or within the orbit of the Atlantic bloc in order to carry out as successfully as possible the aggressive plans of the United States. This was so obvious that a number of delegations—Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Afghanistan—were compelled to request the insertion in the draft resolution of a special and extremely important clause overthrowing the whole conception of so-called collective measures. That clause was immediately included in the draft resolution as paragraph 10 by the United States of America, which, when the draft resolution was discussed, retreated in panic all along the line under the pressure of the resistance from those Powers, which had a premonition of what that draft resolution on "collective measures" would have in store for them. The paragraph reads as follows:

"...nothing in the present resolution shall be construed to permit any measures to be taken in any State without the free and express consent of that State."

This paragraph 10 is in direct opposition to the requirements which the United States delegation, acting, of course, on the instructions of its Government, had set forth in its draft on "collective measures".

106. The most important points in the original United States draft on "collective measures" evoked serious resistance. For example, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution as originally submitted had proposed that the General Assembly should "take note of the report of the Collective

Measures Committee and approve its conclusions." With one accord many delegations thereupon protested. I should have called it a rebellion—a rebellion on bended knee perhaps, but still a rebellion—against the dictates of the United States of America. As a result we now find in the draft resolution no proposal that the Assembly should approve the conclusions in the report of the Collective Measures Committee. That, of course, means the collapse of the whole draft resolution.

107. Even after the introduction of quite substantial amendments, however, this draft still remained unsatisfactory—indeed, no less so. The draft follows the lines of the hypocritically-named "Uniting for peace" resolution [377(V)] adopted last year, and is still a document which represents a programme not of measures to defend and strengthen peace and prevent aggression, but for the preparation of a new war. This programme is a further step along the way towards the unleashing of a new war now being followed by the aggressive Atlantic bloc, which is attempting to exploit the United Nations and adapt it to the requirements of the bloc's own interests.

108. The representative of the United States stated here that these measures are not intended for aggressive purposes. That statement contradicts the facts and is refuted by them. He said here that he hoped—he probably had in mind the Government of the United States of America—that the Soviet Union would understand the meaning of "collective measures" and support the draft resolution. This statement by Mr. Cohen, however, only serves as further proof of the degree of hypocrisy and falsehood to which the representatives of the United States of America can go in their efforts to put public opinion off its guard.

109. From the very beginning the delegation of the Soviet Union adopted a negative attitude towards this draft resolution and, judging that the resolution of the eleven delegations could not be corrected by partial amendment, submitted its own draft resolution, in which it drew attention to the aggressive character of this draft resolution on "collective measures" and to the unsatisfactory nature in this connexion of the work of the Collective Measures Committee; and naturally it concluded that this Collective Measures Committee, should be dispensed with and abolished.

110. We make a similar proposal now in the form of a separate draft resolution [A/2050] which we ask representatives to support.

111. So far as concerns draft resolution B submitted by the First Committee to the General Assembly, the part dealing with the immediate convening of a periodic meeting of the Security Council primarily for the consideration of important outstanding matters and, in the first place, of the Korean question, the USSR delegation, although the amendments to our original draft have weakened it considerably, has nevertheless seen its way to vote for that draft resolution.

112. The effort to achieve peace, to reduce the tension in international relations, obliges us to use all possible means of helping to achieve these lofty aims, the attainment of which is ardently desired by millions upon millions of people throughout the world.

113. For that reason the USSR delegation considered it possible to vote in the First Committee, and will vote here, for draft resolution B, on the convening of a periodic meeting of the Security Council to consider what measures might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations even though the draft resolution is in a much less satisfactory form than it would have been if it had not been spoilt by the amendments introduced into it.

114. The delegation of the Soviet Union is convinced—as I hope are many other delegations here—that the progress of

events will compel even its present opponents to choose the way of a genuine defence and strengthening of peace, the way which the Government of the Soviet Union is following, and the way which, in the conviction that its appeal will be heard, it calls upon all States to follow likewise.

115. Faris EL-KHOURY (Syria): In the First Committee I explained the affirmative vote which my delegation cast in favour of the collective measures resolution as a whole, namely that this vote does not in any way bind my Government or affect its full liberty as regards taking any active part or otherwise in the collective measures forces referred to in this draft resolution, noting at the same time that my country is not in a position, in the present circumstances, to afford to maintain within its national forces elements suitable for service as United Nations units. I reiterate this reservation here for the purposes of the record, emphasizing also the provision in paragraph 10 of draft resolution A that: "...nothing in the present resolution shall be construed to permit any measures to be taken in any State without the free and express consent of that State."

116. In this respect I do not agree with Mr. Vyshinsky when he said just now that that paragraph has nullified or destroyed the whole draft resolution. It has nothing to do with the principle which is contained in that resolution for the creation of collective measures forces in order to cope with any aggression which may take place in the world. It means simply that no measures for creating these forces would be applied to any State without its consent. That is to say, the participation of States in the creation of these forces would certainly be optional, in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter which makes such participation subject to the free will of nations as to whether they will participate in these measures, in the hope that the military elements which will be produced by the application of this resolution will fill the gap which exists in the present structure of the United Nations, and that sufficient forces will be available to make the resolutions of the United Nations properly respected by the parties concerned, and enforced if necessity calls for enforcement.

117. With regard to draft resolution B calling for periodic meetings of the Security Council, my delegation is happy to see that the representative of the USSR, Mr. Vyshinsky, sponsored this draft resolution, and I conclude from that that Mr. Vyshinsky intends to take an attitude towards realizing the intention which is expressed in that resolution.

118. I entertain the cherished hope that the intentions of the leaders of world policy will undergo a new process of evolution towards realizing the determined aspirations of the whole world that we shall be able to remove the annoying tension in international relations which is terrifying human beings at the present time owing to the unjustified "cold war" which is at present going on between the big Powers. Leaders of world policy fulfil these cherished desires of the whole world, then and only then will they be worthy of the positions which they occupy in the estimation of the whole world.

119. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (*translated from French*): I do not intend to repeat here the various points of the very complete discussion in committee on the item now before us. But I think that, in view of the persistent misrepresentation of our intentions and objectives made by five delegations in this hall, it may be useful that, in explaining our vote, we should briefly reaffirm these objectives and intentions in unambiguous language.

120. I was struck by the fact that in the observations on the USSR draft resolution reference was also made to the eleven-Power draft, the report of the Collective Measures Committee and the "Uniting for peace" resolu-



tion [377 (V)] itself, even to the discussions at San Francisco. Thus, we have debated anew a decision taken by our Assembly at its fifth session. In order to make my explanations clear, I propose briefly to cover the same ground again, but in the opposite direction.

121. I shall therefore repeat once more that the "Uniting for peace" resolution does not seek to replace the Security Council by the Assembly. The competence of the Council remains intact, as do its powers. It alone can take a decision binding upon Member States. The Assembly would be called upon to make a recommendation, in accordance with procedures henceforward defined, only when the Council is prevented from taking such a decision, when such impediment is established. We all know that recommendations are not binding upon Member States. A casual and subsidiary competence, limited powers, and a fixed procedure, those are, in so far as the Assembly is concerned, the points brought forward by the resolution of 3 November 1950.

122. As regards collective measures, the position is equally clear. The Military Staff Committee had been prevented from functioning. Hence, it was unable to organize either United Nations forces or the strategic direction of those forces. Accordingly, the United Nations found itself powerless to take military action. Furthermore, measures not involving the use of armed force had not received any methodical study. The Collective Measures Committee was asked to make a study and report to the Council, and subsequently to the Assembly, on all such means and methods. The draft resolution presented by the First Committee takes note of the Committee's report and directs it to continue its work for another year.

123. The conclusions of the report are not, of course, binding on either the Council, the Assembly, or the Member States, whatever Mr. Vyshinsky may persist in saying. That was always our intention, even before any amendments were submitted. Nor will the eleven-Power draft resolution be binding if it is adopted. The Collective Measures Committee will not become a standing body nor even one endowed with long life; it will merely be prolonged for one year so that it can finish its work, which, though very largely accomplished, is not yet quite complete in all its parts.

124. Like any work of man, the report is open to criticism. The draft resolution was criticized and was amended in consequence. The chief criticisms made here, however, relate rather to the resolution of 3 November 1950 which set up the Collective Measures Committee than to the report or to the draft resolution taking note of it.

125. We have listened to very keen and sometimes even very virulent criticism of collective measures as such. And yet the principle of such measures figures in the Charter, where it is expounded in some detail. Apparently, therefore, despite the impression that many have been gained from certain speeches, that principle becomes reprehensible, in the eyes of the USSR delegation, only when it is put into effect by some body other than the Security Council.

126. This brings us to the second criticism we have had to meet. We are told that on 3 November 1950 the Assembly violated the unanimity principle, and we are reminded that the unanimity of the five permanent members of the Security Council is the very foundation upon which the San Francisco Conference sought to base world security. That was unquestionably the intention of the San Francisco Conference, and it has not been questioned. As I said in the Committee, the French Government upholds the unanimity principle in every case where a collective decision might require it to take some specific action. That privilege is the counterpart of the particularly heavy responsibilities

incumbent upon the permanent members of the Council within the United Nations. But in November 1950 a majority of 52 proclaimed that if the United Nations were unable to enforce collective action, it should be enabled to express an opinion by which Member States might be guided. The unanimity principle is not affected, since the Assembly can only make recommendations which are not binding on Member States.

127. One last point may call for explanation. The report and the draft resolution refer to regional and collective self-defence arrangements. That might give the impression that new links are being created between those arrangements and the United Nations, and that the sphere of application of the arrangements will extend beyond the geographical limits originally assigned to them. That is not so. The report and the draft resolution merely state existing facts. The Charter is world-wide; regional and self-defence arrangements have a limited and specific purpose. The arrangements are made within the framework of the Charter and, like the Charter, their object is the maintenance or re-establishment of peace. If collective action were to be taken affecting an area covered by a regional arrangement, and if all the States belonging to that regional arrangement took part in such action, the organs provided for in the arrangement might be set in motion. No doubt they would be, even if there was no provision to that effect in our text. I thought it might be helpful to mention that possibility.

128. Such are the considerations which led the French Government, in conjunction with ten other governments, to present and support the draft resolution before the Assembly.

129. I shall deal very briefly with the amendments submitted to the draft resolution of the Soviet Union. The draft calls for the abolition of the Collective Measures Committee and hence is incompatible with the eleven-Power draft resolution. It also raises the question, in connexion with collective measures, of periodic meetings of the Security Council, recommending the Council: first, to call such a meeting without delay; and secondly, to examine in the first place the Korean question.

130. This second paragraph of the draft might have been ruled out as bearing on an item not on the agenda. Furthermore, the French Government considers that the Assembly has no authority to give instructions to the Council. My Government was, however, unwilling to lay itself open to the suspicion of repudiating a procedure—I refer to periodic meetings of the Council—which is laid down in the Charter. It has accordingly co-sponsored an amendment limiting the USSR draft to a reminder of that provision, the Council retaining full discretion as to the time it should be used.

131. Mr. H. S. MALIK (India): I shall explain briefly the attitude of my delegation on the two draft resolutions. As regards draft resolution A, we recognize of course that the Charter provides for collective security arrangements under Article 43 and related articles. We appreciate, therefore, that the study made by the Collective Measures Committee has been both comprehensive and interesting, and we consider that the tributes paid by many to the work of the Committee and of its distinguished Chairman are well deserved.

132. The draft resolution of the eleven Powers, draft resolution A, follows from the "Uniting for peace" resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly last year. It will be recalled that India abstained from voting on that resolution as she could not agree to the main recommendation contained in parts C and D relating to the maintenance of national units for service under the United Nations upon requisition by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Our main objection was on the ground that it was inopportune to stress the military aspects of the

functions of the United Nations at a time when all the peoples in the world were looking for peace, as that part of the resolution which related to collective measures gave the impression that the United Nations was more concerned with perfecting its enforcement machinery than with promoting international co-operation and mutual goodwill.

133. Since then there have been many developments and we feel that subsequent events, and many of the statements which have recently been made, have confirmed the view taken by us last year. In Article 39 of the Charter it is the Security Council on whom has been placed the responsibility for determining the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. It is for that Council, therefore, to make recommendations or decide what measures should be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42 to maintain international peace. Moreover the recommendations of the General Assembly have not the same binding force on the Member States as decisions of the Security Council. If these recommendations are carried out by certain Member States and not by others, particularly in opposition to the views of one or more of the great Powers, we feel that there is danger of general war.

134. In our view there have been two important developments recently which have a great bearing on the timing of this draft resolution. These are : first, the negotiations for an armistice in Korea ; and secondly, the recent decision of the General Assembly to constitute a disarmament Commission. We know, of course, that there has been a great deal of disappointment over the very slow progress of the talks in Korea but in spite of that there is a general hope that these negotiations will be successfully concluded and that the fighting in Korea will come to an end.

135. In the case of the decision to set up a Disarmament Commission also there are grounds for misgiving since there are extremely important differences of opinion regarding the terms of reference and the role of the Disarmament Commission. The fact remains, however, that a Disarmament Commission has been set up and that it will start functioning shortly to consider ways and means for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments, and this fact alone holds out some hope of steps being taken towards the relaxation of the existing tension and the eventual attainment of peace.

136. We feel that under the circumstances it is unfortunate and inopportune to proceed with a proposal which might result in not lessening but in increasing the tension, mutual distrust and ill will. The world looks to the United Nations for relief from this tension and for it to take steps towards the attainment of peace, and in our opinion it is very important that the emphasis on our work here should at the present time be on measures which would promote the whole conception of conciliation and mediation.

137. For these reasons my delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution A. As regards draft resolution B we shall support this as the recommendation made in it, is, we feel, entirely unexceptionable.

138. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : We shall now take the vote. The First Committee recommends the adoption of draft resolutions A and B in document A/2049. The delegation of the Soviet Union has submitted a draft resolution which appears as document A/2050. We shall vote first upon the First Committee's draft resolutions. A request has been made for a vote by roll-call.

139. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) (*translated from Spanish*) : In accordance with the rules of procedure, I should like to ask for a separate vote on the eighth paragraph of the

preamble, and also on paragraph 6 of the operative part of draft resolution A.

140. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : In accordance with the request of the representative of Chile, I now put to the vote the eighth paragraph of the preamble of draft resolution A.

*The eighth paragraph of the preamble of draft resolution A was adopted by 46 votes to 7, with 3 abstentions.*

141. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : I shall now put to the vote paragraph 6 of the operative part of draft resolution A.

*Paragraph 6 of the operative part was adopted by 46 votes to 7, with 2 abstentions.*

142. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : I shall now put to the vote draft resolution A as a whole. A request has been made for a vote by roll-call.

*A vote was taken by roll call.*

*Yugoslavia, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.*

*In favour* : Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen.

*Against* : Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*Abstaining* : Argentina, India, Indonesia.

*Draft resolution A was adopted by 51 votes to 5, with 3 abstentions.*

143. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : We shall now vote on draft resolution B.

*A vote was taken by roll-call.*

*Guatemala, having been drawn by lot by the President, voted first.*

*In favour* : Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece.

*Against* : None.

*Abstaining* : Argentina, China.

*Draft resolution B was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.*

144. The PRESIDENT (*translated from Spanish*) : Since the Assembly has adopted draft resolution A which provides for the continuation of the Collective Measures Committee for a further year, I consider that there is no need to take a vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union which, in the operative part, recommends the abolition of that Committee.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*