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President: Mr. Nasrollah ENTEZAM (Iran).

Statement by the Secretary-General

1. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I am grateful for the confidence in me that is reflected in the decision taken this morning [298th meeting]. I understand your vote to be a reaffirmation by the General Assembly of the independence and integrity of the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations. In the present circumstances, I feel that I am under an obligation to the United Nations not to refuse your mandate continuing me in office for a period of three years.

2. When I assumed the office to which the General Assembly appointed me on 1 February 1946, I took this oath:

"...to exercise in all loyalty, discretion and conscience the functions entrusted to me as Secretary-General of the United Nations, to discharge those functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the United Nations only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the Organization."

3. I have tried, in all sincerity and with all the energy at my command, to carry out that pledge in letter and in spirit, to uphold the Charter of the United Nations, to act in accordance with the decisions of all its organs, and to use the influence of my office always in support of peace and the authority of the Organization.

4. The United Nations cannot function effectively unless the Secretariat acts in loyal conformity with the decisions and recommendations of the organs of the United Nations. The United Nations cannot function

effectively unless the Secretariat acts in the collective interest of the United Nations as a whole, and in the collective interest only.

5. You may be quite sure that my actions and the actions of my staff will continue in the future, as they have in the past, to be governed strictly by these considerations and by the oath to which we have all pledged our faith.

6. I am grateful for the many courtesies and friendly co-operation that have been extended to me by the delegations during the past five years and for the many ways in which they and the Member governments have assisted me in the performance of my duties as Secretary-General.

7. I shall do my part towards the maintenance of similar relations with all the Member governments—without exception—during the next three years.

8. This is not the time to embark upon a review of the many trials and tribulations through which the United Nations has passed during the past five years, or to attempt to forecast what lies ahead. Now I shall say only that my faith in the United Nations as the right road to peace has been made stronger rather than weaker by every crisis through which the world has passed since 1945.

9. I further believe that there is still time for mankind to choose the right road to peace—the United Nations road—and thus to prevent the disaster of a third world war. The United Nations road to peace requires universal collective security against armed aggression. That we must achieve and I believe we shall achieve it. The Member nations have been taking historic strides

in that direction before and during this session of the General Assembly.

10. But more is required than this, essential as it is. Force alone will never be enough to preserve peace. There must be steady, persistent, continuous effort to bring about a reconciliation, one by one, of the conflicting interests that divide the world. I have worked hard during the last five years for the reconciliation of these conflicting interests. I shall continue to do so.

11. The combination of conciliation and force in support of peace is also not enough. The United Nations must develop a bold and statesmanlike programme on a world scale that will bring reasonable hope for an adequate standard of living and a decent life to the two-thirds of the world's people who do not have either today.

12. These are United Nations goals for which I shall work during the next three years. With the support of the Member governments and the hopes and prayers of all humanity urging us on, I firmly believe that the United Nations will succeed if we follow this road—and there is no force in the world that can stop us.

United action for peace: reports of the First Committee (A/1456) and the Fifth Committee (A/1463)

[Agenda item 68]

Mr. Thors (Iceland), Rapporteur, presented the report of the First Committee and the accompanying draft resolutions (A/1456).

13. Mr. THORS (Iceland), Rapporteur of the First Committee: The question now before the General Assembly for discussion and consideration bears the title "United action for peace". People all over the world will place great hope in any genuine united action for peace, and will wholeheartedly welcome any such action. Many will be encouraged by the unanimity achieved for the draft resolution of Iraq and Syria, recommending to the permanent members of the Security Council that they should meet and discuss all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and which are likely to hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to solving their fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter. Let us hope that subsequent actions will not cause disappointment, and that the noble hopes of all people all over the world may come true.

14. The PRESIDENT (*translated from the French*): In addition to the First Committee's report, the Assembly has before it the Fifth Committee's report [A/1463] on the financial implications of the draft resolutions submitted for its consideration. The report is self-explanatory: I do not think it is necessary to ask the Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee to present it. In addition to the reports of the First and the Fifth Committees, the Assembly has before it some amendments [A/1465 and A/1466] and a draft resolution [A/1467], submitted by the USSR.

15. Should the Assembly wish to proceed to a discussion, I would ask representatives wishing to speak to bear all these documents in mind and to refer to them now, if they so desire, so that it will not be necessary to revert to them later or to reopen the debate.

16. Although I have no doubt that the General Assembly desires to discuss this issue, I must, in order to

comply with the provisions of rule 67 of the rules of procedure, ask whether it is the Assembly's wish to discuss the First Committee's report.

It was decided, by 27 votes to 2, with 10 abstentions, to open the debate on the First Committee's report.

17. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The Assembly has just decided in favour of a general discussion. A vote of one-third of the members for the motion would in fact have been sufficient.

18. Mr. ARMAND UGON (Uruguay) (*translated from Spanish*): The debates held in the First Committee¹ on this important draft resolution were chiefly devoted to a discussion of legal problems bearing on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of this proposal in terms of the Charter. Our delegation considers that that necessary and most useful discussion has demonstrated the complete conformity of the draft with the provisions of the Charter and with the distribution of powers set forth therein. Consequently we do not believe that it is necessary to dwell upon this legal discussion, but will confine ourselves to what we said in the First Committee. On the other hand, the legal discussion, although indispensable in view of the legal aspects of the draft resolution, has to a certain extent obscured consideration of the political and constitutional significance of the step about to be taken by the United Nations.

19. If we take a more general view, and consider the draft in a wider context, we find that this measure represents the most decisive progress yet made by man in the organization of peace and security. It is beyond any doubt the most constructive step taken since San Francisco. If the fourth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations could be called the "Peace Assembly", these reasons justify us in calling the fifth session the "Assembly of collective security", as its President, Mr. Entezam called it in a memorable speech [295th meeting].

20. This resolution, once it has been adopted, will empower the organized international community to take the enforcement measures indispensable to repel aggression, a power which the League of Nations never acquired. We have benefited from our experience in Korea and broadened its application to build a practical, realistic and world-wide system of collective security, the most advanced yet known.

21. This system is not a substitute for, but rather an addition to, the one already in existence. It is not designed to replace the security system envisaged at San Francisco and hinging on the Security Council. It is designed to operate in the event of a flaw or breakdown in the Security Council system of security. The Security Council retains the vast powers conferred upon it by the Charter. The big five Powers continue to bear the heavy weight of primary responsibilities conferred upon them by that document. The new system merely gives to the Assembly and the smaller States a responsibility for collective security in addition to that of the Council and the big five.

22. The new system will come into play whenever the Security Council is unable to act because of the veto, or the misuse of presidential powers, or any other hindrance due to disagreement among the great Powers.

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee*, 354th to 371st meetings inclusive.

23. No revision of the Charter is involved; what is proposed is a remedy, within the system of the Charter, for the inactivity of the Security Council. In the opinion of our delegation the essential part of this draft resolution is the provision for calling, for the first time in international history, upon the smaller States to take decisions on collective security and contribute towards it.

24. Hitherto the maintenance of collective security has been the affair of the great Powers, which arrogated to themselves the function of preserving peace in the Holy Alliance, in the Concert of Europe, in the Council of the League of Nations—as permanent members, in the Security Council—also as permanent members, and finally in the transitional system envisaged in Article 106 of the Charter and which was apparently intended to become permanent. Now, however, the smaller Powers are called upon to contribute, at the international level, to the maintenance of collective security.

25. We have here, for the first time in history, a system of collective security based on the contribution of all States, large and small, in proportion to their economic and military means.

26. As Uruguay pointed out at San Francisco,² we are sure that this clarion call to the small States will be of fundamental importance and will serve to strengthen peace and security.

27. Lacking in strong military forces, but likewise lacking in designs for conquest and aggrandisement, the small countries represent an untapped force for peace and international justice, since all of them hope for the reign of law and cannot but reject aggression, threats and violence. It follows that, in the organization of world security, these nations without designs or plans for conquest can and must be regarded as a powerful force serving the peace-loving community of nations, the rules of international law, and the ethical and legal principles of civilization. As between what is just and what is unjust, they will choose justice; as between what is legitimate and illegitimate, they will choose law; and as between violence and security, they will choose the maintenance of peace.

28. To call upon geographically small and militarily weak countries to co-operate in the maintenance of international peace and security means to employ a new force to establish effective and solid guarantees for the achievement of the essential and supreme aim of the Organization: international peace and solidarity. The co-operation of all the nations, large and small, militarily weak or strong, whatever their creed, race or political organization, will make it possible to build a lasting world peace, a peace which will not consist merely of the absence of war, but which will be founded on justice, law, liberty and the well-being of all mankind. Those are the objectives of this draft resolution.

29. One point, however, deserves particular attention. While this draft resolution calls upon the small States to play an active part in maintaining peace and security, it also imposes upon them grave and weighty responsibilities already laid down in the Charter. In voting for

this draft resolution, every one of us will shoulder a serious obligation, a heavy responsibility. Every one of us must return to his country conscious of his duty to do his utmost for the adoption of the legal, economic and military measures required to place our countries in a legal and material position to discharge, whenever necessary, the responsibility which we are assuming in this historic hour.

30. We have been called upon to participate in the organization of security because of the failure of the great countries brought about by the recalcitrant attitude of one of them. We must not let a security based on the co-operation of all the countries, large and small, fail because of the indifference, unconcern or inertia of the small countries. We have criticized the failure of the great Powers so much that we dare not fail ourselves. The draft resolution will very greatly strengthen the international solidarity which is required for safeguarding peace and law. It is simply a stage in the fulfilment of the obligations and responsibilities enacted and laid down in the Charter. Nothing new is being added here that is not specifically mentioned in the Charter. The Charter provides that enforcement action, based on a pooling of economic and military forces, should always be ready to contain international aggression, violation of the sovereignty of peoples and threats to the peace. The draft resolution reaffirms and ratifies those aims. For the first time in the history of the world an impressive majority of Powers emphatically decides to vote for a recommendation of the General Assembly so that the principles of the Organization may be safeguarded firmly in all the continents. Henceforth the United Nations stands also for the united continents, because both the Members of the former and the countries of the latter are convinced that the obligations laid down in the present recommendation flow from respect for, and observance of, the duties imposed by the Charter. With this draft resolution we are taking a firm step towards the maintenance of security with justice.

31. Mr. DULLES (United States of America): The First Committee has brought us a proposal which we can accept as a good policy of insurance against a third world war. The terms of this proposal are in themselves nothing novel. It is the Charter programme of seeking to deter aggression by being able quickly to expose and to suppress aggression. That Charter programme in turn was based upon the experience of the world during the decade of the 1930's.

32. You will recall, I am sure, that series of events: Japan's attack on Manchuria in 1931 and the League's decision after three months to send a commission to investigate, then ten months of investigation, and then a report³ which, after five more months, was adopted by the League,⁴ a report which condemned the Japanese but which invoked no restraining action. But, by then, eighteen months after the initial aggression had occurred, the tide of Japanese aggression had rolled on and the initial breach of the peace could not be localized.

33. Other ambitious despots took note and followed suit. In 1935 Mussolini attacked and conquered Ethiopia.

³ See *League of Nations, Report of the Commission of Enquiry (Lytton)*, document C.663, M. 320, 1932, VII, and annexes, Series L.O.N. VII, Political, 1932, VII, 12 and 14.

⁴ See *League of Nations, Report on the Work of the League since the Thirteenth Session of the Assembly*, document A.6, 1933, Series L.O.N., General, 1933.2., page 32.

² See *Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization*, San Francisco 1945, Vol. I, document 24, P/8.

In 1938 Hitler seized first Austria and then Czechoslovakia. In 1939 Hitlerite Germany and the Soviet Union combined to seize and divide Poland.

34. That was the succession of events which touched off the Second World War. In the First Committee I quoted Marshal Stalin's words of March 1939, and they are words that deserve repetition. He said at that time: "The non-aggressive States, primarily England, France and the United States of America . . . rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention . . . consequently, transforming the war into a world war." Those words proved too true and six months later it was indeed world war.

35. Those who founded the United Nations were determined not to repeat that mistake. So as a very first point in the Organization's statement of purposes they wrote "effective collective measures" for the suppression of aggression. But for five years our Security Council proved unable to vitalize those words. Then came the armed attack on the Republic of Korea and it seemed that the pattern of 1931 had in fact begun to repeat itself and that the third world war might be in the making. And that might have been—and I think it would have been—had it not been for a series of accidental circumstances which made it possible to improvise collective resistance to that aggression.

36. Today the aggressors are largely broken and we surely breathe more freely than we did on Sunday, 25 June. But our respite may be short if we go on trusting to luck. We must organize dependably the collective will to resist aggression. If the Security Council does not do so, then this Assembly must do what it can by invoking its residual power of recommendation. That is what we shall do by adopting the first draft resolution submitted by the First Committee.

37. That draft resolution provides for procedures for observation in areas of tension so that potential aggressors will know in advance that any aggression would be instantly detected and labelled as such. The draft resolution makes it possible for the General Assembly to meet at twenty-four hours' notice in emergency special session if the Security Council is prevented, as by veto, from acting. It invites Member States at once to create and maintain armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as United Nations units, and it provides for further study of ways of fulfilling the task of organizing collective resistance to aggression.

38. If, in response to our resolution, the Member States do actually establish a system which ensures that aggression will be promptly exposed, if they maintain a collective strength, and if they have both the will and the way to use that strength promptly in case of need, then a third world war may be permanently averted. That is so plain that the First Committee, by the votes of fifty members, with only the Soviet block in opposition and three abstentions, approved the first draft resolution. It would be vastly reassuring to all who love peace if here we could adopt unanimously a programme which only aggressors need fear.

39. There is a further part of that draft resolution to which I would allude. It is part E, which derives from what was originally an independent Chilean proposal. That part reminds the Member nations that enduring

peace depends not merely on security arrangements but also upon the observance of human rights and the promotion of economic well-being. That, I know we all realize, is an essential reminder. Too often in the past men have taken the false and superficial view that peace depends merely upon maintaining the *status quo*. The reality is that repression produces violent explosion unless the efforts at maintaining a peaceful order go hand in hand with efforts which advance the material, intellectual and spiritual welfare of mankind. This draft resolution commits us to that enlightened way.

40. In addition to the principal draft resolution, to which I have already referred, there is another important draft resolution which was initiated by Iraq and Syria and which recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that they should meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, problems likely to threaten international peace. That draft resolution was approved unanimously. The United States was happy to support it for, as Secretary of State Acheson said in the course of our general debate [279th meeting] and as President Truman told us last week [295th meeting], the United States will always be ready and willing to negotiate with a sincere desire to solve problems.

41. It should, I think, be borne in mind that what this draft resolution refers to as the fundamental difference which now dangerously divides the world is not a difference of a kind on which the so-called great Powers can readily compromise, for that fundamental issue deeply concerns others, and most of all it concerns the smaller nations.

42. The United States has no national ambitions which clash at any point with the welfare of the Russian people, and between our nations there are no territorial disputes and no commercial disputes. The Soviet Union, to be sure, has not yet settled its lend-lease account with us, but no one anywhere thinks that the United States will go to war to collect its debt. The issue on which we part is not that kind of issue. The issue on which we part is the issue of whether freedom and diversity in the world shall be systematically stamped out and replaced by enforced conformity with the pattern of Soviet totalitarianism.

43. That basic issue does not concern exclusively, or even primarily, the United States. If the United States gave way on that issue, it would be the smaller nations which would first pay the price, for they cannot survive unless there is collective support of a system of tolerance. That is the basic issue from which stem the particular controversies that create the danger points.

44. Let us take situations such as exist in Austria, Germany and Korea. It would be possible to reach agreement at any time if we accepted conditions which would subject all Austrians, all Germans and all Koreans to dictatorship and servitude such as are now imposed on Poles and Czechs. Also, all who have followed those situations closely know that nothing less would win USSR agreement. Why is that? It is because, as Marshal Stalin has put it, Soviet Union foreign policy is, "the most internationalist of all", because it seeks to "amalgamate" all the various nationalities into "a single State union". The USSR is, he says, "the living prototype of the future union of nations".

45. Already the Soviet Union has gone far in achieving the goals of its foreign policy. The official newspaper

Izvestia, in its new year's editorial of 1 January 1950, listed what is called the "camp" growing up around the USSR. It said that the forces of this camp were multiplying day by day, and it went on to list Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, the Chinese People's Republic and the Eastern German Democratic Republic as members of that "camp". It concluded: "Communism is conquering; communism will triumph!" If any nation really wants to join that camp and add its name to *Izvestia's* next new year's list of "conquered", it is free to do so. But no people yet have freely made that choice. No people yet have come under the yoke represented by the USSR brand of imperialist communism except by violent coercion. The United States will not be a party to that programme and thus, so long as it remains the programme of the Soviet Union, the possibilities of negotiation are limited. I say "limited", which is not to say that the possibilities are non-existent.

46. The basic problem, as we see it, is to create enough collective strength to protect the freedom of the people who want to be free. The United States is willing to contribute to that strength, and indeed we have already contributed largely. We do so because we do not believe in a "one world" of enforced conformity. We believe that peace does not depend upon forcibly ironing out differences, but that peace should permit people to respond in their own distinctive ways to their own distinctive needs and aspirations and, for example, to practise socialism, private enterprise or even communism, if they desire. The people of the United States feel a sense of common destiny with other free peoples, even though we disagree with them. That is the key to an understanding of our foreign policy.

47. Of course, when a materially strong Power like the United States contributes preponderantly to a common cause, that fact automatically exposes it to the charge of seeking to dominate and extend its power in the world. No one who knows the people of the United States, no one who takes into account our record as a major victor in two world wars, credits those charges. But many do not know of their own knowledge, and they are misled by false propaganda.

48. That fact is an added reason why the United States wants the new conditions which would be created by the main draft resolution now before the General Assembly. Under that resolution, if implemented, the defensive power of the free world will be more evenly distributed, so that there will not be so great a dependence upon one or two; each Member nation will maintain some forces available to serve as United Nations units. Of course, in many cases that force would be small, but the total would be large and its composite character would itself bear eloquent testimony to the collective will behind it.

49. Then, too, under that resolution, the direction of concerted action will be more securely lodged in the United Nations, so as to reduce the risk that force might be used to promote distinctly national ambitions. As the world moves in the path that this resolution defines, it will move nearer and nearer to the Charter ideal, the ideal of impressing armed force, with a trust, so that it will not be used, as our Charter says, save in the common interest, a common interest as found by a body that is responsive to the moral judgment of mankind.

50. The step marked by this draft resolution is along a path that is as yet untravelled. We are explorers, but we can proceed, confident that we are taking a historic step towards reaching the great goal of a peace that will be both durable and just.

51. General ROMULO (Philippines): Few draft resolutions have been debated so minutely and exhaustively in committee as the first draft resolution now before the General Assembly. This is only as it should be. I doubt whether any single act of the United Nations, other than the adoption of the Charter, will loom so large and vital as this in the history of the Organization.

52. The draft resolution now before the General Assembly has been attacked on legal and constitutional grounds. The argument that, by the terms of the resolution, the General Assembly would usurp the functions and powers of the Security Council, was advanced in the First Committee with great force and skill by Mr. Vyshinsky and others. I am sure it will be repeated here again. That argument was met with the explanation that no such usurpation is intended or, indeed, will ever take place, and that the sole aim and purpose of the proposal is to enable the United Nations, through its most representative organ—the General Assembly—to consider breaches of the peace and acts of aggression and to make suitable recommendations thereon whenever the Security Council is prevented from taking action by reason of the veto.

53. The principle bears repeating: while the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, this responsibility is not exclusive, and the General Assembly may, in default of a decision by the Security Council, make appropriate recommendations to the Member States to curb a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. This authority springs from the broad powers of the General Assembly under the Charter, from the United Nations' inherent right of survival and from its supreme responsibility to all the world's peoples to preserve the peace. No legal technicality, however brilliantly advanced, can prevail against the overriding force of this threefold principle.

54. The argument based on the principle of the inviolability of the Charter must be rejected as a pretext once it can be shown, as indeed it has been shown, that the proposal before us, far from nullifying the Charter, seeks rather to give it life and to make it work. The whole purpose of this proposal rests upon a reasonable interpretation of our fundamental law.

55. The struggle which has become familiar in the political histories of most countries, between a strict and a liberal interpretation of the constitution, is now being re-enacted among us with equal bitterness and tenacity of purpose. However, reason and common sense must prevail, for growth is the genius of life, and those who stultify life are sundered and broken in the end.

56. Among nations, as among men, the first law is the law of survival. Long ago, it was said that the Sabbath was made for man and not man for the Sabbath. We say, with equal conviction, that the nations were not made for the Charter but the Charter for the nations which desire peace with all their hearts. To hold a contrary view would be, as it was two thousand years ago, to betray a certain poverty of conscience and imagination, for it was intended from the very beginning that the

Charter should be much more than a mere instrument for the adjustment of the rival political claims and ambitions of the great Powers, a tool to be cast aside at the first sign of disagreement among them. The Charter was and is a covenant among the peoples of the world, by which they have resolved to abolish the scourge of war.

57. We are committed to this world-embracing purpose, with the support of all the great Powers if possible, but without the sanction of any of them if necessary.

58. The Charter is a bulwark of peace and not an advancing forest which conceals aggression and war. It is difficult to escape the feeling that the opposition to this draft resolution is inspired by the desire to conceal aggressive aims, to nourish them in secret and to pursue them by stealth. Nobody can reasonably suggest that this resolution will encourage breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. No amount of ingenious argumentation and no tricks of casuistry can turn this resolution upon its head, twist its meaning and so misrepresent its purpose that it can be said in any manner or form to foment war and encourage aggression.

59. The whole purpose of this draft resolution is, first, to uncover aggression, and, secondly, to repel aggression. This twofold purpose is writ clear upon its face. Therefore those who oppose it on narrow technical grounds lay themselves open to the suspicion either that they have no interest in curbing aggression or, what is worse, that they themselves harbour aggressive designs directly or through their friends. Although the inference may be unfounded—and I hope it is unfounded—it is nevertheless inescapable.

60. We have heard Mr. Vyshinsky affirm repeatedly, and always eloquently, that the Soviet Union desires peace. Whenever Mr. Vyshinsky speaks of peace, he rises to heights of eloquence which have earned for him the reputation of being the unrivalled master in dialectics in this Assembly. By all the rules of logic, therefore, this draft resolution should enjoy his full endorsement and support.

61. It is significant that, while the USSR has sought membership in the proposed peace observation commission, it has refused to concur in the measures which, upon failure of the Security Council to act, the United Nations may take to halt and repel any aggression which that commission may uncover. The Soviet Union holds that action against such aggression may be taken only by the Security Council where, as a permanent member, the USSR has the right of veto. It cannot accept the view that such a situation should in any circumstances be submitted to the judgment of the veto-free General Assembly—that is to say, to the judgment of the rank and file of the nations, particularly the small nations, whose abhorrence and fear of war cannot be less than that of the Soviet Union.

62. Mr. Vyshinsky is sharply aware of the fear of war which bedevils the small nations, or else he would not so persistently play upon it as he so effectively does. If, then, he knows how deep our apprehensions are and how anxiously we hope that war may be avoided, why should the USSR distrust or fear the judgment of our nations?

63. If further proof is needed of the peaceful inclinations of our countries, let him consider the votes in the First Committee on the second and third draft resolutions.

64. Let him note how the but slightly amended USSR draft resolution, asking the Security Council to perform its functions under the Charter, and in particular the early application of the articles regarding the placing of armed forces of Member States at the disposal of the Council and the functioning of the Military Staff Committee, was approved by 49 votes, only one vote less than was received by the first draft resolution.

65. Let him note further how the third draft resolution, originally sponsored by Syria and Iraq, which requests the great Powers to continue consulting with one another in an effort to resolve their fundamental differences, was adopted unanimously by the First Committee.

66. Does the Soviet Union require more proof of our peaceful intentions? We supported its proposal affirming the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. We echoed its hope that the Security Council and the Military Staff Committee may reach agreement at last on concrete measures which will enable the United Nations to deal effectively with breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. We agreed that the organ in which the USSR wields the supreme prerogative of the veto should be requested once again to set itself to these tasks. We recognized the right of the Soviet Union to a place on the peace observation commission.

67. Having given these proofs of our intentions, have we not in turn the right to expect that the USSR should agree to a proposal which seeks to develop a secondary line of defence against aggression, a measure of safety on which we could fall back in the event of the failure of the Security Council to take necessary action? We realize—and how well do we realize—that there is one missing ingredient: the element of mutual trust. Let us admit frankly that the distrust is mutual. The Soviet Union distrusts the motives of the free countries. But to show whether this suspicion has any basis in fact, let Mr. Vyshinsky prove that any State covets a single inch of Soviet territory or seeks to subvert by violence the institutions of the USSR. On the other hand, our distrust of the Soviet Union is based on facts of bitter experience. It is based on recent events in Iran, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Berlin and Korea.

68. Is this chain of menace and subversion ended at last? We should like to think so, and we pray God it is so, but dare not. We still are waiting for a sign that the USSR has decided to let its deeds comport with its words, and that it has finally discarded the systematic programme of political subversion and terror that so long has had the whole world in its grip.

69. By its vote on the first draft resolution, we shall know whether or not the sign has been given, the sign by which alone we can conquer fear, breed confidence in one another and set ourselves to the tasks of peaceful reconstruction for the benefit of all our peoples.

70. Mr. KANELLOPOULOS (Greece): At the present meeting of the General Assembly we are called upon to take a step—an important step forward—in the life and scope of the United Nations. We are called upon to reduce the power of negation and to reinforce the power of truth. The veto, and especially its abuse, is negation. Truth resides in the free conscience and will of the great majority of the nations.

71. The road leading to the draft resolution which we are enjoined to adopt today was opened to us in no

uncertain or indefinite manner by the blood which had been shed, and is still being shed, in Korea. It is indeed a grievous shame that mankind should require the sacrifice of the blood of the innocent in order to arrest the violence of the guilty and to impose justice. But so it is; and now, for the first time in history, under the aegis of a world organization, the law of collective security has been enforced automatically, swiftly, and effectively.

72. But the question arises: has this happened in a way offering a sure guarantee for the future? Can we say with certainty that collective security will surely function in the same effective manner should a situation similar to that in Korea present itself again? Unfortunately the answer is "no".

73. If the Security Council was able, last June, to take the decision it took, this was of course due partly to the will of those who voted for it and, more particularly, to the fact that at last responsible and decisive world leadership has come into being, but partly also to chance or to luck, as Mr. Dulles said. For assuredly it was a stroke of fortune that a certain great Power which makes a systematic and exaggerated use of the veto was absent from the decisive meeting of the Security Council. Had it been present, a decision which was hailed with enthusiasm by the men and women of the free world would never have been taken.

74. I presume that this was the thought which led the delegation of the United States to make the proposal which was discussed and elaborated in the First Committee and upon which we are now called upon to take a decision.

75. The first draft resolution under discussion of course solves the problem within the framework of the basic rules adopted at San Francisco. The Security Council remains the sole organ which, in the event of a threat to peace, is empowered to take decisions legally binding on the United Nations. However, without changing this basic principle, the proposed draft resolution constitutes a signal advance in the moral field, the political effects of which cannot but be most beneficial.

76. If, in any part of the world, the illegal violence of the powers of darkness manifests itself, then, under this resolution, the General Assembly is summoned immediately and has the power, by placing itself on the side of the victim, to render any veto in the Security Council politically and morally difficult. In other words, we hope that the power of the democratic will of the majority of the free nations—and that will is the essence of the matter—proves itself stronger than that of legalistic procedure in any form.

77. If, after a decision has been rendered by the General Assembly by a great majority, the Security Council, by reason of the veto of a single Power, is not able to respond to the mandatory will of the nations, then automatically the question of the survival of our Organization will arise. This could only be solved by the predominance of the will of the overwhelmingly large number of the free nations which demand not only the continuance of our Organization, but also the essential fulfilment of its purpose.

78. It is in this sense that the Greek delegation salutes with a deep feeling of confidence the progress that the Assembly is about to make today or tomorrow in adopting the decision of the First Committee on the United States proposal. By this act our Assembly will

most fittingly and constructively celebrate the fifth anniversary of the coming into force of the Charter of the United Nations.

79. However, on this occasion, I think it indispensable to draw your attention to a critical subject indissolubly bound to the draft resolution under discussion. During the last few years—and I am sure this has not escaped the attention of any among you—there has mysteriously appeared under the surface of conventional historical processes a radical change in the acceptance of war as an international phenomenon.

80. International warfare was once considered to be warfare waged between States. Consequently the implication of aggression—an aggressor being one who has disturbed the peace in contravention of international law—was associated with the status of a politically constituted and independent State. But the events of the last twenty years, so deeply influenced by the totalitarian régimes and their movements, have brought about a fundamental change in the essence of this problem.

81. War as an international phenomenon has taken on a new shape. If, for example, in 1934 the *coup d'état* of the Austrian National Socialists in Vienna had succeeded, and these had assumed power after the assassination of Dollfuss, it would have appeared naïve to say that the tragedy was one of civil strife and internal in character. Dollfuss' assassins were allegedly the Austrian vanguard of a foreign Power and a foreign army.

82. The totalitarians have invented and brought into history the contrivance of the fifth column, which does not operate on the basis of the nationality of those who constitute it. Those who belong to the fifth column have, morally and politically, severed their association with their natural nationality and are exclusively identified with the nationality of the foreign State of which they are the creatures and tools. Therefore any warlike activity or manifestation of violence on the part of fifth columnists constitutes an international and not a national phenomenon.

83. If we overlook this fact, if we refuse to acknowledge this reality, then we leave open a wide field of action for any Power which, after organizing a fifth column in other countries, will not need to assail the peace of the world overtly by means of its forces, but will none the less assail it in an underhand manner through the fifth column under its control.

84. For instance, let us suppose that in Korea the geographical partition of the 38th parallel—that extraordinary historical paradox—had never existed; even so, the war that has broken out there ought still to be considered an international and not a civil war. Suppose that instead of the North Koreans attacking the South Koreans, the "Reds" had come down from the mountains, where they had been secretly trained and armed, and had invaded the cities and the plains. This difference would in no wise have altered the character of the aggression and the war as an international phenomenon.

85. In recent years we in Greece were subjected to aggression in this form. But because, in the conscience of the nations, the significance of international warfare in its contemporary form had not yet crystallized, we were deprived of the benefits which the application of the principle of collective security would have afforded us.

86. Fortunately we did not need them. We fought alone, and we are happy and proud that, with the moral support of the United Nations, and with the material aid of generous friends, we won the battle alone. We are proud because we have been able to present to the world the spectacle of a virile democracy undaunted by fear—a democracy which knows how to fight for its ideals.

87. But suppose the Greek democracy had not been able to emerge victorious and had succumbed beneath the weight of so harsh a struggle, ought it then to have been abandoned and to have been sacrificed on the altar of dubious sanctity dedicated to antiquated concepts regarding war? Alas, upon this altar other peoples have been sacrificed.

88. Let us therefore beware for the future and show ourselves worthy of the demands of history. Its message is clear, but we have not always ears to hear it. History requires that we should be ever vigilant, resolute, bold and unyielding where democratic faith is at stake. Let us dedicate ourselves to this high purpose on the present solemn occasion for our own sakes and for the sake of the free men and women throughout the world.

89. Mr. DONGES (Union of South Africa): The First Committee has presented to us three draft resolutions, namely, the draft resolution jointly sponsored by several delegations, the draft resolution introduced by the Soviet Union and amended in committee and the draft resolution introduced by the delegations of Iraq and Syria and revised in collaboration with delegations which had introduced amendments. All three draft resolutions were discussed exhaustively in the Committee and there can be little new which could be added to what was stated during those discussions.

90. The justification for my intervention is, however, twofold. In the first place, there is the necessity for a final definition of the considerations which will govern our voting on the different provisions of these draft resolutions to which I have referred. In addition, I crave the indulgence of the Assembly to accord me the privilege of making my maiden speech on such an important subject before this august Assembly.

91. When the draft resolutions were voted on in the First Committee, the South African delegation voted affirmatively on the joint draft resolution as a whole, although we expressed certain misgivings as to the necessity of some of its provisions and although we had abstained on part E, the text of which we regarded as extraneous to the main issue raised in the draft resolution.

92. The South African delegation voted affirmatively on the other two draft resolutions, that is, the one presented by the USSR delegation, as amended, and the one introduced by the delegations of Iraq and Syria, as revised. The South African delegation will again vote affirmatively on the first draft resolution as a whole. We shall also vote in favour of the other two draft resolutions as they stand at present.

93. In defining briefly, for the information and records of this Assembly, the considerations which will govern our voting and the South African Government's interpretation of some of the provisions, I shall deal, first of all, with the first draft resolution.

94. As was explained in the Committee, it is the view of my government that the primary function of the

United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. It is also the view of my government that if the Organization does not fulfil this primary function satisfactorily, it cannot hope to be successful in its other varied and essential pursuits. If it fails to protect the world against armed aggression, another holocaust will inevitably ensue, and whatever may have been achieved in regard to the social and economic advancement of peoples will disappear and the world will again become a place of material and spiritual destruction—that is, if our modern society and civilization are not destroyed completely. Therefore, unless the United Nations is willing and is able to ensure international peace and security, its value and its main purpose in international life will be of little account.

95. The position which now faces the Organization is that the procedures which we have developed in terms of the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security are such that our machinery cannot be relied upon to act quickly and effectively in the event of any State deciding to break the peace by resorting to armed force. This machinery, as employed hitherto, does not, therefore, afford the world a safe guarantee against aggression and war.

96. The reasons for this impotence of our Organization have been explained at length in the Committee as well as by previous speakers in the present debate, and it is not my intention to dwell on them. The facts are clear. It is now generally accepted that the abuse of the rule of unanimity can effectively prevent the Security Council from taking action—certainly from taking early and effective action—in the event of an armed threat to the peace. This is a fact—a fact which we must all now accept.

97. On the other hand, we have seen that if the Security Council is permitted to function as originally intended, this Organization can act with great effectiveness in the event of an armed attack by one country upon another. The manner in which the Organization intervened in the Korean conflict furnishes us with the clearest possible demonstration of this. That the United Nations, if permitted, can intervene effectively in the event of armed aggression must therefore also be accepted as a fact.

98. The third fact is the danger of war. The threat of war is constantly casting its shadow over a world which, five years ago, emerged from an armed struggle that had all but destroyed it. War has already been the fate of Korea, and this Organization is still engaged upon a struggle with the aggressor from beyond the 38th parallel. The fear of war and the overriding consideration of averting armed conflict obtrude themselves constantly into our discussions and our resolutions. They form the sombre background of much of what we hear, of what we read and even of what we think.

99. It is this state of emergency that we are called upon to meet. It is this overriding consideration of safeguarding our peoples against armed aggression that has forced us to seek ways and means of rendering aggression unfruitful and dangerous to the aggressor, of enabling us to present a united front to anyone who should decide to break the peace by resorting to armed force.

100. It is true, of course, that the United Nations Charter provides ample measures for dealing with

ordinary disputes. It is, however, in the emergency of aggression or imminent aggression that the Organization is or may be impotent; and it is intolerable that this Organization, which was created primarily for the preservation of peace and security, should condemn itself to impotence in such an emergency because of the wilful persistence of any one Power in the abuse of its rights under the Charter.

101. A number of speakers in the Committee argued cogently that our present efforts should not in any way impair the provisions of the Charter for dealing with ordinary disputes, and that the procedures which have now been evolved in the first draft resolution should not be permitted to overlap or supplant those Charter provisions. This is a fact, which I would emphasize, for it is also the understanding of my government.

102. Other representatives have also expressed the view that it should be emphasized that the proposals put forward in the draft should in no way derogate from the place accorded by the Charter to the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security. The draft resolution clearly recognizes the position of the Council, for it is only when the Council has found itself incapable of action that the measures and procedures which are now being created will be invoked.

103. In the circumstances, it is the wish of my government that I should take this opportunity of again stating clearly the understandings which, as far as the Union of South Africa is concerned, are implicit in my government's acceptance of the draft resolution.

104. First, it is our understanding that armed force will be used only in circumstances where armed aggression has taken place or is imminent, and where the Security Council is not able to take action.

105. Secondly, it is the understanding of my government that the words "breach of the peace or act of aggression", in part A, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution, will signify exclusively a breach of the peace or an act of armed aggression as between States.

106. Thirdly, it is the understanding of the Government of the Union of South Africa that the reference to a "threat to the peace", in the same paragraph, and any action by the Assembly under that paragraph arising from such a "threat to the peace", are regarded as being limited to circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency in which the danger of armed aggression as between States is considered to be imminent and unavoidable. I must repeat that my government considers that there is ample other provision in the Charter to deal with ordinary disputes not likely to lead immediately to an act of aggression, and that the machinery provided by this resolution should not be applied to such classes of disputes.

107. It is on these understandings that the delegation of the Union of South Africa will vote affirmatively on the first draft resolution as a whole.

108. The second draft resolution which is before us is the one which was originally introduced by the Soviet Union delegation and which was amended in the First Committee. There is, of course, nothing that we can say against this draft resolution apart from the fact that it reiterates what has been stated so often, namely, that the Powers concerned should endeavour to implement the provisions of the Charter which were de-

vised for the purpose of enabling the United Nations to deal, in terms of the Charter, with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, acts of aggression and disputes or situations likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. We can only hope that the introduction of this draft resolution by the USSR delegation will be followed up by a sincere effort to co-operate with the other permanent members in an effort to achieve the aims of their own draft resolution. My delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution.

109. Lastly, there is the draft resolution introduced by the delegations of Iraq and Syria, as revised in the First Committee. It is true, of course, that similar appeals to resolve their differences have in the past been addressed to the permanent members of the Security Council. It is also true that the big Powers must be acutely aware of the fears which their continued differences are engendering among the smaller countries of the world, which have followed these differences with great concern and apprehension. While their true causes have been apparent for a considerable time, the draft resolution is wisely silent on the question of blame, for it is important that the appeal should not be a source of further differences and of offence to any one of the permanent members concerned.

110. It is to them—or, at any rate, to those of them which sincerely desire international co-operation—that we leave the final decision in this draft resolution as to when further negotiation with a view to unanimity will be possible. The delegation of the Union of South Africa will therefore also vote in favour of this draft resolution.

111. I trust that the members of this Assembly will not regard it as presumptuous or inopportune if I make use of this, my first opportunity of addressing the Assembly, to make a few general observations on the principles underlying and the aims motivating the draft resolutions now before us.

112. A reference to Article 1 of the Charter shows that the maintenance of international peace and security and the suppression of acts of aggression are placed in the very forefront of the purposes of the United Nations. I venture to predict that the verdict of history on the United Nations will be mainly determined by the measure of success achieved in the attainment of this purpose.

113. I believe that the first draft resolution now before the Assembly is a step in the direction of ensuring a favourable verdict from history. It envisages a practical and realistic approach to the problem of checking the aggressor and ensuring international peace.

114. The whole world realizes that the determination to suppress aggression from whatever source, translated into immediate and effective action in the case of Korea, has done more than anything else to revitalize the United Nations. But we realize equally well that, owing to imperfections and shortcomings in the machinery of the United Nations, immediate and effective action would have been rendered impossible in the case of Korea but for certain fortuitous circumstances which were present when the Security Council took its fateful decision in June 1950.

115. We desire in these draft resolutions to modernize our machinery in the light of what might so easily have

been our tragic experience, and the first draft resolution is designed specifically to remedy a proven defect in our machinery for suppressing acts of aggression. It is being perfected, so far as we can judge at the moment, to meet any potential menace of aggression.

116. The small nations see in a United Nations equipped with the necessary power, and imbued with the proper will, the best guarantee of security against aggression, whether directed from outside or generated from within their borders. For them it is a national insurance policy for which they are prepared to pay the appropriate premium in certain circumstances. They want, however, to be satisfied that the policy covers the risks against which they wish to be insured, and that their support in building up the great insurance company and the premiums they pay, and will continue to pay, will not be utilized for ulterior purposes or turned against themselves as an instrument of interference in their domestic affairs. If they have these guarantees, their enthusiasm and continued support is assured.

117. But we must face the fact that the small nations are not without misgivings and doubts on this score. The fear of the Frankenstein monster is ever-present. My government, however, has indicated by its active support in Korea that its hopes are for the present triumphant over its fears. I trust that its great act of faith, supplemented and confirmed by its action today, will in the event be fully justified, and that even during this session of the United Nations it will have proofs which will foster and strengthen that faith.

118. Mr. CHAUVEL (France) (*translated from French*): The draft resolution before us, of which France was one of the sponsors, was discussed at length in the First Committee. I do not propose to revert to the legal and political arguments which were then put forward, but as my delegation took part in drafting the text it might be well to recall the general principles which guided its action.

119. On 27 September last [286th meeting], Mr. Robert Schuman, speaking from this rostrum, referred to the speech made [279th meeting] by the Secretary of State of the United States, head of the United States delegation, and expressed satisfaction at the speed with which the Security Council had taken its decisions and at the effectiveness of the measures taken to put them into effect. He voiced the hope that the United Nations would act with the same speed and efficiency should the occasion arise in the future. He associated himself with the views set forth by Mr. Acheson. At the same time he emphasized that in a matter of such importance it was necessary to proceed methodically, first forming a clear picture of the ends it was desired to achieve and, having done that, to select the means best adapted to attain them. This is what has been done.

120. The objectives are clear, and I gladly avail myself of this opportunity to say that France supports the Charter—the whole Charter. It supports the principles which have been given pride of place in the Charter. It supports international co-operation, the development of friendly relations based on respect for equal rights and the self-determination of peoples, and the maintenance of international peace and security. Since these are the objectives sought, we hold that all the power and authority of the Charter should be brought into action. Where peace and security are at stake, France

considers that the General Assembly and the Security Council should assume all the responsibilities laid upon them by the Charter.

121. Yet what do we see? The Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, and it has corresponding powers of decision. Military action for the maintenance of peace and security is decided upon by the Council and organized upon its responsibility and under its supervision.

122. The Assembly is competent to discuss any questions or any matter within the scope of the Charter. It is therefore competent to deal with subjects relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

123. As the Security Council has the primary responsibility in that field, the Assembly has only a secondary responsibility, with corresponding powers of recommendation. It is furthermore stipulated that it shall not make any recommendations while the Security Council is exercising, in respect of any dispute or situation, the functions assigned to it in the Charter, unless the Security Council so requests. That is all perfectly clear and simple.

124. If we pass from texts to facts, however, we note first of all that the Security Council's power of decision has been hampered in some forty-five cases by the veto imposed by one of the permanent members of the Council on proposals supported by the other four permanent members. I am not recalling this very well known fact in a contentious spirit. I am recalling it simply to show that the assumption upon which the Charter was drafted at San Francisco, namely, that there would be continued co-operation and understanding among the five permanent members of the Security Council, has not been borne out by the facts.

125. We further note that, for the same reason, the military forces which were to support United Nations action and, if need be, to enforce it, have not been established.

126. Finally, we note that the General Assembly meets in regular annual sessions and that under its rules of procedure it may meet in special session within fifteen days of the receipt by the Secretary-General of such a request.

127. Thus an issue could well arise which jeopardized peace and security, but in which the Security Council, because of disagreement among its permanent members, was unable to take the decisions called for. To convene the General Assembly in special session would take a fortnight. Furthermore, should the General Assembly, when convened, be able to agree on a recommendation entailing military as well as political action by the Member States which were prepared to support such a decision, there would be no organized means for taking such action with the speed and effectiveness which the circumstances required.

128. Inasmuch as the hypothesis on which the Charter was founded has not proved accurate, the Charter could thus remain a dead letter in an issue jeopardizing the maintenance of peace and security, which is its primary objective. Our methods, our rules, the interpretation so far given to the texts governing our activities, lead us to this lamentable conclusion. It is not a mere theo-

retical conclusion. On the contrary, in the light of recent experience it appears to have been verified in actual fact.

129. The Council acted swiftly and effectively in the Korean question. It might not have been able to do so, however, if all five permanent members had been present at its meetings. And it can be safely said that, if the United States, because of circumstances extraneous to the issue, had not had substantial forces in the immediate vicinity of Korea and had not used them to support the Council's decision, the absence of military forces, the organization of which is provided for in the Charter, would have made it impossible to take international action in sufficient time for it to be effective.

130. The Korean affair has yielded another finding—affirmative this time. The presence on the spot of a United Nations commission made it possible for the Security Council to have first-hand information on the facts of the case immediately available. It is easy to imagine situations arising in other places and involving a threat to peace and security. Those situations might continue for some time. As the Charter now stands, there is no convenient arrangement for keeping such situations under continuous observation and sending observers to the spot at the request of a State which feels itself threatened. The United Nations is thus in danger of being taken unawares by sudden and unexpected developments, and of taking decisions without sufficient knowledge of the essential facts of the problem.

131. France, I repeat, stands for the Charter and for the whole Charter. Its policy is founded on the rights and guarantees laid down in the Charter and also on the obligations it entails. It appears inconceivable to my delegation that those rights and guarantees, those obligations, the very Charter itself, should lapse into impotence and ineffectiveness. It is unthinkable that this entire machinery, designed to safeguard the peace and security of the world, should remain inactive when there is a threat to peace and security. And if, as I have shown to be the fact, there is a real danger of such inactivity, then we must revise our customs, our methods, our rules and our interpretations. We may even have to revise the Charter.

132. It is in that spirit that the French delegation studied the statement made here by the United States Secretary of State. It is with that desire, to ensure the effective application of the Charter, that my delegation co-operated in drafting the proposal which is now submitted to the General Assembly. My delegation felt, in so doing, that it was unnecessary to revise the Charter, which itself afforded the means of ensuring that its principles should be applied. It considered that it would be sufficient in some respects to adjust our customs and rules, in others to augment the means laid down from year to year by which the United Nations could meet its obligations; elsewhere to provide interim and transitional measures until those laid down in the Charter had been made effective.

133. The draft resolution does not infringe upon the Security Council's competence, responsibilities or powers. The Council should fulfil its role; if it does so it will be adequate, as it has been in the past. If, however, for some reason, it does not fulfil its role, the United Nations will not thereby be paralysed. A special session of the General Assembly can be convened within twenty-four hours and the Assembly, on a procedural

decision of the Council, can discuss and adopt any recommendations which appear necessary for the maintenance or re-establishment of peace and security.

134. The United Nations will have at its disposal a new instrument to keep it informed concerning any incidents which may occur—the Peace Observation Commission.

135. In order to contribute to United Nations action pending the conclusion by the Security Council of agreements relating to armed forces, Member States will survey the resources at their disposal and maintain within their national forces elements which can be made available to take part in any possible collective intervention.

136. In conclusion, the draft resolution states that no measure, however good, will of itself suffice to ensure peace; the will of men is needed and that will—which inspired the joint draft resolution submitted by Iraq and Syria and unanimously adopted by the First Committee—must be demonstrated by the observance of the principles and rules established in common, and by respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which in turn presuppose the attainment of decent economic and social conditions in all countries. No reminder could be more timely or more consistent with the spirit of the Charter, which is designed to remove the scourge of war, to reaffirm the dignity and worth of the human person, and to establish and maintain justice, progress, freedom and tolerance, without which there is no liberty.

137. Such is our draft; such is the spirit which has motivated it. Much has been said about total war; let us speak of total peace. It is to that peace that France is committed, it is that peace which France hopes will be established and extended. In that hope the French delegation commends this draft to the General Assembly.

138. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) (*translated from French*): The draft resolution we are discussing is of great importance in the history of our Organization. It suggests new methods which are designed to strengthen international security, and in which the Assembly is called on to play a preponderant part.

139. Does the draft reflect discerningly the present international situation? Does it provide for the measures which should be taken in the face of this situation to lessen the danger, or rather the dangers, threatening the world at the present time? Those are the questions which occur to every Member of the United Nations and to which we must reply.

140. Yugoslavia is a profoundly peaceful country. Our peoples are jealous of their independence and have never coveted the territory of others. Never at any moment in its history has Yugoslavia been an aggressor. Today, after suffering the nazi-fascist aggression, after seeing their country devastated by a war which was imposed on them, the peoples of Yugoslavia are pursuing the enormous task of economic reconstruction and cultural rehabilitation. It is natural in these circumstances that the peoples of Yugoslavia should be more attached than ever to the cause of peace. Our people's attachment to the cause of peace and their profound desire to preserve their country from the horrors of a new war have found adequate expression in our government's foreign policy in every development in international relations since the last great war.

141. It is probably not superfluous to point out what our foreign policy has been since the time when a particularly strong tension became manifest in our part of the world. The causes of that tension are generally known. They are aggressive pressure against my country, accusations that it is preparing to invade neighbouring countries, systematically organized frontier incidents, and so on.

142. In these circumstances, our government is doing everything possible to prevent that tension from becoming worse and the provocations from having any serious consequences. It has retained its presence of mind and has abstained from any action which might even indirectly increase the tension created by others in the Balkans.

143. Furthermore, as our Foreign Minister, Mr. Kardelj, stated in the course of the general debate at this session of the General Assembly [282nd meeting], our government has declared its readiness to conclude agreements for lasting peace and non-aggression with each one of our neighbours.

144. In the same statement, Mr. Kardelj proposed a principle, which is enunciated in a special draft resolution [A/1399], under which any State finding itself engaged in hostilities with another State would be required to declare itself ready to cease fire within a period of not more than twenty-four hours if the other party did the same. The adoption of such a principle would create a fresh obstacle to aggression.

145. Mr. Kardelj added that Yugoslavia was ready to put that principle into practice, whether or not it was adopted by the General Assembly as a rule applicable to all.

146. I believe that by all the acts I have enumerated, and also by others, Yugoslavia has clearly proved that it intends to remain strictly and unequivocally faithful to its policy of peace and its obligations under the Charter.

147. On the other hand, our government is perfectly conscious of the gravity of the international situation and of the obligations both towards our own peoples and towards the international community which that situation imposes on it.

148. Seen from that angle and in the light of our own experience, the draft resolution obviously has solid advantages. The action so far taken by the United Nations, while constituting a serious check on tendencies dangerous to the peace, has not been able to prevent the growth of international tension from year to year until this year, when it attained disquieting proportions. This summer saw the outbreak of a war which, although the military operations have been local, has had world-wide repercussions and increased the general anxiety to a point not previously experienced. The situation is certainly grave, and, the draft resolution before us proposes that we should so direct our efforts that a country which intended to threaten or break the peace or to commit an act of aggression would be confronted not only by the means at the disposal of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter but also by new means at the disposal of the Assembly.

149. The most serious objection so far made to the draft is that it provides a procedure which is politically

unsound since it is allegedly contrary to that policy of understanding among the great Powers of which the legal expression is paragraph 3 of Article 27 of the Charter; that is the paragraph which establishes the rule of unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council or, in other words, the right of veto.

150. The absolute need for harmony, understanding and concerted action among the great Powers cannot be doubted. None can deny that an understanding among the great Powers based on respect for the principle of the equal rights of States, great and small, and on respect for the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, is the solid basis of a lasting peace. Nevertheless, facts must be seen in their true light. If we want to stop this slide down a dangerous slope which may lead us to a new great war, immediately attainable solutions must be sought for present problems.

151. The fact that there is disagreement among the great Powers has been demonstrated so often that it cannot be denied. We have to take that fact into account if we wish our decisions to be more than empty words. What the sponsors of the draft resolution had in mind was to take steps to ensure that this disagreement among the great Powers did not pave the way to another war. The possibility they envisaged was that aggression might take place in circumstances such that the lack of agreement among the great Powers prevented the Security Council from taking action. Were they justified in envisaging such a possibility? Would such a hypothetical case cover a wide category of possible armed conflicts? We believe so.

152. An unprejudiced view of the activity of the Security Council and of the present international situation shows us that the Council has been and will be able to act with some effectiveness only in the case of purely local wars—by which I mean wars local both in form and in content, such as the wars in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is evidently improbable that the Security Council could ever act in the case of a war which was local only in form and essentially affected to any degree the interests of one or other of the great Powers. In such a case the Council would probably be divided and unable to take appropriate decisions. Such a war would constitute a much greater danger to the general peace than would a purely local war. If the present system were retained, the role of the Security Council would become nonexistent at precisely the time when the danger of a general conflagration was greatest. The United Nations would thus be reduced to observing passively the conduct of the local war and its spread to other areas.

153. It is objected that the majority, when dealing with the question in the General Assembly, might dictate a recommendation and impose it on the minority, which in the Assembly has not the defensive weapon of the veto which it has in the Security Council.

154. In our opinion, the opportunities available to the minority in the Council and those available to the majority in the Assembly are very similar. In both cases the parties concerned can in some measure dictate their wishes. The veto enables a minority in the Council to dictate inaction; the majority in the Assembly makes it possible to dictate some action.

155. The majority in the Assembly might, of course, make biased recommendations harmful to the cause of

peace. But it would obviously be mistaken to state that the majority must necessarily be wrong and requires the guardianship of the Security Council in all circumstances. In substance that statement would be equivalent to maintaining that the very idea of the United Nations is a mistake, that the principle of the sovereign equality of States has no practical meaning, and that the privilege of the veto should be the supreme law of the international community, to which even the interests of general peace should be subordinated.

156. The dilemma, however, is not really to decide which of our two principal organs, the Assembly or the Council, deserves most confidence when it is a question of taking wise—and timely—decisions with the object of checking actual aggression. The dilemma is to determine which is the better course if there is actual aggression and the permanent members of the Council cannot agree—action or inaction on the part of the Assembly.

157. Clearly in such circumstances it would be preferable to give the Assembly the right and the power to take action, for the other alternative would mean that our Organization would have no means of ensuring collective security. That was what Mr. Kardelj, the head of our delegation, had in mind when he stated in the First Committee, during the discussion of this draft resolution, that Yugoslavia would prefer even a somewhat defective system of international security to no system at all. In making that statement, Mr. Kardelj of course had in mind the fact that the Security Council had already shown its impotence in that respect by failing to fulfil its duty under Article 43 of the Charter, which instructs the Council to negotiate special agreements with the object of having armed forces placed at its disposal.

158. Furthermore, if there is real faith in the concept of the United Nations, and belief that its very existence represents an important step in the development of co-operation among peoples in the sense of making international relations progressively more democratic, it must also be believed that the General Assembly, in which all the States Members of the United Nations are represented on a basis of equal rights, is much better qualified than any other organ of the United Nations to express the general will of the peoples of the world, who desire peace and not war. The peoples expect us to do everything in our power to strengthen international security and to lessen the danger of aggression and of a new war. The resolution which we are to adopt unquestionably represents an attempt to achieve that end. That is why we voted for the draft in the First Committee, and that is why we shall do the same in the General Assembly. We shall do so with all the more conviction because it is the only concrete and practicable proposal for the strengthening of international security, whereas the counter-proposals embodied in the USSR amendments do not represent the smallest practical step in that direction.

159. What is the substance of the main amendments submitted by the Soviet Union?

160. In the first place, we are asked to reject that part of the draft resolution which recommends that States should establish, within their national armies, armed units which would be at the disposal of the United Nations in case of aggression, and to do nothing in that respect until the Security Council has carried out Arti-

cle 43 of the Charter. For five years the Security Council has been unable to implement Article 43; to wait until Article 43 was put into effect would be tantamount to agreeing to resign ourselves to the absence of those armed forces and to let the United Nations remain in the future as impotent as it has been so far and as impotent as was the League of Nations.

161. Secondly, it is suggested that, in the event of aggression and failure of the Security Council to act, the General Assembly should be convened only a fortnight later instead of within twenty-four hours. That proposal of the Soviet Union is certainly especially negative, not to say astounding. Why should there be such a delay, during which the United Nations would be completely passive, in case of aggression? Whom could it benefit, the aggressor or the victim of aggression? The answer is clear. Has the USSR delegation forgotten the advance of Hitler's army during the two weeks which followed the attack against the Soviet Union in 1941? That army went from Warsaw to Bialystok and occupied a territory equal to that of several small countries put together.

162. We have not heard a single convincing argument in the Council in favour of that proposal. That is not surprising, as there is not and cannot be such an argument. It is therefore quite natural that a USSR amendment of such a kind should be unacceptable to us.

163. Our delegation proposed certain amendments to the draft resolution at the beginning of the discussion in the Committee; two of those were amendments of principle.

164. The first amendment was to the effect that it should be clearly stated in the resolution that the General Assembly would consider recommending the use of armed forces only in case of armed aggression and not in cases of threats to the peace, that is, cases where the potential aggressor had not yet committed an act of armed violence. The aim of that amendment was to prevent the resolution from being construed as permitting any measure which might in practice amount to preventive war. The sponsors of the draft resolution and the Committee acted very wisely in accepting our amendment and including it in the text which is being discussed in the General Assembly today.

165. Our second amendment [A/C.1/582] was to the effect that the following paragraph should be included in the preamble of the draft resolution:

"Recognizing, on the one hand, that the Charter does not authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State and, on the other hand, that every activity of the United Nations should be based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and that consequently every measure of collective security should be in harmony with these principles."

Our intention in proposing that amendment was that the General Assembly should explicitly guarantee that the new machinery would never be used to contravene the two principles of the Charter mentioned above, in other words, that it would not be used in connexion with a civil war or a war of national liberation in a non-self-governing country. We believe that the authors of the draft resolution and the Committee itself acted wisely in introducing one of the above-mentioned principles into the revised text, by adding to the original draft

what is now the second sub-paragraph of the first paragraph of the preamble, which simply reproduces the text of Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter. Naturally we regret that the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a country has not been explicitly mentioned. It would have made the resolution clearer. Nevertheless, the amendments which were introduced did add to the clarity of the text, precisely in respect of the points about which we had made reservations at the beginning of the discussion in the Committee.

166. For all these reasons, the Yugoslav delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by the First Committee; it will vote for the individual parts of the draft and for the draft as a whole.

167. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): We have on our agenda two items on which the Sixth Committee has submitted reports. As long as those items have not been disposed of, the Sixth Committee cannot meet and its members have no choice but to attend our meetings. If the Assembly agrees, we should be able, I hope, to dispose of these two items within a few minutes.

Reparation for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations: report of the Sixth Committee (A/1420)

[Agenda item 50]

168. The PRESIDENT (*translated from French*): The first item concerns reparation for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations. It will be seen from the Sixth Committee's report that the draft resolution was adopted in that Committee by 48 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. I shall put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by the Sixth Committee [A/1420].

The draft resolution was adopted by 48 votes to none.

Permanent invitation to the Arab League to attend sessions of the General Assembly: report of the Sixth Committee (A/1442)

[Agenda item 58]

Mr. Kural (Turkey), Rapporteur, presented the report of the Sixth Committee and the accompanying draft resolution (A/1442).

The draft resolution was adopted by 49 votes to 1, with 5 abstentions.

United action for peace (*continued*)

169. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland): At the last stage of the discussion on what is known as the Acheson plan, we find ourselves almost at the same point where we were at the beginning of our long discussion in the First Committee.

170. The first draft resolution before us is bad. It not only violates the law, but it is illegal as well as harmful and dangerous for the future of our Organization.

171. Before the voting machine is put into motion and before you put the stamp of doubtful legality on this draft resolution, the Polish delegation deems it its duty to raise its voice once more in protest and in warning. We shall briefly reiterate our viewpoint because our arguments, in our opinion, prove irrefutably the unacceptability of this draft resolution, and explain our negative attitude to it.

172. We had the opportunity to state our arguments very extensively during the discussions in the First Committee. We heard there from many delegations crushing and irrefutable legal criticisms of the principles of the draft resolution. Even in the speeches of those representatives who on the last day mechanically raised their right hands in affirmation or cautiously retired behind the safe position of abstention, we could hear expressions of uncertainty and anxiety, expressions of doubt and reservations.

173. Our arguments have not been refuted by the sponsors of the draft resolution. The doubts have not been dispelled; they have merely been belittled through phraseology and false pathos. Anxieties have not been allayed, they have been silenced by pressure and strangled by threats. It could not be otherwise. This draft resolution was intended to heal our Organization and to diminish the international tension, but if it is erroneous and illegal, it is so first of all because it is based on a false evaluation of the reasons of the political tension, and on a lack of correct diagnosis of the sickness which is to be cured.

174. The threat of a new war which hangs over mankind did not develop spontaneously. It was built up by the spreading of false ideas, for instance, the idea of the impossibility of political and economic co-operation between two different systems, namely, socialism and capitalism. It was built up by harmful myths, for instance, the myth that the "American way of life" must be imposed upon all the nations of the world. It was built up by the breaking of mutual understandings and agreements forged in the fires of the last just war; thus, for instance, the four-Power agreement for the control of Germany has been broken and the agreements on the liquidation of the consequences of the war, on demilitarization, on denazification and on democratization have been violated.

175. The spark of a new conflict has been fanned on by efforts to subordinate economically the major part of the world to one big Power, to one centre of political control. The Marshall Plan, the loans with political strings attached to them, the discrimination in international trade are well known facts. Furthermore, the creation of a military bloc, the North Atlantic Treaty and projects of new pacts, the enormous programme of armaments within the United States, the thrusting of armaments programmes on other nations, the promotion of war hysteria, warmongering, the threats to use the atomic and hydrogen bombs and, finally, the open aggression on Korea—all these are but a short enumeration, but a part of those facts and actions which have resulted in the tense situation in which we find ourselves at present.

176. Mr. Acheson did not remember—or rather he preferred not to remember—all those facts while drafting his resolution. Instead, we were given today by Mr. Dulles, speaking on behalf of the United States delegation, a striking example of distortion of history; I refer to his false statement about events in 1939 when Poland became a victim of Hitlerite aggression, and his false, untrue and slanderous insinuations concerning friendly and fraternal relations between my country and the Soviet Union. These are only two examples of this distortion of the facts of history which are really below the level of serious polemics.

177. A cure which is not based upon a correct diagnosis automatically falls into the category of quackery. The draft resolution before us proposes to cure the deficiency in international co-operation in this unscientific manner. The cures prescribed for the world by the American quack doctors deal with the delicate organs of our Organization and the whole system of collective security, which is one of its bases, in a brutal and harmful manner. The juggling with the rules and paragraphs of the Charter warps the whole structure of the United Nations which was painstakingly and unanimously erected in San Francisco.

178. Let us return once more, briefly, to the paragraphs of the draft resolution. Let us look calmly and realistically at this black magic of the American witch doctors.

179. First of all, the draft resolution very substantially impairs the importance, the role and the prestige of the most vital organ of the United Nations, the Security Council. By depriving it of the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and by depriving it not only of a decisive voice in these matters but also of control of the military forces of the United Nations, the resolution would reduce the Security Council to the role of a debating society—a society which is limited to taking stock of the opinions of its eleven members in order to refer problems to the “proper” tribunal, the General Assembly. But the General Assembly is not the proper tribunal; it has no authority to intervene in cases of a threat to international peace and security; it cannot replace the Security Council because it lacks the competence of that body.

180. Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Charter leave no doubt on this point. These two organs, the Security Council and the General Assembly, cannot be substituted one for the other; they merely complement each other. All efforts to violate this legal construction amount to open and flagrant violations of the Charter. Moreover, they constitute a violation of one of the fundamental principles of our Organization—the principle of the unanimity of the great Powers. I do not think that there is any necessity to stress the importance of this principle or to repeat all the arguments by which, from the days of the San Francisco Conference until now, the necessity for the faithful implementation of this principle has been confirmed.

181. Secondly, the necessity to find a compromise and to reach understanding, to conciliate divergent interests and to find grounds for common decisions by the great Powers in the interests of mankind, is self-evident. Throughout the war, and even during the years which followed, we had ample evidence of the possibility of such co-operation. The difficulties which arose are not and cannot be looked upon as proof that this conception is wrong. These difficulties should be overcome by new and increased efforts towards conciliation, by the exhaustion of all the possibilities of compromise decisions, and by a better understanding of each other's viewpoints.

182. However, if an attempt is made to substitute the rule of the mechanical majority for that of unanimity, intimidation for conciliation, *diktat* for compromise, capitulation for mutual concession, intervention for sovereignty and *pax americana* for world peace, then, we say, this is not a vocabulary of peace.

183. As we have heard it stated here within the framework of Mr. Acheson's total diplomacy—the principle of understandings based on the might of one side and the total capitulation of the other—we say that this is not a diplomacy of peace. In fact, this is not diplomacy at all. This policy is wholly unrealistic since it is based on the mistaken premise that the other party will yield to intimidation. This plan of Mr. Acheson's is completely alien to the spirit of the Charter and to the ideals of our Organization, and that is why all efforts to implement it by means of the draft resolution which we are now considering should be branded for what they really are and categorically rejected.

184. I wish now to pass to a third major reason for rejecting the United States plan, namely, that military forces would be placed at the disposal of the General Assembly. As we stated in the First Committee, such a provision would amount to a violation at one blow of thirteen articles of the Charter, and primarily of Articles 43 and 106. The draft resolution ignores the special agreements which are necessary for the creation of these forces and, what is more important, it ignores the fact that, under the Charter, the sole organ authorized to deal with these forces and to use them in circumstances provided for in the Charter is the Security Council.

185. What the sponsors of the draft resolution are trying to create is not a military force serving the United Nations, but an instrument to divide and disunite the nations of the world, an instrument of the imperialistic policy of the United States. In actual fact, it would be the enlarged army of the Atlantic bloc, working for obvious aims and in an obvious direction.

186. It would doubtless bear a very close resemblance to those forces which are today in Korea illegally usurping the United Nations flag. What these forces are actually doing under this flag is imposing despised rulers upon the people of Korea, colonizing the country and creating one more base for the United States imperialism in the Far East. That this operation could be carried out under the banner of the United Nations has proved a great convenience for United States politicians.

187. Obviously, however, the scope of this operation is too small for them, the contribution of other nations too limited, the price paid in American blood too high. These politicians would therefore have us create for them an international force—on a much larger scale—to be used whenever a nation aspires to rise in defence of its own freedom and sovereignty.

188. I should like to ask all the representatives who are voting on this draft resolution to consider its full consequences and how far it will lead us. Let them remember that he who sows the wind reaps a tempest.

189. The fourth reason why the United States plan is wholly unacceptable is the illegality and harmful character of the creation of the so-called collective measures committee. It is planned that this organ, which was not envisaged in our Charter, should illegally co-operate in the unlawful disposition of military forces by the General Assembly, and that it should, at the same time, constitute a body competitive with the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee provided for in the Charter has been constituted and is functioning. In these circumstances, the proposed new committee is obviously absurd and harmful, because it violates the law, infringes the authority of the Security Council,

indirectly violates the principle of the unanimity of the big Powers, and facilitates the imposition of the will of one big Power upon another.

190. All the points which I have just outlined can lead to only one conclusion, a conclusion which can be summed up simply in this sentence: the United States plan is an ill-concealed attempt to alter the Charter. Unable or unwilling to utilize the legal means provided in Article 108 of the Charter, the United States and a number of other countries are attempting to effectuate the change under camouflage. This is a step in international relations which is unacceptable and highly dangerous.

191. I wish to stress here that, even if the provisions of the draft resolution were not so wrong and harmful as they in fact are, and even if its aims were not so obviously dangerous to international co-operation, the Polish delegation would still, for reasons of principle, have the strongest objections to this weakly disguised attack upon the Charter; for we take a very firm stand on the inviolability of international treaties, on respect for the signatures affixed thereto, and on the loyal fulfilment of the obligations undertaken therein. Those who wish any clauses of a given treaty to be changed must make use of the special provisions of the law. This procedure is acknowledged by international law and accepted principles of justice and is commonly enforced in international practice.

192. As our delegation stated at the very outset of the discussion on this question, we approached the United States plan in a very realistic mood. We tried to find in it those positive elements which could help our Organization and which we could accept. That is why we supported the provisions in the draft resolution for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly when necessary and for the creation of a kind of patrol commission. This is evidence of our realistic approach and attitude to the work of the United Nations. This is proof that we consider draft resolutions upon their merits and not from the viewpoint of political sympathies for their authors. This cannot be said of certain of the other delegations which usually vote against any draft resolution submitted by the USSR, Czechoslovakia or Poland, even when they openly admit that they consider such proposals correct.

193. But our support for two sections of this draft resolution does not weaken in any way our negative attitude to the draft resolution as a whole. In our opinion, it is wrong, harmful, illegal and dangerous. In the cocktail which Mr. Acheson is concocting for us,

we find too little ambrosia and much too much hemlock for our taste. This is a dangerous drink which could poison international relations. Possibly it may be extremely convenient at the present time for the United States, in order to carry out its own political goals, to weaken our Organization. But we ask the General Assembly to look ahead to what would be the eventual results of such a violation of the Charter, of the law and of the whole structure of our Organization.

194. A sharp line must be drawn between the positive and useful aspects of this draft resolution and its harmful and illegal part. In our opinion, the amendments offered by the Soviet Union draw this line. If the stipulations concerning the transfer of competence from the Security Council to the General Assembly were deleted and also the provisions regarding the placing of military forces at the disposal of the General Assembly and the collective measures committee, the draft resolution would be cleansed of the illegal and harmful elements which I have described. The resolution thus constructed would constitute a real achievement for this session of the General Assembly. It would improve our system of collective security and peaceful relations between the nations and between political systems.

195. In addition, the Polish delegation considers that it would be a very useful contribution to our common cause to accept the draft resolution of the Soviet Union [A/1467] which recommends that the five permanent members of the Security Council should implement Article 106 of the Charter, that is, should initiate consultations in order to agree upon common action to maintain international peace and security. For notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in recent years, the unilateral decisions and the *faits accomplis*, we still consider that in order to diminish international tension and to agree upon crucial questions it is necessary to initiate harmonious collaboration among the big Powers based upon sound compromises, justice and respect for the United Nations Charter. Moreover, we are certain that the possibilities for such an understanding exist.

196. That is why, instead of voting for proposals that would create international tension, that would render international collaboration more difficult, and that would impair the strength of our Organization, we have to direct all our efforts towards its consolidation. We have to work for the conciliation of the differences and for the strengthening of international collaboration. Only in this way shall we be working for the idea which binds all the nations of the world, without exception—the idea of world peace.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.