

had nearly produced its downfall a year previously, at the mercy of Arab forces which, by the facts of geography, would then be free to surround it from three sides. The demilitarization programme also conflicted with the armistice agreement which exclusively governed the security situation in the whole Jerusalem area, including the disposition and reduced size of armed forces.

211. Regardless of its strong feelings on the Commission's report, the Israel delegation would contribute earnestly and constructively in the Assembly to the work of determining, in a practical and final form, the responsibilities of the United Nations on the one hand and of the Government of Israel on the other. It would seek a solution which satisfied the interests and concern of the world religions and of the United Nations, and at the same time the aspirations of the people of Jerusalem to government and security in conformity with their national allegiance.

212. Israel was already encouraged by some principles put forward in the general debate. The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (225th meeting) had rightly ascribed primary importance to the protection of the Holy Places and the need for an agreed solution. The Foreign Minister of France (225th meeting) had carried the discussion into new and constructive channels by concisely emphasizing three factors: the importance of carrying out the practical objectives of the United Nations without undue insistence on juridical preferences; the need to avoid imposing obligations not strictly indispensable; and the desirability of seeking the consent of the population concerned.

213. The Israel delegation would propose that the General Assembly should limit the commitment of the United Nations to the safeguarding of the Holy Places and should initiate such formal agreements as might be necessary between the United Nations and the State of Israel for the implementation of those safeguards. The Israel Government aspired to full international recognition of the political status of the Government of Israel in Jerusalem.

214. A solution along those lines would have the following advantages over that proposed by the Commission: it would rest on consent and would therefore present no problem of implementation or enforcement; it would terminate the period of doubt and potential conflict that had already lasted too long; it would be financially and administratively feasible; and it would simultaneously give complete satisfaction to the interests of the great

world religions and of the people of Jerusalem. Under those conditions, an era of peace and development would descend upon the Holy City, while the United Nations would stand forth as the ultimate and accepted guarantor of its religious immunity.

215. The solution of most international problems required an exact balance between the interests of the international community and those of an individual State. Yet when two legitimate interests faced each other, it was often possible to satisfy the main substance of both.

216. Small nations represented in the General Assembly must often ask themselves what they could contribute to the general welfare in a world so dominated by large units of power. Perhaps in their very disinterestedness and in their passionate need for security, they were the best qualified to search out the common ground between conflicting interests and to assert the persistent need for mediation. The Israel Government, which had itself learnt the consequences of war and the benefits of conciliation and which represented a new political unit whose traditions and future depended on the maintenance of international peace, would join its humble effort to any movement for extending the use of the methods of pacific settlement prescribed by the Charter. It was in that spirit that the delegation of Israel came forward to undertake its duties at its first full session of the General Assembly as a Member of the United Nations.

Inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fourth session: report of the General Committee (A/998)

217. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Assembly to the report of the General Committee (A/998), which read as follows:

"The General Committee, at its 66th meeting, held on 26 September 1949, considered the request of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the inclusion in the agenda of the item:

"'Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-power pact for the strengthening of peace.'

"The General Committee recommends that this item be included in the agenda and that it be allocated to the First Committee."

The recommendation of the General Committee was adopted.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 29 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fourth session: report of the General Committee (A/1004)

1. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the General Assembly to the report of the General Committee (A/1004), which read as follows:

"The General Committee, at its 67th meeting, held on 28 September 1949, considered the re-

quest of the delegation of the Republic of China for the inclusion in the agenda of the fourth session of the item:

"'Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from violations by the Soviet Union of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded on 14 August 1945 between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, and from violations by the Soviet Union of the Charter of the United Nations.'

"The General Committee recommends that this item be included in the agenda and that it be allocated to the First Committee."

2. Mr. TSIANG (China) said that his delegation was no less eager than any other to make a contribution to world peace and security and, with that end in view, to help to maintain an atmosphere of calm reasonableness in the Assembly. The General Assembly had been established in order to further important purposes common to all nations. Neither the Assembly, nor the United Nations as a whole, could gain in usefulness or prestige by ignoring such purposes. On the contrary, it was the duty of all loyal Members of the United Nations to settle their differences among themselves if possible and, if not, to submit them for the consideration of the Assembly and to abide by the recommendations of that body.

3. Accordingly, as a loyal Member of the United Nations, China had requested the addition of a new item to the agenda of the fourth session. It should be made clear from the outset that the question proposed by the Chinese delegation was not a matter between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists. It was a matter between the Chinese Government and the Government of the Soviet Union.

4. In that connexion, Mr. Tsiang wished to correct a misrepresentation which had been assiduously fostered in certain quarters. At the meeting of the General Committee held on 28 September¹, Mr. Vyshinsky had tried to insinuate that the Chinese delegation's request for the inclusion of the new item had been instigated by the United States. That insinuation was false; in the matter under discussion China had taken the initiative of its own free choice and decision. Mr. Tsiang wished to stress that fact because he feared that the members of the Assembly who were well aware of the historic friendship between China and the United States might give credence to such an insinuation. Certain pertinent facts concerning that friendship should be borne in mind.

5. The friendship between China and the United States was fully recognized by the Chinese people. Mr. Tsiang wished to draw the attention of the Assembly to the most recent manifestation of that friendship. In the recent war against the Japanese aggressor, the United States had given China generous and effective help. That assistance had been given unconditionally. As a prior condition, the United States had not asked China for a port, large or small, naval or commercial. It had not asked for a railway or half a railway. During the period of military operations against the Japanese in China, the United States forces, from commanders down to common soldiers, had at all times been friendly and helpful. Upon completion of their task, they had returned to their own country without removing a single piece of machinery or other property which properly belonged to China. That was a clear demonstration of friendship of which the Chinese people were well aware. Neither the remarks of Mr. Vyshinsky nor false propaganda could obliterate that awareness from the minds of the Chinese people.

6. Nevertheless, the friendship between China and the United States had in no way influenced the initiative taken by the Chinese delegation in submitting the new item for the Assembly's agenda. It could not be overemphasized that that action had been taken freely, by a free decision on the part of the Chinese Government.

7. Inasmuch as the current meeting of the Assembly had been convened for the purpose of deciding whether or not to accept the recommendation of the General Committee, the discussion would in fact be entirely procedural. Mr. Tsiang therefore felt that for the time being it would be out of place for him to go into the substance of the question. After the Assembly had decided to include it in its agenda, there would be ample opportunity for the Chinese delegation to present its case and for the USSR delegation to do likewise. However, certain facts warranted a brief explanation.

8. On 14 August 1945, the Chinese Government had concluded with the Government of the Soviet Union a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, together with a series of annexed agreements which formed an integral part of that treaty. The treaty and the agreements had been concluded in fulfilment of the Yalta Agreement of 11 February 1945 and, under their terms, the two contracting parties had assumed definite obligations towards each other.

9. In the first place, they had agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and not to intervene in each other's internal affairs. They had further agreed to afford one another all possible economic assistance in order to facilitate and expedite the reconstruction and rehabilitation of both countries in the interests of world prosperity. In one of the notes implementing that principle of mutual assistance, the USSR Government had agreed to give China moral support and to assist it with military supplies, on the understanding that that support and assistance would be rendered exclusively to the National Government as the Central Government of China. The Government of the Soviet Union had also affirmed its respect for the complete sovereignty of China over Manchuria and had recognized the territorial and administrative integrity of that area. The agreement between the two Governments on the port of Dairen stated specifically that its administration would be Chinese.

10. The provisions of the treaty and the agreements were entirely in accordance with those of the United Nations Charter.

11. The Chinese Government deeply regretted that despite protracted negotiations, the Government of the Soviet Union had failed to honour its treaty obligations during the post-war period. Instead of giving China economic assistance, as provided in the treaty, the USSR army had removed a considerable part of the industrial equipment of Manchuria. Instead of giving moral support and military material aid to the Central Government of China, as specified in one of the agreements, the Soviet Union had given direct and indirect moral and material support to the communist insurrection in China. Instead of respecting China's sovereignty in Manchuria, the USSR Government had prevented the Central Government of China from using the port of Dairen and from setting up an administration there.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, General Committee, 67th meeting.*

12. Mr. Tsiang pointed out that he had enumerated only some of the Soviet Union's violations of the treaty and agreements of 1945. These violations were also violations of the principles of the Charter. The Chinese delegation would submit evidence to substantiate that claim in the appropriate Committee.

13. In conclusion, Mr. Tsiang regretfully observed that the representative of the Soviet Union had used impudent language when addressing the General Committee on the previous day. The Chinese representative did not intend to retaliate in kind. He felt it his duty to speak in a manner consistent with the dignity of the General Assembly and worthy of the cultural traditions of China. Nevertheless, he did not intend to allow himself to be overawed by the language which Mr. Vyshinsky might choose to use either in the Assembly or in the Committee.

14. Mr. CLEMENTIS (Czechoslovakia) remarked that the General Assembly was once again confronted with a provocative proposal. Despite the general feeling that the way in which the proposal was formulated was quite inadequate to warrant its inclusion in the agenda, and that its substance did not meet the conditions for inclusion, the usual majority in the General Committee had decided to transmit it to the Assembly.

15. The sole aim of the mover of the proposal was, according to the *New York Times* of 28 September 1949, to obtain a "moral and political judgment" from the Assembly on China's case. What kind of judgment was the General Assembly expected to pronounce on the policy of the Kuomintang Government? Did the mover of the proposal wish to give still greater publicity to the State Department's White Paper on United States relations with China? Mr. Clementis quoted from the report by General Stilwell appearing in the White Paper, which concluded with the words:

"I believe he [Chiang Kai-shek] will only continue his policy of delay, while grabbing for loans and post-war aid, for the purpose of maintaining his present position, based on one-party government, a reactionary policy, or the suppression of democratic ideas with the active aid of his Gestapo."

16. If the proposal were to be considered from that aspect, a useful and instructive discussion might ensue on the development of events in China, on the wonderful resurrection of the great Chinese people and the well-earned victories of the Chinese people's armies, which were on the way to liberating the whole of China from its external and internal enemies.

17. If the moral aspect of the matter were to be raised, it would be possible to quote from comments in the British and American Press on the corruption, robbery and destruction accompanying the flight of the Kuomintang armies and the disciplined and orderly conduct of the Chinese people's armies. Indeed, the history of the previous year's struggle of the Chinese democratic forces deserved to be widely known, and a discussion on those lines would offer an excellent opportunity to achieve that end.

18. However, even questions concerning events of such great importance and instructive value could not be included in the General Assembly's

agenda if they failed to meet the conditions for inclusion laid down in the Charter.

19. The references of the Kuomintang Government's representative to threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace in the Far East were farcical. It was well known that, after hundreds of years of struggle against European, Japanese and United States imperialists, China was at last becoming really independent, thanks to the victories of the Chinese people's armies. China's territory would be cleared of foreign concessions and other humiliating factors which had reduced its sovereignty. As to the question of peace in the Far East, the Assembly could trust the words and deeds of the representatives of the real China, who had already declared their adherence to the camp of peace.

20. The attempt to link the total bankruptcy and moral decomposition of the so-called Nationalists in China with alleged violations by the Soviet Union of the treaty between the USSR and China and of the United Nations Charter was a revealing demonstration of the mental capacities of what was, in China, a disappearing world. It was common to speculate on the fear of communism and the witch-hunting psychosis; but such speculation had been absurdly overdone in the case under discussion.

21. Mr. Clementis recalled that, at the third session of the General Assembly¹, the Chinese representative had attempted to make insinuations against the USSR in connexion with the events in China. He had asserted at that time that the Soviet Union had sent to the aid of the Chinese people's army some 50,000 Japanese prisoners of war. That allegation had been so obviously untrue that even the most fervent enemies of the USSR had been unable to support the Chinese representative. The insinuations brought before the General Assembly at the moment were more vague but equally absurd. Was the Kuomintang representative going to allege that it was the Soviet Union which had supplied arms to the Chinese people's armies when it was known to all that it had been the United States which had done so, with the Kuomintang acting as intermediary?

22. The agenda of the current session of the General Assembly included an item dealing with the most vital contemporary problems, namely, the USSR proposals on condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-Power pact for the strengthening of peace (226th meeting). The inclusion in the agenda of the Chinese proposal would merely add to the number of items introduced for purposes of provocation.

23. Mr. BEBLER (Yugoslavia) considered that what was happening in China was the conclusion of a series of events which had begun almost a quarter of a century earlier. It was doubtless the result of a deep-rooted popular movement which the world had been able to observe in all its phases, from the peasant rebellion in southern China in 1926 and 1927, the creation of freed territories, the great march of the Chinese people's army from the south to the north in 1932, the creation of the great free territory of the north and the heroic struggles of the people's army

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, 194th meeting.*

against the Japanese occupiers, to the growing popularity of that army by reason of its contribution to the liberation of the country and the triumph of the United Nations. The last phase, which had been in progress since 1947, was the victory of the people's army over the forces of the Government of Chiang Kai-shek, supported by foreign Powers, especially by the United States.

24. China was the scene of a popular liberating revolution, similar to the great revolutions which were milestones in the history of civilized peoples—the English revolution of the seventeenth century, the American revolution, also known as the War of Independence in the eighteenth, the great French revolution at the end of that same century, the European revolution of 1848, the great Russian revolution of 1917 and the Yugoslav revolution of 1941-1945. All those revolutions had been phenomena resembling natural physical convulsions governed by the immutable laws of nature.

25. The question was what attitude the United Nations should take towards an event of the kind.

26. It was quite obvious that any action taken against the people's movement for liberation would be tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of China. It would also be a great blunder, for it would mean intervening in a struggle which was at the same time ideological, inasmuch as the great Chinese popular movement had its own ideology. To intervene in such a struggle, against the great Chinese popular movement, would mean intervention in the contemporary ideological struggle on the side which opposed Marxism. Such a step would be particularly dangerous, since it would prepare men's minds for the possibility of a great war which, in existing circumstances, could be only a world war.

27. Mr. Bebler ended by saying that the Yugoslav delegation considered that it would not be proper to agree to the inclusion in the agenda of the item proposed by the delegation of China.

28. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) regretted the fact that the General Committee had recommended to the General Assembly the inclusion in the agenda of the item proposed by the Kuomintang Government. In his opinion, all true friends of the United Nations should join him in deploring that the majority had associated itself with the proposal of the representative of the Kuomintang Government. An extremely serious decision was involved.

29. The representative of the Kuomintang Government had not even taken the trouble to present facts or considerations which could have served as a basis for his complaint. Mr. Vyshinsky had already drawn the attention of the General Committee to that point at its 67th meeting. He had said that a paradoxical situation had arisen; it was enough for the representative of any country or delegation whatsoever to submit a proposal supported by mendacious and defamatory statements for his claims to be automatically accepted and for his complaint to be included in the agenda of the General Assembly. That was a somewhat original way of establishing an agenda and of submitting to the Assembly items in which no one so far had been able to find any meaning. First the proposal was accepted and included in the agenda, whether or not it corresponded to the

facts; it could be seen subsequently whether it really had any basis in truth. Instead of beginning by setting forth the facts and arguments which might justify the inclusion of the item in the agenda, members were asked to decide *a priori* that such and such a country was justified in registering its complaint and in launching accusations against another country. Evidence would not be supplied until later and then, of course, if such evidence was deemed inadequate, the item would be rejected.

30. In the General Committee, Mr. Vyshinsky had emphasized the fact that the broad statements made by the representative of the Kuomintang in no way enabled members to decide on the substance of the question. Thus, for example, it had been said that the Soviet Union had prevented the setting up of a Chinese administration in Dalny (Dairen). Since the representative of the Kuomintang had not presented any facts which might confirm his thesis, Mr. Vyshinsky could reply only by equally general statements; he could say only that the whole accusation was false, that it had been made solely for purposes of provocation, since the allegations were unfounded and since no facts had been produced in support of them. With all due respect to his colleague, Mr. Vyshinsky was obliged to say that in the circumstances it was impossible for him to state that it was at such and such a point that the Kuomintang representative had distorted the facts or that it was such and such an event that he had falsified. He might have been able to say that at a particular point the representative of the Kuomintang had not told the truth; he could not do so, however, because he was reduced to mere conjecture concerning the nature of the facts which the representative of the Kuomintang intended to put forward in explanation of his complaint.

31. If the item were included in the agenda, an extremely dangerous precedent would be created. The Assembly would be establishing a tradition of automatism based, not on the merits of the cases submitted to it, but on political considerations or, more specifically, on hostility towards the Soviet Union. If any one was to be slandered, that country was the obvious victim. The question would be included in the agenda and evidence would be furnished later. In civil law that procedure would be equivalent to haling an individual before the bar and furnishing proof of his guilt at a later date. It was not by chance that the Special Committee on Methods and Procedures of the General Assembly, in the new draft rule¹ which was under study by the Sixth Committee and which would subsequently be submitted to the Assembly, recommended that the authors of any proposal for the inclusion of an item in the agenda should submit an explanatory note. That was the only way to protect States Members of the United Nations against false accusations and to enable them to defend themselves against vilification. And vilification was certainly involved in the matter under discussion, for Mr. Vyshinsky had not the slightest idea to what facts the representative of the Kuomintang was referring when he stated that the Soviet Union had prevented China from setting up its administration in Dalny.

32. If he were to reply regarding the substance of the matter, Mr. Vyshinsky could argue on the

¹ See document A/937, paragraph 17.

basis of notes of the USSR Government and statements of that Government published in the Press. In December 1945, and again in January 1946, the USSR Government had assured the then existing Kuomintang Government that it was prepared to co-operate in the establishment of a Chinese administration in Dalny. The Soviet Union had shown itself willing to provide all the necessary co-operation to the Mayor of Dalny as soon as that official was designated by the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government had informed the Soviet High Command that the Mayor of Dalny had been appointed but, in fact, that official had never arrived on the scene.

33. A special Chinese mission headed by General Tung Yang-pin had visited the region of Dalny and the naval base of Port Arthur. That mission had received full co-operation from the USSR authorities, but its visit had produced no results because the Kuomintang Government had not been in a position to establish a Chinese administration in Dalny as proposed by the Soviet Union. There were numerous documents to substantiate those facts. But perhaps the representative of the Kuomintang Government had something else in mind; perhaps at a given moment he would without any warning produce new allegations. Mr. Vyshinsky must be in a position to know the basis of those allegations.

34. He could state, for example—if his Government considered it necessary for him to continue to deal with that miserable affair—that immediately before leaving Port Arthur, General Tung Yang-pin and Mr. Chang Hsiang-fai had stated in conversations with the official representative of the USSR that they were completely satisfied with the co-operation they had received from the Soviet Union Command. All that proved the absurdity of the statements of the representative of the Kuomintang Government. Mr. Vyshinsky had just referred to documents which dated back to 1945 and 1946. Not one of those documents had been disputed heretofore and yet, almost five years later, an attempt was being made to use them for slanderous purposes.

35. He could dispose of the other accusations of the representative of the Kuomintang Government in the same way as he had disposed of that concerning Dalny.

36. The USSR was certainly not troubled by the calumnies of the so-called Kuomintang Government, a Government which was in the process of disintegration, as indicated by its best friends and stated in the United States White Paper. There was no reason to question the part of that document which dealt with the disintegration of that Government, and the representative of the Kuomintang would probably not attempt to do so.

37. Although, however, the so-called Chinese question was of minor interest to him, Mr. Vyshinsky could not fail to react strongly to any attempts to make the Assembly adopt methods which would not serve the cause of the United Nations. There were, for instance, people who claimed that the question was already included in the agenda. If that were so, it would be sufficient for any representative to make the most slanderous allegation for that charge to be automatically included in the agenda.

38. Methods of that kind would constitute a gross violation of the principles of co-operation

on which the United Nations rested. If such methods were applied, the Organization would soon be transformed into a political instrument pursuing sinister ends which had no connexion with the aims and principles of the Charter. Far from increasing the prestige of the Organization, such methods would weaken it and perhaps even deprive it of all authority.

39. The representative of the Kuomintang was well aware of the inadmissible character of his methods and was therefore trying to insinuate that the USSR had violated its treaty of 14 August 1945 with China. He was constantly promising to submit the facts but did not do so.

40. The Assembly was called upon to decide whether or not it would examine the item. It could not make such a decision without looking, however superficially, into the substance of the question. The Assembly must ascertain whether the arguments put forward were sufficiently in accordance with the facts to warrant the consideration of the question.

41. It was necessary to ask how the General Assembly had come to find itself in a position where the Kuomintang Government was able to submit its complaint. Mr. Vyshinsky asserted that neither the representative of that Government nor its champions who were present in the Assembly could conceal the true motives of that step.

42. The Kuomintang representative had spoken of China's long tradition of civilization and had protested against the terms used by the representative of the Soviet Union in the General Committee. Everybody was familiar with the age-old civilization of China; Mr. Vyshinsky would come back to that point at a later stage. He must, however, warn the representative of the Kuomintang that he would call things by their proper names. He would clearly label every slander, provocation and lie. He would not tell the polite representative of the Kuomintang that he was distorting the truth; he would tell him that he was uttering mendacious slander against the Soviet Union. He would tell him that he was engaged in a campaign of provocation which would ruin every possibility of co-operation within the United Nations and that to attain his objective he did not shrink from besmirching the country where democracy and socialism held sway; that, furthermore, he was taking the opportunity to slander his own people, the Chinese people, who had driven him and his Government from the greater part of their territory and who certainly did not consider him their representative. The representative of the Kuomintang should remember that hypocrisy was always unmasked in the end.

43. The real motive behind the submission of the Chinese complaint was the desire of the Kuomintang to deceive public opinion at home and throughout the world and to place the blame for its failure on the alleged interference of outside forces in the internal affairs of China. The whole world knew, however, that the real responsibility for the current situation in China rested with the Kuomintang and its inherent shortcomings.

44. According to the Kuomintang representative, the shameful bankruptcy of the Kuomintang militarists was due to the interference of the Soviet Union in the internal affairs of China. That

allegation could hardly be taken seriously. There had been other, genuine, attempts to interfere in Chinese affairs, attempts by means of those 3,000 million dollars, those arms and other equipment which had been placed at the disposal of a Government hated by the Chinese people. Was it not true that those attempts had been made by Governments whose attitude was worthy of the highest praise? Those same Governments had explained their policy in the thousands of pages that made up the White Paper. That was a clear case of officially admitted intervention, a direct intervention in the Chinese struggle between the people and the reactionary elements. That intervention had contributed to the support of militarists and feudal lords, who fought against Chinese workers, peasants and intellectuals while the latter fought under the flag of democracy and equal rights for the independence and sovereignty of their country. The White Paper showed the sad consequences of that intervention. That was surely excellent proof of the fact that a revolution could not be imported from one country to another and that such disputes as those which were being settled in China could not be resolved by foreign intervention.

45. It was ridiculous to attribute to the USSR the success of the Chinese people in its struggle against a corrupt régime. All corrupt régimes were fated to follow a process as inevitable as a chemical process; they dissolved and disappeared to make way for new forces which stood for democracy and independence.

46. Mr. Vyshinsky would have occasion to return to the revelations of the White Paper, of which he perhaps exaggerated the importance. He would certainly have occasion to do so, because he had not the slightest doubt as to the result of the vote which was about to take place. He knew that, as a matter of routine, and also through a secret desire to harm the Soviet Union, many delegations would vote in favour of the Kuomintang representative's proposal.

47. The real reasons for the bankruptcy of the Kuomintang, the responsibility for which Mr. Tsiang was trying to lay on other countries, and primarily on the USSR, were obvious.

48. The *New York Times* of 8 September contained a statement by Mr. Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, to the effect that the chief of the Kuomintang Government had fled to Formosa, deserting the Chinese people and absconding with 138 million dollars in gold which belonged to China.

49. Mr. Vyshinsky drew attention to part of the covering letter under which Mr. Acheson, the United States Secretary of State, had transmitted the White Paper to President Truman. That letter indicated that, according to several observers, the Kuomintang Government had sunk into corruption, while its supporters fought among themselves for high positions, hoping that the United States would win the war for them and keep them in power. The observers in question were afraid that the Nationalist Government would thus isolate itself from the people and become incapable of maintaining its authority in the period following hostilities. According to the same letter, the tension provoked by the war had drastically weakened the few democratic elements within the Kuomintang Government and had

strengthened the reactionary group. Mr. Acheson added in his letter that the mass of the Chinese people were coming more and more to lose confidence in the Government. Thus it was clearly indicated that the cause of the Kuomintang Government was lost. Mr. Acheson stated that during the Second World War, Chiang Kai-shek had in fact ceased to fight against the Japanese imperialists in the belief that the United States would finally conquer Japan and that the time was ripe to improve his position with a view to the decisive struggle against the Communists. Events had shown that that assertion was true. If it were so, however, what explanation was there for the fact that the United States had continued to assist the despotic Kuomintang régime which General Wedemeyer himself, in the report included in the White Paper, had accused of corruption and of using arbitrary police measures?

50. All those facts were surely enough to show the true nature of the group which was slandering the Soviet Union, and to prove to what extent they despised the moral traditions and political beliefs born of an old civilization, to which the Kuomintang representative had referred in the Assembly.

51. Mr. Vyshinsky went on to refer to an article which had appeared in the *New York Times* on 24 April 1949 under the heading: "Climax in China". He was quoting the *New York Times* again because that newspaper contained so much information on the topic. The article in question indicated that after twenty years of Kuomintang Government, the population of Nationalist China was demoralized. As a result of the inflation, the average Chinese was unable to obtain the bare essentials of life. Corruption was sapping the country's strength. During the preceding three years, the United States had given the Nationalists 3,000 million dollars in the form of military and other assistance. Of the 2,000 million dollars spent on military assistance to the Kuomintang, 90 per cent, at the final estimate, had passed into the hands of the Communists. The Communists, the article added, should be very grateful to the United States for the thousands of millions of dollars it had given to the Kuomintang. Mr. Vyshinsky asked whether it could truly be said that the USSR was responsible for that situation, and that it was the USSR which had encouraged the United States to supply arms to the Kuomintang, well aware that those arms would go directly to the Communists. The same article stated that United States supplies passed into the hands of the revolutionary people's army so swiftly that the Communists had a sobriquet for Chiang Kai-shek. They called him supply sergeant Chiang. And that was how Chiang Kai-shek, the supply sergeant, had supplied arms to defeat Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo.

52. The *New York Herald Tribune*, also, had stated on 16 April 1949 that Mr. Acheson was convinced that the Chinese Communists were capable of overrunning the whole of China. Such an assertion appeared to Mr. Vyshinsky to be reasonable. According to certain estimates, 80 per cent of the United States war material sent to China was currently in the hands of the Communists. A radio communiqué had said that 400 American tanks had driven past in the parade of the Communist forces on the anniversary of the revolution of national liberation. It was not the

Soviet Union which, incidentally, possessed, as was known, quite good tanks, that had supplied those arms to the Communists.

53. So much, therefore, for the alleged interference of the USSR in China's internal affairs and for the help it was supposed to have supplied to the Chinese Communists. It had even been said that the Communists would have been sorely in need of that help, whereas, in point of fact, they had found a far easier source of supply in Chiang Kai-shek and his American contractors.

54. Mr. Vyshinsky did not mean to imply any criticism of the United States in speaking as he did. He was merely noting the historical facts and using as a basis a document published by the State Department itself, namely the White Paper.

55. What, then, was the position of the Soviet Union in the matter? What of its interference in China's internal affairs, its disregard of the United Nations Charter, its violation of its treaty of 1945 with China? What of the threat which, according to the representative of the Kuomintang, the USSR represented to the national independence and territorial integrity of China? It was surely clear from what Mr. Vyshinsky had said that the Kuomintang complaint was nothing more than a mere political manoeuvre and that the Government of the Kuomintang had certain aims which had no connexion with the aims and principles of the Charter and which were quite unrelated to the motives it claimed to invoke in the Assembly? That Government was making a desperate effort to prove that, despite circumstances, it could still be of some use to the forces of reaction and aggression in their fight against the forces of democracy and progress.

56. Mr. Vyshinsky had gone into the question at some length only because he considered that the position should be clarified immediately and that no cause for misunderstanding should be left.

57. For the reasons he had just stated, Mr. Vyshinsky was categorically opposed to any attempt to oblige the Assembly to examine the slanderous complaint made by the Kuomintang. He found some cause for anxiety in the fact that the representative of the Kuomintang was not alone in taking such action. As had already been rumoured and as it was not difficult to guess, there had been much intrigue surrounding that question and the Kuomintang had raised the problem with the blessing of other Powers. Mr. Vyshinsky considered it his duty to warn his colleagues in the General Assembly who might fall victims to the intrigue which was being plotted off-stage. They were really being asked, in the name of the losing Chinese militarists, to take part in a vile and gross provocation.

58. The USSR felt it its duty to declare that such methods would do nothing to raise the prestige of the United Nations. On the contrary, to accept the Kuomintang's proposal would serve only to encourage attacks against the Soviet Union, the State which was the bulwark of peace, democracy and progress.

59. Mr. WIERBLOWSKI (Poland) said he thought the recommendation transmitted by the General Committee to the General Assembly was indeed extraordinary. It implied, in fact, the existence of a threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to peace in the Far East. The cause, it was claimed, was a

violation by the Soviet Union of its treaty of 1945 with China and of the Charter of the United Nations. The Polish delegation was of the opinion that neither the request for inclusion in the agenda, nor the efforts of its author to justify it, contributed to a clarification of the position. All that could be said was that the internal situation in China was involved. The solution of such a crisis was a matter for the State concerned, and did not fall within the competence of the United Nations.

60. The history of recent years in China was one of internal struggle. The existing Government had rapidly lost all credit with the people and had advanced along the road to complete failure. Having failed in their military efforts in China, Chiang Kai-shek's supporters had decided to engage in battle at Lake Success. In the circumstances Mr. Wierblowski was induced to ask on whose behalf had the question been raised. Was it really the Chinese people who asked the General Assembly to interfere in their domestic affairs? It would appear that the answer might be in the negative.

61. The General Assembly had been seized of a charge of intervention; but it was impossible to discover the grounds on which that charge was based. The charge was the more astonishing since it was notorious that it was the Government of another Power that had long and systematically been interfering in the internal affairs of China; the Government of the United States had not even attempted to conceal its activities, of which the White Paper provided convincing proofs.

62. United States intervention in Chinese affairs had ended in an unprecedented failure. The sole purpose of the current proposal was to divert the attention of the world from the substance of the problem and to mislead public opinion.

63. It was difficult to speak of intervention by the USSR in China when that country had been the first Power freely to renounce its special rights and privileges in China in order that that country might become a partner, enjoying equal rights, in international relations.

64. The Government of the Soviet Union had scrupulously complied with all the clauses of its treaty of 1945 with China. It had fulfilled all its obligations as an ally during the war against the common enemy, Japan. Yet that had not prevented the Kuomintang Government from feverishly preparing an anti-Soviet pact, the Pacific pact, contrary to article 4 of the treaty between the Soviet Union and China.

65. In the face of such evidence, it was easy to see who was really threatening the peace in the Far East and who was violating the Charter of the United Nations.

66. Mr. Wierblowski could readily understand that the events which were taking place in China caused no pleasure to the representatives of the Kuomintang; but one had to bow to facts and recognize that an inevitable historical process of evolution could not be stopped. Corruption, nepotism, administrative incompetence and the police régime in China belonged to the past. The mixture of feudalism and a capitalism rotten from its outset had been swept away by the Chinese people. On that point, the Polish delegation was fully in agreement with Secretary of State of the United States who had described

the situation in China in an almost identical manner.

67. In those circumstances, the source of developments in China could not be sought outside China, for that would be to ignore the evidence.

68. The Polish delegation considered that there were neither formal nor factual reasons to justify consideration of the question raised by the representative of China. It therefore reiterated its appeal to the General Assembly to reject the General Committee's recommendation.

69. Mr. AUSTIN (United States of America) remarked that it would not be proper to discuss the merits of the proposed item at a time when the only question before the Assembly was whether that item should be included in the agenda. He, for one, had no intention of doing so. It was well known that the United States had always taken the position that any Member of the United Nations was entitled to bring before the General Assembly any matter falling within the scope of the Charter. That principle was expressed in the Charter.

70. It had been asserted that, before an item involving charges against a State was placed on the General Assembly's agenda, those charges must be substantiated. Such a practice, if adopted, would entail a complete reversal of the procedure of the General Assembly and of the obvious purposes of the Charter. The General Committee would then become involved in prolonged discussions on the substance of a question before it had been decided whether the question should be placed on the agenda.

71. It seemed astonishing that such a suggestion should come from the USSR delegation and its supporters, who had always claimed and exercised the right of placing any matter whatsoever on the agenda. Only a few days previously (226th meeting), the delegation of the Soviet Union had submitted proposals containing the gravest possible charges against the United States and the United Kingdom without offering a shred of evidence. Those proposals had been placed on the agenda (229th meeting); it was

curious, therefore, to hear the representative of Poland say that there was no room in the United Nations for slanderous or provocative proposals. Mr. Austin recalled that in the General Committee¹ his delegation had taken the position that even the USSR proposals should be included in the agenda, emphasizing, of course, that that attitude did not prejudice the United States views on the substance of the matter.

72. The item proposed by the delegation of China was obviously one of important international concern falling within the scope of the Charter. For that reason the United States had voted in favour of recommending that the item should be placed on the agenda, and would again vote for its inclusion.

73. Mr. SARPER (Turkey) reserved the freedom of his delegation to vote on the main issue as it considered proper in the light of subsequent developments in the debate. Only when the facts of the case had been presented and the various views expressed would the Turkish delegation find itself in a position to vote in conformity with its convictions. Mr. Sarper would therefore vote in favour of the inclusion of the item in the Assembly's agenda.

74. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the recommendation of the General Committee to include the item in the agenda.

The recommendation was adopted by 45 votes to 6, with 5 abstentions.

75. The PRESIDENT announced that the item proposed by the Chinese delegation had therefore been included in the agenda and that it would be allocated to the First Committee for consideration.

76. Mr. AZIZ (Afghanistan) explained that his delegation had abstained from voting on the inclusion of the item because it had not had time to receive instructions from its Government on the matter.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, General Committee, 66th meeting.

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Thursday, 20 October 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Election of three non-permanent members of the Security Council

1. The PRESIDENT stated that as the terms of office on the Security Council of Argentina, Canada and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would expire at the end of 1949, three new non-permanent members were to be elected.

2. He reminded the Assembly of the terms of Article 23 of the Charter, in accordance with which due regard should be paid in the election both to the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and to equitable geographical distribution. The Article further

provided that retiring members were not eligible for re-election.

3. In accordance with rule 84 of the rules of procedure, the election would be held by secret ballot and there would be no nominations.

4. Mr. VYSHINSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking on a point of order, thanked the President for reminding the Assembly of the rule contained in Article 23 of the Charter. The President was quite right to recall that under rule 84 of the rules of procedure no nominations were allowed in elections to the Security Council. Mr. Vyshinsky had no intention whatever of making any such nomination. He had asked to speak on a point of order simply to request the Assembly to take into account not only