

and trained to the military or other service of his Government from the cradle to the grave. When some States, knowing that there was at the moment no prospect of universal collective defence through the United Nations, attempted to remove or alleviate fear by banding together in a pact which would make possible at least some collective resistance against aggression, the attempt was branded as aggressive and contrary to the Charter. The repetition of that charge did not make it true, especially when it was made by those who had already worked out a whole network of treaties and alliances in eastern Europe, only a few of which had been registered with the United Nations.

139. If and when the United Nations could organize effective arrangements for defence against aggression on a universal basis, all other alternative and second-best arrangements would have to be scrapped. In spite of all obstacles, all efforts should be directed to that end. Until it had been achieved, however, collective force, on a narrower front, should be put behind the will for peace. The actions of the North Atlantic nations would be the best proof that their intentions were not aggressive. They were willing to accept that test; others would also be judged by their actions and not by their words.

140. That test could be applied, for instance, to the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Soviet Union (226th meeting).

141. The first proposal, by singling out two Member States for condemnation as warmongers, was obviously intended for propaganda and not for peace.

142. The second laid down, as the condition for prohibition of atomic weapons, a system of adequate and rigid international control. The majority in the Assembly had already translated those words into express conditions which represented the requirements for effective control and prohibition. If the USSR accepted those conditions, progress could be made in that most vital matter. If it did not, then its proposal did not achieve anything except, once again, in the field of propaganda.

143. The third proposal was an appeal to the Members of the United Nations—and especially to the permanent members of the Security Council—to settle differences peacefully. That specific obligation had already been assumed by all Member States by acceptance of the Charter. Furthermore, the inclusion of the words “the mighty popular movement . . . for peace and against the warmongers”, which had a peculiar meaning in the communist lexicon, seemed to bring that proposal also into the field of propaganda.

144. If the practice of introducing proposals for propaganda purposes persisted, the Assembly would find it difficult to make that contribution to peace which was so ardently desired. In spite of all obstacles, however, the task must be everlastingly continued. Only by so doing could there be maintained, in the minds and hearts of all peoples, faith in the United Nations as the best—possibly the only—hope for the prevention of a war, which, if allowed to occur, would engulf and destroy all mankind.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Flushing Meadow, New York, on Monday, 26 September 1949, at 3 p.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

General debate (conclusion): speeches by Mr. Bevin (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Mr. Padilla Nervo (Mexico), Mr. Manuilsky (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), Mr. Arce (Argentina), Mr. Henriquez Ureña (Dominican Republic), Mr. King (Liberia), Mr. Eban (Israel)

1. Mr. BEVIN (United Kingdom) recalled that in his speech to the General Assembly at the third session,¹ he had made it clear that the United Kingdom was disappointed with the progress of the United Nations. He felt that it might yet recover its original spirit, but he was bound to point out that the apparent incompatibility existing between the great Powers had made it impossible to find a satisfactory basis for a world peace structure. It was useless to nourish delusions; the facts must be faced.

2. The United Nations had been created to achieve universality. That had been the concep-

tion behind the League of Nations, but it had never been achieved. It had been confidently assumed that if the great Powers could, in spite of their widely differing economic systems, find a basis upon which they could co-operate, there would be a reasonable chance of succeeding in giving effect to that principle of universality. He had come to the current session with a slight hope that in the course of it the General Assembly might take a step forward in that direction. The speech the USSR representative had made at the 226th meeting, however, could scarcely be called encouraging or likely to help in the achievement of that objective. It must be remembered that unless there was a firm universal foundation based on understanding between the five great Powers, there was little chance of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the subordinate agencies proving effective.

3. Scarcely any problem which had been referred to the organs or to the subordinate agencies of the United Nations had been approached or dealt with in an objective way. The hopes of the United Nations had been given a grave set-back by Mr. Molotov's speech during the Assembly in 1946, in which he had described what he called

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part I, 144th plenary meeting.*

the two tendencies.¹ It had been clear, from that speech, that one section of the United Nations was firmly convinced that the non-communist area of the world was bound to fall victims to its own contradictions, that no genuine co-operation would be received from the USSR Government. That had been borne out by events. Every step that had been proposed for the rehabilitation of the world, such as the Marshall Plan, any scheme devised to raise the standard of life throughout the world, such as that of assistance to under-developed countries, had met with virulent and abusive propaganda of the kind to which the world had become accustomed.

4. Sooner or later, however, people would learn that things were not inevitable in the world. The great slump of 1929 would not inevitably recur. Mr. Bevin was convinced that the prophets of disaster and doom would be disappointed. A large area of the world had learned to co-operate; it had profited by past experience and was consciously resorting to measures to counteract the operation of blind forces. As Mr. Acheson had said (222nd meeting), the conscience of the world was developing, and it was realized that universal co-operation could and did produce better results than could be attained by merely waiting for world collapse. The United Kingdom was consciously planning, thinking and trying to work out schemes to avoid the devastating and blind operation of economic forces visiting doom upon the people.

5. One of the handicaps of the United Nations had been the refusal by certain Powers to abide loyally by its decisions, but in spite of that some achievements had been realized during the previous year. The United Kingdom was happy to be able to note some improvement in the situation in Greece. It was to the credit of the Assembly that it had made tremendous efforts, session after session, to try to reach a solution of the problem of Greece, and Mr. Bevin was convinced that the whole world realized that the promotion of civil war anywhere, or interference from outside, was contrary to all the principles of the United Nations. At the meetings of the Security Council in London in 1946 it had been made quite clear that Greece must be allowed to settle its own affairs and develop its own institutions in its own way. The United Kingdom delegation was grateful to President Truman and his Government and to the Congress of the United States for the generous assistance which they had extended to Greece when its independence and integrity had been seriously threatened, as also for the timely help they had extended to Turkey when that country had been subjected to a war of nerves.

6. The efforts of the Greek people to maintain their free institutions, the sacrifices made by the Greek Army, the patience shown despite a flow of abusive language and propaganda, all evoked the same kind of admiration the United Kingdom had felt for Greece when, in the early days of the war, that country had faced the fascist hordes and when those who currently abused it had concluded a treaty of friendship with Hitler. Greece had paid a heavy price for liberty. It was to be hoped that it would henceforth be left alone in peace and would be free to hold elections without

interference. Mr. Bevin trusted that Greece would find it possible to be generous to those of its people who had been misled.

7. Greece had been a signatory to the five peace treaties signed in 1947. Unfortunately it still had no agreement with its neighbour, Albania. That little country had been used as a base for attacks on Greece. Mr. Bevin would urge Greece to settle its differences with all its neighbours in a spirit of conciliation. In that connexion, the United Kingdom Government was indebted to the Members of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, whose report² it had received and read. He would ask representatives to study chapter V of that report, which gave the conclusions of the Committee. The report was impressive in its impartiality, as also for its solemn condemnation of the conduct of certain Governments.

8. The General Assembly would be called upon to deal with the question of the former Italian colonies. The colonies had been under military occupation since 1943 and failure to arrive at a settlement had been a great obstacle to their political and economic development. The United Kingdom had had to operate a military occupation under the terms of the Hague Convention, and it was unfair to the people living in those territories to handicap them further by failure to decide the issue.

9. During the war, at the time of the great fight of the desert, when the United Kingdom had been almost alone, a solemn pledge had been made to the Senussi. That pledge must be honoured. In order that internal affairs might be carried on, a local administration had been established. That did not in any way prejudice the Assembly in dealing with the problem.

10. With regard to Eritrea, Mr. Bevin said that it was the British Commonwealth which had liberated that country and Abyssinia. At the second part of the third session of the General Assembly, after full consideration and study, the United Kingdom had made clear its attitude towards that problem and, although it had given further study to the whole problem, its position in principle remained the same. The United Kingdom Government supported Ethiopia's claim to Eritrea, except in regard to the Western Province. It was firmly convinced that, provided proper protection was assured to the Italian minority, a great step could be made towards peace in that area. There had already been co-operation between the Italians and the Ethiopians in trade and development, and there was evidence that if such co-operation were allowed to grow naturally, the whole community would benefit.

11. With regard to Italian Somaliland, the United Kingdom maintained the proposal it had submitted in the First Committee³ during the second part of the third session.

12. Turning to the question of Tripolitania, Mr. Bevin wished once more to make it quite clear to the Assembly that the United Kingdom had no desire to remain in that territory. His Government as the occupying Power was prepared to do anything it could in helping to reach a solution. The interests of the local inhabitants must be given full consideration, and it was greatly to be

¹ See *Official Records of the second part of the first session of the General Assembly*, 42nd plenary meeting.

² See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 8.

³ See document A/C.1/446.

hoped that there would be no delay in producing a solution to the problem.

13. Mr. Bevin would take the opportunity to deal with some of the reflections which Mr. Vyshinsky had made (226th meeting) upon the United Kingdom Government and other Governments in relation to the parts they had played in their foreign policies and in the promotion and conclusion of the Treaty of Brussels and the signature and organization of the North Atlantic Treaty.

14. The North Atlantic Treaty was one of the great events of history. The threatening language which had been used by Mr. Vyshinsky in his speech had been heard by the General Assembly year after year. It was a constant repetition of untruths, made in the hope that if they were reiterated often enough, someone would believe them.

15. Mr. Bevin said he had made it clear, during the debate at the third session of the Assembly, that if it were found impossible to proceed on a universal basis, as had been hoped, an attempt must be made to proceed with those who would co-operate. That conclusion had been reached because so much remained to be done as a result of the war, and it had been proved to be true.

16. The North Atlantic Powers were a community. They had a similar civilization. They all adhered to the basic principles of liberty and democracy. They did not rely on secret police. They believed in government by the people and for the people, uncontrolled by any dictatorship. It was therefore a natural development that those Powers should come together, but they had taken care to come together within the framework of the United Nations.

17. Mr. Bevin turned next to the question of Germany. It was a subject which had caused great concern during the third session of the Assembly and was still causing concern; it had a great bearing on the discussions which would take place during the current session.

18. The four great Powers had undertaken to bring about a peaceful Europe, and the United Kingdom Government had always striven to give effect to the undertaking. Before the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in 1947, it had given months of consideration to every facet of the situation in Germany. As a result, the United Kingdom delegation had placed before its colleagues on the Council of Foreign Ministers its proposals for a basis on which a peace treaty with Germany might be drawn up. It had been prepared, of course, to give full consideration to any other proposals that might be made on the subject.

19. Seven weeks had gone by, but the only response had been speeches similar to the one made by the USSR representative at the 226th meeting. That was not negotiation; that was not trying to find a solution; that was not doing business in international affairs. Ministers could not be expected to sit, week after week, month after month, simply to be abused and told that they were warmongers.

20. Prior to that meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Mr. Byrnes, then Secretary of State for the United States, had put forward a

draft treaty, the provisions of which were designed to contain Germany for forty years, and so to eliminate any possible danger of war or of conflict between the Allies within that period. Mr. Bevin asked all delegations to study the reply given to that proposed treaty by the Government of the Soviet Union and, by that reply, to test the sincerity of the proposals it had submitted to the Assembly at the 226th meeting.

21. Later, Mr. Marshall had brought forward his plan for the relief of Europe, and in London, in November 1947, had renewed his Government's offer of a treaty of disarmament. Once again, Mr. Bevin asked students of international affairs to study impartially the proceedings of those negotiations and then decide where the danger to the world peace really lay.

22. Credit had been claimed for the United Nations in the report of the Secretary-General¹ for the settlement of the Berlin incident. That was perhaps an over-simplification. The Assembly should consider where the initial responsibility for precipitating the crisis in Berlin lay. It had not lain with the United States, France or the United Kingdom. The entire world had been thrown into a state of apprehension by the action of the Government of the USSR, which had sought to use its power of blockade to starve two and a half million people and to bring pressure on the other three Allies. It could hardly be claimed that that action was in keeping with the proposals submitted to the Assembly at its 226th meeting. No one had known the intentions of the Government of the Soviet Union, or what incident it had been trying to provoke. The other three Powers had displayed much patience. For a whole year they had proceeded together to feed two and a half million people by air communications rather than submit to USSR pressure. They had done everything possible to settle the problem, including bringing it before the Security Council. The then President of the Council, Mr. Bramuglia, together with his colleagues, had made great efforts to find a way out. The solution they had proposed had been accepted by the Western Powers but it had been vetoed in the Security Council by the USSR representative.² In Mr. Bevin's opinion, the actions of the Government of the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin had been designed to persuade the world that that Government was prepared to risk war rather than be denied its objective, which was the complete and illegal control of Berlin. Only the determination of the Western Powers to combine to give effect to the principles of the United Nations in the face of that possible aggression had brought about a partial solution of the problem, which unfortunately had not yet been satisfactorily settled.

23. Looking back over the previous years, and re-examining the policy pursued in Europe, the question arose whether any other course could have been followed by the Western Powers. Greece had been threatened. Mr. Vyshinsky had visited Romania, abolished the Government and installed another under the domination of his Government. Bulgarian independence had been destroyed and the opposition leaders liquidated. In Hungary the freely elected Government had been undermined; in Poland no free elections had ever been allowed to take place, in spite of the

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 1.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council*, third year, No. 120.

undertaking given at Potsdam. Finally, in the Assembly where the great democrat, Jan Masaryk, had been a familiar figure, a reference must be made to the disappearance of everything that he and his father and President Benes had stood for in Czechoslovakia.

24. If all that was the price of peace, then in Mr. Bevin's view it was a very high one. Indeed, he would go further and ask whether it was really peace.

25. The Western Powers were fully aware of the USSR's intention to use its agents and the Cominform to upset the economy and political structure of every Western Power. It could not be denied that that was the deliberate policy of the Government of the Soviet Union. Could the Western Powers really be expected supinely to permit the development of that policy to lead to such results as had been seen in Czechoslovakia and in the other countries mentioned? If the USSR Government expected by such methods to convince the Western Powers of its sincerity, it was deluding itself. The Western Powers would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union; one step towards promoting confidence would be for the Government of that country not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

26. No country had more successfully carried out its imperialistic policy under a new disguise than the USSR. It had sought to create in each of the democracies a group charged to attempt disintegration and destruction, while at the same time it kept its own doors tightly closed because it could not permit the truth from the outside world to reach its people. Not only was no one in that country permitted to entertain an opinion which was unacceptable to the Government, but, behind those closed doors, the Government was pursuing a policy designed to ensure that words, in the minds of the people of the Soviet Union, should have a meaning directly contrary to their meaning for the rest of the world. Thus peace was apparently peace only when it produced results approved by the *Politburo*. The possessors of independent opinions were labelled warmongers. That produced some curious results. Markos, in Greece, as long as he had been approved, had been a peace-lover. The fact that he was fighting with foreign assistance against the duly elected Government of his country had been quite irrelevant. Suddenly, however, he had ceased to be peace-loving. Yugoslavia had also been peace-loving as long as it had found favour, but had become a warmonger overnight. The Chinese Communists were so far peace-loving; so were the North Koreans. But at any moment they might cease to be peace-loving and become warmongers. Czechoslovakia had become peace-loving overnight, in February 1948. The world knew that Czechoslovakia, in all its history, had never been anything but peace-loving. "Peace-loving", then, could be made a word of ill-omen, just as "warmongering" signified independence of Moscow.

27. There were many other verbal perversions. Religious freedom was interpreted to mean persecution, and civil liberty meant the rule of the secret police. All those whose duty it was to listen in the United Nations to the representatives of the Soviet Union were under no misapprehension. The USSR representative's recent speech

abounded in examples of such differences in the use of words.

28. It had been suggested that differences should be settled by mutual discussion. If that meant that in the future views were to be exchanged in a spirit of reasonableness and compromise, then on behalf of the Government and the people of the United Kingdom, Mr. Bevin would welcome it. For three years the United Kingdom had been trying to conclude a treaty with Austria. In the light of the new declaration, it seemed that a solution might be reached.

29. It was, however, difficult to reconcile that declaration with the language used in the note addressed by the Soviet Union to Yugoslavia. At the end of the note the following appeared:

"If this is so, then the USSR Government deems it needful to declare that it will not put up with such a position and will be forced to use other more effectual methods to defend the rights and interests of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia and to call to order the fascist violators who have gone too far."

30. Yugoslavia was an independent country and a Member of the United Nations. There was, however, nothing in the note to the effect that if a satisfactory solution was not reached, the matter would be referred to the United Nations. What it did say was that the Government of the Soviet Union alone would determine the instrument, and would use it. It said that that Government would use "more effectual methods". It was not known what those methods were. Would they endanger the security and integrity of Yugoslavia? More, would they endanger the peace of the world? Some unhappy events in history had begun in that part of the world. Was it the intention of the USSR to resort to some dastardly means? The meaning of the words was obscure. The United Kingdom Government had information, however, that troops had begun to move towards Yugoslavia.

31. A very dangerous situation existed which all regarded with apprehension. The matter did not solely affect the two countries. It was to be hoped that Mr. Vyshinsky's advice to other countries had been accepted by his own Government, and that the threat of force contained in the Soviet Union's note to Yugoslavia would be withdrawn. The situation strongly resembled that which had existed in Berlin when the United States, France and the United Kingdom had been in effect warned that they would be forced out of Berlin unless they submitted to USSR pressure. If the note were withdrawn, and, in the event that no settlement were reached between the parties concerned, if the question were submitted to the United Nations, that would represent an important practical contribution to the restoration of world confidence.

32. Turning to the question of China, Mr. Bevin said that the plea of the Chinese Government representative (223rd meeting) merited full consideration. He did not propose for the time being to discuss the details of the problems which it raised.

33. There had been many conquests of China but no conquerors. Each in turn had been absorbed by the Chinese people. Modern China, however, had been sorely tried. In 1931, it had suffered from Japanese aggression. When the Japanese had been defeated, civil war had divided the country. The United Kingdom Government

would watch events in China very closely, but judging by the speeches being made by the victorious leaders, slogans of the same kind as had been heard elsewhere were echoing through China. China might, after all, find itself in need of all the Members of the United Nations, and not only of one single country. Any attempt to create prejudice and hatred would not be in China's interests. The United Kingdom would make no attempt to interfere in the choice of government, but China had entered into certain international obligations which must be honoured, and a wise approach to the handling of those problems would be in the interests of the whole world.

34. Mr. Bevin made a short reference to Malaya, where circumstances were closely connected with those in China. There had been terrorism in that territory on similar lines. The local inhabitants had been struggling hard to restore their economy, and the United Kingdom had been collaborating and assisting, step by step, in the development of measures leading ultimately to self-government. Great strides had already been made, and it was a matter of great regret that the people were being kept in a state of apprehension, not by the revolt of any of the local population but by the instruments of an outside Power.

35. Mr. Bevin had taken careful note of the speech delivered by the Indian representative (222nd meeting). It had been, in his opinion, a very thoughtful speech, particularly in its references to self-government. The United Kingdom Government was, of course, very gratified to have been able to co-operate with the peoples of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma to bring about a transfer of power to over 400 million people in Asia, a major political operation carried out in a most remarkable manner and in good faith. Notwithstanding all the differences that had hitherto existed, the United Kingdom had been glad to be able to hand over a great civil service trained by the United Kingdom in the art of administration and an army well trained to keep order; the transfer of power had been carried out effectively.

36. The United Kingdom earnestly hoped that the difference between India and Pakistan would soon be finally resolved. Nothing would give greater joy to their friends. If that one difficulty were removed, it would help to expedite their economic development, so essential in that part of the world.

37. It was a matter of great regret to the United Kingdom Government that Ceylon, which was innocent of wrong of any kind, which had achieved its independence like India and Pakistan, had been denied the right to sit in the Assembly. It was in the interests of the United Nations that a way should be found whereby nations which fulfilled the conditions required for admission to the General Assembly should not be kept out by a veto.

38. Mr. Bevin wished to take the opportunity of congratulating the Economic and Social Council and its President, Mr. Thorn, on a very good year's work. Reading through the Council's report,¹ he had felt that its recent session had probably been the best it had held. In his opinion, the future success of the Council would depend to a great extent on the cutting out of less essential activities and concentration on really practical

ones which could be applied effectively and quickly. Confusion and loss of efficiency would result if the efforts of the Council were too diffused.

39. Turning to the question of atomic energy, he characterized as threadbare the accusation that the Atomic Energy Commission had failed to fulfil the task given to it by the General Assembly because of continuous attempts on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom to impose on the Commission a plan which was unacceptable to self-respecting nations. The facts were that, so far from having been imposed, the plan had resulted from several years' work in the Commission, in which, it should be remembered, nineteen Members of the United Nations had taken part at various times. All but two of the members of the Commission had accepted it in preference to the USSR plan. Both plans had been thoroughly examined and exhaustively discussed, and the Commission's acceptance of the plan in November 1948 had been endorsed in resolution 191 (III), adopted by no less than forty members of the General Assembly. Those forty members must feel flattered by the suggestion that they had been coerced into adopting a plan which no self-respecting nation could adopt.

40. The USSR was continually putting forward a plea for prohibition of the atomic weapon and perpetually seeking to blame the United Kingdom and others for failure to make prohibition a reality. That was an absurd charge; those nations were as anxious as any others for prohibition. The original declaration by President Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King, issued in Washington in 1945, had, in fact, called for the elimination of the atomic weapon, and General Assembly resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946 had repeated that call.

41. Since that time, a series of resolutions adopted by overwhelming majorities in the Atomic Energy Commission itself had emphasized that essential aim of the elimination of the atomic weapon. The United Kingdom and others had, however, recognized that effective prohibition depended on effective control of atomic energy. In common with others, it supported the plan approved by the General Assembly, because that plan would provide for effective control. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union had clung obstinately to the proposals for control which it had put forward in 1947² and which had been rejected over and over again as inadequate. It had continued to decry the plan approved by the Assembly. Mr. Bevin had listened to the USSR representative's speech at the 226th meeting with very great attention, and would like to know whether he was to understand that the Government of the Soviet Union was finally prepared to accept the decision of the United Nations. If that were so, then the decision must be put into effect.

42. It was not obstruction on the part of the United Kingdom or of those who thought as it did that had prevented agreement. Mr. Bevin would remind the Assembly that at the 226th meeting, on 23 September, the USSR representative had called for the "unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of appropriate strict international control". President

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 3.*

² See *Official Records of the Atomic Energy Commission, third year, Special Supplement, Third Report to the Security Council, Annex 3 (C).*

Truman's statement on the same day had emphasized the need for "truly effective and enforceable international control". The two statements appeared to advocate the same thing. If, then there was to be effective control, the means of inspection and of operating effective control must be open to the United Nations to carry out.

43. A further argument had been used, however, to the effect that the reason the Atomic Energy Commission's plan had not been accepted was that it interfered with independence and sovereignty. If, however, all nations were in danger from atomic weapons and wished to establish control, and if they placed control in the hands of a collective body, representing the world, then, up to that point, they would surrender their sovereignty in order to achieve effective control and in order to see to it that each one was treated fairly and that its position was secure. That was provided for in the plan adopted by the Assembly. It meant, therefore, that the USSR must raise its curtain and open the way to the system of control approved by the General Assembly, the system which the United Kingdom and the majority of the other nations believed in their hearts to be the only means that would ensure adequate security.

44. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, adhered to the original declaration which President Truman, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Mackenzie King had issued in Washington in November 1945, and it was ready forthwith to take all constructive steps to give effect to it.

45. It was being asserted, however, that a convention prohibiting the use of atomic weapons would in itself be enough, and the argument had been advanced that the use of gas during the Second World War had been prevented by the existence of the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare, signed in Geneva in 1925. In that connexion, Mr. Bevin drew attention to the fact that no provision had been made in that Protocol for enforceable inspection. Such inspection had certainly never been applied, and in the course of the war it had become known to the United Kingdom Government, as it had to the USSR Government, that the Germans were producing gas. It had been feared that they would use it and, indeed, they had come near to using it. In the very critical days of the war, Generalissimo Stalin had received the same information and had requested the United Kingdom Government to issue an announcement that, should the Germans resort to the use of gas, the United Kingdom would retaliate to the fullest possible extent. The United Kingdom had agreed to do that and the announcement had been made. The United Kingdom had proceeded to speed up the production of gas in order to be able to retaliate in the event that Germany resorted to gas warfare. That situation had arisen largely because there had been no provision in the Protocol for inspection. It was an ineffective Protocol, because its implementation had been left to the discretion of the respective Governments. The atomic weapon was such a terrible weapon of destruction that any nation which really wanted to put an end to it could readily agree to inspection in order to satisfy every citizen of the world that a convention on atomic warfare was really effective.

46. The United Kingdom had approached all those problems on the basis, first, of collective security; secondly, of disarmament with inspection; thirdly, of enforceable control.

47. In conclusion, Mr. Bevin asserted that, notwithstanding disappointments in those great problems, the United Nations had performed a great task. The world Organization could not be built in a day or a year, but it would grow. One of its great advantages was the opportunity it offered for debate and open discussion of different approaches to world problems. All those annual events, all those agencies which were confidently created, were gradually helping to develop in the minds and hearts of the peoples of the world a greater understanding of the importance of international law, of the rule of law, of the moral acceptance of law, of the necessity for the adoption of a high standard of moral values in the enforcement of that law, and of the necessity for the universal adoption of optional clauses and for the willing acceptance of decisions, even if they were not quite to the liking of all.

48. In view of the magnitude of the problems involved, the United Nations might have to limit its scope in order to have greater success in the questions it sought to deal with. It had perhaps, in its enthusiasm, thrown its net a little too wide. It had perhaps attempted too much and achieved too little. Concentration on fundamental problems might be the way to make it more effective and more successful; that was a course which should be carefully studied.

49. Mr. Bevin was convinced that, in spite of frustrations, it was the people's will that the United Nations should go forward and not lose sight of the great objectives that man had always had before him: universal peace, universal brotherhood and the means to settle all disputes without resort to force.

50. Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico) said that the fourth session of the General Assembly was opening at a time when the international political atmosphere was decidedly calmer than that which had prevailed at the opening of the third session in Paris.

51. The event which had led to President Truman to make his speech of 23 September had stirred public opinion, even though the great Powers had doubtless already taken that event into account in their policies. It would not, therefore, affect the auspices under which the current session was opening.

52. The news should lead the Assembly to make a renewed effort at its current session to prevent an unbridled atomic arms race and open the way to the conclusion of an agreement for effective international control of atomic energy, since the very serious problems which had kept the world in a state of unrest since the end of the war were still unsolved and represented a grave threat to peace. The disputes or situations which had been brought to the Assembly's notice and which had disturbed or were likely to disturb international peace, had not progressed towards favourable solutions except where the great Powers had been in agreement, as had happened in the case of Palestine, of Kashmir and of Indonesia.

53. The problems on which the great Powers still held stubbornly opposed points of view, such as the international control of atomic energy, the regulation and reduction of armaments, the

organization of the armed forces of the United Nations and the admission of new Members, were still unresolved and had not progressed one step towards solution. Nor had it been possible as yet to create a propitious atmosphere of mutual trust in which those problems might be reconsidered without fear or suspicion.

54. How was it, then, that despite such obstacles and despite the continued existence of the unfavourable circumstances and events referred to, the opening of the fourth session of the General Assembly was marked by a more peaceful political atmosphere than that of the previous year? What influences had led to the relative slackening of international tension? What were its causes? How could the Assembly use the auspicious pause for the better achievement of its task?

55. The Secretary-General said in his annual report that the fear of war had decreased. The President of the General Assembly had made a similar statement (220th meeting), exhorting the Assembly to take advantage of the improvement by renewing its efforts on the lines of its resolution 190 (III), introduced by Mexico and unanimously adopted on 3 November 1948, which urged the great Powers to settle their differences by peaceful means.

56. Why could the fear of war be said to have decreased? Why were nations and Governments no longer facing current problems in an atmosphere of confused panic, but with coolness and a constructive attitude? The nature and operation of the causes should be analysed.

57. It was a fact that regional arrangements for co-operation and mutual aid had strengthened, in the nations concerned, the confidence in international brotherhood and had simultaneously reinforced the faith of each and all in their individual and collective capacities. Hence, alarm and despondency concerning the immediate future had lessened.

58. In addition, there could be no doubt but that the determining factor in that improvement in the international political atmosphere was the welcome fact that the great Powers had resumed their consultations and negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers, which had been suspended for eighteen months. That single fact, though seemingly unimportant, that direct contact among Powers, that entering upon the path which the Charter had indicated for the pacific settlement of disputes, meant that it was the intention of the great Powers to attune precept and practice and to listen to world opinion, which desired beyond all things that its faith in the principles of the Charter should be confirmed in everyday action.

59. The resumption of negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers and the efforts of the great Powers to come to terms regarding Berlin and with respect to the peace treaty with Austria, were the real cause of the relative improvement in the international situation; those facts showed the General Assembly the aim which it should pursue during the current session, and the use which it could and should make of the powerful moral influence of the United Nations.

60. Nobody failed to realize that the General Assembly, by unanimously adopting its resolution 190 (III), which appealed to the great Powers to increase their efforts toward peace, had exerted that moral influence with satisfactory results.

That resolution, in addition to having been a moderating factor which helped to decrease existing tension, had set in motion other conciliatory forces; it continued to be the expression of the unanimous will of the United Nations and a basis for further and more effective efforts towards international conciliation and the establishment of lasting peace.

61. Mr. Acheson, the representative of the United States, had told the General Assembly (222nd meeting) that his Government could be depended upon to contribute fully to the creation of the necessary conditions of confidence and, with their attainment, to play its full role in the regulation and reduction, under effective safeguards, of armaments and armed forces. He had added that the policy of the United States in that important matter was in full conformity with the General Assembly resolution 190 (III), which was aimed at securing the composition of differences among the major Powers and the establishment of lasting peace.

62. At the 225th meeting, Mr. Schuman, the representative of France, had said that although the Council of Foreign Ministers had failed to reach an agreement on Germany, it seemed to have opened the way to the conclusion of a treaty with Austria, a treaty which would make it possible to put an end to the military occupation of that country and to restore to it its real sovereignty. Thus at least in that respect, Mr. Schuman had continued, the wish expressed in resolution 190 (III), adopted by the General Assembly on the initiative of the Mexican delegation, and of which the President had appropriately reminded the Assembly in his opening speech, would be fulfilled.

63. The great Powers should persevere in that attitude, and the General Assembly, for its part, should help and encourage them to retain it, for thus alone would the world believe in progress, slow perhaps, but sure, towards the building of a world order of freedom, peace and well-being for all.

64. The Government and the delegation of Mexico reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations and their intention to co-operate in the everyday tasks and in the achievement of the noble purposes of the Organization.

65. The Government and delegation of Mexico were justly proud and greatly encouraged to note that their initiative, as embodied in a unanimous resolution of the General Assembly, had been the humble origin of a great moral force in the service of conciliation and peace.

66. Mexico was engaged on far-reaching domestic enterprises. Every year, thanks to government programmes which were carried out systematically, the realization of the people's aspirations reached new heights in the fields of labour, production, health and culture. In international relations, Mexico cherished no territorial ambitions and no plans for domination or for unilateral or unfair advantages; it could pride itself on the reward it received for that policy in the friendship and quiet confidence bestowed upon it by other nations.

67. Those circumstances had enabled Mexico to guide its activities in international bodies by the desire to serve the universal cause of peace, whose

triumph, as President Alemán had said recently, could be achieved neither by the intimidation of the weak by the strong, nor by the forced subjugation of peoples to ideological principles conflicting with their historical tradition.

68. Mr. MANUILSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that if the General Assembly had been impatiently awaiting the speech of the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, it was not because Mr. Bevin was an orator likely to electrify his audience but because, at the 226th meeting, the USSR had submitted proposals for the strengthening of international peace and security. For that reason, the Assembly hall had been crowded during Mr. Bevin's speech.

69. Mr. Bevin's speech had probably disappointed the Assembly, for it had had the same effect as the devaluation of the pound sterling after the Washington Conference. Mr. Bevin had been unable to give any consistent reply to the questions raised by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The reason was that the accusations against warmongers applied also to the United Kingdom.

70. Mr. Manuisky would not dwell long on that speech, which would probably be analysed in detail in the First Committee. It might, however, be asked what that speech contained in the way of precise and accurate information or factors corresponding to reality. It was sufficient to take any one of the questions raised by Mr. Bevin to see that he had distorted the truth.

71. For instance, there was the Greek question, concerning which Mr. Bevin had merely said that Greece was following its own road. That was a ridiculous assertion, for the whole world knew that since 1945 Greece had been occupied by foreign troops.

72. With regard to the question of Korea, the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would undertake to refute Mr. Bevin's allegations, in the same way as his unjustified assertions concerning Greece.

73. In regard to the situation in China, Mr. Bevin should consult the White Paper issued by the United States State Department, which refuted his arguments completely.

74. As for the question of disarmament, a mere perusal of the records of the General Assembly and of the Security Council showed that the Soviet Union's proposals for the reduction by one-third of the armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council had been systematically sabotaged by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. Whenever the Soviet representatives had proposed the reduction of armaments, they had been asked how that could be done without control and prohibition of the atomic weapon. When the same representatives had suggested prohibition of the atomic weapon and control of the production of atomic energy, the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States had objected that that could not be done without a reduction of armaments. When the Soviet representatives had proposed a solution to both difficulties, the reply had been a demand for guarantees. First of all, it had been said, peace treaties must be concluded with Japan and Germany and Article 43 of the Charter, concerning armed forces to be made

available to the Security Council, must be implemented. Nevertheless, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had known very well that the artificial structure they proposed to erect depended entirely on the Anglo-American bloc, and that the removal by them of one of those so-called guarantees would be enough to bring down the whole structure. That was what had happened, and the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would bring forward evidence in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee to show the absurdity of Mr. Bevin's allegations.

75. But that was not what the world expected of the General Assembly. World opinion awaited a reply to the Soviet Union's proposals. But Mr. Bevin distorted the truth by attributing dark political designs to the USSR and deliberately fomenting differences of opinion.

76. Moreover, it was not the representatives of Soviet Socialist Republics who had invented the existence of an economic crisis in the capitalist countries; that fact appeared in black and white in the United Nations report on the world economic position. Mr. Bevin need not try to persuade others that there was, and that there would be, no crisis. Mr. Bevin, who was probably less competent in economic affairs than in politics, had only to consult his own specialists to learn that crises were an integral part of the economic system which still prevailed throughout a large part of the world.

77. Mr. Manuisky then turned the proposals submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Soviet Union. Those proposals were an important contribution to the cause of the United Nations and should promote progress in establishing a sound and lasting peace. They were the Soviet Union's reply to the reckless policy of the imperialist reactionary forces that were trying to foment a new war; Mr. Manuisky was referring to the practical measures in preparation for war that were being taken by ruling circles in the United States and the United Kingdom, with the assistance of certain other Governments which followed them blindly, particularly Yugoslavia.

78. Since the end of the Second World War, the supporters of an aggressive policy in the United States had seen to it that industry in that country continued to work for war. The greatest scientific discoveries of humanity—atomic nuclear fission and the production of nuclear fuel—had immediately been utilized for military purposes and converted into enterprises paying high dividends. The adversaries of peace had prevented prohibition of the dreadful atomic weapon, and had opposed the establishment of strict and effective control of atomic energy.

79. The speech by Mr. Acheson, United States Secretary of State (222nd meeting), showed that the United States Government refused to implement the important General Assembly resolutions 1 (I) and 41 (I) of 24 January and 14 December 1946, which recommended that all States should eliminate the atomic weapon from their national armaments.

80. Unmindful of the lesson taught by the shameful defeat of Germany, which had aspired to world domination, the warmongers had started an armaments race unprecedented in history, setting aside the most substantial part of their budgets for military purposes. Aggressive circles

in the United States, motivated by the desire to enslave other peoples, had begun to organize military, naval and air bases throughout the whole world. Their principal aim was the encirclement of the Soviet Union.

81. While adopting economic and military measures in preparation for a new war, the enemies of peace had made every effort to establish political and military groups enabling them to wage war against the USSR with foreign troops on foreign soil. Among those groups were the western European bloc and the North Atlantic bloc. They were of a distinctively aggressive character, but the warmongers had endeavoured to pass them off as defensive alliances, regional arrangements such as those provided for in the Charter.

82. But even a person with the scantiest knowledge of political questions could perceive the fallaciousness of those assertions. The Charter provided for the conclusion of regional arrangements between neighbouring States and for purposes of defence. That was precisely the type of arrangement which the Soviet Union had concluded with its neighbours with a view to preventing an attack by Germany.

83. But the agreements concluded at the instigation of the Anglo-American ruling circles were of quite a different nature. Those agreements grouped together States in various parts of the world, and had been concluded not for purposes of defence but for purposes of aggression. They were directed against the USSR, a nation which had been an ally in the previous world war. Furthermore, on the pretext of forming a European union, the organizers of aggressive blocs intended to admit a rump State of western Germany, thus sanctioning the partition of Germany and utilizing that country for their aggressive purposes.

84. Even such an outspoken enemy of the Soviet Union as the reactionary United States Senator Taft had had to admit the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty was aggressive in purpose. The blocs directed against the USSR and created at the instigation of the aggressive Anglo-American circles divided the world, made normal economic relations difficult and added to the economic and political chaos in that part of the world where the system of private interests and profit was in force.

85. In addition to those plans which aimed at the establishment of their military domination over the world, the warmongers were developing plans for vast economic expansion designed to facilitate the execution of their military projects.

86. Those projects had found concrete expression in the notorious Marshall Plan, which selfishly exploited the misery which the peoples of Europe had been enduring since the war. Crafty United States politicians, on the pretext of aiding the countries of western Europe to stabilize their economy, had first sent to those countries useless war stocks. They had then flooded European markets with United States products in a deliberate attempt to paralyse the industrial production of those countries. The representatives of the Latin-American countries were perfectly aware of that situation, but had not the courage to state the fact in the forum of the United Nations.

87. The results of the economic impoverishment of the "Marshallized" countries of western Europe were very evident. Mr. Bevin should note the fact that the industrial production of those countries had not yet reached the pre-war level. In the *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics* of the United Nations it could be seen that, taking 1937 as the basic year, with 100 as the index, the industrial production of a country such as Greece was 83, that of Italy 96, that of Belgium 96, whereas in November 1948 that figure was 171 in Poland and 235 in Bulgaria.

88. In view of the economic stagnation and decadence in which the countries of western Europe were foundering, it was interesting to note the extent of the economic development of the Ukrainian SSR, which had suffered particularly from the enemy invasion. The industrial production of that country in 1946 had been 44 per cent higher than the previous year. There had been an increase of 32 per cent in 1947 and 43 per cent in 1948.

89. The report of the United Nations on the world economic situation contained other facts which Mr. Bevin could not overlook. Thus it stressed the fact that, in the first quarter of 1949, the number of unemployed in the countries of western Europe had increased by 100 per cent in comparison with the corresponding period of 1948. Commercial relations between the countries of western Europe had reached only 70 per cent of the pre-war level. Because United States products had invaded the European market, the foreign trade deficit of the western European countries with the United States had been 3,245 million dollars in 1948. Mr. Manuisky also requested the members of the General Assembly to read the report in order to see the heavy deficit in the balance of payments weighing on the countries of Latin America.

90. By means of so-called Marshall Plan credits and subsidies, the industrial and financial circles in the United States had succeeded in enslaving western Europe and had forced it to take part in their political and military manoeuvres. The warmongers had set in motion their entire propaganda machine in an effort to persuade the working masses that the policy of expansion and preparation for war was the best means of preventing the economic crisis. They asserted that the production of armaments would guarantee the masses full employment. But—and Mr. Manuisky hoped the representative of Canada would take particular note of those words—the social régime which forced men to eat bread soaked in their own blood and in the blood of others was doomed to disappear.

91. It was obvious that neither the arms race nor the Marshall Plan had saved the United States from an economic crisis; on the contrary, the United States, which was sinking irretrievably into an economic crisis, had dragged its satellites with it. It sought, as was clear for instance from the notorious currency agreement signed in Washington, to make its satellites bear the consequences of that crisis. The measures taken by the American monopolies were serving to disorganize still further the economy of the capitalist part of the world, to aggravate the disequilibrium in evidence there and to deepen the gulf dividing the rich capitalist countries from the

impoverished capitalist countries. The vast accumulation of wealth by a number of monopolies and the ruin of the greater part of the population of the globe were merely diminishing the capacity of the world markets and thereby producing a further contraction in trade.

92. All the evidence went to show that in a society based on private property, with maximum profits as the sole incentive, in a society where anarchy prevailed in production and where the main trends of economic life were determined by the monopolies alone crises were inevitable. In the light of such facts, events in the Soviet Union acquired increasing interest.

93. As was generally known, there neither were nor could be crises in that country. Statistics showed that the Soviet Union and the peoples' democracies were developing rapidly. The representative of the Soviet Union had already informed the General Assembly that gross industrial production in the USSR for the second quarter of 1949 had shown an increase of 20 per cent over the figure for the corresponding period of 1948. In June 1949 production had exceeded the 1940 level by 41 per cent. There had been an increase of 6 million hectares in the area under crops.

94. Such facts could of course be challenged, but it would be as futile as challenging the occurrence of storms at sea. The only difference was that modern meteorologists could forecast storms, whereas the American and British statesmen could forecast nothing and sought to solve the crisis only by preparing for new wars.

95. The United States had not suffered war on its own territory; it had not been invaded or bombarded; it had amassed vast profits during the war, in addition to the world's gold reserves. It was nevertheless advancing slowly but surely towards economic crisis. The USSR, on the other hand, presented a very different picture. It had suffered devastations unparalleled in history. It had sustained enormous losses in men and materials. It was nevertheless rapidly healing the wounds of war, restoring its economy by its own efforts and consolidating its position despite the bitter hostility of its one-time allies. In the face of the atmosphere of crisis in the capitalist world, it was engaged in expanding production at a rate of which capitalism at the height of its glory had never dreamed. Those facts were food for thought.

96. What Mr. Manuisky had said surely proved strikingly the vitality of socialism, its invincibility and superiority to the system known as private enterprise. It was irrefutable proof of the power of Lenin's and Stalin's creative thought, of their assertion that the imperialist régime was in the process of decay and contained the seeds of its own dissolution, whereas the socialist structure contained a strength against which none of the forces of reaction could avail.

97. Mr. Manuisky understood the warmongers. The reason they sought armed conflict, was that they were unable to deny glaring facts or to change the course of events; they succeeded only in entangling themselves further in their own contradictions.

98. It was useless for Mr. Bevin to argue that there was no crisis, that there was only a tem-

porary depression; the masses realized through their family budgets that a crisis did exist. Everybody knew what would be the consequences of the devaluation which the American monopolies had forced on the sterling area countries. According to figures furnished by the United Nations, the consumption of meat in most countries of western Europe during the first quarter of 1949 was only 60 to 70 per cent of the pre-war consumption. In all countries, and especially in those still under the colonial yoke, unemployment was increasing, living standards were falling, and ruin, poverty and hunger were spreading. The countries where the so-called private enterprise system prevailed were in a state of crisis and were preparing for a new war.

99. The people asked for peace but were offered war. The people desired international collaboration, but were presented with the North Atlantic Treaty. They wanted prohibition of atomic weapons and a reduction of armaments, but they were offered an arms race and the stockpiling of atomic weapons. They desired the strengthening of the United Nations, but they witnessed systematic efforts to strip that Organization of all real value.

100. In the circumstances, the USSR proposals for the strengthening of international peace and security was bound to be welcomed by all peace-loving people. The practical application of those proposals was the business of all true lovers of peace, regardless of their nationality, race or colour. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR warmly supported the proposals of the Soviet Union.

101. Those proposals derived quite naturally from the policy pursued by the USSR ever since the inception of the United Nations. It was in order to strengthen peace that the Soviet Union had proposed the prohibition of atomic weapons, the reduction of armaments and the banning of propaganda for another war. The proposals which the USSR had submitted at the current session were likewise designed to serve the cause of peace. Only the sworn enemies of the human race could oppose them. Only those totally devoid of any sense of honour and conscience would try to sabotage them. They must know that they were playing a very dangerous game.

102. The agents of the warmongers had tried to draw the General Assembly's attention away from the Soviet Union's proposals. It could only be regretted that a man of the political stature of Mr. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, should have joined those who wanted to sabotage the USSR proposals. What was one to say of the statements of Mr. Tsiang, representative of China, of Mr. Santa Cruz, representative of Chile and of Tito's discredited clique? It would be useless to engage in long arguments with people of that calibre. The representatives of the Soviet Union (226th meeting) the Byelorussian SSR (227th meeting) had already answered Mr. Tsiang and Mr. Santa Cruz. Mr. Manuisky would simply answer briefly the slanderous and hypocritical statements made by the representative of Yugoslavia at the 228th meeting.

103. It was an old trick used by Governments on the eve of bankruptcy to shift the blame for their failure to some alleged outside force. The Yugoslav representative's allegation that his

Government was placed between two camps was absolutely untrue. Indeed, the Tito Government had for some time been in Mr. Tsiang's and Mr. Santa Cruz's camp; it had long since joined the camp of the most dismal reaction, the orders of which it was carrying out at the current session of the General Assembly.

104. Like Mr. Tsiang and Mr. Santa Cruz, the Yugoslav representative had libellously accused the Soviet Union of intervening in his country's domestic affairs. It was the USSR Government's duty to protect its citizens, who were being persecuted and tortured in Yugoslav prisons, where fascist and Gestapo methods were used in dealing with USSR nationals. The Yugoslav representative could not deny that.

105. The Yugoslav representative had no moral or political right to speak of national sovereignty and independence, because it was well known that the Tito Government had delivered its country into the hands of foreign capitalist monopolies, and that it was at the moment making every effort to obtain loans in exchange for the raw materials of strategic importance which it was supplying to foreign interests.

106. The Yugoslav representative had no right to speak of national independence, as the Government he represented was plotting with fascist Greece against Albania and Bulgaria. He had stated that troop movements were taking place along his country's frontiers. That was nothing but a simple provocation, started by the agents of foreign intelligence services, in order to justify the aggressive plans of the imperialist Powers in the Balkans. The Yugoslav representative was well aware of that, and the only person who was likely to believe those assertions was possibly Mr. Bevin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

107. The Yugoslav representative had declared to the General Assembly that the trial of the State criminal Rajk, which had just ended in Hungary, was a provocation. That trial had made it possible to uncover the real machinations of the existing Government of Yugoslavia, which, in co-operation with the United States intelligence service, headed by Mr. Allen Dulles, planned to overthrow the existing régime in Hungary and in the other peoples' democracies in order to create a new anti-Soviet bloc under the aegis of a fascisized Yugoslavia and a so-called Balkan federation. Caught in the act, the Yugoslav Government was trying to justify itself by slandering the Soviet Union.

108. The Yugoslav representative had also stated that there was a discrepancy between the words and deeds of the USSR. That too was absolutely untrue. The Tito Government's hypocritical attitude towards the Slovene population of Styria and Carinthia had been sufficiently demonstrated to make it unnecessary to dwell on the matter at any great length.

109. The Yugoslav delegation was well aware that the words of the Soviet Union were always followed by deeds in accordance with those words. An end should be put to the Yugoslav Government's vile attempts to sabotage the adoption of the USSR proposals for strengthening peace. Moreover, nobody could be deceived by those manoeuvres.

110. The Yugoslav representative, who had claimed to be speaking for the small Powers,

had stated that he would like those Powers to adhere to the peace pact to be concluded among the five great Powers. His real purpose, however, had been to oppose the proposal that a pact should be concluded among the five permanent members of the Security Council.

111. There was already, and had been for a considerable time, a vast association of great and small Powers. That association was the United Nations. The Soviet Union's proposal was for a peace pact between the five great Powers which bore the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and the establishment of international co-operation. The signing of such a document would strengthen the authority of the United Nations and would thus guarantee a lasting peace to the smaller nations.

112. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR wholeheartedly supported the proposal of the Soviet Union that all preparations for a new war should be condemned. Moreover, it was convinced that that proposal was in accordance with the most earnest aspirations of the masses.

113. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported the proposal of the Soviet Union that the atomic weapon should be prohibited and that effective control should be established over the production of atomic energy. The conscience of civilized man must revolt against plans for the mass destruction of peaceful populations.

114. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR supported the Soviet Union's proposal for a peace pact between the five permanent members of the Security Council; such a pact would serve as a basis for effective and honest collaboration between those Powers which, under the Charter, had assumed the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

115. Mr. ARCE (Argentina) said that the difficulties which clouded the international horizon could be traced to causes both within and without the United Nations but that some, if not all, of those difficulties had been successfully resolved.

116. Those which divided the great Powers, or which were the outcome of their conflicting interests, were beyond the sphere of action of the United Nations. The most the other States were able to do was to offer their good offices and to emphasize the responsibility of the great Powers in maintaining peace.

117. On the other hand, the differences which arose within the Organization were more within the scope of Member States, which were in duty bound to study them, to publicize them and, whenever possible, to suggest a method or methods which appeared best calculated to resolve them. It was partly for the purpose of fulfilling that duty that Mr. Arce had risen to speak.

118. For the fourth time since the entry into force of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations had assembled in order to deliberate. When the Organization had been established in San Francisco, it had been decided that its Members should meet together annually. According to the terms of the Charter, the current session was the fourth regular session of the General Assembly. But if that purely formal consideration could be disregarded for a moment, and if the political significance of that gathering of the nations and the peace of the world were borne in mind, then it would be seen that that gathering was also—

and must be—the annual gathering of Member States determined at all costs to survive, whether by retaining the existing Organization or by establishing another which would be better able to ensure collective security, order, justice and social progress.

119. That consideration should be borne in mind for two important reasons. First, because the purpose of maintaining peace, which was the primary objective of the Organization, required a wider rather than a more narrow field of action; it called for the admission of all the nations of the earth; it required that the war which for six years had devastated large areas of the earth should be forgotten and that thoughts should be concentrated solely on peace, which could be more easily preserved with a greater number of nations associated in the achievement of that noble aim.

120. The second reason was that if the peace were unfortunately broken, it would be much easier to restore it if there were a greater number of associated nations. Moreover, it was imperative that possible aggressors should be fully aware that in such an eventuality they would have to face a union of nations already in being. A policy of plain speaking, of calling a spade a spade, was the best service to the United Nations.

121. Mr. Arce then proceeded to take stock of the period which had already elapsed, of the defects which had been noted and of the results achieved. The United Nations was a living organism which thought, spoke, acted, succeeded and made mistakes. It was an organism which must develop and be perfected if it were not to disappear. Although its disappearance would not necessarily result in the disappearance of its component parts, it would destroy the aims which had inspired its formation and structure. If the nations wished to profit by experience, they must at all costs prevent the eclipse of the Organization. The United Nations must not be destroyed.

122. Mr. Arce preferred to associate himself with those speakers who dealt with the success achieved rather than the mistakes made by the Organization although, in the last analysis, both groups were solely concerned with serving the cause of the United Nations.

123. The Argentine Government was particularly interested in the improvement of the Organization and, as in the past, it was always prepared to co-operate in the task of ensuring peace among nations, of promoting liberty among peoples and of improving the social conditions of individuals.

124. Even in the very darkest moments, the Argentine delegation had never lost sight of the noble purpose of seeking good for the sake of good alone without considering less worthy interests. Argentina was prepared to fulfil the obligations arising out of its international commitments, but that did not prevent it from working for the settlement of differences, no matter how deep-rooted such differences might be. Argentina would never give up the hope that agreement might be reached, and even if all paths appeared to be blocked, Argentina would still be ready to work for peace. Recent events furnished authentic proof of the purposes of the Argentine Government and of the aims which inspired the policy of the delegations which had represented it previ-

ously and of the delegation which represented it at the current session.

125. Representatives of all the groups and voicing all the tendencies existing in the General Assembly had made frequent references to violations of the Charter. The representative of Argentina felt that such references proved that no one deliberately set out to violate the Charter. The diversity of points of view provided a sufficient explanation of those charges, and showed the advisability, if not the necessity, of undertaking a study of the provisions which gave rise to such controversies.

126. The undertaking of such a study did not imply that those provisions must be modified in accordance with a given point of view. It was necessary, in the first place, because provisions which had been approved without great difficulty four years previously had in practice been subjected to the most contradictory interpretations. They must therefore be revised, clarified, modified or deleted or, if in the course of debate agreement were reached on a single interpretation of a controversial provision, that provision must be retained.

127. It was necessary, in the second place, because a provision which had been approved in spite of serious differences of opinion or under the pressure of special circumstances, had turned out to be bad or inoperative in practice; it was therefore advisable to reconsider it.

128. Those differences had arisen both in regard to the sphere of action of the Security Council and in regard to the interpretation of the powers of the General Assembly.

129. The energy with which the Argentine delegation had fought the privileges granted to certain members of the Security Council was a matter of common knowledge. Mr. Arce did not dispute the privilege of membership conferred upon particular States under Article 23 of the Charter. But whereas the Charter did not require that those States should be given similar treatment in the Economic and Social Council, they were re-elected whenever there was an election. And although the Charter did not require that they should be given five of the seven vice-presidencies of the Assembly, that always happened.

130. Such conduct in organs in which the various States had no special privileges whatever clearly showed the consideration given to the great Powers notwithstanding the silence of the Charter in that regard. In those circumstances, the fact that the members which enjoyed the privilege to which Mr. Arce had referred were re-elected, showed *a fortiori* that they would be re-elected to the Security Council. For while the permanent members of the Security Council might doubt the sentiments of some of the fifty-four other Member States, they could not doubt the political experience of those States; consequently the one Council where they would remain indefinitely, even if no such privilege were granted in the Charter, would be the Security Council.

131. The fifty-four other Member States were at least as much concerned with world peace as the five permanent members of the Security Council, and the indefinite re-election of those members would be in the nature of an insurance policy which the other States would willingly sign

and maintain without any external compulsion. It was clear that such a course of action would be in greater harmony with Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter, concerning the sovereign equality of all the Members, than with Article 23, which conferred the privilege of permanent membership on certain States designated by name.

132. But what could not be accepted was the privilege commonly known as the veto. The use of such an extraordinary power might be justified in a case involving the political interests of the State concerned, if any decision of the Security Council were likely to harm those interests. It was absolutely unjustified, however, in cases involving the interests of other States or in connexion with the most varied and most insignificant questions.

133. That privilege was bound to create, and did in effect create, sectors or spheres of influence, as in the era of the balance of power. The expansion or contraction of those spheres of influence might affect privileged States which were proposing to exercise, in their own interest, the privilege granted to them, but the other nations were kept in constant fear, waiting for the spark which would once again ignite a horrible war.

134. Mr. Arce would not discuss the disadvantages which had been demonstrated in practice by the use of the veto; they were well known to all the representatives as well as to those who followed the proceedings of the Security Council in the Press. But certain drawbacks could not be passed over in silence; he was referring to what had been called the hidden veto and the double veto.

135. The first of those had been regarded with favour by those who considered that the end justified the means. Mr. Arce held a completely different view. The so-called hidden veto was actually a veto, despite the fact that the permanent member which resorted to it, not wishing to cast an affirmative vote, took refuge in abstention. In fact, it was not a hidden veto, because nothing attracted greater notice than a permanent member which abstained from voting. It could be said that it was morally inadmissible for the permanent members to abstain from voting. They had accepted a responsibility under the Charter, and hence should always cast a vote, whether yea or nay.

136. It was easy to show that an abstention was, in effect, a veto. The Charter made no mention of a veto; nor did it speak of negative votes intended *ipso facto* to void a decision which had been approved by seven or more affirmative votes. The Charter spoke of decisions adopted by an affirmative vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members. Under the Charter, any decision which had not obtained the affirmative votes of the five permanent members had no legal force.

137. Nevertheless, the Security Council, using an arbitrary interpretation, had accepted as valid resolutions which had obtained the affirmative vote of only four permanent members, provided the fifth permanent member had taken refuge in abstention. Such an interpretation led the representative of Argentina to call the so-called hidden veto by a name which was more accurate in the light of the Charter and the facts, to wit, a furtive or shame-faced affirmative vote.

138. That arbitrary interpretation constituted a new privilege for the permanent members, which

appeared to seek their own convenience and to escape their responsibilities, rather than to promote the general interest of the United Nations.

139. Mr. Arce recalled the Declaration¹ subscribed to by the five permanent members in San Francisco, for that Declaration was apparently the Gospel of the veto. That document, which bore the signatures of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, stated: "The first group of decisions"—the document was referring to questions of substance—"will be governed by a qualified vote—that is, the vote of seven members, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members."

140. Accordingly, in pursuance of an explicit provision of the Charter and of the equally express opinion of the Governments of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, all decisions of the Security Council which had been held valid although they had obtained the affirmative vote of only four of the permanent members, were null and void.

141. The permanent members of the Security Council answered those arguments by saying that the Council was implicitly empowered to interpret the scope of the powers granted to it and that, consequently, no other authority of the United Nations had the right to discuss the validity of its decisions concerning the application of Article 27.

142. It should be pointed out that the issue was not an interpretation but a modification of the Charter. As yet, however, so few representatives claimed that the permanent members of the Security Council had exceeded their powers that it was useless to make attempts which were doomed beforehand. They would have to wait for a better time, but, in the meantime, it should be recognized that the Security Council was claiming the right to interpret the Charter in regard to its own powers; it was to be hoped that it would not deny the same right to the General Assembly, in other words, to the United Nations.

143. No such prerogative as the double veto appeared in the Charter; it was based on the San Francisco Declaration. That Declaration had not been incorporated in the Charter as a key to interpretation, nor had it been approved by the San Francisco Conference. Hence, the double veto was a new privilege which the permanent members of the Council conferred upon themselves, though without any legal justification. An examination of the text of the Charter led to a diametrically opposite conclusion.

144. In accordance with the procedure of the double veto, whenever a doubt arose as to whether a question was one of substance or of procedure, and therefore whether it was or was not subject to the veto, it must be resolved by a prior decision which required the affirmative vote of the five permanent members. That method of resolving doubt was provided for neither in the Charter nor in the Council's rules of procedure. Consequently, it had no legal value. The correct procedure in such cases should be to seek guidance from Article 18 of the Charter which dealt with voting in the General Assembly.

¹ See *United Nations Conference on International Organization*, document 852, III/1/37 (1).

145. The Security Council had preferred to depart from the Charter and to adopt its own interpretation, basing itself solely on the fact that that was the solution appearing in the Declaration of the permanent members. Thus the least important question might become a question of substance simply at the wish of any one of the permanent members.

146. The use of the double veto as well as of the hidden veto showed that the permanent members of the Security Council believed themselves entitled to interpret the Charter in their own way in so far as it referred to the powers which had been granted them. So long as there was no revision of the Charter, that view must be noted.

147. The delegation of Argentina felt that in both cases there was an abuse of power and hence had asked at earlier sessions of the Assembly that a general conference should be convened under Article 109 of the Charter to discuss various questions and to proceed to the revision of the Charter if the conference considered it advisable or necessary.

148. When a text was open to doubt or when, through abuse of power, it was given an entirely false interpretation, it was more advisable to amend it so that it would clearly express what had been decided and thus establish the procedure to be followed thereafter.

149. The Argentine delegation had renewed its request (A/970) before the opening of the fourth session of the General Assembly. It had been argued in the General Committee that the subject might give rise to heated debates and that the current session of the General Assembly, already named the "Peace Assembly", was aiming at solutions based on effective international co-operation which might be prejudiced by the Argentine proposal. The delegation of Argentina had not wished to shoulder so heavy a responsibility; it had withdrawn its proposal¹ and was prepared to accept less extensive and even provisional solutions. It hoped, however, that its confidence would not be deceived.

150. Should the attitude of Argentina contribute to the removal of even one of the difficulties dividing the great Powers, the delegation of that country would feel satisfied with the procedure adopted in accordance with the principles of peace and harmony put forward by its Government. Should the contrary prove to be the case, the Argentine delegation would feel compelled to renew its proposal the following year and would attempt to convince the representatives that the sole purpose was to seek a clarification of those provisions which in practice had given rise to contradictory interpretations.

151. The much discussed assessment of the powers of the General Assembly was one of the questions most vital to the life of the United Nations; Mr. Arce deplored the fact that its importance had failed sufficiently to impress itself upon those States, Members of the United Nations which enjoyed no privileges.

152. Next to the question of the maintenance of peace, the admission of new Members was the most important subject to be considered by the General Assembly, since the acceptance of all, or

at least most of the States still outside the Organization, was a decisive factor in the strengthening of peace.

153. When every country in the world had the right to be heard before the Assembly of the United Nations, no Power, however great, would dare to defy the world, as represented in the United Nations. Any attempt to do so would merely condemn that Power to the execration of all free men of the world including those living within its own borders. Hence the General Assembly should take up the defence of the principles of the United Nations and finally reach a decision with respect to all pending applications for admission to membership in the Organization.

154. The Argentine delegation would be very pleased to see all peace-loving countries admitted to the United Nations. Even though some of them were not admitted in consequence of a negative decision of the General Assembly—the only organ with the right to postpone their admission—the Argentine delegation would prefer a final decision to the shameful spectacle of more than a dozen States knocking at the doors of the United Nations without the latter condescending to reply.

155. The General Assembly could, but was not bound, to bar any State from admission to the United Nations. When the facts leading to a negative attitude on the part of the General Assembly were not serious, as in the case of States which had not as yet obtained the support required under the Charter, a mere postponement might be sufficient. The reasons for a negative decision might disappear. Mr. Arce was convinced that in the end the United Nations would admit all countries showing a desire to co-operate in the task of maintaining peace. The General Assembly must emerge from the impasse which it had reached. With that purpose in mind, the Argentine delegation intended to submit to the First Committee certain solutions which it was considering.

156. The Argentine delegation felt that the provisions of the Charter on that question were clear. In view, however, of the fact that doubts had repeatedly been expressed, it was desirous of securing some decision which would safeguard the unquestionable right of the United Nations to settle matters pertaining to its own constitution; those were matters concerning which no privilege could be invoked, since they were within the competence of the United Nations itself, which had laid down the procedure governing its decisions.

157. The "Peace Assembly" quietly proceeded with its discussions in spite of rumours and reports of all kinds. Mr. Arce felt, personally, that the General Assembly was right in not allowing itself to be swayed by the political difficulties that had emerged in one of the areas into which the international field was divided. Political difficulties appeared and disappeared; technical progress was a consequence of unending study and work and could not be held back. A step in any given direction was followed the next day by a step in the opposite direction. There should be no cause for alarm, however, since the forces of nature could be used in various ways and human genius would always contrive some means to eradicate or reduce the bad effects and to make use of the good.

158. Mr. Arce proposed a truce during which the United Nations might pursue its efforts for the realization of its primary aim, peace, pending

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly, General Committee*, 65th meeting.

the working out of an agreement on all types of weapons, both atomic and non-atomic. If such an agreement were to be arrived at, it was necessary to reduce the effects of other even more dangerous weapons, such as rumour, intrigue, political jealousies, arbitrary measures and unbridled ambition.

159. Mr. Arce stated, on behalf of the delegation of Argentina, that it would do everything in its power to bring about such a truce.

160. Mr. HENRIQUEZ UREÑA (Dominican Republic) said that if ever the United Nations General Assembly had commenced its work in an atmosphere propitious to fruitful mutual collaboration it was on that occasion, when the world political horizon was again bright with hope. The General Assembly was meeting in an atmosphere of tranquillity under the leadership of a distinguished statesman, General Rómulo, who could be described as the embodiment of the spirit of human kindness.

161. The task before the Assembly was not easy, nothing was more arduous than the effort to reconcile conflicting ideologies and interests. Good will, however, had power akin to faith, which moved mountains.

162. While the Assembly agenda covered a vast number of topics, the political items, which occasioned the great differences, were not as numerous as in the past; moreover, they had all been discussed previously.

163. The question of the disposal of the former Italian colonies was of primary importance. Mr. Henriquez Ureña hoped the Assembly would find an equitable and workable solution of the problem during that session; the position of the Dominican Republic thereon had already been clearly indicated and it would remain unchanged. Any solution designed to ensure the preparation of those former colonies for self-government or independence, through an orderly process carried out under the supervision of the United Nations, would have the support of the delegation of the Dominican Republic.

164. The Dominican Republic maintained an equally firm attitude with regard to any problem involving respect for the independence and sovereignty of a State. For that reason it could not remain indifferent to another question which had already been debated in past sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece. Not only was the sacred principle of independence attacked by such threats but also another principle, that of non-intervention, which the American Republics had embodied in many treaties and declarations.

165. The defence of those principles assumed a special importance in the case of Greece, a country which occupied so high a place in the history of civilization through the far-reaching influence of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Archimedes, Aeschylus and Anacreon, and the incomparable marble beauty of the mutilated Venus of Melos or the headless Victory of Samothrace.

166. Was it unusual then if peoples whose culture had been nourished by the life-giving stream of Hellenic thought were united in their ardent desire to support and defend Greece when her independence was at stake? On the altar of that

great idea Byron had laid down his life at Missolonghi, and the soul of humanity had been filled with wonder when the people of Greece, like David before Goliath, had risen up to engage in unrelenting war with the invading hosts of fascism and nazism, as if from the depths of the past the martial and harmonious strains of the Trytaean lyre had re-echoed in their ears.

167. Fortunately, it would appear that the problem of Greece was approaching solution. There was ground for hope that normal, good-neighbourly relations would soon be re-established between Greece and adjacent nations in spite of the mutual accusations arising from regrettable incidents, the responsibility for which each of the contending countries ascribed to the other. The frontier incidents, however painful they might have been, were not the essence of the problem, but only one of its consequences. The Assembly must go to the very heart of the question, and that could be done if all the parties concerned accepted the mediation of the United Nations with the greatest good will in an effort to find an amicable solution.

168. A similar procedure had been successfully employed in dealing with the Indonesian question which, although very different in substance and origin, offered a fine example of what could be accomplished by a spirit of good will. The parties concerned were discussing their problems under the aegis of the United Nations and there was a good prospect that an agreement could be reached on principles which might well be a prelude to a final solution.

169. In respect to Korea, the Government of the Dominican Republic had recognized its existence as an independent nation. The delegation of the Dominican Republic considered that for the time being the United Nations Commission on Korea, established for the purpose of co-operating in the solution of Korean problems, and in the first place the problem of the country's unification, should not be dissolved.

170. With regard to the questions that still awaited settlement in Palestine, the delegation of the Dominican Republic expressed the firm belief that the protection of the Holy Places and free access thereto would be fully guaranteed in the Assembly by means of a definitive agreement on the subject. It likewise believed that practical solutions would soon be found for the problem of the Palestine refugees, to whose assistance the Government of the Dominican Republic had already contributed from its resources just as it had contributed, and in no small measure, to other humanitarian undertakings of the United Nations, such as the International Children's Emergency Fund.

171. The activity of the United Nations in the economic and social fields had certainly been, and continued to be, very effective, although pessimists did not realize the full extent of the enormous work the Organization was accomplishing, since they considered only the difficulties constantly arising in connexion with political questions. However, apart from the fact that the Organization had, in more than one instance, achieved complete success in the political field and had settled more than one dispute which might have endangered world peace, the technical work it had accomplished, social as well as economic, juridical

as well as cultural, was of inestimable value to humanity.

172. Mr. Henriquez Ureña reviewed the achievements of the United Nations in those fields: its action to promote the development of under-developed territories and technical assistance; the establishment of regional economic Commissions for Europe, Asia, the Far East and Latin America; the establishment of vast and very useful services, such as the international statistical services; the holding of the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources. The United Nations had effectively contributed to the improvement of the legal and social status of women. The General Assembly, by its resolution 217 (III) of 10 December 1948, had promulgated the first International Bill of Human Rights. By its resolution 260 A (III) of 11 December 1948 it had approved the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a forward step of surpassing importance in the international field. The General Assembly at its current session was to study another significant draft of vast social and juridical import, namely, the declaration of the rights and duties of States.¹

173. Mr. Henriquez Ureña concluded by saying that his enumeration of some of the undertakings and achievements of the United Nations was sufficient to indicate the great importance of the Organization's work and efforts, and justified the view that it represented the last and supreme hope of mankind.

174. Mr. KING (Liberia), after congratulating the President upon his election, said that the speeches made by members on the successes and failures of the United Nations had been punctuated by a certain amount of frankness which was often necessary to pave the way for better international understanding, good will and friendship among nations.

175. Attention had been drawn in those debates to the deteriorating effects the two great but conflicting political ideologies and concepts had had upon the most friendly and cordial relations hitherto existing between certain great nations and countries of the world.

176. The conflicts between those two political ideologies had been so sharp as to divide the world into two definite and distinct political groups, known as the East and the West, each led by powerful and great States. That clear and definite division was noticeable in every sphere of international relations between the nations comprising the respective groups. Even within the United Nations the marked division of the nations of the world was clearly discernible, and seemed to be fully understood and accepted by all. As a result, the Organization which had been primarily created to bring about a unification of all the peace-loving nations of the world, irrespective of size, colour or religion, under the one banner of world peace and international security, found itself confronted with a divided world, and what course it would pursue would no doubt be left to the wiser councils of the great nations to decide.

177. The Liberian delegation believed that the United Nations, with its lofty and noble ideals for world peace and international security as set

forth in its Charter, would never fail the world when the hour for decision came. The question, however, was whether the world would fall short of the lofty ideals of the United Nations. If it did, then the responsibility for the grave consequences which would result would rest entirely upon those statesmen and leaders of the world who had counselled and advised such a course.

178. To avert such a calamity, serious and honest efforts must be made at the current session of the General Assembly to remedy the causes of the war of nerves, which seemed to be rapidly spreading its germs of fear, mistrust and hate throughout the world. But those remedies must be carefully studied and determined before being applied. The State, or groups of States, which arbitrarily refused to accept the remedies thus prescribed, should be considered as hostile to the aims and purposes of the United Nations and their action should therefore be denounced by the General Assembly and the Security Council as a serious threat to world peace and international security. The preservation of world peace and the attainment of international security should be the controlling and governing factor in world situations requiring immediate decisions and prompt actions.

179. Liberia fully recognized the veto as being originally intended as a safeguard and protection for each one of the great Powers, which otherwise might some day, by a very slim majority vote in the General Assembly or the Security Council, find itself, together with its great resources in human and material values, committed to a cause in which its people might not consider themselves immediately concerned. But the unanimity rule should not be so broadened as to apply to purely administrative matters in connexion with the functioning and operation of the General Assembly, the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, and to matters of general interest in world affairs.

180. It was most unfortunate that the veto should have been used in connexion with applications for membership in the United Nations. The criteria for membership should be only those provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and no other conditions or standards whatsoever should be applied or considered.

181. The use of the veto by a Member State against the application of a State for membership in the United Nations, when both the vetoing State and the State which was applying for membership were on friendly terms and exchanging diplomatic representation, was completely paradoxical.

182. With regard to the disposal of the former Italian colonies, the Liberian Government continued to adhere to the views it had expressed at the second part of the third session.²

183. Liberia welcomed and approved the idea advanced by the General Assembly regarding specialized technical aid and assistance for under-developed areas of the world. It was confident that such a programme would be practical and effective, and that it would take due account of the rights to independence of the nations concerned and the welfare of their peoples.

184. With regard to the Indonesian question, the Liberian delegation hoped that the negotia-

¹ See *Official Records of the fourth session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 10, Part II.

² See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly*, Part II, 217th plenary meeting.

tions being conducted at The Hague between the Netherlands Government and the representatives of the Indonesian Republic would terminate in such a manner as to ensure lasting peace between those two Governments as well as the happiness and prosperity of the peoples of the two countries, without any further intervention on the part of the United Nations.

185. Pious platitudes and mere wishful thinking for peace would not of themselves bring it about but more definite and positive action on the part of all the nations of the world, especially the great Powers, would lead to its early and practical realization.

186. Mr. EBAN (Israel) observed that the General Assembly was approaching its labours in the fourth session under the critical and expectant gaze of the world. The instinct among peace-loving peoples everywhere to identify the prospects of peace with the success of the United Nations was accurate and sound. It was true that the international scene was rich with many other groupings and coalitions of States united in the pursuit of common objectives and ideals. Yet they did not claim to answer the crucial question which faced the contemporary world. To say that Governments and States founded on similar political doctrines and kindred cultures could achieve close co-operation was to affirm something that stood in no need of proof. That was not the question which multitudes of anxious peoples all over the world were asking; they were asking whether Governments with different and opposing interests could achieve a point of mutual tolerance, above their differences and above their opposition. They were asking whether divergent and contrasting political doctrines could live together in peace, side by side. The main issue was the co-existence of different ways of life within a common allegiance to a single international code.

187. That was an issue which could be decided only in the General Assembly—that unique forum where alone all the factors of world power and opinion were represented as equals. Seen in that light, the principles of the universality of the United Nations and an equitable geographical distribution of its organs assumed a primary and urgent importance. Those two principles would guide the Israel delegation in its approach to the discussion of the problems of applications for membership, the future of the Interim Committee and other constitutional questions.

188. The lack of agreement among the great Powers had rendered the enforcement provisions of the Charter inoperative so far; yet it would be wrong to conclude that the lack of a capacity of enforcement doomed the United Nations to ineffectiveness. For that deficiency did not prevent the United Nations from promoting the advance of subject peoples towards independence. It did not impede the work of the Organization in developing international co-operation in the economic field, with the objective of full employment and technical assistance; it in no way affected the capacity of the General Assembly to reach binding decisions on questions such as that of the former Italian colonies, in which its jurisdiction had been accepted in advance by the parties. It did not hamper the work of the specialized agencies. Above

all, it did not diminish, but powerfully increased, the need for United Nations efforts in the field of mediation and conciliation.

189. The Government of Israel had had opportunities of intimate contact with the work of the United Nations in that field. During the previous month the Security Council had been able to endorse the armistice agreements concluded between Israel and its four neighbours with the aid of the United Nations Acting Mediator.¹ A pattern of normal and orderly life had grown out of those agreements. The armistice lines did not merely separate armed forces; they marked clearly defined areas of full civil jurisdiction. The Government, the courts, the legislatures, the security authorities of each respective State operated smoothly and unchallenged up to the appropriate armistice line. The agreements themselves committed all their signatories to abide firmly by that provisional settlement until new and final agreements were reached by further negotiation. The United Nations might well find satisfaction in the end of hostilities and the assumption, by the Governments concerned themselves, of full responsibility for a final settlement to be attained by peaceful means.

190. Mr. Eban pledged his Government to continue with zeal and perseverance its efforts to reach such a settlement in direct negotiation with the Arab Governments concerned. The lesson of the past year had been concisely expressed by Mr. Bunche to the Security Council when he had stated that “once the parties could be brought together, they could, with United Nations assistance, be led to reasonable and honourable agreement.”² Recent experience had convinced the Israel Government that it was only by coming together that the parties were likely to evolve the provisions of a new agreement. It was Israel’s hope that the United Nations would make it its main resolve to promote that objective. It had become generally recognized that the Arab States and Israel needed a maximum of contact and a minimum of intervention in order to settle the political problems still outstanding between them.

191. The fact that such a savage and inveterate conflict could have been brought to an end and healed by methods of pacific settlement could not be without significance for the treatment of other conflicts which had so far baffled the Organization. The mediation which had brought about the armistice had been patient, impartial, detached from the predilections of individual Governments and assiduously addressed to the maintenance of contact between the parties. It might be of some value for the General Assembly to explore whether such principles of conciliation under neutral and mutually accepted auspices might not be applied anew during the current session towards the solution of such acute problems as the relations between the States of the Balkans and the overriding issue of atomic control.

192. Among the residual problems of the Palestine conflict, two were still in the forefront of international interest.

193. During the second part of the third session,³ the Israel delegation had put forward the view that the refugee problem created by the attack upon Israel could find its solution only in a

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council*, fourth year, No. 38.

² See document S/1357.

³ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee*, 45th meeting.

co-operative regional effort on the part of all the Governments concerned. It had not changed its view on the initial responsibility for that great human catastrophe; surely those who decided to initiate military operations could not wash their hands of all responsibility for helping to dispel the suffering thus created. For that reason the Israel delegation felt it to be both unrealistic and inequitable to require a solution of the problem by exclusive concentration on Israel alone. The Israel Government was gratified to observe a growing consciousness that all the States of the Near East must bend their efforts, each to the limits of its genuine capacity, to contribute towards a rapid solution. Had resolution 194 (III) adopted on 11 December 1948 laid greater emphasis on the principle of wide regional responsibility, it might have been possible for Israel and the Arab States to find a common approach at Lausanne.

194. The humanitarian issues involved in the refugee problem were undoubtedly tragic and grave. Moved by those considerations, and eagerly desirous of creating conditions of co-operation and stability throughout the Near East, the Israel Government, though beset by grave financial problems of its own, had decided to contribute to the United Nations Relief For Palestine Refugees, to reunite Arab families separated by war, and also to undertake a specific commitment for facilitating a solution by a measure of repatriation to be carried out in the context of peaceful relations and as part of a regional programme of resettlement.

195. Israel had made those offers before a single one of the Arab States had undertaken any commensurate responsibility. It had done so in the hope, thus far unfulfilled, of eliciting a similar response among other Governments in the Near East. Having already taken from the shoulders of the international community the major burden of the refugee problem bequeathed by the racial persecutions perpetrated by nazism, Israel had become the first Government to make a tangible offer towards the solution of another humanitarian problem produced by the military action of other States. In a continuation of that effort, the Israel Government was preparing to co-operate closely with the United Nations Economic Survey Mission which was exploring the possibilities of development and resettlement in the Near East. A fuller discussion of that problem might well await the report of that group.

196. The agenda included another item of vital importance to the relations between the United Nations and its newest Member, namely, the question of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. Earlier in the year, when the Jerusalem problem had been a subject of profound international interest, the President of Israel had made a public pronouncement, to the terms of which the Israel Government still faithfully adhered. He had said:

"The Government and people of Israel are conscious of the international interest in the safety of the Holy Places and the right of free access to them. We pledge ourselves to ensure full security for religious institutions in the exercise of their functions; to grant the supervision of the Holy Places by those who hold them sacred; and to encourage and accept the fullest international safeguards and controls for their immunity and protection. Just as we are resolved to give com-

plete and practical expression to the universal interest arising from the Holy Places, so we expect that the international community will understand the direct and inescapable responsibility which Israel bears and exercises in the daily life and administration of Jewish Jerusalem."

197. On 5 May 1949¹ when the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee had proceeded to discuss the Jerusalem question in relation to Israel's obligations under Article 4 of the Charter, Mr. Eban, in accordance with his Government's instructions, had developed those principles by advocating the establishment by the United Nations of international agencies extending over the whole city but "concerned exclusively with the control and protection of Holy Places."

198. It would thus be seen that Israel regarded the Jerusalem problem as composed of two elements. First, there was the responsibility of the United Nations for ensuring that Holy Places and sites were reverently preserved and that religious institutions were assured full liberty in the exercise of their functions. Secondly, there was the responsibility, no less valid, and for the Government of Israel not one whit less compelling, for ensuring to the Jewish population of the city the full enjoyment of its democratic political rights in association with the only Government to which it was prepared to offer its allegiance.

199. There was no incompatibility between those two purposes. Conflict could arise only if there was an unjustified encroachment by one upon the other. Thus, if the political aspirations of Israel and of Jerusalem's population were carried to the point of repudiating the concern of the United Nations for the safeguarding of Holy Places and sites, there might be an encroachment upon a universal religious interest. No such eventuality would ever take place. On the other hand, if the United Nations were to impose upon the population of Jerusalem any burden of deprivation not strictly related to the satisfaction of universal religious interests, an encroachment would take place upon cherished political freedom.

200. It must be remembered that the safeguarding of the Holy Places and religious rights had always been the exclusive justification of any measure of international supervision. General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 did not make an unconditional demand for separate treatment or effective United Nations control in Jerusalem. It recommended separate treatment and effective international control explicitly "in view of [Jerusalem's] association with three world religions". Once full provision was made for the effective recognition of that religious association under United Nations supervision, the international and religious aspects of the problem would be settled, and there would remain only a problem of political relations in Jerusalem, to be solved in accordance with the principle of self-determination by the method of conciliation.

201. It would be a disservice to realistic investigation to ignore the exact relationship existing between the Jews of Jerusalem and the State of Israel, for that relationship would profoundly affect the task of the General Assembly in the Jerusalem question.

¹ See *Official Records of the third session of the General Assembly, Part II, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 45th meeting.*

202. The situation might be briefly described. When a law was promulgated in Israel, the Jews of Jerusalem obeyed it. When a tax was levied in Israel, the Jews of Jerusalem paid it. When the parliamentary institutions of Israel were elected, the Jews of Jerusalem helped to elect them and participated in their operation. When civil or criminal litigation arose in Jerusalem, it was to the courts of Israel alone that the Jews of Jerusalem took their case. The coinage and stamps of Jewish Jerusalem were the coinage and stamps of Israel. The slowly reviving economy of Jerusalem was sustained and nourished by the State of Israel, which provided from its own resources all the social services of the new city—in regard to health, education, water supply and social welfare. The language and religion, the cultural sentiment and national allegiance of the Jews of Jerusalem were those which they held in common with the State of Israel and its people.

203. There was thus no link uniting a citizen of Paris to the Republic of France, there was no bond between a citizen of London and the United Kingdom, which did not exist between a Jew in Jerusalem and the State of Israel. For in modern society no man, however conscious of civic pride, felt complete in the limits of a purely municipal allegiance; he must reach out to identify himself with a wider political and social culture. In that respect, too, the Jewish citizens of Jerusalem were as those of all other cities.

204. Yet there was one aspect of the ties uniting Jewish Jerusalem and the State of Israel which had an altogether exceptional force. In 1947, after the United Nations had undertaken full responsibility both for the religious and the secular life of Jerusalem, it had failed to carry out that responsibility. Jerusalem had been subjected to siege and famine, while the international community, for several months, had remained supine. Men, women and children had fallen by the hundred in the city's defence and in its relief. At critical moments both water and food supplies had been cut off with no hope of replenishment. The consequences of that situation, had it been permitted to endure, would have been annihilation for every Jew in Jerusalem as complete as that which could be inflicted by the most devastating bombardment.

205. Salvation had come from one quarter alone. The State of Israel, struggling against dire odds for very survival, had girded all its strength to throw a lifeline to the beleaguered city, reopening its communications and saving it from strangulation. Every man, woman and child in Jewish Jerusalem could thus ascribe the fact of his or her physical survival directly to the State of Israel and its Government. It was not surprising, therefore, that they were disposed to give their loyalty and co-operation to that Government alone.

206. The existing situation in Jerusalem was thus both a cause and consequence of the city's rescue and pacification. It rested firmly upon valid armistice agreements entered into by the parties concerned and endorsed by the Security Council. It was therefore a legal situation and not merely an accomplished fact. Moreover, the relation between Israel and Jerusalem constituted no obstacle whatsoever to the fulfilment by the United Nations of its desire and duty to undertake responsibilities for safeguarding the Holy Places and sites.

207. The fact that such firm patterns of authority and government already existed in Jerusalem made it imperative for the United Nations to seek a solution in harmony with established and legitimate interests. Indeed, in its second progress report (A/838), presented to the General Assembly on 19 April 1949, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine wrote that it was endeavouring "to formulate in conformity with the terms of paragraph 8 of the resolution of 11 December, proposals, which will at the same time be acceptable to both parties". Yet the Commission had since apparently reached the conclusion that the consent of the parties was not an important or even a relevant consideration. The General Assembly was perhaps not aware of the fact that the plan presented by the Commission in document A/973 had never been discussed with the Government of Israel, which was administering almost the entire new city of Jerusalem. Nor had it been at any time the subject of negotiation with representatives of the population of Jerusalem.

208. That procedural disregard of the opinion of the authorities and population directly concerned was unfortunately reflected in the substantive proposals themselves. The plan set up organs of government as though Jerusalem had no Government; it established courts as though Jerusalem had no courts; it made detailed arrangements for the control of public services as though Jerusalem were living in anarchy; it replaced independent institutions, resting upon consent, by new institutions having no roots in the city and no duty of response to democratic processes. Not one of those administrative councils was really necessary for the protection of the Holy Places; not one of those courts had duties essentially related to the religious associations of the city. The whole administrative superstructure, which would revolutionize the budget of the United Nations, was irrelevant to the primary objectives of the Organization in Jerusalem.

209. Moreover, by dispensing with any effort to reach consent, the Conciliation Commission sometimes collided sharply with the devout political and religious conscience of the population. Thus, for example, there was a proposal in article 5 whereby Jews might be forbidden to take up residence in Jerusalem on the ground that they were Jews. The Israel Government knew the General Assembly too well to believe that there was a chance of such a proposal being adopted, and had no real feeling of alarm. It knew that the Organization would not put up a notice to the effect that no more Jews were wanted at the gates of the Holy City, which had been made illustrious in history through the spiritual experience of the Jewish people, wherefrom had branched off the great streams of Christianity and Islam. Yet the fact that such a proposal could be made showed how urgent it was to begin formulating the policy of the United Nations in regard to Jerusalem anew, in close association with the peoples and interests involved.

210. Finally, a similar criticism could be made of the proposal for demilitarization, which failed to take account of two facts. In the first place, the simultaneous dismissal of Jewish and Arab forces from Jerusalem would not create equal security for both parts of the city. It would put the entire city once more in the situation which

had nearly produced its downfall a year previously, at the mercy of Arab forces which, by the facts of geography, would then be free to surround it from three sides. The demilitarization programme also conflicted with the armistice agreement which exclusively governed the security situation in the whole Jerusalem area, including the disposition and reduced size of armed forces.

211. Regardless of its strong feelings on the Commission's report, the Israel delegation would contribute earnestly and constructively in the Assembly to the work of determining, in a practical and final form, the responsibilities of the United Nations on the one hand and of the Government of Israel on the other. It would seek a solution which satisfied the interests and concern of the world religions and of the United Nations, and at the same time the aspirations of the people of Jerusalem to government and security in conformity with their national allegiance.

212. Israel was already encouraged by some principles put forward in the general debate. The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (225th meeting) had rightly ascribed primary importance to the protection of the Holy Places and the need for an agreed solution. The Foreign Minister of France (225th meeting) had carried the discussion into new and constructive channels by concisely emphasizing three factors: the importance of carrying out the practical objectives of the United Nations without undue insistence on juridical preferences; the need to avoid imposing obligations not strictly indispensable; and the desirability of seeking the consent of the population concerned.

213. The Israel delegation would propose that the General Assembly should limit the commitment of the United Nations to the safeguarding of the Holy Places and should initiate such formal agreements as might be necessary between the United Nations and the State of Israel for the implementation of those safeguards. The Israel Government aspired to full international recognition of the political status of the Government of Israel in Jerusalem.

214. A solution along those lines would have the following advantages over that proposed by the Commission: it would rest on consent and would therefore present no problem of implementation or enforcement; it would terminate the period of doubt and potential conflict that had already lasted too long; it would be financially and administratively feasible; and it would simultaneously give complete satisfaction to the interests of the great

world religions and of the people of Jerusalem. Under those conditions, an era of peace and development would descend upon the Holy City, while the United Nations would stand forth as the ultimate and accepted guarantor of its religious immunity.

215. The solution of most international problems required an exact balance between the interests of the international community and those of an individual State. Yet when two legitimate interests faced each other, it was often possible to satisfy the main substance of both.

216. Small nations represented in the General Assembly must often ask themselves what they could contribute to the general welfare in a world so dominated by large units of power. Perhaps in their very disinterestedness and in their passionate need for security, they were the best qualified to search out the common ground between conflicting interests and to assert the persistent need for mediation. The Israel Government, which had itself learnt the consequences of war and the benefits of conciliation and which represented a new political unit whose traditions and future depended on the maintenance of international peace, would join its humble effort to any movement for extending the use of the methods of pacific settlement prescribed by the Charter. It was in that spirit that the delegation of Israel came forward to undertake its duties at its first full session of the General Assembly as a Member of the United Nations.

Inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fourth session: report of the General Committee (A/998)

217. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Assembly to the report of the General Committee (A/998), which read as follows:

"The General Committee, at its 66th meeting, held on 26 September 1949, considered the request of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the inclusion in the agenda of the item:

"'Condemnation of the preparations for a new war and conclusion of a five-power pact for the strengthening of peace.'

"The General Committee recommends that this item be included in the agenda and that it be allocated to the First Committee."

The recommendation of the General Committee was adopted.

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.

TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH PLENARY MEETING

Held at Lake Success, New York, on Thursday, 29 September 1949, at 10.45 a.m.

President: General Carlos P. RÓMULO (Philippines).

Inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the fourth session: report of the General Committee (A/1004)

1. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the General Assembly to the report of the General Committee (A/1004), which read as follows:

"The General Committee, at its 67th meeting, held on 28 September 1949, considered the re-

quest of the delegation of the Republic of China for the inclusion in the agenda of the fourth session of the item:

"'Threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and to the peace of the Far East, resulting from violations by the Soviet Union of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded on 14 August 1945 between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet