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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 79: Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (<i>continued</i>): (b) Committee on Contributions Report of the Fifth Committee	1
Agenda item 101: Amendment to rule 156 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly Report of the Fifth Committee	1
Agenda item 22: The situation in the Middle East (<i>continued</i>)	1

President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).

AGENDA ITEM 79

Appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of
subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly (*continued*):*
(b) Committee on Contributions

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/8462)

AGENDA ITEM 101

Amendment to rule 156 of the rules of procedure of the
General Assembly

REPORT OF THE FIFTH COMMITTEE (A/8571)

1. Mr. RAMBISSOON (Trinidad and Tobago), Rapporteur of the Fifth Committee: I have the honour to present the report of the Fifth Committee on appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Contributions [A/8462]. The recommendations of the Fifth Committee are contained in two draft resolutions appearing in paragraph 9 of the report. Draft resolution A covers the appointment of one person to fill an unexpired term of two years, and draft resolution B covers the appointment of five others for the usual three-year term.

2. In document A/8571, the Fifth Committee recommends in paragraph 5 an amendment to rule 156 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly that would increase the membership of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, with effect from 1 January 1972, in order to include a member from China.

3. The Fifth Committee, on whose behalf I have the honour to speak, hopes that the draft resolutions on both

these items will be unanimously approved by the General Assembly.

Pursuant to rule 68 of the rules of procedure, it was decided not to discuss the reports of the Fifth Committee.

4. The PRESIDENT: We shall take up first the report of the Fifth Committee on agenda item 79 (b), concerning appointments to fill vacancies in the membership of the Committee on Contributions.

5. The General Assembly will now decide on draft resolutions A and B, recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 9 of its report [A/8462]. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly adopts draft resolutions A and B.

Draft resolutions A and B were adopted (resolutions 2797 A and B (XXVI)).

6. The PRESIDENT: We shall consider now the report of the Fifth Committee on agenda item 101 [A/8571]. The General Assembly will now take a decision on the draft resolution recommended by the Fifth Committee in paragraph 5 of its report. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the General Assembly adopts the draft resolution.

The draft resolution was adopted (resolution 2798 (XXVI)).

AGENDA ITEM 22

The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

7. The PRESIDENT: The General Assembly will now hear those representatives who wish to speak on draft resolutions A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, A/L.651 and A/L.652 and Add.1. Amendments have been submitted to draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 and will be distributed shortly in document A/L.655.

8. Mr. LEGNANI (Uruguay) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Everyone's conscience is offended by war or the threat of war. Pain, misery and any manner of affliction caused by aggressiveness and violence and designed to destroy human lives inevitably create chain reactions which only tend to propagate violence and extend their harmful and ominous consequences. It is true also that they lead to reactions designed to do away with war when war has not been prevented or avoided. My delegation believes—or feels, which is a deeper way of thinking—that such reactions are quite just and legitimate, because they are encouraged and brought about by the most noble and lofty forces of the human spirit and because they are in line with a natural need, a biological mandate to defend and safeguard human life.

* Resumed from the 1979th meeting.

9. Our distinguished Organization, the United Nations, is basically founded on those spiritual values. For that reason the Preamble to the Charter reaffirms the determination of peoples to preserve mankind from the scourge of war. This is also one of the first purposes of the United Nations:

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.

10. Historical experience, which has recurred *ad nauseum*, and reason and human feeling agree that there cannot be and must not be any scourge, any major calamity or disaster afflicting human beings worse than the phenomenon of war, which destroys the greatest good which is life, the foundation of all else which is good.

11. In order to put an end to the great disaster of war, the Charter placed its trust in the political organization of power, sheer power, to impose peace. We are not saying that the system of collective security conceived in the Charter is bad. In principle, it was natural, logical and consistent with the circumstances which existed when the Charter was framed, because at that time the major Powers—major because of their industrial power and their financial and military might—were in a position to provide guarantees for the world against war.

12. But, while we are not affirming that the system of collective security enshrined in the Charter was poorly conceived, we would say that facts have shown increasingly that the system does not function well, that it is deteriorating constantly, and that this has come about as a result of a lack of unity on the part of the major Powers, and that unity is needed for the smooth functioning of the system and is essential for peace.

13. The political success and wisdom of the international instruments and structures which exist, including the Charter, and their ability to overcome human problems and do away with the lack of security in relations among peoples, depend to a very large extent upon the excellence of the texts but also fundamentally on the spiritual values of governments and peoples and those who apply the rules and the norms of those instruments.

14. We would not want to be pessimistic and indulge in exaggerated, more or less facile criticism.

15. We believe that it might be more useful, more constructive and perhaps in the final analysis more effective, if we were to become more creative and seize upon an optimistic view of the future of mankind and our Organization.

16. Circumstances may change; the human picture is a constantly changing and variegated one. It may well be that national passions, suspicion, bitterness and struggles for power will continue, but a sense of one's own responsibility

in the face of lack of security and uncertainty over the fate of human beings may prevail. Although new, modern weapons of mass destruction will continue to pose a threat, the unity of power necessary to ensure peace in the world may be restored.

17. The obvious deterioration of the system of international security for imposing peace, a system to be used primarily by the permanent members of the Security Council, should not be allowed to have a bad effect upon peace in this Assembly, which is representative of the membership of our Organization, as though we were nothing more than chess-men on the international chess-board.

18. For the promotion of peace in the Middle East, the principles of international law, the norms of the Charter and the principles set forth therein provide this Assembly with effective international instruments.

19. We have available to us Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which constitutes a harmonious and carefully thought-out plan setting forth well-balanced views covering all the extremes existing in the serious situation in the Middle East. The well-balanced body of measures contained in that resolution reflect a strict application of purposes, principles and norms for action expressly provided for in the United Nations Charter and solemnly reaffirmed by the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)].

20. In compliance with Council resolution 242 (1967), Ambassador Jarring was appointed mediator and began his difficult task of negotiation, which deserves our full support and which is a credit to his hard work in the exceedingly important task to which he has devoted his efforts.

21. The Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, as I have already said, reaffirms the universal and unconditional validity of the purposes and principles of the Charter; it urges Member States to use and try to implement as best they can the means and methods provided by the Charter for the pacific settlement of any dispute or situation endangering international peace and security, including negotiation, mediation and conciliation—all so many ways of settling the conflict in the Middle East in a desirable manner.

22. Furthermore, in terms of practical action, means for bringing about conciliation that deserve great praise have also been put into effect by the mission of Heads of African States, in accordance with a resolution adopted on 23 June 1971 by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. It may well be that their action will lead to practical steps and the complete implementation of Council resolution 242 (1967).

23. The elements of draft resolution A/L.652 and Add.1, which my delegation is sponsoring with Costa Rica and Haiti, are quite in line with existing legal principles, and all fall within the framework of the proper functioning of the United Nations and are designed to promote existing negotiations and efforts at conciliation. These efforts should be redoubled, and States should be called upon to

contribute to them, thereby creating a favourable atmosphere for a peaceful, just and final settlement.

24. Our draft is not an original one possessing virtues that will automatically bring about a settlement. As I have already stated, the fact is that no text could aspire alone to such an achievement. Everything depends upon the spiritual values of those in charge of implementing the texts.

25. The course of action we have suggested falls within the framework of existing negotiations and efforts at conciliation, and in terms of practical achievement our purpose is to act fully in accordance with resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council.

26. If we wish to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful settlement of the dispute, it would not be advisable or wise to indulge in mutual accusations or recriminations. Understandably enough, the representatives of the parties, who have first-hand experience in this dismaying affair, tend to blame all acts of commission or omission on others.

27. In my opinion, all Members involved in this effort should take a stand on one side—the side of peace, the side of reason, the side of conciliatory efforts and negotiated settlement in this whole situation composed of illegal, reprehensible acts, in this warlike situation which offends the conscience of all mankind and indeed poses a threat to the entire international community, to us all.

28. We realize that the path to negotiation and conciliation is not an easy one. It requires patience and lengthy, tenacious effort. It will be an uphill battle, for on the path ahead lie many obstacles and difficulties, and it is our task to remove them. And, really we have no other choice. In order to solve the problems of peace, we must appeal to the consciences and deeper motives of men, for it is there that the destiny of the world will ultimately be decided. Persistence should be our byword until peace is achieved. That is the simple philosophy underlying our draft resolution.

29. Mr. NUÑEZ (Costa Rica) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The delegation of Costa Rica is indeed pleased and honoured to join with the delegations of Haiti and Uruguay in submitting this draft resolution, which endeavours to reflect the main concerns set forth in the general debate on the situation in the Middle East. May we now take a few minutes of the Assembly's time to explain draft resolution A/L.652 and Add.1?

30. I am pleased to announce that this text will be submitted in revised form.¹ A further operative paragraph will be added reading as follows:

“Decides to retain the item entitled “The situation in the Middle East” maintained on the agenda of the General Assembly until a peaceful, just and definitive solution has been achieved”.

31. My delegation very much welcomes the expressions of goodwill and desire for peace on the part of the two most

competent representatives of the parties in the conflict before us, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban. In the course of the debate there have been moments of high tension and emotion, feelings of bitterness and hostility, but this has not eclipsed the firm hope, unanimously expressed, for peace, stability, prosperity and the harmonious coexistence of the peoples of the Middle East.

32. At this time, which is filled with apprehension, we wish to set aside any negative considerations. We wish to overcome obstacles. Let us give peace a chance, and indeed as many chances as are needed for it to prevail in relations among these peoples who, because of their contributions to universal culture, deserve our full respect, admiration, gratitude and affection.

33. Taking a spiritual approach to history, the Government of Costa Rica has always been prepared to support the peaceful existence and security of the State of Israel as a sovereign political entity, but this does not imply any lack of respect toward the other peoples with whom Israel has to share a geographical area of the world which throughout history has seen more upheaval than anywhere else. The tides of history have struck this area of the world, which has witnessed the movements of peoples determined to survive and become an active and creative part of the modern world, which wants to ensure well-being for all and to destroy all injustices which stand in the way.

34. I do not wish in any way to offend the dignity or infringe upon the fundamental rights of any peoples that have walked together throughout history with the people of Israel, when I say, as representative of my Government and—if I may be allowed—as a Catholic priest, that the position of Costa Rica is based on a historical event the effects of which cannot be avoided. It must be recognized that the admission of this fact for many people is nothing but a religious or ethical act, but the effects are very real to those of us who accept it. A unique historical event occurred when a people arose as a result of a triangular pact the terms of which are: one God, one people, one land. There then emerged a constant historical bond as the people became vitally identified with the land, with a constant reference to their God. It may well be that members of this people as individuals or in groups have denied God and have forgotten the land. It may well be that the physical limits of the land have changed with passing circumstances, where not the people of the area themselves, but the forces of despotism and imperialism, from the most ancient to the most recent times, have played an important role. But throughout these vicissitudes, the triangular pact was not broken. On the contrary, it found concrete expression in the fundamental principle of civilized life among nations that people have a vital right to determine for themselves the kind of life they prefer within their own territory, with precise and secure borders recognized both by immediate neighbours and the international community.

35. When two empires were overthrown as a result of two wars, the geo-politics of the Middle East were redefined. First there was a state of extreme fluidity but now it is being consolidated in final form as recognition is gaining ground of the right of all the peoples of the area to live as

¹ Subsequently circulated as document A/L.652/Rev.1.

sovereign nations within clear, precise, secure and recognized boundaries.

36. The United Nations, acting as the conscience of history, decided in 1948 to recognize the right of one of these peoples to live in one part of that area, as a sovereign State and independent nation. The people of Israel thus realized a dream, an aspiration, which was based on that triangular pact, which cannot disregard the philosophy of history. It was to be hoped—and this indeed was the intention of the United Nations—that that people, at the end of its age-old painful and tragic journey, could then live with its neighbours and create happiness for all human beings in the area without any distinction. This aspiration should have been realized peaceably. Unfortunately, the process was interrupted by war.

37. I wonder if we would be discussing today the subject that we are discussing with so much anguish if United Nations decisions, constructively, as a source of law, instead of leading to violence, had created powerful movements toward negotiations in a spirit of good will and if United Nations efforts had helped countries wishing to do so to set themselves up as sovereign nations within clear and just boundaries and if there had been negotiations to define the rights of those who have had to live in States not entirely hospitable to their cultures? Instead of violence there should have been an attempt at mutual understanding, an attempt at co-operation and economic integration, an attempt to promote the social and economic development not just of one side but of all the peoples living in the area.

38. Will this process of war continue, or will we help peace to—as it were—break out in the area, assuming, as we have heard, that there is a genuine desire for peace? Can only instruments of war in the end stop suffering, stop destruction, stop the violations of the rights of the various peoples living in the area? No, a thousand times no.

39. An anguished voice has already been heard to say in this noble forum: “Never again war, war never again”. Neither Jews, nor Egyptians, nor Palestinians, nor the other noble groups living in that mysterious part of the world deserve it. We have the instruments for peace which are worthy of dignified human beings. First, the resolution creating the State of Israel; second, Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which in a stroke of genius and creativity established a fair and equitable framework for efforts designed to achieve peace; and, third, there is the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, entrusted to a distinguished international figure, Mr. Jarring. To those instruments we can add the spontaneous efforts of the emerging nations, the African countries which have promoted a peace mission headed by 10 heads of African States, who have produced a document showing good intentions which can serve subsequently as a source of understanding. It is true that that document does not have a strictly legal value equal to that of the other instruments which I have mentioned, but it is an expression of goodwill; and many of the speakers at this rostrum have referred to it as a very important document.

40. But if there is still time for us to do anything about contributing to peace in the world, if these documents are not enough, then we here, together, can produce another

document. We can applaud those who have said that they want to establish friendly ties among the peoples of the Middle East. Our job here now is to express this intention. My Government is pleased to join with the delegation of Uruguay in submitting a draft resolution [*A/L.652 and Add.1*] as a logical consequence of our spiritual values, of our need of the rule of law and desire to contribute to the reign of peace.

41. Our draft resolution does not contain anything which, in our opinion, would work against the desires for peace expressed by the parties that are now regrettably in conflict. Nothing can be interpreted as a partisan view; everything is designed to achieve peace. For this reason we trust that all delegations which are anxious to do away with obstacles to peace will support this draft resolution.

42. There are many matters which those with good intentions would like to see included in a draft resolution on the situation in the Middle East. But if we were to include them all, that would necessarily involve us in a “virtuous” circle. If we tried to include certain things, then others would have to be brought in to counter-balance them, and there would be no end to it. That would be a futile search for perfection, one which very probably would hurt our chances for success at any level.

43. That would indeed be an outline for a final peace treaty, which, because of its delicacy, must be left in the hands of a negotiator who can undertake a process that will yield the desired fruit—peace.

44. The process which will lead the parties to the conflict to peace is a process that is very similar to the gestation of human life; it takes place in the mysterious environment of the mother or it cannot take place at all.

45. We would ask for others free from prejudice or pre-established positions to help us overcome the obstacles to peace. We would ask all representatives to work in a positive direction and to demonstrate a sincere desire for peace and affection for all the peoples of the Middle East, as we are enjoined to do by a message uppermost in the minds of many men at this time of the year, a message which in fact came from that troubled part of the world: “Peace to all men of good will”.

46. Mr. EBAN (Israel): This is the first time that I come to a United Nations rostrum since the death of Ralph Bunche. Mr. Bunche was a servant of the entire international community, but he has a special place in Israel's history. As early as October 1948, in his first report, he had the foresight to describe Israel as a vibrant reality, whose sovereign existence was a starting-point for any true vision of the Middle Eastern future. In subsequent years his work of conciliation and his efforts in the field of peace-keeping had a special bearing on the Middle East. I cherished him as a friend and as a partner in the work of peace. He leaves a bright memory behind.

47. The present debate has not substantially advanced the Middle East towards a solution of its tensions. We should not be surprised at this. What is needed for a solution of the Middle Eastern crisis is not public controversy but private conciliation. After all, the issues of history, equity, reality,

law and peace have all been revolved in many places at many times. I sometimes ask myself if anything new is capable of being said.

48. As we listened to the speeches and read the reports, we became aware of a constant dialogue between the Middle Eastern countries and each other, and between them and the rest of the world. Sometimes there was something new. Here and there there was an eccentric deviation from rationality, like the description given by the representative of Guinea in his statement [2010th meeting] of Israel as commanding and controlling the policies of major Powers and casting aspersions on those African States—happily a majority of them—which maintain dignified co-operation with Israel. That co-operation is a fact of international life. So also, irrespective of the parliamentary outcome, is the existence of a document signed by the Heads of nine African States; this document, on a high level of objectivity and international courtesy, sets out proposals which, while not being identical with the policies of either party, would open the way to an immediate renewal of fruitful conciliation.

49. Well, there have been other entertaining moments in the debate, such as Mr. Baroody interrupting his pugilistic career in order to reflect on the need for removing Israel's flag from the map of the Middle East and the United Nations.

50. But with those exceptions, the debate has concentrated on well-known and familiar themes.

51. In discussing these draft resolutions I should like briefly to summarize the basic philosophy with which Israel approaches the termination of this debate. It is an unchangeable fact of history that the Jewish people has resumed its career as a nation, in the land which gave it birth and in which the universal conscience has witnessed and endorsed its renewal. This nation has a right to safeguard its security, in full recollection of the implacable hostility to which, for 23 years, it has been subjected. Israel has a right to free negotiation on all the problems affecting its security, including the problems of withdrawal, the determination of secure and recognized boundaries, and additional arrangements for ensuring a stable future for itself and its neighbours.

52. As I said before, the policy of Israel is not annexation, but peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined by negotiation and agreement. Our business is not to reconstruct the fragile armistice which fell about our heads with great potentiality of ruin; our business is innovation, to build a stable and enduring peace.

53. Now an understanding of Israel's attitude is no less important than a detailed analysis of texts. At the heart of our response to these draft resolutions there stands our deep preoccupation with physical security. There is something special in the intensity and depth of that preoccupation. There is something special because no other people has undergone such an assault on its physical security as that which Israel suffered during the Nazi decade. This is an experience whose depth and scope had no parallel in the consciousness of any other people, and there is no other State in the international community which has lived for 23

years with a permanent mark of interrogation hovering over its very existence.

54. Therefore we cannot possibly escape this predicament of security. We brood upon it and reflect upon it day and night. That is why the peace-making process must have the precision of craftsmanship, and that is why the peace structure must arise from the agreement of the parties at issue.

55. At the very root of the problem there lies an absence of confidence. We are told that the Arab States believe that Israel's policy is based on some arbitrary appetite for expansion. Now that is not true. In peace negotiations we shall make only such proposals on boundaries as are essential for security. That will be the criterion for the changes that we shall propose, and I do not intend to discuss again the immense and unchallengeable historic, political and juridical justification for saying that what we have to do is not to build an armistice line but for the first time to establish permanent, agreed and secure boundaries between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and each of its neighbours. On the Israeli side our view of Egyptian policy is this: we fear and we believe that it is Egypt's policy first to ensure that we return to the fragility and vulnerability of the armistice demarcation line and then to maintain and continue the pressure upon us. In other words, we are not convinced that there is a genuine and authentic desire for peace.

56. Now this lack of confidence is nourished by the refusal to negotiate. This lack of confidence is reinforced by some of the evasive replies which the Egyptian Government gave to Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire [A/8541, annex I]. We believe that its proposals on the Suez Canal mean a renewal of the blockade. We believe that its proposals on the Straits of Tiran mean a permissive capacity to renew the blockade. We believe, in fact, that the Egyptian Government is suggesting the restoration of the fragile armistice, simply replacing the word "armistice" by the word "peace".

57. This is a frank statement of Israel's predicament due to its lack of confidence in basic Egyptian intentions. Now if there is a lack of confidence on Egypt's part in Israel's intentions and on Israel's part in Egypt's intentions, what is the solution? The solution is negotiation. If we are wrong in this interpretation of Egypt's attitude, nothing but the processes of negotiation could bring about a modification, if a modification is justified by reality.

58. The international history of recent years, and especially of 1971, proves that negotiation is not a question of procedure, but a dynamic principle which has its effect on substantive positions and eventually brings about concrete agreement. But if negotiation is to be effective it must be free. Neither party can ask of the other party that it accept its own views or proposals in advance of the negotiation itself. The multiplicity and variety of the possibilities open for negotiation were discussed in my address to the General Assembly on 30 September this year [1946th meeting]. We are available for a discussion of an especial agreement on opening the Suez Canal with a certain withdrawal of Israeli forces to an agreed distance, provided that the conditions are met which would neutralize and balance the resultant

military risk. We are available for an immediate renewal of discussions on an over-all settlement under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring and within the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

59. The question is whether the General Assembly will take action which would have the effect of removing the difficulties which have virtually suspended the work of that mission since February of this year. The General Assembly has an opportunity, if only it will seize it, to unlock the door and to unfreeze the deadlock. I see three such possibilities. One lies in operative paragraph A of the memorandum signed by nine African Heads of State, which is quoted in a draft resolution presented by the delegation of Barbados [A/L.651], namely,

“(a) Acceptance, by the . . . parties, to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Mr. Jarring . . . and within the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in order to reach a peace agreement”.

We have not made a secret of the fact, and I shall not deny it today, that we regard the term “indirect negotiations” as an unfortunate reservation. Experience has shown that international agreements are not reached by States one of which refuses to have direct contact with another. But in order to make some movement possible we have accepted the indirect procedure involved in Mr. Jarring’s mission, without ever abandoning the hope that if those contacts were fruitful they would lead to the logical consequence of a normal negotiating procedure. At any rate that is one possibility: the acceptance of the proposals of the African Presidents.

60. Another possibility lies in the adoption of the Barbadian draft resolution—which, I understand, has additional sponsorship as well—as it stands. Again, this draft resolution does not endorse many of Israel’s positions. It does not endorse some of our most vital positions. But if it were adopted, supporting the proposals submitted by the Committee of African Heads of State for the consideration of the parties, then Israel would be able on that basis the next morning to resume co-operation—which, in fact, we have never wished to suspend—with Egypt under the auspices of the Jarring mission.

61. Another possibility would lie in the adoption of the draft resolution presented with such moving eloquence this morning by the representatives of Costa Rica and Uruguay [A/L.652 and Add.1]. Latin America is the only major disinterested continent at work on the Middle Eastern scene in the sense that neither Israel nor any of the Arab States are members of its continental organization. Therefore, there does not exist the disparity, the parliamentary or arithmetic disparity, which objectively arises in other continents in whose organizations Israel is not represented while Arab States are represented in great arithmetical profusion.

62. There is, therefore, a certain moral weight arising from detachment, from distance, from objectivity, in proposals that come from that continent. Here we have a text to the emotive sources of which I have listened with attention; a text which has nothing abrasive, nothing unbalanced, and one which says some very simple things, namely, that,

irrespective of whatever has happened before, the parties should again co-operate in renewing negotiations through the mission of the Special Representative and do their utmost to make possible the agreements necessary for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) taken as a single whole.

63. All that the draft resolution says, therefore, is that there should be peace, that there should be negotiations, and that those negotiations should be within the procedural and substantive framework indicated in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). I am at a loss to understand how anybody who wants peace and who supports resolution 242 (1967) can find anything whatever to object to in this text. At any rate, if it were adopted, then Israel would on the morrow of its adoption make contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to discuss a renewal of the effective work of his mission.

64. Here then are various possibilities under which the present paralysis, or suspense or deadlock in the conciliation effort could be broken. It is for this reason that we can only react with some perplexity and confusion to the existence of the text presented by Afghanistan and other Member States [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2]. We notice that this does not command the unanimous support of the nine African Presidents—that in fact it makes no acknowledgment whatever of the work that they have done. I know that there is a vast disparity between Israel and Egypt in their voting strength in this Assembly, but the fact that there are 18 Arab States and an Egyptian voting block of over 40 States cannot really induce us to sacrifice our vital interest to arithmetical hazards.

65. I believe that the organs of the United Nations should attempt to promote agreement rather than to adjudicate the main issues themselves, and the texts to which I have given approving reference have this feature in them: they seek to get the negotiating process on foot again. Their adoption would mean the renewal of the work of the Jarring mission the next day. They show the degree of restraint necessary in order to leave agreements to the sovereign responsibility of the parties themselves.

66. The text presented by Afghanistan and other countries does not have any of these positive qualities. If there are formulations, such as those presented from Latin America, which are free from prejudice and from abrasive criticism and which would enable the Jarring mission to resume its work tomorrow morning, why should the General Assembly insist on a text which would clearly have a contrary effect? Of course, the issues to be voted on here are less dramatic and far-reaching than those which are being discussed in the Security Council today, and of course General Assembly recommendations do not have the same political or juridical force, yet the General Assembly is in the important position of having the capacity today to promote or to obstruct negotiations. I believe that a vote for the two draft resolutions which I have discussed would have the effect of renewing negotiation tomorrow. I believe that a vote for the Afghanistan draft would obstruct that negotiation, and for the following reasons.

67. I now wish to make a detailed comment on the text of draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2. First, let me say

a word about its sponsorship. It is sponsored by a group of States half of which have no relations with Israel while all have relations with Egypt. In addition to this initial evidence of bias, there is the known circumstance that Egyptian representatives took part in its formulation. This document, therefore, is a description of the Arab position. It is not, in our submission, an attempt to formulate an objective international policy.

68. Some of its main defects are as follows. First, the statement in the third paragraph of the preamble is not relevant to the current dispute because the United Nations —almost the totality of its membership—are agreed that the cease-fire lines should not be abandoned until the establishment of peace. There is hardly any support in the international community for any other doctrine. Therefore, general statements on this matter of territorial situations do not have relevance to this position. Israel's policy is that there would be withdrawal from the cease-fire lines, on the establishment of peace, to those boundaries that would have to be agreed between Israel and its neighbours.

69. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble there is this great paradox. The General Assembly is invited to express appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State, and yet it has for some reason never been seized officially of the conclusion to which the efforts of that Committee have led. Substantively, draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 is in effect a repudiation of the efforts by the African Heads of State. It omits the main proposals of the African Heads of State and it includes provisions and statements inconsistent with those proposals. If the General Assembly wishes to express a sincere appreciation of the efforts of the 10 African Heads of State, it will surely support a resolution which embodies their conclusions. Those conclusions are embodied in the draft submitted by Barbados; they are not embodied—scarcely one of them is quoted, hardly one sentence of them exists—in draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2.

70. The fifth paragraph of the preamble violates Security Council resolution 242 (1967) under which withdrawal from occupied territories is conditional on the establishment of peace with secure and recognized boundaries. That link, which is the essence of the Security Council's jurisprudence, is weakened here. It is weakened by an expression of concern over the occupation without any expression of concern over the absence of peace. In this one-sided form the paragraph becomes little but invective. Nothing of this spirit—which isolates the issue of occupation from the other two conditional links, the establishment of peace and secure and recognized boundaries—appears in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) or in the conclusions of the African Heads of State. Thus, this paragraph is in conflict with the jurisprudence of the Security Council, and therefore with a documentary consensus which the two parties have accepted.

71. We do not believe that the Special Representative of the Secretary-General can take as his mandate anything at all except the text of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The renewal of his mission in November of last year was made possible only when it was made clear that, in his contacts with the parties, he would invoke nothing except the text of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

Why, therefore, create a confused and double jurisprudence by selective, inaccurate quotation from that basic document? The fifth paragraph of the preamble is an inaccurate and selective quotation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and therefore cannot in logic be supported by those who give their support to that Security Council resolution.

72. Operative paragraph 1, the reaffirmation concerning the acquisition of territory by force, is a selective and inaccurate quotation of the preamble of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In fact, the draft submitted by Afghanistan and other countries does not reaffirm the basic provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) on peace, on secure and recognized boundaries or on the mutual recognition of States. It only reaffirms a preambular reference of interest to the Arab side without any corresponding reference to any of the balancing provisions of interest to Israel.

73. One way of destroying a document, of course, is to oppose it. Another way is to take out of it—and, therefore, out of the conditions of balance—one part, without any corresponding reference to another part. The delicate equilibrium achieved by the authors and supporters of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is assaulted by every attempt at selective quotation. The most glaring attempt at selective quotation is this elevation of a preambular reference in the Security Council resolution to the first operative reaffirmation of this text.

74. I turn now to operative paragraph 2. The Security Council resolution envisages a peace agreement in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). This text says that the peace agreement must be that envisaged in the Special Representative's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [A/8541, annex I]. Therefore, this draft narrows the options; it does not broaden them; it does not tend to leave them as they were. This draft narrows the options to a single working document which has been a source of deadlock since February 1971.

75. Now, the parties have a sovereign right to reach a peace agreement on whatever terms they mutually accept, and they have mutually accepted the principles laid down in the Security Council resolution. Despite their conflict on interpretation, the fact of their documentary consensus is valuable; but they have not reached a similar consensus on this working paper.

76. They must not be limited to the sole possibility outlined in the Special Representative's report. That aide-mémoire should not be elevated to a position at which it becomes an obstacle. Here I will quote the wise observation in the statement of the eminent Foreign Minister of Zaire [2010th meeting], who pleaded with us not to let the peace of mankind depend on the reply to the aide-mémoire of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. I think that is a very important exhortation. If there is a contradiction between the needs of negotiation and a document, which comes first? Do we canonize the document, or do we make an effort to help the parties embark on active negotiation?

77. Something of this applies also to operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. This is perhaps the heart of the issue that the

General Assembly has been discussing. Our opposition to these paragraphs arises from the fact that they merely consolidate the deadlock which has existed since February 1971. Here the General Assembly is invited to say that "there has been a suspension of the negotiations since February; let us make sure that that suspension should continue; let us consolidate and confirm the sources of that deadlock".

78. These paragraphs are all the more extraordinary when we consider that the other drafts before us—submitted by Uruguay and Costa Rica, and Barbados—as well as the African 10-Power memorandum, all make an honest attempt to widen, and not to narrow down, the approach to the negotiating table. There is also a factual misstatement in these paragraphs. It is not a fact that Egypt replied positively, or Israel negatively, to the aide-mémoire. What happened is that each State made counter-proposals—which is the legitimate right of each. There is not a single operative sentence in the memorandum of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to which Egypt replied with unconditional acceptance; in each case it replied—as it legitimately could—with different formulations embodying its own policy. Israel did the same.

79. If the object of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is to get an agreed solution, it is not legitimate to dictate a particular solution to either party, as is done in operative paragraph 5. The States concerned have a right to respond to that aide-mémoire in terms of their policy—to say what they want, to say what is acceptable and what is not acceptable to them.

80. What I think should have happened in February 1971 and what should happen now is this: now that both parties, in their reactions to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire, have set out their basic positions, there should take place detailed and concrete negotiations between them in order to examine the possibility of bringing those positions into agreement. I do not deny that the task is difficult; there are gaps in the positions of the parties. But the aide-mémoire of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, having fulfilled its catalytic purpose in eliciting precise formulations of the parties' attitudes, should now yield to a process of concrete and detailed discussion of the differences which have emerged in their replies.

81. That is what I mean by saying that a solution would be for the General Assembly to recommend a continuation of the Jarring mission, in the terms indicated in some of the drafts before us—and here I quote the memorandum of the African Heads of State:

"... acceptance by the two parties to resume direct negotiations under the auspices of Dr. Jarring and within the terms of resolution 242 (1967) in order to reach a peace settlement"—

or, as is stated with equal effect and with somewhat different formulation in the draft presented by Costa Rica, Haiti and Uruguay [*A/L.652 and Add.1*]:

"Requests the parties to agree to renew negotiations through the mission of the Special Representative and to do their utmost to make possible the agreements neces-

sary for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) taken as a single whole".

82. To either of these drafts, if accepted by the General Assembly, my Government would make immediate and affirmative response.

83. On the other hand, draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 is not calculated to unfreeze the deadlock. I get the impression that it has a different purpose. Its purpose is not to break the deadlock, but to place responsibility for the deadlock on Israel. Now, that is a purely tactical objective; it could perhaps be achieved because of the realities of arithmetical strength, but it would be of no substantive benefit to the Middle East or to the world. There may even be a more ominous consequence, and in the light of what is written in the press I have to ask myself and the General Assembly this question, Is not the object of this draft resolution to prevent Israel's emergence from the suspension of the Jarring talks, to create a legend of responsibility for that paralysis, and, under the cover of that legend, to renew the fighting? Has the General Assembly the right to exclude from its mind that one of the consequences of this draft resolution would be to create a permissive atmosphere for the absence of negotiation and, therefore, for a possible renewal of the fighting? Is it an accident that not a word in favour of the cease-fire appears in this document? Those questions have to be asked in the light of what we see in the press.

84. I cannot get away from this problem of the absence of confidence. In order to take the issue beyond its procedural context, let me say what is the main difficulty that faces Israel in respect of this demand, in advance of the negotiation, for a total withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula. Israel does not question that that is a legitimate Egyptian position. But we have an equal and legitimate right to make our reservations and counter-proposals in the light of tragic and recent history, in the light of our conviction—to give one example—that on the day that there were no Israeli troops at Sharm el Sheikh the fourth Arab-Israel war might have begun, and that nothing would remain except the date. Now, this is our conviction; this is our belief. It is sustained by a memory so traumatic and vivid as to be present, I think, in the mind of everybody here.

85. We do not believe that we can, therefore, in advance, exclude our right to reach a contractual arrangement, within an agreement—and there are such agreements of different kinds across the world—on the basis of which we would be able to ensure the protection of Israel's vital security interests and vital navigation interests. The fragility of the other alternatives is being illustrated day by day. Many representatives have spoken of what they call "Security Council guarantees". I ask all my colleagues here, does such a thing exist? Of course, we aspire to a world governed by order and law and peace, in which there will be international authorities capable of guaranteeing security. That is the dream; that is the aspiration. Does anybody think it now exists?

86. It is a very lofty dream. It has a very powerful hold on the Israeli mind. If you examine this dream of an international family of sovereign nations bound together in

a covenant of law and peace, you can find its origins in the literature and in the philosophy of our people. But does that dream exist? Does nobody see the link of connexion between this discussion and the even more tense and momentous discussion proceeding in another place? Experience has told us that no matter what assault was committed on Israel, the Security Council would take no action to redress that assault. If the blockade against Israel were renewed, the Security Council would be able to do nothing. If troop concentrations or invasion were committed against us, the Security Council would be able to do nothing. If one morning Tel Aviv were bombed without any provocation, the Security Council would do nothing. That is the fact of the power balance.

87. Can anybody imagine the Security Council, even if a majority were mobilized, allowing, on two levels of potential veto paralysis, the adoption of a resolution not compatible with Arab ambitions and Arab aspirations? Have we not seen this week that the Security Council is effectively debarred from taking action against any State which has the protection of one of the major Powers? Is there any difference between the Soviet-Egyptian treaty and other treaties the effects of which have been seen in the Security Council debate this week?

88. Therefore this question of getting agreements on security that are valid, that depend upon negotiation, that are implemented by the parties, that are not at the whim and the fancy of great Power competition--this is an urgent interest, safeguarded in the other texts, but utterly prejudiced in this one by the demand that before we negotiate we should say in advance that we exclude all ideas except those which envisage a total withdrawal to a former international boundary--which incidentally nobody has said is an existing international boundary. The international boundary between Israel and Egypt should be established by their agreement. It should have happened many years ago. It should now happen through negotiation under the auspices of the Jarring mission.

89. To sum up, then, draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 merely repeats in an even more unbalanced form the resolution adopted in 1970 [resolution 2628 (XXV)], which had no beneficial effect on the Middle Eastern situation. The aim should now be to help both parties to emerge from the deadlock which has existed since February 1971. The parties have both stated their fundamental positions. We have not stated ours in an ultimative or conditional way. We do not say that Egypt's acceptance of any of our views must be a condition for renewing the talks. But now that the parties have explained their fundamental positions, they should negotiate under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in a detailed and concrete way in order to reach agreement.

90. The memorandum of the 10 African Heads of State, the Costa Rican, Haitian and Uruguayan draft resolution [A/L.652] and the Barbados text [A/L.651] all contain formulations which, whatever our other reservations are, would make this renewal possible. On the other hand, the draft resolution contained in document A/L.650, by its selective and inaccurate quotations of the Security Council resolution, by its atmosphere of acrimony, and by the narrow range of the alternatives which it presents, makes

negotiation less probable and therefore would have the effect of weakening the potential stability of the cease-fire.

91. That, then, explains the Israel vote. I believe that a vote for draft resolution A/L.650 would obstruct negotiation. We shall therefore oppose it. I believe that a vote for the other texts here presented would enable the negotiations to proceed tomorrow morning and therefore, notwithstanding our other reservations, we believe that the General Assembly would be wise to give them its support.

92. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (Egypt): There are no international boundaries between Egypt and Israel. There have not in the past been international boundaries between Egypt and Israel. When Israel was born, as a result of the resolution adopted by this Assembly in 1947 [resolution 181 (II)], it was created in a part of Palestine.

93. The letter by which the Israeli-Jewish State solicited recognition from the President of the United States of America declared clearly that it sought recognition within the frontiers and borders allotted to it by the 1947 partition resolution of the General Assembly. That partition resolution of the General Assembly did not partition the Middle East. It partitioned Palestine. Our historical borders and frontiers--4,000 years old--with Palestine remain as they existed with the ex-Mandated Territory under the British Mandate. These were the former boundaries and when the Mandate was ended, they became the actual borders of our country with Palestine.

94. What Mr. Jarring has been asking is that Israel commit itself to return to the international borders of Egypt with Palestine, as a first step, after which the Palestine question would be examined. Nobody really dared to think that Israel's ambition for expansion would not stop at engulfing the entire Arab State created in 1947, or what was left of it after the earlier wars, but would include going into other, surrounding countries in the Middle East to try to violate the borders of Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

95. I have not come here to reply or to engage in polemics which seek to delay and belittle the action of this Assembly. I have come to say that the Foreign Minister of Israel could have made a very short statement here, which perhaps could have been a historic statement. He could have come here and said, "Yes, we have no intention of expanding, and we commit ourselves never to expand, beyond the lines which we reached in 1947." If indeed secure borders are needed, they must be acceptable, because maximum security for yourselves is going to be maximum insecurity for your neighbours. The only way to get security is to get acceptance; and that can perhaps be achieved by withdrawal to lines acceptable to the Palestinians, to the Jordanians, to the Syrians and to the Egyptians.

96. We, for our part, have no intention, no desire, to expand one millimetre beyond our international borders. As far as Israel is concerned, our international borders are the borders with Palestine. Mr. Eban could have said that, and satisfied the anxieties which are in the minds of many people who do not know the situation as well as we do. Does Israel really want to expand, or is it only a poor country in search of shelter and security? Mr. Eban could have answered that, but he did not.

97. Another equally eloquent, short statement would have been: "Yes, we have accepted Security Council resolution 242 (1967), delicate or not delicate. We have accepted the paragraph in it appointing Mr. Jarring as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, engaged in and entrusted with the implementation of that resolution."

98. This man Mr. Jarring has found after four years that he has reached an impasse. He has said, "I cannot get out of this impasse without putting these questions and asking for parallel, simultaneous answers to them. Without that, I cannot do anything." He put his questions, he put them to Israel and to Egypt. We have replied and Israel has replied. Israel has replied by addressing a letter to us, through Mr. Jarring.

99. No amount of rhetoric can blur the situation. We have said, "Yes, we would" and this, of course, is conditional; I agree with Mr. Eban "accept to enter into a peace agreement with Israel if Israel would give you, Mr. Jarring, what you are asking, and that is a commitment to withdraw to the international borders of Egypt, and so on."

100. We never left the indirect negotiations, or the talks with Mr. Jarring. I have never left New York. I was here, and I am still here. It is Mr. Jarring who left New York. He left New York because, having received the reply saying for the first time, "No, we are not going to go back to the international boundaries of Egypt", he concluded that it meant, "Yes, we are going to annex a part of Egypt". And since he cannot be a party to facilitating the annexation of a country's territory, he left his work.

101. You ask him, "Why and how would you come back?" He has already said that. He has said it in his report to the Secretary-General [A/8541], which is in your hands. He has said that he can only come back if he gets a favourable answer from Israel.

102. It is painful for me now to have to speak about the African initiative. The African initiative is something that we cherish. We take it as a great demonstration of Africa's brotherhood and solidarity with us. We tell ourselves that it shows that "a friend in need is a friend indeed". The African mission has made a report. I have that report before me here. I have it in full. But the members of the mission found in their wisdom that they must keep the report confidential until the 41 Presidents of African States had seen it. They kept it as a confidential report; but from our brothers and colleagues here I know that Israeli embassies all over the world, especially that in London, are distributing the report.

103. Are they distributing this report complete? Is the document which many Members of the General Assembly have seen here a complete document? Is it not mutilated? Has not page 9 been taken out of it? I say it has; that what we have here is an eight-page memorandum. The full text—and I am very sorry I have to give it to you now—contains nine pages, and I should like to read, translating as quickly as possible from the original French, the last three paragraphs. I may not be keeping to what should be done by an African member of the Organization of African Unity, but what else can I do in order to show what is a fact: that Africa could not have been trading away

or selling some of its territory, or the territory of one of its member States; that Africa could not have been standing against the real implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967); that Africa could not have been opposing the initiative of Mr. Jarring. How else could I tell this Assembly that the African leaders never thought they had, or ever pretended to have had, or ever gave to themselves any special or different or separate mission other than that of strengthening Mr. Jarring's mission and of strengthening the United Nations effort for peace. How else can I tell this Assembly that they do believe in the guarantees of the world community—otherwise they could not go on living, weak as they are?

104. Instead, and in spite of what the Foreign Minister of Israel says in essence, that one cannot expect anything from the Security Council—they do expect that the dreams of men regarding the United Nations and its Charter will be realized. That is why they are here, and that is why we are here. It escapes me how anyone does not expect anything and does not believe that the United Nations can be anything but impotent. Why, then, do they bother to come here?

105. I shall now read the last three paragraphs of the memorandum, translated from the French:

"To judge by the data collected by the Sub-Committee, it would seem possible that the negotiations can be resumed under Dr. Jarring's auspices. Their success may be considered a foregone conclusion, provided that the practical application of the idea of secure and recognized frontiers does not compel Egypt to surrender part of its national territory.

"In the last analysis, the crux of the matter is to induce Israel to agree to the establishment (without any annexation of territory) of machinery which will adequately guarantee its security.

"It seems clear that the Security Council and the great Powers, which will be in a position, at the appropriate time, to enforce the decisions arrived at, have a crucial part to play in this connexion."

106. So the draft resolution of Afghanistan and 20 other States [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2] is a brave effort to force open the door to peace—the door being blocked by the reluctance or refusal of the State of Israel to reply to Mr. Jarring after four years of difficult, prolonged work to see how we can really take the first step on the road to peace. But if there is a resolution that tells us that Israel will never take a part of the land of Egypt, as is stated in the African conclusion—if there is a resolution that tells us that Israel will not seek any territorial annexation, as is stated in this memorandum—if, indeed, anyone will tell us that Israel will be satisfied with the guarantees to be given it by the international community, by the United Nations, by the Security Council, by permanent members—then that would be a better, longer step on the road to peace.

107. I just want to say that we are very, very thankful for the initiative taken by the African Heads of State. We have given it, and we do give it, every possibility of succeeding, because we have no doubt that they will never accept, even

if we should, the idea of the acquisition of territories as a result of war being enshrined or the idea that the Charter is good only to look at but not to live by. They will never accept that idea, and they will never accept part of the territory of Egypt being taken away through negotiation, or non-negotiation, or by the weight, the unbearable burden, of occupation, with a new principle being declared here that that occupation would continue until Egypt agreed to a way it could be lifted partially. That will never happen, and if we are speaking here only about a portion of the problem, the relations between Egypt and Israel—I am not speaking about all the other problems of the occupation by Israeli forces of three other Arab States and the rights of the Palestinians it is because we are trying to accommodate and take exactly the steps that Mr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, thought we could take.

108. But I say to the Foreign Minister of Israel and to all our friends here that when we say we should not insist on a reply to Mr. Jarring, we are not only getting Israel off the hook, so to speak; we are not only saying that we do not insist upon a positive reply from Israel; but also—and I hope this is obvious and very clear—we are also withdrawing, negating and making completely void, useless and meaningless the reply of Egypt to Ambassador Jarring. There will be no reply. I agree it was a conditional reply. The question itself was a conditional one: “If Israel does that, will you do this?”—and if it does not do it, then of course our reply will have no existence whatsoever. And if our reply does not exist, and Ambassador Jarring is back again, faced with a dilemma; if he is back again saying he has nowhere to go, then the only place he can go is home or to his post in Russia, leaving the United Nations and declaring this resolution after this year, and before it goes into another pilgrimage towards a fifth birthday, dead and non-existent.

109. That is why we want the Assembly to help us to push open the door to talks with Ambassador Jarring in order that the great concessions, the great new decision taken in the Middle East after 1967 for a really consolidated search for peace, should not be frustrated—because, if we have nothing to hope for, the only other course available to us is to ask the Assembly what to do and to ask Members to do what they pledged themselves to do when they signed the Charter: to be united for peace, to be united in order to ensure the territorial integrity of all States, and to gather in a concerted effort to remove any violation of territorial integrity by whatever means the General Assembly or the Security Council has available to it.

110. We have here a very simple draft resolution. We have accepted it, and I declare now in the name of Egypt that we are going to vote in favour of it. We shall vote for it because it is the will of our friends to try to get the United Nations to make a perhaps last effort to see that peace is realized in the Middle East on terms laid down by the Security Council in 1967. We are still abiding by that; we are going to vote in favour of this draft resolution, and we hope it will be adopted with the greatest possible majority.

111. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): I have returned to the rostrum to introduce formally the amendments contained in document A/L.655 introduced initially by Barbados. I am instructed by my colleague and friend

the representative of Ghana to announce to the Assembly that his Government joins Barbados in sponsoring draft resolution A/L.651 as also the amendments I now formally introduce to the Assembly. So the Governments of Barbados and Ghana are now parents of both the amendments and that draft resolution.

112. I shall not speak at length because, as can clearly be seen from the draft amendments, their purpose is essentially the same as that of the draft resolution I introduced to the Assembly on Saturday afternoon [2014th meeting].

113. Now, it is the considered view of my Government that the quintessence of the issue before us is not the elaboration of the terms which will ultimately be enshrined in the peace agreement, or peace treaty, between the contending parties, but, rather, that the purpose of the issue before us, the cross-road which we have reached, is the redoubling of our efforts, by way perhaps of a procedural modality, to resume the negotiations under the Special Representative, Mr. Jarring.

114. In sum then, as we understand it, the single purpose before the Assembly is the reactivation of the Jarring negotiations.

115. The Assembly will find that our amendments to draft resolution A/L.650 would essentially remove what we consider to be partisan positions dealing with the substance of the contentions, and replace them by procedural expedients. Those procedural expedients form the main part of the draft resolution which stood originally in the name of Barbados [A/L.651], in its operative paragraph 1.

116. It so happens that the views articulated and submitted to the parties by the 10 African Presidents are the considered views of the Government of Barbados. So that what has happened is that the views of the 10 African Presidents, as manifested in their recommendations to the contending parties, and the views of Barbados have collided in an identity. If, then, the Government of Barbados seeks to ascribe to the 10 Heads of African States the recommendations submitted both in paragraph 1 of our main draft resolution, and in the main portion of the draft amendments which I now submit, it is because we wish to demonstrate a certain intellectual honesty. We therefore wish to ascribe these recommendations to the African Presidents, who, in their wisdom and in their sobriety, have elaborated and formulated these views in a manner much better than we, in all humility, could have done. Hence, these are essentially our views, but they have been postulated, if you wish, by the 10 African Presidents in a manner which commends itself to my Government.

117. Therefore, we would remove the first five operative paragraphs of the so-called Afghanistan draft [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2] and replace them by paragraph 1 of my initial draft resolution [A/L.651]. Then we would add three other operative paragraphs. We would take note, for instance, of the response of the parties to the aforesaid proposals. We would call on the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Finally, we would call upon the parties to resume immediately the conversa-

tions under the auspices of the Special Representative, with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

118. Since we as a Government follow our intention to adhere scrupulously to a position of neutrality in this issue, we have not sought to amend other provisions of draft resolution A/L.650, which we find are patently and overtly partisan in nature and intention. If individual elements of that draft resolution are put to the vote seriatim, then my delegation, in conformity with instructions, will vote on them and so indicate the degree of support, or lack of support, which we would want to give to those particular provisions of the draft resolution.

119. The memorandum of the African Presidents has attracted to its personality varying degrees and definitions of secrecy, and my delegation would not want to enter into any debate on this, except to say that we know that the memorandum has been given the widest possible public currency, so that it is now a matter of public record. It is in the domain of the vulgar. It has been published *in extenso*, as we understand it, in one of the leading public newspapers in Dakar, Senegal; it has been given wide publicity, as we understand it, in newspapers in the Middle East—in Jerusalem and in Cairo; it has received equal public attention in newspapers in the United States, including the *Washington Post*.

120. Therefore, as we in our simplicity understand the word "secrecy", we could not, in the light of this factual evidence, ascribe to the personality of this document the classification of secrecy. But we do not propose to enter into any dispute in this matter.

121. One of my colleagues and friends would want to ascribe to me the accolade of a master espionage agent. I must in all simplicity decline that accolade. I do confess that I am a good diplomat—and I say this with appropriate immodesty—and I am even a better lawyer, but I must decline the accolade of a James Bond.

122. I have now said all that I want to say with respect to my amendments, except, finally, to invite the Assembly to vote by roll call on my second amendment, which would replace operative paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of draft resolution A/L.650, and again to vote by roll call on my third amendment; that is, the paragraph which reads as follows:

"Calls on the Secretary-General to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)".

123. Mr. PACHACHI (United Arab Emirates): It was too late for our delegation to take part in the general debate on this item. When we were admitted to membership a few days ago, the debate was approaching its end and we did not ask to take part in it, because we were aware of the tremendous pressure under which the General Assembly has been working these last hectic days of the session. In any event, my Arab colleagues have covered every aspect of the problem and there is nothing that I can add to what they have already eloquently said.

124. In the statement which I made on the occasion of the admission of the United Arab Emirates to membership in the United Nations a few days ago [2007th meeting], I stated very briefly the general position of my delegation on the question of Palestine and affirmed our solidarity with the other Arab States in upholding the right of the Palestinian people to their ancestral homeland and to the free exercise of the right of self-determination.

125. I should now like to confine my remarks to the draft resolutions before the Assembly. It is quite clear that these three drafts have many features in common; in fact, the drafts sponsored, respectively, by Barbados [A/L.651] and Costa Rica [A/L.652] add nothing essential to the 21-Power draft resolution [A/L.650]. Their main purpose, we are told, is to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in conformity with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). This main purpose, this avowed purpose, of the Barbadian and Costa Rican draft resolutions is fully covered in the 21-Power draft resolution; that draft resolution, too, calls for the reactivation of the Jarring mission in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

126. The difference lies not in what the two draft resolutions contain but in what they omit. Now, what do they omit? They omit the two distinctive features of the 21-Power draft resolution, namely: first, a clear affirmation of the fundamental Charter principle regarding the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war or the use of force—a principle which forms one of the two main pillars of Security Council resolution 242 (1967); and secondly, reactivation of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring, on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), as well as his peace initiative of 8 February 1971. So the omissions relate, first, to the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war, and secondly to Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February.

127. Since those two omissions constitute the main and essential difference between the 21-Power draft resolution and the other two drafts, it is necessary to examine them closely and see whether or not the General Assembly should endorse those omissions.

128. It is our view that the absence of any reference to the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war implies the negation of that principle which, as I have said, is one of the corner-stones of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Barbadian and Costa Rican drafts fail to relate the concept of secure and recognized boundaries envisaged in the resolution to that principle. They merely state that these boundaries shall be determined in the peace agreement, the implication being that new boundaries shall be negotiated without reference to any principle or recognized framework. In other words, the negotiators would not be able to rely on any internationally accepted principles or guidelines, but must proceed from the existing territorial *status quo*.

129. Thus, besides ignoring the Charter and Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which make the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition one of the bases of the settlement, such a method of negotiation inevitably gives Israel an enormous advantage. It would sanction and

perpetuate the gross inequality in the bargaining positions of Israel and Egypt. Can representatives really expect proper negotiations to be conducted when one side occupies vast territories of the other?

130. It was precisely to redress that inequality and establish some balance between the two respective positions that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) enunciated certain principles and guidelines to govern any eventual settlement. Without such principles as safeguards the Egyptian negotiator would constantly be at the mercy of his Israeli opposite. The question of conditional or unconditional negotiation was one of the principal issues discussed in the lengthy talks leading to the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

131. The Israeli position was, then, that the United Nations should confine its activity merely to calling upon the parties concerned to negotiate directly with a view to reaching a settlement. The Arab viewpoint was that there should be immediate and unconditional withdrawal from occupied territories. The majority of the members of the Council accepted neither of these points of view. The Israeli position was found to be totally unacceptable because it implied, first, the recognition of the right of Israel to continue indefinitely its occupation of Arab territory and to use that occupation for bargaining purposes, to impose on the Arabs a settlement that would involve the surrender of large areas of the occupied territories to Israel.

132. The fact is that the international community was determined to uphold the Charter principle concerning the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war. This position remains as valid in 1971 as it was in 1967. For, after all, it is not a matter that exclusively concerns the Arab-Israel conflict; it concerns one of the most important and fundamental principles enshrined in the Charter. It is a principle that cannot be compromised or tampered with.

133. In the negotiations leading to the adoption of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), it was found necessary to establish a framework for the eventual peace settlement and to lay down certain principles which should govern such a settlement, that is to say, certain conditions had to be agreed beforehand. It was on the basis of that common understanding that the lengthy and strenuous negotiations culminated in the unanimous adoption by the Security Council of resolution 242 (1967)—the first time such unanimity was obtained on a question as controversial and important as the Arab-Israel conflict.

134. Ambassador Jarring was appointed by the Secretary-General to promote agreement in accordance with the principles contained in that resolution. After more than three years of futile attempts, Ambassador Jarring, who has the most detailed and intimate knowledge of the positions of the two parties, came up with his peace initiative of 8 February 1971. That initiative was the result of thorough and exhaustive discussions with the two parties. He knew, as no one else could, the precise positions of the two parties—their demands, their fears, their hopes and their intentions. In other words, he was and still is uniquely qualified by his infinite patience and knowledge of the issues, as well as his integrity and ability, to pursue what the Secretary-General rightly described as an almost impossible task.

135. Ambassador Jarring proposed what he believed to be minimum conditions for breaking the deadlock. The idea of prior commitments was not his, but he proposed it in response to the insistent demands of both parties.

136. It is really quite astonishing that Israel and some of its supporters are now proclaiming the new slogan of no preconditions. It was Israel which had insisted on certain prior commitments from the United Arab Republic before agreeing to have indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. Let me quote from the Secretary-General's report before us:

“More importantly, each side was insisting that the other should be ready to make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions of a peace settlement.

“On the Israeli side there was insistence that the United Arab Republic should give specific, direct and reciprocal commitments towards Israel that it would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make towards Israel the various undertakings referred to in paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).” [A/8541, paras. 8 and 9.]

137. Ambassador Jarring's estimate of the situation, based as it was on his intimate knowledge of the positions of the two parties, and taking into account the obstacles and difficulties encountered in the months of futile and frustrating efforts, led him to the conclusion that the only way to unblock the talks was to obtain prior commitments from the two parties on crucial matters which they considered vital. Israel has insisted from the beginning that a settlement must be embodied in a peace agreement signed by the two sides. This demand the Egyptian Government at first rejected because under resolution 242 (1967) it was not specifically required to sign such an agreement with Israel, but finally accepted Ambassador Jarring's request for such a commitment in order to enable him to pursue his efforts.

138. In making his proposal Ambassador Jarring did not depart from resolution 242 (1967), as Mr. Eban this morning suggested he had done. Quite the contrary, he was acting fully within the framework of that resolution, which introduced the two basic principles, namely, the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war and the right of every State to live in peace within recognized and secure boundaries.

139. Israel, on the other hand, having obtained this commitment from Egypt, still refuses to accept the commitment which not only is required by resolution 242 (1967) but is essentially an obligation of all Member States under the Charter.

140. I am sure that Egypt's acceptance of the Israeli demands for a peace agreement must have come as a very unpleasant surprise to the Israelis. They had hoped that Egypt's refusal to do so would enable them to sabotage the Jarring mission and get rid once and for all of resolution 242 (1967), which they have always found to be a great inconvenience. Now having obtained from Egypt the commitment to conclude a peace agreement, Israel pro-

claims the theory of no pre-conditions in yet another attempt to grind to a halt the Jarring mission and kill resolution 242 (1967).

141. The astonishing thing is that the draft resolutions submitted by Barbados and by Costa Rica and others completely ignore Ambassador Jarring's initiative, which, after all, has been the only hopeful element in a situation darkened by four years of deadlock. We cannot accept Mr. Eban's fanciful version of the position taken by the two sides. He tried to equate Egypt's acceptance with Israel's refusal. This curious semantic exercise was nothing more than a desperate attempt to confuse and distort the truth.

142. We should accept the Secretary-General's evaluation of the two replies rather than Mr. Eban's. If the General Assembly were to reject Ambassador Jarring's constructive initiative now, it would be taking upon itself a most serious responsibility, the responsibility not only for undermining confidence in the Secretary-General and his Special Representative but also for violating the fundamental Charter principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition and resolution 242 (1967) itself.

143. Adoption of the Barbados and Costa Rica draft resolutions means just that. I hope that every member realizes the serious implications of this. On the other hand, by adopting the 21-Power draft resolution the Assembly would be upholding a fundamental principle of the Charter and supporting the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative to promote agreement in pursuance of his mandate under resolution 242 (1967).

144. This is not a dogmatic attachment to documents, as Mr. Eban suggested; it is a dogmatic attachment to principle. The rejection of the 21-Power draft resolution and/or the adoption of either of the other two would render resolution 242 (1967) devoid of any meaning. Such action would also reflect a lack of confidence in the judgement of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. More serious than that, it would end any real possibility for a peaceful settlement. Even those who do not accept resolution 242 (1967) and who have reservations regarding it must realize that by withholding their affirmative vote they would be making it possible for Israel to escape from its obligations under the Charter and resolution 242 (1967).

145. Our concern with resolutions and reports should not obstruct from our view the essential truth about the item euphemistically called "The situation in the Middle East". This question is primarily the plight of the people of Palestine, a peaceful and highly gifted people that has been living in its ancestral homeland for centuries and whose title to that land could not be challenged either in law or history. The Zionist movement, which first laid claim to their country and then displaced them by force, is at the root of the problem. From the beginning it was clear that the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine could be achieved only at the expense of the Arab majority of that country. How can you create a State dominated by immigrants without sacrificing the interests of the original and indigenous inhabitants of the country? Have we not seen ample evidence of this in southern Africa and Rhodesia?

146. Mr. Eban blames the Arabs for not surrendering Palestine and says that we "have never had a true vision of

Israel's purpose and Israel's identity" and that we "have not grasped the historic forces at work in its national rebirth". [2000th meeting, para. 68.]

147. But the fact is that we do have a true vision of Israel's identity and purpose, perhaps a truer vision than anybody else. What is the true identity of Israel? It is an immigrant settler community which first came to Palestine against the will of the majority and then by the use of force dislodged that majority. That is its true identity. Its purpose is to create a ghetto-like, exclusively Jewish State which would eventually become the home of all those who profess the Jewish faith. If more land is needed to accommodate the new immigrants and generate strength in the State, then Israel shall expand at the expense of the neighbouring Arab States. That is the purpose, which is freely admitted by many Israelis, some of whom hold positions of high responsibility.

148. What are the historical forces in Israel's birth? They are, first, Britain's occupation of Palestine during the First World War and the imposition of the Mandate against the repeatedly expressed wishes of its people, a Mandate which violated the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, upon which it was based. The British Mandate enabled the Jewish community in Palestine in 30 years to increase through immigration and under the protection of the British Army from 7 per cent to over 30 per cent of the total population of the country.

149. The second historic factor was the Jewish tragedy in Europe during the Second World War, but atonement for the Nazi crimes should have been the responsibility of Europe and not exclusively that of the Arabs.

150. The third historic factor in the birth of Israel has been the continued and unlimited economic, political and military support of the United States. It was this support which made it possible for the Jewish minority in Palestine to proclaim the State, expel the majority of Arab inhabitants and then steadily expand and maintain its occupation of vast Arab territories.

151. These then, are the historic forces and, contrary to what Mr. Eban said, we grasp them fully because the Arabs have been the only victims of these so-called historic forces. I never cease to wonder at Mr. Eban's ability to stand before this Assembly and repeat one of the most tiresome *clichés* ever uttered in these halls: that describing Israel as "a small nation fighting for nothing but its own peace" [2000th meeting, para. 69], to quote his words. Even the most gullible would not be taken in by such talk, not after four and a half years of military occupation of Arab lands, after 24 years of preventing hundreds of thousands of refugees from going back to their homes in accordance with numerous United Nations resolutions and after the continued defiance of the United Nations resolutions on Jerusalem and on the treatment of the Arabs in the occupied areas. These actions are hardly those of "a small nation fighting for nothing but its own peace". The true image is that of a State armed to the teeth with unconcealed territorial designs and expansionist ambitions, a State which has steadfastly rejected every reasonable peace initiative and which is today trying its best to destroy the latest and perhaps the most hopeful of those initiatives.

152. In view of the statements I have just made, my delegation will vote in favour of the 21-Power draft resolution [A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2], will vote against the amendments proposed by Barbados [A/L.655] and will vote against the draft resolutions presented by Barbados [A/L.651] and by Costa Rica and others [A/L.652 and Add.1].

153. Mr. MARTÍNEZ ORDOÑEZ (Honduras) (*interpretation from Spanish*): As the debate on the question of the situation in the Middle East is about to come to an end, we have been concerned to see that, although each and every draft resolution submitted contains some things which in our opinion should be part of any declaration on behalf of the General Assembly, each one also has disregarded certain provisions which should be part of such a document. This is why we consider it necessary for us to take the floor.

154. There is one thing which is obvious to my delegation. Any resolution of the General Assembly which does not bring the parties to the conflict closer to a settlement would have no practical value. The principles which should underlie any settlement in the Middle East accepted by both parties appear in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Nevertheless, the obstacles to the implementation of what was decided there are obvious and well known. Any new resolution should be measured in terms of its ability to help the parties to reach an understanding and in terms of its ability to point to the ways and means of making effective what has already been decided upon as a result of the Jarring mission, whose efforts we have supported. My delegation has respect and friendship for all

the parties in the conflict and we hope that the draft resolutions at present under discussion can have certain things added to them or subtracted from them until they become ways of reaching a solution to the problem which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. In any case we intend firmly to support certain principles which we believe must not be shirked.

155. First, no State has the right to obtain territory as a result of the threat of the use of force. Armed occupation is not a source of law.

156. Secondly, any State has the right to live in peace within legally and duly defined borders which effectively circumscribe its territorial sovereignty.

157. Thirdly, the dignity of the human being should be respected at all times, even in times of serious emergency, and this respect should serve as a guarantee for the inalienable rights set forth in ethical documents of lasting value which were freely subscribed to by those of us who set up the Organization.

158. Our vote, accordingly, will be consistent with these principles which we believe have permanent validity. We trust that the parties now negotiating an agreement that will make it possible to add to a resolution—or to delete from it—the concepts necessary to make it effective and satisfactory to everyone will be successful in their mission.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

