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The situation in the Middle East (*continued*) 1

President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).

AGENDA ITEM 22

The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

1. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) (*interpretation from French*): The situation in the Middle East, a constant source of tension, is a matter of concern to the whole international community.

2. The existence anywhere of a conflict between States brings with it the danger of the spreading of that conflict, thus endangering general peace and security and hence affecting the vital interests of all peoples.

3. At the same time, such conflicts lead to dire suffering for the countries directly concerned and hinder their economic, social and political development, thus serving only the interests of the imperialists, who are opposed to progress, peace and understanding among nations.

4. In the view of the Romanian delegation, recent developments in the Middle East can only aggravate our concern.

5. The maintenance of the cease-fire is, of course, a positive element; but if it is to become truly effective it must be reinforced by concrete measures aimed at a political settlement of the conflict. The prospect of such concrete measures has been rather gloomy recently. Negotiations have practically been suspended, while the continuation of the present situation in the Middle East is increasing ever more the danger of the emergence of new crises and of the resumption of military operations, with all the grave implications entailed thereby.

6. All this clearly underlines the need for determined efforts to be made to bring about a peaceful settlement of the Middle East situation. The present debate in the General Assembly can and must make an important contribution to that end.

7. We should like to reiterate at the outset our firm conviction that such a settlement is possible and that in spite of the complexity of the problems of the Middle East, those problems can be resolved in such a way as to lead to the creation of lasting peace in this area in the interests of the people of the region and also of general peace and security.

8. Even before the conflict broke out, Romania spoke out against, and opposed, the use of force in favour of a political settlement. Consistently pursuing that policy, Romania requested, after hostilities had begun, the cessation of fighting, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories and the solution of all problems by peaceful means—a solution which would guarantee to each State in the area independence and territorial integrity. At the same time we spoke in favour of the idea that an appropriate solution, in keeping with its national interests, should be found for the Palestinian people.

9. Romania has consistently developed its traditional relations of friendship with the Arab countries and, consequently, has promoted co-operation in many fields with those States, at the same time manifesting its solidarity with and support for the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism and in defence of their independence and national sovereignty, for their independent economic and social development without foreign interference.

10. We have also favoured the recognition of the right to existence of all States in the region and the establishment of relations of peaceful coexistence among all peoples in this part of the world.

11. It is of pre-eminent importance to all the States of the Middle East that a political settlement of the conflict should be brought about as a matter of urgency. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) constitutes a reasonable basis for such a settlement.

12. It is clear that there can be no political solution to the conflict without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories. No State can claim the right to send its armed forces into foreign territory and thus impose its will; nor can any State encroach upon the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of any other country.

13. The interests of peace and security in the Middle East also require recognition of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States in the region, including Israel. Such recognition would open up favourable prospects for the peaceful coexistence of the people of the region and their independent development.

14. The establishment of peace in that part of the world calls, at the same time, for a solution to the problems of the people of Palestine, in keeping with the interests and legitimate aspirations of those people.

15. In view of the complexity of the problems which still await a solution, lasting peace in the Middle East can only be brought about as a result of persevering and constructive

efforts, primarily on the part of the countries directly concerned.

16. The activities undertaken early this year by Mr. Jarring, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General have made possible the formulation of certain suggestions relating to a practical way to begin negotiations and to secure some clarification of the respective positions of the parties to the conflict.

17. During the same period, Egypt presented useful proposals, particularly proposals with regard to the resumption of navigation through the Suez Canal. Romania welcomed the efforts and initiatives of the Egyptian Government aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

18. Within this context we consider that the Israeli Government should demonstrate more receptiveness towards a solution by peaceful means of the controversial problems in this area.

19. It is the duty of all States to respect strictly the fundamental obligation not to have recourse in their international relations to the threat or use of force. This is a categorical imperative which flows from the Charter of the United Nations. This is the purport of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, adopted last year by the General Assembly [*resolution 2734 (XXV)*], which:

"Solemnly reaffirms that every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any other State, and that the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter, that the territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from the threat or use of force, that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal and that every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State".

20. In the view of the Romanian delegation, it is urgently necessary to take resolute action to give proper momentum to a peaceful and effective solution of the Middle East conflict. What is needed along these lines is that States should display political will. This necessarily implies the broad use of peaceful methods, negotiations as well as the seeking for viable political solutions, including a partial solution suitable to the parties—solutions fully in keeping with the interests and rights of each State in the area.

21. In order to create a favourable climate for efforts to promote a political settlement, what is necessary, in our view, is to avoid any act which would cause further complications and new dangers and which would make even more remote the prospect of a solution to the Middle East problems. It is our firm conviction that the principal role in the settlement of the Middle East problem should be played by the States in the area concerned that are directly interested in bringing about peace in that area.

22. At the same time, other States and the United Nations can and must contribute to facilitating a peaceful solution to the conflict. The present session of the General Assembly should give new and effective momentum to the efforts to achieve a settlement of the problems by peaceful means. In this context we believe that the Jarring mission should be resumed and its possibilities should be fully explored until fruitful results are obtained. Similarly, we believe that as a result of the concerted efforts of States, and primarily the countries directly concerned, the present situation can be overcome and the problems can be solved.

23. Like other States, Romania will continue to work for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict—a settlement which would be in accordance with the legitimate interests of all States in the area and with the cause of strengthening world peace and security.

24. Mr. EL-SHIBIB (Iraq): The fact that the Israeli occupation of the territories of three Member States of the United Nations, in defiance of the principles of the Charter and numerous United Nations resolutions, has lasted for four and a half years has not altered the dismal picture of the inability of this Organization, and particularly the organ responsible for the preservation of peace and security, to put an end to such an anomalous situation. We are rightfully preoccupied with the problem, which not only threatens peace in a vital and important area of our world, but could draw the whole world into a major global conflict. This preoccupation tends sometimes to lead us to believe that the present situation we are debating resulted from the war of 1967. In the view of my delegation the present crisis resulting from the war of 1967 is but a chapter in a story of aggression and expansion for which the United Nations bears a primary responsibility.

25. After the General Assembly 23 years ago resolved to partition Palestine against the will of its people and in denial of their inalienable right to self-determination, a situation was created where an alien settler State was implanted in the heart of the region—an alien State that is foreign in culture, aspiration, outlook, and sense of belonging, to the whole region. It is a State whose boundaries are buried in deep mythology, and whose appetite for expansion and increase in population knows no bounds.

26. A series of aggressions, beginning with the dispossession of the Palestine people of their homeland and followed by numerous attacks against the neighbouring Arab countries, has led us today to the present chapter, where, as I stated, the territories of three Member States of the United Nations have been under foreign occupation for nearly five years. The appetite of the Zionist State for territory has become all too obvious, and the passage of years and the accumulation of resolutions by the United Nations have not proved to be the answer to the problem of putting an end to such aggressive intentions and avaricious desires. The Middle East conflict is first and foremost a confrontation between the Zionist State of alien settlers and the people of Palestine who were dispossessed of their homeland. The Arab States were, and are, in duty bound—by kinship, culture, history and their belief in the principles of the Charter affirming the right of the people of Palestine to self-determination—to support the struggle of the Palestin-

ians. Thus these States have become a primary target for Israeli aggression and expansion. The war of 1967 and the present political situation in the Middle East is but a chapter in that tragedy. The Security Council, after Israel unleashed its war of aggression of 1967 and after months of pondering, adopted resolution 242 (1967), which has perhaps become the most quoted, though the least applied, resolution of the Security Council.

27. From the day the Security Council resolved this issue, my Government clearly expressed its misgivings about that resolution. We doubted the motives behind it and we have doubted its practicality. We felt that the resolution, no matter how much one wishes to explain it, has rewarded the aggressor by ignoring the principle calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of Member States. We doubted its practicality because—and events have proved us right—Israel's objective has always been the acquisition of more Arab territory.

28. Israel has used various excuses for this acquisition. It expanded its borders between 1948 and 1967 to add one third more territory than that apportioned to it under the Plan of Partition of Palestine [resolution 181 (II)]. Then Israel's excuse was the absence of permanent peace and the fact that these lines were merely truce lines. Today, after trebling its territories, its excuse for the retention of these territories is security. In the history of aggression we have heard many aggressors explain their acquisitions of other States' territory but they have never admitted their real motive. They put forward either arguments of security or some other far-fetched reason to retain their loot. We are witnessing another such argument today.

29. But the inability of this world Organization to enforce its will and its famous resolution 242 (1967) has not been a reason for us to gloat about our foresight, which has proved to be only too right. We are rather saddened to have to go through the same motions while we see that, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the remedy to the situation is all too clear and too obvious.

30. Israel has always used force, has believed in force and was built upon force. It can understand only coercion as the remedy for its aggression. Thus, what seems to me to be perennial senility on the part of this Organization in putting its will into action has not only encouraged Israel to have a record of defiance of and contempt for the United Nations, but will also encourage any potential aggressor to do so in the future. One reason for Israel's defiance of this Organization and world public opinion which we cannot but note, is the support, moral and material, that has been given to it over the years in spite of the fact that it is defying the United Nations and occupying the territories of States Members of this Organization. This support has been given by no less than a permanent member of the Security Council and a super-Power, namely, the United States.

31. Israel has a famous appetite for territory and Phantom jet aircraft. It needs the latter to digest the former and the United States has been a very generous provider. Only last year \$500 million was granted to Israel to cover its military needs. When such a situation prevails, it is no wonder that this Assembly and the Security Council find themselves paralysed and unable to take action to face and deal with this clearest case of aggression.

32. Allow me very briefly to state the position of my Government, which has been unchanged over the years and which we have had various opportunities to state from this rostrum over the years. We believe that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). That resolution refers, as if it were an afterthought, to a just solution to the refugee problem. We do not believe the Palestinian people to be mere refugees who have to be resettled. The people of Palestine are a people like any other people, entitled to their right to self-determination in their own country. Fortunately, this Assembly has come to recognize that right and has affirmed it in a number of resolutions adopted during the last three sessions. We support all the efforts made by our sister Arab States—Egypt, Syria and Jordan—to regain their territories and to achieve the complete withdrawal of the Israeli occupation forces. We feel that the cause of the Palestinian people and the cause of the three Arab States, against which aggression has been committed, are gaining more and more support among the peoples of the world. This is a source of encouragement and strengthens our faith in our position. We feel that what is needed is not more resolutions but the will to apply existing resolutions. We put our faith in the support of friendly countries, the peace-loving countries, in our just struggle, and we feel that ultimate victory can be achieved only through the unity of the Arab people relying on the justice of their cause and on their determination to regain their rights.

33. Mr. ISMAIL (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen): As we have done at every session since 1948, we are today debating an issue which could be renamed appropriately "the great defiance of the United Nations", an Organization which is considered by the peoples of the world as an important instrument of peace, justice and liberty.

34. When one reviews the verbatim records of the meetings of the different organs of our Organization regarding the many aspects of the question of Palestine and the Middle East, what does one conclude? Has there been any change or progress in resolving the problems? Has the United Nations been able to promote a just solution? The answers are, "No, no, no".

35. Consequently, another question is raised, What is to be done? The answer is crystal clear, but unfortunately it remains in the realm of theory. The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations are explicit as to the maintenance of peace and security; but, unfortunately, the aggressive State of Israel has no respect for the United Nations and no belief in its Charter.

36. Israel invaded and occupied with impunity the territories of three Arab States, Members of this Organization. Israel annexed the Holy City of Jerusalem. It was under this annexation and occupation that the holy Al Aqsa Mosque, sacred to both Moslems and Christians, was burned. Israel displaced the Palestinian people and bombarded the civilian population in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, with no concern for the Charter of the United Nations.

37. If we follow the history of the aggressive Zionist State since its inception, all we see is proof of its defiance of the United Nations and its Charter. It is clear that all the

peace-loving countries are on one side and the aggressive Zionist State is on the other. What is more surprising is that Israel arrogantly announces that it is not bound by the resolutions of the Security Council or of the General Assembly. Moreover, Israel invites and urges all the Jews of the world to go to Palestine, only to displace the Palestinians, to invade more Arab territories and to endanger the peace and security of the Middle East and the world.

38. The speakers who have preceded me have revealed the Israeli expansionist plans and motives. Israel, which claims that its people are the chosen people of God, believes that its domination should stretch from the Nile to the Euphrates. It is unnecessary to point out that what has been called the question of the Middle East is essentially the Palestinian problem. Had it not been for the colonization of Palestine, there would not have been a question of the Middle East. It is the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to regain their colonized territories in the same manner as that in which the Zionists usurped it. The Palestinian people, with their vanguard resistance movement, will unrelentingly continue their war of liberation to restore their natural rights. Unless the Palestinians are allowed to return to their homeland and exercise their sovereign rights, they are completely justified in using whatever means they deem fit in their struggle against the usurpers.

39. On 5 June 1967 Israel invaded and occupied the territories of three Arab States, with the assistance of the United States. Since then, some of those Arab States have been trying to regain their occupied territories by peaceful means. They have respected the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and have responded to world opinion. But what has been the reaction of the Israeli aggressors? They have stubbornly refused all attempts to resolve the question peacefully. In so acting, Israel has defied the Charter of the United Nations and has flaunted its disregard of world opinion. It has insisted on pursuing its policy of fait accompli.

40. The important question now is, Why has Israel insisted on aggression in utter disregard for the United Nations? Who is primarily responsible for the continuing tension and instability in the Middle East? Unfortunately, it is the United States of America, which bolstered and continues to bolster the aggressors. Israel may believe that its military victory is permanent, and the United States may think that the inception and existence of Israel will weaken the Arab nation, thus safeguarding the United States imperialist interests in our area and facilitating the continued exploitation of our wealth. However, history will prove that the Palestinian people and the Arab nation will be victorious in the end. We salute the material and moral support of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and all socialist countries and the moral support of the progressive people of the world. We earnestly believe that the aggressor cannot continue to remain unpunished.

41. Four years have elapsed since the Israeli armed forces launched their third major aggression since the beginning of the Zionist State in Palestine. This time the Israelis seized the entire territory of Palestine and invaded the lands of three Arab States, in utter contravention of the Charter of

the United Nations. It is obvious that Israel has no respect for the lofty principles and purposes of the United Nations.

42. Notwithstanding the latest Israeli aggression, one may simply ask, What is the crux of the issue that came to be known as "the situation in the Middle East"? The core of the problem is the usurpation of Palestine by the Zionist aggressors. Therefore, the multitude of problems that resulted cannot be considered outside that context. In other words, unless the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination are ensured, the whole issue will never be resolved. The total withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan would certainly be conducive to the relaxation of tension and the lessening of the possibility of yet another war. However, the heart of the problem will remain. Consequently, no solution can be equitable or just unless the wishes and interests of the Palestinians are duly taken into consideration. The Palestinian resistance movement has repeatedly advocated the idea of a secular, democratic Palestinian State in which all Moslems, Christians and Jews could enjoy equal rights, regardless of race, religion or creed. Only such a democratic State could preserve the rights of all the people in Palestine.

43. The draft resolution contained in document A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2 has been submitted in good faith by 21 Member States. This draft resolution is based mainly on Security Council resolution 242 (1967). My Government finds it difficult, if not impossible, to accept this draft resolution, because it is impractical. The second preambular paragraph of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) states:

"Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security".

My Government believes firmly that an aggressive Israel, based on Zionist ideology, does not and will not serve the cause of peace. The ideology of Israel is belligerent in nature. Thus, to expect from Israel a lasting peace is a delusion.

44. Paragraph 1 (ii) of that same resolution 242 (1967) states the following:

"Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

I regret to say, on behalf of my Government, that we cannot acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Israel, for the simple reason that we cannot and have not the right to recognize any of the preceding as long as the indigenous people of Palestine, who are a part of us and who are now existing in the deserts as refugees, are bravely struggling to exercise their right to return to their homes in Palestine and to maintain their sovereignty.

45. How can we permit Israel to exist in secure boundaries while the people of the Palestine territory are driven from their homeland and forced to become refugees?

46. What about the security of the Palestinian people? The above-mentioned resolution in paragraph 2 (b) affirms the necessity "for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem". It is not a matter of achievement. It is rather a matter of the fundamental, inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland. Furthermore, it is a matter of the wrong and injustice done in permitting the illegal occupation of Palestine by the aggressive usurpers.

47. For the reasons mentioned, we feel, with all due respect to the other Member States, that any political solution to the problem of Palestine based upon Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is not practical and is, therefore, doomed to failure. Accordingly, my delegation will not be able to vote for draft resolution A/L.650 and Add.1 and 2, or any other draft resolution based on Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

48. My Government will never hesitate to support, by all means, the Palestinian people and other Arab countries in their struggle to liberate our Arab land.

49. Mr. ALARCON (Cuba) (*interpretation from Spanish*): The conflict in the Middle East has become one of the critical problems for this Organization. Its consideration constitutes a permanent item on the agenda of the General Assembly. The roots of this problem go back to a time which antedates the establishment of this Organization, but the problem has accompanied it persistently throughout its existence. Nevertheless, that is not the angle which confers on the conflict its essential and definitive character. Strictly speaking, the situation in the Middle East places us before the cardinal principles which gave life to the United Nations and its just solution will be possible only on the basis of complete respect for the rights of peoples by adhering with absolute constancy to the principles enshrined in the Charter. In sum, what is on trial is the ability of the United Nations to fulfil the aspirations of peoples to realize their historical reason to exist.

50. Since June 1967 the Revolutionary Government of Cuba has expressed a position which is as crystal clear as it is unchanging in regard to this problem. Since then nothing has happened which would lead us to alter it. We reaffirm that the indispensable conditions for a just and lasting peace in that region are: the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories which they occupy as a result of the aggression of June 1967; and at the same time, respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Only thus will it be possible to ensure for the people who are victims of imperialist aggression the exercise of prerogatives which are inalienable. The fulfilment of these conditions constitutes the only course to restore peace in that area, which has been convulsed by decades of tensions, and to guarantee to its peoples the enjoyment of their national rights.

51. In the joint Soviet-Cuban communiqué, which was signed during the visit to Cuba of the member of the Politburo of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrade Aleksei Kosygin, we affirmed the following:

"The Soviet and Cuban parties stated their firm support for the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liquidation of

the consequences of Israeli aggression; for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab territories which were occupied in the month of June 1967; for the recognition of the legitimate and inalienable rights of the people of Palestine; and the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The parties agreed that the achievement of a political settlement of the conflict in that area would be helpful in lessening international tension."

52. During recent years the international community has been pronouncing itself in favour of such a solution. Nevertheless, we are bound to note that the armies of Israel continue to occupy by force territories which belong to Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and so far there has not appeared even an indication of its willingness to leave them, in accordance with the repeatedly stated requirements of this Assembly. The people of Palestine, dispossessed of their own homeland, uprooted once again because of the aggression of 1967, continue to live one of the most anguished tragedies of our century.

53. The problem of the Middle East can only be understood if it is placed within the framework of the global counter-revolutionary strategy of North American imperialism. The aggression against the Arab States, depriving the Palestinian people of their rights, constitutes a part of the same policy of aggression, exploitation and extortion which is carried out by North American imperialism in order to impose its hegemony on the world, establish the domination of its monopolies over the peoples of the third world and carry out its role of world policeman. The delivery of large amounts of military and financial assistance to the State of Israel and the political and diplomatic support provided by Washington are proof that the perpetuation of the present crisis, the extension of the aggression and its consequences, constitute an objective of the North American Government to try to bend the will to independence of the Arab peoples, to halt the liberation movement in the area and to ensure for itself control of the vast natural resources therein. It is within this context, and only within it, that we can analyse the present situation in the Middle East.

54. North American imperialism is the standard-bearer of a reactionary policy and of oppression throughout the world. Whenever a people rises to affirm its independence and to conquer its destiny, North American imperialism opposes it with all its resources in its sterile endeavour to halt the march of history. This is the true enemy which the Arab peoples face in the present conflict: that same imperialism which has unleashed against the people of Indo-China the most brutal war of aggression; that same imperialism which has not stopped at using the most barbarous methods to wage war on the Viet-Nameese people; that same imperialism which in 1950 attacked the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and since then has continued to carry out hostile acts against it; that same imperialism which organizes plots and provocations against the independent States of the third world; that same imperialism which sustains the colonialist and racist régimes in Africa; that same imperialism which practises a policy of interference, threats and subversion against the peoples of Latin America; that same imperialism which holds the people of Puerto Rico under its colonial boot. Hence, the

struggle to solve the crisis which has arisen in the Middle East can lead to victory only if it is taken up with a consistently anti-imperialistic approach.

55. The cause of the Arab peoples, their struggle to consolidate national independence and resist aggression, is an integral part of the general process of emancipation of the peoples of the third world. That cause deserves the support and the solidarity of all States interested in promoting peace and the progress of mankind.

56. The Revolutionary Government of Cuba reaffirms its solidarity with the Arab peoples and its readiness to contribute to the attainment of solutions in keeping with the criteria which we have invariably upheld. We trust that the struggle of the Arab peoples, including the Palestinian people, for independence, social justice and progress will develop and grow in depth. We trust in the final victory of the Arab peoples against the forces of imperialism.

57. Mr. VINCI (Italy): The situation in the Middle East is once again the subject of our deliberations and a distant observer might comment that this happens more or less in the same conditions as last year, in short, a deadlock of the mission of the Secretary-General's Special Representative. Yet, when we met last year to consider the Middle East situation, the Jarring mission had been inactive for a very long time and the positive initiative taken by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers, during the summer to have that mission resumed was on the verge of failure. We can say today, in the light of last year's experience, that our debates, perhaps more than specific resolutions introduced or finally adopted, helped in breaking the deadlock by giving expression to the concern of the world community and showing its overwhelming support for a peaceful settlement based on the integral implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

58. The Jarring mission was resumed and, although the process towards a negotiated solution has been extremely slow, we cannot deny that some progress, however small, has been achieved. Thanks to the skill, tenacity and patience of Ambassador Jarring, the position of the parties on several aspects of the crisis has been clarified and some inevitably polemic views have been gradually abandoned, thus starting a new positive trend. In his report of 5 March 1971,¹ for instance, the Secretary-General noted with satisfaction the reply given by Egypt on 15 February to Ambassador Jarring, in which it was specified, among other things, that Egypt would be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. The Secretary-General's reports to the Security Council and to the General Assembly indicated why Ambassador Jarring's efforts were again deadlocked.

59. In these circumstances it is up to the General Assembly to turn its attention to the Middle East with a view to reactivating the process leading to a peaceful settlement of the conflict. In fact, if it is true that the situation has not deteriorated and the guns are silent, that situation continues to be, as my Foreign Minister Mr. Aldo Moro stated yesterday, a source of justified apprehension in

the light also of more recent events. In addition, the continued inactivity of the Jarring mission and the suspension of other constructive initiatives might produce a setback in the peace efforts. The only result would be a resumption of hostilities. In other words, the choice we will be facing in a few weeks is negotiations or a new confrontation. In view of this, the responsibility of the General Assembly is very clear. We must take a decision which can enable the parties to resume their indirect talks without delay.

60. In this connexion, I wish to reaffirm the position of my country. Italy has on several occasions maintained that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) offers a concrete and sufficient basis for a political settlement and a just and lasting peace. Italy has therefore consistently advocated the implementation in all its parts of this resolution, which is constructive, well-balanced and contains all the essential elements for the establishment of peace. My country has therefore lent its full, whole-hearted support to the Jarring mission. We feel that the efforts of Ambassador Jarring and all the initiatives taken by him up to now are consistent with the task entrusted to him.

61. We feel, furthermore, that the parties should co-operate in good faith with Ambassador Jarring and respond to all his initiatives. There is certainly a wide-spread feeling in this Assembly that a direct reply by Israel to the Jarring aide mémoire of 8 February 1971 [*A/8541, annex I*], consistent with the Israeli reply² to the memorandum of the OAU Committee of African Heads of State, would contribute in a decisive way to the resumption of the negotiations through the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

62. Two recent initiatives have reinforced our belief that the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the Jarring mission deserve our full support. One is the initiative taken by the United States Government for an interim agreement that could bring about the reopening of the Suez Canal and the first step towards a comprehensive settlement of the dispute in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). That initiative has been shelved for the time being, but we have been told that the parties concerned are still willing to seek such an agreement. Let us hope that that is so, and that Egypt and Israel will renew their efforts to achieve this partial solution.

63. The second initiative has a more direct bearing on our deliberations. I refer to the findings and conclusions of the Committee of African Heads of State, which contacted the parties on behalf of the Organization of African Unity. I wish to pay a tribute to the members of that Committee for their deep understanding of the position of the parties and of the underlying causes of the dispute, for their spirit of impartiality and for their restraint and their ability in producing a document which is the most important contribution provided by a group of States to the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

64. The report of that African Committee bears the mark of statesmanship and, in our opinion, we should take its

¹ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*, document S/10070/Add.2.

² *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, document S/10438.

conclusions duly into account in our deliberations, since they have been accepted by Egypt and Israel.

65. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal has noted in his address to this Assembly [2002nd meeting], the probings of the Committee of African Heads of State have shown that the parties coincide on the need to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the purpose of reaching a peace agreement. Furthermore, the work of that Committee has demonstrated that resolution 242 (167) remains the sole basis for fruitful negotiations.

66. In our view, what the General Assembly can and must do in a constructive spirit at this delicate stage—it is imperative—is to press on the parties a recommendation that would command the support of the virtual unanimity of the Member States—a recommendation urging the parties to resume immediately indirect negotiations under Ambassador Jarring. This is a goal which can be attained, especially if we avoid any provision that could upset the balance of principles set forth in resolution 242 (1967).

67. We know that this long period of over 20 years of confrontation has created enormous psychological obstacles. We realize, therefore, why progress towards an agreement has been so slow. We have, however, the duty to urge the parties to make decisive efforts to overcome those obstacles. Time is to no one's benefit; the populations directly affected by the crisis are longing for peace; they need to dedicate their energies and resources to the improvement of their economic and social conditions and to put an end to the miseries and sufferings of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons.

68. We know that the peoples of the Middle East want peace in order to liberate themselves from the burden of an arms race that does not improve their security and hampers their economic and social progress. We know that they are convinced, as we are, that war is no alternative to negotiations.

69. We must appeal, therefore, to the Governments concerned to proceed speedily to a constructive resumption of talks leading to a just and peaceful settlement.

70. It is on the basis of all these considerations that the Italian delegation will determine its position on the draft resolutions submitted or to be submitted to the General Assembly.

71. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) (*interpretation from French*): As every year for more than two decades, we come to this rostrum of lamentations to state our indignation and chagrin at the fate which by word and by fire has befallen an entire people, the people of Palestine, which has since been living under domination or in camps, in conditions which we know of or can imagine.

72. As at every General Assembly session, and for four years, we have come here to recall the situation in the Middle East, to denounce the acquisition of territories by armed force, and to call for the evacuation of all the territories conquered by Israel during the war of 5 June 1967.

73. As every year, the arguments of those who defend law and justice confront the accusations of the conquerors, who obstinately cling to their conquests.

74. As every year, Israel speaks of peace, but obstructs the course that leads to peace. Israel speaks of justice and commits the worst inequities.

75. Who would have thought in 1947 that the armies of Israel would, 20 years later, be on the banks of the Suez Canal and on the Golan heights? Who would have thought that Jerusalem would be occupied, deformed and disfigured by the Israelis? Who would have thought in 1967 that in 1971 we would still be speaking of the restoration of occupied Arab territories?

76. The series of maps annexed to the speech of Mr. Riad, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt [1999th meeting], is certainly edifying. Regrettably, the evidence and the arguments became lost in the eloquence of Mr. Eban. It is easy to accuse the Arabs, to reproach them for their lack of realism, their bellicose spirit, and even their divisions and disarray. But the real truth is elsewhere. The Zionists have created by violence a situation in Palestine which has brought about the sufferings of the Palestinian people. Not content with setting up a homeland which would have been for the Jews of the world what the Vatican is for Catholics, they have established an expansionist State which is a source of instability, of hatred, and of periodic wars in the Middle East.

77. Who can refute the fact that before 1947 there was no State named Israel in the Middle East? Who can refute the fact that that State was created by the Zionists organized in armed bands—the Irgun, the Stern Gang, and Haganah of sinister renown? Who can refute the fact that the first shots on 5 June 1967 were fired by the Israeli army? Intoxicated with their victories and their force, encouraged by certain outside support, the Israelis installed themselves in ephemeral power. But the more time passes, the more confusion is dispelled. Where is the sympathy which in Europe and in America surrounded the Israelis at the time of the birth of their State and which led States Members of the United Nations to grant them support and favour, despite the warnings of the Arabs? The unconditional friends of Israel are becoming increasingly rare in the world. The votes at the United Nations in this connexion are sufficiently eloquent. Only certain interests still maintain their support for Israel. Does that mean that, as Israel sees it, international opinion matters little? Are the Israelis not aware that it is a grave error to rely on force? The hopes born of resolution 242 (1967) have almost vanished. And what is the basic cause? Is it not simply—because in fact, it is—a fool's bargain?

78. Can one really solve the problems of the Middle East without considering all the aspects? This seems to us to be difficult if not impossible. It is not that partial solutions, such as the opening of the Suez Canal, cannot be reached, but that any partial solution is a delay and may become itself a source of new complications. So that what has to be done is to arrive at an over-all solution which will define the place and the role of all the parties concerned in the region.

79. Resolution 242 (1967), unfortunately, has scuttled the Palestinian problem, which is the fundamental problem to which other, equally important, problems have become attached. And since one cannot scuttle the destiny of a people, it seems to us that resolution 242 (1967) will remain inoperative. To consider the Palestinian people as a group of refugees who must live in an uprooted state and in poverty and who must depend on international charity is unacceptable. Yet this has been going on for more than 20 years.

80. But for more than 20 years there has been one conflict after another in the Middle East, aggravating the situation in the world and more particularly in the Mediterranean, where the fleets of the great Powers cross each other, under the frightened eyes of the coastal States and to the great satisfaction of Israel, which benefits fully from this in order to consolidate its domination and extend its territory.

81. How far will Israel go in its claims? Up to the Euphrates and the Nile in order to fulfil the dream of the promoters of the Zionist State? The maps furnished us by Mr. Riad should give us food for thought. To every honest and enlightened man, they reveal the expansionist designs of Israel and explain the legitimate fears of the Arabs in regard to their future. Can one honestly expect the Arabs to be resigned when their liberty, dignity and even their sovereignty are trampled upon and constantly threatened? As was recently stated by President Bourguiba, the Arab States, victims of aggression and occupation must co-ordinate their efforts so as to be able to recover their territories and to impose peace.

82. As for the Palestinians, they struggle and will continue to struggle until the day when their rights are restored and they take their proper place in the international community.

83. Mr. Eban in his statement of 6 December said:

"If there is one thing which members of the General Assembly owe to Israel, it is the duty of understanding Israel's policy in Israel's own terms." [2000th meeting, para. 74.]

84. I find that that statement is, to say the least, strange; it is an insult to our intelligence. We are not credulous to that extent. If we were—as Mr. Eban invites us to be—whom should we believe among the Israeli leaders, who unceasingly flood the world with statements which are disconcerting, to say the least, because they are full of contradictions? And then, if we are to take Mr. Eban literally, he should be the first not to interpret, for example, the reply of Egypt to the aide-mémoire of Mr. Jarring of 8 February 1971 [A/8541, annex I].

85. Yet, Mr. Eban finds a way of interpreting that reply, which is of obvious clarity and which has been considered by all as positive, by alleging against all logic that it contains pre-conditions. Is it really a pre-condition to ask that an agreement on the Suez Canal should be part of an over-all settlement such as the one advocated by resolution 242 (1967)?

86. As is proved in the report of the Secretary-General, the reply of Egypt was positive and worthy of a country

which respects the principles of the Charter and the resolutions of the Organization, whereas Israel, according to the report:

"... has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring that it should give a commitment on withdrawal to the international boundary of the United Arab Republic." [A/8541, para. 21.]

87. Instead of replying to Mr. Jarring, Israel has used subterfuges which have deceived no one.

88. It is not my intention to reply to the arguments of Mr. Eban; others are entitled to do so. I shall limit myself to saying that if we were to go by his own statements we would be baffled. Those statements do not change at all the position that Israel has adopted since the conflict of 5 June and do not allow for the unblocking of the Jarring negotiations. Taken literally, as is suggested by Mr. Eban himself, these statements mean purely and simply that Israel will not abandon its intransigence.

89. As was stated by Mr. Gaye, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Senegal, in the course of his statement on 7 December 1971 [2002nd meeting], the African messengers of peace have been able to gather the impression that resumption of the Jarring mission would be possible if Israel notified the Secretary-General that its intention is not to annex Arab territories.

90. What is it that would prevent Israel from replying to the Jarring aide-mémoire, if it is not its desire to prolong the crisis, to delay the time of withdrawal, and to use intransigence for the sole purpose of imposing on the Arabs its own conditions? Israel considers the Jarring aide-mémoire as a simple working document which merits no reply. Israel's replies to the memorandum of the African wise men do not differ from the public statements of Israeli leaders. And yet the African memorandum is certainly not a simple working document.

91. If the international community has the duty to encourage the African initiative, which proves the desire of all of Africa—and my country, like Egypt, is an African country, whether Mr. Eban likes it or not—it is because the wise men intended by that initiative to strengthen the efforts of the Secretary-General and of Mr. Jarring, to whom we pay a vibrant tribute for their unswerving efforts for peace and justice. The wise men of Africa have undertaken a historic mission of peace which will have great repercussions, whether it succeeds immediately or whether, like the Jarring mission, it encounters difficulties. Who, then, has whispered to Mr. Eban that one is now seeking to dodge the very clear-cut lessons of a peace initiative coming from the heart of Africa and from the conscience of the African continent? Let no one seek to divide the Africans. They are—despite temporary divergencies which may at times separate them—capable of solidarity and of major initiatives against injustice. Let the world beware: the Africans do not like their good faith to be betrayed.

92. Mr. Eban in his statement recalled the deterioration of the regional atmosphere because of the multiplication of threats and the fixing of dates for the resumption of hostilities.

93. I am speaking on behalf of a country which has known war and has a horror of war. The appeals of President Bourguiba for peace are universally known. No one can reproach Tunisia with having warlike moods or intentions. But, Tunisia and its President are firmly attached to the principles of the Charter.

94. That is why, while we know who is really responsible for the deterioration in the regional atmosphere, we cannot fail to understand the cries of anguish and of fury of those who see their territories occupied and who, in the deadlock where the initiatives for peace now are, are driven to consider every means to recover their rights.

95. Mr. Eban further alleges that the Middle East is today convulsed largely because the Arab Governments have never really understood the objectives and the identity of Israel. Is he quite sure? The identity of Israel, is it not to be an exclusively Jewish State? The objective of Israel, is it not to grow ever larger so as to contain all the Jews of the world?

96. This has been achieved progressively, implacably, to the detriment of the Arabs—the Arabs of Palestine first, then the Arabs of Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

97. Does Israel really understand the Arabs, their identities and their objectives? That is the true question.

98. Israel bears within itself its contradictions and its weaknesses. Power cannot last forever. Israel, from conquest to conquest, intends to give itself frontiers which are secure and defensible. Nevertheless, without the consent of the Arabs, its neighbours, it can achieve nothing in the Middle East outside of war and repression, and can sow nothing but hatred.

99. We, for our part, express the hope that the mission of the “wise men”, supported by our debates and the resolution which we shall adopt, will make it possible to break the infernal circle of conflicts and hatred and bring us closer to justice and peace, for the attainment of which no effort should be spared.

100. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): The search for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East has now dragged on for still another year, with no sign that success is anywhere near. Vast amounts of money and wealth are being poured into the area, not for the alleviation of human suffering, not for development and the construction of peace, but rather for ever more threatening machines of war and destruction in an escalating local arms race. The dangers of such an arms race in the emotionally surcharged atmosphere of the Middle East are infinitely greater than they would be elsewhere, and the element of explosiveness increases, by reason of such emotions, as time interminably passes without the prospect of a solution and with the ever-continuing deterioration in the plight of the refugees and in the general situation in the area.

101. The solution of problems in our time can be achieved only by strict adherence to the principles of the Charter, not by trying to dodge them. A year ago this Assembly adopted an unequivocal resolution—resolution 2628 (XXV)—reaffirming the principles for a peace settlement in the

area. The resolution made it abundantly clear, as did the basic Security Council resolution 242 (1967), that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible, and that territories so acquired must be restored. The Assembly resolution reaffirmed the two fundamental premises upon which a lasting peace in the Middle East must now rest. The first was:

“Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.”

and the second was:

“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”

102. The General Assembly urged the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and called upon the parties to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts.

103. It is pertinent to look at exactly what followed the adoption of the General Assembly resolution. The discussions that ensued between Mr. Jarring and the parties concerned reached a critical point when Mr. Jarring, in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971, requested of the representatives of Egypt and Israel respectively certain parallel and simultaneous commitments, on the basis of the Security Council resolution, to be made by them reciprocally and

“... subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including ... a just settlement of the refugee problem.” [A/8541, annex I.]

104. The commitment required of Israel was for the withdrawal of its forces from occupied Egyptian territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine.

105. The corresponding commitment required of Egypt was to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicit therein the various undertakings and acknowledgements arising directly or indirectly from paragraph 1 (ii) of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

106. Those commitments requested by Mr. Jarring correspond to the required application by both sides of the relevant principles enunciated in Security Council resolution 242 (1967). As appears in the report of the Secretary-General [A/8541] the reply of Egypt, contained in its aide-mémoire of 15 February 1971 [*ibid.*, annex II], was acceptance of all the specific commitments required of it, as well as of all the other commitments arising directly or indirectly from the Security Council resolution. The reply of Israel, on the other hand, contained in its aide-mémoire of 26 February 1971 [*ibid.*, annex III], was in effect a

refusal to make the corresponding commitment required of it, namely, the withdrawal of its forces to the lines existing prior to 5 June 1967. In consequence, there was a deadlock, and as a result the various commitments made by Egypt became, *ipso facto*, inoperative.

107. It may be pertinent to recall, in this connexion, that in all the discussions on the Middle East problem for two decades now the primary and fervent demand of Israel has all along been that the state of belligerency should be terminated, that its Arab neighbours should explicitly recognize its existence as a sovereign State, and that there should be a binding peace agreement containing full reciprocal commitments, not a mere armistice. It therefore seems ironical that now, when for the first time the opportunity is offered for the satisfaction of that basic, legitimate and important demand of Israel—as evidenced by the willingness of the Arab side to give the relevant commitment in the way required by Mr. Jarring—Israel should appear to be throwing away this opportunity for the termination of belligerency on the very terms it has been seeking over the years.

108. This reversal of policy is the result of Israel's reluctance to make the corresponding commitment demanded of it—to withdraw its forces from occupied Arab territory. Thus, Israel is in effect asking the Arab States to accept less than the Security Council has agreed rightfully belongs to it. It is asking them to forget the principle of the illegality and inadmissibility of the acquisition by a State of the territory of another State through the use of force, in violation of the Charter—a principle that has only recently been further affirmed and emphasized in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)], which was adopted almost unanimously by the General Assembly. It would seem unrealistic to expect the acquiescence of the Arab States in such a proposition.

109. To interject such territorial demands into the negotiations for the implementation of the Security Council resolution is to refuse to make peace, at the cost of the real security of Israel itself. It seems, indeed, much safer for Israel to accede to a peace settlement on agreed boundaries, which would be made secure, not by the extent of the territory, but by demilitarized zones of peace and international forces and which, in addition, would be guaranteed by the Security Council and the big Powers, than to annex by force and hold the territory of neighbours in a continuing state of belligerency and war, further aggravated by reason of that very retention of territory.

110. The necessity of withdrawal from occupied territories, apart from its significance in the progress towards a feasible solution and peace, is an obligation on Israel, stemming from the Charter and from Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

111. The offer by Israel in its reply to Ambassador Jarring to enter into negotiations without pre-conditions is self-contradictory when, in the same document, Israel officially declares it will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines, thus placing its own pre-conditions on the negotiations. The aide-mémoire of Ambassador Jarring did not set pre-conditions, but asked from both sides the commitments that are clearly required by Security Council resolution 242 (1967),

and more specifically by the principles enunciated in its preamble and in its paragraph 1.

112. In view of that enunciation and the emphasis on the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war—a principle, the application of which was required by the resolution—it is idle to suggest that the call therein made for the withdrawal of Israeli forces could possibly be intended to apply to only a part of the occupied territories. The meaning of the relevant paragraph is clear and unambiguous. Inasmuch as paragraph 1 refers to the withdrawal from occupied territories by way of the application of the said principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war, that principle cannot possibly be satisfied or given application by the withdrawal from only a part of the occupied territories. Withdrawal has, by necessary implication from the text of the resolution, to be from all such territories. It is therefore wholly immaterial whether or not the word “all” appears in the resolution. Indeed, the use of the word “all” would seem redundant in the context of the resolution. For what is the criterion of withdrawal? The criterion of withdrawal from any territory is whether such territory has been occupied by war or not. Consequently, from every territory so occupied withdrawal would necessarily be implied. This becomes still more obvious when we consider the impossibility of the resolution speaking explicitly in its text of withdrawal from a part of the occupied territory when such withdrawal is stated in that resolution to be in application of the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It stands to reason that if something would be logically unacceptable as being self-contradictory when it is explicitly stated in the document, it *a fortiori* would be unacceptable as implicitly intended.

113. The need to proceed on the only open road to peace through the due implementation of the Security Council resolution in accordance with its tenor and in compliance with the Charter should be the vital concern of the parties to the conflict and of the international community at large. We are not unmindful of the concern of Israel over its security. We realize that there is such concern. But the argument of supposed security through the retention of territory occupied by war is untenable on principle and unrealistic as a policy. It is untenable on principle for, as the Foreign Minister of Senegal, Mr. Gaye, pertinently remarked, “. . . neither side can arrogate to itself the right, for defence purposes, to seize territories of another sovereign State” [2002nd meeting, para. 14]. That it is also unrealistic as a policy, particularly in our present nuclear age, to seek security through annexing the territory of another State by force hardly needs further elaboration.

114. We realize the dilemmas faced by those responsible for the security of any State. These dilemmas are real, and we do not in the least overlook the significant influence within any State of international problems and other factors in the formulation of its external policy. Yet grave would be the consequences of failure of the peace mediation under the Security Council resolution. Its inevitable result would be a more devastating war, the repercussions of which in terms of escalation and dimensions are incalculable and could in their wider implications be tragic for all. No friend of Israel or of the other countries concerned and no friend of peace in the area and

in the world could find wisdom in an unhappy digression from the road to a peaceful solution through the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), towards which Ambassador Jarring has applied his dedicated and patient efforts.

115. My delegation joins the appeal of the Foreign Minister of Senegal—reflecting the approach of the Organization of African Unity Committee to the Middle East problem—for the resumption of the negotiations through the mission of Ambassador Jarring on the basis of the due implementation by both sides of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). And we join the voice of the international community in calling for peace in the area.

116. We live in highly turbulent times, amid national and international disorder, and even anarchy, almost everywhere. Situations of war with untold human suffering and agonizing anxieties have become endemic. Yet there is a harbinger of hope: a clearly discernible and growing world conscience for peace in the world—a world conscience against the hatreds of war and the divisions of power. This conscience increasingly finds overwhelming expression in this august Assembly. We confidently hope it will assert itself on all problems, including that of the Middle East.

117. Mr. WALDRON-RAMSEY (Barbados): I have come to the podium to introduce the draft resolution that stands in the name of my delegation, the delegation of the Kingdom of Barbados. That draft resolution is to be found in document A/L.651.

118. If we felt constrained to introduce a draft resolution on this admittedly intractable problem—the issue of the Middle East—we were motivated essentially by two principal considerations. The first consideration was that, as very strong advocates of peace and the pacific settlement of disputes, we feel that any effort which appears to lend assistance to the resolution of the problem of the Middle East by way of the avenues of peace is worth an effort and certainly worth a trial.

119. We felt constrained, too, to introduce this draft resolution because we feel that the issue of the negotiations led by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has reached a very dangerous impasse. So that the crux of the issue before the Assembly is how to resolve this difficulty, how to extricate the negotiations from this nebulous impasse.

120. A number of delegations which participated in the general debate have discussed the rights and the wrongs on both sides. My delegation is here simply to introduce a draft resolution and therefore deal with the procedural aspects of the issue. We prefer not to enter into the arguments and the various lines of the argumentation advanced by the protagonists on both sides. Then, too, we are principally and indeed solely concerned with the reactivation of the negotiations by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General which the Secretary-General instituted pursuant to resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. If therefore, we conclude our efforts here on this issue by establishing a modality which would lead the Special Representative of the Secretary-General back to the table of negotiations, indirect or direct, then it seems to me that we will have crowned our efforts with success.

121. What are the principal considerations of the Barbadian draft resolution? What if anything has prompted the Barbados delegation to advance the draft resolution which stands in its name? Even a superficial reading of the Barbados draft resolution will indicate that it is predicated exclusively upon the recommendations of the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity that, pursuant to the parent resolution of 23 June 1971 of the Organization of African Unity, embarked upon its journey to the Middle East to hold a discussion with the participants, with a view essentially to getting the Jarring talks back to the conference table. Therefore it will be found that in our draft resolution we are expressing appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to bring about a peace agreement between the parties in pursuance of resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. Again, in the preamble of the draft resolution, we express appreciation of the efforts of the Committee of African Heads of State.

122. The African States submitted to both parties—that is, to the Prime Minister of Israel and to the President of the Egyptian Arab Republic—six principal recommendations. I have the document, which was signed by nine of those African Heads of State—the document which contains these principal recommendations which were submitted to the Prime Minister of Israel and the President of the Egyptian Arab Republic. This document was signed by Moktar Ould Daddah, current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity; President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia; Léopold Sédar Senghor, Chairman of the Sub-Committee of the OAU, President of the Republic of Senegal; El Hadj Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon; Lieutenant-General Joseph Désiré Mobutu, President of the Republic of Zaire; General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; William Tolbert, President of the Republic of Liberia; for Jomo Kenyatta, President of the Republic of Kenya and by delegation, Arap Moi, Vice-President; for Félix Houphouët-Boigny, President of the Republic of the Ivory Coast and by delegation, Arsène Assouan Usher, Minister of Foreign Affairs. President Julius Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanzania, was unable to attend and consequently did not sign the document.

123. Thus the proposals which were transmitted to these two Governments, the Governments of Egypt and Israel, were the proposals of the Committee of African Heads of State instituted by the Organization of African Unity. What are these proposals? I am reading from the parent document simply to attest to the fact that the recommendations which appear in our document have validity. In paragraph 13 of the letter transmitted by these 10 Presidents to Egypt and Israel we find the following:

“In view of the foregoing respective positions of the parties as reported by the Sub-Committee of Four”—this was a Sub-Committee of the larger Committee of Ten—

“...The Committee of Ten of the Organization of African Unity submits to the two parties the following proposals for their consideration:

"1. Acceptance by the two parties to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Dr. Jarring and within the terms of resolution 242 (1967), in order to reach a peace agreement;

"2. Acceptance by the two parties of an interim agreement for the opening of the Suez Canal and the stationing, on the east bank of the Canal, of United Nations forces between the Egyptian and Israeli lines;

"3. Acceptance by the two parties that (secure and recognized boundaries be determined in the peace agreement);

"4. Acceptance by the two parties that solutions to security problems be found:

(a) Within the guarantee of the United Nations;

(b) In the creation of demilitarized zones;

(c) In the presence of international forces at some strategic points;

"5. Acceptance by the two parties that the terms of withdrawal from occupied territories be embodied in the peace agreement;

"6. Acceptance by the two parties in order to guarantee freedom of navigation of all ships through the Strait of Tiran, the stationing of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh."

124. Those are the six recommendations which the Committee of African heads of State of the Organization of African Unity—10 illustrious Presidents—submitted to the two Governments. Paragraph 14 of this memorandum states:

"The Heads of State members of the OAU Committee, are of the view that these suggestions reconcile the essentials in the respective positions of the two parties."

In paragraph 16, which is the concluding paragraph of the memorandum, we find the following:

"They earnestly appeal to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Prime Minister of the State of Israel to accept these suggestions and thereby allow the resumption of the Jarring negotiations and the establishment in that region, of a just peace, which they wish to be lasting as between brothers."

As I said, one finds there the enumeration of the signatures of the nine Heads of State.

125. In my operative paragraph 1 there is again an enumeration of those six proposals or recommendations of the African Presidents to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. Thus my operative paragraph 1 [A/L.651] reads:

"Expresses its support for the following proposals submitted by the Committee of African Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity for the consideration of the parties:

"(a) Acceptance, by the two parties, to resume indirect negotiations under the auspices of Mr. Jarring, the Secre-

tary-General's Special Representative and within the terms of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in order to reach a peace agreement;

"(b) Acceptance, by the two parties, of an interim agreement for the opening of the Suez Canal and the stationing, on the eastern bank of the Canal, of United Nations forces between the Egyptian and Israeli lines;

"(c) Acceptance, by the two parties, that 'secure and recognized boundaries' be determined in the peace agreement;

"(d) Acceptance, by the two parties, that solution to security problems be found:

"(i) Within the guarantee of the United Nations;

"(ii) In the creation of demilitarized zones;

"(iii) In the presence of international forces at some strategic points;

"(e) Acceptance by the two parties that the terms of withdrawal from occupied territories should be embodied in the peace agreement;

"(f) Acceptance by the two parties, in order to guarantee freedom of navigation of all ships through the Straits of Tiran, the stationing of international forces at Sharm el Sheikh."

126. My operative paragraph 2 states: "Takes note of the response of the parties to the aforesaid proposals". In this connexion, it is the understanding of the Barbados delegation that the Governments of both Egypt and Israel have responded favourably to those recommendations by the African Presidents.

127. My operative paragraph 3 would call on the Secretary-General—and this is a direct and deliberate call—

"to reactivate the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in pursuance of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)".

128. Finally, operative paragraph 4 states:

"Further calls on the parties immediately to resume the conversations under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to concluding a peace agreement."

129. We feel that these recommendations represent the result of a constructive and positive venture on the part of the African Presidents of the Organization of African Unity, and I think we should be doing a disservice their very earnest endeavours if we were not to introduce these proposals and recommendations formally to the Assembly when dealing with the matter with which those African Presidents dealt. It seems to me that those African Presidents submitted what are clearly objective proposals which attempt to reconcile the contending positions of the two parties but proposals which are essentially aimed at reactivating the Jarring negotiations. My delegation holds the view that the Assembly might find that these proposals of the African Presidents, which we have simply embraced as our own, might be the safest guide to our efforts to reactivate the Jarring negotiations.

130. I said I would not touch upon any of the substantive matters alluded to in the course of the debate, but I might say that many of our colleagues have referred to the impasse which first began in February 1971 and stated the feeling that these negotiations and the attempt to set the activities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on an avenue of peace must end in December 1971. We are now in December 1971 and it seems to me that, although we cannot ignore the past, we must certainly be very conscious of the anxieties of the present. If I am right in this contention, it seems to me that we must try to utilize the resources at our command to go beyond February 1971 and see what we can do in a positive and constructive effort in December 1971. One has the feeling that we do not have too much time at our disposal.

131. If my Government is correct in its understanding that both parties, that is, the Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt, accept these proposals by the African Presidents, it seems to me that the Secretary-General must equally accept them and he must instruct his Special Representative to proceed with the reactivation of the special mission on the basis of these proposals. The Foreign Minister of the Egyptian Arab Republic was good enough and frank enough, in a formal statement which he made to the Latin American States yesterday, to indicate that his Government felt that the Committee of African Heads of State was instituted to undertake this mission in order to protect the interests of Egypt, and he used as his argument—and I am sure the Foreign Minister will correct me if I am wrong—the fact that this mediation team of the Organization of African Unity was instituted pursuant to a parent resolution which, among other things, called on Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory.

132. If the distinguished Foreign Minister of Egypt is correct—my delegation would be the last to challenge him on this, and we support his contention that the Organization of African Unity, when it created this body, was primarily concerned, and rightly so, with the fate of Egypt, because Egypt is an African State, a sister State of the Organization, and that these African Presidents set forth then to protect the interests of Egypt—then, if those selfsame African Presidents in their effort to protect the interests of Egypt have made these recommendations, one feels driven by the logic of the argument to say that the Government of Egypt would be in duty bound to accept these recommendations.

133. But this is not a point of contention, as the distinguished Foreign Minister indicated, because it is our understanding that his Government does not object to these recommendations.

134. Equally, the distinguished Foreign Minister of Israel, who followed hard upon the heels of his illustrious colleague from Egypt in the meeting of the Latin American States yesterday, indicated that his Government looked with favour upon these proposals of the African Presidents.

135. Now I think that the Organization of African Unity will have made a signal entry upon the international stage if, by virtue of these very plausible recommendations, correct recommendations, the General Assembly is able to reactivate the negotiations of the Special Representative of

the Secretary-General. It seems to me that this would be a lasting footprint on the sands of time and would redound to the credit of the Organization of African Unity. I think we must be careful and must ponder these recommendations rather cautiously before we are inclined to reject them. These African Presidents, it occurs to my delegation, set out to try to establish a régime of peace in the area. They are men of goodwill. They are men whose integrity cannot be challenged in any form, and my Government for one would be extremely slow to reject the proposals of the 10 African Presidents.

136. These proposals are the proposals in the draft resolution of the delegation of Barbados. They are not embellished. They are not added to. They are not detracted from. So that in a certain sense the delegation of Barbados has really embraced as its own position the recommendations advanced to the two Governments of the Middle East by the 10 illustrious African Presidents. All that is really ours, perhaps, would be the two last operative paragraphs where we call upon the Secretary-General in the light of this mission to reactivate the negotiations conducted by his Special Representative, and where we call further upon the parties to resume immediately the conversations with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.

137. So, we have submitted this draft resolution embracing the recommendations of the African Presidents with a single objective, and that objective is to try to find a common ground, a safe harbour, from which we can urge the Secretary-General to reactivate the activities of his Special Representative, Mr. Jarring. We have carefully eschewed even the semblance of a partisan position, and hence we have found it comfortable to embrace the recommendations of the 10 illustrious African Presidents, which recommendations those very distinguished gentlemen felt ought to be able not only to reconcile the positions of the contending parties but to assist the Secretary-General in reactivating the activities of the Special Representative.

138. I conclude by warmly commending the draft resolution which stands in the name of Barbados to my colleagues in the Assembly, and I hope that we shall get the vote which the effort on the part of the 10 African Presidents who set out on a journey of peace deserves. We commend it most warmly to our colleagues.

139. Mr. MWAANGA (Zambia): It is with the deepest regret that my delegation takes the floor at this stage to comment very briefly on the remarks which have just been made by none other than my very distinguished and illustrious friend, the Ambassador of Barbados. I have always listened to the Ambassador of Barbados very attentively because of his wisdom and because of his experience in matters which this Assembly has been seized of for many years.

140. I regret, however, that the Ambassador of Barbados referred to a secret memorandum prepared by the Organization of African Unity committee of 10 wise men on the question of the Middle East which has not yet even been received by a majority of African Heads of State and the disclosure of which has shocked not only me, in my capacity as Chairman of the group of African States, but many other African representatives as well.

141. No one is more aware than the Africans themselves that there has been an OAU peace mission that went to the Middle East. They have prepared their report and it is supposed to be discussed by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government due to be held in Rabat in June 1972. It is, therefore, surprising, to say the least, that the contents of a secret memorandum which has not even been distributed to all the African Heads of State should be made the subject of a General Assembly draft resolution.

142. I regret this very, very much, and the African group of States I am sure will wish to try to consider the

implications of this matter and the implications of the unauthorized disclosures which have been made by the Ambassador of Barbados. I know that the Ambassador of Barbados is very knowledgeable about African problems, but the African countries are more than capable of speaking about memoranda which they have been able to produce. I reserve my right to speak again.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.