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President: Mr. Adam MALIK (Indonesia).

AGENDA ITEM 22

The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT: A draft resolution on this item has been submitted in document A/L.650.

2. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translation from Russian*): Four and a half years have gone by since Israel launched armed aggression against three Arab States—Egypt, Syria and Jordan—and seized a substantial portion of their territory. This created a hotbed of war and tension in the Middle East which to this day presents a grave danger of causing serious international complications.

3. What is the substance and the cause of the Middle East crisis? Why has the military conflict in that area remained unsettled for four and a half years? Today scarcely anyone is doubtful or uncertain about this. The essence and the principal cause of the dangerous situation in the Middle East is the policy of imperialist aggression which Israel stubbornly continues to pursue against the Arab States by refusing to withdraw its troops from the Arab territories it has seized, despite the demands of the Security Council, the principal United Nations organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and security.

4. Four years after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 242 (1967) concerning a peaceful settlement in the area and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, Israel is stubbornly and systematically frustrating, one after the other, all international efforts aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement. At the same time, it has so clearly and quickly appropriated and colonized the occupied Arab territories that it has fully exposed to the whole world its predatory, annexationist efforts illegally to appropriate these lands which do not belong to it. No one takes seriously any longer the Israeli tales alleging that the essence of the Middle East crisis lies in Israel's defence of its existence and its security. By disseminating this legend, the Israeli leaders and Zionist propaganda organs throughout the world have tried to hide the real purposes of the piratical Israeli invasion of the Arab countries in 1967. This false propaganda myth has now been fully and completely exposed and dismissed. It is quite obvious to the whole world that the essence of Israel's policy lies, not in ensuring security, but in committing

imperialist aggression and international piracy, with the active support and patronage of imperialism and zionism. It is not its "existence" which Israel is defending by trying to impose upon the Arab States its terms of slavery on the pretext of "establishing peace".

5. No. Israel is clearly aspiring to territorial expansion at the expense of the neighbouring Arab countries and peoples, endeavouring to annex and appropriate the territories of others, and stubbornly evading the question of the withdrawal of its troops from foreign territories.

6. The map of Israeli expansion, presented to the General Assembly by the Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Riad [1999th meeting], is documentary proof of this predatory policy.

7. The crucial question which emerges from the events in the Middle East at the present time is this, will the lawful rights of the Arab States and peoples, which have been subjected to the imperialist aggression of Israel, be respected? Will the Arab lands which have been seized by force be returned peacefully? Or will the aggressor continue to play with fire as before, refusing to withdraw its troops and to embark on a course of peaceful settlement?

8. More than four years of international efforts and striving to achieve a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East have shown that there is one essential key question among the many important questions involved in the complex Middle East crisis. Unless this question is solved justly, positively and quickly, it will be impossible even to think about the possibility of restoring peace in this area. This is the question of the return to the Arabs of the lands seized from them, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied in June 1967.

9. Such is the reality of the Middle East situation and the key to a settlement in the area.

10. The United Nations has taken a clear and definite stand on this question; in a number of its resolutions it has proclaimed the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war as a most important principle of contemporary international relations.

11. This firm and unambiguous position of the United Nations was stated in the well-known Security Council resolution 242 (1967), concerning peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The outstanding feature of that resolution was its demand for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in June 1967.

12. This position of principle of the United Nations was backed up by two subsequent General Assembly resolu-

tions—the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)] and resolution 2628 (XXV) on the situation in the Middle East, adopted last year at the commemorative meetings of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

13. It is quite obvious that the stubborn refusal of Israel to withdraw its troops from the Arab territories means nothing other than a continuation of aggression and a cynical refusal to reach a peace agreement with the Arab States.

14. It is high time that the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs, and those who instructed him to present his annexationist ideas from the rostrum of the General Assembly, understood that a peaceful agreement between Israel and the Arab States can be reached only if it involves no annexations or seizures and appropriations of territory and provides for the withdrawal of troops from all Arab territories to the lines which existed before 5 June 1967.

15. What was Israel's attitude toward the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly?

16. The facts are well known. For four years Israel has been persistently sabotaging these decisions. It has been openly violating the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. In defiance and in violation of the decisions of the Council and of the Assembly, it has stubbornly continued its illegal occupation of the Arab territories and has been doing everything in its power to justify its annexationist claims.

17. Israel's plans to seize and illegally appropriate the Arab territories have been repeatedly exposed in the General Assembly. They were clearly and persuasively unmasked and exposed once again in a recent statement at the present session by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Egypt, Mr. Riad.

18. Israel and its patrons are clearly calculating that the policy of force and international piracy, the policy of aggression, will triumph, that the Arab States, the victims of the aggression, will capitulate in the face of the Israeli aggressors and that the international community and the United Nations will resign themselves to these acts of lawlessness and imperialist plunder in the Middle East.

19. There is another thing which everyone also understands now. Israel, with the support of the United States, has paralysed the mission of Ambassador Jarring, who, in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), was to try to achieve a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East on the basis of the principles contained in that resolution, primarily the withdrawal of troops and the establishment of peace. The United States, continuing its policy of concealment, and, in effect, justifying and encouraging Israeli aggression, has not only paralysed the Jarring mission, but has also obstructed the Middle East consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council. As a result of the United States position at these consultations over more than two years, it proved impossible to adopt even one agreed decision. Everyone now well knows that this is the case from reading the articles of the former Permanent Representative of the

United States to the United Nations, Mr. Yost. Three months ago the representative of the United States, Mr. Bush, refused even to agree to the fixing of a date for the next consultative meeting. And now, almost a whole month later, despite the active efforts of the representative of France, Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet, who was to have been the next chairman of the consultative meeting, the United States representative has refused to agree to the meeting being held.

20. We view the Middle East consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council as one of the possible serious means of providing assistance and support to Ambassador Jarring in the performance of his noble mission, and of exerting influence on the arrogant aggressor. We consider that, if every permanent member of the Security Council viewed this question objectively, without pro-Israeli tendencies, and with an awareness of its responsibility to the United Nations in this regard, the consultations could to a significant extent facilitate a speedy settlement in the Middle East. Today, however, the outlook for a solution to this question is unfortunately very bleak.

21. One permanent member of the Security Council, first of all, blocked the consultative work on the Middle East and is now opposing its resumption and continuation. A second permanent member of the Security Council is refusing to take part in these consultations. We do not know whether there is any collusion between them on this point or not. It is quite obvious, however, that two permanent members of the Security Council, two great Powers, have backed away from a concerted effort by the permanent members of the Security Council to assist the Jarring mission, which is supported by the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, as is obvious from the resolutions adopted by the Organization. This also sheds light on the question which two great Powers do not want to promote a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and are thus in effect, whether intentionally or not, helping Israel to sabotage and delay the settlement. Consequently, the "one or two super-Powers" formula is inappropriate, senseless, and without any foundation. The real formula in this case is that "two great Powers, permanent members of the Security Council" are obstructing a peaceful settlement and thus facilitating the continuation of Israeli aggression and the occupation by Israel of Arab lands.

22. This is the actual state of affairs today.

23. The rulers of Israel and their supporters evidently think that, since they have succeeded for four and a half years in holding on to the occupied Arab lands and defying the will and opinion of the whole world, such a situation can be preserved indefinitely and with impunity. However, these calculations of the Israeli adventurers are not only mistaken and naive, but dangerous, particularly for themselves. Only people who are politically blind can fail to see what the alternative is to a political settlement in the Middle East and how dangerous that alternative is to the Israeli people themselves.

24. The longer the attainment of a political settlement in the Middle East is delayed, the fiercer will be the indignation of world public opinion and the hatred of the

Arabs toward the aggressor and its patrons, and the greater will be the damage done by the Israeli rulers to their own people and their own country.

25. Spurred by wild Zionist plans for the creation of a "greater Israel", the rulers of Tel Aviv are pursuing a racist policy of *apartheid* and oppression toward the Palestine people and the population of the Arab territories they have occupied, and are driving the Arab inhabitants from their homes in order to place Jewish settlers in the Arab lands. This is a clear example of the insane, criminal, fascist and racist theory of the "chosen people".

26. Zionist Israel is pursuing the policy and practice of the South African racists, under Middle East conditions. This is the basis of the close friendship and mutual understanding between the racists of Israel and the racists of South Africa.

27. The Arab countries and the other Asian and African States, as well as a number of international organizations, have repeatedly, and with profound indignation and categorical condemnation, drawn attention to the plunder of the Israeli occupiers in the occupied territories and to the cruel persecutions and violations of the elementary rights of the Arab population.

28. The Israeli vandals of the second half of the twentieth century are wiping off the face of the earth Arab dwellings in Jerusalem and in other Arab towns of occupied Palestine and are barbarously destroying invaluable and unique monuments of Arab culture. Their purpose is clear: racism. The expulsion of the people of Arab Palestine and Arab Jerusalem from their homeland, the destruction of Arab culture, the imposition by force of its own culture, views and insane racist theories, and the piratical appropriation of lands and property belonging to the Arabs, all this international criminal activity by Israel is at the same time a flagrant violation of the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, signed at The Hague on 14 May 1954.

29. In order to carry out annexationist plans, Israel is systematically taking measures aimed at changing the ethnic and demographic composition of the population of the Arab territories it has occupied. Through violence and terror, forced resettlement and mass deportation of Arabs, the occupiers are trying to provide *lebensraum* for Jewish settlers in the occupied part of Arab Palestine.

30. It is appropriate to recall in this connexion that such actions were condemned in the strongest terms by the International Military Tribunal which, in 1945 and 1946, passed judgement at Nürnberg on the Fascist war criminals.

31. The longer a settlement is deliberately delayed, the more obvious will become the invidious role of international and United States Zionism, with its fascist ideology of a "chosen people", and of those who support militant Zionism and dance to its anti-human and ultra-chauvinistic tune.

32. Aggressive Zionism is a tool of contemporary imperialism. It represents at the present time the same threat to peace as was at one time represented by the aggressive

adventurist policy of fascism with its anti-human, racist ideology. Militant Zionism, which preaches the racist ideology of a "chosen people", and nationalistic, chauvinistic fanaticism, has grown deep roots and is trying to strengthen its position in a number of Western countries, particularly the United States, where there are influential Zionist lobbies and where the most fanatical Zionist elements are creating a kind of "fifth column" and even something similar to the SS storm-troopers. It is not difficult to see that the most aggressive part of militant Zionism, with its terrorist methods, has by exploding bombs, shooting from high-calibre rifles through the windows of a foreign mission to the United Nations and engaging in subversive activities, now become a serious threat to the normal development of international relations.

33. The present discussion by the General Assembly of the Middle East situation is taking place in the midst of a very critical situation. Whether events in the Middle East move toward peace or in the opposite direction now depends to a large extent on the influence which the General Assembly brings to bear on Israel to make it abandon its obstructionist policy and carry out Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which—for the information of one of the previous speakers at an earlier meeting—was unanimously adopted by the Security Council and approved at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. I think we should waste no time refuting all the slanderous anti-Soviet fabrications of that speaker.

34. Can the General Assembly make an effective contribution to bringing about a Middle East settlement and exert the necessary influence on Israel? Indeed it can, if in actual fact it displays a determination to curb the arrogant aggressor. But that is not enough. The General Assembly must also try to drive some sense into those who are helping Israel and who, by so doing, are encouraging the continuation of Israeli aggression. Those parties must once again be put in a position of international isolation, as has already happened more than once in the United Nations.

35. A year ago the General Assembly took a first important step in that direction. At its twenty-fifth session, by an overwhelming majority of votes, it expressed its will in a resolution which in effect condemned Israel for its sabotage of a peaceful Middle East settlement. By adopting that resolution, the General Assembly categorically rejected the attempts of the United States to take Israel under its wing and to supplant Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the Jarring mission by unilateral, pro-Israeli "quiet diplomacy". As a result, Israel and its two friends—one large, one small—found themselves in total international political isolation in the Assembly. By adopting that resolution, the Assembly compelled Israel to resume its contacts with Ambassador Jarring.

36. Later, however, relying on United States military assistance and political support, Tel Aviv once again disregarded that decision of the Assembly, defied the entire United Nations and openly undermined the efforts of Ambassador Jarring.

37. These actions on the part of Israel aroused universal indignation and condemnation. The United States, however, did not exert any positive influence on Israel. It

refused to join in the concerted efforts with other permanent members of the Security Council to assist Ambassador Jarring and to ensure the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). It ceased to participate in the Middle East consultations. It adopted a course of supplanting the Jarring mission and the initiative of Ambassador Jarring by its own unilateral, uninvited mediation in the Middle East. This attempt was, of course, unsuccessful. As a result of all this zigzagging in United States policies and positions, another whole year was lost. The aggressor did not leave the foreign territory. Peace in the Middle East was not established. Jarring's efforts to achieve a settlement in the Middle East were undermined. The United States repeatedly asserted that only it could persuade Israel to withdraw the troops and to agree to a peaceful settlement, and alleged that neither the Security Council nor its permanent members, and still less the General Assembly or the United Nations as a whole, could do anything. Consequently, it said, only the United States, through unilateral "quiet diplomacy" could bring about a solution. Yet at the same time United States officials were asserting, as they continue to assert, that the United States did not favour imposing on Israel the conditions of a settlement. That position is contrary to a decision of the Security Council, and Security Council decisions are binding on all Members of the United Nations. There is no question of imposing anything but of implementing the decisions of the United Nations and one of its principal organs, the Security Council.

38. While the recent United States propaganda about "quiet diplomacy", which was so widely disseminated, was going on, the opposite phenomenon was occurring. Under growing pressure from Zionist circles at home, the United States has constantly been departing all this while from its own stated and widely-advertised official positions.

39. Indeed, the opposite picture is emerging. Israel for four years now has been imposing its conditions on the United States.

40. As a result of the joint diplomatic manoeuvring and zigzagging, Israel and the United States have paralysed the Jarring mission, blocked the consultations of the permanent members of the Security Council and, in the last analysis, caused an unacceptable delay in work toward a political settlement in the Middle East.

41. It is no accident, therefore, that many States Members of the United Nations consider that the United States, together with Israel, is primarily responsible for the deadlock on the question of a Middle East settlement and for the continuation of Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. That country has been encouraging the aggressor by its military and economic assistance and patronage.

42. During the consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council, the Soviet delegation and one other delegation criticized this unilateral action by the United States. The delegation of the USSR spoke out firmly both against this self-appointed mediation of the United States in a Middle East settlement and against the use for these purposes of so-called "quiet diplomacy", which we called "secret diplomacy".

43. We stressed that secret diplomacy, at all times and for all peoples, has never enjoyed any respect but has evoked apprehension, suspicion and condemnation. We viewed this action by the United States as an attempt to disregard and exclude from a Middle East settlement the Jarring mission, resolution 242 (1967), the consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and the Security Council itself, to take over the problem of a settlement under the camouflage of "quiet diplomacy" and to impose pro-Israeli conditions and conditions advantageous to Israel in a Middle East settlement through "secret diplomacy".

44. We firmly and categorically insisted, and continue to insist, on the continuation of Ambassador Jarring's work, on intensification of the consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and on active involvement of the Security Council and the General Assembly themselves in the question of a Middle East settlement through implementation of their own decisions.

45. We said that the unilateral mediation and "quiet diplomacy" of the United States would fail. Events have confirmed that we were right in what we predicted. As is known, the United States engaged in three rounds of its unilateral diplomacy in the Middle East, the Rogers round, the Bergus and Sterner round and, finally, the Sisco round. What was the result of this? All three rounds burst like a soap bubble.

46. The unilateral "quiet diplomacy" of the United States, which was advantageous only to Israel, did not work. It was a total fiasco. So it is time, finally, to put it aside and return to the open collective diplomacy of the United Nations through the Jarring mission, with consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and with the participation of the Security Council and the General Assembly in a Middle East settlement.

47. What must be done in order to break the dangerous deadlock over a Middle East settlement? There must be an immediate resumption and continuation of the work of the Jarring mission through implementation of Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February 1971 on the two key questions involved in a settlement: the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the peace terms.

48. In the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General observed:

"Ambassador Jarring has clearly defined the minimum conditions that are required to move the peace talks ahead and, until those conditions are met, it is hard to see what else he can do to further his efforts. Steps to ensure that those conditions are met must be taken by the parties concerned and, failing this, by the Security Council itself or by States Members of the United Nations and, particularly, the permanent members of the Security Council, both because of their special responsibility within the United Nations and of their influence on the parties concerned." [A/8401/Add.1, para. 223.]

49. The Soviet delegation considers that this approach is realistic, objective and appropriate to the conditions prevailing in the United Nations. It is fitting in this connexion to recall that during the consultations among the perma-

ment members of the Security Council there were indications that it would be possible to reach an agreement to the effect that Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February should be supported, that his initiative was fully in keeping with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and with his mandate, that the constructive and positive position of Egypt, which responded affirmatively to Ambassador Jarring's initiative and appeal, should be welcomed and, finally, that Israel should be induced to give an equally positive answer to the Jarring appeal.

50. This agreed opinion of the permanent members of the Security Council was brought to the attention of the President of the Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but only orally. Why orally? The answer is simple. To formulate these agreed positions in definitive form or to issue them in the form of a joint statement, declaration, communiqué or any other kind of document was not possible because of the negative position of the United States delegation. Clearly, the fear of zionism tied the hands of the United States delegation and of the United States itself on this question. Israel, of course, took advantage of this. It rejected Ambassador Jarring's initiative on the two key questions involved in a settlement and did not give a positive reply to his appeal of 8 February 1971.

51. The General Assembly should draw the necessary conclusion from all this. It should make its contribution to a speedy, peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

52. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which was supported unanimously by all members of the Security Council, provides a realistic basis for reaching a settlement. To implement that resolution it is necessary to resume, first, the Jarring mission and, second, the consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to provide Ambassador Jarring with immediate and active support and co-operation. Those permanent members of the Security Council which evade this responsibility of theirs will in effect be helping Israel to pursue its policy of aggression and to remain in the Arab lands.

53. Furthermore, the United States must be urged not to prevent Ambassador Jarring from carrying out his noble mission in the Middle East or to supplant him by Mr. Sisco, since the latter has not been empowered by the Security Council, the Secretary-General or the General Assembly to act as a mediator in the settlement of the Middle East crisis. This is quite clear to all the delegations at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. The Assembly must also call upon the United States to stop imposing on the Middle East its uninvited mediation and its so-called diplomacy which, as I have already said, should more properly be called "secret pro-Israeli diplomacy".

54. About one thing there is no doubt: a Middle East settlement is impossible without the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab lands seized in 1967. Without this, it is also impossible to achieve a stable peace in the Middle East.

55. Realistic and collective—not individual and unilateral—steps must be taken on behalf of the United Nations in order to move from crisis to settlement, and from armed

confrontation to peace, in the Middle East. A great deal can be achieved by stepping up the efforts of the peace-loving States which are interested in eliminating the dangerous hotbed of war in the Middle East.

56. All States Members of the United Nations voted in favour of the resolutions which reaffirmed the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war, a principle which has become a binding rule of the international community.

57. The General Assembly, guided by this principle, must in the interests of international peace and security take urgent measures to exert influence on the Israeli adventurers, who have encroached on foreign territory, and to force them to comply with the decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, to co-operate positively with Ambassador Jarring, and to accept his initiative on the key questions of a settlement—the withdrawal of troops and the peace terms.

58. Firm, decisive and speedy action is needed if Israel and those who encourage it are not once again to send the whole matter of the Middle East settlement back into a deadlock or to continue a policy of aggression in the Middle East, a policy fraught with grave consequences.

59. The Soviet Union sincerely wants to see a lasting peace in the Middle East. Our country is ready to participate, along with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in establishing international guarantees for a political settlement and for security in the Middle East.

60. The Soviet Union is providing the Arab States, which have been the victims of imperialist aggression, with a broad range of assistance, in order that they may defend their legitimate national rights and interests. This has been, and remains, a consistent and firm policy of the Soviet Government. No matter how anyone may slander the position and policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, this slander does not even deserve a reply.

61. The Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which adopted a broad programme of measures to ensure international peace and security, issued a special statement on the Middle East situation. It said:

"The Congress expresses its firm conviction that the attempts of the imperialists and their henchmen to impose their *diktat* on the peoples of the Arab countries, to subvert the progressive régimes in the Middle East and to defeat the national liberation movement in that part of the world, are doomed to failure. The legitimate rights and interests of all Arab people, including the Arabs of Palestine, will triumph. The Israeli aggressors will be compelled to get out of the Arab territories seized by them in 1967. The guarantee of this is the unbending will of the Arab peoples, their striving for independence, freedom, peace and social progress, and their close alliance with the peoples of the Soviet Union and those of the other socialist countries and with all anti-imperialist, peace-loving forces."¹

¹ *Materialy XXIV Sezda KPSS* (Moscow, Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1971), p. 304.

62. The conclusion of a treaty of friendship and co-operation between the USSR and the Arab Republic of Egypt was a clear expression of the growing friendship and solidarity between the Soviet and Egyptian peoples.

63. The Arab peoples, fighting for their independence and their national liberation, esteem highly the friendship and support of the Soviet Union and its multinational people. The Assembly heard an indication of this from the Foreign Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Mr. Riad.

64. In this regard, it is appropriate to refer to the joint Soviet-Arab communiqué issued in connexion with the visit of President El-Sadat to the Soviet Union in October 1971. It said:

“President A. El-Sadat, on behalf of the Government and people of the Arab Republic of Egypt, expressed his sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for the large amount of assistance and the constant support given to Egypt. This support is a reliable bulwark in its fight against Israel and against the imperialist forces which support it.”

65. Equally high assessments of the co-operation and unselfish assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the Arab peoples in their fight against Israeli aggression have repeatedly been given by other Arab leaders, representing different sectors of the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

66. We, the Soviet people, are proud of our friendship with the Arab peoples. We highly value this friendship and, for our part, are doing everything in our power to strengthen in every possible way our fraternal co-operation with the Arab peoples and to give them real, not just verbal, assistance. It is no accident, therefore, that the enemies of the Arab peoples react to this friendship with such hatred and anger.

67. The imperialists, their Israeli agents and all other anti-Soviet people of all stripes are doing everything to divide the Arab peoples and to undermine their friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Following the principle that imperialist ends justify the use of the dirtiest means, the enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship are trying in every way to arouse mistrust in the Arab countries towards the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and are disseminating fabrications, lies and myths about what they call “Soviet expansionism”. However, all these pitiful and vain efforts by the enemies of Soviet-Arab friendship and of co-operation and common struggle for the elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression are hopelessly doomed to failure. They will bring success and glory neither to those who invent them nor to those who disseminate them.

68. In a recent statement in Algeria, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, stressed that the Arab peoples have learned to understand who are their friends and who are not. They have learned to identify the provocations of those who would like to delay the progressive development of the Arab East.

69. The central task of the United Nations and the core of its work is the preservation and guaranteeing of peace. It

was for that lofty purpose that the Organization was created. The duty of the General Assembly and the duty of all peace-loving countries is to make an effective contribution, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to a speedy and just settlement in the Middle East, and to eliminate a hotbed of dangerous military conflict in that region which may flare up at any moment.

70. Mr. FACK (Netherlands): For almost a quarter of a century the United Nations has been confronted with the worrying situation in the Middle East. Back and forth the problem has gone, from the General Assembly to the Security Council, from the Security Council to the General Assembly in annual, special or emergency session, and back to the Security Council again. Last year it came up for consideration in the General Assembly, and for nine days the plenary session discussed the issue, largely in a manner which seemed to justify some guarded optimism: first of all, a general desire for peace pervaded the debate and, secondly, there was wide-spread recognition of the fact that only Security Council resolution 242 (1967), taken as a whole, could provide a basis for a future settlement.

71. How does the picture look at present, a full year after the debate during the twenty-fifth session? In the view of the Netherlands delegation the situation in the Middle East, seen in the perspective of one year, presents some positive and hopeful aspects, some less favourable ones, and finally some puzzling points.

72. To start with the last category: it seems curious that, although the situation in the Middle East has been presented to the General Assembly in the course of this debate as “armed aggression”, “continued aggression”, “colonial aggression”, “military conquest for territorial expansion”, thus constituting an ever more serious threat to international peace and security, justifying enforcement measures by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council, the principal organ of the United Nations primarily concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, has not, in the full year that has elapsed since our previous debate, devoted one single meeting to this point on its agenda. What is more, not one Member of the United Nations, as far as my delegation is aware, has asked the Security Council last year to consider the situation in the Middle East. True, two months ago, the Security Council devoted a brief discussion to the question of the status of Jerusalem, but that is, after all, only one aspect of the complex problem of the Middle East. As a whole, the situation in the Middle East, although on the agenda of the Security Council as a matter under active consideration, has not been discussed by the Council, nor has any Member even suggested that the Council should take it up.

73. And yet, puzzling as this may seem at first sight, the Security Council was probably wise in avoiding a public debate on the issue in its entirety in the year gone by. One of the reasons the Council may have had for its “hands off” attitude may well have been its own assessment of the other aspects I referred to—particularly the positive and hopeful developments; this may well have persuaded the Council, on balance, to leave well enough alone.

74. As my delegation sees it, some of the positive developments of the last year may be summarized as

follows: since August 1970 the unconditional cease-fire orders of the Security Council have been largely observed on all sides. The mere fact that, by and large, the guns have remained silent reflects a desire for exercising restraint on the part of all parties concerned.

75. Under the able guidance of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, a cautious advance has been made towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Secretary-General's Special Representative has made praiseworthy efforts in February of this year to introduce a new concept and a novel approach, which may well prove to be the key to a just and lasting settlement. The response given to Ambassador Jarring by Egypt has been promising and my delegation wishes to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the Government of Egypt for its attitude towards Ambassador Jarring's approach. We note that the Government of Israel has, so far, not replied to the Special Representative's questions, and we in the Netherlands associate ourselves with the appeal of our Secretary-General to the Government of Israel to give further consideration to Mr. Jarring's request. A clear reply by Israel is of the essence, in our view, if there is a sincere desire to arrive at even the very first step in a negotiated settlement. In the view of my Government, Security Council resolution 242 (1967) implies that Israel should, in a negotiated settlement, withdraw behind guaranteed, secure and recognized boundaries to a territory of approximately the same size as its national territory was before June 1967. In view of Israel's declared policy to seek not territorial expansion but secure and recognized boundaries, we trust that further steps along the thorny path leading to a just and binding peace settlement will before long become possible under the patient and well-tried stewardship of Ambassador Jarring.

76. The third favourable development is the interest shown by Israel and Egypt in the possibility of arriving at a solution of one particular question: the reopening of the Suez Canal. My delegation is aware of the many obstacles to be overcome before even this one aspect of the over-all problem can be regarded nearer a solution, but the mere fact that ideas have been developed on both sides and that those ideas have been exchanged through the good offices of the United States of America is in itself encouraging. Understandably, perhaps, these efforts have come to a halt during this session of the General Assembly, but we trust that they will be resumed before long and that, in due course, they will be successful. Such a development would, in our view, augur well for a subsequent over-all solution. At present, the Suez Canal performs the function of the English Channel during four years of the Second World War: it forms a natural barrier keeping the armed forces of two opposing parties apart. And we can well imagine that Israel would be willing to relinquish the obvious advantages of such a natural barrier only if iron-clad guarantees were given against armed attacks, accidental or intentional, on its armed forces in withdrawn positions. But understandable as the Israeli doubts, reluctance and hesitation are, we are convinced that it is not beyond the ingenuity of the international community to devise ways and means to replace the Suez Canal by another formidable barrier between the opposing forces—for instance, by interposing a strong United Nations peace-keeping force, under the auspices of the Security Council, not to be withdrawn or

otherwise deployed without the express orders of the Council.

77. Not that my delegation wishes to suggest particular solutions or part-solutions at this stage. We just want to illustrate that, if security safeguards are the stumbling-block on the road to agreement between the parties, solutions should not be too difficult to find. And, as far as the Netherlands is concerned, I wish to repeat our previous assurance to the effect that if a United Nations peace-keeping force for the Middle East is envisaged at any time, my country's attitude towards participation in such a force will be positive and constructive.

78. The fourth favourable factor is the decreasing activity of the guerrilla movement on the borders of Israel, rendering the refugee problem considerably more tractable. The Netherlands Government has repeatedly declared its willingness to contribute constructively to the solution of the refugee problem within the framework of an over-all settlement. I hereby reiterate that willingness.

79. Last, but not least, there is the welcome initiative of the African Heads of State, who undertook an extended fact-finding mission recently and whose interesting and constructive proposals have been explained to the Assembly [2002nd meeting]. If I may say so with respect, my delegation is particularly impressed by the most appropriate, business-like and wise suggestions made by the committee of ten to President El-Sadat and to Prime Minister Meir—suggestions to which, we feel, every Member of the United Nations, whether directly concerned or not, could subscribe. My delegation wishes to pay a tribute to the African leaders concerned and to congratulate them on their constructive efforts.

80. Encouraging as some of those developments may be, there are, in the opinion of my delegation, other aspects of the situation which must be regarded less favourably. In the first place, a certain feeling of stagnation undeniably exists. That may lead to dangerous outbursts, dashing the world's hope for a just and lasting peace. Equally disturbing is the immoderate language used from time to time by persons in authority on both sides. Although it is often open to doubt whether more than passing importance should be attached to such emotional public statements, my delegation cannot help feeling that it is a pity that they should occur at all, and that it would be in the interests of the region, and indeed of the world, if they were avoided. As a representative from a Caribbean country remarked the other day in one of the committees of the General Assembly when the situation in the Middle East was under discussion, the world is worried by the statements of those who seek belligerency for the sake of belligerency as a solution to this problem. And the world vividly recalls the fate of those who were carried away by fiery words and allowed belligerency to take the place of wise counsel in the region.

81. Another most disquieting factor in the situation is the possible resumption of the arms race. Does the General Assembly really need to be reminded of the dangers of an arms race in the Middle East? Have the destruction and bloodshed of the first half of 1970 already been forgotten? Uneasy as it may have been, the arms balance of the last 12 months has, in our view, had a salutary effect, in the sense

that a truce was observed. Then suddenly a few weeks ago the world was startled by the news that the Soviet Union has decided to resume important arms deliveries to the Middle East. Immediate reactions followed in the United States, as was to be expected. What the outcome will be is not yet clear, but the history of the last 25 years points to one inescapable conclusion: the arms race in the Middle East is at best costly and senseless and, at less than best, perilous.

82. In spite of these unfavourable developments we, for our part, must conclude that on the whole there is still ground for cautious optimism. That being so, my delegation subscribes to the view of the Security Council that there is at present good reason to leave well enough alone and thereby to enhance the chances of the implementation of the Council's delicately balanced resolution 242 (1967). My delegation hopes that the General Assembly will follow a similar course.

83. In our view, the General Assembly would be well advised to refrain from formulating recommendations, for a variety of reasons—some of substance, some constitutional. It is hard to see how the Assembly can make any constructive contribution of its own. Matters of international peace and security are the primary responsibility of the Security Council. The Council's resolution 242 (1967) is the only basis for further activity, and the General Assembly cannot and should not try to add to or detract from that resolution as a whole, or attempt to formulate its own interpretation of that carefully balanced text. In addition, the Netherlands feels, as a conscientious Member of the United Nations, that Article 12 of the Charter should be just as scrupulously observed by the General Assembly as all the other Articles of the Charter. Perhaps a simple appeal to the parties to resume the Jarring talks on the basis of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) would be the answer.

84. In conclusion, I should like to summarize the elements which are at the basis of the Netherlands' views on the situation in the Middle East.

85. First of all, the Netherlands Government remains of the opinion that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) is the only reliable infra-structure for peace in the region and must therefore be implemented in all its parts. We strongly deprecate attempts to present tendentious and selective interpretations of that resolution, which, in our view, either stands as a whole or falls to the ground.

86. Secondly, we stand firmly behind the efforts of Mr. Jarring, and we venture to appeal to the Special Representative to continue them with his customary tact, patience, courtesy, perseverance and ingenuity, and to appeal to the Governments directly concerned to co-operate to the largest possible extent with Mr. Jarring.

87. Thirdly, the Kingdom of the Netherlands maintains excellent and most amicable relations with all the States directly concerned. We have no axe to grind one way or another. We wish all parties well, in peace, justice, prosperity and good neighbourliness. Our national and regional interests, as a European Power, command us to judge every development in the situation in the Middle

East, a region where stability is of prime importance to us, exclusively on its merits, and especially on the basis of its significance for the advancement of a peaceful settlement between Member States.

88. Fourthly, we therefore appeal to the parties directly concerned to enter into a form of dialogue with each other, as prescribed by Security Council resolution 242 (1967), as a first step towards the establishment of the climate of confidence indispensable for further progress. Such a dialogue might be direct or indirect, possibly via Mr. Jarring or, on particular problems, via any other intermediary. But the same world that is witnessing dialogues between opposing parties on Berlin, on European security, on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, on mutual and balanced force reductions, on Viet-Nam—in brief, on a host of complicated problems which looked like impossible subjects for dialogue a short time ago—can no longer understand why a peaceful settlement in the Middle East cannot be accepted as a matter for urgent dialogue and negotiation, direct or indirect.

89. In the fifth place, an appropriate and equitable settlement of the smouldering and potentially explosive refugee problem remains, in our view, essential. Such a settlement should be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the refugees involved, to whom, apart from voluntary repatriation, various attractive alternatives should be offered for rebuilding their lives.

90. Finally, we want to reiterate the point that the cease-fire should be observed in future, as it is at present, until a peaceful settlement has been achieved. Any resumption of hostilities would not only be contrary to the provisions of the Charter and at variance with the cease-fire orders of the Security Council, but it would also destroy the present climate, possibly beyond repair.

91. As the history of the Middle East over the last quarter-century shows, it is all too easy to start armed conflicts, but, as the life history of our late friend, Ralph Bunche, shows, it requires almost superhuman efforts to restore peace. All the fighting, the bloodshed and the destruction of the past decades have only led to increased misery for the peoples concerned and to an ever-deteriorating political climate. The damaging effect of past hostilities on the economic and social development of the region has been immeasurable. Violence breeds violence and destruction is a self-perpetuating process. War spares no one. It slays, as a poet put it, "the shepherd and the herd".

92. We are confident that the leaders of the countries of the region are aware of this danger and we would therefore appeal to them to avoid, most carefully, inflammatory rhetoric and provocative sabre-rattling from now on. We would ask them to realize the indignation and the concern of the world at large over persistent and unnecessary human suffering and to remember that real and lasting victories are those of peace—not of war.

93. Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): First of all, I would like to join all those who have preceded me at this rostrum today to pay tribute to the memory of a great American of African descent. The passing away of Ralph Bunche is a loss not only to the United States but also to the United

Nations, indeed to the world. Ralph Bunche dedicated his life to the cause of truth, justice and peace. May he now rest in peace. We offer our sincere condolences to his widow and to his family.

[The speaker continued in French.]

94. The question of the Middle East is, together with the tragic situation prevailing at the present time in East Pakistan, one of the two most disturbing questions to which the General Assembly must devote most of its attention at the present session in an effort to contribute to their solution before it is too late.

95. On the one hand, we are confronted with an armed conflict which is a very serious threat to peace on the Indian subcontinent. On the other hand, we find a latent conflict which, because of the precarious cease-fire and increased tensions in the area, could lead to a resumption of hostilities between Israel and the Arab countries, if we do nothing to get out of the impasse which has been reached in the negotiations under the aegis of Mr. Jarring.

96. The task of the Assembly is to facilitate the successful resumption of negotiations under the guidance of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General by suggesting, if necessary, what concrete steps must be taken for the full and definitive implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), so that finally a just and lasting peace may be established in the Middle East.

97. This is consistent with the goal of the mission which the Organization of African Unity assigned to a 10-member committee. The rest of us who are members of the Organization of African Unity hope that some of the measures advocated by the Commission will serve as a basis for the measures to be decided upon by the General Assembly at the conclusion of this debate.

98. It is encouraging to note that the Foreign Ministers of the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel have indicated that their Governments are prepared to resume negotiations under the guidance of Mr. Jarring.

99. In our opinion, our acceptance of the formula of indirect negotiations should be subject to no restrictions. Of course, bilateral contacts between Egypt and Israel might prove useful, but they could take place only if the questions to be discussed were decided upon by common consent of the two parties. In other words, one party should not insist that some questions should be discussed on a bilateral basis exclusively without the consent of the other side.

100. The statements by the representatives of Egypt and Israel make it possible now to identify the most urgent problems to be settled, namely, the fate of the territories occupied by Israel as a result of the 1967 war, the question of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from these territories, the definition of secure and recognized boundaries likely to guarantee a lasting peace in the area, and the parallel issue of a possible demilitarization of certain areas.

101. The delegation of Mauritius believes that these questions could be easily settled if we concentrated on

giving full effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In this connexion there is one fundamental principle on which Mauritius, like the majority of Member States, cannot compromise, and that is the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by war. The territorial integrity of all Member States should consequently be respected, and restored when necessary.

102. That is why we attach special importance to the proposals put forward by Ambassador Jarring in his aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971 [A/8541, annex I] addressed to the Governments of Egypt and Israel. You will recall that in that aide-mémoire Mr. Jarring asked Israel to pledge to withdraw its forces from the occupied territory of Egypt to the former international boundaries between Egypt and Palestine under British Mandate and Egypt to undertake, on a basis of reciprocity, to enter into various commitments and obligations with Israel consistent with the provisions of resolution 242 (1967).

103. As Egypt has agreed to enter into the commitments asked of it, one might have expected that the fundamental issue of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territory in Egypt was going to be settled. But because of Israel's attitude, not even a beginning has been made towards a solution of this crucial issue. It is clear that if the General Assembly wishes to help Mr. Jarring to get out of the impasse that has thus been created, it must induce Israel to make the necessary concessions.

104. We believe that the major Powers, thanks to their bilateral relations with the parties, also have a decisive role to play, jointly or severally. In this connexion we noted with interest the statement made by the United States on 24 June 1971 after a meeting of the four great Powers. This statement read in part as follows:

"The United States remains dedicated to the search for just and lasting peace in the Middle East based on carrying out Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and provisions. We remain dedicated to the support of Ambassador Jarring's role in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and specifically to his proposals of February 8 which we consider in accordance with his mandate. As I have said before, we consider the reply of the UAR to Ambassador Jarring's proposals to be positive and we hope that Israel will make a similarly positive reply. As we have stated previously, we intend to continue our dialogue with Israel in support of Ambassador Jarring's efforts to bring about an over-all settlement in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts and provisions."²

105. We hope that in its dialogue with Israel, the United States will be able to find an effective way of convincing it to co-operate to a greater extent with Mr. Jarring's efforts. While awaiting the resumption of negotiations in the circumstances to be defined by the resolution that will be adopted by the General Assembly, we appeal to the parties concerned to maintain and strengthen the cease-fire and to avoid any action which might increase tension in the area.

106. Mr. DUGERSUREN (Mongolia): The consideration of the situation in the Middle East by the twenty-sixth

² Quoted in English by the speaker.

session of the General Assembly as an extremely urgent and crucial matter constitutes an eloquent expression of the deep concern and anxiety of the peace-loving forces over the crisis in the area and at the same time it also represents their determination to spare no effort in the search for a peaceful solution to this problem. This is amply evident from the statements by many representatives both now and during the recent general debate.

107. The regrettable fact is that, despite all the efforts on the part of the world community and this Organization, the crisis in the Middle East is no nearer to a solution and the situation in that region remains explosive. Its precarious nature seems to have acquired a new accent in connexion with the crisis on the Hindustan subcontinent.

108. The main reason for the deplorable situation in the Middle East lies in the expansionist policy of the ruling circles of Israel which, having committed naked aggression against the neighbouring Arab countries, are tenaciously seeking to perpetuate the evil consequences of the aggression.

109. In open defiance of the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), the Israeli rulers vehemently refuse to withdraw or even to commit themselves to withdraw their armed forces from the occupied Arab lands. They intentionally block the way towards settlement in order to play for time to entrench themselves still deeper in the Arab territories.

110. The Israeli authorities have virtually shifted now from non-implementation of the Security Council resolution to an open violation of its spirit and letter, to the use of it to justify their persistence in the retention of the territories occupied by force. Earlier they used the demand for "direct talks" with the Arab counter-parties as a specious excuse for their intransigence. Now they have taken to clinging to the formula "secure and recognized boundaries", conveniently disregarding the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

111. The concept of "secure boundaries" in Tel Aviv's interpretation turns out to be nothing else but an excuse for the expansionist policy of Israel and becomes a modern version of the Hitlerite theory of "living space".

112. By its completely negative reply to the aide-mémoire of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General [A/8541, annex I] concerning the commitment to withdraw its armed forces from occupied Arab territories, Israel has put his mission into deadlock. In this connexion the Secretary-General clearly pointed out in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization that:

"Ambassador Jarring feels, and I agree with him, that, until there has been a change in Israel's position on the question of withdrawal, it would serve little useful purpose to attempt to reactivate the talks." [A/8401/Add.1, para. 219.]

113. Israel has given not a single positive answer to a number of constructive proposals and initiatives by the Government of Egypt nor has it shown any desire to negotiate seriously on the substance of the Middle East problem.

114. The ruling circles of Israel openly ignore the relevant resolutions of the United Nations with regard to the status of the occupied Arab territories and the population therein. During and after the June 1967 war the Israeli military expelled more than half a million Arabs from the west bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip. The Sinai peninsula has become for Israel an economic region of primary importance. Special companies are said to have been set up in order to exploit and rob the oil wealth in the Sinai peninsula belonging to Egypt. Israel continues to defy all the resolutions on Jerusalem.

115. All this is the clearest testimony to the fact that the obstructionist policy of the Israelis and their continued occupation of the Arab territories are the main obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. Israel's policy is certainly not one of peace. The world community should not forget the cynical utterance of one of the former Israeli leaders, who said, "The dirtiest trick the Arabs could play on us would be to make peace with us."

116. The true nature of the Middle East crisis would be extremely vague if the United States political, military and economic support to Israel were overlooked.

117. The United States policy of "balance of power" feeds the expansionist desire of the Zionists, because it means American supplies of Phantoms and all kinds of offensive weaponry. This policy has rightly been identified by the Arab countries as one whose aim it is to secure permanent Israeli military superiority over the Arab countries, the victims of the aggression. Indeed, the United States stand on the Middle East is strongly manifest in the huge military and financial aid that the United States gives Israel. In this connexion I should like to quote a former United States diplomat in Cairo who wrote in *The New York Times* of 5 June 1971:

"Since 1969, our assistance has greatly increased"—referring to assistance to Israel—"Dollar transfers in 1970 reached \$800 million and in 1971 will approximate \$1.5 billion. A further increase is anticipated in 1972. . . .

"... We have provided aircraft, missiles, and electronic systems in some cases of greater sophistication and greater strike capability than those furnished our NATO and SEATO allies.

"In the exchange of intelligence, our co-operation with Israel is unprecedented . . .

"... Israel has become our 51st State."

118. The collusion between United States imperialism and Israeli zionism also has another important aspect. Israel in its turn serves the interests of the United States global strategy of "local conflicts". In this sense Israel is an instrument through which imperialism tries to contain the national liberation movement in the Arab world and, first and foremost, to stifle the progressive régimes there. A United States banker and one-time adviser to President Roosevelt, Mr. James Warburg, says:

"The present American policy, in effect, makes Israel the supplier of the military muscle required to hold down social revolution in the Middle East."

119. The Israeli *élite* seems to consider it unnecessary to conceal its role as the United States *gendarme* in the Middle East. The Israeli newspaper of the religious parties, *Hatzofe*, noted, "Israel is an advanced United States position." The United States is in fact blocking the four-Power talks on the Middle East by calling for so-called "quiet diplomacy". It virtually encourages, by its deeds, the Israeli rulers to render the Jarring mission ineffective. In the light of such acts, the so-called United States peace initiatives and plans for the Middle East cannot but be regarded as devices for delaying a real and equitable settlement of the crisis.

120. Unlike the Israeli rulers and those who are behind them, the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt pursues a truly peace-loving and constructive course towards a settlement of the Middle East conflict. During 1971 alone, the Egyptian Government advanced a number of constructive proposals aimed at a just political solution to the problem in accordance with the well-known resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

121. The Government of Egypt responded promptly, clearly and, above all, positively to the Jarring aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971. It stated in particular that it was willing to conclude a peace treaty with Israel if the latter undertook to withdraw from the occupied territories. Egypt has also expressed its readiness to undertake the required arrangements for reopening the Suez Canal in return for the first stage of an Israeli withdrawal on condition that Israel responds positively to Mr. Jarring's aide-mémoire. As Ambassador El-Zayyat of Egypt stated here yesterday [2006th meeting], in the memorandum given to the mission of inquiry of the four African Heads of State, the Egyptian Government again confirmed the aforementioned positions and also expressed its readiness to accept United Nations guarantees for peace, the establishing of demilitarized zones astride the borders and the stationing of international forces at some strategic points, including Sharm el Sheikh. By its positive attitudes towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt has made an important contribution facilitating the Jarring mission.

122. Every indication shows clearly that the Israeli aggressive and expansionist policy is the main cause of tensions and the absence of peace in the Middle East. Therefore, in the opinion of my delegation, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories is the only real basis on which a political settlement can be reached. My delegation, like many others, continues to hold that Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in spite of its shortcomings and weaknesses, provides the framework for achieving a peaceful settlement of the present crisis on an equitable and just basis.

123. The crux of an equitable solution to the problem resides in the implementation of the resolution, taking all its important provisions as one single stipulation. The initial and perhaps decisive clue to that end lies in the resumption of the mission of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who has clearly defined the conditions objectively called for to move the peace talks ahead.

124. The twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly should make every effort to find ways and means to bring pressure to bear upon the Israeli aggressors so that they

abandon their expansionist and obstructionist policy. This Assembly should also once again reaffirm the principle of the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force.

125. The prevailing circumstances cannot but give rise to the conviction that there is every legal justification for considering the use of other more effective Charter measures by this Organization against Israel as a State which systematically violates the main provisions of the Charter and the Security Council resolutions. Strongest pressure also should be exerted on the United States and it must desist from providing Israel with political, financial and military assistance.

126. May I quote here from the statement of the Chairman of our Council of Ministers, who on 7 June 1971 said:

"The Mongolian People's Republic considers that the establishment of a lasting peace in the Middle East calls for the liquidation of all the consequences of Israeli aggression. Such a settlement should duly take into account the rights and interests of all peoples in the Middle East including the Arab people of Palestine".

127. Let me finish on a note of hope. Time is working for the Arab cause. The peace-loving and democratic forces in the area are closing their ranks and strengthening their friendship and co-operation with the socialist countries and all peace-loving forces.

128. These factors are bound to play a decisive role in the just and equitable solution of the crisis that will eventually be found. In this connexion I should like to state that the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, signed at Cairo on 27 May 1971, will certainly play a constructive part in this respect, despite whatever attempts may be made to distort the aim of such treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with other States. The Government and people of the Mongolian People's Republic will spare no effort to contribute to every positive step towards a just political settlement in the Middle East.

129. Mr. ZAKARIA (Malaysia): Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to associate my delegation with the profound sentiments expressed by you, Sir, the Secretary-General and the chairmen of groups of States in paying a tribute to the memory of Under-Secretary-General Mr. Ralph Bunche. May I take this opportunity of extending to the United States delegation and to the bereaved widow and family of Mr. Ralph Bunche my delegation's deepest and most heartfelt sympathy and condolences.

130. It is now more than four years since the outbreak of the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East and yet, despite Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which was unanimously adopted as the framework for a solution of the Middle East problem, a peaceful settlement is nowhere in sight. As a result of its aggression and in defiance of the Security Council resolution, Israel is still in occupation of territories belonging to Egypt, Jordan and Syria. Furthermore, the Arab people of Palestine continue to be denied their inalienable rights. The continued Israeli occupation of Arab lands, which is the fruit of its aggression, cannot be allowed to persist. It is a violation of the cardinal principles

of the United Nations Charter and must continue to be condemned. There can be no justification for aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State and the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible. These principles have been emphasized and re-emphasized and nowhere are they in more urgent need of application than in the Middle East. Indeed, the situation in the Middle East today is rocking the very foundations of the United Nations and is threatening the basis for a peaceful world order. It is, therefore, the duty of the United Nations, especially the Security Council, mindful of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to exert every effort to secure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories as a central element in the restoration of peace in the Middle East.

131. It is a matter of deep concern to my delegation that the United Nations has not secured the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which embodies those principles and which represents a practical, just and workable settlement for a lasting peace. My delegation remains insistent that the United Nations must continue to devote all its endeavours to ensure the full implementation of this resolution in all its parts.

132. In this connexion, it is a matter of deep concern to my delegation that the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ambassador Gunnar Jarring, have come to a virtual standstill. And as clearly testified by the Secretary-General in his report submitted jointly to the General Assembly and to the Security Council [*A/8541-S/10403*] the burden of responsibility for the standstill must fall squarely on Israel. While we note with appreciation the positive reply given by Egypt to the Special Representative's initiative for establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, it is a matter of serious concern to my delegation to note that Israel has not only ignored the specific commitment sought by Ambassador Jarring on withdrawal from occupied Egyptian territory, but in its communication sent to Ambassador Jarring, which is contained in the annex to the Secretary-General's report, Israel had explicitly stated: "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines" [*A/8541, annex III*]. Nothing can be clearer than this assertion of Israel's intentions. My delegation wishes to reiterate firmly that the situation created as a result of aggression cannot be made the bargaining point in an effort to extract conditions for withdrawal.

133. Recent developments in the area have added to the urgency of a peaceful settlement. Since the present lull, the parties concerned have strengthened their military capabilities and, if the present impasse in the search for peace remains, there can be no doubt of renewed hostilities. My delegation, therefore, supports the view that the United Nations must review the situation once again and find ways and means to enable Ambassador Jarring to move forward with his mission in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). My delegation wishes also to reiterate our conviction that in any solution of the Middle East problem, the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine must be fully respected. So long as the injustice inflicted on them remains unresolved and uncompensated, so long will there not be peace in the area, for without justice, there can never be lasting peace.

134. Mr. IBINGIRA (Uganda): So much has been said, and so little that is new remains unsaid, on the Middle East situation that I propose in this address to be brief in restating the position of my delegation and Government on this intractable and tragic problem.

135. First, I wish to pay a tribute to Ambassador Jarring for his unyielding efforts to bring about a successful settlement of this dispute where a lesser man would long ago have surrendered to defeat. A tribute must also go to our illustrious Secretary-General, who has consistently explored all possible avenues to a solution of this problem. When we are justifiably lamenting the fact that no solution has yet been achieved, let us not totally overlook the fact that, without the efforts of these men and those who assist them, the situation could have been worse.

136. The basis for a solution, in the view of my delegation and Government, lies in the Security Council resolution 242 (1967). In that resolution all the basic problems are highlighted and the requirements for a return to normality are indicated. It is so basic and crucial that I must briefly reiterate its main points. To begin with, there must be a "withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied" in the June 1967 war. This sentence in the resolution is simple, plain and unambiguous in the English language and is not susceptible to other interpretations except what it means in the ordinary sense of the words expressed. It means that before the war of June 1967 there were distinct and well-known territories belonging to the Arab States which during that war were occupied by the armed forces of Israel. It consequently requires Israel to remove its armed forces from those territories.

137. We have noted with dismay in the report of the Secretary-General, dated 30 November 1971, that the Government of Israel communicated to Ambassador Jarring on 26 February 1967 that "Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines" [*A/8541, annex III*]. The absence of withdrawal means occupation, and occupation, given a protracted length of time, means acquisition or annexation of territory by force, which I am convinced this great Assembly cannot witness with pleasure nor accept without censure.

138. Secondly, the resolution requires, among other things, "respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area". These are reciprocal requirements. They are demanded of Israel as well as of the Arab States. It would be meaningless to expect one party to the dispute to honour these requirements when the other party defies them. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel must be as real and concrete as those of Egypt and Jordan. We know that sovereignty is exclusive to the State entity possessing it and the moment you occupy a part of that State entity; not only do you contravene that State's territorial integrity, but you also derogate from its sovereignty and political independence. We believe that this is a proposition too plain to contest; that the occupation of Arab territories by Israel contravenes this provision of the Security Council resolution.

139. This part of the resolution also recognizes the right of each State "to live in peace within secure and recognized

boundaries free from threats or acts of force". We cannot fail to realize the real fear of Israel and its desire to have secure and recognized borders. For such a small State as Israel to be surrounded by comparatively vast Arab nations, seemingly hostile, it is a condition for survival that its borders must be secure for its people to live in peace. Failure to acknowledge this fact is not only unrealistic, it is also unhelpful in the search for a lasting and just solution of the problem. The question which we must, therefore, ask and answer is this: Is the occupation of Arab territory surrounding Israel by Israel's armed forces the only way to provide Israel with secure borders free from threats or acts of force?

140. It is significant that Ambassador Jarring, in his aide-mémoire to the Governments of both Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, does not consider the Israeli solution of occupation the right one. It is the view of my delegation that Ambassador Jarring's proposals to the Arab Republic of Egypt and to Israel provide a sound basis for a solution to this problem. Those proposals envisage the establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances and the establishment of a United Nations peace-keeping force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate. These proposals, among others, would have to be accepted by Egypt and Israel and the consequence would be the withdrawal of armed forces from the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza Strip. We are convinced that these proposals, read together with the others in the aide-mémoire referred to above, constitute the most hopeful basis for a solution and would enable Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force.

141. We cannot at this stage in the world community subscribe to the view that, in the event of an international dispute or conflict between two or more States, the United Nations is not capable of providing security through its peace-keeping machinery to one or more of the aggrieved parties. To hold the contrary view would be to nurse the seeds of our own dissolution, first among the small nations, and then among the super-nations of our Organization.

142. Thirdly, the Security Council resolution affirms the necessity for "guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area". Coming as I do from Uganda in East Africa, where our shortest sea route to the whole of Europe and North America was through the Suez Canal, I speak on this matter as one directly and adversely affected by the closing of the Suez Canal. Glance at the map of Africa and you will realize at once that all the countries in eastern Africa have been put to considerable economic disadvantage by the closing of this Canal. Our exports and imports not only take a longer time now to get to their destinations by sea, but in many cases freight charges, because of longer distances round what I may call the Cape of Bad Hope, have increased the cost to our disadvantage.

143. I am convinced that both the Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel have also lost considerably by the closing of the Suez Canal. The tragedy is even more profound when we consider that what we have lost by the closing of this Canal has been gained by the *apartheid* régime of South Africa which is being enriched economically by the

shipping that has had to be rerouted southward from the north. Certainly, this cannot help to enhance the struggle for independence and the assault on *apartheid* in southern Africa since it strengthens the *apartheid* régime in southern Africa.

144. The second point the resolution affirms on this subparagraph is the necessity for "achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem". On this matter let me recall that Lord Caradon, the former permanent representative of the United Kingdom to this Organization, stated in the Special Political Committee in 1969 that:

"The Palestinian refugees were the victims of an intolerable injustice, an injustice which must never be accepted or condoned."³

145. Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter states one of the purposes and principles of the United Nations to be "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". I take this to be irrespective of their colour, religion or country. We cannot be blind to these principles when considering the situation of the Palestinian refugees.

146. Again, the resolution further affirms the necessity for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures that include among others the establishment of demilitarized zones. I have already indicated and commented upon our views on this aspect. Towards the attainment of these ends the Organization of African Unity took the initiative, through the sub-committee of its Committee of African Heads of State, to assist Mr. Jarring in implementing Security Council resolution 242 (1967) by directly going to Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt for discussions. My delegation pays a warm tribute to this African initiative. We support the spirit which motivated their mission and the basis for their report and findings.

147. My delegation will support measures in this Assembly which will be designed to implement resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council and which will be directed towards the attainment of a just and lasting solution to the problem. My country enjoys excellent and useful relations with the State of Israel. We have a long and varied history with the Arab Republic of Egypt, including a common membership in the Organization of African Unity. Accordingly, it is our concern that both parties should settle this painful dispute and live in peace.

148. I think that there are two choices open to us: either we accept resolution 242 (1967) adopted by the Security Council and implement it, or we request the Security Council to adopt another resolution rescinding or varying that previous resolution and then proceed along those lines. There is nothing in the practice or jurisprudence of the Security Council or this Assembly that precludes us from varying or revoking our previous decisions. But so long as those previous decisions stand, so long as that Security Council resolution stands in plain and unambiguous language, it is our belief and conviction that we must

³ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Special Political Committee, 676th meeting, para. 21.*

implement it. We are in duty bound to do so, and to fail is to abdicate our responsibility.

149. Mr. KAMIL (Indonesia): Mr. President, my delegation was very much grieved when you informed this Assembly this morning of the news of the passing away of Mr. Ralph Bunche. Permit me, on behalf of my delegation, to express our condolences and statements of grief and sorrow to the family of the deceased, to the Secretary-General and to the delegation of the United States.

150. As the resolutions of previous years have gone unheeded, the General Assembly is taking up once again the question of the situation in the Middle East. There are several possible approaches one might take to the various facets of the problem—as indeed the recently concluded discussions in the Special Political Committee demonstrated with respect to one of its aspects. However, the occupation of Arab lands by Israel constitutes the single most important bar to the termination of hostilities between Israel on one side, and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the other Arab nations on the other. It may be recalled that just a few days ago, by an overwhelming majority, the General Assembly dealt with another problem by rejecting the use of force to solve disputes and reaffirming the inadmissibility of foreign territorial occupation.

151. Those basic principles apply with equal validity to the situation in the Middle East. The arms build-up in the region, which reflects the rivalry of outside Powers and aggravates a situation already fraught with tension, argues compellingly for urgent and decisive action without further delay.

152. It is the hope of my delegation that our discussions here in the General Assembly will be carried out with a paramount concern for justice and conciliation; and in this spirit they need not damage the cause of peace, harden positions, prejudice the cause of “quiet diplomacy”, or trespass upon the prerogatives of the Security Council. The virulent mutual suspicions of the parties, the harsh realities and attitudes which sometimes seem insuperable, these are well known to all. Let us therefore not indulge in a rehearsal of these negative postures, but let us instead look positively towards a solution.

153. Since the very beginning of this period of troubles in the Middle East, dating back to 1947, the Government of Indonesia has taken many opportunities to make its position clear on this crisis which today poses perhaps the most serious threat to international security. As recently as the general debate at this session of the General Assembly, the chairman of my delegation explained that:

“... Israel’s adamant refusal to comply with the essential conditions for peace as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) remains the principal cause of continuing and explosive tensions in the area.”
[1962nd meeting, para. 64.]

154. When we now review the current situation in the light of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) or General Assembly resolution 2628 (XXV), the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security [resolution 2734 (XXV)], or the Declaration on Principles of Inter-

national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 2625 (XXV)], we can only conclude that Israel acknowledges these documents and the principles contained therein more in the breach than in the observance.

155. Resolution 2628 (XXV) of last year’s General Assembly in effect appealed to both sides in the dispute to continue efforts towards a peaceful settlement based on resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council. The natural requirement for this peaceful solution is the resumption of the Jarring mission. Egypt accepted this appeal, but Israel responded ambiguously. Thus it came to naught early this year, but it continues to provide a sensible approach to peace, and ought to be repeated again. One would hope that it might receive as cordial a reception in Tel Aviv as it did in Cairo.

156. Accentuating the frustration within the United Nations over the situation in the Middle East during the past year is the fact that the twenty-fifth anniversary of this Organization provided the General Assembly with a suitable occasion for the adoption of two declarations of importance, that on the strengthening of international security and that on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States. Chief among the principles elaborated in those declarations is that of the non-use of force or the threat of force against the territorial integrity or national unity of any State. States should not be the object of territorial occupation as the result of the use of force, nor can territorial acquisition by conquest be recognized as legal. The strengthening of international security requires that States make full use of every means and method under the Charter to settle disputes peacefully. Israel’s actions demonstrate that its acceptance of principles surpasses its willingness to put them into practice.

157. The situation in the Middle East has vexed the United Nations for too long without admitting of a solution. The beginning of this “tragic error”, as the representative of Algeria aptly termed it, goes back to the partition plan for Palestine contained in General Assembly resolution 181 (III) of 1947. The intention of the General Assembly was to provide for the establishment of two States—one Arab, one Jewish—with the City of Jerusalem under a permanent international régime. Even at that time there were those who had the foresight to counsel against treating the question of Palestine in connexion with the problem of Jewish refugees from Europe. In linking the two questions, the proponents of a Jewish State in Palestine failed to see the more compelling and inexorable connexion between events in Palestine and the world-wide trend to nationalism in colonial countries. It was a case, as the *cliche* describes it, of failing to see the forest for the trees. The State of Israel came into being, providing, so it thought, the final solution to the problem of Jewish refugees. In effect, however, the solution to one refugee problem carried with it the seeds of another, whose tragic sequel we are now facing.

158. In 1948, while the new State of Israel was only in its infancy, it gave the world a preview of the territorial expansion it intended to carry out. Palestinian Arabs

became *émigrés*, deportees, refugees—sad names which do not even express the plight of those people with adequate emphasis. An armistice brought about a temporary cessation of hostilities, and armistice lines were established, which eventually hardened. The situation was temporarily stabilized, but the basic problem was not solved.

159. In its resolution 194 (III) the General Assembly required Israel to indemnify the refugees who had fled from their homes, or to allow for their repatriation. One could think of no human rights more fundamental than the right of a man to his home. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in article 13: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." How much more a right this must be for the Palestinians who were driven into their unwelcome exile. To this day, neither indemnification nor repatriation has been provided for.

160. In 1967, Israel moved to occupy the land of three Arab countries, including the Jordanian sector of Jerusalem. In an emergency special session the General Assembly adopted resolution 2253 (ES-V) calling on Israel

"to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem".

Later in the same emergency special session, another resolution [2254 (ES-V)] was adopted deploring Israel's non-compliance with that resolution. To this very day, Israel has failed to comply with those resolutions. The most recent developments regarding Jerusalem include Israel's failure to comment specifically on paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 298 (1971) mentioning a United Nations visiting mission to Jerusalem. Statements emanating from the Israeli Government make it clear to us that the status of Jerusalem is for them non-negotiable.

161. Israel has rebuffed every approach of the international community on the question of withdrawal from the occupied territories. It has shown its contempt for the international community with unilateral acts and faits accomplis. Such defiance of resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, such non-co-operation with the many efforts of the Secretary-General: should these not be regarded as the major obstacle in the way of negotiations?

162. With regard to the now-famous Jarring initiative of early this year, Secretary-General U Thant has told us that "... the United Arab Republic"—that is, Egypt—"... would accept the specific commitments requested of it..."⁴ but that "... the Government of Israel has so far not responded to the request of Ambassador Jarring..."⁵

163. The response of Israel came later. It was that negotiations should be held without prior conditions. In her statements during her recent visit to the United States, the Israeli Prime Minister repeated that demand of "no prior

conditions"; and the Foreign Minister of Israel restated it before the General Assembly in his statement a few days ago [2000th meeting].

164. How often has this formula of "no prior conditions" been used to cover up the profusion of prior conditions of its own which Israel advances for the resumption of negotiations. What must be made clear is that withdrawal from territories seized by force and illegally occupied does not constitute a prior condition in the ordinary sense of the phrase but is rather a restoration of a fundamental condition of justice, without which negotiations on "secure and recognized boundaries" are merely a formality to gain acceptance of the *fait accompli*.

165. In commenting on the explosive situation in the Middle East, various other important organizations outside the United Nations have focused on the question of occupied territories as the issue which most immediately requires rectification. The consultative meeting of foreign ministers of the group of non-aligned nations re-endorsed the decisions of the Lusaka Conference,⁶ while the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted resolution AHG/Res.66 (VIII) headed "On the continued aggression against the United Arab Republic",⁷ by which it expressed its concern over the Israeli occupation of Egyptian lands and called for the full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The Indonesian delegation also fully appreciates the efforts of the OAU peace mission, which has just recently concluded its work, and we hope that its efforts to bridge the gap between the two opposing sides will prove to be helpful in the reactivation of the efforts of Mr. Jarring in achieving the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). The Indonesian delegation shares the world-wide belief that in resolution 242 (1967) there exists a balanced and fair outline for peace—a model of compromise for a situation which has so long defied all the efforts of the United Nations to devise a just solution acceptable to both sides.

166. For Israel, resolution 242 (1967) holds out the specific promise—and I shall quote it directly—of

"Termination of all claims... of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

167. My delegation would like to emphasize here the fact that here is a guarantee of the right to exist of every State in the area and a recognition of the need for secure and recognized boundaries, so that no one should consider this resolution as being lopsided or one-sided

⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1971*, document S/10070/Add.2, para. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.*, para. 14.

⁶ Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 8 to 10 September 1970.

⁷ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-sixth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1971*, document S/10272.

168. The Foreign Minister of Senegal eloquently stated in this connexion on 7 December:

“...one must admit that States ordinarily resort, without territorial annexation, to a machinery offering sufficient guarantees to ensure their security. I think that neither side can arrogate to itself the right, for defence purposes, to seize territories of another sovereign State.”
[2002nd meeting, para. 14.]

169. My delegation whole-heartedly concurs with that statement. It is inadmissible that any State, least of all a Member of this Organization, should undertake to alter the status of any territory or to adjust boundaries unilaterally by the use of force. That principle, indeed, provides the underpinning of all friendly relations between States, and it is being so sorely put to the test in the Middle East.

170. As Security Council resolution 242 (1967) has been universally accepted as a formula for solving the Middle East problem, the mechanisms for bringing about that settlement already exist as well. Mr. Jarring's efforts produced the formula “parallel and simultaneous commitments”, which seems to my delegation to be eminently fair. We can only conclude that there is a lack of political will, certainly on the part of Israel and perhaps also on the part of some other nations of the world as well. It falls to the Security Council and especially to its permanent members, to examine the record to discover where those deficiencies of political will exist, and to redouble their efforts towards obtaining implementation of resolution 242 (1967). The indisposition of one State to accept that resolution—indeed, to accept a host of resolutions dating back to 1948—has prolonged the tortuous course of conflict in the Middle East. The mediation of Mr. Jarring, based on the principles of resolution 242 (1967), remains the most widely accepted approach to peace.

171. The situation in the Middle East presents political dangers which threaten to explode at any moment. To avert those dangers it is necessary to defuse the situation by removing its causes, the chief among those causes being the continued illegal occupation of Arab lands.

172. In the view of my delegation there are only two alternatives remaining. In the first instance, and by far the more preferable for all concerned, Israel could offer its voluntary and complete willingness to implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and other relevant resolutions on the Middle East, by resuming co-operation within the framework of the Jarring mission and by withdrawing its forces from occupied territories. In the second instance, the Security Council could seize the initiative by finding ways and means of rectifying the situation, including the resort to measures as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

173. It is necessary to provide some proof of the Security Council's effectiveness, and to redeem the reputation of the United Nations as an instrument of peace in the eyes of the peoples of the world. We must not falsely assume that because the crisis in the Middle East has endured for over 20 years it is not extremely urgent. Although many in the United Nations grow weary of this continuing crisis, we must nevertheless not shirk our responsibilities. If adversity

can sometimes call forth the best from the human spirit, may the United Nations find the wisdom and the political will as well to end this conflict in an ancient land and bring peace with justice to all.

174. Resolution 242 (1967) has been lauded by all States save one. The major Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council, in voting for the resolution in 1967 emphasized its fair and balanced scope. It was adopted by the Security Council, the major organ entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security. It has been time and again endorsed by the General Assembly. My delegation wishes here to emphasize that resolution 242 (1967) carries with it the authority of the United Nations, and on its implementation depends the dignity of this world Organization as well as the issue of peace or war in the Middle East. It is, therefore, the considered opinion of my delegation that the United Nations should leave no stone unturned to persuade all sides concerned to co-operate with Ambassador Jarring in the implementation of the resolution, honestly and resolutely. If persuasion is of no avail, only Chapter VII of the Charter remains as the sole means to enforce it and thereby to establish once again the authority of this august body, the United Nations. It is thus for this General Assembly to indicate the way for the solution of this vexing problem.

175. The situation is grave, the hour is late, the question is obvious and the answer must be immediate. Let the Assembly act lest the United Nations be accused of shirking its responsibility now that the time of action is at hand.

176. Mr. OGISO (Japan): At the outset I wish to associate myself with other delegations in expressing our deepest condolences on the death of Mr. Ralph Bunche, whose dedication and contribution to peace in the Middle East still remain very vividly in our memory.

177. Since we assembled here to discuss the Middle East question at the last session of the General Assembly, and indeed ever since the Security Council was convened to lay down the basic formula for a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East question in November 1967, there has been practically no progress in the peace-making efforts concerning the Middle East.

178. In particular, despite the constructive efforts involved in the two major peace initiatives which have been taken in the course of the past year—one proposed by the United States of America to promote an interim agreement providing for the reopening of the Suez Canal, and the other, a more recent one, pursued by an Organization of African Unity mission of inquiry—any ray of hope there may have been for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East question remains, to our deep regret, as slim and gloomy as ever.

179. There is no doubt that these laudable peace initiatives, emanating from the genuine goodwill of the proposers in quest of peace, are in harmony with the objectives and work of Ambassador Jarring's mission and should lead to its reactivation.

180. Unfortunately, these efforts have so far not been fruitful, and this circumstance has engendered irritation and

frustration on the part of the parties concerned in the area. The impotence of the United Nations as an organ of peace-keeping in a matter of such great importance has led to the impairing of the credibility of this august body. Japan, which served as a member of the Security Council at the time of the adoption of the Council's resolution 242 (1967), is particularly distressed and frustrated.

181. We sincerely share the grave concern and anxiety expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization:

"It is not possible to predict how long this quiet will last, but there can be little doubt that, if the present impasse in the search for a peaceful settlement persists, new fighting will break out sooner or later. Since the parties have taken advantage of the present lull to strengthen considerably their military capabilities, it is only too likely that the new round of fighting will be more violent and dangerous than the previous ones, and there is always the danger that it may not be possible to limit it to the present antagonists and to the confines of the Middle East." [A/8401/Add.1, para. 221.]

182. Recent news reports on the aggravating situations and mounting tensions across the Suez Canal are alarming and seem to substantiate the dismal forecast of the Secretary-General.

183. My delegation believes that it is essential that the parties concerned should take advantage of every possible opportunity in order to achieve a peaceful and agreed settlement of the present conflict, despite the formidable difficulties lying in the way. For this purpose, we believe that the Security Council resolution 242 (1967), if properly implemented, should provide the basis and the framework for achieving settlement of the conflict.

184. May I elaborate on some of the focal points of the policy of the Government of Japan concerning the Middle East question.

185. Point 1. Japan categorically and unequivocally opposes the acquisition of territory by war and, therefore, calls upon Israel to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied in the conflict of June 1967. It should be added, however, that once basic agreement is reached as regards the extent and modalities of withdrawal, this process could be undertaken by stages, according to an agreement, not necessarily all at once.

186. In this connexion, my delegation thinks it particularly pertinent to recall the truism that military occupation by foreign armed forces, however benevolent in intent it may be, will prove in the long run an unhappy and unpleasant experience to the population of the occupied territories. So long as military occupation persists, history shows that misunderstanding, friction and, at worst, violence and violations of human rights inevitably ensue.

187. My delegation appeals earnestly to all the parties concerned, by taking into careful consideration the sensitive psychological factors involved, to show the magnanimity and the spirit of accommodation necessary to create conditions conducive to dialogue. In this context, it would

contribute a great deal to finding a breakthrough in the present deadlock, if Israel should declare without equivocation its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal from territories occupied by it in the war of June 1967.

188. Point 2. My delegation believes that all the States in the Middle East should fully enjoy sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence as well as the right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force. For this purpose, effective international guarantees should be devised to help create mutual confidence among the parties.

189. Point 3. The principle of freedom of navigation through the international waterways of the area should be impartially applied to all parties and effective measures for the guarantee of this right should be secured. Japan supports the proposal for partial settlement which would involve reopening of the Suez Canal within the purview of the over-all settlement envisaged in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

190. Point 4. The settlement of the refugee problem is an indispensable element for the settlement of the Middle East question.

191. Last June the Government of Japan announced its decision to make a substantially increased contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA] for the current fiscal year, including a special contribution in the form of Japanese rice.

192. My delegation wishes to renew its pledge to continue such humanitarian relief assistance, the amount of which will duly reflect our grave concern for and sympathy with the refugees. We shall reinforce our co-operation by extending aid in such fields as vocational training and education for refugees carried out under the auspices of UNRWA, UNESCO and other international organizations in the conviction that these particular aid efforts will lead to the fundamental solution of the refugee problem itself in the long run.

193. My delegation thinks it appropriate on this occasion to renew a special and urgent appeal to all the Member States, especially non-contributing States, which are potentially capable of making substantial contributions, including some permanent members of the Security Council which have not contributed so far, to testify their sympathy for Palestine refugees not simply by words but by deeds, namely, by making maximum contributions to UNRWA to help alleviate the tragic plight and suffering of the innocent Palestine refugees which have persisted for a period of one generation.

194. Point 5. We believe that after both parties agree upon basic pre-conditions, it would be necessary to set up demilitarized zones, as appropriate in such areas, for maintaining peace and to provide such minimum United Nations forces as may be necessary as an international guarantee for the maintenance of peace in the region.

195. In order to find the clue to an over-all settlement of the Middle East situation on the lines as I have explained,

the Jarring mission should be reactivated as promptly as possible and all the parties concerned should be asked to co-operate fully with it in order to arrive at a peaceful settlement.

196. The delegation of Japan most earnestly hopes that the parties concerned, both the Arab States and Israel, will extend their unqualified support to the peace-making mission of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, placing full trust in his impartiality and goodwill. It is also our ardent hope that all Member States, including especially the five permanent members of the Security Council, will play a further active role in the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

197. The delegation of Japan solemnly calls upon all the parties to realize that international public opinion considers the question of peace-making as an urgent question of highest priority, which leaves no room for polemics and rhetoric.

198. With such international public opinion behind it, this Assembly should reaffirm Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in its entirety and call for the reactivation of the Jarring mission and for other practicable means and opportunities to be continuously pursued for the same purposes.

199. From this point of view, my delegation will support any constructive draft resolution which contains the above-mentioned elements of peace-making in the Middle East, hoping that it will meet the overwhelming support of the Member States, including all the parties concerned.

200. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): The delegation of Liberia shares in the grief occasioned by the death of Mr. Ralph Bunche, whose integrity was beyond reproach and whose manly virtue never compromised with circumstances.

201. For some time now, the attention of the Government of Liberia has been drawn, with painful interest, to the unfortunate situation prevailing in the Middle East. That this question has been before both the Security Council and the General Assembly since the beginning of the conflict underlines, in my opinion, the desire of both Egypt and Israel to harmonize the contending and conflicting interests inherent in this matter with the assistance of the United Nations. In the circumstances, it should be our sincere endeavour to adopt a constructive attitude to this problem rather than take partisan positions which could only fan the flames of this conflict. Egypt has every right to enjoy full sovereignty over its territory and thus enable its people to pursue a life of peace, prosperity and happiness. Israel has the right to secure and recognized boundaries and thus to enable its people also to pursue a life of peace, prosperity and happiness.

202. Even though far removed geographically from the area of conflict, my Government, apart from enjoying most friendly relations with Egypt and Israel, is deeply interested and concerned, and I would say committed, to a peaceful and lasting settlement of the situation now prevailing in the Middle East.

203. We must recognize the fact that what is incompatible with the exercise of the full sovereignty and territorial

integrity of a State will continue to be a constant source of friction and conflict unless removed. All States strive for complete, full and unfettered independence and the enjoyment of all the attributes inherent in independence, and rightly so. The United Nations, in this process, must endeavour to play a leading and constructive role in boldly implementing new categories of thinking which have been blueprinted in our Charter—a Charter that will become a reality only as we utilize in our world today its purposes and principles in mastering the powerful forces abroad. In my opinion, that is the background against which the burning question of the Middle East situation should be viewed.

204. As previously stated, the attention of the Government of Liberia has been drawn with increasing apprehension to the growing tensions, and at times conflicts, in the Middle East, and what has been of particular concern to us is the lack of any negotiation which would lead to a speedy resolution of these tensions and conflicts. Liberia regards the maintenance of peace and the peaceful settlement of disputes as a primary condition not only for its own welfare and development but for the welfare and development of all States which have subscribed to the Charter of the United Nations. It is, therefore, a source of grief to us to see States Members of the United Nations at odds with one another, particularly States with which, I would add, Liberia has very cordial relations.

205. Motivated by this position, the President of Liberia, Mr. William R. Tolbert, Jr., spared no effort to be present at Dakar, Senegal, to participate in the work of the Committee of African Heads of State designated by the Organization of African Unity for the purpose of ensuring a resumption of negotiations between the parties, that is to say, Egypt and Israel, under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

206. A sub-committee of four, composed of the Heads of State of Senegal, Cameroon, Zaire and Nigeria, undertook a thorough investigation of the problem, held meetings in Cairo and Jerusalem and upon completion of its work submitted its findings to the Committee. The Committee, after a thorough study of the findings, approved the text of a memorandum which was addressed to the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel. This memorandum spelt out the respective positions of the two parties concerned as communicated to and understood by the sub-committee of four during the course of its visit to Jerusalem and Cairo.

207. If I may, I should like to quote Egypt's position:

"1. Acceptance to hold indirect negotiations under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring for the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in all its parts, and the implementation of Ambassador Jarring's initiative of 8 February for the conclusion of a peace agreement.

"2. Egypt was ready to undertake the required arrangements for reopening the Canal in return for the first stage of Israeli withdrawal in conformity with the initiative underlined by the President of the Republic on condition that Israel responds positively to Ambassador Jarring's aide-mémoire of 8 February 1971.

"3. Agreement that secure and recognized boundaries should be embodied in the peace agreement in accordance with the OAU resolution which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the Arab territories to the lines of 5 June 1967, and in conformity with the borders specified in the Jarring initiative which underlined the necessity of the withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international borders.

"4. Acceptance of the following guarantees for peace:

- (a) United Nations guarantees;
- (b) Establishing demilitarized zones astride the borders;
- (c) Stationing of international forces at some strategic points.

"5. Acceptance of the stationing of international forces in Sharm El Sheikh to guarantee the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran."⁸

208. Israel's position is as follows:

"(a) Israel agrees to resume negotiations without prior conditions under the auspices of Mr. Jarring within the terms of resolution 242 (1967) in order to reach a peace agreement. This undertaking was given to Mr. Jarring in August 1970.

"(b) Israel agrees to work out a Suez Canal agreement, the details of which will be negotiated and agreed. In the negotiation of such an agreement we would be prepared to discuss measures to ensure supervision and observance of a Suez Canal accord.

"(c) Israel agrees that the secure and recognized boundaries should be determined by negotiation between the parties and embodied in the peace agreement.

"(d) Israel agrees that in addition to the determination of agreed, secure and recognized boundaries, further arrangements for ensuring security could be negotiated.

"(e) Israel agrees that the terms of withdrawal to the boundaries negotiated and agreed should be embodied in the peace treaty.

"(f) The question of Sharm el Sheikh will be included in the peace negotiations as specified in paragraph (c)

⁸ *Ibid.*, Supplement for October, November and December 1971, document S/10443.

above. In accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967), free navigation in all international waterways, such as the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran, for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel, will be provided for in the peace agreement."⁹

209. On the basis of the memorandum, it appears to my delegation that there are essential areas of agreement which should urgently assist the parties to overcome the obstacles that prevent the conclusion at an early date of a peace agreement. The sub-committee of four drew a similar conclusion that the respective positions of the parties did not prevent any wide divergence of opinion, and these respective positions were duly communicated to the Egyptian authorities on 23 November 1971 and to the Israeli authorities on 24 November 1971 by the Heads of State of Senegal and Nigeria and the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Zaire and Cameroon.

210. It appears to my delegation that the response given by the two parties to these proposals has the positive effect of enabling Ambassador Jarring to resume the mission with which he was entrusted by Security Council resolution 242 (1967):

"... to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution."

211. We unreservedly share the view expressed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Mr. Riad, that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) has become the corner-stone of United Nations efforts to establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

212. It seems to me that the contribution that we can now make to the promotion of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is to call upon, and appeal urgently to, the parties concerned to resume negotiations, under the terms of resolution 242 (1967), under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring, and to request Ambassador Jarring once again to embark upon his mission in the interests of tranquillity in the Middle East and peace in our troubled world.

The meeting rose at 11.55 p.m.

⁹ *Ibid.*, document S/10438.

