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President: Mr. Edvard HAMBRO (Norway).

AGENDA ITEM 22

The situation in the Middle East (*continued*)

1. The PRESIDENT: Before I call on the first speaker, may I remind the members that, in accordance with the decision taken by the General Assembly this morning, the list of speakers will be closed at six o'clock this afternoon.

2. Mr. OFWONO (Uganda): The delegation of the Republic of Uganda has asked to speak on this matter because it is one which Uganda views with keen seriousness. Moreover, given its concern, it is only proper that Uganda should have its views on the question spelled out clearly.

3. The starting point in Uganda's stand on the situation in the Middle East is justice and freedom for all the people in the area. This is so because we believe that although the ultimate aim is peace in the area, nevertheless peace is a remote possibility without justice founded upon solid freedom. In the view of the Uganda Government, what is lacking in the Middle East is not only peace, but the first step to peace which is freedom and justice.

4. The continuous unrest in the area is further complicated by the involvement of the economic interests of certain extraneous States. To these external States, freedom of the indigenous people of the area is secondary to the considerations of their economic gains, which accrue to them from the exploitation of the riches of this area.

5. Thus it would appear that these external interests profess preference for peace in the area, while in reality they are afraid of peace, because they are more interested in fishing in troubled waters—as the saying goes. Genuine peace in the area implies freedom for the people there to determine their own destiny by themselves. Hence it follows that those who enjoy fishing in troubled waters would not be enthusiastic at the prospects of calm and tranquillity. Therefore, we see a situation where external interferers all speak of peace because they, too, must present their intentions as noble, while deep in their calculations peace and their selfish interests are incompatible.

6. The second point which influences my Government's policy on this matter is the implications to small States of the situation in the area. I refer here to the propensity of more powerful States to achieve territorial expansion by force. To our people, and in the view of my Government, such a development is not compatible with the aims of peace. It is with this in mind that my Government has been consistent and persistent in demanding the withdrawal of the Israeli military forces from all occupied Arab lands in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967. My Government is convinced that this is a *sine qua non* ingredient in the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem, and my delegation wishes to appeal once again to the Government of Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands.

7. The third point which enters into the making of Uganda's policy on this question is the issue of the freedom of the Palestinian people. This is an extremely important question in the view of the Uganda Government. The plight of the people of Palestine is a grim reminder of the cruelty of man against man. These people have been refugees for over two decades and their prospects for leading a happy and dignified life seem as yet remote and hardly discernible. Our plea for these people is made that much more valid because Uganda, as members may well know, has been dealing with refugees who have fled across borders in great numbers in the last decade. We have seen the strain on their faces, the wretchedness of their condition, the fear of not knowing what tomorrow may bring.

8. With the situation of refugees so vivid in our mind, Uganda wishes to place on record its strong plea on behalf of the Palestinian people. My delegation does not underestimate the delicacy and obduracy of this problem. Yet it is true that the problem of the Palestinian people is of the United Nations' making, and this Organization cannot shirk its responsibility for this problem. This Organization cannot hide behind the humanitarian gestures as exemplified by the activities—indeed very noble activities—of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and wash its hands in satisfaction that it has done all it can do. On the contrary, this Organization must go beyond mere humanitarian gestures by rectifying the harm and injustice for which it is solely responsible.

9. In any case, the Palestinian people should get what belongs to them. Their struggle touches the conscience of the people of my country. To us the situation is clear. There cannot be a final solution of the conflict in this area unless a solution is found which will, among

other things, get the Palestinians out of the cold, hunger and fear to which they have been subjected for the last 22 years. Fortunately, the whole world also shares in this conviction. But this can be achieved only if all our actions are based solidly upon justice. For as Lord Caradon, formerly the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to this Organization, stated in the Special Political Committee last year: "The Palestinian refugees are the victims of an intolerable injustice . . . an injustice which must never be accepted or condoned."¹

10. We feel the same way, and we hope that whatever solution is found to this thorny problem, a stop will be put to sacrificing the freedom and manhood of the Palestinian people.

11. The fourth point which plays a part in the shaping of my Government's policy on this delicate question is the consideration of what may be the long-term effects of the continuation of the crisis in the area upon the political and economic integrity of all the African and Middle Eastern States. When my country looks at the continual unrest in the Middle East we find that no matter what efforts are made, the unpleasant repercussions of such a conflict cannot be localized; on the contrary they spread far and wide and they affect us in eastern Africa just as they affect those immediately involved, albeit in different degrees. The consequences, in fact, have a dual impact. On the one hand, the Suez Canal, which is the shortest sea route between East Africa and any point in Europe and North America, is closed to shipping. This situation has serious implications for the economies of all areas east of Suez. The beneficiaries from the closure of the Canal are the ship builders and giant tanker builders—and we all know who they are. On the other hand, the closure of the Suez Canal has the effect of forcing all the States in this area into the hands of the racist *apartheid* régime of South Africa. We need not remind you of the well-known fact that the advocates of *apartheid* itch with the desire to gain a stranglehold on every African State that comes within their grasp.

12. The thrust of my argument is that, all matters considered, the *apartheid* economy in southern Africa has never had it so good as now that northern Africa is in turmoil. This point is fully recognized by those countries which are essentially responsible for the situation in the Middle East today. I wish to highlight this remark by quoting from a document entitled *A Special Study of South Africa: The Strategic View*, by an American, General S. L. A. Marshall, who prepared it for the American-African Affairs Association in November 1967. On page 4 of that document, General Marshall writes:

"When a line is drawn through the top of Africa across the Arabian peninsula to the corner where Iran meets West Pakistan and with this base, with one point at Karachi and the other at the Canaries, an isosceles triangle is projected evenly toward the

cape, much open ocean is enclosed as well as a twelfth or thereabouts of the earth's surface. With Aden out, now that the British are yielding it to the Arabs, the only modern and friendly ports are in South Africa The United States must not discount the connexion between such a facility and the conserving of its worldwide strategic interest. In the event of major war in the Middle East—a struggle over Iraq, for example—in which our forces became engaged, we would have to lean on that prop. We have done so before."

13. To make the serious implications of the above quotation absolutely clear, I wish to quote a little more of what General Marshall said, for it is at the root of the concern of my country with regard to this matter. On page 7 of the same document he said:

"South Africa this year [1967] plays the most dramatic, the least dispensable role, in keeping lamps lit and wheels turning around the world at a close-to-normal rate, despite the prolonged blocking of Suez Canal which will certainly extend into 1968 and possibly beyond. All of South Africa's ports began adjusting to the overload of work that was certain to come, this while the shoooting was still on.

"South Africa had prepared itself to help moderate what might have developed as a far costlier world emergency. During the preceding five years, \$35,000,000 was spent in improving the harbours."

14. Then General Marshall asks an important question: "Why was South Africa embarked on the harbour improvement programme in the timely hour?" He answers his own question by saying:

"Precisely because, during the other Suez Canal crisis in 1956, when the Canal was closed for eight months, these several harbours around the Cape were called on to handle some 12,000 diverted ships. The Government [of South Africa] anticipated that the same thing could happen again."

15. We might ask ourselves whether South Africa was tipped off ahead of time about a war which was being prepared secretly, thus meriting the remark by General Marshall that "South Africa embarked on the harbour improvement programme in the timely hour . . . precisely because . . . [it] anticipated that the [1956 crisis] could happen again". I say that we could legitimately ask ourselves that question; but we are not going to ask it because the answer, although apparent, would take us off the thrust of our observation. Rather, the main point in my quoting at length from the document of the American-African Affairs Association is to vindicate the basic concern of my Government, namely that the beneficiaries "on the side"—and they gain more than the rest—in the situation in the Middle East are the régimes of imperialism and *apartheid*. Concretely, what form does the benefit of these profiteers of the Middle East situation take? Again, I can do no better than to rely on the document of the American-African Affairs Association. In it, General Marshall said the following:

¹ This statement was made at the 685th meeting of the Special Political Committee, the official records of which are published in summary form.

- “Until recently, the shift to mammoth tankers—that is, more than 70,000 tons, which is too large to go through Suez—seemed to many operators uneconomic and unwise. But in the wake of what happened in Sinai last June [1967] . . . the loop around the Cape is becoming a bargain for oil companies. The 300,000 ton tanker can deliver oil to western Europe at around \$2.33 per ton while the tanker [of less than 70,000 tons] going through Suez lays it down at \$3.32 per ton. An Associated Press survey reports ships now on order average well over 100,000 tons. The . . . Royal Dutch Shell has commissioned well over 29 tankers of 200,000 tons, Jersey Standard 12 more tankers, and that Gulf Oil has ordered six 312,000 ton tankers.”
16. This is only in the realm of oil shipments. Add to this merchant ships from east of Suez and the Assembly will see why my delegation feels as it does. In this matter my delegation agrees with General Marshall—although our moods are undoubtedly discordant—that “the diminution of Egypt’s power and position cannot fail to have the effect not only of profiting South Africa monetarily, but of proportionately enhancing her position and prestige over the long run”. The closure of the Suez Canal thus not only forces us into the hands of *apartheid*, but makes African States in eastern Africa involuntary partners in the enrichment of South Africa. We find this state of affairs utterly intolerable.
17. We are not implying by this remark that we would prefer an open canal to the establishment of genuine freedom for all the peoples in the area. On the contrary, we mean to show by the above how the struggle of our brothers in Egypt, and the Arab world generally, and our own struggle against *apartheid* are interlinked. Thus what is taken away from one brother goes to help the enemy of another brother. It is this absurd situation which disturbs Uganda.
18. The people of Africa and the people of the Middle East share a brotherhood that is rooted not merely in legends but in historical reality, for the African civilization which has enlightened much of the world of today originated in Egypt. For over 80 centuries now Egypt has stood sentinel against the forces which would swallow up Africa or the Middle East. To us at the present time Egypt is a bulwark against our would-be destroyers, and he who would be inclined to destroy Egypt professes in vain his friendship for Africa; for to strangle Egypt is to suffocate Africa and the Middle East.
19. My delegation, having considered everything, wishes to reiterate the following.
20. First, it opposes without reservation any attempt by any country or State to acquire territories by military conquest. Such a practice, if condoned or sustained, would endanger first and foremost the existence of small States and ultimately that of all States.
21. Second, therefore, the withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied during the June 1967 war is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of peace in the area. This is because such a withdrawal is just and consistent with the freedom of the Arab people concerned.
22. Third, a formula should be found as soon as possible, especially by those immediately affected, to ensure the existence of all States in the area.
23. Fourth, to that effect Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 should be implemented by all the parties to the conflict, since it provides machinery by which all concerned can act without much loss of face.
24. Fifth, the present cease-fire should be extended so that fighting in the area is averted.
25. Sixth, while the cease-fire is in force every attempt must be made to reactivate the mission of Ambassador Jarring. My delegation feels that attempts by certain parties to this conflict to refuse to participate in Mr. Jarring’s mission until the condition is met that other parties cease deploying this or that missile are, when seen in the very simple terms of a fight with spears and shields, tantamount to asking the opponent to drop the shield while you are holding both your spear and shield so that you can spear him in the groin. Such demands, apart from being unfair, are undoubtedly unrealistic. The party to the conflict who persists in demanding such conditions will sooner or later qualify in the eyes of the world as an obstructionist.
26. In conclusion, my delegation considers that both the United Nations and the parties to the conflict have an unqualified interest in seeing to it that the conflict is resolved from its roots. However, this can be done only when the interests and freedom of all the peoples of that area are not mortgaged, on the one hand, by the materialist considerations of imperialism and, on the other hand, by ideological irrelevancies.
27. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): Only a few days ago the General Assembly completed its special twenty-fifth anniversary commemorative session. During that session all Member States tried to demonstrate their determination to make the Organization more effective, to give it a chance to take the initiative to a greater extent and assume greater responsibility in the settlement of the political problems facing the international community.
28. Like other countries near us, we expressed anew our confidence that the major Powers should play a positive role in the Security Council and at the same time we reaffirmed the right of all Member States to exercise their right on equal footing to make their opinions known at all times and in all appropriate bodies and to put forward their recommendations on any issues. That session ended last Saturday not only with a promise that we would do so but with the specific determination that we would make that promise a reality as soon as possible.
29. A few days after the closure of that session the General Assembly was called on to deal with one of

the problems most closely related to the very existence of the Organization over the past 22 years, the one which has provided an opportunity to assess what it has done and what it has not dared to do. But this is also an opportunity to win back the confidence of the world in what the Organization can accomplish in the future.

30. The delegation of the United Arab Republic, aware of its responsibility to the Organization and victim of an act of aggression on the part of a State that owes its existence to the will of the Organization, informed the General Assembly of the particularly serious situation prevailing in the Middle East after Mr. Jarring's mission had once again reached an impasse.

31. After the policy statements by all States last week including particularly those that had sent their Heads of State to testify to their sincere willingness to co-operate, it was not expected that anyone would challenge this debate or the fact that the international community should not be informed on this delicate issue merely through the press, television and other media, or that the people of the world should know what the situation in the Middle East is and who is responsible for the failure of the efforts that have been undertaken. First the delegation of a major Power, with a certain amount of courtesy, invited us to allow secret diplomacy to pursue the efforts which it had begun and not to hold a debate in the General Assembly, lest the controversy be detrimental to those efforts.

32. Mr. Abba Eban took the floor yesterday and addressed the Assembly [*1888th meeting*] in threatening tones, virtually denying the right of the Assembly to debate the problem and saying that any decisions of the General Assembly would be detrimental to the search for truth and jeopardize diplomatic talks which, incidentally, are non-existent at the present time.

33. Such a challenge to the rights of the General Assembly has been attempted on a number of occasions in the past in connexion with the Middle East itself or with other matters before the Security Council. In this connexion and in compliance with Article 12 of the Charter, the Assembly has always shown its desire to preserve its prerogatives without infringing on those of the Security Council. Indeed, for a few years now, the Security Council has had before it the problems of Namibia, the Portuguese Territories and *apartheid*—in connexion with which there are even some special committees—and yet the Assembly has categorically rejected interpretations and attempts to take the problems away from it, whether those attempts have been made in an elegant manner or in very imperative tones and with authoritative gestures from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

34. From the political standpoint, moreover, it would be very difficult to persuade us that this debate could in any way compromise chances for peace in the Middle East. Secret talks, the profusion of contacts which have taken place for three years outside the Assembly and even outside the Security Council, have unfortunately not had a more salutary effect on peace than coming

here after that failure and reporting to a sovereign body of the United Nations. Besides, what is Mr. Eban afraid of in this debate? What does he want to hide from the General Assembly? His efforts, his rhetorical talents, the sophism of his arguments, the tenets on which he endeavours to build his logic have by no means made us sincerely conclude that secret talks have in fact led the parties concerned to any results, even preliminary and partial ones, which our debate might place in jeopardy. We are not denying the merits of secret diplomacy. We are particularly devoted to efforts undertaken by the Security Council as a matter of priority. We even supported the action by the four major Powers. We welcomed the Soviet-American contacts, and we were hopeful about Mr. Rogers' initiative. I have mentioned only a few of the stages of secret or semi-secret diplomacy to which Israel's contribution has hardly been decisive.

35. Let us consider Israel's attitude towards the Council resolution itself. Everyone will recall the long meetings which were held to work out resolution 242 (1967). Mr. Eban himself, or the various representatives working with him, until the very last minute challenged the right of the Security Council to deal with this matter, and one need only refer to the statement made on behalf of Israel immediately following the adoption of that resolution to realize that Israel hardly supported the resolution but rather tried to impose its own interpretation of the various provisions.

36. The Prime Minister of Israel, commenting on the result of the debate in the Council, announced to the world the failure of the principal international body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, the Arab countries directly concerned in the implementation of the resolution communicated to Ambassador Jarring, as soon as his mandate had been made clear, their willingness to implement the resolution of the Council, and they offered their complete co-operation. But Israel—through its Ministers most directly engaged in the aggression—long refused to enter into any negotiations under that resolution. In this connexion Mr. Eban himself, in the various capitals in which he happened find himself, made contradictory statements without ever repeating those which were somewhat encouraging but which the policy of his Government had just denied.

37. The Arab countries informed Ambassador Jarring that their representatives were prepared to meet with him in Cairo, Amman or New York to co-operate with him on the basis of the decisions of the Council, but Israel's negative attitude, its endless quibbling on various points of the resolution, on whether one provision should take precedence over another, served to delay secret peace negotiations which were possible immediately after the adoption of the resolution.

38. That attitude toward a decision which seemed to have received general support and which had given rise to real hope for a global settlement of the problem of the Middle East was so intransigent that it was difficult for the Arab peoples and their Governments to

remain completely passive, with their arms crossed, waiting for Israel to decide when it would deem it most useful and advantageous to announce that it could join in Ambassador Jarring's peace effort.

39. Could Israel, which constantly invokes the dignity of peoples, their right to self-defence and the legitimacy of their struggle, possibly expect the Arab peoples to have so little pride that they would allow their territory to be occupied indefinitely, to accept the powerlessness of the Organization to defend their rights and to ensure the implementation of solutions which it had sponsored itself—even when they do not ensure the protection of all their legitimate rights? The cease-fire adopted by the Security Council did not at all mean that the parties were being asked to halt military operations, to allow Israel to take root in the territories which it occupied, to wait indefinitely for the aggressor alone to choose the circumstances and conditions for negotiations to restore peace. And yet that was Israel's view. The powerlessness of the Council or of the four great Powers and even the super-Powers to make Israel resume the dialogue justifies in our eyes and those of the world the right of the Palestinian people and Arab Governments whose territories are occupied not to abdicate or renounce the defence of their territories when the Organization to which they gave the responsibility to do so has so far demonstrated its inability to change Israel's attitude.

40. The courageous fighting on the Canal and the Jordan was admittedly the decisive factor in prompting the Security Council and the entire world to try to make Israel understand that it cannot rest on its laurels and consider that its victory is final. Any State Member of this Organization retains the full right—when the Organization whose rules it has accepted demonstrates its inability to ensure its protection or to apply the decisions whereby it had decided in principle to restore the rights of one of its Member States—to mobilize its own energies to recover its territorial integrity and full dignity. The fighting began again on the Canal and the Jordan because this time Israel's victory was not over the Arab States but over the Security Council, over the authority of the four major Powers and over the Organization as a whole. No amount of rhetoric, no matter how brilliant, can disguise the chronological sequence of events which have obstructed peace, in spite of attempts from all sides and at all levels to bring about genuine negotiations.

41. This passive attitude of Israel towards the search for peace might have been designed to discourage the Security Council, or to prompt the four major Powers and the Representative of the Secretary-General not to make any further efforts. Israel was doubtless counting also on the complacency of the peoples in the occupied territories and dreaming of internal upheavals in certain Arab countries, and hoping that the combination of all those factors might make it possible for it to wait for ideal circumstances to ensure its own brand of peace on its own terms—in order to carry out its own ambitions.

42. I now turn to the most recent initiative, the Rogers plan. Egypt and Jordan communicated their consent

immediately after the plan was submitted to them but the world anxiously waited for several days before Israel, with studied ambiguity, finally stated that it accepted the form of the talks proposed.

43. What is more, as soon as Ambassador Jarring extended invitations to the representatives of the parties concerned, Israel made it known that it wanted contacts with the representative of the Secretary-General at the ministerial level—as if that were a fundamental requisite for peace, whereas in fact it was only a means of stalling which served to postpone the beginning of talks, with serious effects.

44. As soon as contact was established between the delegate of Israel and Mr. Jarring, Tel Aviv called back its representative, thereby once again hurting the chances of success of the United States initiative. When Mr. Abba Eban comes and tells us in the General Assembly how anxious Israel is to bring about peace and accuses the Arab States of always having obstructed peace, does he sincerely or naively believe that the sequence of events since the Security Council meetings in June, 1967, to this day, does not prove conclusively that Arab States directly concerned have always responded positively to all steps taken in the Organization or outside it to establish or resume a dialogue? When Mr. Eban mentions the breach of the cease-fire to justify after the fact Israel's constant refusal to talk and its attitude towards the Rogers plan, the General Assembly might be taken in by his eloquence, but it cannot be convinced politically by his arguments.

45. Ever since war has existed among men, men have always, fortunately, tried to find a way out of war, but the idea of a cease-fire or an armistice does not imply that the aggressor is free to govern and exploit territories occupied, to change their status or administrative structure, to disrupt their economy, to increase its military power not only by national means but also through foreign assistance, to establish a war budget on the basis of military gifts, or by assistance from foreign countries or to finance a budget with loans from the entire world. A cease-fire or an armistice does not mean either that the victim of aggression should stop trying to assert its rights if the cease-fire or the armistice does not bring peace, or if the aggressor continues to seek refuge behind the cease-fire or armistice to consolidate its conquests with impunity.

46. No one would be convinced if someone came here and said that, since 7 August, Israel has put an end to all activities designed to increase its military might or that it has abandoned all administrative, economic or legal measures gradually to integrate the occupied Arab territories. The modern concept of national defence encompasses all these considerations for a State and it does not just mean putting an end to military operations. Furthermore, it is from the Israeli press that we have learned that additional military colonies have in recent weeks been set up in the Golan Heights in Syria and that civilian families are in the process of emigrating to Sharm el-Sheikh.

47. A cease-fire should mean that dialogue is substituted for confrontation. It should not mean that the victim is to be incapacitated or made to surrender his positions, or that the aggressor has freedom of action, both military and political, in the territories he occupies. Furthermore, the military superiority of Israel has constantly been confirmed by the person primarily responsible for defence, Mr. Dayan, and is also recognized by the major Powers. Israel's victims would have to receive much greater military assistance than that which Israel continues to receive, and the present military map would have to be radically changed for Israel to say with any chance of being believed that the balance of power has changed in its detriment.

48. If an adversary is assured of military superiority either in terms of his own resources or those of his allies, and if he is, moreover, in control of large sections of the territory of his neighbours, he cannot seriously claim that he is anxious for peace and at the same time obstruct efforts to bring about a peace, on the pretext that a given military weapon of his adversaries has been moved to another place. Israel is in an even worse position for such conduct, since at the very time it was complaining about new threats it knew that 200 new tanks and two additional squadrons of Phantoms, destined for Israel, were perhaps being shipped from United States ports. Mr. Abba Eban spoke to us yesterday about a number of things, but not about this new delivery of weapons, which substantially and for a considerable time to come will establish Israel's military superiority in terms of fearfully destructive modern weapons. He did not try to justify this. Perhaps he finds it only natural that, directly before the Senatorial elections, the Government of the United States should send him the means to ensure Israel's present occupation of the Arab territories.

49. We should be curious to know, incidentally, when it was that a military agreement of this importance was concluded in such a delicate international situation and in such a short period of time. And we should also like to know how the Government of the United States could take such a decision and could announce it only a few hours after the President of the United States honoured us last Friday with a statement here [1882nd meeting]. I should like to ask Mr. Eban what is more likely, in his opinion, to jeopardize the chances for peace: a debate in the General Assembly or this delivery of weapons made openly at such a delicate time in the international situation?

50. As to those who invited us the other day to give priority to secret talks, I wonder whether they have taken into account, at this time especially, the extraordinary threat to the frail chances of peace represented by this delivery of weapons, which they have advocated. Perhaps for some countries it is well worth endangering peace to gain a Senate majority.

51. This explains why, in spite of our preference for secret diplomacy, private meetings and classic methods of overcoming crises and resolving conflicts, we are so firmly determined that the prerogatives of the United

Nations bodies should be upheld and that this principle be clearly reaffirmed. If the conditions of trust necessary for private talks exist there is nothing to prevent us from exercising a certain discretion in judging at any given moment which form of diplomacy is most appropriate. But at the present time we regret to note that the secret talks are at a hopeless standstill. That is why the General Assembly should be informed of the facts; it might wish to have a chance to formulate recommendations—recommendations which would not, of course, go against the decisions of the Security Council in any way, provided that the Security Council's decisions remain valid for everyone and will not be indefinitely ignored or rejected.

52. However, we must recognize that the self-same decisions of the Council, over the past three years, have lost much of their impact due to endless talks in the course of which the major Powers have tried in vain to reach agreement. Then the prerogatives of the four major Powers were suddenly ignored because two Powers seized these rights, and finally one of the two decided unilaterally to interrupt proceedings. That is why we are perfectly entitled to ask where the responsibility of this Organization lies and which Power is to blame.

53. We believe very sincerely that one reason why there is an impasse today is that the major Powers in the recent talks tried to solve the problem on their own. We let them act as they wished so as not to compromise the secret talks. But these two major Powers undoubtedly encountered difficulties which perhaps had little to do with the Middle East; rather one can safely say that the difficulties related to the whole complex of international problems in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. If the situation therefore is not conducive to a tête-à-tête between the major Powers, then a positive settlement of the problem we have been discussing will be postponed indefinitely.

54. That is why we are asking the General Assembly, on the basis of Security Council decisions, to reactivate Mr. Jarring's mission without any delay, so that the problem of the Middle East can be put back into proper focus, the focus of the Security Council, within the framework of the responsibility of the four major Powers. We hope that Ambassador Jarring will be allowed to resume his mission and to seek, with the parties, a solution which will take into account as a matter of priority the interests of the peoples of the Middle East, and will also take the international balance into account so that the security of the world will not depend solely on the major Powers.

55. What may appear most urgent to some is not necessarily the most important thing to others, especially when the others are the victims. Israel would like to see a cease-fire which might last indefinitely, thus creating a situation which would ensure that it could continue its occupation with impunity, a situation which would involve the Organization in a cease-fire requiring constant renewal. This would create a situation identical to the one which has lasted for the past 20 years in Kashmir and in Korea. The Arab States

are anxious to establish a just peace. They do not want a continuing cease-fire. There can only be a just peace if the cease-fire leads to a dialogue, a dialogue which in turn would lead without ambiguity to the evacuation of territories acquired through the use of force.

56. Mr. YOST (United States of America): The subject of our present debate, the situation in the Middle East, is certainly one of the most dangerous problems and at the same time one of the most difficult that confronts the world today. Because the situation is both so dangerous and so difficult it is of vital importance how we handle its consideration in this Assembly. None of us would wish to bear the responsibility for enhancing the dangers inherent in the confrontation that exists in the area, or for adding to the difficulties that face those working for a solution to the differences dividing the parties.

57. The United States Government is most anxious that means be found to move more rapidly towards the attainment of the just and lasting peace set forth as the goal in the Security Council's unanimous resolution of 22 November 1967. It has bent its efforts to this end, not only since that resolution's adoption, but since a much earlier date, when this Organization first became seized of the problem of Palestine. At times it has been argued that where differences are so great and hatred so deep peace is unattainable through peaceful means, through the means of the Charter. The United States has never accepted this view and does not do so today. It remains dedicated in word and deed to the course of peaceful settlement, and it remains dedicated specifically to the achievement of a just and lasting peace for the Middle East based on the principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

58. I do not believe there is any need for me to rehearse in detail the history of the negotiations leading to the adoption of the Council's resolution, or of the efforts of Ambassador Jarring and the States concerned to carry out the provisions of that resolution. I do think it important, however, that we all remind ourselves and constantly bear in mind the gains achieved with the adoption of that resolution and what has occurred since. The resolution itself is a balanced document designed to take into account the interests of all concerned and to favour neither side over the other. It provides a reasonable and workable basis for a solution and the means for seeking the agreement of the parties to such a solution. Because of the balance and practicability of its approach, it received the unanimous support of the members of the Security Council and has been repeatedly cited by the overwhelming majority of members of this Assembly as a sound basis for the search for peace in the Middle East.

59. Ever since this resolution's adoption my Government has done its utmost, with the parties directly involved and with others concerned, to help achieve its objectives. The initiative which led to the developments reported by the Secretary-General in document S/9902 of 7 August 1970² was a part of that continuing effort. These developments were most significant.

² See *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-fifth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1970*.

60. As a result of an intensive period of quiet diplomacy this summer, we were able to work out with the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Israel an arrangement whereby all three explicitly stated their willingness to carry out Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts, and committed themselves to the goal of reaching agreement on a just and lasting peace between them based on mutual acknowledgement of one another's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict—both in accordance with resolution 242 (1967). This was the first time such undertakings by all three parties had been entered into. In order to reach agreement on the details of carrying out resolution 242 (1967), the Governments agreed to designate representatives to discussions under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jarring. The three Governments agreed to enter into discussions under Ambassador Jarring according to such a procedure and in such places and at such times as he might recommend, "taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience" between the parties".

61. Moreover, observance of the cease-fire replaced the round-the-clock shelling and bombing on both sides of the Canal. Let me emphasize that the agreement on the cease-fire, as noted in document S/9902, says it will be strictly observed until at least 2200 GMT 5 November. This means it does not automatically expire on that date. Not only did the shooting and the casualties stop, but the escalating danger of a great-Power confrontation, which concerned all of us last June and July, was eased. These were objectives which had long been sought and they were warmly welcomed not only by Governments but, more importantly, by the people of all the States concerned and, indeed, around the world. Perhaps too many great expectations were aroused, given the sad history of peace-making efforts in the Middle East, but today people, and Governments, tend to forget that the elements of progress I have just cited remain as a solid foundation for further progress towards peace.

62. We must persevere in our efforts to create the conditions that will enable us to build on that foundation. As President Nixon said to this Assembly on 23 October:

"The Middle East is a place today where local rivalries are intense, and where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are both involved. Quite obviously, the primary responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East rests on the nations there themselves. But in this region in particular, it is imperative that the two major Powers conduct themselves so as to strengthen the forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forces of war.

"It is essential that we and the Soviet Union join in the efforts towards avoiding war in the Middle East and also towards developing a climate in which the nations of the Middle East will learn to live and let live. It is essential, not only in the interest of

the people in the Middle East themselves, but also because the alternative could be a confrontation with disastrous consequences for the Middle East, for our nations, and for the whole world. Therefore, we urge the continuation of the cease-fire and the creation of confidence in which peace efforts can go forward." [1882nd meeting, paras. 59 and 60.]

63. Let me stress this need for the restoration of that measure of confidence which is required for meaningful negotiations.

64. The United States, for its part, remains completely dedicated to the goal of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, based on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all its parts. We are concerned about the slow progress made to date in bringing this about, but we are convinced that it can still be obtained. It took almost three years to get from all three of the States directly concerned explicit, public agreement to carry out the resolution in all its parts, as well as agreement on how discussions to that end should be conducted. We believe it would be extremely irresponsible for the General Assembly to adopt any resolution which would appear to add to, subtract from, interpret or distort the careful balance of the resolution which was worked out by the Security Council after long and laborious negotiations. Should it single out one aspect of the package settlement envisaged under Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and attempt to give it special weight or primacy, the Assembly would endanger the solid progress which that resolution represents.

65. This is the problem we have with the draft resolution contained in document A/L.602, submitted yesterday. For example, in that resolution we find five paragraphs relating to withdrawal and the non-acquisition of territory by war. This is one part of resolution 242 (1967), but only one part. There is only passing reference in this draft to the stated objective of resolution 242 (1967), which is the establishment of a just and lasting peace. There is no reference at all to that paragraph of resolution 242 (1967) which calls for:

"Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force".

This is what I mean about the danger of altering the careful balance of the Security Council resolution by irresponsible action in the General Assembly.

66. Another paragraph of the draft resolution would request the Security Council to consider taking steps to ensure the implementation of resolution 242 (1967). In the context of the draft resolution, this paragraph seems clearly intended to suggest to the Security Council that it take action against Israel under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter. Do members of the General Assembly really believe this will advance us towards

a peaceful settlement? There are a number of other difficulties, and the United States is therefore opposed to such a resolution.

67. It is not necessary for me to point out the serious problems, both legal and political, which would be posed by any General Assembly effort to interpret or rewrite a resolution of the Security Council or to try to prejudice future Security Council action on a matter which has such direct bearing on the maintenance of international peace and security. I would, however, like to stress my Government's special concern that the Assembly resist the temptation to indulge in counterproductive action. We have worked hard to help bring peace to the Middle East and we shall continue to do so. We value the role of both the Assembly and the Security Council in dealing with the Middle East problem. Both have been very important and useful in the past history of trouble in the Middle East—primarily because members of the General Assembly and of the Security Council have shown concern for, and understanding of, the effect which their actions could have, for better or for worse, on the situation in the area. Now is certainly the time for this body to continue to act soberly and responsibly and to avoid unrealistic and unhelpful actions in relation to the problems under discussion.

68. During this debate we have heard much about the question of the Palestine Arabs. The United States agrees with the conclusion of several speakers that, if any peace is going to come to the Middle East, it has to take into account the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians. However, we have no preconceived ideas about what form Palestinian participation in a settlement would take. It is not now clear what peaceful goals the Palestinians set for themselves, who speaks for them, what their relationship is to established Arab Governments, or if there is any consensus on the Palestinian role in a peaceful settlement. The answers to these questions need to be clarified. We think this is primarily a matter for the Palestinians themselves to work out in conjunction with established Arab Governments.

69. We have also heard it alleged that the United States is delivering without restraint large quantities of arms to Israel because we support permanent Israeli retention of Arab territories occupied in the conflict of June 1967, and that reported recent United States arms deliveries to Israel constitute a violation of our own peace initiative. These allegations are completely untrue.

70. First, the United States position on withdrawal has been stated by Secretary of State Rogers, in a major policy address on 9 December of last year and on a number of other occasions.

71. Secondly, the United States has tried repeatedly to find some means to stem the flood of arms deliveries to the Middle East. We have asked the Soviet Union privately on several occasions over the past two years to begin discussions on an agreement on arms limitation, only to be rebuffed each time. President

Nixon raised the question from this rostrum at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly [1755th meeting]. Early this year, we attempted, in the four-Power talks, to obtain Soviet agreement to consider the question of arms limitation, but again met with a negative reply. Massive arms deliveries, including combat aircraft and tanks, long-range artillery and amphibious vehicles, continued to pour into the hands of Israel's Arab neighbours. Yet we continued to exercise unilateral self-restraint. Secretary Rogers said on 23 March of this year³ that President Nixon had decided "to hold in abeyance for now a decision with respect to Israel's request for additional aircraft. In doing so, he has instructed that close watch be kept on the military balance in the area."

72. Thirdly, as part of our discussions during June and July with the parties to our peace initiative, we indicated that we would continue to act with restraint on arms deliveries while our initiative was being explored. We respected that undertaking, although it was not formally a part of any agreement. Yet the Soviet Union continued to ship large quantities of arms into the Arab countries which had been combatants against Israel during the 1967 conflict, and, moreover, sent along additional Soviet military personnel for training and advisory purposes and, in some cases, actual combat roles. When we became convinced beyond the shadow of a doubt that the agreement on a standstill cease-fire was deliberately being violated by the installation of new SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles near the Suez Canal, we considered ourselves obliged, in view of the violations and the shifting military balance, to provide some additional arms to Israel. We continue to favour restraint, but restraint cannot be one-sided. I believe the record will clearly show where responsibility for the continuation of the arms race lies, despite the attempts which have been made to confuse the issue and to reverse cause and effect.

73. To return now to the crucial question of confidence, I must point out that there is another element of the present problem in the Middle East which is too serious to be avoided or ignored. That is the question of the violation of the cease-fire standstill agreement of 7 August. Members are familiar with the political aspects of the agreement contained in document S/9902. The text of the accompanying cease-fire standstill arrangements does not appear in any United Nations publication, though it has been published in full in the world press. It reads in part as follows:

"Israel and the United Arab Republic will observe the cease-fire effective at 2200 GMT Thursday, 6 August.

"Both sides will stop all incursions and all firing, on the ground and in the air, across the cease-fire line.

"Both sides will refrain from changing the military *status quo* within zones extending 50 kilometres to

the east and west of the cease-fire line. Neither side will introduce or construct any new military installations in these zones. Activities within the zones will be limited to the maintenance of existing installations at their present sites and positions and to the rotation and supply of forces presently within the zones."

74. These cease-fire standstill arrangements were an integral component of the agreement of 7 August. Prior to the entry into effect of the cease-fire standstill my Government had the concurrence of the parties and the major Powers concerned that a military standstill was an acceptable part of the cease-fire. There was no misunderstanding on that score. Maintenance of the military *status quo* was one of the conditions in which the talks would be undertaken. That is why we have stressed the need for rectification of the situation resulting from the violations of the standstill.

75. We can all be gratified that both sides have exercised admirable restraint in refraining from actual hostilities. But the failure scrupulously to observe the standstill is a cause for serious concern. We have noted the charges of alleged Israeli violations. There have been Israeli overflights contrary to the agreement. The United Arab Republic has alleged other violations in a document recently submitted to the General Assembly. Whatever the judgement may be regarding the other instances, which in any event were subsequent to the clear violations which had already occurred, they cannot in any way be equated with the changes in the military *status quo* west of the Suez Canal resulting from the violations of the standstill.

76. My Government has incontrovertible evidence that, first, new missile sites were constructed; secondly, many more missiles were emplaced in both new and existing sites; and, thirdly, numbers of SAM-2 and SAM-3 missiles were moved closer to the Suez Canal within the 50-kilometre zone west of the Canal in the days and weeks after the cease-fire standstill agreement went into effect on 7 August. There can be no doubt that the country from which these highly advanced missiles came, as also the Government on whose territory they were emplaced, are responsible for these developments.

77. The text of the cease-fire standstill agreement I have just read out clearly prohibits all of these activities even if one leaves aside the question of whether or not additional missile equipment was introduced into the 50-kilometre zone after the cease-fire went into effect. In brief, there was a large-scale, immediate and continuing disregard by one side of the standstill provisions of the cease-fire agreement, which were an integral and essential part of the package of commitments undertaken by the parties. This disregard led to the interruption of the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring.

78. From the military point of view these violations of the standstill agreement brought about a significant change in the military *status quo* in the Canal zone. In addition, pertinent questions were raised about the good-faith adherence to arrangements and agreements

³See *The Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1970), vol. LXII, No. 1607, pp. 477-484.

once undertaken. These questions affect not only the prospect for resuming the talks under Ambassador Jarring but the prospects of success for the talks should they be resumed. Those questions must somehow be resolved if the efforts at peaceful settlement are to go forward. My Government believes that they can be resolved. It required weeks of patient and quiet diplomatic discussion to arrive at the August agreement. In order to resolve the present impasse, only a renewal of such serious, patient and quiet efforts can succeed. My Government pledges itself to do its utmost in this sense, and wishes to urge all others to do the same. We also urge all members of the General Assembly to assist rather than hinder these efforts by moderating their approaches and paying careful attention to any draft resolutions submitted for their approval.

79. The United States desires as earnestly as any Member of this Organization to see the parties resume discussions under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring. That is of vital importance. So is a further extension of the cease-fire arrangements between Israel and the United Arab Republic, which could facilitate the reaching of agreement in such discussions. For we must not mistake the means for the end or confuse form with substance. Our objective must be agreement on a peaceful settlement, not just the resumption of talks. Ambassador Jarring for months trekked fruitlessly from one Middle Eastern capital to another in 1968, talking to the leaders of Israel, the United Arab Republic and Jordan. That is not the kind of discussion we had in mind when we launched our initiative last June, and it is not the kind of talk we want now. We want serious discussions that will permit rapid progress towards a settlement. We pledge ourselves to do everything possible to help get such talks started and to promote their successful conclusion. I believe it should be abundantly clear that comparable efforts are required from others who seriously seek a peaceful settlement for the Middle East and whose disregard of a key element of the hopeful start made in June and July lies at the root of the present impasse. In particular, a new forward movement will require concerted efforts by all concerned to establish the conditions of confidence in which the parties could resume discussions promptly under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

80. To that end the United States proposes the following draft resolution [A/L.603], which we believe is balanced and would assure a constructive outcome of our discussions:

"The General Assembly,

"Having considered the item entitled 'The situation in the Middle East',

"1. Endorses Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 and urges that it be carried out in all its parts;

"2. Recommends to the parties and all concerned to exert their utmost efforts, taking into account the

obstacles and difficulties which have arisen since the cease-fire standstill agreement went into effect, to create, in accordance with that agreement, the conditions necessary to establish the confidence in which the parties could resume discussions promptly under the auspices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East, in accordance with the proposal contained in the note by the Secretary-General of 7 August 1970;

"3. Endorses the Security Council resolutions of 1967 on the cease-fire and recommends that the observance of the cease-fire as contained in the note by the Secretary-General of 7 August 1970 be extended for at least three months in order to facilitate the promotion of agreement as set forth in Security Council resolution 242 (1967)."

81. Mr. TOMEH (Syria): It was only on Saturday of last week that the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations came to a close. One world statesman after the other decried the disparity between the high ideals of the Charter and the tragic situation of the world today. Since the beginning of this week, the General Assembly has been debating one aspect of the Middle East crisis, that of the occupation of the territories of three Member States, the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, by aggressive Israeli forces. No more concrete illustration exists of the gap between last week's emphasis on idealism and the ugly realities which the world faces than this grave situation. Thus in this moment of great national concern for the Arab States it will be understood if we plead earnestly, and continue to plead, for our claimed rights. We make this plea in a perspective of understanding of the great issues of the world, questions of war and peace, of equity and of order under the rule of law.

82. It is now three and a half years since Israel achieved its latest, but by no means final, conquest of new Arab territories in its drive for *lebensraum*.

83. I wish to put these last few years of anguish and crisis and of recourse to warfare in the perspective of only part of the aggressor's record in the United Nations. I do this because this house of nations symbolizes mankind's hope for a march forward, albeit a slow one, towards law and order in international relations, and it is certainly relevant and certainly of concern to the frail instrumentality of the United Nations itself to see in what degree its influence, its prestige and its moral power are at stake, challenged by Israel, world zionism and their allies.

84. Against this background, then, the only method at this stage is to proceed factually—not to revel in the role of an injured party, but to try to establish some criterion of the credentials with which the parties most immediately involved, such as ourselves, come to this United Nations.

85. In his statement yesterday [1888th meeting], Mr. Eban cynically and arrogantly tried to argue that the war of 5 June was not an aggressive war started by

Israel, that Israel had no expansionist designs. No greater insult to the intelligence of this Assembly could exist. His faulty assertions are denied by scores of his partners in this most inhumane, aggressive war.

86. Suffice it to mention the words of Brigadier Hod, Commander of the Israeli Air Force, who led the *blitzkrieg* on the morning of 5 June 1967, while the Security Council was deliberating issues of international law. That declaration was reported by *The Sunday Times* of London on 16 July 1967. Hod said: "Sixteen years' planning had gone into those initial 80 minutes. We lived with the Plan, we slept on the Plan, we ate the Plan. Constantly we perfected it." How do those words tally with Mr. Eban's statement yesterday? Furthermore, this Assembly would do well to remember and ponder what was quoted by the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic who opened this debate last Monday [1884th meeting]. He quoted Mr. Moshe Dayan's statement on 5 July 1967, after the complete conquest of Arab territories, when he addressed his army on the Golan Heights of Syria. He said:

"Our fathers reached the frontiers that were recognized in the partition plan of 1947.

"Our generation reached the 1949 frontiers.

"But the six-day generation"—that is, the generation which unleashed the 5 June aggression—"were able to reach the Suez Canal, Jordan and the Golan Heights in Syria.

"This is not the end, for, after the present cease-fire lines, there will be new lines, but they will extend beyond the Jordan River, maybe the Lebanon, and perhaps to central Syria as well."

The statements of Israeli leaders to the effect that they will not cede one inch of conquered Arab territory have by now become legend. Suffice it to mention one made on 19 February 1970 and reported as follows by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency:

"There must be no territorial concessions whatever to the Arabs, Gen. Ezer Weizmann, Israel's Minister of Transport, declared at a United Jewish Appeal fund-raising dinner here last night . . .

"He told his audience: We must be suffering from some psychosis to think that we have to give back territory.

"He maintained that 'Once the ancestral Israel is in our hands, any talks with the Arabs must be centred on Israel's rights with no territorial concessions.' General Weizmann, a nephew of the late Chaim Weizmann, Israel's first President, did not specify what he meant by 'ancestral Israel'."

87. Detailed plans for the settlement and colonization of Syrian and other occupied territories have indeed been made public. In his statement this afternoon, the representative of Morocco mentioned, and thus spared

me from citing again, the last announcements made by Israel about new, additional settlements in the Golan Heights of Syria. But to give the Assembly a sample of such statements, I quote from the Jewish Telegraphic Agency's publication of 1 June 1970:

"A \$48 million five-year plan to expand Israeli settlements in the occupied Golan Heights was approved by the Ministry of Agriculture's planning committee today. The project calls for the addition of six new settlements to the 11 already established in the region. Each settlement will have 1,000 head of cattle and about 8,000 acres of pasture land for grazing. Golan settlements already produce potatoes, grapes, citrus fruits, plums, olives and walnuts."

88. Official Israeli maps have been published to show the Israel of 1967, but the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, although incorporated in these maps of the Israel of 1967, have been singled out as being no part whatsoever of any settlement and an integral part of Israel, never, never to be returned.

89. In his statement yesterday, Mr. Eban stated: "The cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council . . . which we support, have no time limit and no extraneous conditions" [1888th meeting, para. 35].

90. It is very clear here that the Foreign Minister of Israel is declaring to the Assembly Israel's respect of the cease-fire resolutions—in the plural, because there are four. But did Israel really support and respect all four cease-fire resolutions? What are the facts? In the sweep of generalizations, the specifics of any given situation are often lost and the listeners are left with ambiguities. That is why I beg your indulgence so that I may be specific here.

91. Syria accepted the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, resolution 233 (1967) of 6 June 1967 and resolution 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967 at 12.30 a.m. New York time on 9 June 1967. At 6 a.m. on 9 June 1967, an urgent meeting of the Security Council was requested by Syria to report on the Israeli invasion of Syria which actually started after both Israel and Syria had accepted the two cease-fire resolutions. On 9 June, the Security Council adopted resolution 235 (1967) which stated:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

"Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

"Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

"1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediated cease-fire and cessation of military action;

"2. *Demands* that hostilities should cease forthwith;

" . . . "

92. Under Article 25 of the Charter, this was a decision of the Security Council which should have been obeyed, but Israel continued its attack on Syria after the adoption of this resolution, and the Security Council reconvened on the same day. The report read by the Secretary-General confirmed that Israel, with all its military might, was penetrating deep into Syria. The Council was in almost continuous session from 9 June until Sunday, 12 June 1967. During this time, one report after another confirmed that the invasion of Syria was proceeding in the most outrageous manner, using napalm and fragmentation bombs and not sparing the civilian population at all.

93. On 10 June 1967, a second cease-fire was arranged but utterly disregarded by Israel.

94. On 11 June 1967 the Security Council unanimously adopted a second resolution concerning Syria, resolution 236 (1967), which stated:

"*The Security Council,*

"*Taking note* of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria

. . . ,

"1. *Condemns* any and all violations of the cease-fire;

" . . .

"3. *Affirms* that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;

"4. *Calls for* the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT on 10 June 1967;

" . . . "

95. Only yesterday Mr. Eban in his statement said that the Security Council had not condemned Israel or asked for the withdrawal of its troops, but here is a clear resolution in which Israel was condemned. This resolution says "Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire", but who at that time was in the territory of whom? The Israeli army was in the territory of Syria and, therefore, Israel was condemned and asked to withdraw.

96. This unanimously adopted resolution is clear and needs no exegesis of mine except emphasis on its operative paragraph 4, which called for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops. The Israeli army, as can be seen from subsequent records of the

Security Council, did not abide by the resolution. It continued its conquest until, in utter disregard of these specific cease-fire resolutions, it reached the positions it always wanted to reach. How do these facts tally with Mr. Eban's statement about Israel's support of the cease-fire resolutions? Who is deliberately misleading this Assembly by making sweeping generalizations?

97. What do we conclude from this? First, that Israel attacked Syria after the acceptance both by Syria and by Israel on 9 June 1967 of the cease-fire resolution; that, in spite of two cease-fire resolutions adopted unanimously by the Security Council with reference to Syria and a cease-fire under the auspices of General Odd Bull, Israel continued its invasion of Syrian territory and completely disregarded the Security Council's two unanimously adopted decisions. Within the context of the jurisdiction of the United Nations, those resolutions, namely, resolutions 235 (1967) and 236 (1967), are the ones which primarily apply to Syria. They were disregarded by Israel. If, as Mr. Eban claimed yesterday, Israel respected the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council, not one inch of Syrian territory would now be under occupation and not one single Israeli soldier would be on Syrian territory.

98. But what lies behind this fraudulent interpretation given by Mr. Eban and other Israeli spokesmen? It is clear that the cease-fire lines are regarded as simply the new frontiers of Israel, something which we firmly and categorically deny. And if Mr. Eban speaks one language here, what we hear as quoted from Mr. Dayan and General Hod is the language which is spoken in Israel. Therefore, this dual act, this split personality should be very clear to the United Nations. Israel unilaterally denounced the Armistice Agreements, whereas international jurisdiction still recognizes the Armistice Agreements as valid.

99. In any discussion of the Middle East crisis, to deal with the results of the Israeli conquest of 1967 would really be tantamount to looking at the top of an iceberg, ignoring its greater part immersed in the ocean's waters. For the 1967 conquest, like the 1956 international war against Egypt, and the 1948-1949 war against the United Nations itself and the Arabs, were but stages in the implementation of the Israeli master plan of conquest of the Middle East. It is appropriate here to recall very briefly—and this is intimately related to the heart of the crisis we are discussing—that in 1919 when the World Zionist Organization submitted its official plan for the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine to the Peace Conference the minimum it would accept for its State included:

(a) The headwaters of the Jordan River in Syria and Lebanon—that is, specifically, the Golan Heights in Syria;

(b) The south of Lebanon up to the town of Sidon;

(c) The southern Bekaa Valley in Lebanon;

(d) The Hauran plain in Syria;

(e) Control over the Hijaz Railway from Der'a to Amman and Mann in Jordan;

(f) Control over the Gulf of Aqaba.

100. Jacob de Haas, in his *History of Palestine*, quotes a letter addressed by the Zionist leaders in the United States to President Wilson, on his sick-bed.

It reads:

"The Zionist cause depends upon rational northern and eastern boundaries for a self-sustaining economic development of the country. This means on the north Palestine must include the Litany river and the watersheds of the Hermon, and on the east it must include the plains of the Jaulon and the Haulon in Syria."

101. They referred to the Golan Heights and the Hauran plain. President Wilson, says De Haas, immediately ordered the letter "to be sent to the British cabinet as his personal opinion".

102. M. I. Bodenheimer, in his memoirs written in 1939 and published in 1963 under the little *Prelude to Israel*, relates that the early Zionist proposal for a chartered company to colonize Palestine called for "the opening of all lands from the Nile to the Euphrates as territory for Jewish colonization".

103. Let us recall that when the State of Israel was finally established in 1948 in defiance of Arab rights and in excess of the frontiers granted to it by the United Nations vote of partition, it refused to adopt a constitution. And you, Mr. President, being the jurist that you are, would certainly understand and appreciate what it means when a new State does not formulate a constitution. That constitution has not been formulated so far. Instead, what did Israel do? It adopted only a basic law giving, among other things, to every person of the Jewish faith in the world the right to become an Israeli citizen as soon as he sets foot in Israel. It acted in that way because even the extended frontiers of 1948 were by no means considered as the final frontiers of the State of Israel. Like a viper shedding its skin as it grows bigger, Israel was to shed one set of boundaries, and with them one name after another. When part of the Palestine of the British Mandate was metamorphosed into Israel, the Palestine defined by the document of the World Zionist Organization in 1919 becomes naturally "greater Israel", which in the fullness of time will be shed again to outgrow even this enlarged Palestine, or now Israel, and become the ultimate Israel yet to be.

104. If anyone has ever been puzzled by the numerous Zionist definitions of Israel, this is the explanation. The wildest among them are neither exaggerations nor nebulous dreams, for the generation of my father, my generation, and my children's generation have seen those ugly realities. They are ultimate objectives to be reached when the viper, having shed so many skins, assumes its ultimate size. The stage through which we are now passing is the stage of the Palestine of

the World Zionist Organization document of 1919, or the intermediate stage of "greater Israel".

105. This analysis should also explain to the Assembly the Arab determination not to accommodate Israeli expansion, but rather to invoke the lawful right of self-defence in the face of conquest and continual faits accomplis. As long as Israel is conceived in terms of boundaries, ever advancing, there is no hope of peace for this area, either for Israelis, or for the Arabs or even for the world at large. There is no solution except one which is based on the "de-boundarization" of Israel. "Boundarization" is the leading tenet in the distorted doctrine of Zionism, which draws behind it by natural sequence all the other distortions: the desire to expel, expropriate, discriminate against, persecute and uproot the original population.

106. I shall give one illustration. Let us take one of the results of the 1967 aggressive war of Israel. Let us remember that at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, resolution 2452 A (XXIII), adopted by 100 votes in favour, with only Israel voting against, asked unconditionally for the return of the displaced persons, who number over half a million, not to speak of the other half a million, the inhabitants of the Suez Canal who fled the area. The text of that resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly,

" . . .

"*Emphasizing*, consequently, the requirement for their speedy return,

"1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to take effective and immediate steps for the return without delay of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities

" . . . "

107. Up until today those wretched refugees live in indescribable conditions that revolt the conscience of mankind. Again I repeat that I am speaking of the newly displaced persons, and not of the old refugees of Palestine.

108. Furthermore, Israel persists in utter disregard of all the humanitarian resolutions adopted since 1967. It continues to bulldoze and burn Arab villages and expel the inhabitants. It continues utterly to disregard the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It has completely refused to accept a representative of the Secretary-General, of the sub-commission on human rights⁴ and of the tripartite commission on human rights⁵ to investigate the occupied territories. But in spite of the sophisticated and distorted version of Israeli-Zionist propaganda, the truth has come to light this month from sources completely neutral, whose integrity can-

⁴ Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities.

⁵ Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories.

not be doubted. On 11 October 1970, *The Sunday Times* of London published the following:

"Israel guilty of Geneva breach, says Red Cross: The International Committee of the Red Cross in an outspoken report released last week accuses Israel of blowing up Arab towns, villages, camps, and houses in its occupied territories in defiance of the Geneva Conventions.

"The report is something of a landmark in Red Cross history. Until now the International Committee of the Red Cross has declined to discuss publicly details of its protests in cases like this on the grounds that it does not want to be drawn into political controversy or do anything that might imperil its negotiations with the Government concerned."

109. This also should shed more light on the statement of Mrs. Meir, the Prime Minister of Israel, which she made to *The Sunday Times* on 15 June 1969. Asked if Israel admits a measure of responsibility for the Palestinians, this benevolent grandmother Prime Minister said categorically: "No responsibility whatsoever; who are the Palestinians and what are their rights to me?" The statement of Mrs. Meir is very revealing. The ignoring of the Palestinian people by the Balfour Declaration in 1917 was deliberate; it was an act of international plotting, since it was the Zionists who had drafted the document which Lord Balfour signed without knowing anything about the realities of Palestine. In the same way, the ignoring of both Palestinians and Palestine by Mrs. Meir was an attempt at concealment. The old lady of Tel Aviv was a Lady Macbeth trying to wash the blood from her hands. She, like Lady Macbeth of the Shakespearean play, will discover that the blood will not wash off.

110. This leads me to the heart of the matter. One of the great Powers, the United States, has also prevented the enforcement of the legislated Arab rights enacted here. We recall now the unconditional backing, nay, the collusion of the United States Government with Israel in 1967 in its inhuman aggression. This collusion has even become part of United States official legislation. I will not repeat what the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, His Excellency Mr. Riad, stated on Monday last [*1884th meeting*] regarding the new offensive arms and hundreds of millions of dollars given by the United States Government to Israel. I only wish to point out that a more ominous measure is the amendment to the 1967 Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill, enacted by the United States Congress, which took effect on 2 January 1968 and which directed the President of the United States to subtract from United States aid to all but seven underdeveloped nations the equivalent of what each country spends for such modern arms as jet aircraft and missile systems. Among the seven exempted nations is Israel. This information was taken from *The New York Times* of 21 July 1968. But Israel is considered among the developed, not the underdeveloped, nations. Only a few days ago the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Eban, was acclaiming the fact that Israel is helping no fewer than 80 nations in the world. And Israel continues to boast of its techni-

cal assistance programmes to under-developed countries.

111. As to its military power and capabilities, on 4 October 1968, according to *The Jerusalem Post* of that date, Mr. Eshkol was reported to have said that Israel had the know-how to make atomic bombs. Should we not be surprised, then, when Israel is converted by American legislation into an "under-developed" country, to enable it to procure supersonic jets, missiles and other weapons for use in pressuring, devastating and consolidating its grip over Arab territories, and expelling and killing more Arabs?

112. This same Power consistently lobbies in these halls for a politically motivated balance—more correctly, ambivalence—in the language and, therefore, the moral weighting of pronouncements. This artificiality of politicking and strained legalism has the appearance of judicial impartiality without regard to the moral merits of the substance. And it is this which generates the righteous indignation of the Palestine resistance. Simply to call for "a package deal", as we heard today from the representative of the United States—indeed he immediately preceded me—a "package deal" involving all the items of a given resolution, is an evasion of moral responsibility when, by the Charter itself, some components of the package are concretely and palpably of greater moral weight than others. To be more specific, the conquest by force and continued occupation of territories of States Members of the United Nations and the adamant refusal to recognize the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homes cannot possibly carry moral weight if described as strategic considerations. Indeed, it is doubtful if the strategic questions can be resolved and the formalities observed until the fundamental moral and human problems are confronted courageously first in moral terms.

113. That is why there is a liberation movement among Palestinians. The simple, inescapable, unavoidable fact, which no amount of sophistry or casuistry can erase, is that for more than two decades—in defiance of every principle of the Charter and of specific legislation on Palestine—Zionist aggression has driven Palestinian people from their homes and kept them in exile. All of the legislation of this body legalizes their right to return if they elect to do so. And if they have lost patience and faith in the ability of the United Nations to bring the aggressor to comply under this legislation, then nothing is accomplished here by the former terrorists—the former members of the Irgun Zvei Leumi, Haganah and the Stern Gang—in calling them "terrorists" if they are now forced to resort to their own devices in an effort to achieve these confirmed rights.

114. This Arab resistance movement of the Palestinian people is but a continuation and a resurrection of the soul of a people which has consistently refused, since the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate, to accept being exposed to a systematic invasion backed by technology, resources, military power so superior that there has been no semblance of any prop-

ortion between them and the forces brought from the outside against them. Zionist-Israeli propaganda has continued up to today to claim that there was no Arab resistance to the Zionist invasion of Palestine. Indeed, the great statesman of France and of Europe, the former President of France, General de Gaulle, stated very clearly that it was Israel which started the 5 June war. Mr. David Ben Gurion sent him a long, detailed letter in which he contended that the Arabs never resisted the Zionist invasion. But we know too well of the rewriting of history by conquerors. Real history knows that the Arab people of Palestine resisted in organized political action, and in all visible forms of resistance ranging from peaceful demonstration to outbursts of violence, and lastly to open, full-scale revolution and guerrilla action, which continued for three years, between 1936 and 1939. And should anyone be prompted to read about this part of the resistance of the Arab people of Palestine, I would refer the interested party to no less an author than the distinguished former Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. He is the author of a book entitled *A Start in Freedom*.⁶ One chapter of the book, entitled "The Great Rebellion", deals exactly with what I am referring to here, namely, the period between 1936 and 1939. That date itself is significant, for it precedes by one decade the national risings of India, Indonesia and Indo-China, by more than a decade and a half the national risings of Arab North Africa, and by two decades the national rising of the rest of Africa. It was the pioneering model of a popular revolution in the twentieth century and this by itself is a tribute to the Palestinian Arabs. Their rising was as tragic and as premature as that of Spartacus against Rome. It was crushed cruelly twice: first in 1939 and then, barbarically, in 1948. The resurgence of this struggle in 1965, after the most drastic and fatal expulsion of the people from its land, is a modern form of the miracle of resurrection.

115. Last year, on 10 December 1969, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2535 (XXIV) by a two-thirds majority. Part B of that resolution recognized "that the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees has arisen from the denial of their inalienable rights under the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". The first of those rights is the right to self-determination, as enshrined in the very first Article of the Charter. A more detailed bill of those rights has been given in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a still more detailed one in the adopted international Covenants on human rights [resolution 2200 A (XXI)]. These declare that by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination enshrined in the Charter, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and that every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

116. It is ironical and indeed tragic that Alexis de Tocqueville, the French author who visited the United

⁶ H. Foot, *A Start in Freedom* (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1964).

States, wrote: "There is an amazing strength in the expressions of the will of a people; and when it declares itself even the imagination of those who wish to contest it is overawed." De Tocqueville lived between 1805 and 1859. The book those words are taken from is entitled *Democracy in America*. He wrote them upon his visit to America, with the realization of the awakening of the American people. Is it not strange that the Government of this people should now deny or be ambiguous about the awakening of the Arab people of Palestine?

117. What are we Arabs being asked to do? History certainly does repeat itself. We are asked to make amends, to pay over to Israel certain unspecified assets which, it is clear, are ours, so that Israel can become a peace-loving State.

118. What of the aggressor State itself? Its Foreign Minister, who is at this Assembly, suggested, according to *The New York Times* of 19 June 1967, that Israel would act again, as it has in the past, in contempt of the decisions of this international body. Said Mr. Eban, the eloquent "peacemaker" of this "peace-loving, law-abiding State": "If the General Assembly were to vote 121 to 1 in favour of Israel returning to the armistice lines tomorrow, Israel would refuse to comply with that decision." Only a few days ago, as Mr. Riad said, Mr. Eban, in anticipation of this debate, declared: "Israel will not be bound by any new resolution that the General Assembly might adopt."

119. What party is guilty, by its own declarations, standing before this forum? What party spits in the face of international law and order? What party consigns the Charter of the United Nations to the bottom of its totem-pole of values and loyalty? If I were to bring in all the quotations from Israel's official pronouncements on the Jarring mission, it would take volumes. Suffice it to mention the following, which is from the newspaper *Le Monde*:

"Questioned on this point, that is, if the Israeli Government really accepted the implementation of resolution 242 (1967) of the Security Council of 22 November 1967, Dayan replied: 'If we had accepted this, do you think that there would have been such international pressure to have you say this publicly?'"

120. Small wonder that there is this attitude of Attila the Hun, of Mussolini knifing through Africa, of every conqueror in history and every State that ever put itself above the law of nations. Small wonder, because for 50 years the Powers loudest in their prating about democracy have encouraged the consistent Zionist rape of the democratic rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Brazen Israel, again contemptuous of the United Nations as it was on the morning of 5 June, relies on that tradition.

121. Not alone for Arab rights do we Arabs plead now, but also for the life and integrity of this Organization, the United Nations, for its higher ideals,

for the wretched masses of the world, for the conquered and suffering people of Viet-Nam, for our African brothers under the yoke of Portuguese, Southern Rhodesian and South African settler colonialism—in a word, for the toiling, suffering masses of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

122. Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon): Last Saturday, 24 October, witnessed the completion of the first 25 years of the existence of the United Nations. During the entire commemorative session glowing rhetoric flowed from the rostrum of the General Assembly. Many words of wisdom were spoken by members of the United Nations community and by visiting representatives from Member States. The past and the present were not their sole preoccupations. The future was of greater import, for, as the Foreign Minister of Brazil, Mr. Barboza, stated: "We have not come here merely to contemplate the past but to create the future" [1883rd meeting, para. 49]. Today the United Nations finds itself at the threshold of a new era. As you, Mr. President, stated last Saturday: "Only the future can show whether this has indeed been an historic session. That will be decided not by the words of today but by the acts of tomorrow" [ibid., para. 74]. At the present time we are already living in the "tomorrow" about which you spoke; we are living in the "future" to which you referred.

123. On that same occasion the Secretary-General, U Thant, reminded us: "We all know what the United Nations has done and what it has failed to do" in the past [ibid., para. 62]. To my mind, those words can allude no more appropriately to any situation than to the problem of the Middle East—the tragedy of Palestine and its Arab people. In 1947 the United Nations was a party to the plan for the partition of Palestine, a plan that has been the bitter root from which have grown all the tensions and crises in the Middle East. Following that plan, Israeli terrorism and expansionist designs have driven a million Arabs from their ancestral homeland. Those acts have created a problem the dangers of which are more potent today than they have been for nearly a quarter of a century.

124. The United Nations has adopted during the past 23 years many resolutions dealing with the plight of the Palestinian people. Yet, by neglecting the implementation of those resolutions, by allowing them to die out, the United Nations has also perpetuated the sufferings of the Palestinians, condemned to live in the squalor of refugee camps. Humanity has been crying aloud that justice should be done to the people of Palestine. They themselves have been hoping for 23 years that such justice would be meted out to them. Israel, however, has constantly thwarted all efforts to implement United Nations resolutions, thus depriving the Palestinians of the exercise of their natural and inalienable right to self-determination and to their homeland.

125. The Secretary-General also reminded us the other day of the words of Edmund Burke: "The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing" [ibid., para. 69]. The evil of Israeli

aggression and of its defiance of United Nations resolutions has triumphed over the years only because the good men here at the United Nations and elsewhere have done nothing to stem that evil. It has now become incumbent upon us to do something, to take a firm stand on our resolutions.

126. Mr. President, may I also be allowed to repeat what you said: "Indeed, resolutions are a grave danger if they are not acted upon" [ibid., para. 77]. We must avert that danger and act now in order for the prospects of peace and justice to brighten for ourselves and for future generations.

127. After 25 years of existence is the United Nations not yet ready, willing and able to rise to the height of manhood and rectify the injustices committed? If we are to succeed in our endeavours to do so we must heed the lessons of the past, rededicate ourselves to the purposes and principles of the Charter and make them a living reality.

128. Israel has never been content with the partition plan of Palestine outlined in 1947, nor even with its own aggrandizement policy of acquiring additional Palestinian territory through war and terrorism. From its inception in 1948 Israel has been bent on violence against its neighbours. It mounted a perfidious attack against Egypt in 1956 and initiated a massive aggression against the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria on 5 June 1967.

129. Before this Assembly on 26 October [1884th meeting], the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, cited in an eloquent and well-substantiated statement the record of all Israel's aggressions against the Arab countries. He further emphasized all the resolutions Israel has chosen to defy.

130. Mr. Eban, however, found it convenient to take exception to Mr. Riad's assertion that the attack of June 1967 was indeed an aggression. Mr. Eban laboured in vain to drown in an eloquent mass of words an irrefutable fact, a fact so established in the annals of history and in the minds of people everywhere that the artful and deceitful Israeli propaganda cannot efface it.

131. A novice in international law cannot but define as aggression a surprise assault on the armies, boundaries, territories, towns and villages and civilian populations of three States, faithful Members of the United Nations. The destruction, killing and suffering meted out to those three Arab countries and their people as a result of that assault cannot be considered by any misunderstanding as legal or moral, or as anything but the consequences of an act of aggression.

132. International public opinion has now grown wise enough to discredit the hoax that the Israelis have been trying to present to the world that on 5 June 1967 they did nothing but tear "the murderous fingers from its [Israel's] throat", as Mr. Eban contended here yesterday [1888th meeting, para. 29]. Such flimsy con-

tentions are not legal tender in the market of international affairs and diplomacy.

133. Are we to forget that the Israeli aggressions have continued for three and a half years, that the towns and villages of the Suez Canal are and have been persistently bombed and devastated, that their populations have suffered an ever-mounting toll of death, and that all normal activities of life in the area have come to a standstill? Nor did Israel halt its aggressions at the Suez Canal. It expanded the realm of its attacks to Cairo itself, to the schools and factories of Egypt and to vital civil installations. The dreadful manifestations of Israeli aggression and occupation abound along other lines as well: the displacement and expulsion of large civilian populations from the occupied territories; mass arrests and collective or neighbourhood punishment; prison tortures; the curtailment of essential freedoms and human rights; the installation of *nahals* in the Golan Heights; the establishment of Israeli communities in Arab Jerusalem and other Jordanian cities; and its desecration of the holy shrines of Old Jerusalem.

134. We in Lebanon, a peaceful and peace-loving country, a country of democracy and friendliness, of tolerance and of openness to the world, have not escaped the violence of Israel. Our international airport at Beirut was attacked in December 1968 and our unprotected civil aviation fleet destroyed. Our villages and towns in southern Lebanon have been attacked several times, and our civilian population of the area has sustained heavy losses of life, property and economic and social stability. On three occasions, the Security Council has adopted resolutions condemning Israel and solemnly warning it against a repetition of its attacks. Yet, it is a known fact that Israel has disregarded those resolutions as it has arrogantly defied every other decision passed against it for so many years in the United Nations.

135. The Arab peoples of Palestine and of the occupied territories of the three Arab States have endured long enough the ordeals of Israeli aggression and occupation. Their nightmare must come to an end. The heavy cloud which hangs over the Middle East, and about which Mr. Eban spoke yesterday, can only be lifted when the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are recognized, restored and exercised; when justice is at last bestowed upon them; when the military occupation is ended and the withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories is effected.

136. The heavy clouds can disappear from the skies of the Middle East and those of the entire world when the material, Mirages and Phantoms, disappear from them, when the illusions that Israel can dominate the Arab Middle East are dissipated. Israeli representatives have attempted often enough during the last few weeks to convince this Assembly that they stand for peace, that they seek only security.

137. There is only one thing that is certain, and the Israelis must clearly understand it. The peace and security they claim to desire cannot be achieved by the threat of force, by intimidation or by military

domination. In this connexion, we must remember the wise words of the representative of Canada, Ambassador Beaulne, which he pronounced at the rostrum of the General Assembly on 24 October: "Security won by submission to force can be called peace only if we mean the peace of the grave" [*1883rd meeting, para. 55*].

138. The Arab countries yearn for genuine peace. They need peace, but peace with justice. They certainly refuse the peace of the grave, the submission to force. They have vast territories, growing populations and tremendous material resources with which to concern themselves. They want to apply all their ingenuity and capabilities to better the conditions of the cultural, economic and social life of their peoples.

139. We in the United Nations are governed by the Charter, by General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, by our jurisprudence and by the norms of international law and morality. They constitute the law by which we abide. This law prohibits the threat or use of force and sanctions the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territories by force. The General Assembly solemnly reaffirmed that law, on the occasion of the United Nations anniversary on 24 October, in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*].

140. On two occasions the Security Council itself strengthened the jurisprudence of the United Nations. Following the invasion of Lebanese territory by the armed forces of Israel, the Security Council adopted two sound and definite decisions. In resolutions 279 (1970) of 12 May 1970 and 285 (1970) of 5 September 1970, the Council demanded in one the "immediate", and, in the other, the "complete and immediate" withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese territory. The Security Council thus enhanced its authority and consecrated the principle that no territory of a Member State should be subject to invasion and the use of force by the armed forces of any other Member State. Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 had also consecrated the same principle, but the Council has thus far failed to give effect to its decision.

141. Why has the Security Council not adopted and given effect to a decision regarding the invasion by Israel of the territories of three Arab States as it did in the case of Lebanon? By attaching too many conditions to resolution 242 (1967), in the hope of solving *in toto* the problem of the Middle East, the Council has in fact bound its own hands. It has diverted its attention from its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security to a wider problem involving political, juridical and human questions. However, two Arab States, the United Arab Republic and Jordan, have accepted resolution 242 (1967) and have declared their willingness to implement it fully. The Council, however, has until now failed to carry out its resolution.

142. This failure is imputed principally to Israel, which has undermined all efforts to implement that

resolution, and it is also imputed to the United States, which has lavished its political, diplomatic and material support on Israel. The Assembly also bears a heavy responsibility for failing to find a just and durable solution to the dilemma of the Middle East. During the General Assembly session of 1968, delegations found refuge behind Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and continuously proclaimed their support for it. During the twenty-fourth session, they found an added refuge in this same resolution, to which were attached the four-Power talks for its implementation. This year still another refuge has been discovered: the United States initiative under the Rogers plan.

143. We can no longer hide behind these three ramparts. We do not know what the fourth refuge will be next year. Perhaps by then the rampart of peace and security in the area and in the world will have been broken by Israel's unyielding defiance of the United Nations. We can say, in all fairness and in a spirit of friendliness, that the support given to Israel by the United States is not conducive to peace.

144. Israel performs the role of the *prima donna* and meets with complacency, approval and support in some United States circles. Delaying tactics have been and are still being adopted to block the Jarring mission, the talks of the big Four and the search for a meaningful and just peace. Such tactics revolve around the timing and extent of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, or around the secure boundaries of Israel, and what kind of rectification should be applied to Arab borders to satisfy Israel's appetite. Are they to be substantial or insubstantial, major or minor, rectification? They revolve also, nowadays, around the problem of rectification or symbolic rectification in the standstill area of the Suez Canal zone.

145. The United States once had a tremendous reservoir of goodwill in the Arab world. Reservoirs, however, are not bottomless, they can dry up, to the detriment of the United States and to the friends of the United States alike. To prevent such an occurrence the intransigence of Israel must be broken, the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people must be recognized and restored, and the complete withdrawal of all Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories must be effected. Then, and only then, will peace come to the Middle East.

146. Charges that the United Arab Republic has breached the standstill agreement in the Canal zone are not conducive to promoting the conditions needed for a peaceful settlement. The United Arab Republic has manifested from the outset its willingness to negotiate such a settlement under the auspices of the very able and patient Ambassador Jarring. The representatives of the United Arab Republic have confirmed their goodwill on many occasions recently. To doubt it is to obstruct peace; to test it is the best and shortest way to peace. The representatives of Israel can dispel the doubts about their bad faith and demonstrate a similar goodwill by making a short journey in this building and going to the thirty-eighth floor and

telling Ambassador Jarring that they are sincerely ready and willing to engage in meaningful talks for peace.

147. The PRESIDENT: There are three representatives who wish to exercise their right of reply. I should like to remind them that it was agreed that a time-limit of 10 minutes would be imposed on rights of reply. If that is not sufficient they are free to inscribe their names on the list of speakers as that list will not be closed before 6 p.m. today.

148. I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia.

149. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): When Mr. Eban speaks Ambassador Yost is always present to imbibe what the United States Government considers are words of wisdom gushing from Mr. Eban's mouth. But when the Syrian representative, or his colleagues from the Arab world, take the floor, quite frequently Mr. Yost disappears from the Assembly hall. It is his privilege. But this presence and absence are not coincidental, they are quite symbolic of the impact Israel has on a super-Power and demonstrate how that same Power treats the Arab world in a cavalier fashion.

150. Ambassador Yost said that the problem is dangerous and difficult. He cited resolution 242 (1967) as "a balanced document". He then divulged to us, perhaps unwittingly, that resolution 242 (1967) was a sort of insurance for averting a world conflict. I am paraphrasing, of course. Why do I say this? Because he emphatically said—he is a very calm, cool and collected person, but his tone rose a little when he said it—that the great-Power confrontation had eased. Are we the subject of great-Power confrontations in our region? Are we the pawns of power politics? Is this the era of the United Nations or is it repeating the same mistakes as the League of Nations? Are we a toy in the hands of super-Powers, or at least in the hands of some of them? We are told that the great-Power confrontation has eased; what are we—a chequer board for the super-Powers?

151. We are Asians—and I will talk for a moment about Asians when I conclude this statement on the immediate problem confronting us. We conclude from such an attitude that Asia is the prize which is sought by certain super-Powers, perhaps more than two super-Powers—who knows? There is no monopoly on being a super-Power. But we know that two super-Powers have, since the end of the Second World War, positioned themselves in such a way on the continent of Asia as to be able to pursue their respective interests. Again I am going to quote—I have been taking notes on Ambassador Yost's enlightening speech. He says: "Vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are involved". I ask you frankly, why should they be involved at our expense? This is power politics. You, Mr. President, and all those who spoke during the twenty-fifth anniversary session, warned us that we should turn over a new page and not have our policies conditioned by spheres of influence in power politics. We are told that vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are involved in our area.

Why do they not concern themselves with their own area? There is nothing wrong in serving one's national interests whether those national interests are the interests of small Powers or super-Powers, but not at the expense of a people, the Palestinian people, whose own interests have been trodden underfoot. All this amounts to letting those Palestinian people die in order that Israel may survive.

152. Resolution 242 (1967) was designed to give a respite to the great Powers in order to avoid a direct confrontation between them. I was present in the Security Council and I decried resolution 242 (1967) because the Council shifted the whole question to the special session of the General Assembly; it abdicated its powers and responsibilities to the General Assembly, which can do nothing but recommend, which cannot decide questions of war and peace. In their innermost hearts the super-Powers and some other Powers knew that neither Israel nor certain Arab States would implement its provisions. Why? Because Israel, time and time again since 1967, has said that Jerusalem is not negotiable, that the Golan Heights and other areas are necessary for the security of its boundaries. And the Gaza Strip was left hanging in the air, as if it was a balloon. Two hundred thousand—I don't know how many—left hanging in the air like a balloon. Whom do they think they are fooling?

153. Mr. Yost spoke almost alarmingly about the pouring of Soviet arms into certain Arab countries contiguous with Israel; but he seems to have ignored the fact that the artificial creation of Israel 22 years ago—to a large extent through the pressure brought to bear on other Member States of the United Nations by Mr. Truman and, subsequently, by successive American Governments with the exception of Mr. Eisenhower's Government—made Israel a fortress in the midst of our region. How was Israel made a fortress? By the constant flow of the most modern and sophisticated United States weapons into Israel. Did Soviet arms or American arms make Israel the impregnable fortress it has become?

154. I should like to ask our distinguished and perspicacious colleague Ambassador Yost the following questions.

155. Would Israel have come into being without the overt, but mostly covert, illicit and flagrantly unjust intervention of the United States President, Mr. Truman, in 1947, in contravention of the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people who had been placed under British Mandate in Versailles and who should have attained independence like the other peoples under League of Nations Mandates, countries like Lebanon, Syria and Iraq?

156. The second question: would United States interests, whether strategic or economic, be served by the commitment of the United States to Israel if such consistent and persistent commitment to Israel alienated the approximately 110 million Arabs whose territories extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the heart of Asia and along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf—the most strategic region in the world for any great Power?

157. The third question I would like to ask Mr. Yost (I think he may have ear-phones at the Mission, I do not know): if the Arab people as a whole, irrespective of their Governments—some of which, like other Governments anywhere, may pursue by force of circumstances expedient and expendable policies—reject Israel as a new European colonial intrusion in their midst and elect, as I am sure they will, to rebel against foreign intervention, from whatever source it comes, is the United States so committed to Israel that it will jeopardize, if not totally sacrifice, its vital interests in that vast region? About 2,000 million Euro-dollars are gained from Arab lands by the sale of oil by American firms to Western Europe and Japan. Those 2,000 million dollars have alleviated the adverse balance of payments of the United States. I am not talking politics now, I am talking economics for a change. If that amount were lost to the United States, would not the dollar as a world currency deteriorate to such an extent that it might have to be devalued officially, notwithstanding its persistent erosion by inflation? Your currency, Sir, everybody's currency, would suffer, I am sure.

158. The next question: is the United States so committed to Israel that, as a consequence of what I have just mentioned, it will risk a deficit in the balance of payments that may well bring about a depression, not only in the United States but in the countries of Western Europe as well, whose currencies are linked to the United States dollar?

159. And lastly, I must warn my good friend Ambassador Yost and his Government that the alienation of the Arab people from the United States has reached a most dangerous point. If the United States entertains the idea that anarchy may prevail, that they can perhaps have stooges in our region, let me proclaim that that era has gone. That era has gone. Dictators will be crushed in our midst—by the young Arab people, not by the old fogies of my generation.

160. I know that my time is now up and I will leave my comments on the role of Asia for another intervention when I have the opportunity to address myself to the various draft resolutions.

161. Thank you for your indulgence; you have been most generous.

162. Mr. EL-ZAYYAT (United Arab Republic): The delegation of the United States of America has now decided to put forward the draft resolution in document A/L.603, read out to us today and submitted, as we now understand it, clearly in opposition to the Asian, African and non-aligned draft resolution submitted yesterday as document A/L.602. To introduce that draft resolution, not only was it necessary for the United States delegation to seek to insert into the record of this Assembly American, not United Nations, documents and texts which can be, must be and are going to be completed by other texts of the same origin; it was also important and necessary for the United States delegation to issue a stern warning to this Assembly not to meddle in such serious and dangerous ques-

tions as the one before us, not to interfere in matters as serious as the question of peace and war. Indeed, what we have before us is a question of peace and war, of aggression, of surrender in humiliation, of a test—and it is a test—of the very foundations on which this Organization is built, including the principles of collective responsibility and collective security. Not only is the Assembly warned not to take action which one of its more than one hundred members considers to be irresponsible; it is also warned not even to take any action such as that authorized under Article 10 of the Charter, that is, not to recommend any course of action to the Security Council.

163. It is very significant that in introducing its draft resolution the United States delegation warned against operative paragraph 7 of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned draft resolution, which reads:

“Requests the Security Council to consider, if necessary, taking steps under the relevant Articles of the Charter to ensure the implementation of its resolution.”

The United States delegation understood this to be an invitation to use Chapters VI and VII against Israel. This is indeed revealing and is a cause for pondering and deep thinking by everyone in this room. There is not one mention of Israel here. It may be that the United Arab Republic is going to be the one against which the “relevant Articles” under Chapters VI and VII are going to be used. How did the representative of the United States foresee that only Israel will be against implementation of the Security Council resolution and that therefore this is to be considered an invitation to the Security Council to implement the relevant Articles of Chapters VI and VII against the country that is going to resist implementation of this resolution of the Security Council?

164. I do not say that there was no reason for them to think that it will be Israel. They know it will, and what they are trying to do is prevent the Security Council from implementing the Articles of the Charter in order to protect one State.

165. The United States delegation has introduced the text of an American document given to us and agreed upon by us, but it has failed to introduce other documents. I have them here, and I should like to introduce some of them. But I shall take the President’s advice and try to speak again tomorrow. However, I would now like to mention what the United States delegation has referred to as confidence.

166. I said earlier that our confidence is in the United Nations, the Security Council, this Assembly and the Charter of the United Nations. We have no confidence in the State of Israel. Why? Because we have tried. We tried in 1947; we tried in 1949; we tried every year, whenever a resolution was adopted by this Assembly. We tried in 1949 at Lausanne: we affixed our signature to a document to which Israel also affixed its signature under the auspices of the United Nations. It contained the Protocol of Lausanne, which was never

respected. We have tried by entering into armistice agreements that were broken and declared dead and buried by the Prime Minister of Israel in 1956. We have tried because we have accepted initiative upon initiative and have found that Israel will respect nothing except what it lives by: violence and power. The confidence we had was, as I have said, in the United Nations. We also had confidence in my colleague to my right here. We had confidence in Great Britain in 1967, when it introduced its draft resolution, which became Security Council resolution 242 (1967). We had confidence in it and accepted that resolution on the basis of that confidence. We had confidence in the French, and on the basis of that confidence accepted the French initiative of 1968, when it was suggested that the four Powers responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security go ahead and see how they could implement the unanimous resolution of the Security Council. We had confidence in the Russians; this year we accepted their initiative and are still waiting to see what the other party will do in response to it. We had confidence in the United States of America; we accepted its initiative in 1970. And what happened to that initiative? I propose to use the minutes I have at my disposal to give a short account.

167. In the United States delegation’s speech we were told that in order to reach agreement the three Governments agreed to designate representatives. We did designate one—immediately. He came here. And on the evening of his arrival he informed Ambassador Jarring that he was at his disposal 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Following that, we entered into discussions under Jarring and tackled each and every subject he suggested. What did Israel do? After so many delays, trying to prevent him from making any progress in his work by first objecting to New York as a meeting place—which it was his privilege to choose—and by objecting to the title of the diplomats who should go and speak to him and by objecting to all sorts of things, they gave Ambassador Jarring the benefit of exactly 75 minutes in which nothing substantive was said, no talk, no reference to anything substantive. They were waiting for something else to arise, something that would give them a better pretext—to use the language of the American magazine *Time* of this week—“the perfect pretext”. That pretext took the form of finding that there was an imbalance of power around the cease-fire zone.

168. I am sure Mr. Yost had no access to the following, which is from a CBS correspondent, Larry Pomeroy, reporting today from Tel Aviv. He says:

“Defense Minister Dayan told an American audience here that one reason why he expects Egypt to continue the Suez cease-fire is that the Arabs know that they would be defeated if the shooting resumed. Dayan’s remarks reported a growing feeling among observers that Egypt knew its anti-aircraft missile is becoming less of a threat to Israel by the day. Information sources of military communications here even speak of the Egyptian missile development as something of a windfall for Israel. They say that the present and future arms shipments

from the United States of America have neutralized the Arab missile line along the Suez Canal and the gap between the two armies is widened even more in Israel's favour. Only a miscalculation of strategy resulting from indecision or confusion in the new Cairo Government can lead Egypt down the road to war again this year, one top military Israeli analyst says. And for this reason military sources now regard Egyptian missile violations as more of a diplomatic problem to be solved by Moscow and Washington to the satisfaction of Jerusalem."

169. I know that my time is running short. But what is suggested by the United States delegation is that this Assembly should be generously allowed to be associated in this effort "to obtain satisfaction for Jerusalem" not only by Moscow and Washington, but also perhaps by 127 States here representing the millions of people who also live on this globe.

170. I have already inscribed my name on the list of speakers for tomorrow, since I want to respect your order, Mr. President, to limit this intervention to 10 minutes.

171. The PRESIDENT: Just a little semantic correction: it was not my order, it was a decision by the Assembly.

172. Mr. SAYEGH (Kuwait): The representative of the United States came here this afternoon with a statement professing his delegation's and his Government's dedication to the cause of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. But concrete actions, which always speak louder than words, leave no room for doubt that the cause of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has been hampered by no State, other than Israel, as much as it has been hampered by the policies and the actions of the Government of the United States, the Government of the United States, which has underwritten the cost of the occupation by Israel of the territories of three Arab States, the Government of the United States which has also furnished Israel with the arms which ensure the continued application of a doctrine pronounced by the President of the United States to guarantee the continued military superiority of Israel over the Arab States at a time when Israel occupies Arab lands and proclaims its intent not to relinquish its occupation.

173. The words of the representative of the United States about his Government's concern for a just and lasting peace cannot silence the more eloquent and louder testimony of the deeds of his Government. Furthermore, the thrust of the statement of the representative of the United States was not to serve the cause of a just and lasting peace, but rather to prevent this Assembly from taking any action or making any expression which would be a forceful and forthright upholding of the principles of the Charter and which would lead to the elimination of the real obstacle to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The representative of the United States comes here professing his concern for a just and lasting peace and yet the thrust of his statement is to prevent this Assembly from helping the Middle East to move in that direction.

174. The representative of the United States, in his own form of concern for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, even offered to help the Assembly by offering his own draft resolution, his own remedy for the situation in the Middle East. But as any good physician would know, no remedy can be more adequate than the diagnosis on which it is predicated is accurate. The remedy proposed by the United States for the situation in the Middle East cannot be more adequate than the United States delegation's analysis of that situation is profound or than the United States identification of the relevant principles that apply to the situation is sound.

175. What is the situation in the Middle East, according to the delegation of the United States, which caused it to offer this draft resolution? Is it that the armies of one State occupy territories of three other States? No, this does not appear from the draft resolution submitted by the representative of the United States. The real trouble in the Middle East, that which Ambassador Yost wants to remedy in this draft resolution, is that the United Arab Republic made certain arrangements and took certain actions on the occupied portion of Egyptian territory. That is the real problem of the Middle East, that is what Ambassador Yost wants to remedy. And what is the principle which he wants to apply in order to formulate the remedy? If I may enunciate it on behalf of the United States delegation, since it was left implicit here, the principle of the United States appears to be the principle of the inadmissibility not of the acquisition of territory by force, but of the defence of the unoccupied territory of a State against attacks by the enemy occupying the remainder of that State. That is what is inadmissible according to the United States delegation, that is its concept of international law and it is to remedy this that the United States draft resolution has been submitted. Support for this draft resolution is tantamount to support for the mistaken analysis that the root of the trouble in the Middle East is what has happened since 7 August, this tail-end perspective, as I might call it, and support for this draft resolution is also support for the novel American doctrine, the doctrine of the inadmissibility of the defence of the unoccupied territory of a State against attacks from an enemy enjoying military superiority, which is lodged and entrenched in the occupied remainder of that State.

176. Finally, the representative of the United States caught my delegation by surprise when, in speaking about the Palestinian Arabs, we heard that the United States considers that any peace has to take into account the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians. We cannot forget that on 16 or 17 December of last year the representative of the United States himself, in a press conference statement at the United Nations, singled out of all the resolutions adopted on the Middle East the one resolution reaffirming the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine, in order to reprimand the General Assembly for adopting it. Frankly I thought that there was a change of heart in the United States position when I started hearing Ambassador Yost's statement on the rights of the Palestinians. But once again it was to uphold those

rights by words only, in order to drown the concept a minute later by raising irrelevant questions that make that concept inapplicable.

177. There were questions that were raised immediately after the declaration I have just cited. Who speaks for the Palestinians, what are their goals? I would say that if the United States delegation does not know who speaks for the Palestinians, that could be more the result of its failure to take the trouble to find out than the result of an objective loss of leadership among the Palestinians.

178. Furthermore, even if the Palestinians had no recognized leadership, would this infringe upon or abridge their inalienable rights enshrined in the Charter for all peoples, including the people of Palestine, and affirmed specifically in respect of the people of Palestine on 10 December last year?

179. Mr. MALIK (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I should like to reply briefly to some of the points touched upon by the United States representative, Ambassador Yost, in his statement.

180. It was yet another futile attempt by him to repeat the fabrications and insinuations of United States propaganda about alleged cease-fire violations of some kind or other by the Soviet Union. Mr. Gromyko, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, conclusively refuted these United States and Israeli propaganda fabrications in his statement in the General Assembly [1877th meeting]. The Soviet Union has no part in the United States proposal, and never has had, nor did it assume any obligations under it. Hence there can be no question of failure by the Soviet Union to carry out an obligation which it never undertook in the first place.

181. The United States submitted its proposal unilaterally and on its own initiative. The Soviet Union was informed about it *post facto* and, as now emerges from the position taken by the United States and Israel, its purpose was to distract the Security Council, the General Assembly, the United Nations and world public opinion in general from resolution 242 (1967) and the need to implement it to United States unilateral pro-Israel proposals. This is now abundantly obvious to everyone.

182. Ambassador Yost must surely remember, if his memory does not fail him, that when he referred to these United States proposals at one of the meetings of the representatives of the four Powers here in New York no one supported them or expressed any desire to discuss them. He was informed by the participants in these meetings that the unilateral United States proposal was neither discussed nor adopted at the quadripartite consultations, and hence none of the participants in them bears any responsibility for it, or can possibly do so. Furthermore, Ambassador Yost must surely remember—I am deeply sorry that he has, like a guest-speaker, said his piece and departed, in much the same way as a vocalist who sings an aria at one concert and then rushes off to another—that I told

that meeting that, unless this kind of unilateral proposal was confirmed by an agreed formulation by the four participants in the consultations, it would have no status and be left hanging in mid-air. I stressed the point that only with agreed formulations presented as recommendations to Ambassador Jarring on questions of peaceful political settlement could there be said to be any real confirmation of such proposals. Otherwise, the proposal would be left dangling. Events have proved the correctness of this assertion and this stand taken by the Soviet side at the consultations.

183. In attempting to level nonsensical and completely unfounded charges against the Soviet Union, Ambassador Yost has by that very fact reflected a new tendency, which has latterly become apparent in United States foreign propaganda, to ascribe its own sins to the Soviet Union and to saddle it with its own guilt and responsibility. This is a very cheap trick, and will bring no success to the United States foreign policy propagandists.

184. Ambassador Yost touched upon the question of arms deliveries. This is a refrain constantly harped on in the United States, which from the very first days of the Israeli aggression in the Middle East ranged itself on the side of Israel and took the aggressor under its protective wing. The aim of this line of policy is to disarm the Arab countries and leave them defenceless, without reliable weapons in their hands to confront an enemy, an aggressor, stationed in proximity to the capitals of three Arab countries. Mr. Yost raised this question many times during the four-Power consultations. The Soviet side gave him the following answer: we are proud of the fact that we are giving assistance to the victim of aggression, in conformity with our high principles and sense of justice. We categorically condemn those who give armed assistance to the aggressor so that he can continue his aggression and ignore the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, the General Assembly and the Security Council. Until the Middle East question is solved and until the consequences of Israeli aggression are completely eliminated, there can be no question of the cessation of arms deliveries to the victim of aggression. This should be clear and unambiguous.

185. I should like, though, to draw the delegates' attention to the fact that not a syllable was uttered, in Mr. Yost's long statement, about the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. This is the whole crux of the matter. The United States is obstructing the implementation of the Security Council resolution, one of whose main provisions was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. Mr. Yost was silent on this, and this was his purpose in submitting his draft resolution—to divert the attention of the Assembly, the United Nations and world public opinion from resolution 242 (1967), from the need for its implementation, and from the necessary withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories. Seen in this light, the unacceptability, odiousness and crassly pro-Israeli character of today's action by the United States representative becomes quite

evident. I doubt whether, among the States Members of the United Nations, there will be any that could agree with this kind of approach to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East, become forgetful of

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and replace it by a unilateral United States proposal.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.