



Tuesday, 28 May 1968,
 at 3 p.m.

NEW YORK

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President: Mr. Corneliu MANESCU (Romania).

AGENDA ITEM 64

Question of South West Africa (continued)

1. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): When the list of speakers wishing to take part in the discussion on agenda item 64 was closed on Thursday, 23 May, at 6 p.m., it contained the names of twenty-four delegations. On that basis, plenary meetings were scheduled until 31 May inclusive.

2. Subsequently, two more delegations, those of Barbados and Kuwait, expressed the desire to take part in the discussions. If the Assembly agrees, I shall add the names of those two countries to the list of speakers, it being understood that their representatives will be good enough to fit themselves into the programme that has been drawn up. If there are no objections, I shall consider that the Assembly agrees with that procedure.

It was so decided.

3. The PRESIDENT (translated from French): The Assembly will now continue its discussion of that agenda.

4. Mr. MBEKEANI (Malawi): Mr. President, the Malawi delegation is happy to welcome you back to the Assembly, and would like to congratulate you on the admirably impartial manner in which you are conducting the business of the resumed twenty-second session.

5. I also wish to take this opportunity to convey, formally, my delegation's condolences to the delegation of Botswana on the recent death of their distinguished Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Professor Matthew's patience, tact and informed understanding of African issues, especially those concerning South Africa and South West Africa, will be sorely missed here.

6. In an address to the Malawi Parliament, given on 16 December 1966, my President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, set forth the Malawi Government's attitude towards a number of important international questions, among them the complex problems associated with the troubled area of southern Africa. The views expressed in that statement remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy today, and at the beginning

of this resumed session I circulated excerpts from my President's speech as a document of the Assembly. Regarding the tragic problem of South West Africa, which is the main item currently under discussion here, I should like to enlarge on some of the points made by my President and try to restate our position in the light of subsequent United Nations developments.

7. Two months before the President delivered his statement to the Malawi Parliament, the General Assembly had adopted, by a vote of 114 to 2—Portugal and South Africa voting against—resolution 2145 (XXI), which terminated South Africa's League of Nations Mandate over South West Africa and proclaimed that the Territory, henceforth, would come under the direct responsibility of the United Nations. Only three countries abstained in the vote: the United Kingdom, France and Malawi. My President Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda wanted to explain to the House why our Government had taken an action so starkly out of line with that of other African States. For, having struggled long and painfully for our own independence—to free ourselves from white minority rule—it could hardly be expected that Malawi would wish to see the people of South West Africa condemned to languish in perpetuity under the control of a foreign country. On the contrary, we have always believed that the South West African people as a whole ought to be given the freedom to exercise their right of self-determination, as other colonial peoples on our continent have done before them. It was in furtherance of this belief that Malawi gladly participated in the Organization of African Unity's cost-sharing scheme to finance the legal proceedings in the case against South Africa's Mandate which Ethiopia and Liberia had brought before the bar of the World Court.^{1/}

8. The move to seek a judgement on whether South Africa had violated its obligations under the Mandate, by introducing the practice of apartheid in South West Africa and by treating the Territory in a manner inconsistent with its international status, seemed to my Government valid and useful. And when on 18 July 1966 the International Court of Justice dismissed the case without ruling on its merits,^{2/} we shared the indignation and sense of frustration felt by almost every Member of this Organization. Nevertheless, we could not believe that it was wise to respond to this negative decision of the Court by pushing through a resolution in the Assembly which abruptly terminated—without consultation with the country directly concerned—South Africa's Mandate over the Territory of South West Africa. While it is true that a Court ruling in favour

^{1/} I.C.J., South West Africa case (Ethiopia [Liberia] v. Union of South Africa), Application instituting proceedings, 1960, General List, No. 46 [No. 47].

^{2/} South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1966, p. 6.

of the case brought by Ethiopia and Liberia would, probably, also have resulted in a move immediately to terminate the Mandate, the atmosphere might have been calmer and more time might have been allowed for reflection.

9. At any rate, Malawi felt that the dictatorial language of resolution 2145 (XXI) introduced a dangerous note of unreality into the Assembly's proceedings on the South West African issue. For all practical purposes, resolution 2145 (XXI) was, and could be, nothing more than a declaration of an important new principle to guide the Assembly in its future deliberations. Had it been worded as such, the resolution would have stood as a creditable and dignified statement of a new goal for us to work towards, a new departure point for exercising pressure on South Africa, and a new framework for further action and negotiation. However, the Assembly chose, instead, to proclaim this declaration of principle as if it were an already achieved fact, even though all Members recognized in advance that South Africa not only would disavow any such outright assertion of United Nations authority over South West Africa, but would categorically refuse to leave the Territory.

10. Seven months later, at the fifth special session held in Spring 1967, the Assembly went a step further in the direction of unreality when it adopted resolution 2248 (S-V)—on which Malawi also abstained—which created the United Nations Council for South West Africa "to administer South West Africa until independence".

11. It did not end there, however; the Assembly even went so far as to set a date for independence—June 1968. This time the abstentions in the voting numbered not three, but thirty; and those thirty included the votes of most of South West Africa's important trading partners, and all four permanent members of the Security Council—the very body that had been requested in the resolution to "take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly".

12. Thus, by the very terms of its own resolutions, the Assembly deliberately opted to take its twenty-one-year-old moral struggle with South Africa to the point of a head-on confrontation which it is, in fact, constitutionally powerless to translate into an actual showdown. And what has been the result of the Assembly's decisions to date? Today, with less than four days to go before the target date for South West Africa's independence is upon us, the Assembly is still helplessly debating how to get South Africa out of the Territory and establish a United Nations presence there. Only last month, the United Nations Council for South West Africa, anxious to prove to the world that it was undeterred from trying to fulfil its mandate, despite South Africa's emphatic warnings, attempted to enter the Territory and was humiliatingly denied access. Speaker after speaker in the current debate has expressed outrage that South Africa has even taken measures to entrench itself more firmly than ever in the Territory. In truth, the Assembly has opted to make itself appear woefully impotent.

13. With respect, I think that this unproductive outcome of the Assembly's resolutions could have been

predicted. Indeed, I will go further and suggest that it was, in fact, confidently awaited by the very countries foremost in the drive to terminate South Africa's Mandate. I believe that the sponsors of this drive hoped that South Africa's refusal to comply with the terms of the Assembly's new position, as described in resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), would provide the clinching moral argument with which to pressure the four permanent members of the Security Council into calling for enforcement measures against the Republic of South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. Why else would the United Nations Council for South West Africa have seen fit to expose our Organization to an expensive and predicted rebuff by vainly trying to enter the Territory, if not only to dramatize South Africa's defiance of the United Nations? The timing of the trip was almost too significant, hastily sandwiched, as it was, between the Security Council's March resolution, censuring South Africa for sentencing thirty-seven South West African prisoners, and the opening of this resumed session. And certainly, many previous speakers have made eloquent use in this debate of South Africa's latest instance of defiance to argue their case once again for coercive action by the Security Council.

14. It is eight years now since the African nations first attained significant voting power in this Assembly. Since 1960, when sixteen new African States became Members at the opening of the fifteenth session, the Assembly's long-standing battle to get South Africa to bring its administration of South West Africa under United Nations surveillance has gradually changed character. The debates have increasingly focused on the role which African nations—and other small nations as well—expected South Africa's main trading partners to play in persuading, or coercing, the Republic into compliance. In preparing their arguments, more and more representatives of small countries also emphasized the need for the Security Council to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter in order to initiate enforcement measures under Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter. As we know, the four permanent members of the Council—or, at any rate, the three Western members—resisted the call.

15. Meanwhile, the resolutions adopted in the Assembly have become steadily more violent in tone, more demanding in their requests of South Africa, and, in the final analysis, more unrealistic. These resolutions gathered large majorities, partly because almost all members here genuinely deplore the South African stand on South West Africa and detest the system of apartheid, and partly—one suspects—because Members knew that Assembly resolutions do not legally commit them to action. Moreover, such was the atmosphere of moral fervour engendered by the passionate stand of African nations that many Members must have felt that to cast a dissenting or abstaining vote would appear as if it were a vote for South Africa's policies.

16. And so in the end the Assembly was stampeded—I am afraid I can use no other word—into adopting, by an overwhelming majority, resolution 2145 (XXI), which so grandly described an objective to be won as if it were already a *fait accompli*, and to the superficial viewer it might have looked at that moment as if the African voice had finally triumphed. But even at

that stage there were ominous signs that the important Powers would be reluctant to co-operate in implementing the terms of the resolution. Thus the two crucial operative paragraphs in the original Afro-Asian draft resolution—paragraph 5 establishing a United Nations Administering Authority to administer the Territory, and paragraph 7 requesting the Security Council to take "the necessary effective measures to enable the Administering Authority to discharge its functions"—were transformed into much less explicit provisions in the text that was finally adopted.

17. Instead of establishing an administering authority, the resolution created an Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa to "recommend practical means by which South West Africa should be administered" and merely called the attention of the Security Council "to the present resolution". The creation of an Ad Hoc Committee was a delaying action which, though it won the resolution the support of two out of the four permanent members of the Security Council, should have sounded a warning bell discouraging further attempts to put teeth into the resolution. Unfortunately, the warning bell sounded a little too late, for by then the majority of the small Powers naturally felt committed to continue what they had started. Six months later, when soberer thoughts prevailed, most of the important countries abstained on the crucial implementation resolution, 2248 (S-V).

18. Of course, the mere fact that all the permanent members of the Security Council abstained on this resolution does not necessarily mean they will refuse to consider initiating coercive action under Chapter VII—which no doubt is why several delegations have devoted their best energies in the current debate to elaborating impressive arguments to this end. However, it must be said that the speeches of the two super-Powers have not been encouraging to the hopes of those who so ardently pleaded for enforcement measures. We have heard the Soviet Union agree that if South Africa does not take steps to liberate South West Africa:

"It is obvious that the Security Council will have to examine the question of the illegal presence of South Africa in the territory of South West Africa and will have to adopt measures under the Charter that will ensure the liberation of the peoples of South West Africa from foreign occupation."* [1648th meeting, para. 63.]

19. Although those are forceful words, they do not actually pledge the Soviet Union to specific action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Next we heard Ambassador Goldberg say that the United States, too, is not averse to enlisting the aid of the Security Council on this issue; on the other hand, he made it clear that he meant for the purpose of peaceful action only.

20. At the last regular session we heard the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom categorically declare that his country would not commit suicide by waging economic war against South Africa—and though Britain may have changed its Foreign Minister since then, I doubt if this means it has changed its policy towards South Africa. As for France, more than one African

representative has already expressed dismay that France itself has defied the Security Council by continuing to sell arms to South Africa, despite the interdict which was called for by resolution 181 (1963) of 7 August 1963, and again by resolution 182 (1963) of 4 December 1963. So there seems little to be hoped for from that direction.

21. It is time that the General Assembly realized that no matter what the provocation offered by South Africa to this Organization, the rich Western nations will not consent to isolate South Africa economically, thereby disrupting their entire trading pattern and cutting themselves off from the wealth that country possesses. For them South Africa is the goose that lays the golden egg, and they simply cannot afford to starve it to death. That being so, assurances of help from small, undeveloped nations to offset the big Powers' economic losses as a result of sanctions are not likely to carry very much weight. And if the Western countries are disinclined to starve South Africa out, how much less will they be inclined to take up arms against it.

22. Discussing this aspect of the South West African problem in an interview with the journal US News and World Report, published on 13 May 1968, my President, Ngwazi Dr. Kamuzu Banda, made the following remarks:

"Before anyone can rescind the mandate of the administration of South Africa, he has to expel, eject, evict South Africa from South West Africa. Who will do that? There are no armies in Africa to do that.

"Will the Americans do it for us? For the United States or Britain or France to evict South Africa from South West Africa, it means sending armies and airmen, doesn't it? Can you visualize an airman from Virginia bombing Cape Town? ... Can you visualize an airman from Manchester, Birmingham or Leeds bombing Cape Town, or Johannesburg or Durban? Is it humanly possible?"

23. Or, to continue this line of reasoning through to the end, suppose the Soviet Union, by some remote chance, were rash enough to undertake a solitary crusade against South Africa on behalf of enraged black African nations unable to fight that crusade for themselves. Who can doubt that the United States would rush to preserve the balance of power by immediately coming to the aid of South Africa? And who can contemplate with equanimity the terrible consequences that might then ensue? No, the more one inquires into the concept of applying enforcement measures against South Africa—beyond a few token embargoes, such as on the sale of arms—the more inconceivable it becomes. It is with those thoughts in mind that I, a representative of a black African country, earnestly appeal to members of this august body, and more particularly my African confrères, to call off their campaign to pressure the big Powers into doing what patently cannot be done.

24. In saying this, I trust that my meaning will not be misunderstood. Certainly, my Government believes that it was both natural and proper for African nations to take an emphatic stand in spurring our Organization on to greater efforts in the long-standing attempt to

*Provisional English version taken from the interpretation.

persuade South Africa to consider giving the South West African people their home and their independence. Nor do we wish to deny that, during the past eight years, the belligerent African voice in this Assembly was successful in helping to hasten the end of colonialism in many areas of the world. As far as the particular Territory of South West Africa itself is concerned the voice has powerfully revitalized the Assembly's energies, and, by so doing, in resolution 2145 (XXI) has led to a statement of a bold new objective to be attained.

25. However, what I am saying is that that part of the African drive to galvanize the Assembly, which consists in the campaign to persuade the permanent members of the Security Council to initiate enforcement action, has now been overtaken by the law of diminishing returns. Unless the four permanent members show signs of responding to this pressure within the very near future, I think it should be frankly recognized, whether tacitly or openly, that there is nothing more to be gained from these tactics. Indeed, not only is there nothing more to be gained but there is everything to lose from continuing on this fruitless course, since it will merely serve to harden attitudes all around. And the more the small nations continue to reiterate old arguments, the more mesmerized they will become by their own angry words and demands, and the more incapable, therefore, of thinking creatively in terms of what can be done.

26. If the African nations persist in talking in terms of punishment and reprisal, then in the view of my delegation the prospects for a successful solution to the problem of South West Africa are slim indeed. For by virtue of their voting power in the Assembly and the fact that African nations represent a sizable portion of the Third World that each of the two world Powers seeks to entice into its orbit of influence, a negative attitude on the part of these nations can effectively hinder the other, more realistic Members of this Organization from adopting a positive approach towards South Africa. Such an approach must, in the opinion of my delegation, eschew violent condemnation, inflammatory language, impossible claims, attempts at boycott and the like. In other words, it should avoid some of the methods that have been tried at one time or another during the past twenty years. As we have seen, those methods have merely resulted in strengthening South Africa's dedication to the system of apartheid and its resolve not to lose its hold over the neighbouring Territory of South West Africa.

27. Looking at the situation in southern Africa with detachment, how could we have expected otherwise? Representative after representative here has expressed the belief that the apartheid system is born of fear—the fear of the outnumbered whites that they will one day be engulfed by the black man. Does black Africa really expect to conquer fear with threats of violence, guerrilla tactics, virulent censure and diplomatic isolation? On the contrary, each violent gesture on the part of African nations merely confirms the white South Africans' view that the black man is not fit to rule and drives them to bolster their defences against him, both within their own country and against the African countries beyond their borders. In general, African nations are economically poor and of course militarily feeble. White South Africans are not at this

moment, I think, afraid of these States in any immediate physical sense and probably despise us for our empty threats. But equally it can be expected that South Africa cannot take any risks for the future. Because if South Africa was reluctant to put South West Africa under United Nations supervision while the membership included less than a handful of African countries, it is not going to put its neighbouring Territory at the disposition of the Assembly now that the African vote carries such powerful weight. And so long as black Africa continues to rage and threaten it, who can really be astonished at its attitude?

28. It seems to my delegation that the impasse created by the Assembly's adoption of resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V) should usefully be seized upon as an opportunity to formulate an entirely new policy, not only within this Organization but even—and more important—among African nations themselves. My President has long advocated that African States should deal directly with the Republic of South Africa as a means of fostering understanding between the black and white inhabitants of our continent. Isolated within the system of apartheid, the average white South African has no means of knowing black men within his own country, in ordinary human terms, as individuals with the same capacities and needs as himself. He can be encouraged to get to know black men by bringing him into direct contact with black nationals from other African countries. And then, little by little, provided world disapprobation of the apartheid system continues to make itself felt, the walls of the apartheid barrier may begin to crack. Already there are signs that the gradual erosion of racial principles has begun: witness South Africa's decision to send a mixed team to the forthcoming Olympics, from which it has now unhappily been barred. As my President said, a reversal of attitude will not occur overnight or even next year. But it will happen, and diplomatic contact combined with unremitting moral pressure represents the best chance we have for bringing about a desirable change in South Africa's policies by peaceful means.

29. It is clear from what I have just said, that my Government considers that the solution to the problem of southern Africa must primarily be an African solution, and thus it must be achieved through an attitude of understanding by the black African countries, seeking to convert the white settler rather than to conquer him. This approach, of course, poses the preliminary problem of convincing the majority of Members that diplomatic relations with South Africa do not necessarily entail condoning its policies or implying any abandonment of the principles of self-determination.

30. It would not be appropriate for me to enlarge further on how a peaceful African solution to the problem of southern Africa will finally be accomplished. However, it seems obvious that the initial impetus for that solution would probably have to come from within the United Nations and that the assistance of the entire membership is required. With those considerations in mind, I should like to suggest that the first task of our Organization with respect to South West Africa ought to be to open a dialogue with the Government of South Africa. I know that dialogues

with the Republic may have been undertaken in the past on several occasions without any success, but, as the representative of Canada has pointed out, in a letter to the Secretary-General dated 27 March 1968 the Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa publicly offered to receive a representative of the Secretary-General.^{3/} Even if that letter were construed as being merely a propaganda move, it undoubtedly proves that the Republic of South Africa has no wish to see itself cut off from all discussion with this world body. This, I submit, is a genuinely hopeful sign despite the conditions which the Foreign Minister attached to his offer; and I agree with Mr. Ignatieff that this offer should "be explored in relations to all the resolutions of the Assembly concerning South Africa" [1655th meeting, para. 9].

31. Similarly, may I also suggest that since the two super-Powers seem agreed that the whole problem of the Territory might profitably be reviewed by the Security Council, this could provide an opportunity for further study on the possibility of opening a full-scale dialogue with the Republic of South Africa.

32. My delegation believes that those views in some measure reflect as yet unspoken sentiments held by many other delegations in this august Assembly. Those sentiments now need to be voiced openly by those who are timid about plucking up their courage. If an African country cannot speak out on this matter, who else can?

Mr. Zollner (Dahomey), Vice-President, took the Chair.

33. Mr. VAKIL (Iran): Allow me once again to express our gratification at having Mr. Manescu guide us during this phase of the Assembly's work, when we are dealing with some of the most difficult and intricate issues facing the United Nations. Of these, the question of South West Africa provides a great challenge. It is the challenge of the defenceless people of South West Africa to the international community to restore its sovereign rights which supposedly had been held in trust. It is also a challenge to the very authority and future of the Organization. Considering that this challenge stems from the intransigent attitude and defiant posture of one Member alone, the situation becomes even more ominous, particularly at this stage of developments, because, if we fail after having reached near unanimity of purpose in terminating South Africa's Mandate over South West Africa, it will be the failure of the entire Organization against one Member State.

34. So far we have not made any headway towards the realization of the objectives set forth in resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V), simply because we have not utilized to the maximum or even to the extent necessary the resources of the world Organization. The unanimity of purpose, in itself achieved through the formulation of resolution 2145 (XXI), represented not only the first significant breakthrough in a twenty-year-old deadlock but also a most noteworthy and successful application of some of the United Nations resources. Through painstaking negotiations, consultations and mediation, we were

able to harmonize our efforts to such an extent as to produce the maximum possible political effect.

35. In this context, I am glad to note that my delegation, as one of the original co-sponsors of the very first Afro-Asian draft and also as a co-sponsor of the final draft^{4/} which became resolution 2145 (XXI), had a part to play. However, political action alone, as some of us had feared at the time, has proved insufficient to overcome South Africa's intransigence, which during the period of twenty years has become fossilized.

36. In fact, political decisions could produce no results if the Organization failed to come up with follow-up actions of the kind necessary to give the promise of enforcement. Moreover, the credibility gap resulting from unbacked decisions could have a damaging effect on the Organization. The application of enforcement measures may not even become necessary once the credit of the world Organization, at least in so far as decisions commanding near unanimity are concerned, is established.

37. In South West Africa's case, however, we have now passed that stage. The United Nations Council for South West Africa has made a gallant effort to carry out the tasks entrusted to it by resolution 2248 (S-V). After having once concluded that the refusal of the Government of South Africa to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 2145 (XXI) had made it impossible for the Council to carry out its mandate effectively, it continued to proceed, on the basis of resolution 2325 (XXII), to discharge its functions and responsibilities by every available means. The Assembly has already heard in detail the account of the Council's efforts to proceed to Windhoek with a view to establishing United Nations authority there. The Assembly has also heard how those efforts were thwarted by the persistent refusal of South Africa to co-operate. More than non-co-operation, in fact, South Africa appears to have been bent on exhibiting its policy of full and total defiance of the world Organization. Despite the Assembly's injunction that South Africa "refrain and desist from any action, constitutional, administrative, political or otherwise, which will in any manner whatsoever alter or tend to alter the present international status of South West Africa" [resolution 2145 (XXI)] the Government of South Africa has proceeded to carry out the odious Odendaal Plan^{5/} in South West Africa.

38. Having already introduced a bill in the South African Parliament, the Pretoria régime plans to put into operation the idea of so-called separate homelands, or Bantustan, in South West Africa. There is no need for me to repeat what we have already said on previous occasions on the Odendaal Plan, except to say that it is designed to perpetuate South Africa's illegal domination over South West Africa. It is designed to destroy the territorial integrity of South West Africa and bring about its gradual annexation.

39. The case of thirty-seven South West African patriots tried in contravention of the most elementary

^{4/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 65, documents A/L.483 and Add.1-3.

^{5/} Republic of South Africa, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into South West Africa, 1962-1963 (Pretoria, Government Printer, 1964).

^{3/} Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1968, document S/8506, annex I.

principles of judicial processes is another example of South Africa's defiance of the world Organization. South Africa's refusal to heed world-wide indignation over the trial of these patriots and to heed the pronouncements and measures of the General Assembly and the Security Council has further aggravated the situation. Having been among those Members requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to obtain the release of the South West African freedom fighters, we are deeply concerned that these patriots continue to remain in detention. Efforts to bring about their release should continue in the most vigorous way, despite South Africa's defiant attitude.

40. In short, not only has South Africa obstructed the efforts of the United Nations Council for South West Africa to proceed to Windhoek so that it may carry out its mandate but it has also shown flagrant disregard for the Assembly and Security Council decisions. I am sure everyone agrees that effective steps should be taken to prevent the present situation from erupting into violent racial conflict. We fully endorse the view that words alone will not bring about a change in the situation. Neither censure nor condemnation alone is the answer. What is required is the adoption and faithful execution of bold and effective measures to supplement political action taken under resolution 2145 (XXI). This resolution offers an excellent base for further action, as it encompasses virtually the full range of political opinions in the Assembly, in particular those of the super-Powers.

41. Therefore, already a large area of agreement exists on which a firm foundation could be built for more effective measures by the Security Council. We have reached a point where the major Powers, permanent members of the Security Council, must rise to their special responsibility by responding positively to the demands of the entire Organization. In their hands lies the key to the full utilization of the United Nations capacity. In their hands lies the key to the solution of the problem within the framework of the world Organization. To fail to rise to the situation would be failing the Organization as well as the people of South West Africa.

42. The people of South West Africa, or Namibia, have also a special role to play. They have already greatly impressed the United Nations Council for South West Africa by their courage and determination to obtain freedom and independence. As a member of the Committee of twenty-four nations, my delegation has been closely associated with their work. We have no doubt that they will redouble their efforts and march on with unity and determination until freedom and independence are won. In this fight, they deserve our full support and assistance.

43. I should like to commend the United Nations Council on South West Africa for the attention it has paid to this important aspect of the problem. The Council has had consultations with the representatives of the people of South West Africa, has heard their demands and has made a useful appraisal of their requirements. In this connexion, it has taken action to facilitate their travel by giving careful consideration to the issuance of travel documents to South West African nationals. The Council has also paid attention to the problem of obtaining assistance from the spe-

cialized agencies for the Territory, and to the question of establishing a separate budget for the programmes envisaged by the Council.

44. In fully endorsing these measures, I should like to state that the Iranian delegation will continue to give its full support, as in the past, to the people of South West Africa. Our contributions, modest as they may seem, for education and training of refugees from South West Africa, signify our deep desire to see the people of South West Africa throw off the chains that have held them back under domination for such a long time. We shall continue to give further material assistance and political support to the people of Namibia, until they regain their rightful place in the community of nations as a sovereign and independent nation.

45. In conclusion, let me once again reaffirm the view that the efforts of the people of South West Africa must be supplemented by forceful action of the United Nations in order to bring about the eviction of South Africa from South West Africa in accordance with resolutions 2145 (XXI) and 2248 (S-V). The United Nations must act to put an end immediately to the continued violation by South Africa of the rules of international law. It must act to uphold the sanctity of its decisions and to ensure that its authority shall prevail. It is, therefore, our hope that the permanent members of the Security Council will lend their support and co-operation in formulating effective measures for the freedom and independence of the people of South West Africa as soon as possible.

46. It is also our fervent hope that the great Powers will live up to the promises they have undertaken in this and other United Nations bodies. Only a fortnight ago, in Teheran, at the historic Human Rights Conference,^{6/} they pledged themselves, among other things, by the Teheran Proclamation, that:

"all Member States should co-operate with the ... United Nations so that effective measures can be taken to ensure that the Declaration [on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples] is fully implemented".

"This policy of apartheid ... continues seriously to disturb international peace and security. It is therefore imperative for the international community to use every possible means to eradicate this evil".^{7/}

47. Through forceful action of the Security Council they should, therefore, enable the United Nations to help the people of Namibia to throw off the chains of oppression and domination, to attain their freedom and independence and regain their dignity and fundamental human rights.

48. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan) (translated from French): Mr. President, the Japanese delegation takes pleasure in seeing you once again guiding the General Assembly's work, and it wishes to convey to you its warmest congratulations for the skill and impartiality you have shown in conducting our debates. There is no need to tell you that you have our complete co-operation.

^{6/} Held from 22 April to 13 May 1968.

^{7/} Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2).

49. Despite the efforts that have been made by the United Nations, the situation in southern Africa has shown no improvement whatsoever. The South African Government is continuing to ignore the resolutions adopted by our Organization. It is acting against the will of the United Nations and against the legitimate aspirations of the inhabitants of South West Africa. This is shown both by the illegal trial of the South West African political prisoners under the provisions of the so-called Terrorism Act and by the submission to the South African Parliament of the draft law entitled the "Homelands Bill". The second report of the United Nations Council for South West Africa [A/7088 and Corr.1], a body to which the Japanese delegation wishes to express its deep thanks, provides us with sufficiently clear evidence to convince us of the deplorable situation in which the Territory now finds itself.

50. It was with deep concern that the Japanese Government learnt of the two facts I have just mentioned. My Government therefore quite naturally hastened to make representations to the Pretoria Government, in conformity with the two Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) and 246 (1968) calling on Member States to use their influence to ensure that those resolutions are complied with. Japan asked that Government to put an immediate end to the illegal trial in question, to free the prisoners and to repatriate them. More recently, the Japanese Government, deeply concerned at the alarming news concerning the "Homelands Bill", called the South African Government's attention to the fact that it was bound to respect scrupulously the Territory's international status, a status that has frequently been reaffirmed in various United Nations resolutions, and especially in resolution 2145 (XXI), which was adopted almost unanimously by the Member States.

51. For many long years, the United Nations has persevered in its efforts to find a solution to the problem of South West Africa. To our great regret, all those efforts have been of no avail, owing to the stubborn attitude of the South African Government. The question that arises today is that of ascertaining what are the practical and constructive methods that would enable the United Nations to fulfil its responsibilities to the South West African people, what are the effective but peaceful methods that are needed to ensure the actual implementation of the various United Nations resolutions dealing with this important question of South West Africa. The Japanese Government is convinced that, as several speakers have indicated, in order to reach such goals joint action must be taken by Member States, and especially by the

permanent members of the Security Council. That is all the more true as the problem we are confronting has become increasingly difficult and delicate.

52. In that regard, many delegations have stressed the need to take effective measures against South Africa, including economic sanctions. It has been emphasized that that is the only effective way to cause South African intransigence to relent both as regards the problem of South West Africa and as regards racial discrimination in general.

53. In that respect, the Japanese Government's position has been explained many times, both in the Special Political Committee and in the Fourth Committee. Japan believes that disciplinary measures cannot produce the desired results unless they are the subject of resolutions of the Security Council, which is the sole body empowered under the Charter to take enforcement action. It also believes that those measures must be made fully effective and that they must be implemented by all the Member States of the United Nations.

54. I should not like to let this opportunity pass without reminding you that Japan has always scrupulously complied with Security Council decisions on South Africa: Japan is strictly observing the embargo on the delivery of weapons. Moreover, we have refrained from investing in South Africa. Japan has no diplomatic relations with South Africa.

55. In addition to general proposals, several delegations have during this session suggested various particular and practical measures aimed at preparing forthwith the ground for South West African independence. These concern the education and training of refugees from the territory. The suggestion made by the Guinean representative to set up a special programme for that purpose seems to merit the Assembly's particular consideration. As in the past, Japan will be happy to participate in our Organization's efforts in that direction.

56. Japan has supported and continues to support resolution 2145 (XXI) and the various resolutions that have subsequently been adopted. It has also taken part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee for South West Africa that was established by that resolution.

57. The Japanese delegation will not fail to co-operate in the future, as it has in the past, with other Member States in order that this world Organization may play its important part in the process of decolonization.

The meeting rose at 4.25 p.m.