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President: Mr. Mongi SLIM (Tunisia).

AGENDA ITEM 9

General debate (*continued*)

1. Mr. GRIMES (Liberia): It is a source of great pleasure, on behalf of the Liberian delegation and myself, to extend heartiest congratulations to Mr. Slim on his election as President of the sixteenth General Assembly. It is indeed significant that this is the first time in the history of the United Nations that an African has been elected President of the General Assembly. We are happy and proud that this honour has come to him. We are aware that he realizes that it imposes a serious and great responsibility upon him at a most critical period. We have no doubt, however, that with his experience, his wisdom and his sense of justice and fair play, he will be able to conduct the work of this session in an orderly and impartial manner and reflect credit not only on him and on his nation, but also on the peoples of Africa and the world.

2. We meet at this session conscious of the many problems which confront us but convinced that satisfactory solutions can and will be found if all of us keep clearly in mind the purposes for which we have met.

3. This is indeed a crucial point in history. The people of the world are in a state of tension. The international situation is fraught with portentous danger. Everywhere people are wondering whether man will approach his problems with reason and calm, or whether he will allow his animal instincts to propel him into the hazardous position of unleashing the powers of war once again on our planet.

4. Two world wars have been fought in this century. Millions of innocent men, women and children have been slain and the world has been deprived of some of its finest material and spiritual possessions. Despite these facts, it is unfortunate that even as we assemble here the international situation continues to worsen.

5. A serious situation exists in Berlin. On the other hand, it appears that the critical state of affairs in Laos has eased. The weapons of destruction now at man's disposal make it perilous and hazardous for the world to be pulled into any situation in which the possibility of a clash of arms becomes imminent. We

cannot afford a third world war. Both East and West having accepted the principle of negotiation over Berlin, the peoples of the world are demanding that such negotiations begin at once to ease the tension and remove the threat of war inherent in such a dangerous situation.

6. Consequently, as Members of the United Nations, we must take such attitudes and pursue such actions as will pull Eastern and Western statesmen off the limb on which they seem to be frequently finding themselves. For should a conflict of arms occur, no one will succeed in localizing it. We shall all be victims of any folly which, because of national prestige or other factors, may lead to war. It is, therefore, in our best interests to ensure that means, either within or without the United Nations, are available to the principal Powers to foster negotiations on all matters. We would also like to remind the big Powers of their obligations to settle disputes by peaceful means, so that international peace, security and justice are not endangered. Meanwhile, they should refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, no matter how small.

7. We are also faced with the fact that the moratorium on nuclear tests has been lifted and mankind is confronted with the dangers of radio-active fall-out in spite of his fears and contrary to his own best interests.

8. The resumption of nuclear explosions immediately following its announcement, and at a time when the three nuclear Powers were discussing ^{1/} a possible test ban, has seriously raised the question of good faith in negotiations either on the banning of tests or on the question of disarmament. I do not think it is necessary to emphasize the importance of good faith in matters of this kind, for each country seeks to the utmost to protect its security and must, of necessity, depend on the good faith of other parties if disarmament is to be achieved.

9. The de-colonization of dependent territories has continued, and we hope that its pace will be accelerated so that all nations can be free and independent and can co-operate in equality and human dignity. Nevertheless, there are still colonial tentacles widely spread which must be eliminated, and some countries have got to realize that in this mid-twentieth century a new day is dawning and nineteenth century practices of humiliation, oppression, barbarity and even death can no longer be tolerated without foreboding dangers to mankind as a whole.

10. Difficulties have arisen which have brought the United Nations to an important crossroad. The sad death of Dag Hammarskjöld, which we all regret, has created a serious problem in this Organization. There is now no administrative head of the Secretariat, and

^{1/} Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, opened at Geneva on 31 October 1958.

there are many United Nations activities which require proper direction. We therefore urge that prompt attention be given to the solution of this problem.

11. At the last session of the Assembly an attack was made on the office of Secretary-General. The report of the Committee of Experts appointed under General Assembly resolution 1446 (XIV), which reviews the activities and organization of the Secretariat, will be discussed at this session. It is unfortunate that the deterioration in the international atmosphere will make it difficult to discuss these questions objectively without introducing highly controversial political issues.

12. Let me recall that in the course of the general debate at the last session I stated the following on behalf of my delegation:

"The Liberian delegation feels that any revision of the Charter which abolishes the position of Secretary-General in favour of an executive triumvirate operating on the basis of unanimity or predicated on regional alignments or blocs would only contribute to the total and complete destruction of the United Nations and would travesty the principles on which the Organization was founded. Instead of creating new blocs, my delegation feels that we should strive to do away with all blocs and seek to create one brotherhood among men." [878th meeting, para. 273.]

My delegation's position on this question has not changed, but I should like to add a few other points.

13. Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations, whose obligations all Members have agreed to fulfil in good faith—and according to Article 2, paragraph 6 of which the Organization is to ensure that States which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with its principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security—provides that "in the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization". They are to refrain from any action which might reflect on their international status, and all Members have agreed to respect the international character of their responsibilities and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of these responsibilities.

14. There can be no doubt that the administrative and political responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff have increased, and Members of the United Nations have quite reasonably centred their attention on the organization and staffing of the Secretariat in order to determine whether there have been faults in the execution of decisions made by the Security Council and the General Assembly.

15. Quite recently there have been complaints about the manner in which some decisions have been executed. It would have been impossible for this to have been otherwise, because many of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly represent compromises and do not always adequately indicate the original positions of the individual Members. Under no circumstances, then, can the execution of such compromises clearly reflect the intentions of individual Members. Hence, neither the Secretary-General nor his staff is to be blamed for this.

16. Distrust of a particular personality who may occupy the position of Secretary-General or dis-

agreement with the manner in which a Secretary-General may implement a resolution should not constitute a motive to destroy or undermine the office of Secretary-General.

17. Indeed, should this attitude persist, it could conceivably reach a stage of absurdity in which each year, as our national policies change and as we desire to use the instruments of the United Nations to pursue our national objectives, we would find ourselves demanding not merely a change in the person of the Secretary-General but also in the institution. The office of Secretary-General should not be used to further the policy or interest of any particular country.

18. My Government will not support any proposal designed to emasculate the position of the Secretary-General by introducing three persons representing socialist States, neutralist States and Western States, nor any proposal for three deputy Secretaries-General representing such blocs, who are to be concerned with political, diplomatic and ad hoc functions.

19. In the first instance, apart from the fact that there are some Members of the United Nations which will continue to pursue an independent policy without being connected with any one of the three blocs mentioned, we do not and will not approve a permanent division of the Members of the United Nations into blocs, which would have the effect of rigidifying a division not only not contemplated by the Charter but also absolutely contrary to its provisions.

20. Only amendment of the Charter could change the position of the Secretary-General; but such a change is undesirable because it would paralyse the Organization and set up criteria of such a transient and evanescent nature that it would be impossible of exactness, and this would be contrary to the principles and purposes of the Organization.

21. This does not mean, of course, that some reorganization of the Secretariat in the interest of efficiency and economy may not be necessary in the light of its responsibility, or that wider geographical representation on the Secretariat is undesirable. But it is felt that this should be achieved in a reasonable manner and with the clear understanding of the provision, in Article 101 of the Charter, that the staff should be recruited with a view to "securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity".

22. A proposed reorganization on this basis will be supported by the Liberian delegation. I wish to emphasize that the Liberian Government has no intention of weakening the United Nations. It wishes to strengthen it. Most of the big Powers probably are able to take care of themselves so far as power itself is concerned—or so they think—but it must be admitted that the United Nations has been an important bulwark for small countries, and we believe it to be important to all nations. In a speech last May, when referring to the United Nations, the President of Liberia said:

"While we do not underwrite every item of its activities in the fifteen years of its existence, we feel that it is entitled to our support and the affirmation of its fundamental tenets. Everything must be done to ensure its continuity, and nothing must be done by any State or group of States to undermine its great objectives".

23. In spite of our obligations as loyal Members of the Organization, created to maintain international peace

and security—a great and important ideal and objective—we are confronted with situations in which some Members of the United Nations—some of them even permanent members of the Security Council—either deliberately ignore decisions of this Organization themselves or encourage other States to do so.

24. When a matter is decided in the Security Council by a majority vote and a permanent member abstains, it is unfair for such a member to refuse to carry out the decision of the Council, since it had the opportunity both of preventing the decision of the Security Council and of having the matter referred to the General Assembly.

25. If the United Nations is to become an effective Organization, it is the Member States which must make it so; for it is the Member States which constitute the Organization and the acts of the institution are merely reflections of the acts of its individual Members taken in a collective manner. The attitude of States Members of the United Nations is therefore very important.

26. In any municipal situation, where an individual is free to do as he pleases and can flout decisions taken by the majority simply because the decisions are not to his liking, society is in a precarious position, for sooner or later law and order will surely break down. What is good for the goose should be good for the gander. There cannot be a double standard. The yardstick by which the measurement is taken must be the same for all Members of the United Nations.

27. But what has been even more shocking is the apparent desire of some States—some of which again are permanent members of the Security Council—to attempt to wreck the Organization through financial strangulation by refusing to contribute to its peace-keeping activities.

28. Under the Charter, States Members of the United Nations conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and they agreed that in executing such duties the Security Council acts on behalf of all Members of the United Nations. It is quite obvious then, that when decisions are made by the Security Council bearing on the maintenance of peace and security—or if the Security Council is unable to make a decision and the matter is referred to the General Assembly where the decision is made—if any financial involvement of the Organization becomes necessary it is the obligation of each Member of the United Nations to contribute its share, once that has been determined, in meeting the expenses which are to be incurred.

29. It is wrong for any Member of the United Nations to refuse to make its contribution on any ground whatsoever; from when either the Security Council or the General Assembly takes an action it does so on behalf of each Member, and we are all obligated because we have conferred on these institutions the power to take action on our behalf. To put it more pointedly, if I conferred upon my agent the right to carry out an act on my behalf and he acted clearly within the scope of his authority, I am certain that you would tell me I was presenting an absurd argument if I did not recognize, as the principal, that I was bound by the act of my agent.

30. But the problem becomes even worse when one or more permanent members of the Security Council refuse to contribute to the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations, for they demonstrate thereby a shameful disregard of the solemn obligations which

they have undertaken in the discharge of their duties. One wonders whether a country which acts in such a manner is really worthy of permanent membership of the Security Council. It may well be that the whole concept on which the Security Council of the United Nations was created should be re-examined, for we cannot be sure that important duties should be entrusted to such members.

31. My delegation feels that peace-keeping operations of the United Nations are an obligation of Members and, therefore, the expenses thereof should be apportioned by the General Assembly in keeping with Article 17 (2) of the Charter.

32. When the United Nations was established in 1945 there were fifty States Members. Today there are ninety-nine. This has been due mainly to the increase in the number of independent African States.

33. The various councils and other organs of the United Nations have usually been established by elections under some arrangements in which seats were allocated to certain geographical areas. Under the present arrangements, Africa has not generally been included in these geographical allocations. No one needs to be told that it is unfair to constitute these organs in a manner which excludes representation of approximately 25 per cent of the entire membership of the Organization. We have urged repeatedly that these organs should be enlarged to permit the election and participation of African States. Unfortunately, this has not been done because no agreement could be reached. The only legitimate alternative is a re-arrangement of the existing seats so that Africa can be represented in each of these organs. It is fervently hoped, therefore, that other Members of the United Nations will support one or other of these alternatives in order to give greater participation to African States.

34. The General Assembly, under the provisions of the Charter, is obliged to consider principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and it can make recommendations to the Security Council regarding such principles. These provisions are not as forceful as those included in the Covenant of the League of Nations; but, unfortunately, nothing has yet been done to bring about either disarmament or the regulation of armaments. This, of course, has been due to the unhappy international situation which has been termed "the cold war".

35. Further complicating this situation has been the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, as well as missiles, and the possibility that outer space might be used for military purposes. These horrible weapons pose an unusual threat to the very existence of civilization and bear in themselves the dangerous possibility of such massive and enormous destruction as is beyond our present comprehension.

36. Must our failure to seek and to find a solution of this perpetual problem be the cause of such dreadful and frightening possibilities? Are we going to make serious efforts to find a solution before we are overtaken by awesome consequences, or shall we permit our own self-destruction because of our unwillingness to solve what is a difficult question? We cannot continue to postpone these problems while tensions become more acute. It is necessary for us to throw our weight on the side of reason and in favour of negotiations, and to tax our resources to find a solution.

37. But it will take more than disarmament to keep peace. We have to find some answers to the pressing problems that divide us and reduce the fear and suspicion which have beset us and which have become nightmares to the big Powers. War must cease to be a means of pursuing policy. New attitudes must be developed, new means pursued, new criteria formed on the basis of right and justice, and a new atmosphere created wherein the perplexing problems of our times can be solved by peaceful means.

38. We believe that the United Nations—imperfect as it is, for nothing created by human beings will be perfect—still provides the best forum and the most suitable place for this new approach to be made. But, whether this is done through the United Nations or through other media, it is absolutely necessary that some solution be found to these problems. Negotiations are necessary, but the attitudes brought to the conference table must be changed if negotiations are to be successful. We cannot continue to undertake negotiations merely for the sake of negotiation. There must be a clearly determined desire to settle disputes by peaceful means. We therefore appeal to the principal Powers in this matter to remove the ominous threat which hangs over mankind. We appeal to all nations and to all men to turn over a new leaf in international affairs so as to dispel the grim horrors that now hover over us.

39. Less than one-third of the world's population lives in what are termed developed countries, while the remaining slightly more than two-thirds lives in under-developed countries. Yet the under-developed countries have only 10 per cent of the world's wealth and the developed countries have 90 per cent. The gap is becoming even wider. This great gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots" is itself a source of tension and may have frightening consequences if it is not bridged.

40. One of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and I submit that this is both a pressing and an explosive problem. A great co-operative movement or organization must be undertaken to help in developing much needed skills, providing capital and planning a massive assault on poverty, ignorance, hunger and disease. Bilateral and multilateral approaches are necessary because of the magnitude of the task.

41. It is here in the United Nations that the developed countries should increase their contributions to technical assistance, the Special Fund and like bodies to enable them to do more in finding an effective solution to this problem. Economic development is a key to the problem in all its ramifications, and it would be wiser to identify problems and find solutions before they reach such proportions that we are swamped by them. This is not a problem to be postponed. The sooner it is solved the better it will be for all of us.

42. Another situation to which I desire to draw attention is the situation in connexion with the continued existence of foreign domination in some parts of Africa and the world. While it is true that many countries have recently achieved independence there are still some places where the entrenched rulers are trying to put up strong rearguard resistance. We may as well face the facts and be realistic. Continued domination by an alien minority can no longer be tolerated in this age. It is no longer tenable, and the

quicker we bring this obnoxious practice to an end the better off all of us will be. In the light of the resolution [1514 (XV)] passed at the last session we hope that it will be possible for the Assembly to discuss recommendations for the acceleration of de-colonization and thereby remove an important source of friction.

43. I desire not to turn to more specific African problems which have come before the United Nations.

44. During the last session of the Assembly, African and other States criticized the failure of Spain and Portugal to submit data on the development of their colonial territories in keeping with provisions of the Charter. They also urged that an end be brought to colonialism at an early date. Spain agreed to provide the requested information, but Portugal flatly refused.

45. As the political situation in the Portuguese territories worsened and military build-ups began, the Liberian delegation was instructed to bring this serious state of affairs in Angola to the attention of the Security Council.^{2/} Unfortunately the draft resolution^{3/} did not receive the necessary majority. The General Assembly at its resumed fifteenth session passed a resolution [1603 (XV)] setting up a sub-committee to inquire into the situation in Angola, and the African-Asian group subsequently went back to the Security Council,^{4/} which on 9 June 1961 approved a resolution^{5/} calling on Portugal to cease its repressive measures against the Angolan peoples.

46. The Portuguese Government defiantly refused to permit the United Nations Sub-Committee on the Situation in Angola to enter the territory to make the necessary inquiry. Instead that Government launched military operations and employed severe repressive measures, causing untold damage to property and loss of life to the people of Angola, on the ground that Angola is a province of Portugal.

47. I do not think that it is necessary to go into the details of whether the territory is indeed a province of Portugal or not, for the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations have wisely rejected that contention. Until 28 August 1961, in the so-called "province of Angola", with a population of four and a half millions Africans, only about 30,000 had been assimilated, and this after 500 years of Portuguese civilization. But the announcement of 28 August 1961 by the Portuguese Minister of Overseas Provinces that the Angolans were then full citizens of Portugal and "subject to a law which is the same for everyone, with no distinction of race, religion or culture" is, in our opinion, an admission that nothing other than a repressive colonial régime continues to exist in that territory.

48. A dangerous practice seems to be developing on the part of some countries of ignoring decisions taken by this Organization, and we have to be careful not to tolerate it or to permit it to go unchallenged. It is hoped that the Commission will make a full report. It is reported that arms allegedly supplied by NATO to Portugal are being used to carry out these repressive measures. NATO countries contend that arms supplied

^{2/} See Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1961, document S/4738.

^{3/} Ibid., document S/4769.

^{4/} See *ibid.*, Supplement for April, May and June 1961, document S/4816 and Add.1-2.

^{5/} Ibid., document S/4835.

for defence are not provided for such military purposes, but the fact remains that some of those self-same arms are being used to repress the legitimate aspirations of the indigenous people. My delegation will therefore propose at this session that an arms embargo be imposed against Portugal.

49. The unhappy state of war in Algeria has been before the Assembly for several years. It had been hoped that negotiations started between the provisional government of the Algerian Republic and the Government of France would have led to complete self-determination and the cessation of hostilities. This has, unfortunately, not been the case. The situation there could further deteriorate and have an adverse effect on world peace.

50. The principle of self-determination is enshrined in the Charter and we certainly hope that this fact is remembered. My delegation will support any measures undertaken here which will bring the two parties back to the conference table so that the right of self-determination might be applied to Algeria as a whole without any further delay.

51. At the third special session of the Assembly the question of Bizerta was dealt with. The Assembly [resolution 1622 (S-III)] recognized the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for withdrawal of French forces. It also called upon France and Tunisia to enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful measures for the withdrawal of French armed forces.

52. This matter has serious implications for the United Nations, and we wonder whether the attitude of some big Powers in boycotting sessions of the United Nations is the kind of international order that is sought to be introduced.

53. It is indeed a sad commentary on any nation of grandeur and prestige that in this enlightened age such outright advantage should be taken of small Powers in direct contravention of the provisions of the Charter, and that some countries are content merely to wince at such action even though they fully realize that it is wrong. This was the same attitude taken towards the matter of Ethiopia in 1935, and no one needs to be reminded of what eventually happened at that time. My delegation strongly urges that a rapid solution to this problem be found.

54. The problem of the mandated Territory of South West Africa is one which has been before the General Assembly from the very beginning. Even though many resolutions have been passed, it is regrettable that nothing has been achieved in wrenching the mandated territory from the clutches of South Africa. Apart from the fact that the unjust and indecent practice of apartheid has been extended by the Mandatory Power of South West Africa, the mandate itself has been violated in several respects.

55. Worse still, in spite of the previous advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the South African Government has patently defied the authority of the United Nations and refused to permit even the United Nations Committee on South West Africa to enter the territory to make inquiries. The Committee's report will probably reveal the serious inhumane and repressive measures undertaken by the South African Government as well as the terrible conditions under which Africans in the territory are forced to live without much hope.

56. My Government has undertaken in co-operation with the Ethiopian Government to bring a contentious

action against the Union^{6/} in the International Court of Justice,^{7/} but welcomes any further action that the General Assembly may take to accelerate the end of this unsatisfactory and painful situation. Meanwhile we will give appropriate study to the recommendations of the Committee and may make further recommendations during the present session, including the possibility of further economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa.

57. The situation in South Africa itself, where apartheid is being rigidly applied to such an extent that it led to the dreadful Sharpeville shootings in March 1960, has not improved in spite of the General Assembly's resolutions [1568 (XV) and 1596 (XV)]. This problem, which goes to the heart of proper relations among people on the basis of equality and infringes human dignity, perhaps in its most insidious form, continues to threaten international peace. The powder-keg in that area will not remain hidden without an explosion which could have a serious effect in the world.

58. Upon authorization of the Security Council,^{8/} the United Nations intervened in the Congo last year to try and retrieve a very serious and desperate situation. This intervention has been the source of attacks on the Secretary-General, on the Secretariat and on the Organization itself. The Congo crisis has been most difficult and complex, and no one should minimize the magnitude of the task which the United Nations undertook when it intervened. The army had mutinied; law and order had broken down; and a grave economic crisis confronted the Government.

59. To add to these problems the mandate given to the Secretary-General was so vague that it was never very clear, and in many instances he was forced to make an interpretation and then request Security Council approval. Whilst in most instances this was given, individual Members seem to have made interpretations most favourable to their points of view and blamed every apparent wrong on the Secretary-General and his staff.

60. The resolution of 21 February 1961,^{2/} which was implemented, did considerably improve the situation. The recall of Parliament has fortunately led to the formation of a broadly based Government which has Parliament's approval, and there were some hopeful signs that the worst had been passed. But then intransigence in Katanga led to a series of unfortunate incidents. Many resolutions have been passed by the United Nations on the Congo and all States were requested to refrain from any action which might undermine the territorial integrity and the political independence of the Republic of the Congo.

61. Whilst there were undoubtedly some errors and imperfections, no one could have expected that in undertaking such a complex task everything would have been perfect. On balance, however, the United Nations intervention did make a significant and valuable contribution to the solution of the problem in the Congo. It has perhaps prevented a cold war situation from becoming dangerous in that area and we hope it will eventually lead to a peaceful solution.

^{6/} Now the Republic of South Africa.

^{7/} I.C.J., South West Africa Case, Application instituting proceedings, 1960, General List, No. 47.

^{8/} Official Records of the Security Council, Fifteenth Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1960, document S/4387.

^{2/} Ibid., document S/4741.

62. We appreciate the magnitude of the work accomplished by the Secretary-General and his staff under very difficult circumstances. We congratulate them for the success achieved so far. It certainly is a tribute to the United Nations and an indication of what can be done if our approach to such problems is more objective and is based on the fairness and justice of the cause.

63. There are very disturbing reports that mercenaries in Katanga are directing Katangese troops against the United Nations troops. This disregard of resolutions passed by the United Nations cannot be condoned, and the Liberian delegation supports the action taken by the United Nations Command in trying to effectuate the resolutions passed by the Organization. The Secretary-General and some of his associates and many United Nations troops have lost their lives in this cause. It is incumbent upon us to ensure that they have not died in vain.

64. A serious refugee problem is developing in Africa and my delegation hopes that there will be United Nations assistance for these refugees through the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

65. Finally, as we stand on the brink of a precipice in international affairs, we need all caution, patience and reason in our every activity to prevent us from making a plunge, either by design or by miscalculation, which can destroy ourselves in what could be one of the greatest catastrophes of all times.

66. Let us, therefore, exercise virtue and bring to our deliberations on the urgent problems before us at this session, that sense of responsibility, that spirit of fair play, and that quality of justice which the seriousness of the time requires of us. It is our fervent and earnest hope that mankind, in these perilous times, will rise to the occasion imbued with a sense of realism, so that our world may be assured that international peace and security will never more be impaired or destroyed by our rashness. In that hope let us go forth with confidence and determination.

67. Lord HOME (United Kingdom): I should like to say at the outset what a pleasure it is for me and my delegation to sit here under the Presidency of Mr. Mongi Slim. He and his country have supported the United Nations through thick and thin. He, personally, has all the qualities of heart, mind and character to enable him to preside over the proceedings of this Assembly. I am afraid that I cannot say that the omens indicate that he is going to have a very smooth time. Nevertheless, I am quite sure that all the delegations here will help him to support the authority of the Chair, thus enabling him to see our work through in a businesslike and harmonious fashion.

68. Many representatives who have spoken in this hall have reminded us that in 1945 fifty-one Members of the United Nations, sick and disillusioned by the folly and waste of the second world conflict, met together to draw up a Charter, the purpose of which was to save humanity from the scourge of war. Today we in the Assembly are double that number. We are sixteen years older. But would anyone say that we are wiser? The fact is that we have not lifted the scourge of war from humanity. On the contrary, what we have done is to invent weapons incomparably greater in their destructive capacity than anything the world has seen before. And, what is more, wherever one looks in the world today there are quarrels, wars and rumours

of war. There is scarcely a part of the world today that is free from strife. Over the whole hang the hooded clouds of the nuclear bombs which have lately been exploded in Asia and the Arctic.

69. We stand here professing our desire for peace—but in fact we are mocked and disgraced by our own performance.

70. The problem which faces us is exactly the same as the problem which faced the authors of the Charter. It is how to deal with an abuse of power by one country or by a combination of countries. The classic answer for keeping the peace is the balance of power. It is true, I believe, that since the last war it has been the balance of power which has in fact kept the peace. It is true, too, that in a nuclear age it is more important than at any other time that no one side should gain an advantage over the other which would tempt an aggressor to act. But the balance of power is not the complete safeguard of peace for which men have been searching. For rearmament, where one combination of countries feels bound to match the invention of the other, gains a kind of momentum of its own, and history has shown us how fatally easy it is for that to get out of hand. It is well to remind ourselves that the authors of the Charter saw only one answer to this problem and one remedy for it—namely, disarmament, and disarmament accompanied by collective machinery to keep the peace.

71. We are faced today with the stark choice of whether the civilized world is to live or die. I am bound to say that I see no other way in which we can live than to follow the principles and recommendations of the Charter.

72. I have studied the Charter time and time again—as no doubt other representatives in this room have done—to see whether the fault lies in the Charter. But I doubt if the most skilful draftsmen could improve upon the principles of international living which it expounds or upon the machinery which it lays down for putting those principles into practice. The more I look at the Charter, the more I find it a clear and unequivocal guide to sanity, to law and to order. I have no doubt that we should meet together to expand the Security Council and the other Councils of the United Nations in order to reflect the modern composition of the Assembly. Of course we should do that. We all know the reasons why we cannot.

73. But, basically, there are three ways—and only three—in which we can have peaceful coexistence. The first is if we agree to settle all our disputes by negotiation. The second is if there is absolute respect for treaties and agreements, freely signed. The third is if we are willing to set up collective machinery to keep the peace if it is broken by deliberate intent.

74. Those plain statements ought to suffice. But I must take them further. It is necessary to say that negotiations must not be looked upon as a means for one side to gain victory over the other. Treaties must be kept not only in the spirit but in the letter. And when there is an aggression, collective action must be supported by all the rest against the one who breaks the peace. The organization of collective security puts upon each nation an obligation to exercise a high degree of restraint. At the best of times that would not be easy. I am bound to confess that today it is not possible to bring about complete collective security. Why is it impossible for the United Nations to keep the peace today?

75. The reason is that the world is divided by an ideological chasm which is far deeper—though the signs were there—than when the authors met to draw up the Charter. When one side advertizes its intention to destroy the way of life of the other one cannot have true collective security. You may try to establish collective security by majority vote and by action upon it, but immediately one side speaks of such an intention collective action is condemned and frustrated by every trick in the political pack. I shall return to that theme in a moment, but would say at once that the United Nations reflects the political divisions in the world: that it is this, and not the Charter of the United Nations, that needs reform. So long as the world is divided the United Nations can be no more than a shadow of what it ought to be. The Soviet Foreign Minister said that we must face this position—must face what he called "realities"—and therefore be content to coexist. I am not. I regard the doctrine of coexistence as the most sterile and negative conception of international life in the twentieth century. What is needed today is not mere coexistence but work towards positive and constructive action between all nations.

76. I should like, taking one by one the points that the Soviet Foreign Minister made yesterday [1016th meeting], to illustrate the difficulties inherent in the organizing of collective security and, at once, the need to change coexistence into co-operation. My first illustration of the international anarchy that results from ignoring the precepts of the Charter is to be found in the negotiations on disarmament. Galvanized by the threat to humanity created by the exploding of nuclear bombs, and the resultant fall-out in the atmosphere, we at last looked like making a breakthrough in regard to disarmament, which we had been debating off and on for forty years. At last it seemed that we might find it possible to ban nuclear tests. I shall not recall the ingredients of the treaty which so nearly became fruitful in Geneva. Very few points remained unsettled and the British and United States Governments came forward with proposals to meet the Soviet criticisms, to meet what we thought were legitimate Soviet wishes. Those proposals were never discussed. In place of discussion there came a string of sixteen nuclear explosions, with resultant fall-out all over the world. Those explosions took, of course, many months to prepare. In other words, while one side was negotiating in good faith the other was practising deception. How can there be confidence between nations, how can one hope for peaceful coexistence, under such conditions? I say quite straight to the Soviet Union this: that if this way of negotiating is not renounced by public example we are in for a very bad time—for the world simply cannot survive another example of such double dealing.

77. Happily, we have still a chance to do better. The President of the United States gave us, in his address [1013th meeting], a stirring and practical lead in announcing his scheme for general and complete disarmament, the purpose of which was to destroy the means of war. My Government fully supports and agrees with that scheme. We are glad, too, that the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree upon the principles which should govern a disarmament treaty. I have compared those principles with the ones announced following the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth earlier this year and have found no substantial difference. It may be that, at long last, we can take the first halting steps along the road to sanity. But is no use hiding our heads

in the sand: when the ostrich does that he not merely looks foolish but is extremely vulnerable. Over the years the difficulty has always been to translate the principles of disarmament into practice, the greatest problem being that of inspection. Yesterday the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union asked whether we accepted the principle of general and complete disarmament. It is one of the objectives named in the Western plan, but there are of course these difficulties of inspection, which I should like to illustrate in two rather telling ways.

78. First, the Soviet Union says that there must be no inspection until all arms are destroyed; that any inspection meanwhile amounts to espionage. Anyone can see how difficult that makes a programme of staged disarmament, yet what else can there be? Let us suppose that each side puts 500 aeroplanes into a bonfire. One can inspect such a bonfire, but one cannot, as I understand the Soviet position, inspect what is coming off the supply lines in the factory. How is one to know that the very next day another 500, or even 1,000, aeroplanes will not be produced to replace those that have been burnt? That is one of the difficulties that must be resolved, but it cannot be done by a mere statement of principle—much as one welcomes agreement upon these, because any agreement is better than none.

79. We must face the fact that inspection and control are at the crux of the whole matter, not for their own sake but because, when distrust has been so deep between the communist and free worlds as it has in the past, confidence is the essence of the matter. Without confidence there will not be disarmament. Therefore, I hope that the United States plan will be most carefully considered by the Soviet Union: that it will understand that when we talk of inspection no element of espionage is either talked about or threatened. On the contrary, our purpose is to produce confidence so that physical disarmament may proceed.

80. I turn now to my second illustration, the sanctity of treaties and agreements freely signed, and to the pertinent and typical example provided by the new crisis in Berlin. I shall retrace the history of this matter no more than I did that of the nuclear talks. I shall merely remind my colleagues in the Assembly that the Allies of the last war, Russia, France, the United States and the United Kingdom, assumed joint responsibility¹⁰ for the whole of Germany, including the whole city of Berlin, pending the signing of a treaty with a united Germany. That obligation was undertaken solemnly, freely and gladly between Allies.

81. It is certainly arguable that, after sixteen years, there may be a case for change. But when the contract has not run out—and this contract between us has not run out—then the change must be by consent.

82. Britain will spare no effort to find a basis for negotiation—I can pledge my country to that—and I think that, while we are seeking a basis for negotiation, probably the less said the better. But there are two aspects of this matter of Berlin which I think it is timely to bring to the notice of the Assembly.

83. The first involves a principle in which I would have thought that everybody in the Assembly has an

¹⁰/ United States of America, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France: Agreement regarding amendments to the Protocol of 12 September 1944 on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin". Signed at London, on 26 July 1945. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 227 (1956), II, No. 533.

almost personal interest. It is the principle of self-determination for East Germans and West Germans, for East Berliners and West Berliners. I thought that Mr. Gromyko said yesterday—and he will correct me if I am wrong—that the principle of self-determination should not apply in this case, in the case of East Germany. Why not? Is there to be one principle for Asia and Africa and another for Europe, one rule for the British Commonwealth and another for the Russian Empire? I thought that, if a principle was anything, it was universal.

84. And so, while I pledge my country to negotiation, there are two things that we must secure. One is that the people of West Berlin are free to live the life which they have chosen for themselves, and the other is that there are absolute guarantees for that freedom.

85. I must say that the picture painted by my colleague, Mr. Gromyko, of life in West Germany and Berlin was grotesque. Before the crisis was engineered, life was smooth. But look at the dislocation brought about by the division of the city. On each side of the frontier there are people of equal attainments, at equal stages of cultural, economic and industrial development. But there were 60,000 workers in employment, earning good money, who came every day from East Berlin into West Berlin. Twenty-five per cent of the students who wanted to educate themselves came from East Berlin or East Germany into West Berlin or West Germany. Families that are on each side of the frontier are no longer able to meet. Between these people and the life of their choice the last section of the iron curtain has been dropped into place and the key has been turned. The wishes of these people ought to be ascertained by a free vote under international supervision.

86. The most persistent feature of United Nations activities has been the insistence on self-determination, and it is on that principle, in the end of the day, that the problem of Germany and Germany's future will have to be resolved. Meanwhile, there are two and one-half million free people with a passion to remain free. If there is to be negotiation—and I profoundly hope that there is—then uninterrupted access to the city and absolute guarantees for the free life of the people must be part of the settlement.

87. My third illustration of the penalty of departing from the precepts of the Charter brings me closer to the functioning of the United Nations itself and to the organization of collective security and peace-keeping machinery—and let us always remember that the purpose of peace-keeping machinery is to substitute an international machinery so that individual nations do not find it necessary to assert their own rights by their own power. The original conception of the authors of the Charter was that, in the case of a deliberate breach of the peace, the rest would combine against the aggressor. And, unless wars are to continue which will involve many countries, what other solution is there than establishing some peace-keeping machinery which in defined cases would entail the use of force?

88. So far, our experiments have been halting. There is the United Nations police force on the frontier between the United Arab Republic and Israel. I think the majority of the Assembly would feel that that has contributed to the stability of the area and reduced the danger of war. But—and it is a very big "but"—this force is not supported or sustained by the communist countries. I am very glad that my colleague

from Liberia has just mentioned this matter—I think this is the first time it has been done—because the refusal of one or more countries to pay for collective action which has been approved by two-thirds of the Assembly is a serious weakness here. Unless every Member is willing to pay its share, as we shall realize when we come to the budget, we may find it fatal to the existence of the United Nations.

89. The second example of the use of United Nations forces to restrain aggression and interference and to keep law and order is vivid in our minds, and that is the enterprise in the Congo—again, one for which the Communist bloc does not pay and has never paid.

90. I remind the Assembly that the reason for the original intervention of the United Nations in the Congo was to prevent external interference designed to exploit conditions of civil war. At this time last year, the Assembly judged overwhelmingly that such external intervention must be stopped for, if it was not stopped, it would bring the independent life of a united Congo to an end. That was the view of the great majority in face of the most dogged communist opposition. I think the Assembly still feels that the original action was justified, and indeed, through a series of resolutions culminating in the resolution of 21 February 1961,^{11/} it added to the powers of the Secretary-General, because it decided that, in addition to force being used to repel external aggression, in the last resort force might be used in order to prevent those inside the Congo who were attempting to disrupt law and order from doing so. It is these instructions—of the resolution of 21 February, in particular—that Mr. Hammarskjöld was doing his best to interpret and to apply.

91. The United Kingdom, from the very start, has backed the United Nations operation in the Congo to the full. I would invite anybody who doubts it to study the speeches made again and again by our permanent representative to the United Nations. And we have paid out millions of dollars in support of this operation. Our troops were not detailed to take part, but, over and above the contribution which we paid toward the enterprise, we transported the troops that the United Nations wanted in our aircraft—constantly, over the months—which certainly ought not to have escaped the notice of the Foreign Minister of Ghana, because we carried a number of Commonwealth troops into the Congo to support the action of the United Nations.

92. We are strongly against mercenaries in the Congo. What did we do? We announced at once that if there were any British nationals in the Congo who attempted to take part in the fighting on either side, they would lose their British passports. Did any other country do anything comparable to that?

93. Our support of the resolution of 21 February, it is true, was conditional. We made it a condition that force should not be used to impose a particular political pattern upon the Congolese nation. Now what was the reason for that reservation? It was not made because we differed with the Assembly of the United Nations about the objective. Its objective was a united Congo, and so was ours. Any influence that we may have had over the months in the Congo has been used to influence the Government of President Kasa-Vubu and his Prime Ministers and Mr. Tshombé in Elisabethville to come together. Our reservation with respect to

^{11/} Official Records of the Security Council, Sixteenth Year, Supplement for January, February and March, 1961, document S/4741.

the use of force was due to this: we foresaw that if the United Nations was to provide the slightest basis for the charge that it was intervening in the internal politics of a country and backing one side against another, irreparable damage would be done to the United Nations itself and to its ability in the future to keep the peace.

94. I would ask any representative here to think of his own circumstances, and particularly the small countries and also those countries where a lot of provincial autonomy is given and enjoyed. The United Nations cannot incur the charge, and must never incur the charge, of being able to interfere in the internal affairs of a country. The small countries would then come to fear the United Nations rather than to trust it. The situation is bad now, but it would be far worse if it were thought that the United Nations could dictate in matters of internal politics.

95. Certain charges have been made against my country of bad faith toward the United Nations. I reject them absolutely. There is not one shred of evidence on which they can be based or by which they can be sustained.

96. I cannot deny that the United Nations and the Assembly are put in a horrid dilemma. The Nations ought to be able to combine to keep the peace. Why have they failed? There are two answers: because one-third of the world is dedicated to the destruction of the way of life of the other third and because one-third of the world has elevated to the status of dogma the exploitation of civil strife as a means to that end. I did not invent that. It comes straight from the published documents of the eighty-one communist parties to the Moscow declaration¹² of 1960. That is the threat to coexistence—the exploitation of civil strife wherever it is found, which is the advertised purpose of the Communist bloc. I am going to analyse the results upon the United Nations.

97. The Security Council is paralysed by the veto, which the Russians have now operated ninety-five times. The Assembly is therefore compelled to act by majority decision against the wishes of the Communist countries. The Communist countries riposte with new ideas to frustrate the will of the majority which they think is unjust or inimical to their interest, ideas such as the "troika". Therefore I come back to what I said before—where nations should be combining, they are in fact dividing. Action is blocked, tempers rise and the result at the end of the day is frustration in the Assembly, which is little if any less dangerous than the paralysis of the Security Council with which we began. I doubt whether anybody would seriously challenge the truth of this analysis. If ever there was a vicious circle, it is this. And what is the way out?

98. I have thought a great deal about this and whether there can be a compromise, but I come back to one solution and one only. If the Communist countries, and the Soviet Union in particular, would be willing to convince the world of the excellence of their system by example and drop subversion backed by force, drop the exploitation of civil strife which was advertised in the communist doctrine, cease setting man against man, and co-operate with collective action instead of driving the coach and three horses through the whole fabric of co-operative efforts, then and only then would we really be able to fulfil the conditions

and purposes of the Charter. So, as long as this doctrine persists, then even coexistence is made precarious and the United Nations itself is in danger.

99. I agree most profoundly with the President of the United States that the United Nations must be saved: whatever its faults, and heaven knows it has them, it is mankind's best hope of peace. Therefore, as far as my Government is concerned, its authority must be sustained. One thing we can do immediately to sustain it is this: to insist that there should be a chief executive supported by an international civil service, none of whom takes his orders from individual Governments. That is essential and that is what the people of the world want, and that is what we ought to try to give them.

100. There is one other matter in this context of impartiality and justice which I feel I must raise now. The United Nations, and in particular the Assembly, must show itself to be impartial and must be seen to be impartial—I am only going to ask this question, I am not sure of the answer—is there growing up almost imperceptibly a code of behaviour where there is one rule for the Communist countries and another for the democracies, one rule for the bully who deals in fear and another for the democracies because their stock in trade is reason and compromise?

101. I think we want to search our consciences. I wonder, if it had been the United States and the United Kingdom which smothered the world with fall-out, whether the critics would have been so hushed? I think it is very understandable; they have my sympathy. The unaligned nations do not wish to be caught up in rival political ideologies. But if the United Nations is to be the body which we wish to see, which guards the weak and is jealous of the independence of small nations, then they must not yield to the temptation to put public pressures always upon the reasonable nations because they feel that, in the last resort, those nations will be decent and therefore will give way. That would be to deny the justice to others which they themselves wish to enjoy.

102. I trust, therefore, that the result of the sixteenth session Assembly will be that it will use its authority to assert the purposes of the Charter, that it will declare itself in favour of an international civil service, in favour of the sanctity of treaties and in favour of change and progress, but change by consent and true co-operation.

103. What contribution can we make, so that the United Nations may be seen as a body which can keep the peace and so that we may add to its authority?

104. The late Secretary-General posed the problem very simply in the introduction [A/4800/Add.1] to his report, and as my colleague from the Netherlands said yesterday [1016th meeting], this has, by reason of his death, become his political testament. He has asked whether the United Nations is to remain merely a debating society or whether it is going to be given the peace-keeping machinery envisaged by the Charter. With all the risks—and there are many—I would opt for the latter. But if that is the decision, then certain questions have to be answered with precision, and I hope that we shall do so.

105. Is the Assembly prepared to set up and equip an international police force which is more than a scratch collection of national forces? Because that is necessary. An amateur force sent out into the blue these

¹²/ Statement of the meeting of representatives of the communist and workers' parties. The meeting was held in Moscow in November 1960.

days is apt to get into great difficulty. A true international police force is needed.

106. Is each country in the Assembly willing to stand up and say that it will pay its share, and are all nations ready to face the consequences of United Nations intervention in a particular matter on the vote of a majority?

107. Until those questions are answered this Organization, which is young, can only act strictly within its strength and only undertake those police actions strictly within its compass.

108. As I have indicated, there is one matter which must be settled now. No action can be taken in the field of collective peace-making machinery if the Member countries feel that the executive and the administration are taking orders from national Governments. That is really the decisive answer to the "troika" or any variant of the "troika", and we should decide now and show the world that we mean to have in this Organization a truly international civil service.

109. If ever we admit the proposition that no one man can be impartial, then the Members of the United Nations had better pack up their bags and go home, because the world will be morally bankrupt and the forces of reaction will have won the day.

11. The modern tendency is towards interdependence. In the opinion of my Government, an international civil service is a necessary part of progress on that road. And if that is the road which the Assembly chooses, then they will not find that the United Kingdom is lagging behind. On the contrary, we have worked for interdependence within our Commonwealth. We are working for greater interdependence within the Continent of Europe. In this matter we shall be the most ready collaborator.

111. I want to close by carrying a step further something which my Prime Minister said to the Assembly at its fifteenth session [877th meeting] last year on the matter of colonialism and the British Commonwealth. I noticed that the President of the United States in his speech said that the United States had been a colony and the victim of all the exploitation associated with that status. I could not help thinking that America looked pretty well on it. If in the course of time all our colonies are as prosperous and as happy as the United States, then there will be a queue of others lining up to be exploited a little further. And how happy we in the United Kingdom would be.

112. The truth of the matter is this: all but 5 per cent of the 660 million people who live in territories that were British are now living in independent territory. Last year our Prime Minister called the roll. Since he spoke Nigeria and Cyprus have come along. Sierra Leone happily comes to the Assembly this afternoon, and soon it will be the turn of Tanganyika. We have been faithful with the many, and equally we shall keep faith with the few who remain.

113. We have always believed and repeatedly shown that the best way to train people in responsibility is to give it to them. We have established courts of law with independent executive authority, giving impartial judgement and respected for their devotion to equal justice. We have trained career officials in the public services who give their loyalty not to a tribe or to a party but to their country. We have trained police forces who maintain law and order with public consent.

We have established elected parliaments and taught them the principles and practices of free elections. We have raised standards of living, improving agriculture and industry, and extending technical aid. In pursuit of these main purposes of our policy, we have found that this does not delay independence. On the contrary, it hastens it and it makes the transition from dependence to independence faster and more smooth.

114. There are many difficult problems still to solve because in some of our territories we have different races whose interests have to be harmonized together. But so certain am I that this process of creating new nations in the British Commonwealth is right, that my Government is now ready to provide full information to the United Nations on the political and constitutional steps we are taking in the territories which remain under British administration.

115. The Assembly will recognize that this is a decision of the first importance. There is nothing in the Charter which requires us to submit political and constitutional information. Article 73 e puts a specific limit on information which has to be "information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions". But we have recognized the intense interest in these matters of constitutional and political progress everywhere, and particularly in the Assembly, and I am confident that we can enlist the understanding of the Assembly and of the United Nations when they see our policies and the steady way in which we are directing them to bring independence to the nations in our colonial empire. And we take this step confident in our record, that it will be a mark, and a major mark, of co-operation in this matter with the United Nations.

116. We cannot share our responsibility, we cannot shift our responsibility. But as the story is unfolded it will carry conviction and it will be found, I hope, to be in tune with the wishes of the Assembly and certainly in tune with the guiding principles set forth in the Charter.

117. So my purpose this morning has been to analyse the reasons why the United Nations is handicapped in its work for peace and the international aspects of this problem which we have to resolve.

118. There are many frustrations, but through them all the United Nations can count on the support of the United Kingdom to sustain the principles set forth in the Charter. Careful of the Organization and jealous of it because it is young, we want it to give confidence to all nations; prudent in its use of power in the meanwhile, because, until it is equipped with real peace-keeping machinery it would be fatal to exceed its strength; but determined to build steadily toward the day when the principles set forth in the Charter can be accepted and operated by the vast majority of the nations here, and so arrive nearer the time when constructive interdependence between nations will be the order of the day.

119. Mr. BANDARANAIKE (Ceylon): First and foremost, I should like to extend to Mr. Slim the cordial congratulations of the Government and people of Ceylon upon his unanimous election to the office of President of the General Assembly at its sixteenth session.

120. There is no single country in the world today that looks forward to the prospect of war without dismay. A world-wide referendum is not needed to

establish that the millions of people in all countries do not want war.

121. We meet at a time of crisis, when there is a great danger of the whole world being laid waste by the ravages of nuclear war, and the whole future of the United Nations is at stake. The ultimate nature of the weapons available to the great Powers of the world is a compelling reason for the General Assembly at its sixteenth session to find practical ways and means to give effect to the ideals and objectives which prompted the formation of the United Nations at San Francisco. It is imperative to put an end to cold war concepts and to the arms race now in progress if mankind is to survive.

122. Year by year these same questions have arisen before the United Nations General Assembly, but our collective thinking has not resulted in the production of any conclusive answer. From time to time the United Nations has made a useful contribution towards the reduction of tensions and has thereby avoided the danger of an immediate outbreak of hostilities. The stage has been reached, I think, today where we all agree that this is not enough. Countries all over the world are convinced that they cannot live with the cold war any longer. The time has come when it is worth taking a calculated risk to find permanent and general solutions as the only alternative to the appalling risks which are built-in features of the world in which we live.

123. The United Nations was founded with a sense of determination and purpose. The ideals for which the United Nations stand are enshrined in the Charter and must continue to inspire our thinking on all international problems. The spirit of idealism in the Charter has not, however, always found expression in the realities of the current international situation. We must recognize, in particular, that national policies of the great Powers are not controlled and directed by principles of idealism alone. It is in the nature of international politics that national policies must take account of national interests, and sometimes there is a clash of competitive and conflicting interests. It would be unreal for us to believe that such conflicts of interests can be resolved by an appeal to principles alone. It would be equally unreal, I submit, and indeed positively dangerous to permit these conflicts to remain unresolved.

124. We believe that there is a very genuine desire on the part of the peoples of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union to maintain world peace. We are convinced that neither of these great countries wants war, in spite of the number of cold war speeches that we have heard in the Assembly during this session. But that does not mean, of course, that either of the great Powers would contemplate for a moment the possibility of negotiating settlements from a position of weakness or at any price. Of course not.

125. The will for peace, though genuine, would not prevent either of the two great Powers from resorting to the use of force in defence of what they cherish and seek to preserve as vital for the well being of their citizens. In the realities of the situation, the fact remains that the actions of one great Power, even if prompted by motives of defence and self-preservation, are open to interpretation by the other that there is an intention to have an aggression made upon it.

126. Each of the great Powers today follows its own way of life and the political ideology to which it is committed, and with good reason. For the people of the United States of America, a society conditioned by private enterprise has spelt prosperity and progress and a high standard of living. For the people of the Soviet Union, likewise, a society conditioned by the public ownership of productive enterprise has meant a very high rate of growth and industrial expansion. The essential premise on which the cold war has been built is that these two ideologies of the great Powers must seek extra-territorial victories and that each requires an armoury of inter-continental missiles aimed permanently at the other to preserve its own security.

127. As a non-aligned country, we just cannot accept that premise. Both in the United Nations and elsewhere the concept of peaceful coexistence has developed as a means to weaken the logic underlying this assumption and to establish a modus vivendi to keep the peace. In our view, it would be an over-simplification for either of the great Powers to say of the other, "We are standing by the United Nations and the principles of the Charter, while you are not". Recriminations of that sort will not lead to positive results. So long as each of the great Powers regards its way of life as a kind of religion to be propagated or defended outside its territories with zeal and fanaticism, peaceful coexistence becomes reduced to a phrase that lacks meaning.

128. The cold war conflicts of the present day reflect implicitly the tendencies of the great Powers to carry their differences into areas that reject the idea of the cold war in all its forms. Self-determination is one of the governing principles of the United Nations, and if it is to be a reality and not just an ideal, it is essential that the great Powers should refrain from interfering with the processes by which each nation and people choose the kind of Government and the kind of economic arrangements that they like to have.

129. The battle for the minds of the uncommitted world has taken various new forms and has produced curious results. It has sometimes meant intervention—I am sorry to have to say it, but it has—in the internal affairs of those countries. There has been political subversion and attempts to influence forms of government, economic and social systems in one way or another and, in extreme instances, there have been attempts to intervene directly by military action. The examples of the Congo and of Laos reflect the degree of disruption which has been brought into the lives of those nations with further accentuation of world tensions.

130. Most of the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America want to be free from cold war pressures. We would like to be left to work out our own destiny and our own forms of social, economic and political life according to the action and interaction of our own internal domestic forces.

131. The reason for this attitude is not just a wish to be left in splendid isolation or to be removed from current world events. No, we want to be in a position to make a direct contribution to the cause of world peace and to the building up of a world order for international security. We think this can only be ensured if the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America can be insulated from external ideological pressures and cold war tensions. These areas of the world do not want to be the cause of any accentuation

of world conflict nor to become the battleground for it.

132. It seems to me, therefore, that an ideological truce covering Asia, Africa and Latin America is vital. The basic principle in the relations of the great Powers to these countries must be non-intervention and non-interference in internal affairs. For instance, military assistance to countries which need it for their internal security purposes should be given only through the United Nations. The widening ideological conflict makes it all the more imperative to implement the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples [resolution 1514 (XV)] formulated during the last session.

133. When actual arrangements are being made for the transfer of power to dependent countries, it is essential that metropolitan States should be placed under the obligation not to involve colonial territories in cold war arrangements by, for example, the retention of military bases.

134. We do appreciate that the success or failure of one ideology or another is a matter of paramount concern to one or other of the great Powers. But it must be realized, and the great Powers must act in the realization, that the conflict must take peaceful forms. If any country, by virtue of purely indigenous development, were to choose one ideological form of government in preference to another, the choice must rest with that country; and it is a choice which must be respected and with which all nations must learn to live.

135. One thing that has struck me very sharply, as a newcomer to General Assembly sessions, has been the tendency, which very often arises in this chamber, for delegations representing countries already enmeshed in the cold war to express attitudes and to take up positions based on the rather unrealistic line that there is no other possible attitude except their own. We have seen examples of that in the course of some of the speeches which have preceded my assumption of the rostrum.

136. Let us take the case of some of the propositions put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom, the Foreign Secretary, who spoke a moment ago. For instance, he quite rightly pointed out that the resumption of nuclear tests cannot be regarded by anybody—not by the non-aligned nations or by anybody else—as a step forward or as a step in the right direction. It is so obviously not in the right direction that I do not think much purpose is served by hammering home the point. The assumption that the non-aligned nations have, either out of a sense of fear or out of a sense of politeness, or out of a sense of anything else, refrained from making comments, is simply untrue. The non-aligned countries have, each of them, expressed their point of view very clearly and forcibly indeed: and, speaking for the Government of my country, I can only state that I was in Belgrade^{13/} before I came here, with my Prime Minister, and in the course of her statement my Prime Minister did deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, just as we deplore the resumption of nuclear tests by the United States. It is a retrograde step.

137. But consider the reasoning that follows that. It is suggested that, inasmuch as these nuclear tests must have taken many months to prepare, there is an

element of bad faith underlying the resumption of nuclear tests by the Government of the Soviet Union because, while negotiations were going on, the implicit assumption is that preparations must have been made.

138. I do not think that I know sufficient about what it takes to prepare for nuclear tests to express any opinion in regard to that. But supposing it does take many months to prepare for nuclear tests, then does it not follow that when the United States Government resumes nuclear tests in answer to the act of the Soviet Government, it too must have been preparing for many months? Can you have it only one way? In other words, is it fair to take an argument on the basis of bad faith and to present it in that way even though we do deplore the act of both the great countries concerned in the resumption of nuclear tests?

139. Then, again, the Foreign Secretary made the point—which I think is perfectly valid—that it will not do merely to satisfy yourselves by inspection in any scheme of disarmament that—shall we say?—500 aircraft are going to be destroyed in a bonfire when you do not know the production lines and the assembly lines of the great countries that may or may not be preparing for war. There is a great deal of force in that and once can certainly appreciate it; but one must also appreciate, I think, that there is the opposite point of view. And the opposite point of view is that a lot depends upon the number of aircraft that are going to be thrown away and the number of weapons that are going to be placed on this bonfire. What would be the position, for instance, if the number were increased from 500 to—shall we say—10,000? Would it not significantly affect the argument? And supposing one does not even taken figures in a relative sense. Let us carry the case one step further and suppose that there is an outbreak of war: does not the destruction of even those 500 aircraft mark a step forward and a step forward in the right direction? Those are matters that one cannot view in isolation.

140. I do agree that disarmament without controlled stages is a futile concept and a concept which cannot be accepted on mere statements of principle. But there is the point of view that a scheme of controls must not become a system of espionage; and so long as there is force in that argument, it will not do for either of the countries engaged in this conflict to adopt self-righteous tones or self-righteous attitudes and to refuse to face the realities that exist and on which a compromise must be found if the world is to move forward towards peace and prosperity in a real sense.

141. The Foreign Secretary again made the point that the sanctity of treaties must be respected if the United Nations is to mean anything. He is quite right. If treaties are going to be treated as scraps of paper, of course the world can have no security and we are all left in a state—a very parlous state—balanced between peace and war and wondering what the future is going to bring to us all. But, the Foreign Secretary says, our contract in regard to Germany has not run out—a contract made at a time when the victorious Powers, in a spirit of friendliness, sought to do what they thought at that time was the best possible thing to heal the ravages of war. It was not intended that a peace treaty should be signed until a reunified, demilitarized Germany could be established—no doubt with the consent and will of all

^{13/} Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade, 1-6 September 1961.

the victorious Powers who had succeeded in the course of the conflicts of the Second World War.

142. One has to be realistic about these things. Is there any likelihood of the contract running out in the present situation? Is there any immediate prospect of a reunified Germany? Is there any likelihood that one can contemplate a situation in which the great Powers, who fought the Second World War to ultimate victory and the unconditional surrender of Hitlerite Germany, will now agree to the setting up of a united Germany in the existing context? Supposing it never happens, the contract will never run out. And once left with the reality that the existing situation will continue, that contract will have to remain merely because it is a contract.

143. We prefer to look at things not from the point of view of the Soviet Union; no, there are no two codes of behaviour in regard to the arguments which we present. We do not accept the philosophy of communism. We seek to move towards socialism according to our own indigenous form that it has taken in our country. But it would be completely unrealistic to suggest that countries such as ours, which are non-aligned, are either being bullied or are being compelled to take lines which we do not want to take, or are adopting a set of double standards—one set of standards for the countries of the West and a different set of standards for communist countries which are here present in the Assembly.

144. The suggestion was made again by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, that one cannot have double standards with regard to countries, shall we say, of the British Empire and countries of what was described as the Russian Empire. There is implicit in that statement an assumption that existing governments in countries in different parts of the world are not really representative of their peoples. There is the assumption that there is not a communist country in the world which wants communism. There is the assumption that, inasmuch as one-party government does imply a greater degree of government controls, a degree of freedom is lacking.

145. We do not know enough to be able to test the correctness or incorrectness of that assumption. It may be that there are countries of which that can be said, but if we adopt it as a general principle, then we must go on the basis that the Government of the Soviet Union does not represent the will and desire of the peoples of that great country. We would have to build on the assumption that there is in force a régime that does not command the respect and confidence of its people. How realistic is that? Are we really to believe that the peoples of the Soviet Union, from 1917 to 1961, did not want the kind of government that they had established for themselves? Are we to assume that governments cannot command confidence merely because there have been no elections in the immediate past, or merely because a space of time has elapsed?

146. In other words, if we start on that kind of assumption we shall get into extremely deep water. Indeed, the Assembly has already got into very deep water by adopting that kind of argument. Is it not precisely on that assumption that the great People's Republic of China has been excluded from the Assembly? Is it not on that argument that we assume that a country whose form of government has been in existence for the last decade is incapable of determining its own destiny, and that the true peoples of

China still want the restoration of a régime which territorially has been now diminished to Taiwan?

147. In the face of realities one must not make assumptions of entering into debates which presuppose such a premise which none of us, as independent sovereign States, can possibly accept on the floor of the Assembly. If we start making assumptions of that sort and saying that such and such a representative in this chamber does not really represent the people of his country, and that he has no business to be here, then of course we find that underlying that assumption there would be a willingness to accept the fact that the principles of the Charter were going to be undermined by the adoption of that very same argument.

148. There is a matter of great importance which has arisen in the course of the last few days, particularly since the sad and tragic death of the late Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjöld. We in our country have had compelling reason sometimes to disagree with some of the decisions made by the late Secretary-General, particularly with regard to the conduct of the situation in the Congo last year, and, as a member of the Security Council, we have expressed our views fairly and frankly in the only spirit in which one is capable of expressing one's views in an Assembly of this type, where one seeks to influence positively the thinking of nations. But that does not mean that we have no confidence in Mr. Hammarskjöld or in the institution. When the issue was raised of our attitude with regard to the proposal formulated by the Government of the Soviet Union in relation to the creation of a "troika", which would require the amendment of the United Nations Charter, the Government of Ceylon expressed the view categorically—and it sees no reason to change it now—that it does not stand for any principle of a "troika". We see in the principle of a "troika" a grave danger—a danger that the United Nations may lose its capacity for effective executive action, and executive action we must have if the United Nations General Assembly and its other institutions are to become a true vehicle to establish a world order and international peace.

149. With that firm conviction in mind we have expressed our view. By that view we stand to date, and we would earnestly appeal to the Government of the Soviet Union to consider the question, within the realities of such divisions as exist in the world today, of making a choice of a person capable of interpreting correctly the collective views of the Assembly and of giving executive force to the decisions which we make here.

150. The realities are there. There is no doubt that the world is divided. The argument has been presented on the floor of the Assembly that the world is divided into two groups of nations—nations which want to preserve the United Nations and its Charter, and nations which want to destroy the United Nations and its Charter. The analysis does not seem to us to be quite so simple. It is not a question of saying, "We want to establish the Charter, while you do not". Both sides say just that. The truth of the matter is that there are three groups of nations. There is a group of nations that stand by the ideologies of the Western world—the free world, as it is sometimes called; there is a group of nations that stand solidly behind the ideology of communism; but there is a very significant group, a group of persons who constitute—although it is sometimes disregarded—the rest of the

world, and we represent in that sense a small constituent element of that third group, the rest of the world. The rest of the world does not get together and establish itself as a bloc or say to itself, "We have a group of principles which we formulate and which we adopt on every occasion". We do not exist according to a code of rules; we exist merely because there are countries which are not concerned with these great Power conflicts and which wish to be left alone and to stand aside without involvement, and that is where we belong.

151. It is not sufficient for any country to say, "We stand by the United Nations Charter, the other side does not" and, by implication, to suggest, "Here, then, is a group of neutrals who also stand by the United Nations Charter, and therefore we are on their side". It just is not as simple as that. On every particular constructive question that arises for the decision of the Assembly we are compelled to take a position. We cannot stand aside and say that we are going to behave like the ostrich to which the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary referred a moment ago. We are vulnerable, and we know it. But, being vulnerable, we are not afraid to speak our mind, to take our head out of the sand, unlike the proverbial ostrich, and to face the realities.

152. During the last few days there has been a certain amount of discussion in the lobbies of the United Nations General Assembly to which, I must confess, I did not pay any particular attention. I did not pay any particular attention to it because, as the representative of a country which is a member of the Security Council, I found that what was being discussed was a proposition which I did not think would ever see the light of day or emerge in the form of any concrete resolution. I did not intend to refer to it here at all, but in view of something that was said by the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary I think that it is clearly my duty to make a statement with regard to it.

153. Owing to a fear that there will be a deadlock with regard to the finding of an executive arm to carry out the resolutions of this international body, because of the difficulty that the Security Council might become deadlocked over the proposition put forward by the representative of the Soviet Union for a "troika" and the equally firm decision on the part of other countries not to yield to it but to maintain a single person as Secretary-General—a view which I personally accept on behalf of the Government of Ceylon—there is a proposal now being talked about in a rather shadowy form with regard to the presentation of a draft resolution to the General Assembly whereby it would consider the appointment of some distinguished person, I suppose from one of the countries represented in the Assembly, who would function as a temporary Secretary-General, an interim officer, pending the resolution of the permanent dispute, a person who would be determined by the force of a majority vote.

154. I thought the suggestion was so fantastic that I did not even give it any serious consideration earlier. But, with regard to the statement by the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, that where the Security Council is paralysed by the possibility of vetoes, it then becomes necessary for us to consider action by the General Assembly according to the wishes of the majority of the world—I consider that an extremely dangerous statement, though uttered no doubt in perfect good faith and without perhaps a

realization of some of the dangerous consequences it can entail for the whole of the Assembly. We are here, all of us, whether we believe it or not, to carry out the principles of the Charter. Now, the Charter did not provide for decisions by a majority rule. There are some things in regard to which the Assembly, however significant it is as an international body, is incapable of deciding by a majority rule. Visualize to yourselves that if all the representatives assembled here in this conference room were to get together and say, "We will determine the pattern of life for the United States of America and the Soviet Union to follow". Supposing all of us vote on this—barring, of course, the representatives of the Soviet Union and of the United States. Is it suggested that the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States should be bound by that majority decision? If one accepts a principle of that sort, then one has got to go the whole way and accept it as a general principle of subordinating one's own decisions to resolutions determined by majority rule. To start with, there is the weakness that we are not completely represented here. The most significant omission perhaps is still the People's Republic of China. And so long as that stands we cannot set ourselves up in that way. Besides, in the Assembly we all stand as independent countries, whatever our size may be. We have only 10 million people, but we still count for one vote in the Assembly. I would still hesitate to take decisions which could influence the life of the people of the United States of America or of the Soviet Union, based on majorities here.

155. The proof of the matter is this; the Charter contemplated decisions to be taken by the Security Council in a spirit of compromise and co-operation. And that spirit of compromise and co-operation must be established between the United States and the Soviet Union if our decisions are really to mean anything. If we are not going to do that, and if we are going to look at this thing as a deadlock, a situation into which we have been forced where one country or the other is going to say, "We cannot solve the problem in the Security Council, therefore, let us take a decision based on majority votes"—all I can say is, that would be the first step towards the disintegration of the entire Organization and all that it stands for. The country which puts forward a proposal of that kind will be responsible for destroying the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter under cover of seeking to find a practical solution to a very real problem that is there.

156. I do agree that the principle of the "troika" cannot be accepted. There is a very large body of opinion, I believe, represented in this hall which cannot agree with that point of view submitted by the Soviet Union. It certainly does not go to show that the non-aligned nations are adopting two codes of behaviour. But may I say this: the fact that they are opposed to a "troika", the fact that we realize that there is a need for some person to replace the late Mr. Hammarskjöld, that cannot mean that we are going to decide these things on a majority vote, on a railroaded decision taken before the Assembly, mainly because the majority of us are opposed to an idea set up by the Soviet Union.

157. The argument against the point of view I hold seems to be this: the Government of the Soviet Union, by presenting the argument of the "troika" has in effect negated the principles of the Charter by making impossible the election of a single person as Secretary-General. That is the argument. Therefore, if the

Government of the Soviet Union is going against the principles of the Charter, we have to find a solution outside the principles of the Charter. In other words, we are getting back to the age-old argument: at some time somebody else does wrong, let us do wrong too. But I do not agree that the point of view expressed by the Government of the Soviet Union necessarily amounts to a rejection of the principles of the Charter.

158. The Government of the Soviet Union as it sees things within the realities of the existing situation takes the line—I think quite wrongly—that the Charter requires amendments, that the Charter requires change, at any rate in regard to the Constitution of the office of the Secretary-General. Now, they may be right or they may be wrong, but it must surely be open to any one of us in the Assembly to consider ways and means of improving the institutions of the Assembly as we think best. The best we can do is to put forward a proposal. Whether the proposal is going to find acceptance or not is a matter that must be decided by the entire body.

159. At the moment it does not seem to me that the "troika" proposal of the Soviet Union meets with any general acceptance. But here is the point: one cannot regard a suggestion made for amendment, prejudice it and decide that it is a clear attempt to sabotage the Organization itself. If you make that assumption and start with a position that you are going to meet with the veto even before a proposal is submitted, if you start with an assumption that one cannot arrive at a satisfactory settlement among the great Powers, then the United Nations has reached a very sorry stage indeed. In these circumstances I do submit that it would be completely wrong and contrary to the principles of the Charter to take the argument: "The Charter is silent in regard to acting appointments or temporary appointments. Let us create a procedure and let us use the technique of majority decisions before this Assembly to achieve that object." I do submit for the earnest consideration of a number of small countries like my own, the seriousness and the implications that any such proposal will have if it is seriously presented in the Assembly at any time.

160. The late Mr. Hammarskjöld himself expressed a point of view once that the United Nations exists for the protection of the small nations. If the United Nations is to serve a useful purpose within that context and to serve the small countries of this world well, it is surely a matter of great importance that merely because there is a need to find some replacement for the late Mr. Hammarskjöld, we should not allow the sanctity of the institutions established in the Charter, which we respect, to be set aside and brought to nought by the result of hasty thought.

161. The late Mr. Hammarskjöld has now been dead, unfortunately, for some days, and yet we are here—the Assembly is functioning, the work of the United Nations has not been paralysed yet. We are able to carry on, at least during these few days. Does it matter if this question is given a little further carefully considered thought? In other words, should we not endeavour to recall to our mind the lofty principles that inspired the United Nations in its thinking in San Francisco sixteen years ago—the principles of compromise, of trying to find solutions between the great Powers. That surely must be the standard which we must adopt in regard to our thinking.

162. The question of the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) always comes up, I think, in the course of any discussion in regard to the General Assembly and its plenary sessions these days. One cannot avoid it. The situation in the Congo is there and it must be faced. We, in Ceylon, were one of the countries that were responsible for setting up the United Nations Command in the Congo. And having set up that command, we cannot help but feel a sense of disappointment in regard to the subsequent phases of that operation. The United Nations Forces there today have certainly not covered themselves with glory—and it is not their fault.

163. We are not proud that the forces of the United Nations, the forces of independent, neutral countries, which were deliberately sent to the Congo to preserve the objectives of the United Nations, to maintain peace and the territorial integrity of the Congo, have been held up for ransom by a lone jet fighter which, according to all reports, is piloted either by a Belgian pilot of SABENA Airlines or by someone from Northern Rhodesia. We are not proud of that fact. We are not proud of the fact that Mr. Hammarskjöld had to fly at night, when he was seeking to arrive at some settlement in furtherance of the objectives of the United Nations. We are not proud of the fact that Mr. Hammarskjöld had to have a number of airfields alerted because he could not have any definite plans about where he was going to land. These are not matters of which we can be proud.

164. We are glad to see the determination of the great Powers to support the operations of the United Nations. We are indeed glad to hear the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom expressing that view in no uncertain terms. I do not know whether or not it is true, but we did hear some time ago that a little difficulty had arisen in regard to the refuelling and landing rights of an aircraft from Ethiopia—it was, I believe, a fighter aircraft which was on its way to the Congo through Uganda. We are glad that the declaration of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary has reassured us that all co-operation will be given to United Nations soldiers in the Congo in order that they may achieve their objectives and carry out the tasks which have been assigned to them by the United Nations.

165. Many complex problems arise out of cold war tensions. To my mind, the important thing now is to get rid of them. It is most necessary that the great Powers should resolve that they are not going to make this a world forum in which to wage their battles extraterritorially.

166. Cold war tensions are most sharply reflected in the city of Berlin, where the situation has almost reached the breaking point. When one makes an assessment on Berlin, it is not sufficient to think only in terms of legal rights and technicalities arising from agreements concluded among the victorious Powers at the end of the last war. The situation has changed a good deal since then, and existing realities cannot be ignored. One of these realities happens to be the existence of two Germanies today, whether we like it or not. Equally we have to bear in mind that no solution in regard to Berlin can be accepted which does not accord with the wishes of the people of West Berlin to retain their way of life. I agree with the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that it is a most dangerous thing to express any views at all when negotiations are about to start on any subject under the sun. We do not wish to place any obstructions in the

path of negotiations. We welcome the spirit in which the recent negotiations have been viewed by the great Powers. We think that their attitudes have been far more realistic than in the past. I shall therefore refrain from making any further comments on this subject and shall merely express the hope that the negotiations undertaken will meet with success and lead ultimately to an over-all settlement of the problem of Germany.

167. Then, there is the question of disarmament. The hopes which we had that the Ten-Nation Committee would reach some affirmative decisions on disarmament have been disappointed. But it is heartening to feel that the great Powers do realize the need to persevere, for on the success of negotiations on disarmament depend all hopes of world peace. However much we may keep ideological conflicts within bounds and seek to minimize tensions in given areas of the world, world peace will remain insecure as long as the world is possessed of weapons and the armaments race continues.

168. Our consistent view has been that there should be general and complete disarmament, and that the objective of negotiations should be to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament. This is a radical and not a pragmatic or partial concept. The compelling argument for it is not just the negative fear of a future war, with all that it means for mankind, but the positive and affirmative need for a secure world basis for peace for the evolving international community of States. It is no more our purpose, on the old theory of the balance of power, to provide for the security of one group of Powers as against another. What we urgently require is an international order of security for our international community of States, an order which would enable all nations, large or small, to find security and resolve differences by peaceful means.

169. Disarmament is a compelling issue for all of us; it is not the concern of only the great Powers and of militarily significant States. As I have said before, disarmament must proceed side by side and step by step with the construction of a world order which would provide for security in a disarmed world. We, the small nations, have an abiding concern in the construction of this order and want to be associated from the outset with its formulation.

170. We are very happy indeed that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to agree on the general principles which are to form the basis of negotiations on disarmament [see A/4879]. We are particularly happy that the agreement was reached in consonance with the concept of general and complete disarmament, and that in this the great Powers have heeded the General Assembly's resolution [1378 (XIV)] on this subject and the desire of peoples everywhere to be freed forever from the dread prospect of war and conflict.

171. But—and there is a "but"—we feel that these objectives will be realized only if the nations which reached that agreement are firmly and irrevocably committed to giving up cold war thinking. If one embarks on negotiations with the attitude that, if one makes a concession or tries to understand the other side's point of view, one is yielding territory or giving ground, then of course there can be no ultimate solution. If, on the other hand, these countries are prepared for a radical break with the suicidal conceptions of nuclear deterrents, massive retaliation,

limited wars and positions of strength, an agreement on general and complete disarmament should not be an impossible achievement. The question of control should not prove to be an insuperable obstacle either, notwithstanding the undoubted complexity of the numerous problems connected with the setting up of a credible control and supervisory organization; the latter must not be allowed to become a final difficulty.

172. My Government, however, has grave doubts, fears and anxieties. We feel that this mutual adjustment has still not been made, that the cold war is still a lingering presence and that the negotiations which are shortly to begin will be dogged by the recurrent fate of many such negotiations in the past. We have had negotiations before, followed by breakdown and mutual recrimination. This has happened too often. It cannot happen again. We cannot afford to let it happen. We must therefore take precautions to prevent it from happening.

173. My Prime Minister has asked me to suggest to the Assembly that future negotiations between the great Powers should be joined by representatives of non-aligned countries. Non-aligned countries do represent a significant point of view, although perhaps they lack the cohesion of a bloc of countries committed to a particular ideology. Fundamentally what we, the non-aligned countries, have in common is that we are outside the cold war and want to remain outside. The non-aligned countries reject the contradictions and assumptions of the cold war. They are committed by their very policies to an unfettered exercise of judgement on the basic issues which confront the world within the framework of the realities. This should not be unacceptable to either side, since the non-aligned countries are pre-eminently in a position to exercise a salutary influence on the course of negotiations. We should therefore propose that the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament be expanded to include a number of non-aligned States. We do not really think that the enlargement of that Committee should be on a population or geographical basis. The only merit in such a proposal would be the purely formal one of increasing the representation on the Committee. We, the non-aligned nations, want to be able to affect the argument, and this can be done effectively only by associating non-aligned countries with the ten nations.

174. It is our firm conviction that atmospheric and underground nuclear tests should be immediately abandoned. We appreciate the fact that nuclear testing cannot be viewed in isolation from the many inter-related and complicating factors which are causing world tension, but the tests must cease, if only because they cause international tension, prejudice the health of mankind and affect even the kindness of our human environment. Such a situation cannot be allowed to continue, and no cold war argument, however inevitable the situation may appear within the framework of that war, can justify its continuance. We do not think that a treaty on nuclear tests is of immediate importance. For three years man has been able to live free from these menacing blasts on the basis of a voluntary moratorium. Do we really need to wait for a treaty? It may even turn out to be unnecessary if there is agreement on total disarmament; but what we do need meanwhile is a moratorium. This must be immediately restored.

175. Recently we have often heard expressed the theory that colonialism has ceased to be a real problem

as more and more dependent territories have advanced to the stage of independence. We are happy to be reassured by the British Foreign Secretary that the United Kingdom is taking positive steps—steps which we know from our own experience it has always taken where colonial territories have been concerned—to that end: that it is even prepared voluntarily to place before the General Assembly the details of those positive processes.

176. We welcome the fact that Sierra Leone, a former British territory, has risen to its full stature and become a member of the Commonwealth. However, the theory that, because the percentage of people living under colonialism has continued to shrink, colonialism is no longer a real problem, is simply not true. Mr. Hammarskjöld's death, in itself, is proof that colonialism is still not dead. Indeed, it has a knack of taking new shapes and forms in the face of evolving realities. Implementation of the resolution [1514 (XV)] containing the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, which the General Assembly adopted with not a single dissentient vote at its last session, is a matter of urgency. I would invite Members to look at the recent happenings in Angola, the new developments in the Congo, the continuing bloodshed in Algeria and the peculiar problem of South West Africa. To take just one example, Angola: the whole world knows that the metropolitan State is waging a war of extermination, without precedent in recent times, in that country. The resolutions of the United Nations have been treated with contempt. In the face of this intransigence, this cynical and calculated indifference to world opinion, it is in our view a matter directly concerning the Organization that Portugal should not be permitted to continue its wilful policies in Angola with impunity.

177. Other countries have suggested that nations such as South Africa and Portugal, which follow such policies, should be excluded from membership of the Assembly. I cannot accept that view as correct, or regard it as a positive step in the light of present international thinking. We are not here as members of a common club—people with one way of thinking and no other. We are not here to act as a kind of superior body, a holy alliance, an "élite" which alone is capable of enlightened thinking. That is not the position: we do disagree with one another. We do have differences of policy. It is surely no solution to say that because we disapprove radically of a policy followed by a country such as Portugal or South Africa, we should exclude it from membership of this community of nations. What would happen if we carried that argument to its logical conclusion? We might reach a position in which the policies followed by any one of us might not find general acceptance. To take an absurd example, the United States might actually disapprove of the policies followed by the Soviet Union, or vice versa! One would not suggest that those two great countries should leave the Assembly as a result. We are here in a spirit of compromise and understanding. We must seek other means of making world opinion felt by the Governments and peoples of Portugal and South Africa.

178. I have already spoken of the situation in the Congo and should like now to deal briefly with one or two aspects of the position in Katanga. Ceylon was one of the nations which offered support to the Government of Mr. Lumumba. It was also one of the many

nations to ask the United Nations to give effective support to the lawful Prime Minister's desire to restore law and order and maintain the territorial integrity and unity of the Congolese Republic. When the Prime Minister, Mr. Lumumba, died, the people of my country were deeply shocked. We deplored what had happened, and had no difficulty in identifying the forces responsible for the crime. Following Mr. Lumumba's death, our Government took up the position that it could not recognize any other person as Head of the Congolese Government unless the national Parliament, under the "Loi fondamentale", validated such appointment. In our view, the Congo has today a Government with parliamentary backing and we are prepared to give it all possible support in helping it maintain law and order, and the unity and integrity of the Congolese Republic. Its Government has asked for the support of the United Nations in achieving these objectives, and it our task to see that the resolutions of the Security Council are fully implemented.

179. There is strong evidence that insidious forces still remain in Katanga province—forces which would do everything in their power to resist the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. A cease-fire agreement has been concluded, but my Government does not consider it of any significance unless it leads to such implementation. The territorial integrity of the Congo must be maintained. The dissidence in Katanga must be eliminated and the provincial government of Katanga brought within the framework of the Congolese Constitution.

180. I regret that I cannot accept the view propounded by the British Foreign Secretary that the situation is analogous to one of provincial autonomy in which the forces of the United Nations have become an external instrument for interfering in a nation's private affairs. Surely it is much more than that. Surely it must remain much more while foreign elements within Katanga province, receiving assistance from neighbouring territories, wage war—let us call a spade a spade—against the forces of the United Nations with, it seems, some degree of success. This is the country that we were told had only eleven or so university graduates when it assumed its independence. Are we to believe seriously that Katanga province is defying the authority of the Congolese Government unaided? Could it, standing alone, withstand with considerable effect the armies of the United Nations? The Government of Ceylon refuses to take up an attitude so naïve as that.

181. I have already referred to the principles embodied in the "troika" and shall say nothing more concerning them. However, it is fitting that I should here express the grief of Ceylon at the death of the Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld. We have, on occasion, had compelling reason to disagree with him, but we have never doubted his integrity or his single-minded dedication to the cause of world peace and the United Nations. He was particularly conscious that the Organization existed for the protection of small nations. Whatever mistakes he may have made, we feel that people of his calibre, acting with such dedication in the cause of international peace, are very hard to replace. To find another person with the qualities of Mr. Hammarskjöld will be difficult, and we should not confuse our attitude to that question with our attitude to the separate one of whether we should retain one single individual as Secretary-General or amend the Charter to establish "troikas".

182. Many of these ideological problems and questions of amendment would cease to exist if we could agree upon a person in whom all the countries of this world could have confidence, and I am certain that I am not being unrealistic when I express the hope, on behalf of the Government and people of Ceylon, that there are still such people left in the world.

183. The structure of the United Nations, apart from the specific question of the Secretary-General, is a matter of increasing importance to the Organization. The membership of the United Nations today is almost double what it was at its inception. The change has not been merely a numerical change, for the addition of countries from Asia and Africa has no doubt had its very strong impact upon the character of the Organization. The time has therefore come to move the structure of the Organization itself into line with these changes, so that the Organization may become a body representative of the significant changes in world opinion brought about by the accession of Asian and African countries to the United Nations. I think it is a matter of general agreement that the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, as they are constituted today, are under-representative. The important thing, however, is not the mere under-representation, but the fact that, as a result of it, the capacity of these Councils to play their full role as organs of the United Nations has been drastically limited. It is in the interests of the United Nations that these bodies should be expanded to express within themselves at any time the broad spectrum of world opinion.

184. In the case of the Secretariat there has been continuing agitation, particularly on the part of African-Asian countries, that it should reflect in their due proportion the increased membership of Asian and African countries. We fully appreciate that this is a matter solely within the discretion of whoever becomes the Secretary-General and that it can be only one of many considerations to be borne in mind in the selection of personnel for the Secretariat. We would, however, commend to the consideration of whoever is chosen, without in any way prejudicing the independent character of the Secretariat itself, the suggestion that every endeavour be made to give the Secretariat a more balanced representation of Member countries in the United Nations.

185. No address by a representative of an economically developing country is ever complete without some reference, I think, to the needs for economic assistance and technical co-operation. Being the Finance Minister of my country, in addition to the other functions I perform in foreign affairs, I think my address would not be complete, at least for home consumption, if I did not refer to it.

186. There is the emphatic and urgent need to realize that under-developed countries must have an accelerated rate of growth to keep pace with growing populations and their growing demands, and for this purpose massive foreign aid is essential. It is necessary also to realize that the problems of sufficient aid will be with us until self-sustained growth is realized, and, while that day is near for some countries, it is very far away indeed for others. We belong to the latter group.

187. Development programmes must not therefore be retarded by shortages of external finance. It is clear that in future years, with the growing development plans of all newly developed countries, the

shortage of external finance will assume an increasingly greater significance in the world payments picture. Even a minimum rate of economic growth may be jeopardized by the inadequacy of external finance.

188. In the last decade, the terms of trade of primary producing countries vis-à-vis industrial countries have deteriorated almost continuously. And, what is more, there is a growing awareness on the part of these under-developed countries that the losses we sustain in the falling prices, the change of the terms of trade, are in excess of the benefits which we have received from foreign aid.

189. There is therefore an urgent need for United Nations financial agencies, either existing or proposed, to find a process to help offset the unavoidable balance of payment crises of the under-developed countries in so far as they stem from development programmes, commodity price fluctuations and short-term capital outflows. There is a very grave need for urgent consideration by the Assembly of some form of automatic access to reserves and some form of insurance against commodity price fluctuations.

190. Before I conclude, I should like once again to appeal to the rest of the world, if not to the great Powers: let us not try to enter into recriminations and into argument. Let us avoid making the mistake of analysing the arguments, or trying to say who is right and who is wrong. Let us not try to enter into arguments on this question.

191. For example, we heard a few moments ago from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom that, as things appear to his Government, there is an overt declaration on the part of communist countries that they mean to subvert Governments from outside and that they mean to go on with that process in furtherance of their ideology. But we must also be realistic and look at the other side of the picture if we are going to enter into that kind of argument. We like to imagine, for example, that there is no crusade against communism. But the facts of history are there. One cannot expect the Russians to forget, for instance, that in 1917 their country was actually invaded, that battles were fought on their territory against communism, that they have been hemmed in from time to time, that attempts have been made to contain their own particular ideology, so that they might themselves perhaps have a very real feeling of fear that they are going to be the victims of aggression. We sincerely hope that that is not going to happen, and we sincerely hope that they are not going to subvert any other countries which do not want to be subverted. The argument goes both ways.

192. We do not want to enter into this pattern of argument. We do not wish to divide ourselves into groups trying to find alignments. We stand with the rest of the world and we think it is a complete mistake to try to enter into arguments for or against, to try to arrive at solutions in that way. That is not the answer. Recriminations will get us nowhere. It is no good trying to pretend that the fault is entirely on the other side, that one particular country has distinguished itself by its clean record in foreign affairs. We in the non-aligned nations, certainly we in Ceylon, do not propose to enter into that argument, and we shall maintain our independence and strive for what we believe to be the true principles set forth in the Charter. We are not going to enter into

arguments as to who is the best defender of the Charter, whether it is the countries of the Western world or of the communist world. We want the Charter to exist and we want both those great groups of countries to stay clear of our affairs and of the affairs of the rest of the world. They should let the rest of the world develop in peace towards the form of government, the forms of social and economic development, that our countries require.

193. I find that it is ten minutes to two, and I must thank all my colleagues who have had the patience to forgo some part of their luncheon interval to give thought to some of the considerations that the Government of Ceylon would like to present for careful consideration in this forthcoming session. We urge all Governments to act with a realization that whatever decisions the Assembly makes now are probably going to affect the future course of world events to such an extent that we must take the right decisions

here and now. There is no postponing the issue. There is no question of avoiding an issue. It has to be faced, and it has to be faced correctly.

194. In conclusion, may I appeal once again to the great Powers of the world, and particularly the United States of America and the Soviet Union: do not forget the principles that inspired you in San Francisco, when you were concerned with arriving at compromise solutions and co-operating with one another for the peace of the world. We need that co-operation now. The real challenge is not so much a challenge to countries like ours, which cannot affect events, which are merely the victims of events. The challenge faces you, and we, the rest of the world, look up to you and look forward to constructive and positive action on the part of the two Governments.

The meeting rose at 1.50 p.m.