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Chairman: Mr. Victor A. BELAUNDE (Peru).

AGENDA ITEM 55

Question of Cyprus (A/3120 and Add.1, A/3204 and Add.1, A/C.1/788, A/C.1/789, A/C.1/L. 168 to A/C.1/L.172) (*continued*):

- (a) **Application, under the auspices of the United Nations, of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in the case of the population of the Island of Cyprus;**
- (b) **Complaint by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus**

1. Mr. SARPER (Turkey), exercising the right of reply, made reference to the statement of the representative of Greece at the 854th meeting. He questioned the method of calculation employed by that representative in arriving at statistics concerning the Turkish Cypriots. He also doubted whether the attempt of the representative of Greece to refute the evidence of the geographical proximity of Cyprus to the Turkish mainland by measuring the distances between the island and the capitals of Greece and Turkey would serve any practical purpose.

2. He reiterated that article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne¹ explicitly distinguished territories whose future was "being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned" and was not concerned with the status of Cyprus, which had been settled by article 20 of the Treaty. As for the part of article 16 that concerned the territories whose status remained to be settled in the sense of the Treaty, such settlements concerned only the cases the final solution of which was explicitly envisaged in the Treaty itself. The Greek claim was not included among those prescriptions, and therefore could never be interpreted as falling within the jurisdiction of that article. That interpretation of the article had been confirmed by a ruling of the Permanent Court of International Justice with regard to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Treaty,² and was contained in the official records of the Court.

¹ Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, and Turkey, signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XXVIII, 1924, pp. 11 ff.

² See *Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Collection of Advisory Opinions, Series B, No. 12* (Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff's Publishing Company, 1925).

3. With regard to the Greek representative's statement, that, although Cyprus had been placed under British sovereignty by the Treaty of Lausanne, that could not mean that Cyprus should remain forever a colony, Mr. Sarper wished to note that neither he himself nor any other speaker had implied that Cyprus should continue under its present constitutional régime. On the contrary, progress in the constitutional development of Cyprus had been obstructed by the partisans of the annexation of the island to Greece. The fact that Cyprus was at present a Crown Colony of one country did not make it automatically a candidate for annexation by another.

4. He wondered whether the suggestion of the Greek representative that treaties could be revised implied that the General Assembly could be seized of one single article from the Treaty of Lausanne and could proceed to its modification through a resolution. That not only raised important questions of competence, but also was contrary to equity and justice, as well as to the established practice of international law. In that connexion, he recalled that the Treaty of Lausanne had established the basis of an important equilibrium in the area, and that Turkey had made great sacrifices to that end, as for example its cession to Greece of Western Thrace, which had had a predominantly Turkish population and to which the application of the principle of self-determination had been denied by Greece.

5. The position of Turkey on the question of Cyprus was far from being a negative one, as had been claimed by the representative of Greece. The Government of Turkey had accepted the latest proposals of the United Kingdom Government as a basis for discussion. Those proposals had been summarily rejected by the Greek Government, as it always rejected any proposal which did not lead eventually to the annexation of Cyprus to Greece. That situation clearly showed which side had taken a negative attitude.

6. With regard to the Greek press campaign against Turkey, he noted that Greek officials, Cabinet Ministers, the Government radio stations and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies had also been involved in the campaign which had started well before the incidents of 6 September 1955, to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, had referred.

7. He reiterated the desire of his Government to maintain and further strengthen friendly relations with Greece, which had been inaugurated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleutherios Venizelos. He believed that in the present world situation it was of particular importance for both countries to continue on the path traced by those two great statesmen. He pointed out, however, that, in view of the reasons set forth in his main statement (848th meeting), Turkey could not on any account be asked to make such sacrifices as would endanger its security and the well-being of its people in a question in which the interests of Turkey, from various aspects, were undeniable.

8. The CHAIRMAN stated that, before proceeding to the discussion of the draft resolutions, he would permit the representative of Greece a further exercise of the right of reply.
9. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) remarked that, in his comments on the figures relating to the population of Cyprus, the representative of Turkey had advanced no statistics. He recalled that he had suggested (848th meeting) that the question could be studied more thoroughly by neutral persons.
10. As to the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne in relation to the status of Cyprus, he emphasized that there was no doubt, from the text of the relevant articles and the statement by Ismet Pasha on 31 January 1923 included in the records of the Lausanne Conference,³ that all territories without exception which had remained outside the frontiers of Turkey, hence also Cyprus, had the right to choose the administration which they preferred. If that had not been the case, exceptions would have been made, but there had been no exceptions.
11. Referring to the concessions which, according to the representative of Turkey, had been made by the Government of Turkey in the hope of establishing the basis of an important equilibrium in the area, notably the cession of Western Thrace with its Turkish majority, Mr. Averoff-Tossizza declared that his Government, faithful to the principle of self-determination, would be prepared to accept a plebiscite in Western Thrace. He was sure that a plebiscite would demonstrate an overwhelming Greek majority in Western Thrace and a Turkish minority, who lived under conditions of brotherhood.
12. Turning to the Turkish contention that Greece was aiming only at the annexation of Cyprus, he reiterated his previous statements to the effect that Greece did not seek the annexation of Cyprus and noted that he had asked the representative of Turkey whether he would be prepared to sign an agreement on a solution of the question of Cyprus which would rule out annexation, but had received no reply.
13. The CHAIRMAN, in granting a further right of reply to the representative of Turkey, announced that that would conclude the replies in the present debate.
14. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) remarked that the census which had been taken on the island of Cyprus could not be considered fully accurate since, in some villages, the figures of the population and property had been obtained through the village *mukhtars*, who at the time had been Greeks. He once again wished to emphasize that the records of the Lausanne Conference and the text of the Treaty of Lausanne made it perfectly clear that the status of Cyprus was not covered by article 16 and the statement of the Chairman of the Turkish delegation to that Conference referred to other territories.
15. Referring to the offer of the Greek representative to accept a plebiscite in Western Thrace, Mr. Sarper noted that that offer had come after thirty years of Greek occupation of Western Thrace. In the course of that period, the composition of the population in the area had changed both as a result of the settlement, in violation of treaty obligations, of those Greeks who had left Asia Minor following the Treaty of Lausanne, and as a result of the emigration of many Turkish inhabitants of Western Thrace. When Western Thrace had been ceded to Greece, the Turkish population had outnumbered the Greek population four to one. At that time, there had been 129,120 Turks, and 33,910 Greeks, while 84 per cent of the arable land had been owned by Turks, and 5 per cent by Greeks. It was then, in 1923, that Greece had refused to accept a plebiscite and to give the right of self-determination to the Turks of Western Thrace.
16. The CHAIRMAN announced, in reply to a request by the representative of Greece, that he would allow him to speak for an additional two minutes, after which he would give two minutes more also to the representative of Turkey.
17. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) commented further on the accuracy of the figures he had furnished and on the interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne in regard to Cyprus. If Cyprus should be taken as an exception, then it should have been mentioned in a specific article.
18. Mr. SARPÉR (Turkey) thanked the Chairman for the permission he had given him for a further reply and stated that he preferred not to continue the duet.
19. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) stated that he had refrained from taking part in the general debate on the question of Cyprus, because he had wished to hear first from the parties directly concerned before he took a stand on the question.
20. With regard to the United Kingdom complaint of support from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus (A/3204 and Add.1), he believed that establishment of a fact-finding committee "to investigate through direct observation", as provided in the draft resolution submitted by the delegation of Greece (A/C.1/L.170), would facilitate a solution of the problem. He wished to pay tribute to the delegation of Greece for the initiative it had shown in submitting that draft, because such a serious accusation as that levelled by the United Kingdom against Greece could not be overlooked or passed over in silence. It was his feeling that the First Committee could not decide upon the complaint until it had proof that there was a relationship between the acts of violence and of terrorism in Cyprus, and the material and effective support allegedly given by Greece. Since Greece itself had asked for an investigation, it was only fair to support such a proposal in order to establish the truth. In the light of a report from the proposed fact-finding committee, it should be possible to decide the question at the twelfth session of the General Assembly.
21. On the basis of the information at present available, his delegation could not vote in favour of any formula which would imply condemnation of Greece, even under the guise of an invitation to Greece to take measures to avoid further help being given to the terrorists in Cyprus.
22. Turning to the other aspect of the question of Cyprus, the claim for the application of the principle of equal rights and self-determination, Mr. Slim observed that, for approximately two years, the people of Cyprus had been fighting for the right to decide its own fate. Like the Hungarians and the Algerians, the people of Cyprus were trying to show the world that they were not satisfied with the situation under which they were living and that they aspired to recover their rights to a dignified and free life.
23. He wished to pay tribute to the delegation of the United Kingdom for having reaffirmed (847th meeting) that it was not averse to recognizing the right of Cyprus to self-determination. He was happy to pay the same tribute to the delegation of Turkey, which had

³ See *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923, Cmd. 1814).

not opposed, in principle, the right of self-determination being exercised in Cyprus. He noted, however, that both delegations at present opposed the recognition of that right by the United Nations.

24. He begged to differ with the representative of the United Kingdom, who feared the right of self-determination, once recognized and exercised, might lead to a fusion between Cyprus and Greece. There must be one of two things: either one admitted that the people of Cyprus should be allowed to exercise their right of self-determination, or else one recognized only a directed freedom to use that right, which was then no longer the true exercise of the right of self-determination.

25. The delegation of Tunisia supported the principle of self-determination in respect of Cyprus and believed that Cyprus should have the right to decide on its own fate. The Turkish minority in Cyprus had a right to live on the island in dignity, in respect and with full exercise of all rights that society and the Charter itself granted all human beings. That minority could either consider itself a Cypriot minority and could then claim equality of rights and duties under the constitution of the country, or it must consider itself alien, in which case it could seek constitutional guarantees in accordance with the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

26. The delegation of Tunisia would accordingly vote in favour of any draft resolution that would affirm those principles and that would lead to the peaceful solution of the question of Cyprus.

27. In conclusion, he wished to appeal to the parties concerned to act in such a way as to favour a return to peace and tranquillity, and to grant the people of Cyprus the right to self-determination, to be achieved through free and direct negotiations between the people of Cyprus and the Government of the United Kingdom.

28. Mr. Krishna MENON (India) reiterated the position stated by his Government in the past, namely that the problem was largely one of Cypriot nationality, and that India was concerned with the independence of Cyprus in conditions maintaining the national, territorial integrity of that country and enabling it to co-operate freely with its present rulers if it so desired. The Government of India understood that to be the general basis of British policy. As had been the case in the past, of course, the element of time played a very important part. Quoting from the statement he had made at the ninth session of the General Assembly (477th plenary meeting), he declared that India regarded Cyprus as the homeland of its peoples, entitled to nationhood and independence. That opinion appeared to have made great progress both in the United Kingdom and in Greece since the question had first come to the General Assembly.

29. There were at least two Member States with populations smaller than that of Cyprus, and there were nearly eight with a population of just over 1 million. Consequently there was no reason at all why Cyprus, with its own traditions and speaking its own language, could not be independent. To argue such a question on the basis of history, although history had its value, was scarcely a profitable approach, since to do so would open similar considerations in the case of other ex-colonial countries. At one time or another the great majority of Member States had been occupied by some other State. India yielded to no one in its respect for freedom. But the land of Cyprus, with its people, traditions, economic life, and with the kind of feeling

that had developed, could not be disregarded on the basis of the fact that an occupation or an accession had been recognized by one State or another.

30. Turning to the question of competence, Mr. Menon observed that the matter could not be regarded as purely a domestic question since the United Kingdom Government itself had engaged in discussions on Cyprus with Greece and Turkey. However, it was indeed a domestic question in the sense that any practical conferment of independence and self-government on the people of Cyprus depended, in present constitutional circumstances, upon the sovereign will of the United Kingdom Parliament. It was fortunate that the United Kingdom Government, and even more the overwhelming majority of the people of the United Kingdom, favoured freedom for the Cypriots.

31. India did not favour—and consequently in previous years had not supported the inclusion of the item in the agenda—self-determination if that were taken to mean the loss of the personality and the territorial integrity of Cyprus by inclusion in another land. He hoped he was right in saying that things had advanced and that the position at present was not one involving the annexation of Cyprus to one territory or another. When the time came, it would be necessary, and to the advantage of the parties concerned, that there should be assurances by the parties regarding that territorial integrity. It would be a great pity if, as a result of the controversy, the newer fashion were followed and, instead of territories being divided and ruled, they were divided and left. Such a fate would be most unfortunate for Cyprus, with its diverse population not only of Greeks and Turks, but also of Armenians and Arabs.

32. Recent history did not support the Turkish representative's claim that Cyprus was part of the mainland of Turkey. Distance was scarcely the only criterion, and in any case Cyprus was closer to Syria.

33. There had been recriminations about violence on the one hand and incitement to violence on the other. There had been a great deal of that sort of trouble in the world, for example in Malaya for the past ten or fifteen years, where the use of force had not been able to settle the problem of the desire of the inhabitants for independence. The use of force had not succeeded either in parts of Asia or of Europe, and it was not likely to succeed anywhere else.

34. His Government had no sympathy whatsoever with the intrusion of religion into political agitation. National independence and the affiliation of countries one to another should not be based merely upon kinship of religion or race, although that might be one factor.

35. India understood the interest of Greece in the problem of Cyprus, since that interest corresponded to the Indian one in the question of the people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. He believed that the only way for minorities and majorities in a territory to enjoy self-government was to be able to live together, and he did not think that the representative of Turkey had said anything which denied that conception.

36. His delegation would not like to see a settlement which did not take into account all the relevant interests. Indeed, any such "settlement" would not really be a settlement. He therefore submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.172), which was based on the premise that the Committee was in no position to decide on a settlement, although it could deal with general

political principles and could, on the basis of the Charter, try to harmonize conflicting interests.

37. In connexion with that draft resolution, he observed that it was not possible to continue negotiations anywhere in the context of a campaign of hatred. An atmosphere of peace was required and would be forthcoming if negotiations were resumed by all parties concerned. Freedom of expression was also necessary, for without it there could be no negotiations.

38. Referring to the issue of competence, he said that there were degrees of competence. The matter was being discussed by the First Committee, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, by joining in the discussion, had established the Committee's competence to discuss it. It was unnecessary to go into the question whether Article 2, paragraph 7 applied. But the General Assembly was always competent to express its earnest desire, and that was what his delegation's draft resolution would have it do. That draft referred to a peaceful, democratic and just solution, which meant that minorities, human rights, freedom of expression and the other principles of the Charter could not be ignored. What the Assembly had to do was to encourage, and to give an impetus to, the whole process of negotiations. So far as India was aware, the United Kingdom had never been unwilling to resume negotiations, nor had the other parties which were involved in one way or another. Although the Cypriot people and nation were not present at the Committee, he believed that it should be possible to find a solution whereby self-government and independence would enable the establishment of friendly relations with all the countries concerned.

39. The Indian delegation could not concede that the reforms proposed by the United Kingdom amounted to self-government. It did not believe that there could be self-government when internal order was somebody else's business. It could never concede that the homeland of a people was a strategic point for somebody else. It was doubtful whether the strategic considerations that had applied in previous times were still appropriate.

40. The Indian draft resolution did not urge or call upon anyone to do anything because there was no desire to infringe in any way on susceptibilities. The great value of the United Nations was often conditioned by the use of its functions in the context that obtained.

41. Turning to the other draft resolutions before the Committee, he stated that although each contained good elements, each by itself was unlikely to meet the conflicting desires and views, and did not fit in with the whole context of the United Nations. Thus, he could not agree more with the principle in the preamble of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169) that States should live together as good neighbours and refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of other States. Likewise, as the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168) stated, there must be an equitable solution. However, the idea of self-determination could not be separated from the assurance of territorial integrity in conditions where a people could live as a free and independent nation. India regretted that it was unable to subscribe to the draft resolution submitted by Panama (A/C.1/L.171) or to the other Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.170) because the question was not one of finding facts. Fact-finding was unlikely to bring about reconciliation in a situation involving the rights of a people to nationhood. The same applied to a committee

of good offices. Had there been an opportunity in that direction, his delegation would have supported it. But apart from the question of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom got along very well together and in fact were allies.

42. India consequently would not be able to support any of the draft resolutions. The Indian draft resolution did not run counter to any of the positions taken by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, and he hoped that the delegations of those countries would be able at least not to oppose it. The purposes of the Charter, and of the parties in bringing the item before the General Assembly, would be served by the adoption of the Indian draft resolution, and he appealed for unanimous support of it.

43. Mr. ARENALES CATALAN (Guatemala) reserved his delegation's right to deal with the question of Cyprus in detail at the next opportunity. For the present, he would refer only to the various draft resolutions before the Committee.

44. Under the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169), the General Assembly would call upon the Government of Greece to take effective measures to prevent support or encouragement from Greece for terrorism in Cyprus; the draft involved recognition of the existence of terrorism and implicit condemnation of Greece on the basis of a denunciation or accusation. In that connexion, he stressed that the difference between guerrilla warfare and terrorism in the dictionary did not coincide with the terms applied to such activities in the past. Equally respectable sources affirmed that, when a struggle for independence took place, excesses could be committed which naturally invited excesses in retaliation.

45. An accusation had been levelled against Greece regarding broadcasts by Radio Athens; if the accuser were to be believed, there was no reason why the accused should not also be believed. However, on the question of material assistance, Greece had entered an explicit denial. Since the accused must be presumed innocent until he was proved the contrary, the General Assembly could not adopt a resolution that involved an implicit condemnation. His delegation was satisfied with the solemn and official word of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece and would therefore vote against the United Kingdom draft resolution. In view of the gravity of the accusation, which implied a violation of the Charter, his delegation could not deny Greece the right to have an investigation of the matter and could not vote against the relevant Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.170).

46. The problem of Cyprus had two aspects to be taken into account in considering the draft resolutions on sub-item (a): There was the internal aspect, in which the main party concerned was the people of Cyprus, and the external aspect, in which the main parties concerned were Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, and in which the parties indirectly interested were those linked to those countries in a number of economic or military alliances.

47. Since the United Kingdom did not state that Cyprus was an integral part of its metropolitan territory, but merely proclaimed its sovereignty over Cyprus, the matter was considerably simplified. His delegation, like many others, had always denied that an administering Power had sovereignty over the administered. However, the United Kingdom itself had admitted the applicability of self-determination in Cyprus. Since the United Kingdom in his opinion did not have

sovereignty over Cyprus, since Greece had declared that it did not want that sovereignty, and since Turkey had stated that it had ceded sovereignty, the General Assembly was faced with a typical case of the application of the principle of self-determination. Accordingly, his delegation could not help but consider favourably the relevant Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168). That draft, however, said nothing about the obvious difficulties regarding how and where the right to self-determination was to be exercised. His delegation was quite ready to consider draft resolutions such as that proposed by Panama (A/C.1/L.171) seeking action that might be constructive along those lines.

48. As for the external aspects of the problem, it was obviously to the interests of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey, as well as of all countries of the world that relations between them be not undermined by the problem of Cyprus. Allies of those countries had thus stressed the necessity of a solution of the problem. In the interests of the world's strategic situation, a solution not only should not be postponed, but should be reached as soon as possible. The situation in Cyprus was extremely delicate and made it very difficult to determine how the principle of self-determination was to be applied. There the concept of negotiations was relevant.

49. In that connexion, he observed that the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.172) appeared to be a compromise solution which did not give up any principles. It had the further advantage that, in the existing parliamentary situation, common ground must be found. He therefore requested that the Indian draft resolution be given priority in the vote.

50. Mr. PERERA (Ceylon) believed that the draft resolutions before the Committee were all motivated by the idea of ending the conflict now raging in Cyprus. It could not be forgotten that that conflict had led to bloodshed and that it was continuing. In such a situation all must exercise self-restraint. There could be no return, as had been implicitly suggested by the representative of Turkey, to the rule of congresses such as those of Vienna and Berlin. A solution must be worked out within the framework of the Charter. The matter was essentially one between the United Kingdom and the Cypriots, and the basis of the solution must surely lie in the terms of General Assembly resolution 637 A (VII), which he quoted, and which he was sure the representative of India had had in mind in submitting the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.172). Accusations and counteraccusations were hardly relevant. Issues revived from the past were also inappropriate. It might be contended that the Cypriots could not wait, but he would submit that policy evolved and that the door was open to negotiation. He trusted that negotiations would be continued between the Cypriots and the United Kingdom in the spirit expressed in the Indian draft resolution. His country, no doubt like other Members of the Organization, hoped that a solution would be worked out on the basis of freedom of expression and in an atmosphere of peace.

51. Mr. ENTEZAM (Iran) said that his delegation had not participated in the general debate in order to retain its freedom of action in the search for a compromise solution. Unfortunately, the efforts it had undertaken together with other delegations had failed.

52. The value always placed by his delegation on the right of people to self-determination and its attempts to have that right respected were well known. In the present case, however, it would be a misinterpretation

of that right and a betrayal of the cause of the people of Cyprus to hasten things by adopting an innocent draft resolution before the necessary safeguards had been granted to the various communities making up the population of Cyprus and before a practical plan had been worked out by appropriate negotiations among the parties concerned. Without denying the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, therefore, his delegation was not in a position to support the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168).

53. As for the draft resolutions dealing with the United Kingdom's complaint, his delegation had never agreed to express condemnation without having convincing proof and documentation. Thus it could not vote for the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169). That attitude applied to the draft resolution submitted by the Greek delegation, which proposed the establishment of a committee (A/C.1/L.170). If the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.172), which was based on what his delegation had suggested to the various parties, could obtain the agreement of the latter, he would be happy to support it.

54. Mr. TRUJILLO (Ecuador) said that the general debate had underlined the great importance of the question of Cyprus. The analysis of history had demonstrated the significance of the human element rooted in a land. It was only on the basis of that element that the future political status of a country could be decided upon. The Hellenic element that had characterized Cyprus from its appearance in the history of civilization had remained through the ages and must be a fundamental element in the solution of a problem of such magnitude. The demographic aspect of the question also proved conclusively that Cyprus was basically Hellenic. As for the juridical aspect, the discussion must lead an impartial observer to the conclusion that the only valid treaty now applicable to the island of Cyprus and to its population was the multilateral treaty that was the United Nations Charter, which, superseding and being greater than the Treaty of Lausanne, must provide the key for the solution of the problem. By the Treaty of Lausanne, Cyprus had become a British possession. But by signing the Charter, the United Kingdom had placed its colonies, including Cyprus, under the system set up by the Charter for Non-Self-Governing Territories and their populations. Thus one could not speak of United Kingdom sovereignty over Cyprus, because such sovereignty had ended in 1945, when the United Kingdom had undertaken the sacred trust to lead the people of Cyprus to self-government and independence. The United Nations consequently had complete competence to decide on the future status of Cyprus and of its inhabitants. The colonial system must be relegated to museums as obsolete. If traces of it remained, that was because of the political aspects of certain parts of the world and because of the political situation obtaining in the world. International peace and security would be much better safeguarded if Cyprus were free instead of being under subjection, with the attendant hatred for the dominator growing every day. That hatred might ultimately endanger the very existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Cyprus free or Cyprus united with its mother country, Greece, would be much more important in the defense of the democratic system of life all wished to see maintained.

55. The union of Cyprus with Greece was a legal process which had been accepted by the United Nations in one of its previous resolutions. There were two ways of exercising self-determination: one was absolute inde-

pendence, and the other was union with another people or group of people.

56. The second paragraph of the preamble to the Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.168), referring to the right of the people of Cyprus to self-determination, was unassailable and indeed the United Kingdom representative had recognized that right (847th meeting). Likewise, the United Kingdom admitted the gravity of the situation in Cyprus—to which the third paragraph of the preamble of the draft referred—by submitting a draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169) containing accusations against the Greek Government. The fourth paragraph of the preamble of the Greek draft was equally well founded, for no one could deny that a breach of the peace in Cyprus endangered not only the eastern Mediterranean, but the entire world.

57. Negotiations must be continued or some way of establishing peace in the area must be sought. That did not mean asking those who were labeled “terrorists” to abandon their emancipatory movement, but asking the responsible officials in the United Kingdom Government to restore freedom to the spiritual and political chief of the people, Archbishop Makarios, return him to his high position and continue with the negotiations broken off by his sudden deportation and exile. Reinstatement of the Archbishop, which had been supported by important sectors of British opinion, would be a fundamental step toward a solution. The so-called terrorism was really the anguished and desperate expression of the views of a people with no other alternative against the British juggernaut. It represented the only way in which the Cypriots had been able to express their desire to live in independence and freedom. His delegation had never accepted or supported terrorism on the part of anyone. If the Cypriots were to be accused of being terrorists, they, in turn, could accuse others of having more terroristically violated the

sacred principles of diplomacy by imprisoning a negotiator. Both sides had committed great errors which would grow if the problem was not satisfactorily solved and returned to the high level of study and negotiations. That was precisely what the United Nations had to do. The operative paragraph of the Greek draft resolution consequently also seemed acceptable and adequate.

58. He requested that the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.169) be voted upon in parts. The first paragraph of the preamble, containing references to the principles of good neighbourliness and of non-intervention in the affairs of other States, must be supported by all Latin Americans. However, the other paragraphs were unacceptable to his delegation because it had not been sufficiently proved that Greece had supported the so-called terrorist campaign; it had also not been proved whether Athens Radio had regularly broadcast special programmes to Cyprus on the orders of the Greek Government or had simply made use of the right of freedom of information as the British Broadcasting Corporation and other radio stations did. The United Nations must establish facts before it could take such charges as proved. He would therefore be unable to vote for the draft resolution as a whole.

59. The second Greek draft resolution (A/C.1/L.170) was in accordance with the title of sub-item (b). If the United Kingdom maintained such accusations, obviously some kind of procedure should be found so that the United Nations might have all the facts before making its final judgment. His delegation, while appreciating the motives which had led to the draft resolution of Panama (A/C.1/L.171), felt that the problem of Cyprus had been sufficiently studied and would be unable to support that draft. Finally, his delegation would support the compromise draft resolution submitted by India (A/C.1/L.172), as well as the proposal that it be given priority.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p. m.