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Chairman: Mr. Roberto URDANETA ARBELÁEZ (Colombia).

**Declaration on the removal of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace and security among the nations (*continued*)**

[Item 69]\*

GENERAL DISCUSSION (*continued*)

1. Mr. CASSIMATIS (Greece) recalled that it was not the first time that a USSR proposal aimed at removing the threat of a new war had been submitted to the General Assembly. Each year similar proposals were rejected and replaced by others, which put the responsibility where it really lay and declared that the USSR and its satellites—which had no desire to consolidate peace and co-operate sincerely with peaceful nations—were at the source of the danger of war.

2. In the circumstances, the fact that the USSR returned time and again to the charge showed its complete lack of understanding of the evolution of opinion. The peoples had understood; they now knew that the USSR's statements did not really reflect its aims. The explanation of the persistency of the delegation of the USSR must be looked for in so-called Marxist dialectics although they had in fact been elaborated well after the death of Marx in order to justify the contradictory character of USSR policy. Those dialectics were first a reaction from the USSR's feeling of isolation and the universal mistrust its leaders had evoked. Secondly, they were a means of maintaining, for internal uses, the conviction that the capitalist Powers were imperilling the USSR and that, if war came, it would be of an entirely defensive character for the USSR. Thirdly, it was necessary to convince some Member States of the United Nations, which had not seen communism at work, of the good faith of the USSR, in the hope of lessening its isolation and the mistrust surrounding it. Lastly, if that purpose were attained, the USSR could continue to nibble at free nations through civil war, thus enlarging the protective girdle of "people's republics" separating Russian territory from the free world.

Such a method seemed best to the USSR because its interest lay, it seemed, not in war as such, but in the spoils.

3. The Greeks opposed the dialectics of Plato, based on reason and the ideal of freedom, to that of Marx. Greece had seen communism at work. From the time of the Nazi occupation, when they had fought against two empires and resisted without fear of concentration camps, the people of Greece had certainly hoped that the ideal of liberty proclaimed first by the great American Revolution, and then by the French revolution, would become reconciled with the social justice of which the October Revolution claimed to have the monopoly. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union had shown that it had no intention of abandoning national traditions of imperialism in favour of the creed of social justice. Although every religion required sacrifices from its disciples—and communist dogma had been raised to the level of a religion—the only sacrifices the USSR allowed were those of its neighbours.

4. In contrast with what had taken place in the USSR, the true democracies, such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom, had made progress in social reforms without sacrificing their freedom. That at any rate was how the Greek people had understood it. The Greek nation, having seen criminal communism at work during the attempted uprising of December 1944 and the rebellion stirred up and directed from abroad in 1947-1949, knew how to avoid the influence of the religion of USSR imperialism, while at the same time recognizing the need for a substantial improvement of its lot.

5. While their internal evolution was operating to bring the Soviet and democratic groups of countries into opposition, the great Powers, victorious in the war, had not managed to agree upon the organization of peace. That was why it must unfortunately be recognized that, at the present time, a threat to peace existed. The USSR was mainly responsible for that situation because, while professing the highest ideological

\* Indicates the item number on the General Assembly agenda.

mission, the USSR had betrayed that cause, thus itself proving how deceptive was the faith it had preached. The truth was that propaganda could not indefinitely replace faith.

6. The conduct of the Soviet Union was in complete contrast to its declarations, but the language of facts was more eloquent than any speech. The USSR was clamouring in vain for the prohibition of atomic weapons. It could not be taken seriously when it did not accept the effective control proposed by the other nations in, for example, the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch plan. In the circumstances, the so-called Stockholm Appeal served no other purpose than to recruit within peaceful nations a fifth column completely devoted to the USSR, which did not yet have enough atomic bombs and feared those who had more.

7. It was true that Mr. Vyshinsky had said (372nd meeting) that there was no fifth column in his country; what could be more natural? Fifth columns could only exist under free régimes, not in Russia, land of monster trials and mass purges.

8. Moreover, if the atomic bomb was a scourge, aggressive war was an even more fearful scourge, to be done away with at all costs, even the cost of using the atomic bomb. Why should that weapon be forbidden if guerrillas were to be allowed to sow mines along the roads of Greece and kill innocent farmers? The losses thus caused were not less grave because they affected the small countries like Greece and not the oil wells of Baku or the factories of the Urals.

9. Abuse of the veto must be added to the number of misdeeds which prevented the free peoples from believing in the good will of the USSR. If the USSR wished to give proof of a co-operative spirit, why did it not propose that the Charter should be amended in accordance with Article 109, paragraph 2, and that the right of veto should be restricted? At the present time, such an initiative would have to come from the USSR; although the Charter provided for revision in 1955, the convening of a General Assembly for the purpose of revision was meanwhile subject to the veto.

10. The small countries accepted the primacy of the great Powers. But why that constant desire to make them say that they expected everything from the great Powers?

11. Certainly, the great Powers should reach an agreement, but that agreement should not be a compromise; compromises were usually made at the expense of the absent or the weak. A genuine agreement, which alone could lead to a lasting understanding among the great Powers, must be based on three principles. The first was the constitutional principle of representative democracy, whether parliamentary democracy, as in Europe, or a presidential system, as in the United States. There could be no certain peace where the people did not by law have the last word. For totalitarian systems preached mysticism and the sacrifice of the present in the interests of a distant future, whereas present and future had equal value for the representative democracies. The second principle was that of social justice, hand in hand with individual liberty and economic progress. The need of the poor and under-developed countries for aid, which one great nation had come to under-

stand, must exclude any thought of propaganda or profit. Lastly, it was necessary to proclaim the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, regardless of the national interests of great empires. Foreign domination, whether by enemies or friends, was always an evil.

12. The free peoples believed that the USSR could help to consolidate peace and secure universal progress; but what was needed for that was not propagandist declarations, but positive acts. If it was found that the great Powers could not come to an understanding among themselves, that would mean, to borrow a phrase, that there was something rotten in the State of Denmark. Nevertheless, it would be better for the United Nations not to be given the role of Hamlet.

13. Mr. SPENDER (Australia) said that some of the ideas set forth in the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) were unexceptionable; its avowed or pretended aims were common to all members of the Committee, or rather to the great majority. In the case of the USSR, however, although members would be happy if that country acknowledged its errors and turned from the paths of aggression and imperialistic expansion to co-operate with all nations, large and small, it must be judged by its past acts, which cast grave suspicion on its present proposal. For what had been the history of similar resolutions introduced by the USSR in relation to the actual policy pursued by it during the same period?

14. In 1946, a Soviet resolution<sup>1</sup> alleging similar purposes had already spoken of the necessity for a general reduction of armaments and had sought a prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes. The Security Council, which had been reduced to impotence unless it carried out the will of the USSR, had been asked to implement those proposals. What had become of them? After the passage of four years, during which the USSR's own actions had brought the world to the brink of the abyss, and in the light of the facts, the proposals were seen to be a cruel mockery, indeed a complete fraud.

15. The facts went back as far as the signing of the Charter (26 June 1945), or indeed further. Who, indeed, had frustrated the efforts of the United Nations to control the devastating weapon of atomic energy? Who was responsible for the accumulation of armaments? Unfortunately, the finger of history pointed to the Soviet Union.

16. If the free nations had been compelled to build up their armed strength, that was because of the threat of the mammoth armed force of the USSR and of Soviet policy. Since 1946 the Soviet budget had included figures which, despite the mystery in which the Soviets enveloped such matters, were known to be enormous, and to be intended for armaments.

17. Of course, Mr. Vyshinsky, who accused certain other countries of warmongering, had claimed that the proportion of expenditure on armaments in the Soviet budget was smaller than in that of the United States of America. But Mr. Vyshinsky was aware that under a

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, First Session, Part II, Plenary Meetings*, 42nd meeting.

political system such as that of the United States, the budget covered only government expenditure, whereas in the USSR it represented a much higher percentage of the national income. At the very moment when the USSR was submitting its 1946 draft resolution, therefore, Soviet armaments had been steadily accumulating and the Soviet air force was being built up to be the greatest in the world.

18. In the following year, the delegation of the USSR called for the prohibition of war propaganda in any form and for the implementation of the 1946 decisions on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.<sup>2</sup> Yet it was precisely at that time that a campaign of hatred against the Western governments was being carried on within the USSR. In view of such virulent attacks, which had been steadily intensified since, and which most people would not describe as exactly peaceful, the lies and distortions poured out by the Soviet Press and war propaganda organs might be called "warmongering in reverse". The chief aim of Soviet authorities was to vilify others under the pretext that other governments wished to attack the USSR. This could only give rise to fears that they were accusing others of what they themselves intended to do. Naturally, the frequent repetition of accusations of such violence and falsity could only arouse grave fears in other countries.

19. In October 1947, the Cominform was created—or reborn—and hastened to publish a declaration violently attacking leaders of Western governments and their parties. But the accusations of imperialism and plans for world domination, in fact, concealed an offensive of the communist parties under Soviet leadership, and in reality was merely intended to justify that offensive. At the same time the doctrine of two camps was expounded and developed in speeches by Soviet leaders. According to that theory, irreconcilable hostility existed between the USSR and the Western camp; to the latter were attributed the worst of motives and plans, against which people everywhere were called upon to unite. Was that a doctrine of peace, or of conflict and hostility? Yet it was proclaimed only a month or so before the USSR draft resolution on warmongering was introduced in 1947.

20. The policy of the USSR in the past had consistently incited nation against nation, class against class, in order to exploit conflict, and had never regarded compromise as anything more than a temporary expedient. Soviet propaganda since 1947 had shown no sign whatever of a true desire to reach agreement with other countries and to solve outstanding difficulties. Thus, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, the USSR had shown that it was determined to avoid agreement.

21. That same year, the break between the USSR and Yugoslavia had occurred. The Soviet reaction had been marked by attempts at intimidation, by means of threats and abuse hardly consistent with a policy of peace. A similar policy had been pursued with regard to Iran. And in 1947, too, the USSR had stultified all attempts to unify Korea.

22. In 1948,<sup>3</sup> the annual resolution presented by the USSR called for the reduction by one-third of all armed forces, for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the establishment of international control in those two fields. During the year which had followed, however, the USSR had not given the slightest evidence of readiness to reach agreement on those points. Vigilance and preparedness were conspicuous themes in the internal propaganda of the USSR.

23. At the same time, rearmament and the building up of so-called police forces had been in progress in Eastern Germany, while the USSR had objected to any agreement on a treaty of peace with Austria, in order to keep its troops there. Finally, 1948 had also been the year of the Berlin blockade, which was a resort to force for political ends and an attempt to coerce the Western Powers and the city by means of the terrible weapon of starvation.

24. In 1949 again, the USSR had called in a draft resolution<sup>4</sup> for the condemnation of war propaganda, of the armaments race, the establishment of new military bases and of aggressive blocs which, allegedly, threatened the democratic countries. That same draft resolution had also called for the prohibition of atomic weapons and for the conclusion of a five-Power pact.

25. Preparations for war, however, had nowhere been more evident than in the USSR. While the official propaganda had been stressing the possibility of a new conflict, the campaign against the Western democracies had been increasing in intensity, and expenditure on armaments had reached a level which would have been inconceivable in a democratic country.

26. The fact that the democracies had been ill prepared to meet aggression even from North Korea showed how false was the propaganda which had accused them of warmongering. If, on the other hand, the USSR desired peace, what was the meaning of its 150 divisions, while the armed forces of the West were so small?

27. During those four years, USSR intransigence had been made apparent with regard to the German, Japanese and Austrian questions. The so-called police forces of Eastern Germany had been increased and Yugoslavia openly threatened, while the USSR had refused to take any conciliatory measures and continued its propaganda campaign against the Western Powers. In that context, it had been learned that the USSR possessed the atomic bomb.

28. Thus, every year, the USSR had proposed measures which flagrantly contradicted its own policy. Of course, if the USSR were to change its attitude, peace would be assured. But it was not possible to be optimistic against the record of the past.

29. The only new aspect of USSR propaganda in the draft resolution (A/C.1/595) was the emphasis, in the preamble, on the Stockholm Appeal. The so-called Stockholm resolutions, however, like the USSR peace offensive of 1949, were merely a trick to obtain signatures which were to be used ultimately for specific

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Second Session, Plenary Meetings, Vol. 1, 84th Meeting.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, 143rd meeting.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Fourth Session, Plenary Meetings, 261st meeting.

national purposes. That was an attempt to play upon the desires of all peoples, including the Russian people, for peace, and to lead them to support the Soviet solution to the problem of atomic energy, which was as impracticable as it was misunderstood by the public at large. It was also an attempt to hamper the defensive efforts of democratic countries threatened by the might of the USSR.

30. In view of the peace declarations and peace offensives of the USSR, and of the signatures that had been obtained, it was essential to ask what constructive action to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and to check aggression could be ascribed to the Soviet Union. In reality, that country had abused its privileges and had continually obstructed and thus paralysed the United Nations. The world had lived under the threat of war and could not now be content with the USSR's purely oral assurances of its peaceful intentions.

31. The Australian delegation would therefore consider the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) in greater detail and would point out why it objected to certain provisions. The delegation reserved the right to submit certain constructive suggestions later, either to be incorporated in an amended USSR text, or to constitute the text of another draft resolution.

32. The Stockholm resolutions, which constituted an international fraud, combined some perfectly acceptable statements with the Soviet formula for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and destruction of all stocks of bombs before any mention was made of control. That was indeed a case of putting the cart before the horse, since control was a prerequisite for destruction of the bombs. Moreover, the USSR's attitude towards inquiry about what was going on within its frontiers was well known.

33. The Stockholm Appeal played on the desire of people for peace in order to request them to appoint representatives to congresses reflecting the international policy of the Communist Party, a policy which was opportunistic and dishonest and had been roundly rejected by the majority of the members of the First Committee. The preamble to the USSR proposal also stated that the use of the atomic weapon constituted a most heinous international crime against humanity. But the most heinous crime was aggression, in comparison with which the use of the atomic weapon was not a crime. It was desirable for an aggressor to be faced with difficulties and, if the Charter was violated, why should the atom bomb not be used in defence?

34. The operative part of the USSR draft contained a proposal that the General Assembly should condemn the propaganda in favour of a new war which was being conducted in a number of countries. That was a vague statement, since the countries which first sprang to mind were certainly not those to which the USSR referred. Those countries should be specified. In his statement on 23 October (372nd meeting) Mr. Vyshinsky had referred primarily to the people of the United States, a country which had no aggressive aims. The fact was that in the United States, as in Australia, people were free to say what they wished, and sometimes said silly things. Even if such a thing could happen in the USSR, no one would ever hear about it.

35. How did the USSR—whose radio and newspapers, together with the communist newspapers throughout the world, disseminated the most lying propaganda against peaceful countries which, for their part, had waited until now before they took effective measures—how did the USSR draft dare to refer to “propaganda in favour of a new war”? That immediately called to mind the disharmony and hatred that had been sown by the USSR since 1946.

36. The USSR draft went on to deal with the problem of atomic energy, which had been on the agenda of the Organization since its establishment. The time had come for constructive effort in that field; that was understood by everyone who had heard the speech of President Truman (295th plenary meeting), with which the Australian delegation was in full agreement.

37. The main value of the atomic bomb lay in its power as a deterrent; the results of its actual use would be appalling. An agreement on the control of its use for military purposes was therefore an essential objective, second only in importance to the elimination of war itself. The conclusion of such an agreement would be a tremendous step in the right direction. But the great Powers would first have to compose their differences, and the atmosphere of confidence necessary for that did not as yet exist.

38. The deadlock reached on the subject of atomic energy was due to the insistence of the USSR that all stocks of the bomb should be destroyed and its use prohibited before a system of control were set up. As matters stood, that appeared to be unacceptable. A first step, however, towards the control of atomic energy and, indeed, the control of all weapons might perhaps be made in order to avoid a real outbreak of hostilities. Questions of detail as to inspection were not at that stage of fundamental importance; they merely reflected a lack of trust in the intentions of the Soviet Union. Such trust might be restored *pari passu* with the achievement of equality of strength. In any case, whatever methods of inspection were used, it would be impossible to detect clandestine activities if the will to make war were there. Moreover, the assembling of the bomb was not a serious problem to anyone having at his disposal the necessary materials, which were the same both for the atomic bomb and for the peaceful utilization of atomic energy. In the present state of affairs, therefore, no form of control would guarantee peace; but that did not mean that efforts in that direction might not prove to be the first step out of the deadlock.

39. President Truman had, very much to his credit, opened up new possibilities by suggesting that the two commissions dealing with armaments might be merged into one and that the question should be attacked on the basis of the following three principles: any plan should cover all types of weapons; it should be based on unanimous agreement; and it should be foolproof and should provide for a free exchange of information among nations.

40. Therein lay a long-term objective, which, however was one worthy of every effort on the part of those who wished to avoid war; for the development of the military forces of the peace-loving Powers, though necessary, involved certain dangers in the long run. While

seeking to increase security, which was merely the negative aspect of the problem, it was therefore necessary to strive to reach agreement through the restoration of international confidence.

41. However, despite all the efforts to be made through a new disarmament commission with extended powers, it must be remembered that President Truman had closed that section of his address by rightly emphasizing the need for the peace-loving nations to arm against aggression, a need which would continue until an effective system of disarmament had been established.

42. Sub-paragraph (a) of the third part of the USSR draft resolution provided for combined efforts by the great Powers and for the conclusion of a pact. The Australian delegation, for its part, had voted for a draft resolution already approved by the First Committee which called upon the five great Powers to take steps to such an end. It was for that very reason that sub-paragraph (a) was superfluous as regards "efforts for peace" and dangerous as far as the conclusion of a pact was concerned. That provision would in fact put a propaganda weapon into the hands of any great Power which first obstructed the conclusion of such a pact and then endeavoured to place blame for the failure on the majority. Experience showed that that was what generally happened. Besides, such a pact already existed in the form of the Charter.

43. The main objection was, however, to sub-paragraph (b). The proposed reduction of armed forces by one-third would have deplorable results. The Western Powers had disarmed almost completely at the end of the war in the false hope that the world had entered an era of peace. Those peace-loving Powers had realized by now that they must rearm and that nothing whatever could be done to reduce their armaments. It was because those Powers desired peace that they could not now disarm. The peace-loving nations were only now recovering the confidence necessary for negotiations with those they had come to suspect so deeply, and it was hardly the right time, therefore, to undertake something that would hamper the establishment of a peace that would be something other than a communist "peace". If it could later be proved that the USSR had no aggressive intentions, Australia would be the first to welcome the opportunity to use its resources for other purposes; but in the light of the experience of recent years, a disarmament proposal was a pure mockery for the time being.

44. If further evidence of the aggressive designs of the USSR was desired, an example was provided by Austria, from which country the USSR would not withdraw its troops until Austria had become a satellite. For that reason and because it did not wish to withdraw its troops from territories serving as lines of communication, the USSR refused to conclude a peace treaty with Austria. Still further evidence of such designs were provided by the Berlin blockade and the aggressive manoeuvres that accompanied it, the aggression in Korea, which the USSR could have prevented or halted, the threats against Yugoslavia, or by—another form of aggression—the fomenting of sedition and disloyalty against the governments of Member States.

45. What was involved was not, therefore, the adoption of a text accusing peace-loving nations of carrying on war propaganda, of being imperialists and aggressors. If it was deemed necessary to have a declaration for peace in addition to the United Nations Charter, the proposal of the USSR should be amended to meet the needs of the peoples of the world who really desired peace, who were, in fact, for the first time "combining their efforts". What was specifically lacking in the Charter was protection against the threat of internal subversion and aggression.

46. To sum up, the delegation of Australia stated:

(a) That it could not approve the Soviet Union declaration as presently worded since it contained much that was unacceptable and, judging from recent events, much that was insincere;

(b) That the declaration would have to be amended or completely altered to bring it into line with the desires of the vast majority of delegations;

(c) That nothing could divert the peace-loving nations from their efforts to ensure peace through their own strength;

(d) That, as President Truman had indicated, every endeavour should be made to reopen the question of control, in order to avoid the risk of war caused by unwarranted distrust while the peace-loving nations were building up their strength;

(e) That the Australian delegation would contribute towards making that declaration, or a substitute declaration, a positive document of hope for mankind;

(f) That the Australian delegation recognized the need for the control of atomic energy and the prohibition of its use except as a defence against aggression, along the lines indicated by the President of the United States, and the delegation hoped to participate in the drafting of a formula which would test the sincerity of the proposal of the USSR.

47. Australia believed passionately in peace and would fight for it if need be. It was prepared to make every contribution it could toward the restoration of confidence among nations, without which any schemes for the control of armaments would remain worthless paper. The enemy was war and aggression. If war could be eliminated, the battle for peace would be won.

48. Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) drew the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/595) was practically identical with previous proposals which the delegation of the USSR had made on the same subject, and which had been rejected in 1948 and 1949 by an overwhelming majority.

49. During the discussions which had taken place in 1948 and 1949 on the USSR proposals, a basic contradiction had been apparent between the peaceful professions of faith made by the authors of those draft resolutions and their deeds, as well as between the doctrine which prompted those deeds and international co-operation, the reason for the existence of the United Nations. The isolation imposed on its peoples by the USSR, the secrecy with which it surrounded itself, the distrust of foreigners in that country, the restrictions of

every kind placed on international co-operation, and its territorial expansion, would all be recalled.

50. Events which had taken place since last year made those contradictions all the more striking. It might well be asked now, as in the previous year, exactly what use the conclusion of an agreement between the five great Powers would be. Would it be to reaffirm the principles of the Charter, to draw up new principles or to establish a new body? Those questions were all the more pertinent since the First Committee had just approved a resolution recommending permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another and to study together the principal problems threatening world peace.

51. Was it necessary also to recall that after the fourth session of the General Assembly, during which the proposal for a five-Power pact had been made, the Soviet group had ceased all co-operation with all the organs of the United Nations on which China was represented. Although no change had been made in that connexion, the USSR had taken its place once more on the Security Council in August, thereby proving that it had failed to fulfil its functions without any valid reason. In such circumstances, and today more than during the past year, the impression could not be avoided that the proposal for a five-Power pact was devoid of any concrete objective except for the propaganda effect which was intended.

52. The USSR draft resolution renewed the proposal that atomic weapons should be outlawed, but it ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly which three times in succession had indicated the path to be followed in order to render any such prohibition effective. Not only had the USSR delegation ignored those recommendations, but since the month of January 1950 it had refused to take part in any consultations between the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission.

53. The USSR also renewed its proposal that armed forces should be reduced by one-third, but neglected to implement the recommendation made a year ago by the General Assembly (resolution 300 (IV)), which had called upon Member States to furnish concrete information regarding their conventional armaments and their armed forces and to allow such information to be verified. A proposal that armaments should be reduced could not be of any practical effect unless a decision were first taken on the quantities to which that reduction should apply.

54. Aggression against the Republic of Korea had shown recently a much more serious contradiction between the peaceful declarations and the deeds of the Government of the USSR. That aggression could be compared only with the aggression committed against Greece, the *coup d'état* in Prague, the 1948 Berlin blockade, and the coercive measures taken against Yugoslavia. The aggression in Korea was not only denied, despite its flagrant character and the findings of the United Nations Commission which was on the spot, but attempts had been made, even in the Security Council, to justify it. Proofs of the material and moral assistance which the USSR had given to the aggressor had accumulated. To cite only one example, the Mos-

cow radio had recently made public a letter from Prime Minister Stalin to the Prime Minister of North Korea wishing the Korean people "who were defending the independence of their country a happy conclusion to their struggle, which had been pursued for many years, and the re-establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korea".

55. Lastly, the objections raised by the USSR against the resolution which had been approved by the First Committee on "United action for peace" were the most recent manifestations of that same contradiction between words and deeds. Those objections were aimed simply at making the United Nations powerless should the Security Council, in case of aggression, be unable to take the enforcement measures laid down in the Charter.

56. It was the expansionist tendency and the new imperialism of the USSR which obliged others to judge its Government by its deeds and not by its words. The Prime Minister of India had recently stated, in that connexion, that the expansionist aspects of world communism were a danger to peace and freedom, although communism sometimes appeared disguised as a liberation movement.

57. Since the First World War, capitalist imperialism characterized by the conquest of new markets, had become a phantom of the past. As to fascist imperialism, it had had only a passing success and had succumbed to the blows of the United Nations. The former imperialistic Powers had now replaced the domination which they had exercised in the past by a system of free co-operation based on equality. While the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia had acquired their independence, the Baltic States, Bukovina, Bessarabia, a part of Outer Mongolia, the island of Sakhalin and the Kuriles had been incorporated in the USSR. In addition to those territorial acquisitions, the USSR exercised its authority over a number of States on its frontiers, and there was no country in the world which was entirely free from its underground influence.

58. That new imperialism was based on a rigid faith and claimed universality. Like the imperialism of the past, the new imperialism had at its disposal a military power greater than those of other States. Yet, the new methods to which it had recourse flowed essentially from the peculiar structure of the Soviet Union and the place occupied in that country by the Communist Party. The latter had complete right of control over all State departments and establishments and directed relations between the USSR and the States subjected to Soviet imperialism. Thus, for example, in 1948 the dispute which arose between the USSR and Yugoslavia was not dealt with through the normal diplomatic channels but directly between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

59. In addition, the States ruled by Stalinist doctrine as well as their Communist parties were entirely subordinated to the USSR. They were obliged to defend it unconditionally and without reservation. In those circumstances, the traditional idea of national sovereignty became purely nominal.

60. Belgium remained faithful to a policy of a general, gradual and controlled reduction of armaments. It would associate itself with the preparatory work to be undertaken in that connexion. It would, however, assume its responsibilities in the collective defence of the region to which it belonged.

61. Of course, a general reduction of armaments would, when it became a reality, engender mutual trust,

but that required to begin with a minimum amount of confidence. It was impossible, however, in the ascending phase of a new imperialism, all the recent manifestations of which contradicted the peaceful declarations. It was in that spirit that the Belgian delegation would vote, as in the past, against the USSR draft resolution.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.