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Chairman: Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Rabetafika (Madagascar), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 AND 38
(continued)**

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security**
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9033, A/9041, A/9228)**
- General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039, A/9141, A/9293, A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1)**
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General (A/9207 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1)**
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141, A/C.1/L.653)**

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107, A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036, 1039, A/C.1/L.651, 652):

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141);
- (b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137, A/9209, A/C.1/L.654)

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9209)

1. Mr. CREMIN (Ireland): The annual debate in this Committee on what are commonly known as "the disarmament items" cannot but strike one at times as taking place in an atmosphere of unreality. For as we talk here about disarmament, and indeed profess our commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament, we see in the world a constant, massive growth in military expenditure, with more and more sophisticated and destructive weaponry being continually developed and, regrettably, being put to use. The waste of human and material resources—resources which should be devoted to badly-needed social and economic progress—seems to make no real impact on governments. The international community, one might think, is incapable of finding a way of effectively limiting armaments, much less reducing them. While, therefore, we extend a welcome to such measures of arms control as have been achieved, we should not blind ourselves to the frightening dimensions of the situation as it exists today.

2. At the same time, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on its work in 1973, which the Co-Chairmen have transmitted to the Assembly in document A/9141, bears testimony once again to serious purpose and painstaking endeavour on the part of participants in the Conference. Annexed to the report are working papers, political as well as technical, which constitute important contributions to the consideration of problems of disarmament and arms control. If we voice our keen disappointment at the absence of concrete achievements from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, for the second successive year, we do not question the dedication of its members or ignore the fact that difficulties exist which have to be faced and overcome.

3. For my delegation, it is gratifying to note that two countries not represented in the Conference of the Com-

mittee on Disarmament, Finland and Norway, have made available to the Conference the results of research conducted nationally which could assist its work. We have refrained from presuming to suggest specific changes in the structure and methods of operation of the Conference. We are conscious of our lack of direct and immediate experience of its activities. However, it seems obvious that there must be many countries not at present members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which would be in a position to make valuable contributions to its work. We should like to feel that such countries are encouraged to place before the Conference their ideas and the fruits of their study and research.

4. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament shows that it has concentrated its deliberations largely on the two areas to which it was requested to accord priority, namely, the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the problem of the elimination of chemical weapons. Regrettably, there is little evidence, so far as we can judge, of really significant progress in either case.

5. Ten years have now elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.¹ Apart from its intrinsic importance in reducing atmospheric pollution, that instrument undoubtedly, facilitated the adoption five years later of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex], which must stand as one of the most valuable of international agreements in the field of disarmament. The United Kingdom delegation, both in Geneva and here, has rendered the useful service of reminding us all that the conference to review the operation of the Treaty, provided for in article VIII, is due to be held in Geneva five years after the Treaty's entry into force, that is to say, after 5 March 1975. The intervening period of about 18 months before the review conference begins should, in our view, be utilized to the full in order to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty. This means, in the first instance, the still wider acceptance of the obligations of the Treaty.

6. Here we are happy to note the signature on 5 April 1973 of the safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy Agency, an agreement which, in the case of my own country, will in due course replace our existing bilateral safeguards agreement with the Agency. But the existing parties to the Treaty—and in particular, of course, those possessing nuclear weapons—have also a duty, for under article VI each of us has undertaken “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that the single most effective contribution to the strengthening of the Treaty by its nuclear-weapon parties which is realistically capable of early achievement would be the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the review conference. Such a step would mark a clear movement in the direction of halting the nuclear arms race and could help to remove the doubts of countries, including

some militarily important countries, which have so far felt unable to accept the obligations of the Treaty. To put it bluntly, the non-nuclear-weapon parties are entitled to expect that article VI will not be treated as a dead letter.

7. One heartening development in the course of the year has been the acceptance by China and France of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.² That has been an important event for the countries of Latin America which have striven to keep their region free of nuclear weapons and one on which all concerned are to be congratulated. But it has a wider significance, which will be obvious to members of the Committee and which will, we hope, lead to co-operation in other areas.

8. Reverting to the conference to review the operation of the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation has noted the point which the representative of the United Kingdom brought to our attention in his statement at the 1941st meeting. The Treaty says where and when the conference is to be held; it does not say who is or are to convene it. If the parties to the Treaty are generally agreeable, my delegation would be happy to see the three depositary Governments take the initiative in this respect. It would also seem to us desirable that the arrangements for the conference should be put in train in the fairly near future. Finally, it would seem essential that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has already carried out such important work in connexion with the negotiation of safeguards agreements, should be closely associated with the proceedings of the review conference.

9. With regard to chemical weapons, my delegation, like many others, has particularly noted the important working papers submitted by Japan and Canada [A/9141, annex II, sects 21 and 22]. The Japanese suggestion of a treaty prescribing a comprehensive ban and a supplementary document excluding certain matters temporarily from its scope strikes us as most interesting. If that idea of a gradual approach to the problem were to lead to early action, it might have much to commend it, provided it was clearly understood that the objective must remain the elimination of chemical weapons. In this connexion I wish to draw attention to what seems to my delegation a valid comment in the working paper submitted by 10 delegations in Geneva:

“The degree of danger represented by the use of chemical agents for purposes of war depends besides their toxicity, to a high degree, on the protection available, as well as on the means of delivery. Since adequate protection against any kind of chemical weapons is not available to the greater part of the world population, even less toxic agents can create as great a danger as highly toxic ones and therefore should be prohibited.” [*Ibid.*, sect. 8.]

10. I wish now to say a word on the question of napalm and other incendiary weapons. My Government's concern about these weapons, which can cause appalling suffering through their direct and indirect effects, has I think been amply demonstrated by our actions in the Assembly. In

² Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations. *Treaty, Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283).

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

1971 we sponsored the draft resolution that became resolution 2852 (XXVI), which requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the matter. At the last session we sponsored the draft resolution which, with an amendment, was eventually adopted as resolution 2933 (XXVII).

11. The provision in the Hague Conventions that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited is one which the Irish Government accepts as forming part of customary international law. In the opinion of my delegation, the time has come for the international community to decide speedily and explicitly on the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain weapons. If there is movement now in this regard after a long period of inactivity and silence, it is due to initiatives in this Organization and by the Red Cross over the past eight years. It is essential, in our view, that the momentum which has been gained should not be lost.

12. Here, may I put on record my delegation's appreciation of the action of the International Committee of the Red Cross in convening this year a group of experts to consider the problem of weapons that may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. The report of that group will be carefully studied by the authorities in my country, as will of course also the recommendations of a Swedish working group which was mentioned by Mrs. Myrdal in her statement at the 1941st meeting and the text of which we have just received.

13. The question now arises as to what should be done about incendiaries and other weapons which may cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. It has been suggested that the matter should be referred to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We would have no wish to exclude the Conference from considering these weapons, but it has to be borne in mind that the Conference is at present charged with the vital and delicate task of negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a chemical-weapons convention. We think that it must continue, and indeed intensify, its efforts to conclude its work on these two subjects as a matter of high priority.

14. It has also been suggested that the question of the use of incendiaries and certain other weapons should be discussed at the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict which the Swiss Federal Council has convened for February-March of next year. We see great merit in such a discussion and hope it will lead to agreement on how best to carry on with the work which has been so well initiated. We doubt, however, that the Diplomatic Conference will be in a position to deal comprehensively in 1974 with the issues involved in the use of certain weapons. Above all, it is important that the Diplomatic Conference should discharge the immediate task for which it has been convened, by considering thoroughly the draft protocols which, after careful preparation, have been submitted to it for adoption. When the countries come together next year in Geneva, a quarter of a century will have elapsed since the previous conference. The opportunity of supplementing the 1949 Conventions must not be dissipated.

15. Finally, I wish to refer to the question of a world disarmament conference. My delegation joins with others in expressing gratitude to Ambassador Hoveyda for his informative account at the 1934th meeting of the situation with regard to the Special Committee provided for in resolution 2930 (XXVII). The position of my Government on the convening of a conference has been stated before. We are willing to support a conference which has been carefully prepared and is assured of the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States. Indeed, not the least of the advantages of a conference on that basis would be the bringing-together of those five States, for I think we all recognize that the absence of two of them impairs the effectiveness of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

16. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): In my statement at the 1935th meeting I offered some comments on matters related to the question of a world disarmament conference. I note with satisfaction that practically all delegations that have taken part in the disarmament debate—with one or two notorious and not surprising exceptions—have reiterated their support for a World Disarmament Conference. Many of them have urged that preparations for such a Conference be accelerated, with due account to be taken of the important and useful work done by the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference set up in implementation of General Assembly resolution 2930 (XXVII).

17. Today I should like to make several observations on developments in the field of disarmament over the past year, dealing more directly with matters raised in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/9141].

18. The delegation of the Polish People's Republic welcomes with particular satisfaction the fact that the positive trends in international relations have led, since the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, to a further consolidation of détente and international co-operation, particularly between the Soviet Union and the United States, and in Europe.

19. In our view, the significance of the improving Soviet-American relations goes far beyond the territorial confines or the immediate national interests of the Powers concerned. The fact that détente and co-operation are becoming lasting factors in international life is a good augury for the interests of all countries and, more specifically, for the chances of further tangible progress in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

20. Indeed, in the time which has elapsed since our disarmament debate a year ago in this Committee, we have seen significant advances in this all-important field. Following up on the accomplishments and the promise of the first round of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, the second round has been in progress for several months now. We wish the negotiators further success in the days ahead.

21. The visit to the United States of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was a historic milestone

in the process of consolidating détente and peaceful co-existence throughout the world, and an important contribution to the strengthening of world peace and security. It may be assumed that the understanding reached at the Washington summit meeting concerning efforts during 1974 for curtailing the quantitative increase of strategic weapons, as well as their further qualitative development, will find its reflection and, let us hope, fulfilment, as a specific objective of the current session of the strategic arms limitation talks, which began in Geneva late last September.

22. The significance of the agreements reached in Washington, particularly those on prevention of nuclear war and on basic principles of negotiations on strategic arms limitation [see A/9293], exceeds their own intrinsic value for at least two reasons. First, the agreements leave the door wide-open for the other nuclear-weapon Powers to join in the efforts for curbing the nuclear arms race. Secondly, they map out the road to further progress in the field of effective limitation and tangible reduction of nuclear arms.

23. In our view, these determined bilateral efforts aimed at halting and reversing the nuclear arms race are bound to exert a major positive influence on the prospects of other disarmament measures that are or may be negotiated in various other, multilateral, forums.

24. It is out of these considerations that the Government and the people of Poland, as indeed those of many other countries, have welcomed with utmost gratification the agreements concluded at the summit meetings in Moscow and Washington, between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon.

25. On the European scene significant developments, instrumental in the further consolidation of regional détente and co-operation, have also been recorded over the past 12 months. Apart from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, whose first phase was successfully carried out in Helsinki at the beginning of July and whose second phase is now in progress in Geneva, these developments included the multilateral consultations in Vienna on the reduction of arms and armed forces in Central Europe, evolving into negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe, which started—also in Vienna—a few days ago. Poland, which has taken an active and constructive part in these consultations and negotiations, expects a positive outcome to these talks and will continue to work actively and patiently with a view to their ultimate success. To us their importance resides primarily in the fact that they represent an effort whereby the political détente in Europe can be followed up by a military one. Their full significance will be better appreciated if one bears in mind that they concern the most sensitive part of Europe and, indeed, one of the most sensitive regions of the world where, along the frontiers between the two political military groupings, there is a vast concentration of both national and foreign forces as well as immense stockpiles of modern military hardware. The success of these negotiations, based on the principle of undiminished security of any of the parties concerned, will certainly contribute to further important progress in the process of détente, normalization and stabilization in this part of Europe.

26. Any picture of the complex and expanding scene of disarmament negotiations, whether multilateral or bilateral, would be incomplete by far without bringing into proper perspective the role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the report of which is now before us. One of the important and much respected vehicles for multilateral negotiations, the Conference has for many of its 12 years of existence stood out as the most important, if not the only, platform available for substantive multilateral disarmament negotiations. Indeed, its record includes some of the most meaningful disarmament-related agreements reached to date.

27. One may well regret therefore, that perusal of the contents of the report of the Conference covering its spring and summer sessions this year reveals that little progress has been made on the urgent yet perennial issues on its agenda: the question of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Yet at the same time it is the considered view of my delegation that it would be utterly wrong and shortsighted to chastise the Committee or to dismiss its work as being entirely negligible or useless. We find that the meetings of this year have served to stimulate the search for possible new approaches to and solutions in the field of partial measures of disarmament. They also helped to clarify many complex problems, to pinpoint areas of major difficulties and, last but not least, helped to encourage interesting new proposals, particularly with respect to the question of chemical weapons.

28. Obviously it is not the Conference itself or its procedures which can legitimately be blamed for the prolonged immobility in either of the two top priority questions referred to it by the General Assembly. In our view the right addressees of any such blame would be some of the members with their rigid positions or, still worse, lack of any position. It is no secret, of course, that certain Western Powers, while dismissing out of hand the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted to the Committee by the socialist States on 28 March 1972³ and subsequently supplemented with respect to its verification provisions [A/9141, annex II, sect. 11], themselves failed to come forward with any consistent, formal counterproposal. The traditional *modus operandi* of the Conference, whereby agreed drafts used to be arrived at through patient give-and-take bargaining, was thus hardly possible.

29. Now as in the past Poland continues to advocate a comprehensive prohibition of all chemical warfare agents, based on the general purpose criterion, as well as prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling. To us this is the only rational way of achieving the effective elimination of all chemical weapons that could be verified through a balance of mutually complementing and appropriate national and international measures. We believe that such an approach would not be to the disadvantage of any country nor would it discriminate against the legitimate security interests of any State.

30. On the other hand, we are prepared to be flexible and, provided such flexibility is reciprocated, ready to examine

³ Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex C, sect. 5.

with an open mind any constructive proposals if and when such proposals are formally made. In the view of the Polish delegation, therefore, the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly should again request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations as a matter of high priority with a view to reaching an early agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States, as is provided for in draft resolution A/C.1/L.653 which has just been submitted.

31. The question of nuclear disarmament, and more specifically that of a comprehensive test ban, is another priority item on which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was not able to record any progress at its last session. The lack of headway in this matter is as disturbing as in respect of chemical weapons. We hope, however, that progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and by all nuclear-weapon Powers on the basis of national means of detection and identification will be possible. I submit that the attainment of that goal would be greatly facilitated if the United Nations were to succeed in ensuring that all the nuclear-weapon Powers join the ongoing efforts and work together to this end. It would likewise be helpful to ensure an early adherence to agreements such as the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by all States which have not yet done so, especially those possessing nuclear weapons or otherwise having substantial military capability.

32. Preoccupied with the top priority problems of nuclear disarmament and chemical weapons in accordance with General Assembly resolutions, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could give but little attention to other disarmament matters notwithstanding the long list of proposals in this field and in spite of the gentle prodding by some of its members that the Conference broaden the horizon of its disarmament negotiations.

33. As is well known, Poland and other socialist countries, members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have been repeatedly suggesting that the Conference explore such problems as full demilitarization of the sea-bed, elimination of foreign military bases, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and the reduction of military expenditures. We continue to believe that these are issues which would lend themselves to serious examination, issues where tangible progress would be a step closer to the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament. This is particularly true with regard to the question of the reduction of military budgets, an issue that brings into sharp focus the close interdependence between disarmament and development. This question, I might add, took on special topicality in view of the Soviet Union's important initiative in placing on the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly the question of "Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries".

34. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is an interesting and instructive document. Its

reading can certainly lead to various conclusions, constructive and not so constructive. Our conclusion is that we would be well advised to seek jointly to revitalize the work of the Conference by adding new momentum and meaning to its efforts, rather than be carried away by a deceptive urge to have a "better" body or bodies. We all know that the establishment of any such new body would amount to giving up, by default, the impressive expertise of the Disarmament Committee. Then too, we all know that any meaningful progress in this all-important field of disarmament depends primarily on matters other than the form or the procedure of a negotiating body. We all know that this in fact depends on the political will of the negotiators. A new body would inevitably tend to divert attention and to relieve the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of its responsibility for meaningful progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

35. In conclusion, I should like to address myself briefly to item 34, entitled "Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use", which for the first time appears on our agenda as an item in its own right. As will be seen from the report of the Secretary-General in document A/9207, Poland is one of the countries that responded to the questionnaire of the Secretary-General concerning comments on his report entitled *Napalm and Other Incendiary Weapons and All Aspects of Their Possible Use*⁴ and its implications. We have found the report to be a valuable and informative study. We have also expressed to the Secretary-General and to the experts our appreciation for its preparation. My Government has stated that "the report can serve as a suitable basis for further consideration of the direction and manner of negotiating with a view to reaching an agreement on the prohibition of the use of incendiary weapons and, subsequently, their total elimination from military arsenals".

36. In this connexion, I should like to express my delegation's appreciation to the delegation of Sweden and the other sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650/Rev.1 for their initiative. We certainly share their intention of achieving an early prohibition or restriction of the use of napalm and similar weapons. The Polish delegation considers, however, as do many other delegations, that the proper forum to negotiate agreement or agreements on such prohibition is the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and not the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, as proposed by the sponsors of that draft resolution.

37. Mr. SOEGOMO (Indonesia): My delegation has listened with keen interest to the statements made by the representatives who have already spoken on several aspects of the disarmament problem. In our view, disarmament constitutes a problem of great importance and the proposals of every nation should be given consideration.

38. In the search for disarmament, the United Nations has been confronted with a complex and difficult task, and in seeking to discharge its responsibilities in the course of nearly three decades it has adopted a variety of methods and approaches. Throughout the period until 1971, a close

⁴ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.1.3.

and more useful relationship prevailed between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers in disarmament matters. The non-aligned countries have taken a growing interest in all aspects of this problem and have exercised a moderating influence in helping to bridge the gap between the extreme positions of the great Powers.

39. Regrettably, the working relationships between the great Powers and other countries and even the role of the United Nations have been seriously eroded. Attempts by the medium-sized and small Powers to influence disarmament talks which are in progress have largely failed, and the United Nations has been bypassed or ignored.

40. It is mainly for these reasons that the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 2833 (XXVI), calling for consideration of convening a world disarmament conference open to all States. It is also the conviction of most Member States that the conference should be convened periodically, but should not detract from the disarmament negotiations conducted elsewhere.

41. My delegation, with many other non-aligned countries, welcomed the idea, but stressed the importance of adequate preparation and insisted that the conference should take place within the framework of the United Nations. We think that such a conference would be useful, not only as a catalytic factor for the efforts to achieve disarmament, but also as a forum where all countries can contribute to the endeavours to achieve peace and security.

42. However, some countries are sceptical about the usefulness of holding such a gathering and expressed their apprehension that it may become an arena for propaganda. Others insisted that important obligations be undertaken even before the conference is convened and that its agenda be formulated in such a way as to predetermine the outcome of such discussions. It was further argued that, apart from the General Assembly and the First Committee, there is a wide deliberative forum for disarmament matters in the form of the Disarmament Commission, as well as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been in existence for many years.

43. But these arguments fail to realize the fact that the Disarmament Commission has become dormant and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has too many weaknesses, and so far progress has been made only on measures that are not militarily significant to the great Powers, and that the range of topics for negotiations in that forum is too narrow to permit greater progress.

44. They also ignore the urgent and serious nature of the question of disarmament and its dimensions. A world disarmament conference would focus the attention of world public opinion on the urgency of disarmament and could breathe life into the stalemated talks.

45. The era of bipolarity has come to an end and this development has created a new situation in the field of disarmament. The policy of preventing the less armed from becoming more armed or a mere adjustment in the nuclear arsenals without reducing their effectiveness will not suffice in the long run. A much more imaginative policy is needed

to make disarmament negotiations meaningful. It is, therefore, most essential to create such an atmosphere and conditions as to facilitate the emergence of a common political will to enable the world disarmament conference to formulate acceptable basic principles and guidelines which can be translated into concrete action.

46. It was in this background that the General Assembly adopted resolution 2930 (XXVII) and established the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference. The main task of the Committee is to "examine all the views and suggestions expressed by Governments on the convening of a world disarmament conference and related problems and to present, on the basis of a consensus, a report to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session". The Special Committee has not functioned properly because of the dissatisfaction of some regional groups due to under-representation of their regions and also due to the non-participation of four of the nuclear Powers. In the course of the informal discussions, the desirability of enlarging the Committee's membership was expressed and my delegation has no objection to an increase in the membership designed to provide equitable geographical representation.

47. With regard to the participation of the nuclear Powers, it is our opinion that their participation is most important for the success of the Committee's work. They should either co-operate or specify a formula under which they will extend their co-operation, if they are not willing to participate fully in its deliberations.

48. After all, the mandate of the Special Committee is not to decide the issue of holding a world disarmament conference, but only to examine the views and suggestions of member countries. As has been pointed out in the informal exchange of views, my delegation would like to consider the possibility that the Special Committee should try to work without the active participation of the nuclear Powers, but that they should be consulted at every stage of its work, and that, further, the Committee should continue to try to advance its work in ways acceptable to all. Should this proposal be accepted, we hope the initial difficulties faced by the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference will be overcome.

49. Before commenting further, may I take this opportunity to comment on the able and patient manner in which Ambassador Hoveyda, as the non-chairman of a non-committee, as he called himself, has conducted the informal exchange of views, in co-operation with the designated members of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, to find ways and means to make the Committee function effectively in accordance with resolution 2930 (XXVII).

50. Let me now briefly comment on three related questions: first, the nuclear test-ban Treaty; secondly, chemical and bacteriological weapons; and thirdly, the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

51. With regard to the nuclear test-ban treaty, there have been no meaningful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban for over a decade, despite several United Nations resolutions calling for the suspension of nuclear-weapon

tests. There is a growing realization among the non-nuclear States, especially the non-aligned, that in view of the relationship of nuclear-weapon tests to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the continuing arms buildup, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is not only desirable in itself, but could also stimulate progress towards other arms control measures. It is feared that nuclear testing creates radioactive hazards as well as risks of earth disturbances or seismic tidal waves. Further, the military and political risks are fraught with dangerous consequences, unless a comprehensive test-ban treaty is signed without further delay.

52. It is necessary to recall in this connexion the forcefully worded resolution 2828 (XXVI) of 1971, in which the General Assembly, reflecting the impatience of many nations with the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, solemnly and emphatically expressed its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests, and urged the nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all such tests. Last year, in resolution 2934 C (XXVII), the Assembly reiterated with the utmost vigour its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests and reaffirmed its conviction that there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban.

53. As far as my Government is concerned, a comprehensive test ban must meet three requirements: first, all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments should be prohibited; secondly, all nuclear-weapon States should be parties to it; thirdly, availability of nuclear fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, to non-nuclear-weapon States through an international agreement.

54. On the matter of chemical and bacteriological weapons, negotiations on this problem have yielded a partial result in the form of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex]. This convention will prevent the spread of biological weapons to countries that do not now possess them. However, biological disarmament is only a marginal disarmament measure compared with the banning of chemical weapons.

55. As outlined in the proposals of the non-aligned countries [A/9141, annex II, sect. 8], a convention banning chemical weapons should contain provisions for national and international verification measures and aim at the general prohibition of these weapons for military purposes. It should also entail the avoidance of any hampering of the peaceful uses of chemical agents and promote the fullest possible exchange of chemical technology for peaceful purposes.

56. It is heartening to note that recently some progress has been made and that Japan and Canada [*ibid.*, sects. 21 and 22] have submitted proposals that have been received with interest by the United States and the USSR and might provide a useful point of departure for further negotiations. These call for the preparation of comprehensive instruments covering all chemical weapons, but with an annex that would restrict its application for the time being to prohibiting the development and production, but not the stockpiling, of only the most toxic weapons. We hope the proposal may be used as a basis for solving the difficult

problem of controlling the implementation provisions of a convention on chemical weapons. An early agreement is imperative on a treaty on chemical weapons to permit the destruction of unnecessary and enormously dangerous stockpiles.

57. With regard to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, several other initiatives concerning disarmament have been taken since the beginning of the Disarmament Decade in 1970. Among the most important initiatives, within the framework of disarmament, have been the General Assembly's Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace [resolution 2832 (XXVI)] and the establishment, at the twenty-seventh session, of an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean charged with the task of devising concrete means to achieve the demilitarization of the region [resolution 2992 (XXVII)].

58. The work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee is indeed fraught with difficulties. If it is to be successful, it must resolve the conflicting interests of the many countries that are legitimately concerned with the status of the Indian Ocean: the littoral and hinterland States and the major maritime and naval users. It will undoubtedly be difficult to achieve this goal, and the *Ad Hoc* Committee deserves our complete support and full co-operation in its work.

59. The countries of South-East Asia—Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia—have already expressed their commitment to the concept of the South-East Asian region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality through the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. This same document recognized the legitimate interests of all Powers concerned in the region and the necessity to undertake efforts to harmonize their interests.

60. Indonesia believes that a similar level of co-operation and understanding among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean is essential to the success of the proposed zone of peace. The common viewpoint achieved as a result of such co-operation will provide a unified basis for discussion with other interested Powers. As an early step to demonstrate this regional solidarity, we support the suggestion that it would be reasonable to call upon the countries of the region to commit themselves to a policy of denuclearization with each nation permanently renouncing the nuclear weapon option. By such means we may hope to advance, in a deliberate and concrete manner, the discussions so auspiciously begun under the leadership of Ambassador Amerasinghe.

61. For almost 30 years, the United Nations has been dealing with the problem of disarmament with mixed success. While progress in these efforts has been slow, nuclear technology has progressed at a formidable pace and is now within the reach of a growing number of countries. At the same time the arms race, both in conventional and nuclear weapons, goes on, posing a continual threat to peace and having a profoundly unsettling effect on the present generation. The Secretary-General stated in his introduction to the report on the work of the Organization that:

“Quite apart from the peril which the continuing world-wide escalation of armaments presents to world peace,

mankind will continue to be deprived of vast human and material resources urgently required for more constructive purposes". [A/9001/Add.1, sect. IV.]

62. It is in this perspective that our Foreign Minister, Mr. Adam Malik, stated at the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held last September at Algiers:

"the prospects of a reduction in the arms race offer an opportunity for the developed countries to channel funds, previously used for armaments, to developing nations, in order to assist these nations in achieving their goals of economic and social progress".

63. A revival of the co-operative working relationships which prevailed in disarmament negotiation between the great Powers and others in the 1950s and 1960s will transform the General Assembly's declaration of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade into a reality.

64. My delegation considers also that disarmament is an inseparable aspect of the problem of security and involves the establishment of effective instrumentalities for international peace-keeping and peaceful settlement of disputes, and that the achievement of each depends on the simultaneous development of others.

65. Mr. NACO (Albania) (*interpretation from French*): The discussion of the problem of disarmament in our Organization, it can be said, is as old as the Organization itself. It has been regularly debated at sessions of the General Assembly and in several committees and other bodies. Many proposals have been made and dozens of resolutions have been adopted. Several committees and commissions have been established to deal with disarmament. But so far nothing positive has been achieved.

66. Most representatives who have spoken in this debate have noted with regret that the past year has shown no progress on disarmament. On the contrary, the arms race has been constantly gathering momentum.

67. However, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, using the same language, have made a great deal of noise about the so-called measures taken by their countries in the field of disarmament and, within this context, they once again have taken the opportunity to advertise the bilateral and multilateral agreements on this question, the primary authors of which are these two super-Powers. They have striven here to create the impression that the détente which has been observed in their relations has now embraced the whole world. In that spirit, their representatives have tried to present the new progress achieved in Soviet-American relations, particularly in the military field, as an important event in international life which opens up the way for progress towards disarmament.

68. They are making a great deal of noise about disarmament to make it appear that they are serious about disarmament. That is no accident and it certainly does not surprise us. Virtually the whole world realizes that while the two super-Powers are talking about disarmament they are actually intensifying the arms race and every year they are increasing their military budgets and armed forces and

are producing new, more sophisticated arms of mass extermination. On the one hand they are striving to keep freedom of action in this area; on the other, they are doing everything in their power to deprive the peoples and other sovereign countries of their right to take the measures necessary for self-defence, to leave them disarmed and exposed to the blackmail and vast military potential of those two super-Powers. Those are also the aims of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and other agreements which are presented to us as a contribution to international peace and security.

69. More than 10 years ago the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty was concluded and was represented as a great step towards disarmament. But throughout this period the two super-Powers have continued their intensive testing of nuclear weapons under ground and they have been constantly increasing their stockpiles of these weapons, thus constituting a serious danger to sovereign States and to peace. At this session representatives of several countries have expressed their great concern over this situation. All this shows their disillusionment on the subject of this Treaty. Time has shown that the non-proliferation Treaty was a typical act of international inequality whereby the United States and the Soviet Union have attempted to deny the right of other States to self-defence and have claimed for themselves the monopoly over the production of nuclear weapons, weapons which they have doubled in the last 10 years. The Albanian delegation still maintains, as in the past, that every country enjoys the sovereign right to take the measures necessary to resist the blackmail and the nuclear monopoly of the two super-Powers and to defend itself against them. We welcome the great success of the People's Republic of China in the field of nuclear weapons which serves not only the interests of the national defence of that socialist State but also the defence of the peoples of other sovereign countries, and contributes to international peace and security. Even the Soviet-American agreements on the so-called limitation of strategic arms have not—as has been claimed—slowed down the arms race between the two super-Powers in any way whatever. As a matter of fact, they have opened up a new phase in the continuation of the arms race by means of the further sophistication of the strategic and nuclear arsenals of those two super-Powers.

70. So, these agreements have nothing to do with disarmament. On the contrary, they have served the interests of the hegemony of the two super-Powers, and their efforts to establish a gap between themselves and other countries in the field of armaments so that they can be sure of absolute superiority for the United States and the Soviet Union in this field. For those reasons we have denounced these agreements as plots against the security of the peoples of the world and their freedom and their independence, and we have firmly resisted the repeated pressure of the two super-Powers designed to impose these agreements on other States that have not accepted them.

71. Many peace-loving countries, both in the course of this session of the General Assembly and at meetings of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, have justifiably expressed their concern about that body, which has not only failed to do the job that it was set up to do, but has in fact become an instrument in the service of

the United States and the Soviet Union which set the tone of its work and use it to attain their goals, which are irreconcilable with the demands of Member States for progress in the field of disarmament. A recent example is the situation created in that Committee this summer when its work was almost paralysed on the pretext that the Soviet and United States representatives had not received the necessary instructions from their Governments on the questions before the Committee, whereas in fact they were awaiting the results of the Soviet-American summit talks taking place in the United States.

72. In those conditions, even the world disarmament conference proposed by the Soviet Union, would meet the same fate and would serve the same purposes. In the present circumstances it would be Utopian to hope that this Conference could yield any positive results on disarmament. It is clear that the proposal to convene such a Conference is made simply for demagogic purposes and does not serve the cause of true disarmament but is a camouflage for the arms race.

73. The claim that 1973 is the year of political détente and that it is even promoting military détente and progress in disarmament does not correspond to the actual situation. We are aware of the fact that at the present time détente exists only between the two super-Powers, which is tantamount to a strengthening of their collaboration in all fields, including the military field.

74. We maintain that the Soviet-United States agreement on the so-called prevention of nuclear war is something whereby the two parties want juridically to authenticate their right in certain conditions to intervene jointly in the internal affairs of peace-loving States, to exercise control over any zone or region and to prevent any people or any country from defending its sovereign rights should such action be detrimental to the imperialist interests of the two super-Powers and the balance established between them. The true nature of that agreement has been clearly explained in the course of recent events in the Middle East, where the United States and the Soviet Union have in fact created a unified front in accordance with a common plan. In the course of those events it has been proved in concrete terms that on the pretext of the so-called threat of the outbreak of nuclear war they have undertaken to stifle any legitimate action which may threaten the deterioration of their tranquillity and influence Soviet-United States relations.

75. Similarly, the conference on the so-called mutual reduction of military forces in Europe is a manoeuvre to create the false impression that in Europe concrete steps on disarmament and security are being taken. In fact, no reduction of troops on that continent diminishes the danger, because with the present development of technology and means of communication there are vast military potential and vast possibilities for transporting troops and military *matériel* over long distances in a very short time. Thus the proposed so-called reduction of forces not only fails in actual fact to affect the military potential of the two super-Powers and their military blocs but has as its purpose the maintenance of that potential at the least possible expense. That kind of troop reduction in Europe would lead us to the legalization of the stationing of Soviet

and United States troops in the other European countries and recognition of the right of the two super-Powers to be present in their respective zones of influence on that continent. The ensuring of peace and security in Europe requires defence of the supreme national interests of the European countries, opposition to the policy of hegemony of the two super-Powers, the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign military bases on the European continent and in neighbouring areas.

76. The Soviet proposal concerning a 10 per cent reduction in the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and use of the funds thus realized to assist the developing countries⁵ simply serves propaganda and demagogic purposes. As we are well aware, this is not the first time the Soviet representatives have made such sensational proposals on disarmament and assistance to developing countries. That proposal has nothing whatsoever to do with the sincere efforts undertaken to achieve true disarmament. As to the illusion that that country is striving to create that its proposal would help to assist materially the developing countries, it suffices to remind the Committee that in the past Soviet leaders have shown themselves even more generous and have promised that the financial resources that would be freed by complete and general disarmament would be used for the good of those countries. We are only too well aware of what actually happened to those promises, and no comment from us is required.

77. Now, if disarmament were to be seriously discussed, it would have to start with the two super-Powers, which are in possession of a powerful military potential and constitute the primary danger to international peace and security. But they cannot proceed in that way, because the whole of their imperialist and social-imperialist policy is based on the force of arms. As to the peace-loving countries, in the present international situation they are continually obliged to strengthen their defensive capacity in order to resist the possible imperialist danger.

78. Experience has shown us that effective peace and security can be guaranteed in the world only by redoubling our vigilance; by strengthening the independence and national sovereignty of States, their independent development and their defensive capacity; by exposing and resisting any plots which may be hatched against them and the policy of aggression and hegemony of the imperialist Powers.

79. True disarmament can be brought about only by the efforts and determined struggle of all the peoples of the world to impose it on the two super-Powers.

80. The People's Republic of Albania will continue to stand behind other freedom-loving countries and will in the future unfailingly make its contribution to that cause.

81. Mr. JOUEJATI (Syrian Arab Republic): When discussing in the General Assembly, session after session, the subject of disarmament, many representatives—particularly those of small developing countries—are justified in feeling

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes, agenda item 102, document A/9191.*

perplexed and mystified. That is especially true of a representative coming from a country like mine, part of whose territory is under forcible occupation by ruthless expansionist forces similar to those in southern Africa which subject to their colonialism and *apartheid* the African masses in Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia, drawing their support from the coffers and deadly arsenal of the most rich and powerful country of the world.

82. What is being said in these circumstances on disarmament in United Nations forums appears to be completely at variance with events. As the representative of the Netherlands said in the introduction to his statement [1948th meeting], a casual visitor entering this room after having listened to the debates in the Security Council might think that he was in another world. That is because armaments are but the symptoms of a world in which the rule of force has not yet been replaced by the rule of law so as to make irrelevant the race for arms and the expenditure on their development.

83. We tend session after session to lament the lack of progress by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament without seriously pondering the conditions of international insecurity: the absence of that system of collective security that must constitute the teeth of the Charter of the United Nations; the failure so far of the international community to mobilize all its energies against injustice; depriving peoples of their self-determination; the acquisition of territory by force; the annexationist policies based on faits accomplis divorced from law and ethics.

84. How can the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or any other forum progress when disarmament is intimately linked with international peace and security, and when the criterion of justice should be first adhered to so that détente brings its full realization? Partly due to this separation between cause and effect, the United Nations efforts in the field of disarmament have fallen short of the objectives laid down in the Charter, and the lack of results of certain very positive steps in themselves in the domain of non-proliferation: the ban on nuclear tests, the denuclearization of some areas, the bilateral talks on the limitation of strategic weapons, and the immense progress achieved in the process of seismic verification of tests.

85. But much more promising were the strides towards peace and reconciliation in Europe as a result of which, among other things, we welcomed in our midst the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, in addition to the coming to an end, or hopefully so, of the United States intervention in Indo-China, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the talks on mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe.

86. The absence in our debate of this vital link between disarmament and international peace and justice has been amply illustrated by the sweeping generalizations we have heard so far when frequent allusion was made to the Middle East conflict. Some representatives seem to reduce the conflict to what they call "the pouring of armaments to belligerents by two super-Powers". What an arbitrary simplification. The merits of the case are just glossed over. The sacred right of countries to safeguard their territorial

integrity and to stand up to the aggressor, who makes public by words and deeds the policy of annexation, is merely omitted. A Power that helps Arab countries subjected to occupation helps them to exercise their legitimate self-defence, stands with other socialist and peace- and justice-loving countries for the restoration of their sovereignty, is equated with a Power that pours arms of the most destructive nature, Phantoms, "smart" and pellet bombs, napalm and others, so that occupation would be secure usurpation, immune from contestation. Can Powers assisting the colonialists in southern Africa to suppress the rights of Angolans, the indigenous people of Mozambique, Namibians and Rhodesians be equated with those who help restore freedom, self-determination and dignity to these innocent African people? Where would the world be if the nuclear monopoly had not been broken by the ingenuity, the assiduity and the deep conviction of the valiant Soviet people? How many Hiroshimas and Nagasakis would the world have suffered had it not been for the vigilant deterrents put up by the peace-loving countries and the socialist community of the world?

87. The crisis of disarmament is thus, first of all, intellectual. Disarmament is either treated in a vacuum and as separate from the values and obligations which the Charter of the United Nations set as the criteria for a new era of peace, equality, justice and progress; or else it is treated separately from any identification of the motives, purposes and uses of armaments. Even with such modest calls for banning incendiary weapons, we cannot reach positive results. We entrust the Secretary-General with making report after report, and when he comes with conclusive and fervent appeals for prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons some of us start to question his conclusions, call for other teams of experts, further discussions, the further preparation of groundwork—if I remember well some of the terms used by a certain representative—as if the suffering and the destruction that befell a large sector of humanity do not really count. Whether these results will materialize after all the process of study, restudy, expertise, groundwork in 10, 20 or 30 years, nobody can tell. The representatives who advocate this do not tell us when they hope to reach any result. While hospitals are filled with napalm victims, crops and human beings are being burned in Angola, in Mozambique, in independent Guinea-Bissau, in the Egyptian villages, in the urban and workers' centres of Syria. Yet, some delegations would like to think and ponder and work and confer, and even with such modest proposals as to study the question in the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict—for which we pay homage to the Minister of Sweden and to the other sponsors—these representatives still find serious reservations about accepting such proposals.

88. It is these paramount considerations that motivate our support for a world disarmament conference. We envisage a world conference, universal, frank, away from polemics, a gathering for harmony, and a new era of understanding, where each participant airs his grievances, where international security is closely linked with disarmament, where the non-aligned countries can play their fruitful role in surmounting the differences and harmonizing the views, among others, of the USSR and the People's Republic of

China, which, in our humble opinion, stem from misunderstanding and difference of approach rather than from fundamental differences; where we would listen attentively to the views of France. After all, France has a case, an opinion and a stand, and we should explore them and not just deplore this or that attitude. A conference should ensure a forum where every nuclear and non-nuclear Power can contribute its share to the realization of the objectives of peace, justice and disarmament.

89. These views might sound Utopian. But we should not minimize the tremendous awakening of peoples to their rights, the immense trend in the international community to condemn aggression and expansion to the detriment of others, the increasing pleas for spending on the needs of humanity the amount that is spent on armaments. The

dawn of a new era is a dream no more. It is within reach if we can now rise above local differences and try—as a representative of Brazil once put it to a gathering here—the criterion of justice instead of that of force.

90. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from French*): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to announce that the delegation of Norway has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.652 on the urgent need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, and that the delegation of Pakistan has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/L.653 on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.