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*Chairman:* Mr. Otto R. BORCH (Denmark).

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 AND 38  
(continued)**

**Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security**

**World Disarmament Conference: report of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference (A/8990 and Add.1, A/9041, A/9228)**

**General and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9039, A/9141, A/9293, A/C.1/L.650)**

**Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General (A/9207 and Corr.1, A/C.1/L.650)**

**Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests (A/9081, A/9084, A/9086, A/9093, A/9107,**

**A/9109, A/9110, A/9117, A/9166, A/C.1/1031, 1036, 1039):**

**(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/9141);**

**(b) Report of the Secretary-General (A/9208)**

**Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General (A/9137, A/9209)**

**Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/9029)**

1. Mr. AKHUND (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation having participated in these debates every year, I do not propose to restate at length the position of my Government on the general question of disarmament. Suffice it to say that we continue to believe in general and complete disarmament as a goal worth striving towards. But it is a distant beacon which tells us the direction to take and cannot guide our feet around the obstacles and pit-falls which lie in the way. We must therefore move forward step by step, with much caution and circumspection and many a halt as we proceed. Indeed, the past several years have not been empty of achievement. There are the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,<sup>1</sup> the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof [*resolution 2660 (XXV), annex*], the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*], the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [*resolution 2826 (XXVI), annex*], the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks of last year and the prospect of the second round leading to another agreement between the two super-Powers, we hope, in the near future. Each of these agreements has been a landmark in its own way, and they have to be welcomed in the knowledge that without them the situation would be a good deal worse than it is.

2. It does not detract from their respective merits that many of the aforesaid agreements were motivated by aims rather different in nature from those which animate the debates here. Nor are we unaware of the great complexity

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 480, No. 6964, p. 43.

and intricacy of the factors which enter into the calculations and actions of the major parties. Still, one cannot help noting the sporadic, almost haphazard character of what has been achieved in the field of disarmament so far. The partial test-ban Treaty has not been followed up, almost 10 years after by an agreement to stop underground testing. This may have something to do with the fact that nuclear testing in the atmosphere continues elsewhere. The agreement reached at the first round of the strategic arms limitation talks does not seem to have resulted in any slowing down of the nuclear arms race between the two super-Powers. Even when they are taken together, one cannot see in the series of agreements evidence of an orderly progression, however halting or deliberate, towards the declared goal. A more systematic approach is needed in order to give some sense of direction to efforts in the field of disarmament.

3. The first priority lies, as it always has, in the field of nuclear weapons. Continued nuclear testing, especially testing underground, is aimed at increasing the sophistication of nuclear weapons, presumably in making them easier to conceal and less vulnerable. There is obvious danger in this to the relative stability that the world seems to be enjoying thanks to the so-called "balance of terror".

4. It may be alarmist yet to speak in terms of nuclear weapons so small and easy to put together and move about that governments can be held to ransom by individuals or groups of individuals, but one can certainly say that with advances in technology and increasing sophistication, more and more States are going to find it less difficult and less expensive to go in for nuclear weapons.

5. Some 80 countries have signed and ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. With few exceptions, this number excludes countries that are known to have the capability, in terms of knowledge and technology, as well as the equipment and resources, to produce nuclear weapons. This is not a reassuring prospect, especially when one considers that in many cases peaceful nuclear facilities and installations in some of these countries have not been placed under international safeguards. My own country has signed the non-proliferation Treaty, but we are unable to ratify it while others in our neighbourhood, retain the option to go nuclear.

6. Nevertheless, as a token of its good faith Pakistan has, in conformity with article III of the Treaty, concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regard to its peaceful nuclear installations. Considering the futility, the waste of resources and the danger to regional and world peace involved in any further spread of nuclear weapons, my delegation remains convinced of the need for self-denial by all in this matter.

7. The same thing holds good for the existing nuclear Powers. Last year, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was instructed by the General Assembly to consider the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty on a priority basis [resolution 2934 B (XXVII)]. We believe the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to have done so in all sincerity. The results, however, have been meagre. The solemn pledge given by the three nuclear Powers, signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty, "to

achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" remains to this day only a declaration of intent. Without in any way gainsaying the importance of achieving a comprehensive test ban, we would commend to the signatories at this stage the need to consider an immediate ban on underground test explosions. This could take the form of a protocol to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty in conformity with its article 1 (b), wherein the three nuclear Powers clearly stated their determination to conclude a treaty "resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground".

8. To recognize present realities, it is the balance between the nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union that determines the issue of world peace and security. It would therefore not be inappropriate on our part to address a special appeal to these two Powers to arrive at an agreement on measures relating to nuclear disarmament. We are conscious of the divergence of views on verification which has hitherto prevented agreement on a ban on all underground nuclear tests. There has been no dearth of interesting and constructive proposals to resolve the problem. My own delegation shares the view that, taking into account the present state of technology, on-site inspection is no longer a *sine qua non* for a viable system of verification on the prohibition of underground tests. Seismological methods, together with observation by satellites and measurements of vented radioactivity, provide a sufficient substitute for on-site inspection.

9. I want to emphasize that an underground test ban should not deprive the signatories of the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. Nuclear-weapon States—namely, those defined as such in paragraph 3 of article IX of the non-proliferation Treaty—would be permitted to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately. Non-nuclear-weapon States must also be in a position to obtain the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions in an appropriate manner and in accordance with internationally agreed provisions. Care will have to be taken in devising such arrangements that, in respect of nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, peaceful nuclear explosions do not serve as a guise to develop, perfect or proliferate nuclear weapons.

10. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was also entrusted on a priority basis, to negotiate an agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction. Here again, regrettably, there has been no progress. We are fully cognizant of the complexity of the issues involved. The scope of the prohibitions and the definition of agents subject to prohibition, as well as verification of compliance with the obligations to be assumed, are vexing problems not susceptible of easy solution. If, in view of this, at this stage a partial ban on chemical weapons were to be considered desirable, the General Assembly might start by considering the outlawing of "single purpose" agents. The scope of such a ban can later be extended, through negotiations, to "dual purpose" and "binary" weapons. In this regard my delegation has noted with interest the proposal put forward by Japan [A/9141, annex II, sect. 21], which we believe deserves serious consideration.

11. On the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference my delegation takes note of the fact that opinion is still divided not so much on the principle of holding such a conference as on its timing. We do not doubt that a worldwide conference will provide a certain impetus in favour of disarmament. However, we must be cautious in making use of the weapon of moral suasion and not allow it to become blunted through excessive or inappropriate use. It is our view that if the Conference is to be productive it must have the whole-hearted agreement of the nuclear Powers.

12. The informal exchange of views that took place on this subject, specially among the designated members of the Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, was useful in its own way. We, for our part, were gratified by the constructive approach brought to these discussions by all participants and the restraint and understanding they showed in not pushing controversies to the point of deadlock. Special thanks from all of us are due to Mr. Hoveyda of Iran, who combined his well-known diplomatic skills with an admirable detachment in guiding the informal deliberations towards a safe and satisfying conclusion.

13. We must pause, however, to consider what now needs to be done for the convening of the World Disarmament Conference and for its successful outcome. The statements we have heard so far in this Committee indicate that not all countries are yet of one mind as to when such a Conference might usefully be convened. Differences on this matter among the nuclear Powers persist and are of course crucial because without their participation and their willing co-operation the World Disarmament Conference will not achieve its ends. It is the belief of my delegation that in this matter the Committee will do well to be guided by the old adage, "make haste slowly".

14. The view has been expressed that the present Special Committee, suitably enlarged, should remain in existence or that a new body might be set up for the purpose of continuing the task given to the Special Committee. My delegation has no strong feelings on the subject. If the majority favours the continuation of the present Special Committee, or the establishment of a new one, Pakistan will go along with the idea. We have always held the view that if participation by all the nuclear Powers in the work of this Committee is not at this stage practicable, nothing should be done that might foreclose the possibility of their willing co-operation with it. We were glad to hear this view echoed in many of the statements made here. Clearly it is not the wish of anyone merely to provide a forum for airing well-known disagreements. We shall study with interest the several proposals that have been made in this regard and may have more to say on the subject later. Meanwhile, in our view the mandate of the Committee should remain confined to the task that it was given last year and which it was unable to perform. If in the discharge of this mandate the Committee can facilitate the reconciliation of differences that exist among the nuclear Powers and between the non-nuclear Powers and the others, we shall all have cause to be pleased indeed.

15. A word now on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. As a member of some years' standing of the

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament Pakistan is fully aware of that Committee's shortcomings. While its utility as a negotiating forum is somewhat in doubt, its role as a catalyst remains valuable. My delegation would certainly favour reforms designed to make the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament a more effective body.

16. The close connexion between disarmament and peace finds its best expression in attempts at creating zones of peace. Although such proposals aim at partial disarmament and regional peace-building, they are essentially models for the establishment of peaceful conditions all over the world. We have been very glad to hear of the progress which is being made through the adherence of two more great Powers to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>2</sup> but in this connexion the proposal to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace naturally evokes my country's particular interest. In the course of last year we were happy to co-operate with other members of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean in giving thought to measures for the realization of this objective. These preliminary discussions were most useful indeed in demonstrating the general support that there is in the region for the idea. They also brought to light the many difficulties which will have to be overcome for its realization.

17. By definition a zone of peace means a region at peace with itself. In the region of the Indian Ocean, more perhaps than in some other areas, much depends on the intentions and actions of the countries of the region. The seeds of conflict and tension in the area lie in unresolved disputes and problems, few of which had their origin in or are related to the cold war. Furthermore, countries of the area can ill afford an arms race and should be devoting all their resources and energies to the economic development and welfare of their countries and peoples.

18. Denuclearization of the Indian Ocean is a worthy objective, but we can hardly ignore the fact that it touches on the strategic interests of the great Powers. Meanwhile, we can begin with a renunciation by the littoral and hinterland States of their nuclear options. Certain elements, namely, peaceful settlement, regional arms balance and regional non-proliferation, seem to us essential to the concept of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, for its part, is willing to sit down with its neighbours in the region to examine the possibility of mutually reducing armed forces and military expenditures, and other related matters.

19. The war which suddenly broke out in the Middle East last month shows what happens when disputes remain unsettled. It shows the bankruptcy of a policy which seeks to maintain an unjust *status quo* by the weight of military force. It shows also how regional disputes can lead to involvement of the great Powers, even when their own interests are not directly affected.

20. I would like to conclude by expressing the hope that these lessons will be taken to heart by those involved, in one way or another, in this tragic and avoidable conflict,

<sup>2</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634, No. 9068, p. 283).

and that they will not be lost on the rest of us in other parts of the world.

21. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I wish to announce that Ethiopia has joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650.

22. Mr. KORHONEN (Finland): The Finnish delegation welcomes the fact that this year, for the first time, the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the German Democratic Republic are participating in this annual debate which gives to all States an opportunity to state their views on problems of equal and vital concern to all. More than ever before, the United Nations can now claim to speak on disarmament with the voice of the world community as a whole.

23. The disarmament debate of this year takes place in a situation which bears seemingly controversial characteristics. On the one hand, the process of political détente, underpinned by the strengthening of co-operation between major Powers, now seems established and has recently survived a remarkable political test. On the other hand, disarmament negotiations, at least in a multilateral frame, do not seem to be making much headway. In a word, détente, as such, does not produce instant disarmament.

24. Yet political détente provides the only realistic framework for success in disarmament efforts, whether bilateral, regional or world-wide. No amount of exhortation and insistence, however legitimate and sincerely motivated, can, as such, produce disarmament as if by fiat. Disarmament is the result of a patient and persistent process of negotiation such as that conducted at the strategic arms limitation talks and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, by the signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, by the International Atomic Energy Agency negotiations on the safeguards of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by the discussions now started on mutual force reductions in central Europe etc. By definition and by experience, this process is painfully slow and at times even tedious. Yet, at a time when the world is moving from confrontation and conflict toward negotiation and détente, disarmament remains a crucial pursuit in the quest for a more stable and peaceful world order.

25. In Europe, the process of political détente is well under way within the institutional framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to which Finland and Switzerland act as hosts. The Finnish Government is gratified that its consistent and active policy of neutrality has enabled us to make this contribution.

26. As far as European security is concerned, the Conference deals mainly with its political aspects, while the negotiations on force reductions in Vienna are supposed to deal with its military aspects in a more specific sense. It is obvious that these two processes are closely related to each other. The Conference itself has recognized this by stating in its agreed recommendations that endeavours to achieve disarmament complement political détente and thus constitute essential elements in a process of vital interest to all participating States. Furthermore, the Conference is dealing directly with a series of issues, so-called confidence-building measures, such as proposals for prior notification on major

military manoeuvres, exchange of observers at military manoeuvres, and prior notification on major military movements. These are not arms-limitation measures as such, but are intended to reduce the risks of military confrontation. Once approved, they would act as a factor of reassurance, and thus would contribute to the strengthening of confidence and stability.

27. It was with these self-same aims in mind that the President of Finland 10 years ago suggested that the Nordic countries be declared a nuclear-free zone. Last year at the 1882nd meeting my delegation gave here a detailed presentation of this suggestion and explained how it could be adapted, as a regional measure, to the changing political circumstances in Europe and at the same time be a contribution to world-wide efforts for nuclear-arms control. It is natural, therefore, that the Finnish Government sees the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in general as an appropriate framework for the further consideration of essential elements of this idea on a new basis.

28. As is the case with the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Vienna negotiations on force reductions have now accomplished their initial preparations and will be entering the phase of substantive work. While being aware that the very complexity of the problems at issue in Vienna will require patient and time-consuming negotiations, my delegation nevertheless wishes to express the hope that concrete initial results can be achieved at a rather early stage. We have noted with satisfaction the recent assurances of the parties that this is indeed their aim. Results achieved in Vienna would no doubt tend to accelerate and to give more substance to the process of political détente in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

29. From the point of view of issues pertinent to this debate, it is to be noted that the discussions between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev in Washington led to two major achievements. Both the Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms [see A/9293] are of far-reaching significance, not only to the parties concerned but to the international community as a whole.

30. The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War introduces a new dimension into the efforts to limit the threat posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are a threat to the strong as well as the weak, to the allied as well as the neutral, to the developing and the developed alike. This is inherently recognized in the Agreement, where the parties undertake an obligation to conduct not only their mutual relations but also their relations with all other States in a manner designed to exclude the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world. The parties also commit themselves once again, as is their duty under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any threat or use of force against any country. In a way, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War is therefore a codified expression of the awareness that nuclear weapons have so transformed the very nature of security, both political and military, that war



and the threat of war are no longer available as rational means of policy to States, however powerful they may be.

31. As a small neutral country which relies for its security not on military means or the protection of one Power bloc against another but on a policy designed to keep it outside the conflicts of interests between the great Powers, Finland has a natural interest in the development of a more rational and peaceful international order. The Government of Finland therefore welcomes the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War as a contribution of great importance to this end.

32. When discussing last year in this same debate the first agreements on the limitation of strategic arms my delegation noted that, since the very aim of the negotiations is to stabilize the nuclear strategic balance and to enhance the security of the mutual nuclear deterrent, it would not seem unreasonable to expect that the parties concerned are aware that qualitative development in the field of nuclear weapons can in the long run prove more upsetting to the nuclear balance than a mere discrepancy in the number of missiles. My delegation assumed that continued negotiations would focus on efforts to achieve restraints on the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race once the foundations for a quantitative balance had been laid.

33. A study of the Agreement on the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms leads my delegation to believe that that assumption was not unwarranted. It is encouraging to note that the permanent agreement which the negotiators have been instructed to work out in 1974 visualizes more comprehensive restraints also on the qualitative characteristics of strategic nuclear arms and that limits on certain technical capabilities such as multiple individually-targetable re-entry vehicles are contemplated. According to the commonly agreed guidelines, the permanent agreement will also provide for subsequent reductions in strategic offensive arms. The agreement therefore seems, in large measure, responsive to the appeal directed in General Assembly resolution 2932 (XXVII) to the Governments of the USSR and the United States to make every effort to expedite the conclusion of further agreements, including important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons systems. It is certainly the universal hope of this Assembly, and also, we believe, the intention of the parties concerned, that the permanent agreement to be achieved in the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms in 1974 will lead to a permanent end of the nuclear arms race between the two leading nuclear Powers.

34. It would not therefore seem only a pious hope that the second agreements to be concluded next year will finally also open up the way to the comprehensive test-ban treaty which has been blocked for the past 10 years. The deadline set for this purpose by the Assembly last year has come and gone, but that is no reason to relent in the pursuit of the fulfilment of the pledges given in the Moscow test-ban Treaty to seek the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

35. This year marked the tenth anniversary of the partial test-ban Treaty. One of the declared aims of that Treaty

was to put an end to the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances. The importance which people everywhere continue to give to this particular achievement can be measured by the wave of emotion and protest which has accompanied the nuclear tests which are still continuing in the atmosphere. But it is sometimes maintained that this is actually the only positive feature of that Treaty. The Finnish delegation begs to disagree. Such a claim would ignore the historical context of the partial test-ban Treaty. The Treaty concluded in Moscow 10 years ago was the first attempt to put any restraints on nuclear weapons. Others have followed: the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the sea-bed Treaty, and the first agreements on the limitation of strategic arms. My delegation believes that these would not have been possible without the first step taken 10 years ago in Moscow. My delegation also believes that without that first Treaty, we would not now be discussing a comprehensive test ban, far less having hopes of its ever being achieved.

36. In assessing the significance of the partial test-ban Treaty, one should also keep in mind its function as a non-proliferation measure. In this respect, this Treaty, which with its more than 100 parties is of the most universal application among all arms-limitation agreements, covers a significant number of States which have not undertaken any other treaty obligations with respect to nuclear weapons.

37. The partial test ban has not reduced the amount or the rate of nuclear testing by the leading nuclear Powers, as it was justifiably expected to do; far less has it stopped the nuclear arms race. Yet it seems legitimate to ask: What would the situation be without the partial test ban? Would there have been fewer tests? Would there have been fewer testing Powers? Would there have been a non-proliferation Treaty? Negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms? A Tlatelolco Treaty?

38. But this apotheosis of the partial test ban could never be an excuse for continued testing, be it underground or in the atmosphere. Nor is it an excuse for failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban, which is one of the most disappointing experiences in the course of the disarmament negotiations.

39. If a comprehensive test ban still continues to elude us, this certainly is not the result of lack of trying. Ever since the conclusion of the Moscow test-ban Treaty, a comprehensive test ban has stood among our highest priorities here as well as in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. No other arms limitation measure has received as intensive technical and scientific treatment as the question of verification of a comprehensive test ban. And this treatment has been highly successful. The assessment that for all practical purposes the question of the verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismic and other remote control methods has been solved was once again confirmed at expert meetings in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament last summer. The conclusion is therefore near that the decision necessary for the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is no longer being delayed by controversies surrounding the verification issue but rather that the absence of political will is now the only factor delaying the solution.

40. Yet there are solid political as well as arms limitation arguments in favour of a comprehensive test ban, not least in terms of the enlightened self-interest of the Powers principally concerned. A comprehensive test ban would be a natural complement to the efforts at the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to halt the nuclear arms race. It would be an important non-proliferation measure in itself, thus completing the work begun by the partial test-ban Treaty in this regard. Finally and most importantly, it would be the most effective single measure to underpin the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and would be understood in political terms as a convincing demonstration of the determination of the Powers principally concerned to fulfil the pledges given in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. These arguments assume increased cogency and urgency in the perspective of the non-proliferation Treaty review conference which will be held in Geneva in 1975.

41. The General Assembly reiterated last year its request to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, as a matter of priority, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction [*resolution 2933 (XXVII)*]. It may not be far from the mark to say that this request, reproducing the very language of the pledge given in article IX of the biological weapons Convention, was made in a mood of cautious optimism. This optimism in turn reflected a measure of progress achieved in the Conference in its discussions on chemical weapons in the previous year. The issue of separate versus combined treatment of biological and chemical weapons had been resolved by the biological weapons Convention. In its wake, the discussion of chemical weapons had assumed a more concrete and productive character; a useful meeting of experts had been held, accompanied by a number of equally useful working papers; a concrete proposal in the form of a draft convention had been presented by the socialist countries;<sup>3</sup> and other concrete proposals were expected. In a word, everything seemed to indicate that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be able to move from constructive discussion to concrete negotiation.

42. For the Finnish delegation it is cause for profound disappointment that this optimism has proved premature. Although a useful dialogue in the Conference has continued and an intensive treatment has further clarified certain key issues with respect to chemical weapons, a breakthrough of sorts, which at least some of us had expected, has not materialized. The outlook then would seem bleak indeed were it not for a most interesting and important contribution made by the delegation of Japan in the very last days of the session of the Conference. This contribution in the form of a working paper on the main points of an international agreement on chemical weapons seems to my delegation to deal in a very constructive and ingenious manner with the principal elements of a future chemical weapons treaty [*A/9141, annex II, sect. 21*]. In so doing, and taken together with other proposals made or yet to be made, it might well provide a framework for negotiation,

when the Conference reconvenes next year to continue its work.

43. Being aware of the need of appropriate preparatory work in the field of scientific knowledge connected with the verification and control of any conceivable treaty on chemical weapons, the Government of Finland has continued the project for the creation on a national basis of a chemical weapons control capacity for possible future international use. The Conference has been informed about the progress of this project through a working paper submitted to it by the Government of Finland on 9 August of this year [*ibid.*, sect. 20]. The work will continue, and my Government will keep the international bodies informed about its future progress.

44. It is an undeniable fact that the momentum of negotiation and agreement, which during the years has gained the Conference the renown of being the most effective and productive organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations available to the international community, has slackened. However, the temporary standstill in the negotiations is not the result of any inherent weaknesses in the structures or working methods of that body. If the negotiations are not advancing more rapidly, the reason for this is to be found in the substantive positions of the parties. It would be shortsighted to conclude that a definite impasse has now been reached in the Conference on chemical weapons, or indeed on any matter under discussion in that body. It is up to the General Assembly once again to give the Conference a chance to prove its usefulness and to resume its work with a greater sense of purpose and will for success than has been the case during the last year.

45. Turning in conclusion to the question of a World Disarmament Conference, I would like to quote the following from the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Ahti Karjalainen, during the general debate:

“A World Disarmament Conference, if well prepared and all nuclear Powers participate, would permit a universalization of the discussion on the subject. From such a Conference new impetus and new ideas could emerge to the benefit of us all”. [*2149th plenary meeting, para. 51.*]

46. My delegation has stressed on many occasions the importance we attach to the participation in the Conference of all the permanent members of the Security Council as well as all other significant military Powers. It is our opinion that we can successfully pursue this idea only on the basis of appropriate preparations during which the co-operation of States concerned could be secured.

47. In this connexion, we regard the discussion held here in the First Committee last year as constructive and positive. On the question of participation, a fragile compromise was reached. We regret the fact that the spirit of compromise which prevailed in the First Committee could not be implemented at the level of the Special Committee, despite the constructive efforts of Mr. Hoveyda of Iran. According to our understanding, the task before us this year is to make a new effort from the basis of last year's

<sup>3</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, document DC/235, annex C, sect. 5.

compromise and to proceed then in a way which preserves the co-operation of all parties throughout the process.

48. The consistent support given by my Government to the idea of convening a World Disarmament Conference has been based on the belief that progress toward the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved only through co-operation between all nations. A world-wide conference on disarmament would provide an opportunity for a general examination of all disarmament questions, for a reaffirmation of our commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament, and for charting the course and finding the priorities of future efforts in the field of disarmament.

49. The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that Bahrain and New Zealand have been added to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.650.

50. Mr. PEREZ DE CUELLAR (Peru) (*interpretation from Spanish*): In my first statement I would like to refer exclusively to item 32, that is, the World Disarmament Conference.

51. Speaking on that subject in this Committee last year, I expressed the opinion that the flaws that exist both in the established system for dealing with problems of disarmament and in the way that system functions could not be remedied within the present framework. I said at that time:

“My delegation considers that in setting into motion the machinery for preparing a World Disarmament Conference, the United Nations can find an exceptional opportunity to analyse itself as a function of the disarmament process”. [1888th meeting, para. 158.]

We therefore consider the World Disarmament Conference as a catalyst for negotiations on general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament.

52. At the last session we were resolutely in favour of resolution 2930 (XXVII) establishing the Special Committee that was to be responsible for studying the different proposals relating to that Conference.

53. Since the twenty-sixth session there has existed a unanimous pronouncement, if only in principle, in favour of the holding of the Conference. Yet, despite this agreement of principle, which was supported at least tacitly by the five nuclear Powers, the Special Committee was given non-operational terms of reference. Prudently, the General Assembly tempered the aspirations of the majority, and refrained from making the Committee a preparatory body.

54. The Secretary-General's note of 17 October 1973 [A/9228], and the statement made at the 1934th meeting by Mr. Hoveyda of Iran, who presided over these activities, are sufficiently objective to show us that the Special Committee has been paralysed this year. I must say that the conduct of Mr. Hoveyda in heading a Committee whose very existence was in doubt affords a rare example of diplomatic dexterity. But if one were to measure the success of a Committee that was never really acting as a Committee in terms of progress towards the Conference,

one would have to admit that its achievements are practically non-existent. I would go further. Perhaps a step backward has been taken in respect of resolution 2930 (XXVII), since there was a procedural agreement on that resolution, albeit fragile, that might have made it possible to set up a network of consultations between the Special Committee and the five nuclear Powers. But the functioning of such a system presupposed that the five nuclear Powers would remain on a footing of absolute equality, both real and apparent.

55. In view of the refusal of some of the nuclear Powers to participate in the Special Committee, a refusal on which I shall not pass judgement but which nevertheless is an inescapable fact, that equality implied, in the opinion of my delegation, that the five nuclear Powers should be in exactly the same situation as regards the Special Committee, namely, that their participation should be formally identical. Unfortunately, those conditions were not met in the establishment of the Committee. Peru's views on the matter are reflected in the letter that the group of Latin American States addressed to the Secretary-General on 2 February 1973 [A/9041].

56. We felt that rather than exacerbate an already difficult situation created by the composition of the Special Committee, we ought to wait until the present session. This is what has happened, and now we shall be able to reconsider the problem and perhaps avoid a relapse into the syndrome of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, with some nuclear Powers in the Special Committee and others outside.

57. I believe that the General Assembly should consider the proposal for a World Disarmament Conference without any preconceived notions. Above all, the true origin of the initiative behind the Conference has to be understood. It is an old proposal, submitted by the non-aligned nations, which was extremely timely in view of the stagnation of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Furthermore, that initiative must be considered as a means of encouraging negotiations and ensuring future participation in them by all nuclear Powers.

58. We shall welcome the proposals that may be submitted in the course of the present session, and it was thus with interest that we heard the ideas put forward by the representative of Argentina regarding the restructuring of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [1938th meeting] and the idea of the representative of Brazil of convening the Disarmament Commission [1942nd meeting]. We do not discard, however, the possibility of really reactivating the Special Committee set up by resolution 2930 (XXVII); but to do so successfully we must not fall into the same errors of form as we did at the last session of the General Assembly.

59. With regard to resolution 2930 (XXVII), perhaps its very vagueness led to the under-representation of certain regional groups and the over-representation of others. Furthermore, we ought not to repeat last year's mistake concerning the participation of the nuclear Powers; we should not hesitate to seek the co-operation of all of them, and to ensure that they participate in the Committee or, if this should be impossible, that all without exception—and

this must not be interpreted either as a restraint or as a reproof—refrain from participating. My delegation would consider it preferable to set up an organ in which the non-nuclear States can jointly and coherently make known their position than to follow *mutatis mutandis* the in-operative pattern of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

60. Mr. DE GUIRINGAUD (France) (*interpretation from French*): Eight items of great importance appear on the agenda of the debate which our Committee is devoting this year to the problems of disarmament. The French delegation has listened with great interest to the statements of previous speakers. We have noted that, as has happened every year, each has stressed the problem which is of particular concern to that delegation, while according to the idea of disarmament the essential place which is obviously due to it. You will not be surprised if I do the same thing and, after having analysed from an over-all viewpoint the general and the most urgent problem, devote some time to a point of special interest to my country.

61. The idea of disarmament may well be the focal point of our debates, the very expression of our aspirations. But we cannot talk about it in a vacuum, in the abstract. To be sure, the discussion is resumed every year in more or less the same terms, but each year it also has its particular tinge. The year 1973, we are told, will be the year of détente. Here I do not want to revert to a discussion in which many ministers, including our own, have taken different positions. I shall confine myself to noting that détente has not appeared in the field of disarmament; quite the contrary.

62. It would seem that never have so many arms been produced and stockpiled, and even distributed and used on battlefields which still survive in Indo-China and have reopened in the Middle East. Never has competition been so great between those who possess the most advanced and the most terrifying technologies. The expensive advances of some States in the atomic armaments field is such that it was not without some surprise that I heard the representatives of one of those States propose a uniform reduction of 10 per cent in the military budgets of States which are permanent members of the Security Council, as if for 25 years now we did not have the proof that two countries have engaged in a race, the burden of which, openly or covertly, they inflict on each other, so that they are in a state of permanent over-armament and have to remain over-armed when everywhere people are talking—and they themselves are talking, sincerely, I am sure—of disarmament. It would seem that there are two different sets of standards: that of those who possess such overwhelming strength that it becomes almost unreal, and the set of those which possess neither the means nor a motive for defying the Powers which are prisoners of their own competition, but simply wish to defend their independence.

63. And indeed, negotiations with a view to limiting so-called strategic weapons were embarked upon a few years ago between the two major Powers. The first agreements achieved within the framework of the strategic arms limitation talks led, as we readily acknowledge, to a limitation of certain types of strategic weapons. The ceilings established in those agreements are, however, higher than the quantity of weapons actually available to the

parties. Rivalry is continuing in the qualitative area; research and development of new types of weapons like multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles is serving to increase the destructive capacity of the two parties, and is also accompanied by an increase in their military budgets. In the circumstances, we may wonder how our United States colleague was recently able to say in this Committee that the agreements constitute a step towards true disarmament. The fact that everyone does not contemplate carrying to the point of absurdity a state of over-armament which remains the basic situation, obviously cannot be christened disarmament.

64. What do we see at the other extreme, that is to say, in the numerous committees and conferences devoted to this great and difficult problem? The report offered to us this year by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is, of all those that we have seen since its creation, the one which seems to be calculated to inspire the least optimism. As was so aptly pointed out at the beginning of the general debate at the 2149th plenary meeting by the representative of a country that has tirelessly worked for the cause of disarmament, the Foreign Minister of Sweden: "For the second year in succession, the Committee on Disarmament comes back to the General Assembly with empty hands."

65. Does not the ineffectiveness of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—and each year the comments to this effect grow more numerous—stem from the fact that this Organization is less than ever equipped to deal with the circumstances, and that neither its composition nor its procedures enable it to keep pace with the developments that have occurred in recent years? The Charter expressly entrusts our Organization with the specific task of dealing with disarmament questions. One may well wonder whether the United Nations has not been too hasty in giving up one of its most basic responsibilities by delegating the study of current problems to an organ not directly dependent on it, an organ that operates according to procedures that do not respect the principle of equality that must prevail among Member States, as it does among the permanent members of the Security Council.

66. The past year has been no less disappointing in another area, namely, the World Conference on Disarmament and its Special Committee, which is the subject of item 32 of our agenda. I should like to say here that France, which itself proposed that the problem of disarmament should be examined at a conference of States that possess nuclear weapons, is also in favour of convening a world disarmament conference in which the same Powers would participate. The obstacles encountered in this new undertaking cannot be attributed to us, and we would be prepared to consider any formula for negotiations that will enable us to tackle in all due seriousness a task which obviously continues to be of overriding importance.

67. This is the sum of our latest efforts. It is a disappointment to all of us. A mere sense of reality compels us to recognize that States exchange more promises than they keep where disarmament is concerned. For example, let us take the two important treaties, the Treaty of Moscow and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed respectively in 1963 and 1968. In the former we



read that the principal aims of the parties—and I should like to stress the word “principal”—is the “speediest possible achievement”—I repeat “speediest possible”—of an agreement on general and complete disarmament... which would eliminate the incentives to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons including nuclear weapons. The second Treaty stipulates in Article VI that “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” I do not want to accuse anyone here. I am ready to concede that some attempts have certainly been made over the last decade. However, when I consider that in the intervening period none of the objectives described as being paramount and urgent has been attained; when I am obliged to note instead that the nuclear over-armament race is being pursued without respite between the super-Powers and that they have found a way to make underground nuclear tests of a strength that is truly terrifying; when I see the excessive might of some and the fear of others, I feel obliged to make a statement to the Committee on France’s policy in this grave matter.

68. Peoples who want to remain free realize the price they must pay for their freedom. It is only natural that they should feel what the Moscow Treaty calls an “incentive” to obtain the weapons that other people possess. This incentive is a right. It is exactly what our Charter calls the “inherent right of self-defence”. No one can dispute this right or place any restrictions on such a right without increasing the dependence of the less strong on the stronger, or without adding to the arbitrariness and disequilibrium in the world in a way that can only be deplored. And if one concedes such a right, one has to accept its immediate corollary, that is, to recognize the legitimate right of all peoples to arrange for their defence by the same means that are used or have been used by others before them.

69. I come now to the special problem that I mentioned today, which has already been the object here and elsewhere of ill-founded and no doubt hasty criticism. I refer to our nuclear tests. I shall give the exact facts of the situation so as to be able to reply with the utmost clarity, I hope, to the two questions most frequently asked, namely, why is France committed to a nuclear policy, and how is France going about this, or, if you like, are our tests a hazard to anyone?

70. France is at peace with the world. It has no quarrel of any kind with any Power. Our enemies of yesterday are our friends and allies today. We maintain ties of cordial co-operation with countries that have political and social systems different from our own. We also maintain very close relations with States that refuse to join any of the existing political blocs.

71. I must say, however, that France cannot forget that in the space of a century its territory has been invaded three times and that, as a result of this, three times its people have been subjected to the direst tribulations. Despite the hopes for détente that have emerged recently, particularly in Europe, and which we welcome particularly since we are convinced we played a decisive role in initiating the process, we are obliged to note that for the time being, until the

world finally embarks upon a course of genuine disarmament, peace unfortunately still depends partly on the balance of armaments.

72. When, over a number of years, substantial supplies of conventional weapons are continually added in certain regions to gigantic stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is the duty of the French Government to foresee even the improbable. One does not improvise a nuclear weapon. Its development and the production of vehicles to carry it require years of research and work, which bear no comparison with the effort that can in the space of a few months cause a strong civilian industry to produce awesome quantities of conventional weapons. So, once France had resolved to follow an independent policy whatever the circumstances, it decided to acquire nuclear weapons, even without being faced with actual danger, in order to guard against potential dangers, even those that cannot now be foreseen. This is by no means a matter of prestige, still less a gratuitous assertion of national pride.

73. Situations could in fact arise in which possession of atomic weapons would be the only guarantee of national sovereignty and independence, in that it would deter any potential aggressor, even one for superior in conventional weapons, for it is quite clear that the weapons France is acquiring could only have a deterrent, that is to say, a defensive value. Hence those weapons are a factor for peace and equilibrium in Europe and the world.

74. Since those are our motives, which, as can be seen, are simple, I shall state once again that France is prepared at any time to discard its atomic weapons if others do the same. France would be the first to applaud if all the money currently being spent on the production of weapons—and world stocks are already quite sufficient for several apocalypses—were devoted instead to the well-being and development of the least favoured nations. By signing Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, my country demonstrated that it appreciates the wish of some regions of the world to protect themselves against the use, however hypothetical it might seem, of weapons which we should possess in Europe. I repeat, France is thinking only of its own defence. However, it does not see how anyone could ask it to make a unilateral sacrifice. It does not see why something which was good for some only a short while ago should now have become bad for others. Any renunciation in this area would, in fact, be tantamount to encouraging the over-armed States to rule the world and to assume responsibility for the destiny of mankind—an eventuality which they themselves say they reject and which we must help them to reject.

75. France’s nuclear weapon, which is necessary for its security and independence, is in the process of being developed. A very small number of nuclear tests are being carried out at the Pacific test centre. Do they constitute a hazard to any one? We have demonstrated that they do not. Every precaution has been taken to ensure that these tests represent no danger, either locally or in more distant areas.

76. The site was chosen so that the thermal and flash effects would do no harm to any one. Our test site is several hundred kilometres away from any inhabited land: 1,200

kilometres from Tahiti and more than 6,000 kilometres from Lima and Sidney. The territory of Metropolitan France naturally has no uninhabited area where we could carry out such tests. We therefore conduct them on a portion of French territory which is far removed from any inhabited area. Other States which have preceded us in the field of atomic research have had similar problems. They solved them in different ways, sometimes by testing on the territory of a foreign country, which at that time made no protest although it is protesting today against the tests we are making on our own national territory thousands of kilometres from its shores. I shall refrain from making any judgement here. What I do ask for is objectivity.

77. Debates, which are all the more heated where the participants lack crucial information, also centre on the risks to people and to plant and animal life at some distance from our test sites. I am aware of the fact that public opinion is sensitive to issues of this kind. Here, however, I am addressing representatives of responsible governments whose duty it is not only to hear the truth but also to see that it is heard. The fact is that it has been conclusively proved that the so-called risks of fall-out are quite negligible. Our tests involve no significant increase in the level of radioactivity. Radiation doses deriving from all natural and artificial sources of radioactivity are far greater than those that might derive from nuclear tests. The effects on human beings of low and very low doses, such as those resulting from our tests, have never been observed.

78. All this is common knowledge, or could be. We ourselves have collected a good deal of perfectly clear data in a White Paper, which has been distributed in New York and elsewhere; and if that is not enough, a reading of the last report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation<sup>4</sup> will prove to be just as convincing. I imagine no one will doubt the objectivity and high level of competence of an organ that all States can control, convene, improve and call upon even more often, according to the proposal we ourselves presented. The truth is quite accessible to everyone, if only people are willing to hear it.

79. Of course, there is nothing we can say to those who, bent on turning a deaf ear, persist in criticising without proof and, what is more, contrary to proof. It is undoubtedly difficult for us to convince those who prefer myths to the testimony of scientists. To the others, however, to those who are mindful of our desire for independence, an asset whose price is known to everyone here, I should like to say this: since it has been proved that France is doing no harm to anyone, it will disregard any discrimination. Deeply hurt by the lack of understanding shown by countries it esteems, it can see nothing but hypocrisy in any criticism overlooking the fact that the dangers of modern civilization stem not so much from nuclear tests as from the mere existence of nuclear weapons and, still more, from the absence of a genuine disarmament policy.

80. This brings me back to my point of departure; that is, that we note, not without sadness and disappointment, the continuing threats which overshadow our world. We are

here to discuss these threats and to try to remedy, to the utmost of our ability and determination, the real evils of our times. Let us get down to work with determination and equanimity.

81. Mr. BISHARA (Kuwait): Once again we rehearse our conventional roles in the debate on disarmament. Our positions are well known and our viewpoints tend to be repetitious. The inability of the small countries to influence the conduct of disarmament deprives their criticism of the weight it should have. In the arena of world politics the strong consider the weak their prey, while the latter are agitated by fear and anxiety.

82. There is a marked contradiction between the pious statements we hear in this hall and the conduct of some Powers outside. Is it a farce of global dimensions that has descended upon us? Or is it a lack of trust and the prevalence of fear?

83. Small countries worry about their future lot. The powerful are less preoccupied with the problem of survival which is the primary concern of the weak. Do we owe our survival to the nuclear stalemate and the delicate balance of power that prevails in the world today?

84. I speak as the representative of a small State whose only weapon is goodwill and the desire to lead a peaceful existence. I have no words to describe the magnitude of our concern with the dilapidated structure of international security. We should like to see disarmament a living reality, but we hate to engage in protracted and endless debates to expatiate on its merits and to apportion blame to those who are responsible for delaying its fulfilment.

85. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not yet succeeded in allaying fear and anxiety.

86. A mutual deterrent does not inspire small countries with confidence. They feel that they are at the mercy of the whims of super-Powers. Their instinct for self-preservation tells them that their destiny is not entirely in their own hands.

87. For the past two decades disarmament negotiations have been mainly in the form of a dialogue between the two super-Powers. The prospects of agreement have always been influenced by the prevalent political climate. Thus, arms control agreements are frequently a symptom of super-Power détente. The nations of the world naturally welcome any symptoms of relaxation of international tension, provided that amity among the big Powers is never achieved at the expense of the small, and that co-operation among the super-Powers should not imply dividing the world into spheres of influence or establishing a partnership in world hegemony.

88. The pattern of disarmament measures is still oriented towards establishing an exclusive arms club for the big Powers. The small countries are filled with anxiety and foreboding. Many of them do not even possess the defensive weapons needed to defend their independence and sovereignty.

89. The Security Council still meets every now and then to recognize some fait accompli. It is still incapable of

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Supplement No. 25.*

upholding the rule of law and restoring to the dispossessed and the injured their fundamental national and human rights. Chapter VII of the Charter remains a dead letter because of lack of agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council. This is, indeed, a very disquieting situation. It is the structure of international security that really matters. So long as the structure remains weak and fragile, the people of the world will view the conduct of the big Powers with scepticism and misgiving.

90. Disarmament is an integral part of the process of détente. The strategic arms limitation agreements, signed during the Moscow summit meeting in May 1972, imposed important restrictions on the production of nuclear armaments. These Agreements have changed the nuclear arms race from a race for quantity to a race for quality. We hope that further agreements will result in ending the race altogether. Complete and general disarmament is not only a cherished ideal which will constitute a major triumph for the cause of world peace. It is an essential prerequisite for employing the world's scarce human and natural resources for constructive purposes in order to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor. It is in this spirit that we welcome the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and a new round of strategic arms limitation talks between the United States and the Soviet Union.

91. It is gratifying to note that about 100 States have already signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. We hope that it will soon enter into force so that the world may be saved from the evils of these deadly weapons.

92. It is also gratifying to note that the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof has already entered into force. This Treaty only partially solved the problem of big Power arms rivalry in the sea-bed. We hope that the big Powers which are parties to the Treaty will honour their obligation to enter into negotiations concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

93. Little progress has been achieved in imposing a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Many constructive proposals were offered in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for dealing with this problem. The delegation of Japan, for instance, suggested a pragmatic approach which would require the prohibition, as a first step, of super-toxic chemical agents, to be followed by a gradual expansion, in scope, of the prohibition to the point where there would be a comprehensive prohibition of all chemical warfare agents. We would like to congratulate all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament who are seeking to bridge the gap between the views of the super-Powers because their conduct offers a ray of light in what otherwise would seem a gloomy prospect for agreement.

94. This year marks the tenth anniversary of the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the

Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. This Treaty has come to be viewed over the years as a measure to prevent pollution of the atmosphere by radioactive wastes rather than a true measure of disarmament. Its real disarmament value depends on widening its scope so as to include underground tests. Progress in science and technology is making it increasingly possible to detect and identify underground nuclear tests. A lot of material has been published which reveals that all the scientific and technological prerequisites necessary to achieve a final comprehensive ban now exist. The main drawback is the absence of a political will reflected in the desire of some Powers to continue tests for the purpose of improving their present weapons and developing new ones.

95. My delegation firmly believes that all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments should be prohibited and that all nuclear-weapon States should become parties to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

96. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on 5 March 1970, is still lagging behind other disarmament treaties because comparatively few countries have ratified it or acceded to it. Many militarily significant and near-nuclear-weapon States remain outside the non-proliferation régime. Among the countries that have not ratified or acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty are some that have the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons in the future; and there is evidence that some are actually in the process of doing so. This naturally undermines the value of this Treaty and should cause concern to States that have hastily ratified it without waiting until all potential manufacturers of nuclear weapons have proved their good faith and willingness to accept the non-proliferation régime.

97. The Soviet Union has taken the initiative during the present session of the General Assembly of raising the question of the reduction of military expenditures and using the proceeds for the benefits of the developing countries. The military expenditures of big Powers are becoming wasteful because they are multiplying the existing capacity of one side to annihilate the other, bringing about a world holocaust in the process, thus not promoting the security of one or the other.

98. Moreover, the problems of the developing countries are becoming more pressing. The process of economic and social development can benefit a great deal if the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics gains wide acceptance. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Soviet Union for the initiative it has taken. Kuwait, which has for the last decade been devoting a large portion of its national income to helping other developing countries, is pleased to note that at least some of the big Powers may be contemplating practical measures for reducing the disarmament burden and channelling valuable resources for constructive purposes in their own countries, and for accelerating the pace of development in the developing countries.

99. My delegation supported from the very outset the proposal to hold a world disarmament conference. Lack of co-operation by several permanent members of the Security Council with the Special Committee has so far prevented

the preparations from reaching an operative stage. We would like to take this opportunity to express anew our support for the proposal and to commend the Special Committee which, notwithstanding the severe restrictions under which it is conducting its work, is making a brave effort to realize this dream which is shared by a majority of States in the United Nations.

100. The World Disarmament Conference, we believe, will deal with a wide range of topics which have not been successfully broached or dealt with by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. These include, *inter alia*, the dismantling of military bases in the territories of other countries, the reduction of military budgets, the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and, above all, the application of complete and general disarmament measures to the big Powers themselves. The World Disarmament Conference will be a useful forum for examining the conduct of the big Powers and asking them to renounce the exclusivist measures that enable them to pile up arms while disarming or restricting the military potential of all other countries.

101. Kuwait is one of the ardent advocates for declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The countries of the Indian Ocean suffered in the past from the ideological conflict between the big Powers and the division of the world into spheres of influence through the establishment of military bases and the conclusion of military pacts designed to promote the interests of the big Powers. We commend the work of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean which was set up to turn the zone of peace concept into a living reality. We wish it success in its endeavours that will strengthen further the friendly relations among the countries of the Indian Ocean and save them from involvement in trends and policies that serve foreign interests.

102. It is our firm conviction that the security and stability of the Gulf area are the responsibility of the littoral States. We shall, therefore, tenaciously oppose any attempt to transform the Gulf into a sphere of big Power rivalry for the purpose of establishing zones of influence in it.

103. We live in an age of great unrest and great change, an age of revolution in thought and ideas. It is the most remarkable age in mankind's history. The genius of man has opened vast vistas of achievement; yet we have failed to find the means to ensure man the peaceful enjoyment of his life.

104. In this modern age any of us can cross the earth at twice the speed of sound. One machine in a second can make calculations which would take a hundred men a hundred years. Men travel through space, reach out to the moon and beyond. Yet with the touch of a button this earth may be destroyed. It would be a pity if man's genius, *which can achieve so much, fails to appreciate the fact that without general and complete disarmament we can all be blown off the face of the earth and that future inhabitants of this planet will wonder about the discrepancy between man's capacity to build and his greater ability to destroy.*

105. Mr. IBINGIRA (Uganda): Sir, let me take this opportunity, as it is the first time I am speaking, to

welcome your election as our Chairman. My delegation and I feel happy at the way in which you are guiding our proceedings and I would like to offer you our continuing co-operation in the discharge of your task.

106. I would like in this debate to dwell principally on the economic consequences of the armaments race and its harmful effects on peace and humanity.

107. All of us in the world community of nations have a great stake in peace, although we may wonder if we have the same ideas about the manner of attaining it. Despite the recent Middle East war and the great Power involvement in it, my delegation feels that, on the whole, the atmosphere for embarking on a serious consideration of the reduction of armaments in order to promote better and more rapid economic development is quite suitable. Everyone has welcomed the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union, including the significant Soviet-American summit in Washington concerning the prevention of nuclear war, the conclusion of the Viet-Nam conflict, which had emerged as a full-scale war, and the new relations between the United States and China.

108. In Europe, which in a single lifetime has been the source of two devastating world wars, we have witnessed the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the discussions concerning the reduction of arms and armed forces in central Europe, soon to be resumed, and the admission of the two German States as Members of this Organization.

109. Yet, despite this apparent trend, there are two facts that stand out with alarming clarity. The first is that the world's military expenditure has already passed the \$200,000 million mark. The great nuclear Powers, in spite of all the other steps already taken towards disarmament, such as the agreements in the first strategic arms limitation talks, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and under Water Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, expenditure on armaments is still escalating. Experts on the arms race say that while there has been an attempt to limit horizontal escalation, there is no corresponding attempt to limit vertical escalation. This means the refinement at a great cost of existing weapons making them more deadly than the world has ever known.

110. But the expenditure has soared not only in the case of the production of nuclear weapons, but also in the manufacture and purchase of conventional arms as well. The Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Algiers in September this year noted with concern that the flow of conventional arms to non-nuclear-weapon States was a threat to the security of the non-aligned countries, not only because it gave rise to tension in some regions, but also because it tended to divert resources badly needed for economic development towards armaments supplied by great Powers, which need markets for them. There is therefore great urgency not only to halt the escalation of the expenditure on armaments, both nuclear and conventional, but to go further and curtail such expenditure so that the funds thus released could be used for the better development of mankind.



111. The second fact that stands out so clearly and that derives from the first is that the escalation of the armaments race contributes towards the widening of the gap between the developed and the developing countries. In his perceptive note of 26 September 1973 on review and appraisal of the objectives and patterns of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade<sup>5</sup> the Secretary-General urges all countries actively to promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament so that the resources thus released as a result of effective measures of actual disarmament could be used for the promotion of the economic and social development of all nations. This noble objective, unfortunately, is so far still doomed to the realm of mere concept.

112. The developing world, which accounts for 70 per cent of the world population, subsists on only 30 per cent of the world's income. The widening gap between the haves and have-nots of the world community can be illustrated by the fact, for instance, that the actual annual *per capita* income in the developing countries ranged between \$150 and \$500, compared with \$2,500 in Europe, \$4,600 in the United States, and \$1,900 in Japan.

113. The actual rate of growth in *per capita* income in Asia and Africa in the last decade, that is, 1960-1970, was \$6.3 and \$4.5 respectively, and \$24 in South America, while the comparable rate in Europe was over \$100, in the United States \$155, and in Japan \$191. Even if the 1 per cent target for aid was achieved, and we are informed by the Secretary-General's report that this has not been the case, a 6 per cent growth rate in the developing countries would improve the situation only marginally. For instance, the rate in Africa would then be \$12 per annum, in Asia \$9 per annum, and in Latin America \$33 per annum, compared, for instance, with Europe, where it would be \$100 per annum.

114. It is because of our desire to see effective disarmament steps taken, thereby releasing funds for economic development, that we have warmly welcomed the draft resolution by the Soviet Union<sup>6</sup> concerning the reduction by 10 per cent of defence expenditures of the permanent members of the Security Council and the use of part of the funds thus released for the economic development of the developing countries. We shall have a few comments to make when the debate on that item takes place but in principle we view it as a positive trend and not as mere polemics, and we will support it in the plenary Assembly.

115. My delegation considers it of the utmost usefulness to the international community that the World Conference on Disarmament should be called without undue delay, and that in that Conference all States Members of this Organization should be represented in the search for a satisfactory solution that would eventually lead to disarmament and to the freezing of military budgets and, it is to be hoped, to their subsequent reduction.

116. With that end in view we regard as important the work of the Special Committee which was set up last year to deal with matters concerning the forthcoming Conference. It is important that all regional groups should be equitably represented. Last year several consultations were carried out between the then President of the General Assembly and representatives of the group of African States with a view to expanding the membership of our group in the Special Committee, as we consider it of paramount importance to be well and effectively represented. I was happy to hear the statement of the representative of Poland [1935th meeting] accepting a reasonable enlargement of that Committee in a manner acceptable to all regional groups and interested States. For our part we are willing to discuss this matter further with all interested parties in order to come to an equitable composition of the Committee.

117. We hold the view that the Special Committee is the forum in which all matters and arrangements concerning a future World Disarmament Conference should be discussed and agreed upon, and we should all take the opportunity to participate in such a discussion in order that it may be all-embracing and avoid the pitfalls that have befallen the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in this respect. It is our belief that this does not usurp the functions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since it would itself be part of the Special Committee. We might not, however, proceed to prepare for a disarmament conference if some Member States, in particular some nuclear Powers, for some reason or other should feel that they were unable to attend, thereby making it impossible to reach universal agreement. In our view the most urgent task should be a positive attempt by all of us to explore all possible avenues through which we can meet the objections of any nuclear Power, and by removing such objections or obstacles pave the way for a disarmament conference that would truly be world-wide.

118. Much as we desire this Conference, happy as my delegation would be to participate in its proceedings it would be abortive if it were to be boycotted by any nuclear Power. On that basis we still have to make up our minds about how soon we should hold such a Conference, and our commitment must depend on the extent to which we succeed in making the desire for a disarmament conference universal, especially with regard to the nuclear Powers.

119. Finally, I should like to make an observation concerning the objective of disarmament. It is true that if we were to end all testing of nuclear weapons of any description, if we were to freeze military budgets at their present ceilings and then gradually reduce them, committing the funds thus released to economic development among the poorer nations, and if we were to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons it would be a great achievement—and it must surely be the ambition of every peace-loving country to attain these objectives. But a fundamental question surely must remain, namely, would this ensure the safety of our planet against a nuclear holocaust for all time? It seems self-evident judging from the behaviour of mankind in all recorded history that every weapon, improvised or manufactured, has always found its use in war.

<sup>5</sup> See A/C.2/L.1287.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 102, document A/9191.

120. We are embarking on the first experiment in the whole span of human history by claiming that we can possess a weapon and still deny ourselves the use of it in conflict at all times, in perpetuity.

121. Indeed, the very desire to retain these weapons—and other weapons of mass destruction—is ample evidence of

the option on the part of those who have them to use them if necessary.

122. In our view, therefore, the most fundamental objective of disarmament must always remain the total destruction and elimination of all nuclear weapons.

*The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.*