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Chairman: Mr. Andrés AGUILAR M. (Venezuela).

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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (continued) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. SHARIF (Indonesia): Before I proceed, permit me, on behalf of my delegation, to extend my condolences and deep sentiments of grief and sorrow to the delegation of France at the sudden death of former President Charles de Gaulle. *Requiescat in pace.*

2. Last year our discussions in this Committee on the items of disarmament coincided with the commencement of the much awaited bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union in Helsinki. Only a week ago the third round of these negotiations was resumed, after the Vienna talks in May this year.

3. My Government attaches great importance to the negotiations, since we have for a long time, urged that any real progress towards nuclear disarmament—or any aspect of disarmament for that matter—depends so much on how far these two major Powers are willing to adjust their national interests to correspond with the interests of the whole world and with the desire of the whole of mankind for peace.

4. Peace is not the prerogative of the major Powers alone. It is of equal urgency to all nations, large and small.

5. It is our hope that the talks will show some real progress and that, even without too much publicity, serious efforts are being made in order that mankind may be able to concentrate more upon a betterment of its economic and social conditions.

6. The question is not so much one of disarmament or of limitation of armaments itself; it is rather how to diminish and if possible to dissipate the distrust and suspicion that bedevil the two opposing parties. However much importance these parties attach to their own interests, my

delegation nevertheless believes that it is also incumbent upon them to consider the presence of others in this world, who are not aligned with any of their political groupings.

7. A future nuclear war could never be a limited war, and a global war will bring mankind total annihilation, since, in view of the destructive power of present-day nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the survival of the victorious party is totally excluded. It is the survival of mankind that is at stake.

8. At an earlier discussion in connexion with the item on the strengthening of international security, my delegation had occasion to touch briefly on the general principle of disarmament as one of the three interrelated main problems of world concern today. I stated at that time [*1735th meeting*] that in order to strengthen international security we must strengthen the United Nations, and in order to strengthen the United Nations we should intensify our efforts in the field of decolonization, development and disarmament. The commemorative session of our Organization has given us the opportunity to reflect upon our 25 years of labour and to prepare a programme for the future in those three fields.

9. By virtue of resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, decolonization is no longer the regional platform of some "progressive" countries, but has become the recognized official policy of the United Nations. Furthermore, even in the face of 15 abstentions, the commemorative session has adopted a programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples [*resolution 2621 (XXV)*]. With a clearly defined policy, and the Committee of Twenty-Four as the appropriate machinery for its implementation, the United Nations is well prepared to meet this unfinished task.

10. In the field of development, the general provisions of the Charter have ultimately been translated into the unambiguous formula of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade [*resolution 2626 (XXV)*], which was adopted at our commemorative session. The implementation of this policy can be entrusted to the United Nations Development Programme, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the specialized agencies and other bodies, with the necessary improvements in the co-ordination of their work. With a clearly defined policy and a complete set of machinery, full implementation of the policy depends further very much on the good will and co-operation of all Member States. It is for that reason that I would take this opportunity to join all those who have made an earnest appeal, in particular to the rich developed countries, so as to ensure their co-operation and assistance in implementing the development strategy.

11. In the field of disarmament our achievements are minimal indeed. Apart from such non-armament measures as the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹ the Antarctic Treaty of

1959,² the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,³ the outer space Treaty of 1967,⁴ the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁵ and its two Additional Protocols of 1967 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] of 1968, which no doubt are all important, we still have at this time, 25 years after the Charter was approved, no agreed disarmament policy or programme. What makes it worse is that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is at present the only functioning machinery charged with the all-important disarmament question. Its status is that of a mere negotiating committee, appointed initially by the two major nuclear Powers, with the subsequent blessing of the General Assembly.

12. It is true that, according to the Charter, two other bodies are charged with disarmament. Article 26 charged the Security Council with "formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments".

13. Article 47 charged the Military Staff Committee with advising and assisting the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. Time does not permit me to go deeper into this matter.

14. We are all very much indebted to the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for their excellent work. The record of their meetings this year, contained in their invaluable report [*A/8059-DC/233*], which is particularly important to us as a non-member of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, testifies to the seriousness and devotion with which they discharged their assignment. From that report, and from earlier reports, we note that progress seemed to be painfully slow. Since, however, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is a negotiating committee, we cannot expect more.

15. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has no sub-committees to deal with specific items such as the suspension of nuclear tests, reduction of armaments, demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, conventional weapons, chemical and bacteriological weapons. Items negotiated are reported to and discussed by the First Committee. Issues that have not been agreed upon are usually referred back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for consideration, and it is only at the following session that some new progress can be expected.

16. As has been stressed, we all attach great importance to the items on disarmament. It certainly is not commensurate

² United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁴ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁵ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

¹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

with the importance we attach to them to deal with these highly important problems by inserting them piecemeal between the general political and security items. If we are indeed serious in our desire to achieve real progress in our urgent disarmament negotiations, we must seriously consider the machinery entrusted with that programme.

17. To our mind, there are at present at least three ways open to us. First, we can plan for a world disarmament conference, as has already been proposed by several members. The time needed for preparations, and the costs involved, would not permit us to have such a conference in the foreseeable future.

18. Secondly, we can reactivate the Disarmament Commission established by General Assembly resolution 1252 (XIII) of 4 November 1958. Since it consists of all Member States, who can include in their respective delegations military and other technical experts as well as political representatives, the Commission can organize its work through working groups and sub-committees so as to accelerate completion of the disarmament programme.

19. Thirdly, we can transform the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and elevate its status from that of negotiating committee to a full-fledged new disarmament commission replacing the present one. The present number of members and the composition of the membership seem to meet with the satisfaction of all Member States. Members of the new disarmament commission should, however, be elected for a fixed term of office in accordance with the representative character of all United Nations organs. We believe that new members may also bring to it a new atmosphere and new ideas for discussion.

20. Having expressed my delegation's views on procedures and machinery, I should now like to request the Committee to turn its attention to the question of disarmament policy and a programme of action that we can entrust to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or whatever organ we may further decide upon.

21. The need for such a disarmament programme, as has been emphasized by many speakers before me, is generally felt. In welcoming the designation of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade, and in ensuring the success of that Decade, the Heads of State or Government of 53 non-aligned countries, at their conference at Lusaka in September this year, unanimously recommended drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament and suggested *inter alia* the following general order of priorities: first, measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, such as a cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and its transfer to peaceful uses, a halt to the production of nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban, and reduction and destruction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons; secondly, other priority measures such as an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all nations; and thirdly, non-armament or confidence-building measures, such as a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons, demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor beyond an agreed limit, and so on.

22. The Heads of State or Government further stressed that to ensure progress one essential confidence-building measure in the field of disarmament is a firm commitment, assumed through an international agreement binding and universal in character, not to resort to force and not to intervene in any manner whatsoever or under any circumstances in the internal affairs of other States. That and other principles have already been incorporated in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [*resolution 2625 (XXV)*].

23. The members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as is noted in the report of the Conference, were particularly aware of the need to encourage activities directed towards systematic progress in solving the complex problems of disarmament. They discussed many subjects relevant to the essence of the issue, including, *inter alia*, the interdependence of disarmament problems and questions of international peace and security; the priority of nuclear disarmament; the need to give due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament, to limit armament and to achieve disarmament; the need to ensure that no State or group of States gains military advantages at any stage of disarmament measures; the importance of converting resources released by disarmament to peaceful uses.

24. We hope that the discussions on the interdependence of disarmament problems and questions of international peace and security have also helped to bring about a better understanding of the question of conventional weapons in the context of maintaining the need to strengthen the preservation of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of developing nations against aggression from without and rebellion from within.

25. For the programme itself, my delegation believes that the set of four priorities proposed by the representative of Sweden [*1750th meeting*] to facilitate the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for 1971—consisting of following up and completing work on first, bacteriological and chemical weapons; secondly, completion of the non-proliferation Treaty, with rules governing the utilization of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes; thirdly, a comprehensive test ban; and fourthly, the demilitarization of the sea-bed—seem to be practical and in line with the priorities suggested by the Lusaka Conference and would thus easily meet with our approval.

26. For a comprehensive long-term programme, we owe thanks to the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, who have submitted a draft comprehensive programme on disarmament [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42*]. With the clarifications of the representative of Mexico last Monday [*1753rd meeting*], and with the targets of the Disarmament Decade before us, my delegation believes it could serve as a basis for discussion in order to facilitate agreement on a 10-year programme for disarmament negotiations.

27. We are particularly happy to note that section II of the draft programme includes, *inter alia*, under the heading "Principles", the principles announced in this very room on

20 September 1961, some 10 years ago, in the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations.⁶ The hopes we had at that time have not been realized.

28. With a short-term programme of four items, as proposed by the representative of Sweden, and a comprehensive programme for our first Disarmament Decade we now have new hope for a fresh start. We also hope to have strengthened machinery to which we can entrust the implementation of our programme. For our part, we should, with our experience of the past 10 years, and considering the importance of the subjects discussed, follow more closely the deliberations and work of the Conference. Furthermore, in order to give all Members of the United Nations full opportunity to follow closely the progress of work, the Conference should not become an exclusive club but should open its doors to observers from any Member State.

29. Concerning the items of our agenda included in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I should now like to give my delegation's comments on agenda item 29, "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests".

30. In our efforts to achieve the early suspension of those tests, my delegation last year supported resolution 2602 (XXIV), appealing to the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a preliminary measure, a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive nuclear weapon-systems. In resolution 2604 B (XXIV) we further called on nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments. The response is, however, ironical indeed.

31. The new *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70*,⁷ from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), reported a total of 73 nuclear tests conducted during the period from January 1969 to June 1970. Of these, 51 were American underground weapon tests. The United States also conducted two "Plowshare" tests and one test-detection test in the same period. The Soviet Union conducted 16 tests during that period; China, two, one in the atmosphere and one underground; and France, five, all in the atmosphere. The biggest challenge, however, is the fact that on the very same day, 14 October, when we were about to begin here the commemorative session of the United Nations, the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China saw fit to conduct nuclear explosions.

32. Whatever the challenge, we have to continue our untiring efforts to bring all nuclear and thermonuclear tests to a halt. We wholeheartedly support the suggestion of the representative of Sweden that the United States and the Soviet Union, at the resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks at Helsinki, take this fresh opportunity of convincing the anxiously awaiting world that a sincere change of course is forthcoming, by halting, for the duration of the talks to begin with, all testing of nuclear weapons, all testing of strategic missiles and, specifically,

the prevention of the development and testing of any new nuclear-missile systems, either offensive or defensive. Such a declaration by the United States and the Soviet Union will strengthen the hopes of mankind and the confidence of all in the good faith and sincerity of the two major nuclear Powers.

33. On the issue of effective measures relating to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, notably on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament shows in paragraphs 12 to 22 that, although the importance of this measure was recognized, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was faced with a stalemate on the issues regarding the question of verification. The United States position is that adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban should include provisions for on-site inspections, while the Soviet Union regards the use of national means of detection for the purpose of control with regard to the prohibition of underground nuclear testing as adequate.

34. My delegation listened with great care to the representative of Nigeria, who stated [*1752nd meeting*] that no control could be absolutely fool-proof, and that in the final analysis the political will to take certain risks might be the deciding factor. The consensus of the scientists in the Pugwash Conference on Peace and International Co-operation strengthened that pronouncement. The scientists stated that the problem of extending the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty to underground testing is essentially political, and that technical problems of verification are not the stumbling block. The group was, further, unanimous in strongly recommending the ultimate adoption of a complete ban on tests, regardless of whether a fool-proof verification system by on-the-spot inspection could be devised and accepted.

35. In order to strengthen the reliability and credibility of the control system, my delegation last year supported General Assembly resolution 2604 (XXIV) on the exchange of seismic data. We believe that progress in seismological detection and identification can reach the point where confidence can be established that faithful observance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be verifiable. We are pleased to see the encouraging responses [*see A/796/7/Rev.1*] to the circular of the Secretary-General, and are grateful to the Canadian delegation for its further analysis of the responses [*A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 34*].

36. We believe that if, for the time being, it is not feasible to agree to a complete ban on underground testing, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could try to proceed along the lines of the different threshold proposals, in combination with some kind of verification by challenge or inspection by invitation, as was proposed by the representative of the Netherlands.

37. On the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation would like to take this opportunity to reiterate that Indonesia signed the Treaty on 2 March 1970 in the conviction that it would serve as an important step towards effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

⁷ Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970.

38. Together with the non-aligned countries, the Government of Indonesia has a consistent policy of supporting all efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and of directing all endeavours towards the exclusively peaceful applications of nuclear energy. The Indonesian Government is already a party to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, and it has always supported draft proposals to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

39. There is no doubt that the non-proliferation Treaty can be effective only if all countries, nuclear-weapon as well as non-nuclear-weapon States, become parties to the Treaty.

40. We take special note of article III, paragraph 3, of the Treaty, stating that the safeguards required shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities. It is therefore the common task of all parties to this Treaty to make the relevant safeguard agreements acceptable to all.

41. We further attach great importance to the declarations of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union affirming their intention to seek Security Council action, to provide or support immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty that is a victim of an act, or an object of a threat, of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Of utmost importance, however, is not the action after a nuclear attack has been committed, but the guarantees to prevent such an attack. The Indonesian Government trusts that the nuclear-weapon States will study further this question of effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

42. Turning now to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons, my delegation is pleased to note that the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and the destruction of such weapons, has made some progress.

43. Chemical and bacteriological agents of warfare represent, indeed, a particularly inhuman variety of weapons of mass destruction, because their effects are often uncontrollable. Their production is, furthermore, not limited to four or five countries, as is the case of nuclear weapons. Their use, which could cause an enormous loss of human life, has therefore been condemned and prohibited as a crime against humanity and a gross violation of the generally recognized rules of international law, by international agreements and, in particular, by the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

44. Last year, in resolution 2603 B (XXIV), we requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the arsenals of States, on the basis of the draft proposals of the socialist countries and of the United Kingdom, and other proposals.

45. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has now reported, in paragraphs 27-38 of its report, that it

is now felt to be important and urgent to reach agreement on halting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and biological agents for purposes of war, and on achieving their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons. There seemed to be a difference of opinion in the Conference on two points only: first, the need for treating together both chemical and biological weapons, and, secondly, the issue of verification.

46. My delegation has studied the relevant working papers, including the individual papers submitted by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Italy and the Soviet Union, and the paper by the United States on the relationship between the production of chemical agents for war and the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes by commercial industry, as well as the working paper by Japan on the question of convening a group of experts to study the technical aspects of verification for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

47. On this issue, my delegation would like to associate itself with the views expressed in the joint memorandum [*ibid.*, sect. 39] submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps to prohibit their development, production and stockpiling and to secure their ultimate effective elimination from the arsenals of all States. The issue of verification is equally important, since adequate verification is indeed also essential for the success of any measures in this field. Reasonable guarantees and safeguards should therefore be devised to inspire confidence in the implementation of any agreement in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure effective implementation of the prohibition.

48. Another important item in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the question of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

49. Last year my delegation supported resolution 2602 F (XXIV), calling upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a new draft treaty for consideration in the present session of the General Assembly.

50. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament testifies to the seriousness of the attention that the members have given to this item. We appreciate having now before us the new draft treaty, in annex A of the report. Article II now contains clearer provisions regarding the treaty obligations. The verification provisions in article III are well specified, and so is the disclaimer provision in article IV.

51. We had occasion in this Committee, and in other forums, to emphasize the unique position of an archipelago State, like my country and others, in regard to the adjacent waters surrounding the component islands. The seas sur-

rounding the islands in an archipelago are important, not only as part and parcel of the national life and a God-given source of livelihood for the people of those islands, but for the security of the entire nation as well. As a non-armament measure, my delegation last year welcomed the idea to prohibit the further spreading of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction to the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, as a continuation of our efforts to ban such weapons from all environments; but the treaty should not encroach upon our national territorial jurisdiction, directly or indirectly.

52. Indonesia is not a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1958.⁸ My delegation is very much indebted to the representative of El Salvador, Mr. Galindo Pohl, for his highly illuminating elucidation yesterday [1757th meeting] of the shortcomings of the draft treaty. We are particularly impressed by his references to the Geneva Conventions in relation to articles I, II and IV. We subscribe to his views. Furthermore, my delegation believes that, in the absence of security guarantees on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, particularly the ones in our area, the limitation of the so-called sea-bed zone of 12 miles reserved for defence arrangements needs further examination.

53. My delegation welcomes the growing attention of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the question of conventional weapons, since these weapons are of direct importance for the developing nations, which now constitute two-thirds of the membership of the United Nations.

54. My delegation has noted with appreciation the United States working paper on the question of conventional arms limitation [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 36]. Stating that its main aim is to reduce the likelihood and potential level of regional conflicts, it develops a set of principles in the context of regional security. The working paper can serve, in the opinion of my delegation, as a helpful basis for discussions to supplement and strengthen our declaration on the principles of international law with regard to friendly relations and co-operation among nations and to the defining of aggression.

55. Regional security no doubt depends very much on stability in each individual State. The question that, in my delegation's view, is urgent at this time, therefore, is to find ways and means of regulating—not controlling—the regular supply of conventional weapons to existing functioning Governments in independent small, medium-sized and developing countries, in order to enable them to maintain law and order against rebellions from within, to defend their territorial integrity and national independence against aggression from without and to secure national stability.

56. Several delegations have drawn our attention to the extraordinary increases in the expenses of trade in conventional weapons in recent years. Figures on defence expenditure have been quoted from such publications as those of the Institute for Strategic Studies: for example, 8.6 per cent of the gross national product for the United States and 8.5 per cent for the Soviet Union in 1969. While averages

for the remaining countries were quoted as 3.7 per cent for countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 4.2 per cent for Warsaw Pact countries, many countries outside the two alliances were reported to spend a much higher percentage: between 10 per cent and 25.1 per cent. The high percentage for expenditures for armament purposes is generally the result of tension and hostilities, not exclusively caused by the nation's own national problems. It is true that the danger of a cold-war confrontation of the major nuclear Powers has been reduced, but the same cannot be said for the smaller nations. This was also noted by the Heads of State or Government of 53 non-aligned countries at a Conference at Lusaka in September 1970, who in their Declaration on Disarmament stated, *inter alia*, that:

"The immediate danger of a conflict between the super-Powers has lessened because the tendency to negotiate for the improvement of their mutual relations is strengthening. However, it has not yet contributed to the security of the small, medium-sized and developing nations, or prevented the danger of local wars.

"The practice of interfering in the internal affairs of other States, and the recourse to political and economic pressure, threats of force and subversion are acquiring alarming proportions and dangerous frequency."

57. We have noted rebellions and unrest within those newly independent small, medium-sized and developing nations. Some have even been the victims of aggression from outside. Newly independent developing nations have, generally speaking, no weapon industry of their own. However important such an industry may be, they need first and foremost the development of their natural resources and of those industries which will help to raise the economic level of living of their peoples. Thus for many years to come they will depend for their armaments on imports from abroad, for which they are compelled to use a large portion of their meagre foreign exchange reserves. To meet these difficulties in payments, we are familiar with practices by which grants, easy payments and other facilities are extended in exchange for a regular supply of conventional weapons, so vitally needed to maintain law and order and preserve the national integrity or internal security, which is the prerequisite to a stable political situation conducive to economic development.

58. The weapon trade is indeed an important part of world trade and, among the developing nations, it consumes an important share of foreign exchange earnings. Geoffrey Kemp, in his survey "Arms Traffic and Third World Conflicts", noted, *inter alia*:

"... during the post-war years, arms traffic to Third World countries has acquired a new dimension, particularly since these countries appear to be diverting a large share of their scarce resources to armament buildups. The statistics of the arms traffic suggest that the number of industrial countries that are willing and able to supply arms is increasing. Several European countries justify their sales of arms to external customers as a means of keeping their own industries alive. The United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China all regard arms aid as an important adjunct to their overall foreign policies.

⁸ Adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958.

None of the major supplier countries seems willing to curtail this traffic.”⁹

59. Regulation, and not control, of the trade in conventional weapons for the maintenance of the security and integrity of the nation may well assist the developing nations in the utilization of their foreign exchange resources for their economic development. The present position of the newly independent nations should not be misused by the politically grouped weapon-producing countries, so that they need not abandon their policy of non-alignment for the sake of a regular supply of conventional weapons to maintain law and order and to accelerate their economic development. Studies should be initiated on the needs and requirements of each individual State.

60. On another aspect, my delegation is reminded of the numerous resolutions adopted in the past directing the use of funds which would be released through essential reduction in military expenses for the financing of development projects in the developing countries. It is to be regretted, however, that none of these funds has thus far been obtained.

61. We may have better success during our first Disarmament Decade, which we agree is to coincide with our Second United Nations Development Decade. Renewed efforts should, therefore, be jointly planned. As a start, we should press for implementation of the numerous resolutions referred to earlier, including resolution 2526 (XXIV), entitled “A day for peace”. Many more resolutions of that kind, if implemented, will assist us in making both our development and disarmament programmes in this decade a success.

62. Because of the limited time at our disposal, I will refrain from speaking on the other items on our agenda relating to disarmament, although they are all of utmost importance to each of us. With a well-defined programme and strengthened machinery, my delegation is looking forward very much to seeing positive results in our first Disarmament Decade.

63. Mr. BHOI (Kenya): The world today seems trapped in a cycle of incongruities on the various issues of disarmament currently under discussion in this Committee. While we have struggled hard over the years to bring about tangible and effective measures of disarmament, what we have achieved so far are limited preventive measures of non-armament. While the world community has aspired to the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests in all environments, we have witnessed nuclear test explosions performed with calculated regularity. Even the commemorative session of the General Assembly was heralded by three nuclear test blasts. We relentlessly pursue the objectives of general and complete disarmament, and yet there is a lack of political will to implement it. We ceaselessly deplore the enormous expenditure on military build-ups, and yet we shy away from the diversion of these valuable resources to urgent economic and social development. We hope for peace and the strengthening of international security and yet frustrate its fruition by encouraging the arms race in areas of acknowledged conflict and by massive

military build-ups of unprecedented variety and incalculable destructive capacity. Even minority racist régimes are being armed to the hilt. We all welcome the peaceful application of nuclear technology for development, but are reluctant to impart its benefits to newly emergent nations. Our words are not matched by our deeds. As the representative of Brazil reminded us the other day:

“A curious philosophy seems to prevail, according to which the danger now lies in the eventual armament, nuclear or otherwise, of smaller nations, rather than in the mushrooming arsenals of the big Powers...”.
[1751st meeting, para. 62.]

64. May I now say a few words on the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at its last session.

65. The Kenya Government welcomes the successful negotiation of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. Although it has certain inadequacies, we recognize the immense complexities of this issue, and also the fact that in its present form it represents a text which can command the widest possible measure of agreement among States today. I should like to emphasize the following points that are particularly welcomed by my Government.

66. First, the draft incorporates the many views that were expressed by various delegations at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The verification procedures were painstakingly worked out, and are fairly well-balanced and practical. The provision for consultations and possible inspection by arrangement in cases of suspected infringement of the draft treaty are noteworthy. Verification can be conducted by an interested State through its own means or with the assistance of any other State or through appropriate machinery within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.

67. Secondly, in article V, parties have assumed the obligation of continuing negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed.

68. Thirdly, the treaty is a hopeful assurance that the arms race will not be introduced in spheres which have hitherto been relatively free of this danger. I use the words “relatively free” advisedly, because we continue to remain seriously concerned about the offensively armed nuclear vessels of the super-Powers operating at will in the depths of all the oceans.

69. Fourthly, article IV specifically recognizes that nothing in the treaty shall prejudice the position of any State on questions pertaining to the law of the sea.

70. My delegation will therefore support in principle draft resolution A/C.1/L.523, which commends the draft treaty for acceptance by States.

71. May I now deal with the question of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical

⁹ *International Conciliation* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), No. 577, p. 74.

and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and the destruction of the existing stocks of such weapons.

72. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII), a group of consultant experts prepared a comprehensive report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.¹⁰ This comprehensive and authoritative study highlights the horrifying aspects of the use of chemical and biological weapons.

73. The discovery of new toxins and psychochemicals and an increase in the virulence and resistance of bacterial agents have been made possible by new scientific and technological advances in experimental pathology, aerobiology and microbial genetics. There are numerous toxic chemical compounds against which effective measures of protection or treatment simply do not exist or cannot be provided for on an adequate scale. The use of herbicides and defoliants can change the very structure of the soil and seriously threaten the ecological balance of nature. These chemicals find their way into natural waters and contaminate subterranean reservoirs, and constitute a grave hazard for all forms of life thousands of miles away from the location where they were originally used. All chemical weapons, whether nerve agents, blister agents, choking agents, blood agents or toxins, are extremely dangerous to all forms of life on this planet. Their total prohibition, and the elimination of existing stocks, are of utmost importance for the survival of humanity.

74. It has also been pointed out with regard to biological agents that it is now possible to acquire newer strains of highly resistant viruses against which no known defences exist. This has been done through genetic manipulation of viruses or chemical manipulation of their nucleic acid. The aforesaid report, in paragraphs 303 and 304, in dealing with the possible long-term effects of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare on man and his environment, states:

“Chemical weapons, in addition to their highly toxic short-term effects, may also have a long-term effect on the environment in which they are disseminated. If used in very high concentration they might cause damage by polluting the air, by polluting the water supplies and by poisoning the soil.

“Bacteriological (biological) weapons could be directed against man’s sources of food through the spread of persistent plant diseases or of infectious animal diseases. There is also the possibility that new epidemic diseases could be introduced, or old ones reintroduced, which could result in deaths on the scale which characterized the mediaeval plagues.”

75. Having regard to the unprecedented variety and unassessable killing capacity of chemical and biological agents, it is imperative that their use for the production of weapons should be prohibited at the earliest possible moment, and the destruction of existing stocks carried out in a safe manner. The experience of the United States shows that, once such lethal weapons are developed, problems arise as to their harmless disposal when they become redundant. In the view of some authoritative

scientists, their dispatch to the depths of the ocean may not be entirely safe. This emphasizes the need for disposal under satisfactory control, after a thorough study has been made as to the possible effects of various modes of destruction. This applies equally to the disposal of radioactive and nuclear waste.

76. I am glad to state that my country ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.¹¹ Furthermore, we urge the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give top priority to this issue at its future sessions. It is indeed regrettable that no progress has been recorded in its deliberations on this question.

77. My delegation notes that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is deadlocked over certain basic issues. The primary one is whether both chemical and bacteriological weapons should be covered simultaneously in one agreement, or whether bacteriological weapons should be dealt with first. It is my Government’s view that both should be dealt with together as speedily as possible.

78. Both are highly dangerous to all forms of life; both are covered together by the 1925 Geneva Protocol; both are subject to difficulties arising in connexion with verification procedures; both require internationally satisfactory controls; further developments in the production of both chemical and bacteriological weapons pose equal threats to humanity at large. We therefore do not advocate separate treatment of the two issues. Scientific breakthroughs in microbial genetics and in the chemical fields make this approach imperative.

79. The other issue is that of verification machinery, particularly in regard to chemical weapons. My delegation appreciates that many difficulties—administrative, technical and financial—exist for the institution of reliable and universally acceptable verification procedures. We believe that the verification procedures suggested in the joint memorandum of the non-aligned countries on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons represent reasonable interim measures that can be adopted as a compromise. That document suggests that:

“Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system which would ensure effective implementation of the prohibition.” [*Ibid.*, annex C, sect. 39.]

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should devise appropriate national and international measures which can command the widest possible agreement.

80. I now wish to express my Government’s views on the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is vitally important to supplement the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963.¹² The General Assembly, recognizing the urgency and the importance of banning underground nuclear

¹¹League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138.

¹²Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁰United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

weapon tests, by its resolution 2604 B (XXIV) requested “the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue . . . its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests”. The results of the deliberations clearly indicate that no progress has been recorded.

81. We all know that the main difficulty has been one of on-site inspection. The United States insists on that position; the USSR maintains that national inspection is sufficient. That has deadlocked the entire negotiations. In that regard the Swedish position that the technology for verification of underground nuclear tests without on-site inspection already exists is worthy of note. It is also very important that informed scientific opinion in many countries should be convinced that the real obstacle is not the technical problem of verification but the lack of political will on the part of the super-Powers to comply with the requirements of the situation.

82. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was requested, by General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), “to work out . . . a comprehensive programme, dealing with . . . the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament . . .”. In response, the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament [*ibid.*, sect. 42]. My Government regards that as a very substantial contribution to the work of the Conference and believes that the document should form the basis for further negotiations on the subject.

83. Furthermore, the establishment of a world-wide seismic data exchange system, under General Assembly resolution 2604 (XXIV), is welcomed by my Government. This constitutes a positive measure of limited control, which can promote the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban Treaty. By concerted international action, national seismological stations should be set up where they are non-existent and existing ones should be brought up to date to improve world-wide detection and identification capability.

84. My Government welcomes the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. Although we had difficulties with its provisions, we decided to subscribe to it on the ground that it was a step in the direction of general and complete disarmament, particularly in the nuclear armaments field. Our difficulties, in the main, related to the fact that it was a one-sided measure, ensuring that nuclear weapons remained in the hands of their possessors while non-nuclear States remained disarmed without any guarantees as to their defence in case of nuclear attack.

85. We had hoped that that Treaty would be followed by vertical disarmament measures in the nuclear field as between the super-Powers. The non-proliferation Treaty will be effective only when its universality is ensured. It is therefore of paramount importance that the People's Republic of China and other nuclear States and potential nuclear States should adhere to the Treaty to make its application universal.

86. With regard to vertical nuclear disarmament measures, we hope that the super-Powers will arrive at a workable arrangement at the present Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks. While those talks are in progress, the General Assembly, at its current session, should reaffirm its position by imposing a moratorium on the testing of all offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, in all environments.

87. During the previous session of the General Assembly, the delegation of Malta, with its characteristic foresight and vigour, recommended that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament consider the threat posed by radiological methods of warfare and by possible military applications of laser technology; the matter was then passed on to the Conference “without prejudice to existing priorities” [*resolution 2602 D (XXIV)*]. It remains the view of my delegation that it is an exceedingly important subject and that full justice should be done to it.

88. My Government fully supports the proposal advanced by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report¹³ that, among the steps to be taken in the field of disarmament, a group of experts should be assigned the duty of studying the economic and social consequences of the arms race and rapidly rising military expenditure. That item is now inscribed in the agenda of the Assembly at the instance of the Romanian delegation [*A/7994*]. Even if such a study is not undertaken, it is clear, as was pointed out at the 1750th meeting by the representative of Sweden, that already “that part of the costs which can be measured by military budgets equals the total income of the poorer half of mankind”. At the 1751st meeting, the Ambassador of Brazil made the telling point that the current estimated military expenditure, amounting to \$200,000 million a year, “is almost 1,000 times more than the regular budget of the United Nations Development Programme”.

89. I wish now to say a few words about the international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Kenya supported the establishment of that service and urges that the international machinery on peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be reactivated and revitalized. In this connexion, it is essential that article V of the non-proliferation Treaty should be implemented without delay, quite independently of the international service devised under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It may be recalled that, under article V, nuclear Powers agreed to transfer benefits from the peaceful application of nuclear energy to the non-nuclear States on a non-discriminatory basis and at the lowest possible cost in return for their agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons from any State or to manufacture them on their own.

90. Having outlined briefly my delegation's position on some of the outstanding issues connected with disarmament, I shall conclude by quoting from the “Declaration on peace and disarmament” by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates:

“If civilization is not to suffer a setback from which it might never recover, if man is to survive on our globe, it is imperative that the Disarmament Decade be made to live up to its name.” [*See A/C.1/1001.*]

91. Mr. FONSECA TRUQUE (Colombia) (*interpretation from Spanish*): On this day of mourning for France and the

¹³ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

world, I could not begin the statement of the delegation of Colombia on disarmament items without paying this brief tribute of admiration and deep respect on the death of General Charles de Gaulle. His overwhelming personality and his gigantic yet simple humanity will live for ever in the minds of all men of good will. His loss dramatically lessens today's honour roll of great leaders and statesmen of the world.

92. In his statement to the General Assembly at its plenary session on 23 September, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia said that Latin America has a high mission to fulfil in universal assemblies: that is, unflaggingly to advocate international co-operation, the rule of law and justice and better treatment for the developing countries as a basis for world balance. When referring to the question of disarmament, Foreign Minister Vasquez Carrizosa, among other views, expressed the following:

"No spot on earth is immune from attack. The Second World War was a clear demonstration of that fact, which is no longer disputed by anybody in this age of technology and science, when man has succeeded in his greatest adventure to travel to other spaces. Since then the destructive power of weapons has been perfected to the utmost, and our planet seems smaller than ever before, more densely populated and more exposed to the danger of universal devastation. At the same time, the needs of the under-developed peoples cannot wait. If the arms race is not stopped, we would face ominous harbingers and the not entirely unimaginable danger that what are now local wars may escalate into more general wars." [1846th plenary meeting, para. 13.]

93. In accordance with that view, the head of the Colombian delegation, when making known our country's position on the strengthening of international security on 13 October 1970 [1738th meeting], made a vigorous statement in support of draft resolution A/C.1/L.517, sponsored by 23 Latin American countries, stressing the imperative need for the international community of nations fully to recognize that "there is a close connexion between the strengthening of international security, the economic development of the developing countries and disarmament". Ambassador Espinosa Valderrama at that time also referred to the indispensable prerequisite that the enormous resources which might be freed by disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, should be channelled especially to the promotion of the economic development of the developing countries and to their scientific and technological progress.

94. The current debate on the disarmament questions proves that the concepts that I have just recalled are fully shared and accepted by the majority of countries. The United Nations should give priority to a study of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its profoundly damaging effects not only on international peace and security, but also, and more specifically, on the developing countries. Colombia is gratified that this item has been included in the agenda on the initiative of the representative of Romania [A/7994].

95. My delegation, with the desire to co-operate, has studied the report submitted to the General Assembly by

the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233]. We have followed very carefully the important statements made by representatives who have spoken before us. We are fully aware of the fact that the complexity of the matters brought to the Conference for consideration will not permit of an exhaustive analysis in the short time that we have available. We shall therefore confine our comments and points of view to those drafts and proposals which we believe are most germane to the search for a solution. However, we reserve our right to speak later if circumstances so warrant.

96. First of all, I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the most significant contribution to the work of the Conference made by the three Latin American members, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, as well as by other non-aligned nations, members of the Committee on Disarmament.

97. The representative of Brazil, in his statement on 5 November last, very eloquently told us why the world Organization has little reason to be satisfied on its twenty-fifth anniversary. We share the opinion of Ambassador Araújo Castro that the Declaration adopted on 24 October on the occasion of the anniversary is a disappointing document, particularly in matters of disarmament, since it does not forge a solid link between the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade. We also share his view that the problem of disarmament, when all is said and done, is a human problem that must be solved by man and not by computers. And we share his opinion that the Charter must be revised not as far as the purposes and principles are concerned, for they remain valid, but, on the contrary, to establish proper and adequate machinery for their implementation. He said that if the purposes and principles were respected and observed, disarmament would come by itself. And then added:

"The main factor behind the present arms race, in which the major Powers are not the only ones involved, is the apprehension, or rather the expectation, that in practice the present purposes and principles of the Charter will be discarded and disregarded, and that force may or will be used." [1751st meeting, para. 70.]

98. At the meeting of 9 November [1753rd meeting], the Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico began his statement by pointing out that on the very day on which the General Assembly began its commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization, three of the Powers which have the dubious privilege of possessing weapons of mass destruction decided to make a macabre contribution to the celebration by exploding three dreadful nuclear bombs. According to the most conservative estimates, Mr. García Robles said, the bombs at present stockpiled in nuclear arsenals represent a fantastic figure of overkill capacity in megatons that add up to 15 tons of TNT for each inhabitant of the earth.

99. The facts that I have just described lead the Colombian delegation to give its strong support to the proposal reiterated by the delegation of Sweden at the 1750th meeting that the United Nations should make a new and urgent appeal for an immediate cessation of the arms spiral.

100. In its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive disarmament programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The draft prepared by the working group which was set up on the judicious initiative of the twelve non-aligned nations, appears in the report of the Conference [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42].

101. The Colombian delegation congratulates the members of the working group, Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia, for the splendid contribution they have made in the draft programme. This doubtless is a document conducive to progress towards ensuring that general and complete disarmament becomes a reality. While ambitious, the programme is at the same time realistic. Hence there is reason to believe that it will be widely supported by both the nuclear Powers and the developing countries. Colombia has no hesitation in supporting it, and considers that the body most competent to decide upon the comprehensive disarmament programme is the General Assembly since all States Members of the United Nations are represented in it.

102. Furthermore, we noted with satisfaction that the text of the draft treaty of the Soviet Union and the United States on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor [*ibid.*, annex A] was considerably improved by the amendments submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, particularly those proposed by Argentina to articles I, II and IV. There does appear to be general agreement that the nuclear arms race should not be allowed to extend to that wide area which covers approximately three quarters of the surface of the globe. Although it is a mere collateral measure of non-armament, the draft treaty does constitute a positive step on the way to disarmament since the States which possess the capacity and the means to emplace such weapons on the sea-bed are exclusively the nuclear Powers. With regard to the draft treaty itself, it is interesting to take into account the statement made by Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas of Argentina when he spoke on 9 November. I refer specifically to his following comment:

“... in no instance should it”—the treaty—“affect the sovereign rights of riparian States over their continental shelf or territorial waters; nor should it interfere with or prejudice the complicated questions of the law of the sea or the positions which various States take in this field of study”. [1754th meeting, para. 82.]

103. Colombia intends to support draft resolution A/C.1/L.523, sponsored by Argentina and 38 other countries, which commends adoption of the treaty and requests the depositary Governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

104. As was the case at the last session, this year's debate on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons has once again shown that well-meaning persons, the conscience of the world community itself, decidedly reject the abominable use of such weapons of mass destruction. The technological progress of the last few years and the

possibility that nations not possessing a high industrial development might also now enter that most undesirable competition, shows the urgent need to prohibit the manufacture, stockpiling and use of such weapons.

105. The joint memorandum on the question of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, submitted by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia, which is included in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 39], is a positive contribution that may well serve as the basis for a resolution of the General Assembly, which Colombia would be ready to support.

106. We have seen that the meagre progress achieved in disarmament during the 25 years of the Organization's life has become practically insignificant when confronted by the gigantic vertical proliferation of megatons of destructive power achieved by the great Powers.

107. The Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 5 August 1963¹⁴ is considered as a positive but incomplete step since it omits mention of underground testing. That is to say, it was rather a measure to avoid contamination of the environment but, in the course of this debate, it has been proved to us that it does not even serve that purpose, since underground explosions most definitely contribute to contamination. Hence the importance of the Canadian suggestion during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly calling for an international prohibition of underground nuclear tests and, particularly, the initial success that surrounded the investigation carried out by the Secretariat on the exchange of seismological information, a procedure which might ultimately become a system of effective international control to detect such explosions. Colombia's reply concerning seismological information can be found in document A/7967/Add.4 of 30 July of this year.

108. While universality is not achieved and all nuclear Powers do not finally cease all tests, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] loses its positive significance, since the security of the world cannot be guaranteed by a mere cessation of horizontal proliferation.

109. Furthermore, it is very gratifying to see the world recognition, that we have been able to gauge during our deliberations, of the constructive contribution of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).¹⁵ We are happy to note that many delegations from other continents consider the Treaty a model worthy of emulation since it constitutes a proof that zones occupied and inhabited by man can be freed from such murderous weapons and also because it is proof of the political maturity achieved in our hemisphere. Colombia co-sponsors draft resolution A/C.1/L.522 which urges the nuclear States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

¹⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

110. The nations and the peoples of the world are anxiously hoping that the third stage of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that have started at Helsinki between the United States of America and the Soviet Union will show positive results. If we want to bring our hopes into line with the strictest realism regarding any agreements which the super-Powers of SALT may arrive at, I believe we ought not to lose sight of two basic factors which doubtless will have a great influence on the negotiators in coming to an agreement: the first is the unchallengeable argument that the destructive power and the danger of strategic weapons has reached such a degree of sophistication that their use is practically impossible, since self-destruction might be the result. That leads us to the logical conclusion that the value of these weapons is simply one of deterrence. If this phenomenon is understood in all its ramifications, we do not see any reason why the parties should not come to an agreement on a substantial reduction of such costly instruments, of death, which would strengthen their security and relax tensions and thus make an important contribution to the peace of the world. The second factor is of a negative character, since it grapples with the power politics that gave rise to the nuclear escalation.

111. The good intentions which were sincerely expressed by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union on the willingness of the two Governments to make progress in disarmament should certainly give us some encouragement. After all, they are the nations which have most to lose in a nuclear confrontation.

112. Yet, when we see that those two great Powers spend \$200,000 million per year to accumulate megatons at the rate of the equivalent of 15 tons of TNT per inhabitant of the planet, we are afraid that the spectre of the Nazi philosophy that "might is right" as opposed to the concept of collective security which was sought in San Francisco 25 years ago, may be invading and dangerously and surreptitiously penetrating the establishments of great industry and the enormous military organizations of both the super-Powers.

113. We all know that to a large extent the nuclear arms race has given the super-Powers the technological supremacy which they today enjoy. In other words, they have now created the economy of death. That was shown us dramatically by the co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, R. J. Barnet, in a book entitled *The Economy of Death*.¹⁶

114. The drama of nuclear armaments has today acquired apocalyptic proportions. In the last few years increasingly sophisticated machinery has been invented ready to cause the death of millions of human beings. These are ghastly and terrifying spectres and among them we see those hydra-headed monsters, the multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs).

115. We were told that nuclear war might break out through error or miscalculation. If to that deplorable possibility we were to apply the well known "Peter Principle" of Laurence Peter and Raymond Hull,¹⁷ that in

all hierarchies, be they civil, military, religious or even scientific, employees tend to rise to the level of their incompetence, then we have no other alternative but to pray that at least computers will not reach such levels.

116. Fortunately, in all countries of the world there are still people who can dream, who still enjoy the uncontaminated landscapes of their villages, and who have a very clear-cut concept of beauty, art and life. For their happiness they need the achievement of general and complete disarmament by the United Nations.

117. If at least we could reach the goal set by President Nixon, that in its second quarter century the United Nations can give the peoples what they want and deserve: a world without war, an entire generation of peace, we would thus be giving youth an opportunity, that youth which is not satisfied with the mediocrity that today rules the world, so that in the passage of those years it will at least, as Kipling's poem says, "fill the unforgiving minute" that today separates the world from its untimely death in space.

118. Mr. MORTENSEN (Denmark): The Danish delegation has noted with great satisfaction that there is, both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this Committee, a growing awareness of the dangerous effects of the arms race. At the end of the 1960s, expenditures on armaments reached unprecedented levels. From 1965 to 1969 alone, defence budgets rose by 30 per cent on the average, and today the world is devoting about 7 per cent of its output to military uses.

119. It is in the obvious interest of the disarmament cause to inform the world of the issues and problems related to the continued arms race. My delegation can therefore fully endorse the proposal by the Secretary-General for a comprehensive international expert study of the economic and social implications of the arms race. On the whole, it is imperative that the disarmament cause should not remain a matter of concern to a small group of experts. Public interest must be alerted through increased information. I think that a study as proposed by the Secretary-General would serve a very useful purpose in this respect.

120. The trends to which I have just referred reflect also a growing understanding of the need for including conventional weapons in the disarmament talks. In the vast majority of Member States it is the conventional weapons that weigh most heavily on the budgets and it is these weapons that pose a danger. It is with these weapons that people are killed in current military operations. And this will continue to be the case in a world where the main risk lies in local conflicts. In some quarters it is alleged that the inclusion of conventional weapons in the disarmament talks would be a step directed against the developing countries and the non-aligned States. To my delegation this argument does not seem convincing. Against this background we have noted with interest that the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42] covers both nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. The need for a curtailment of conventional forces and armaments is just as great in the industrialized countries as it is anywhere else, and my country is among those which earnestly hope that a European security conference may pave the way for a reduction of European force levels.

¹⁶ New York, Athenium, 1969.

¹⁷ New York, William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1969.

121. All things considered, developments in 1970 seem to allow of guarded optimism. As for arms expenditures, the indications are that some reductions may now be expected for the first time in many years—cutbacks of about 2 per cent according to estimates made by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). In the nuclear field we note with satisfaction that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] has entered into force and that the United States and the Soviet Union have now initiated substantive Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Finally, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has succeeded in drawing up a draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/8059-DC/233, annex A*].

122. These forward steps should not, however, be an anodyne for the organs and committees dealing with disarmament. In my statement I shall touch on some problems calling for urgent solutions.

123. It is a sad fact that, despite the repeated appeals of the General Assembly for the conclusion of a complete test-ban treaty, the parties directly involved have not moved any closer towards agreement. It is to be hoped, however, that the successful outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, which we expect to see, will also render possible a ban on all military nuclear test explosions. Pending that, our efforts should be focused on narrowing down the permissible range of test explosions. There are today sufficient scientific data available to assess the possibilities of detecting and verifying such explosions above a certain threshold without on-site inspection. It would therefore seem a logical preliminary step at this juncture to prohibit explosions above this threshold.

124. Permit me in this context to make some observations on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. My delegation finds it appropriate and useful that the International Atomic Energy Agency should make a careful study of the technical problems involved. There can hardly be any doubt that the Agency is the best equipped forum for assessing all the technical aspects of the matter. But discussions of these problems should not, of course, be directed solely at the prospects of technical progress and to the verification arrangements necessitated by the non-proliferation Treaty. The possibly harmful effects of such explosions on the human environment should also be carefully considered. As far as I can see there would be considerable ecological risks involved, and the whole question of contamination must be taken up as an integral part of the problem.

125. My delegation feels that, while the International Atomic Energy Agency is well suited to discuss the technical modalities, the competent disarmament organs of the United Nations must be consulted when it comes to the legal aspects in connexion with peaceful explosions. It would seem reasonable that both the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and this Committee be given the opportunity to voice their opinion on any such arrangements as would necessitate amendments of existing international disarmament agreements, notably the Moscow Treaty of 1963.¹⁸

¹⁸ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

126. I should like also to make some remarks on the question of biological and chemical weapons. The past debates in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and here in New York seem to reflect a growing understanding of the danger posed by such weapons, an awareness to which, I am convinced, the reports of the Secretary-General¹⁹ and the World Health Organization²⁰ have contributed essentially. But the discussions have also revealed that in regard to chemical weapons the question of verification gives rise to great difficulties. My delegation, while understanding the wish of some members to deal with biological and chemical weapons in one instrument, considers it important, particularly because of the verification problem, that we should try to reach agreement on a treaty prohibiting biological weapons as a first step and simultaneously continue the efforts to reach agreement on a treaty on chemical weapons with the shortest possible delay. It is not a question of everything or nothing; the point is to solve what is possible now and then go on to the remaining issues. Such a pragmatic procedure has been used in other areas of disarmament. A case in point is the Moscow Treaty of 1963, with its partial test ban. Another one is the recent draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. Many would undoubtedly have liked to see a wider definition of the area of prohibition than that which has now been achieved. But as it was realized that general agreement could not be reached on this point, the draft treaty was framed in terms on which broad agreement could be reached. My delegation would recommend such a procedure in the case of biological and chemical weapons too. To promote achievement of a ban on chemical weapons my delegation supports the idea of requesting the Secretary-General to set up a group of experts to study the problems related to verification.

127. Mr. STATHATOS (Greece): The inscription of the question of general and complete disarmament on our agenda invites us once again to discuss, comment on and review, at the risk of being repetitious, a question that has made very little, if any, progress in the last 25 years.

128. We do not, of course, underestimate the importance, immensity and complexity of this crucial question, which is so closely interrelated with other major issues before us, and more particularly with those of international security and economic and social development, as was very convincingly stated yesterday [*1756th meeting*] by the representative of Romania.

129. However, we cannot overlook the fact that almost 25 years have elapsed since the General Assembly in its very first resolution unanimously established the Atomic Energy Commission and asked it to formulate plans for the elimination of atomic weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

130. During this period a new generation has reached manhood, and boys who were not yet born in 1946 are

¹⁹ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.1.24).

²⁰ *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (World Health Organization, Geneva, 1970).

now being drafted in the armies of their respective countries.

131. We cannot overlook the fact that 11 years have passed since the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 1378 (XIV), which expressed the hope “that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail, and agreed upon in the shortest possible time”. Neither can we overlook the fact that nine years have elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,²¹ embodied in the well known resolution 1722 (XVI).

132. The mad momentum of the nuclear arms race continues; and, as the Secretary-General points out in his introduction to this year’s annual report,

“In the conventional arms race, which absorbs by far the largest portion of all military expenditure, there has been a dangerous trend to produce, accumulate, and disseminate ever more sophisticated and deadly weapons.”²²

133. When the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament began its work in 1962 the total world expenditure for military purposes already amounted to \$120,000 million. By 1969 it has risen to \$180,000 million. The world arsenals have not ceased enriching their stocks both qualitatively and quantitatively.

134. It is far from the intention of my delegation to draw a gloomy picture of the situation. However, as this is a year for stocktaking, we must draw up a balance sheet of our achievements and our failures. The results in this particular field do not give much cause for rejoicing. Hard and dedicated work is needed in order to extricate disarmament from the realm of Utopia, where world public opinion seems to have placed it.

135. In their declaration on peace and disarmament, issued last September, five Nobel Peace Prize Laureates have warned us that the present state of affairs has created “a decline of general interest, sometimes a sense of cynicism and even a feeling of despair”, that has “begun to cloud the efforts of nations to bring meaning to disarmament” [see A/C.1/1001]. The world has lulled itself into the belief that it can live with nuclear weapons and that these and other armaments bring security. But in fact all they bring is the threat of disaster. Weapons are but the raw materials of war. We cannot accept the notion that peace is the child of terror, unless we are speaking of a monster-born child with a foreseeably short span of life.

136. We cannot and should not admit that the Roman axiom *si vis pacem, para bellum*: if you want peace, prepare for war, which might have had some value during the Roman period, cannot be replaced in the present nuclear and space era by a more constructive and positive precept.

137. The Disarmament Decade, which happily coincides with the Second United Nations Development Decade,

²¹ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

²² Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 20.

provides, we feel, the proper premises for transforming words into deeds and for moving from the periphery to the hard core of the problem.

138. It is encouraging that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union, both of which are committed under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] to the pursuit of measures to halt the nuclear arms race, are under way. If the results are positive, it will contribute immensely to the goals we are all pursuing.

139. It is obvious that without such an agreement it would be impossible to put an end to the arms spiral because of the action-reaction phenomenon that leads each of the nuclear Powers to respond to the actions of the other. The same phenomenon is apparent *mutatis mutandis* in the field of so-called conventional weapons, and our preoccupation with the nuclear arms race should not make us lose sight of it. We hope that, if for no other reason, progress in technology, which transforms last year’s counterforce capabilities into this year’s minimum deterrence, will make it both possible and compelling to place restraints on the nuclear arms race. In the meantime, and as long as agreement has not been reached, the spiral of the arms race will continue, perhaps at an ever increasing pace.

140. My delegation does not underestimate the importance of various meritorious partial measures that have been achieved in the field of non-armament, rather than that of disarmament, during the 1960s.

141. In this context my delegation wishes to express its appreciation of the new draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A], which takes into account many of the views and observations expressed during last year’s session of the General Assembly and contains provisions for future improvement. The new revised text is the product of the spirit of compromise shown by all members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, who have intensively and fruitfully worked for, and have finally succeeded in obtaining, a general consensus on this important question. This welcome development has also amply demonstrated the importance of the role the General Assembly can and should play in the field of disarmament.

142. I should like now to turn briefly to the question concerning the banning of chemical and biological weapons. Let me say at the outset that my delegation would welcome measures intended to strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925,²³ provided they are coupled with an adequate and satisfactory system of verification and control.

143. The revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare submitted to the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament last August by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 2], which now

²³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

covers toxins as suggested by the United States, constitutes an important improvement. We understand, however, that no agreement has been reached as to whether chemical and biological weapons should be treated separately or jointly. For our part, we feel that if a positive step can be achieved with regard to this two-fold problem, a fragmentary approach should not be rejected outright. The difficulties we may encounter in making progress on one question should not necessarily exclude progress on the other.

144. Last year the General Assembly, in its efforts to promote a comprehensive test ban, which needless to stress is heavily dependent on the results of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, adopted by an overwhelming majority its resolution 2604 A (XXIV), in which it asked the Secretary-General to transmit to Governments a questionnaire concerning the provision of certain information in connexion with the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data.

145. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation for the task undertaken by Canadian scientists [*ibid.*, sect. 34] in analysing and assessing the replies thus far received. We are of the opinion that the improvement of a world-wide seismological data exchange will undoubtedly contribute to the elaboration of an acceptable, adequate verification system and will therefore greatly facilitate the long-sought agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

146. Those are, very briefly, the considerations that will determine the position of the Greek delegation vis-à-vis the various draft resolutions that are to be presented to this Committee.

147. Mr. EL-ERIAN (United Arab Republic): The First Committee is considering the questions relating to disarmament and arms control at a session which marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations and which coincides with the ushering in of the Disarmament Decade.

148. The beginning of what has been called the second era of the United Nations has generated a process of stock-taking and self-appraisal. Such an assessment is particularly necessary with regard to the question of disarmament, which is universally recognized as the most imperative and urgent need of the international community today. On the positive side of the matter, it should be noted that the objective of general and complete disarmament was endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), which was adopted unanimously and which is rightly considered among the most significant landmarks in the history of the United Nations. That resolution declared, in its preamble, that the question of general and complete disarmament was "the most important one facing the world today", and contained an appeal to Governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem".

149. This was followed by an endorsement by the General Assembly of the joint statement on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,²⁴ for the implementation of which a negotiating machinery was set up at Geneva: the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-

ment. As a result, a number of important international agreements were concluded, and have since entered into force, which represent a significant contribution to the restriction of the arms race. The agreements include: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water²⁵; the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967 [*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*], which banned nuclear and other mass destruction weapons from outer space and provided for the non-militarization of celestial bodies; and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of 1968 [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which prohibited the further spread of nuclear weapons.

150. While these Treaties constitute significant progress, one cannot but agree with the observation of the Secretary-General in paragraph 17 of the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization,²⁶ to the effect that, "Although disarmament is one of the highest priorities of the United Nations, its achievements in this field hardly measure up to the needs."

151. The epoch-making scientific and technological revolution, which has opened unlimited vistas of progress, has also put in the hands of man weapons that threaten the very survival of mankind. The peoples of the world are becoming increasingly and disturbingly conscious of the threat to mankind posed by the ever spiralling arms race, especially in view of the large existing stockpiles and of impending new qualitative advances in the ever more devastating nature of nuclear armaments and other weapons of mass destruction.

152. On the threshold of the Disarmament Decade, the challenge is precise and compelling. It is the attainment of the objectives of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources"—objectives inscribed in Article 26 of the Charter—and the achievement of general and complete disarmament, a goal to which the General Assembly has committed itself.

153. Since the General Assembly last considered items pertaining to disarmament, the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has entered into force, early in March of this year to be precise.

154. Welcome as this historic event was, it nevertheless remains overshadowed by the fact that this important instrument has not yet received the universal adherence necessary to ensure the complete success of all of its objectives, the most important of which is to limit the number of nuclear-weapon States. This, I submit, is cause for concern, and we therefore join our Secretary-General, when, in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization, he calls for the acceleration of the whole process of signature and ratification to halt the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

155. Parallel to this, we must also keep in mind the fact that imaginative and bold steps on the part of the nuclear

²⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

²⁶ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

²⁴ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

super-Powers, calling a halt to the nuclear arms race, would give the necessary impetus for the non-proliferation Treaty to become the universal instrument it is intended to be. Only by putting an end to both horizontal and vertical proliferation can we hope to be able to look forward to a world order where the risks of nuclear war are successfully eliminated while the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are freely and fully enjoyed by all.

156. This leads me to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), entered upon by the Soviet Union and the United States and with the intention of finding a way to put an end to vertical proliferation, which have recently been resumed in Helsinki.

157. We are watching these talks with the keenest of interest, since all of us, nuclear and the non-nuclear States alike, have a stake in their fruitful outcome. We are heartened to hear and read of the businesslike character of the talks and the seriousness of purpose of both parties. These discussions must succeed, since they are the only means of bringing us all nearer to our ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, the alternative being a further escalation in the nuclear arms race with all the ensuing grave risks and fears and the staggering expenses involved.

158. In the meantime, while we do not in the least underrate the necessity for bilateral discussions, we nevertheless hope that at some stage of their evolution a parallel spur can be given in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to multilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control, and in particular on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

159. For in spite of the recognized importance and urgency of the issue of the suspension of underground nuclear tests, as reflected in many General Assembly resolutions, the negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament thereon still remain deadlocked, ostensibly because of the failure to reach agreement on what constitutes adequate verification. Since the prevalent view is that the reasons for this impasse are largely political, efforts were exerted, during the General Assembly's last session and this year in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, to develop the technical means that could assist in overcoming political considerations. This, it was expected, could best be achieved through an improved international exchange of seismic data, obtained by national means of detection, that would facilitate the solution of the verification issue. This pattern of thought is shared by the United Arab Republic.

160. To that end, and in response to the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2604 (XXIV), the United Arab Republic transmitted to the Secretary-General relevant information on its seismic station at Helwan [*see A/7967/Rev.1*].

161. My delegation believes that this road should be explored further, as for the present it offers, so it seems to us, the only means of achieving progress in this field.

162. Allow me to add, however, that while we fully recognize the importance, indeed the necessity, of resorting

to technical endeavours when searching for a solution acceptable to all, we must keep in mind the fact that such recourse should remain within its proper context, which is principally political in nature. Resorting to technology must, therefore, be kept within suitable limits, since too excessive a utilization of such means could prove to be a political liability.

163. Before concluding my remarks on this item, I should like to express the hope that renewed efforts will be exerted next year in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to reach agreement on the question of the suspension of underground tests. Many constructive proposals have been put forward over the years. In particular, several variations on threshold solutions have been put forward, including one formulated by the United Arab Republic as long ago as 1965,²⁷ which still finds a favourable echo today.

164. The General Assembly now has before it a draft treaty, negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [*A/8059-DC/233, annex A*]. In the view of my delegation, there can be no doubt that this draft represents an important, though only partial and limited, step towards achieving an aim on which there is general agreement amongst all of us, namely, to confine the use of the sea-bed and ocean floor to peaceful purposes only.

165. With regard to the subject matter of the treaty, I should like at the outset to underline the fact that this draft is the result of a collective endeavour in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the spirit of co-operation and accommodation shown by the two co-authors of the draft, the Soviet Union and the United States, who took into account many proposals and suggestions made both here in New York and later in Geneva.

166. Thus the draft now includes a clear and unequivocal undertaking to continue negotiations on further measures of disarmament in this environment; the width of the sea-bed zone is clearly defined; the disclaimer clause appears in a separate article; a new verification process, including appropriate international procedures, has been introduced; and, besides many other important additions, the participation of the Security Council in the implementation of the treaty is recognized.

167. On this latter point, it is the considered view of the United Arab Republic that the Security Council could be applied to directly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, especially in cases when relations between States parties to the treaty do not allow for normal implementation of the verification procedures mentioned in article III, paragraph 2. Under those circumstances the Council would naturally act in such a manner as to help in and facilitate the fulfilment of the verification process provided for in article III.

168. In this connexion we are appreciative indeed of the statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union,

²⁷ See ENDC/PV.224.

co-author of the draft treaty, when on 2 November he spoke in this Committee on this particular point and confirmed that "any State party to the treaty may appeal directly to the Security Council, even without holding consultations" [1748th meeting, para. 13]. We hope that a similar undertaking can be given by the representative of the United States on behalf of the other author of the draft treaty.

169. I would conclude on this item by saying that the United Arab Republic believes that the mandate of the General Assembly embodied in resolution 2602 F (XXIV) has now been successfully carried out. We hold the view that the draft treaty submitted is of benefit to all of us—nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States—for all have an interest in eliminating from the sea-bed activities that are contrary to the peaceful exploitation of that environment. It is with this in mind that the delegation of the United Arab Republic is co-sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/L.523, commending the draft sea-bed treaty. With many others, we hope that the treaty will be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date and receive the widest possible adherence.

170. The problem of banning the development and production of all chemical and bacteriological weapons is becoming more serious every day and the call for an agreement whereby these horrid weapons of mass destruction will be eliminated once and for all from military arsenals grows stronger.

171. Acknowledging the ever increasing concern of the international community, the General Assembly in resolution 2603 (XXIV) once again called for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925²⁸ and invited all States which had not yet done so to accede to or ratify that instrument. In this respect, my delegation welcomes the fact that in the course of this year many States have acceded to the Protocol, adding their weight to its further strengthening. We trust that more signatures and ratifications will be forthcoming soon, thus making the Protocol a truly universal instrument. Furthermore, in resolution 2603 A (XXIV), the scope of the prohibition embodied in the Protocol is set out precisely and in detail. This is an important resolution, which must guide our steps in all future negotiations concerning the banning of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

172. The same resolution requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give urgent consideration to reaching agreement on prohibition as referred to in two draft conventions: one submitted by the socialist States on chemical and bacteriological weapons, the other presented by the United Kingdom on biological methods of warfare. Yet in spite of the fact that amendments were included in those respective draft conventions during the deliberations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and that revised texts of both were indeed introduced—by the United Kingdom at Geneva [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2] and recently by the socialist States in New York

[A/8136]—embodying a certain rapprochement on a number of points, the basic difference on the question of which weapons are to be banned next and how best to verify such prohibition was not overcome.

173. On this important issue, the position of the United Arab Republic remains unaltered. We are resolutely in favour of the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction and we have made clear our preference that the discussions and deliberations in the Conference should result in the banning of both chemical and bacteriological warfare. The United Arab Republic therefore believes that negotiations on this important and urgent issue should continue to deal with both chemical and biological warfare together. To this end, we have joined with all the other members of the twelve-nation group in elaborating a common position which can be gathered from the joint memorandum [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 39], annexed to the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which reads:

"It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States."

Concerning the problem of verification a wealth of suggestions and ideas have been advanced in the Conference. The joint memorandum I have just mentioned recognized the need for adequate verification, which, in the view of the twelve-nation group, "should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other". Within this context, a working paper was presented by the United Arab Republic [*ibid.*, sect. 43], incorporating many elements that emerged from the discussions in the Conference.

174. The problem of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons is a most difficult and complex one. Ways must be found of channelling into one mainstream, acceptable to all, the many currents with which we are confronted. There is, therefore, need for further negotiation on the issue.

175. In resolution 2602 E (XXIV), operative paragraph 4, the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive programme, which would provide it with a guideline to chart its course. This particular issue was intensively debated in the Conference and it became apparent from the outset that the task was not an easy one to accomplish. However, the will to succeed was there, and shortly before the session ended specific ideas concerning the programme did emerge. These will have to be discussed—in fact this process has already begun—since we deem it important that a disarmament programme receive the overwhelming, if not the unanimous, support of the General Assembly.

176. In conclusion, I wish to state that it is the earnest hope of the delegation of the United Arab Republic that the beginning of the Disarmament Decade will serve as a stimulus for the intensification and acceleration of efforts to realize the objectives of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

177. The ushering in of the Disarmament Decade coincides with the consideration by the General Assembly of

²⁸ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

measures to strengthen international security and to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for the maintenance of peace and the promotion of international co-operation.

178. The two questions of disarmament and international security are organically interdependent and have a mutual influence. This has been reflected in the joint statement on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations and in the concept of collateral measures elaborated by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. If, for some, certain disarmament measures generate security, for others a strengthening of international security and the capacity of the United Nations to remove threats to peace and to suppress acts of aggression renders possible the undertaking of progressive measures towards disarmament and the devotion of their resources, human and material, to their desperate need for economic development and progress.

179. The CHAIRMAN (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform the Committee of the present state of our work.

180. We still have 16 names inscribed on the speakers' list for the general debate on the disarmament questions and, as you all know, we had scheduled two meetings for tomorrow. Yet I am sorry to have to announce that none of the delegations on that list has indicated its readiness to speak tomorrow.

181. That being the case, we have no alternative but to cancel the meeting scheduled for tomorrow morning. This might make it easier for delegations on the list to prepare their statements for the afternoon meeting. I trust and hope that the greatest possible number of delegations on the list will be ready to speak by then.

182. I should also like to appeal to all members of the Committee to be punctual, so that the meeting may begin promptly at three o'clock. We could then continue as long as necessary—until seven o'clock, perhaps—in order to hear all those who may be ready to participate in tomorrow afternoon's debate.

183. Finally, I would remind you that we have a very heavy agenda; and, bearing in mind the fact that thus far we have not concluded even one of the items on our agenda, I would again hope that I can rely on the co-operation of all so that we may conclude debate on the disarmament items as soon as possible.

184. At the end of tomorrow afternoon's meeting, in accordance with the results of that meeting, I think I shall be able to give some indication regarding a more precise programme of work for the next days.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.