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Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security (*continued*) (A/7994)

GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)

1. Mr. KHATTABI (Morocco) (*interpretation from French*): The commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations gives us an opportunity to ponder once again the multitude of problems that remain to be resolved in the vital and urgent field of disarmament.

2. After this Organization's quarter century of life, one need only glance at the disarmament agenda item to realize not only the gravity of the problems listed, but also, and above all, the growing complexity of a field which is in a state of constant and rapid scientific and technological progress and on which vast financial resources are lavished. Thus it is that the threat of armaments already deployed weighs heavy on the international climate, constantly jeopardizing the balance of man and nature.

3. Despite the importance of what has thus far been achieved—limited, for the most part, to preventive and collateral measures—general and complete disarmament seems more and more to be a Utopian and unattainable goal.

4. Nuclear disarmament, the item of greatest and most pressing concern to the international community, is showing no progress. Indeed, the nuclear arms race is continuing at its usual place, as weapons and delivery systems are improved and expanded. Serious reports, like *Military Balance*, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, give terrifying figures on what is called the "world military balance", indicating that thousands of nuclear devices—missiles, submarines, bombers and others—are constantly being emplaced and held ready to wreak havoc at any moment. Other no less serious publications speak of the increase in the annual rate of nuclear test explosions.

5. With this sad state of affairs, one can easily believe that the world is spending on armaments 7 per cent of the gross world product—40 per cent more for armaments than for

public education—and that military expenditures, if they continue to grow at the present rate of escalation, will attain the astronomical sum of \$4,000 million in the course of the next ten years.

6. This familiar and well-known nightmare—to borrow the expression used by the Secretary-General, U Thant—gives growing importance to disarmament questions, which, from every standpoint, are becoming a matter of priority, since it is unthinkable that peace, justice and progress could be built on a powder keg.

7. That is why the international community cannot but welcome with hope the resumption in Helsinki of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the continuance of useful and constructive efforts at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In this regard, my delegation sincerely hopes that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks may lead to a real limitation of strategic arms as a first stage on the way to total elimination of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

8. As regards the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it can be said that, in the course of the two sessions held this year, it has achieved some encouraging and in many respects positive results. After two years of painstaking negotiations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has prepared a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A]. This draft treaty, which is the fruit of joint and sustained work, will contribute significantly to slowing down the arms race by excluding from competition in weapons of mass destruction an environment which, according to the experts, contains the largest quantity of organic matter in process of formation on our planet, thus offering the rapidly increasing population of the globe inexhaustible biological and mineral resources.

9. This draft treaty, which has the merit of leaving the way open to further measures towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, provides, in the matter of verification, for international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the Charter. Article IV, which is a waiver clause, makes the draft treaty logical and acceptable. We are confident that this draft treaty will enjoy the support of the General Assembly and that it will be opened for signature at an early date.

10. Taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV), the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament devoted the bulk of its discussions this year to the question of bacteriological and chemical weapons. If differences of view persist as to the negotiation procedure for the prohibition and the elimination of these two types of weapons, the fact remains that the question as a whole has been given thorough consideration and that a good number of constructive proposals have been put forward. Furthermore, certain aspects of the problem concerning verification have been clarified by distinguished experts, who have been kind enough to contribute to the progress of our work.

11. Several delegates who have spoken before me have broached this question so as to throw light on the fundamental positions as to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. I shall therefore confine myself to recalling that my delegation's position of principle is in favour of a total prohibition of those two categories of weapons. This position is reflected both in the joint memorandum co-sponsored by Morocco [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 39] and in the working document submitted by my delegation [*ibid.*, sect. 24]. This document, the purpose of which is both to help reconcile the ideas expressed and to contribute to a solution that can break the deadlock in which we now find ourselves, takes into account the problem of verification as regards chemical weapons. Our proposals have been welcomed with interest by a good number of delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

12. In our opinion, the two revised draft conventions now before us—one submitted by nine socialist countries of Europe [A/8136] and the other by the United Kingdom [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 2]—seem to contain the basic elements of the prohibition advocated by our working paper, which I have already mentioned. It remains to be hoped, therefore, that biology and chemistry, the sciences of life and progress *par excellence*, will cease to make their contributions to the preparation and manufacture of dreadful and inhuman weapons.

13. The question of preparing a detailed programme concerning all aspects of disarmament was the subject of careful consideration in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Certain specific proposals were put forward, principally the detailed draft programme of disarmament submitted by Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia [*ibid.*, sect. 42]. This document, which was considered by the group of twelve non-aligned countries over a relatively brief period, contains some very useful elements which could constitute the basis of a detailed programme which the General Assembly asked us to prepare in its resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

14. My delegation's view as regards the detailed disarmament programme could be summarized as follows.

15. First, the programme should take account of the reality of the international political context as well as of the inherent complexity of the disarmament problem. The programme should thus be flexible and feasible in order to secure the agreement and support of those primarily involved.

16. Secondly, the close links between 'disarmament and the strengthening of international security' should be taken into consideration, while emphasizing the fact that the maintenance of peace and the preservation of international security should at all times be based on the United Nations Charter and other relevant international instruments such as the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [resolution 2625 (XXV)].

17. Thirdly, the attainment of effective world-wide agreements requires the participation of all the nuclear Powers in

disarmament negotiations. Those Powers must, therefore, make an effort to respond positively to the desire of the international community to see them all, without exception, take their place around the disarmament negotiating table, even outside the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament if that should be necessary.

18. Fourthly, the paramount role of the great Powers should not cause us to forget that responsibility in the disarmament field rests upon all the other States, for the great Powers possessing weapons of mass destruction necessarily need moral and political support in order to progress towards disarmament. So as to be able to give this essential support, the various non-nuclear States, for their part, should also demonstrate their devotion to the principles of the Charter and their determination to live in peace and to shoulder their share of the collective responsibility by ideological and racial tolerance and by making a positive contribution to strengthening international security.

19. Fifthly, nuclear disarmament should occupy the front rank in all efforts to stop the arms race, the suspension of all nuclear tests being the key and the point of departure for all subsequent disarmament measures.

20. Sixthly, the problem of the limitation of conventional weapons should be solved as part of global measures and with a view to a radical cessation of the arms race, since this problem is very closely bound up with the international situation and with certain conflicts whose nature and scope very often involve the responsibility of one or other of the great Powers.

21. Seventhly, any progress in the disarmament field cannot but have positive effects on economic development. In that regard we support the initiative of Romania suggesting that the economic and social consequences of the arms race should be considered.

22. Before I conclude, I should like to take this opportunity of saying that the admirable achievement of the Tlateloleco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America¹ should serve as an example to other continents, particularly Africa, where the creation of nuclear-free zones could only be beneficial.

23. Unfortunately, however, the existence on the continent of Africa of certain racist and colonialist régimes, and the danger flowing from the continuing occupation of territories belonging to an important African country by aggressive forces coming from outside, makes the creation of such zones difficult for the moment.

24. However, we appeal to all African countries to consider the possibility of concluding agreements in the best conditions aimed at creating nuclear-free zones in Africa as a positive contribution to the Disarmament Decade.

25. Mr. MATTEI (France) (*interpretation from French*): Twenty-five years ago the signing of the United Nations Charter brought the promise of an era of universal peace to a world ravaged by a conflict unprecedented in its violence

and dimensions. However, only a few days later, as our Secretary-General reminds us in the introduction to his annual report,² the explosion of the first atomic bomb instilled new anguish in the hearts of men. It is in the shadow of that dual portent that the General Assembly, in its first resolution, set disarmament as its first task.

26. We know how that initiative fared.

27. Regardless of the significance and weight that one may attach to the agreements concluded since that time in that domain, one fact remains: over that same period of time, man, for the first time in his history, has invented and accumulated more means than would be required to destroy the world in which he lives many times over, and this insane undertaking is continuing right before our eyes, costing the international community more resources than it allocates for development.

28. We can entertain few illusions about the future. The fact of nuclear power and the division of the world into two camps have indeed forged such close links between the strategic and the political situation in the world, they have created interests and encouraged attitudes of mind of such a kind that the day seems still far removed when conditions will be propitious for the general and complete disarmament that the United Nations stated to be its desire 10 years ago. How indeed can we expect this day to dawn in the near future when China has still not resumed its place in the world community and when that same community confesses itself unable to put an end to the conflicts which are tearing it asunder today. Whatever be the contribution that a sincere effort at disarmament might make to the relaxation of tension and peace, obviously, the attempt, if it is to prosper, assumes, as a prerequisite, the existence of a whole set of political conditions that have not yet been realized.

29. However, when the day comes that these conditions have been satisfied, the task of disarmament must be ready to take advantage of the promises the situation offers. Now, it is on this point that my delegation entertains doubts, and we wonder whether far from being, as it should be, an endeavour to change the situation I have just mentioned, this work is not rather a reflection of that situation and does not help to crystallize it. That idea, we believe, provides useful food for thought at this dawn of the Disarmament Decade, which may ensure that this Decade lives up to the hopes placed in it by our Secretary-General and by most delegations.

30. It was shortly after the United Nations had set itself the task of general and complete disarmament that, by an act of irony frequent in history, the endeavour to bring about disarmament took the course that we know and, veering from the objective that had been so solemnly set for it, attention was devoted to the elaboration of so-called partial or collateral measures, which were, in fact, the implementation of a new policy, known since that time under the name of policy of armaments control, a policy which should be designated in French as the policy of mastery over armaments in order to avoid any possible

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068.

² *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

misunderstanding. In a world considered to be too deeply divided for true disarmament to be seriously envisaged, but where the balance of terror had been established between the two great Powers, it was a question of acting in such a manner that the balance would not be upset.

31. My delegation is very much aware of the immediate advantages that might flow from such a policy. While it cannot imagine that the Soviet Union or the United States would be tempted to take advantage of any nuclear superiority that might be attained, it recognizes that nothing could be more ominous for the future of mankind than a breach of the strategic balance between those two great Powers. That is why my country viewed sympathetically the opening of the negotiations at Helsinki and Vienna on the limitation of strategic weapons, and sincerely hopes that those negotiations will meet with success.

32. But who is blind to the fact that the policy of the control of armaments, whether concerned with the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, with their non-dissemination in new environments, or with the limitation of strategic weapons, tends mainly to freeze the present situation, and does not constitute a beginning towards true disarmament because, quite the contrary, it advocates that stockpiles of armaments should be maintained at a sufficiently high level in the name of the merits of mutual dissuasion. Is that really, as its proponents claim, a realistic policy, even if it is considered—at least by the two greatest Powers—as the only one possible under present conditions? Is it not rather tainted with that realism the dangers of which were denounced by the representative of Brazil? For who would question the precarious nature of a balance that is always at the mercy of a technological breakthrough, a mistake in calculation, even a rash decision, for a monopoly on armaments would not necessarily ensure a monopoly on wisdom, even in the case of the most sophisticated weapons.

33. What is more, in addition to the risk of an unavowed refusal to accept nuclear disarmament, the policy of the control of armaments offers the further risk of “a certain sharing of power” between the States responsible for the balance—that sharing which Mr. Maurice Schumann denounced recently from the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly, and which he declared “would, if we were not careful, perpetuate the division of the world”.

34. It is not the nuclear weapon that has caused that division, but it helps to perpetuate it just as it also permits localized conventional conflicts to be endlessly prolonged. This is one more reason, in addition to the frightful dangers which it symbolizes, for calling for true nuclear disarmament, as my country has been doing without interruption since 1960.

35. It is that disarmament which, to my delegation, still takes priority over everything else. Let it be undertaken—that is, let all nuclear Powers, without exception, agree, according to the wish expressed by France, to prohibit the manufacture of such weapons and to eliminate the stockpiles, not forgetting the problem of vehicles of delivery, and then, and only then, would the task of general and complete disarmament acquire its full meaning. Thus, conventional disarmament measures, which are highly

desirable now, but which, in present circumstances, could be considered discriminatory towards non-nuclear Powers, would then be recognized, without umbrage to anyone, as the necessary counter-weight to the imbalances which nuclear disarmament might create.

36. My delegation is aware of every facet of the immensity and difficulty of the task thus proposed, but it considers that apart from this there is no other real way out of a situation unanimously denounced as dangerous, the solution to which, it seems to us, is being sought, for the time being, in a direction which, despite certain appearances, rests on a concession to the very evil that we want to uproot. If the course that we believe the right one is adopted, then my country would willingly renounce the nuclear arsenal it has amassed for its defence, and would work towards the building of a world where security would no longer rest on might. Until these prospects loom on the horizon, my country can only maintain its freedom of judgement vis-à-vis partial measures which, regardless of the good faith of their authors, may only too often prove a sham by conveying the impression that the worst has been avoided, whereas only the hypothetical dangers have been set aside in principle, and the same sword of Damocles still hangs over our heads. My country cannot subscribe, in particular, to any measures which, in view of this state of affairs, would subject it to a situation where it could rely only on others in order to ensure its own safety in case of extreme danger, thus mortgaging its independence.

37. These conclusions do not lead my country to remain indifferent to the initiatives undertaken within the framework of the policy of control of armaments. On the contrary, as matters stand we are following developments closely, even if they do not always seem to be as important as is sometimes claimed, in view of the absence of genuine nuclear disarmament. We have expressed our sympathy for the efforts to denuclearize Latin America, and we gave assurances to its sponsors on this score at a time when the Tlatelolco Treaty was not yet concluded. In the General Assembly, through our representative, we have indicated our intention with respect to the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to behave like the other nuclear Powers signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], and our abstention was intended only to indicate that there might be serious drawbacks if the commitments entered into by non-nuclear Powers were to weaken the feeling of responsibility of the primary Powers in regard to genuine disarmament. We also adhered to the Antarctic Treaty³ and the Treaty on outer space,⁴ and we participated in the negotiation of these texts which contain, as we know, the “non-militarization” clauses.

38. I have thus indicated the care with which France has considered the problem of the non-militarization of the sea-bed and the question of banning the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons, and may I say, if that question were one day to meet with a favourable solution, that would in our opinion obviously constitute a measure of genuine disarmament.

³ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 402 (1961), No. 5778.

⁴ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (*resolution 2222 (XXI), annex*).

39. The ban upon the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed certainly constitutes in itself a praiseworthy measure which is likely to prevent the two great Powers—which are the only ones that really have the means to do so—from extending their arms race to that area. However, the proposed treaty [A/8059-DC/233, *annex A*] does not satisfy us. We might recall, it proceeds from the principle unanimously recognized by the General Assembly since 1967 in its resolution 2340 (XXII), that the sea-bed should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Yet it applies that principle only in part, while at the same time it does not, we believe, take sufficient account of the right of coastal States to defend the ocean floor along their coasts.

40. We would be in favour of a treaty which would provide not for the denuclearization but for the total demilitarization of the sea-bed, beyond that reserved zone.

41. As for the zone itself within which only the coastal State would have the right to carry on military activities with a view to organizing its defence as it pleased, we believe that it should extend over the deep-sea bottom, off its coasts, to a limit which remains to be defined, it being understood that its width would not at any point be less than twelve miles.

42. These are the broad outlines of an agreement on the non-militarization of the sea-bed which we could support. It would still have to be accompanied by satisfactory control measures. However, on this point the draft before us does not satisfy us either. My delegation notes that, despite the changes made in last year's wording, the draft continues to leave to national means of observation the business of effecting the necessary verification and does not provide, contrary to the wish generally expressed by the international community, for a genuinely international control system.

43. It is obviously some such system that would also have to be applied to any agreement banning the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. My country, which considers that the prohibition of the use of these weapons was satisfactorily and definitively settled by the 1925 Protocol⁵ and which can therefore only associate itself with the fervent hope expressed by our Secretary-General that all States concerned should accede to it and fully accept its universal obligations, was one of the first to suggest that the manufacture of the weapons in question should likewise be prohibited. This was made clear in the reply which it addressed on 12 August 1968 to the Soviet memorandum on disarmament of 1 July of that year.⁶ We nevertheless stated at that time that any ban on manufacture should be the subject of strict international control. This obviously remains our view.

44. While not concealing from ourselves the difficulties of the problem, my delegation does not see how dissociating biological weapons from chemical weapons could facilitate a solution. No matter how horrible the former may be, a

horror which was rightly emphasized by the United Kingdom representative, the use of the latter is perhaps more probable, and there may be reason to fear that if they are not dealt with together with biological weapons any solution concerning them will be postponed indefinitely.

45. On the other hand, my delegation has noted with interest the idea advanced by the representative of Japan that experts might be consulted on the problems relating to the control of chemical and biological weapons. For its part, my delegation would gladly associate itself with any draft asking the Secretary-General to convene a group of experts under his high authority, as he has done in the past for other studies involving disarmament, to prepare for the next session of the General Assembly a report on all the questions raised by the control of a ban on the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. The complexity and the importance of the problem require it to be dealt with with the utmost possible objectivity, quite apart from any particular draft agreement.

46. These are the considerations which will guide my delegation in the course of the debate. If some of these considerations point to pessimistic conclusions, none betokens a lack of faith in an enterprise whose definitive failure would render vain all our other efforts for peace and security. Unless we imagine man consenting to his own destruction, this enterprise is bound to succeed sooner or later. May we, nevertheless, in order to hasten it, keeping in mind the moving declaration on peace and disarmament that five Nobel Prize winners have presented for our reflection [see A/C.1/1001] achieve the change of attitude which it requires.

47. Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): A few days ago the United Nations marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of its birth. Most of the important statements made to celebrate that event were devoted to an analysis of the road that the Organization had travelled. In summing up the record in the field of disarmament, unfortunately no one could find any real reasons for rejoicing. In its fundamental aspects the situation in 1970 is considerably worse than that which existed in 1945. The arms race has continued at an ever increasing pace and has attained alarming proportions. Year after year statistics show world-wide investments in armaments to be in amounts which are far beyond man's wildest capacity for astonishment. Yet nothing has so far been achieved in the field of disarmament. The only concrete results refer exclusively to simple collateral measures of agreement not to acquire armaments.

48. Certainly we cannot fail to recognize that these partial agreements are to some degree encouraging. But they are far from sufficient. Through negotiations and as a matter of utmost urgency, it is essential to find the means to put an end to the arms race and to proceed to a disarmament that has some real substance.

49. The primary responsibility in this undertaking rests with the great nuclear Powers and the highly industrialized countries, which, as a group, allocate to the production of weapons and to the general heading of military expenditure more than 90 per cent of total world expenditure, according to the interesting information provided in the

⁵ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

⁶ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annexes, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.*

yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which has just been published.⁷

50. It is well to emphasize this fact because in recent years a trend has emerged in this group of nations which, curiously enough, seeks to transfer the responsibility and the obligation for disarmament to those countries which have only the indispensable minimum for their defence and which also lack real arms industries and must rely on sources from abroad to meet their needs. And this is happening while the above-mentioned group maintains its arsenals intact and reserves to itself the liberty of constantly augmenting them with ever more lethal, more sophisticated and more costly weapons. This discriminatory posture cannot really be seriously advocated.

51. It is well to put matters in their proper perspective. Disarmament should begin, and soon, following the most elementary and unquestionable order of priorities, that is to say, we should start with nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, which represent the most serious danger and threat to mankind.

52. The present juncture is propitious. We are just beginning the Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations and the great majority of the States represented here have made it abundantly clear that this time the expectations of the international community must not be deceived.

53. At the same time the Second United Nations Development Decade is also getting under way. Disarmament and development are closely interrelated. On many occasions, here and in other forums, the delegation of Argentina has said that the vast resources that would be released by the ending of the arms race should be allocated in substantial measure to promote the basic development of the economically backward countries.

54. Is it even necessary to adduce a flood of arguments to demonstrate the benefits of all kinds that would have been obtained if even a tiny percentage of the \$180,000 million spent on armaments in 1969 had been devoted to the industrialization of the developing countries?

55. Peace, security, economic progress and social well-being are concepts that cannot be viewed in isolation. As long as the disequilibrium between the developed and the underdeveloped persists, as long as the technical gap between countries continues to widen, as long as progress continues to be the privilege of only one group, and as long as the more powerful nations do not realize that it is essential to attack at the root and in depth the causes of underdevelopment and not to confine themselves to simple palliatives to offset their disastrous consequences, peace and security will be built on shaky foundations that can be overthrown at any time.

56. Disarmament and development, therefore, continue to be the crucial problems of our time. For that reason we supported the Romanian proposal to include in the agenda of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly an item

on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security [A/7994]. It seems to me that, as a logical corollary, we should now ask the Secretary-General to prepare a report on this item, with the assistance of the experts and specialists in the field from various countries.

57. Faced with a panorama which does not offer much room for optimism, some encouraging signs have nonetheless become discernible. Obviously, in recent years the great Powers have begun a constructive dialogue to replace the policy of confrontation. It is our duty to encourage this beginning towards understanding, for only through the device of negotiations will it be possible to put aside sterile antagonisms and reach constructive solutions, to the benefit of the parties concerned, and of all other countries as well.

58. One result of this rapprochement is the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, which have just entered their third stage in Helsinki. Argentina looks forward confidently to a speedy and positive outcome of these negotiations, as we are convinced that they will constitute a first transcendental step in the prevention of the armaments race and will help significantly to improve the international situation.

59. In this vast and complicated undertaking, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament plays a role the importance of which we should like to emphasize. The discussions that are held in Geneva are carried out in an atmosphere of objectivity, understanding and goodwill, which are essential for the success of negotiations in this field. At times this Conference has been criticized because it has not produced quicker results. But, undoubtedly, in matters which affect the security and the sovereignty of States, and where the national interests of all States must be reconciled and harmonized in the search for compromise formulae, undue haste in procedures may create other obstacles than those it would presumably be attempting to avoid. What is important is that the efforts should not be halted, and that, with all members contributing their points of view, efforts should be made to work out satisfactory and appropriate measures to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

60. At the last meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, it was precisely on this capital question that excellent initiatives were put forward. Among these I would welcome, first of all, the proposal of the delegation of Italy which, pursuing its efforts of previous years, and following upon intensive consultations with other delegations, submitted on 19 August 1970 a working paper [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 38] dealing with a series of proposals in connexion with the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Along the same lines, the delegation of the Netherlands, in another working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 5], offered a series of preliminary observations on ways and means to be included in a programme of this kind. Lastly, just before the end of the summer session in Geneva, the delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia introduced a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which appears in the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [*ibid.*, sect. 42].

⁷ SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70 (Stockholm, Almqvist & Wiksell, 1970).

61. This draft programme, as has already been mentioned by a number of other representatives here, is a very valuable contribution by which to guide our discussions. Of course, some of its provisions are subject to amendment, but in general it provides a basis for negotiation which would make it possible to adopt a programme at the current session. In view of the clear and detailed statement made this morning by the representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles [1753rd meeting], I feel that any further comments that I might make on this draft would be redundant. Nevertheless, it might not be amiss if I were to emphasize that the guiding criterion in the minds of the sponsors was the wish to make it a series of steps which would serve to lead to the prevention, limitation, reduction and elimination of armaments. The conditional nature of the terms in which it has been drafted and the lack of rigid time limits or denunciatory clauses, in our opinion, provide the necessary flexibility that so vast and complicated a programme should have.

62. We are sure that the three sponsors, whom we congratulate for having presented such an impressive piece of work, will be gratified to receive all possible support to facilitate its widest possible acceptance. To this end, apart from any suggestions which may emerge from the debate, we believe that it would be advantageous from every point of view if we tried to harmonize decisions and opinions with those of various delegations such as Italy and the Netherlands, which have also made noteworthy suggestions in this field.

63. Another fundamental problem which continued to command the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is the problem concerning chemical and biological or bacteriological weapons. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to record progress in dealing with this delicate question, owing primarily to the intransigence with which the parties that maintain different positions have adhered to their views.

64. My delegation considers that, as in the case of any disarmament measure, the solution to the serious danger entailed in the production, possession and possible use of this type of weapon can be found only through conciliation and co-operation inspired by a desire to overcome antagonisms. At the meeting held in Geneva on 3 September we said:

“Agreements are not achieved through the sum of individual positions but rather through a process of real negotiations in which each and every view is examined according to its merits. That is the approach and that is the spirit which we believe should prevail in the case of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.” [See CCD/PV.494, para. 62.]

65. In his interesting statement to the Committee on 6 November last [1752nd meeting], the representative of Nigeria, when referring to the important aspect of verification, rightly said that between the two extreme positions a happy medium could be found, which would ensure a level of control reliable enough to be acceptable to all. We share this evaluation which, in a few words, focuses the problem in its true light and shows the only viable way out.

66. For the same reasons Argentina, with eleven other delegations, sponsored a joint memorandum on the subject [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 39]. In synthesis this memorandum emphasizes three essential aspects: first, the importance and urgency of finding a solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons; second, the need to ensure that questions concerning such weapons continue to be tackled jointly; and third, the importance of the system of verification. In this way the group of twelve sponsoring countries wished in all objectivity and in keeping with the need for a settled balance to define the premises that would permit of a reasonable way out of the present stalemate in the situation.

67. Precisely because the most characteristic feature of this memorandum is its objective nature, we can only lament the fact that one delegation continues to rely on that same document to interpret it as “unanimously supporting” the thesis sustained in the draft put forward by the socialist countries. Already in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament itself and on the basis of capricious interpretations we have had to clarify that nothing contained in that memorandum and nothing stated during its presentation to the Committee would justify the supposition that it was supporting, or even favouring, either of the two opposing trends of opinion. We consider that the merit of the document derives from the fact that it carefully avoids prejudging the issue and therefore makes a process of negotiation possible.

68. It is to be hoped that after this further clarification there will be no further insistence on using this memorandum for biased purposes. At the same time we trust that, taking its well thought-out provisions into account, the General Assembly will recommend it to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament so that it can continue examining the item and propose adequate measures designed to eliminate once and for all this reprehensible method of warfare.

69. I should like now to refer to the question of the application of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.⁸ Above all, I want to express our gratitude to the Director-General and the secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency for the efforts they have made during the past two years to bring about compliance with the resolutions of that Conference.

70. In 1968, in that forum, the recommendation was made that ways and means should be studied for increasing the funds available for technical assistance. No one is unaware of the importance of this proposal for Member States in the execution of their programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This explains the interest in having such assistance reflect a rate of growth commensurate with the total activity of the Organization and the expansion of the use of nuclear energy in the interests of general progress and the lessening of the technological gap.

71. It is essential to bring out that even though the assistance provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the developing countries during 1969 was higher

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

than in previous years, the resources made available for that purpose follow a descending curve as compared with the total activity of the Organization and the well-known fact of the growth in the use of nuclear energy in almost every country in the world. The efforts of the Director-General and the positive attitude of Governments and organizations have unfortunately not yet been translated into satisfactory results.

72. The Agency has the responsibility for promoting peace and international co-operation and encouraging and supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a factor for progress and well-being. Technical co-operation constitutes the means for achieving this end.

73. The Organization has demonstrated its ability and efficiency in tackling both questions and it has a competent staff to handle an increase in activities. Therefore, we believe that conditions are ripe for the United Nations General Assembly to accord due consideration to this item, thus setting up a logical balance between efforts and resources.

74. Another of the recommendations formulated by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States refers to the establishment within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under adequate international control. There is no doubt that for this purpose the Agency in Vienna is competent to handle the task, by virtue of its technological and functional skills and also on the basis of the functions and purposes attributed to it under its charter. This instrument categorically establishes the need to centralize in the Agency all international programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, or any other activity, the purpose of which is to publicize any new contribution of nuclear energy to the general well-being. Moreover, these provisions recognize the right of all Member States to benefit from these services without discrimination of any kind.

75. In the last part of my statement I wish to refer to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, which appears in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. This draft is the result of arduous and extensive negotiations which began at the very moment when the two co-sponsors, the delegations of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union, submitted the original version to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in October 1969.⁹ More than a year has passed since that time. During this period, the Geneva body devoted almost three meetings to a consideration of its provisions, and the First Committee debated them as well at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. At the same time there was an intensive exchange of ideas between the delegations concerned and the two co-sponsors in order to bring about the introduction of changes designed to improve the document and, finally, to ensure its widest possible acceptance.

76. The fact that the draft we are considering is now in its third revised form clearly shows the extensive study that was made of each one of its clauses. It also reflects the spirit of understanding and co-operation of the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in their desire to incorporate most of the changes proposed to them and to produce a common text reconciling their own interests with those of the other parties.

77. In expressing our gratitude to the co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament for their attitude, we wish to record our satisfaction at the way in which this process has been carried out. We believe that all disarmament measures, without exception, should be negotiated in the same way and in the same spirit; in other words, by providing an opportunity for all countries to decide on an item which is of such vital importance, showing goodwill and flexibility in the search for compromise formulae.

78. In considering the question of the denuclearization of the sea-bed, my delegation started from the following basic assumptions.

79. First, despite its nature as a collateral measure of non-armament, it is one further step towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament under strict international control. In addition, because of the understanding reached by the two great Powers it constitutes a substantial contribution to peace, security and the improvement of international relations.

80. Secondly, by virtue of its range of application and the prohibitions it lays down, the treaty has real meaning for only a limited number of States which hold a monopoly on nuclear weapons, which have the capacity to place this type of weapon on the sea-bed and sufficient naval power to control any possible violation of those provisions. For the other countries, the treaty only represents an important agreement, the purpose of which is to prevent the extension of the arms race into an area which heretofore has been exempt from the competition for military supremacy among the great Powers.

81. Thirdly, in view of the situation and in order to ensure its viability, the treaty should carefully consider all the interests at stake, without discrimination, and adopt an acceptable balance of responsibilities and obligations for all States parties to the treaty, without any exception whatsoever.

82. Fourthly, in view of its special features, in no instance should it affect the sovereign rights of riparian States over their continental shelf or territorial waters; nor should it interfere with or prejudice the complicated questions of the law of the sea or the positions which various States take in this field of study.

83. With those criteria in mind, my delegation participated actively in the deliberations and negotiations which led to the presentation of the third and last revised text of the draft treaty. I believe it unnecessary to repeat now the observations that we made in the course of five speeches on this item and during the frequent conversations that we had with the co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament and other delegations which shared our views and our

⁹ *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232, annex A.*

concerns. Suffice it to recall that articles I, II and IV of the draft reflect the amendments submitted in due course by Argentina and that in article III, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 were amended to introduce compromise phraseology which met our aspirations in essential aspects concerning the problem of verification.

84. Furthermore, I should like to lay special stress on the fact that, at the meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 1 September 1970, in the course of which the draft that we are analysing now was introduced, in order to make its legal scope as regards the law of the sea perfectly clear, my delegation noted the statements made by the co-sponsors to the effect that:

“...its provisions are in no way designed to, nor do they seek to, undermine, strengthen or affect the positions of States, or to prejudice or influence future decisions on those questions, or to confirm or annul existing or future obligations assumed under international instruments.” [See CC/PV.492, para. 51.]

At that time we considered these declarations of the co-Chairmen as a formal commitment and we expressed our conviction that they would not challenge our interpretation. To our satisfaction, and I believe to the satisfaction of all those who may entertain similar misgivings, this interpretation was not challenged. This means, in brief, that under this treaty no position is affected or consolidated to the detriment of others which hold different legal criteria in matters basic to international maritime law.

85. For all those reasons, Argentina supported that document in the Committee on Disarmament and now, together with a specific group of delegations, we are sponsoring the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.523, which extols the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and requests the depositary Governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

86. We hope that this instrument will meet with the approval of the great majority of Member States and that the procedures used in its elaboration will prove an example that will permit us to continue to progress towards more ambitious objectives in the field of disarmament.

Mr. Farah (Somalia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

87. Mr. KÖMIVES (Hungary): The discussion of disarmament questions this year gains particular significance in the light of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. It is no mere chance that almost all the representatives who took part in the general debate and attended the commemorative session dealt with the problems of the arms race and of disarmament. The importance of the question of disarmament was also underlined in the statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly on the questions of disarmament and arms limitation, contained in document A/C.1/1010.

88. Those concerns and the attention given to disarmament are expressed in the Declaration on the Occasion of

the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations [resolution 2627 (XXV)], in which we find the following:

“We call upon all Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal—general and complete disarmament under effective international control.”

89. The twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations was celebrated amidst growing dangers and certain results in the field of armaments and disarmament. The growing dangers and burdens are clearly shown by the rise to \$200,000 million, from \$120,000 million in 1962, in aggregate military budget estimates the world over, by the development of new and more sophisticated types of weapons and the continued stockpiling of atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction.

90. We can nevertheless state with some satisfaction that the progress made on a number of disarmament questions since the twenty-third session of the General Assembly is not insignificant. In that connexion, I wish to refer to the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and to the preparation of a draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof.

91. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233] truly reflects the considerable work the Conference has accomplished this year. The Hungarian delegation notes with satisfaction that the Conference was able to submit to the General Assembly the agreed text of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. We consider that the elaboration of that draft treaty represents a major contribution to the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. The increasing attention given to questions of general and complete disarmament was also characteristic of the activities of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year.

92. The draft treaty is the main result of the work done this year by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2602 F (XXIV), the Committee devoted great attention to drafting the treaty, which is the product of the joint efforts of its two sponsors, the Soviet Union and the United States, with the participation of all members of the Committee. It is owing to this co-operation that the question of verification and inspection has been solved, and that the draft eliminates the possibility of misinterpretations and differences of opinion regarding the definition of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the purposes of the treaty.

93. We are pleased to draw attention to the extremely important fact that, in accordance with a proposal made on various occasions by our delegation, and by other delegations as well, a separate article in the operative part of the treaty contains the provision that the States Parties to the treaty shall undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament.

ment for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

94. In this connexion, my delegation takes the opportunity to welcome the Polish proposal submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed be kept on the Conference agenda [see CCD/PV.471]. That proposal received general support in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

95. The Hungarian delegation regards the draft treaty as a significant step towards the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and, at the same time, towards general and complete disarmament. The treaty can create new, more favourable conditions for the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seas and oceans for the benefit of all mankind. Consequently, my delegation supports the draft treaty and, as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.523, recommends that draft resolution adoption by the other delegations too. I should like to express my hope that the draft treaty will meet with the general approval of this Committee and that it will soon be open for signature.

96. I now turn to item 28 of the agenda, the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. My delegation regards the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of such weapons, and their destruction, as extremely important and urgent disarmament measures.

97. Since the General Assembly and this Committee took up the question, we have come to see ever more clearly not only the real dangers of the use of such weapons, but also the complexity of the issue involved in their prohibition and destruction, and also the necessity and urgency of measures aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons, and at their destruction, under an international convention.

98. This aim has been considerably furthered by documents such as the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*,¹⁰ the World Health Organization's study, *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons*,¹¹ and the documents drafted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Pugwash Conference, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Secretary-General's report, based on the analysis of relevant data, has come to the conclusion that the use of such weapons would entail catastrophic consequences to all mankind. In section 2, the WHO study states, among other things, that "The possible effects of chemical and biological weapons are subject to a high degree of uncertainty and unpredictability, owing to the involvement of complex and extremely variable meteorological, physiological, epidemiological, ecological, and other factors." The report concludes that it would be necessary to take every step "that would help ensure outlawing the development and use in all circumstances of chemical and biological agents as weapons of war".

¹⁰ United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24.

¹¹ World Health Organization (Geneva, 1970).

99. It can be stated that the growth of the destructive power of chemical and bacteriological weapons has brought with it an increase in the potentiality and danger of the use of such weapons. Their use in Viet-Nam has further aroused international public opinion. Scientists and researchers who feel responsible for the fate of mankind demand the prohibition and destruction of such weapons. In these circumstances, we cannot remain inactive either.

100. We are of the opinion that in this respect we still have to strive to enforce strict and universal observance of the prohibition laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹² The Hungarian delegation regards the Geneva Protocol, which has acquired historic significance, as an international instrument prohibiting the use of all chemical and bacteriological agents in warfare, as it was declared in General Assembly resolution 2603 A (XXIV). My delegation has noted with satisfaction that the General Assembly resolutions inviting States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol have not remained unheeded. We hope this will continue until all States have become parties to the Protocol.

101. As is well known, during last year's session of the General Assembly, the delegations of nine socialist countries, giving due consideration to the significance of the Geneva Protocol from the point of view of international law, submitted a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.¹³

102. The General Assembly, by its resolution 2603 B (XXIV), referred the draft convention to the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The discussion in the General Assembly, at its session last year, of the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as the exchange of views that took place at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its spring and summer sessions this year, have already demonstrated that the majority of States support the very principle of the draft convention of the socialist States, namely, that chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should be dealt with together.

103. In this connexion, my delegation attaches great importance to the joint memorandum of the twelve non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 39], which states:

"It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States."

104. Those ideas—those principles—are incorporated in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.527,

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

¹³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Annexes*, agenda items 29, 30, 31 and 104, document A/7655.

which has just been introduced and which is sponsored by the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland. I should like to express the hope that the Committee will give favourable consideration to this draft resolution.

105. The discussions regarding the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the various proposals and suggestions put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament prompted the sponsors of the draft convention to make further efforts. As a result, Hungary, Mongolia and Poland presented a working paper [*ibid.*, sect. 14] to the Conference. And by submitting their revised draft [A/8136] now, the socialist countries wish to make a further contribution to the earliest possible conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition and the destruction of those weapons. Since the representatives of Mongolia, Poland and the Soviet Union have already commented upon the revised draft convention, permit me now to comment briefly on article VIII alone.

106. The sponsors of the draft convention have made a thorough study of the ideas and proposals concerning the draft. They have reached the conclusion that the operative part should also include the formulation of the aim laid down in the preamble of the first version of their draft, namely, that scientific discoveries in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) activities should be used only for peaceful purposes. This is what the provisions of article VIII are meant to ensure. This article reads as follows:

"1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents.

"2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical and bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents and equipment for the processing, use or production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention."

107. It is the opinion of the authors of the revised draft convention that the inclusion of paragraph 1 in article VIII provides a proper basis for the States parties to co-operate in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents. It is obvious that joint efforts are needed to explore and to work out the ways and means of such activities, as is provided in article VI:

"The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention."

108. The provision in paragraph 2 of article VIII is closely related to that of paragraph 1 and creates an unequivocal

situation. It precludes the misconstruction and misinterpretation of the prohibitive measures contained in the Convention. In this way, the provision in paragraph 2 precludes the danger that the prohibitive measures would adversely affect economic, scientific and technological development.

109. The adoption of the provisions of article VIII would create a new basis for States to co-operate in the propagation of scientific and technological information about chemical and biological activities. This would promote international co-operation, which badly needs strengthening, first of all in the interest of the developing nations.

110. In my delegation's opinion, the revised draft convention submitted by the socialist countries creates a sound basis and better conditions for the efforts being made to attain the prohibition and the destruction of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

111. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), paid particular attention to the problem of general and complete disarmament and, in this connexion, to the question of a comprehensive disarmament programme.

112. The increased attention given to the question of general and complete disarmament in the past two years both in the United Nations General Assembly and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was the logical outcome of a long process. It will be recalled that General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), which welcomed the joint statement by the Soviet Union and the United States of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations,¹⁴ recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,¹⁵ the Treaty of 1967 on principles for the peaceful uses of outer space,¹⁶ and the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*, *annex*] also gave expression to the intention of the contracting parties to make further efforts to realize general and complete disarmament. Let me add that the draft of the sea-bed Treaty also contains a provision for a similar obligation of the contracting states.

113. The foregoing examples clearly demonstrate the inseparability of collateral disarmament measures from general and complete disarmament. In the opinion of my delegation the collateral measures pave the way toward general and complete disarmament, while general and complete disarmament, as an aim, helps the elaboration of collateral measures.

114. For the whole future and prospects of disarmament, the Hungarian delegation also attaches great importance to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States. We are certain that these talks, if they make headway, will exert a positive

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, *Sixteenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

¹⁵ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

¹⁶ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (resolution 2222 (XXI), *annex*).

influence in the solution of disarmament questions in general and in nuclear disarmament in particular.

115. Our experience up to now with the negotiations on general and complete disarmament shows that we are faced here with a historical process and not with some kind of single action. How this process will work out is largely dependent on the international situation. At present the war in Indo-China, the crisis in the Middle East and the system of foreign military bases are all factors which impede any progress in the field of disarmament. Consequently, actual progress is dependent on the lessening of international tension. For that very reason, those who really want disarmament must do their utmost to remove the causes of international tension. Any lessening of international tension could create better conditions for disarmament measures, and those measures could result in a further lessening of tension.

116. It is an inescapable fact that the measures of general and complete disarmament in the real sense of the word can be properly discussed and effectively carried out in the first place only with the participation of all militarily significant Powers, of all nuclear States. This idea was expressed and underlined by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization.¹⁷

117. In view of what I said before, it is not by chance that the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, although devoting serious attention to the question, has been unable to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

118. The Hungarian delegation has followed and studied with particular interest the proposals made at the Conference concerning both general and complete disarmament and a comprehensive disarmament programme, and is looking forward to the suggestions to be made by members of the Committee at the current session. We could support a disarmament programme provided that it is realistic and flexible, and lays stress upon the most urgent problems, thus contributing to tangible results in the field of disarmament.

119. The Hungarian delegation is of the opinion that the programme should give priority to nuclear disarmament, as well as to the prohibition and destruction of other types of weapons of mass destruction, namely, the chemical and bacteriological weapons. In connexion with nuclear disarmament we consider it extremely important that the principles defined by General Assembly resolution 1653 (XVI) regarding the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons be laid down in a multilateral international convention as soon as possible. With a view to reducing the nuclear arms race it seems necessary to ensure universal adherence to the partial test-ban Treaty and to the non-proliferation Treaty and to arrive at an agreement on the suspension of underground nuclear explosions.

120. With regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, my delegation deems it very important to speed up the process of ratification and accession. Concerning the comprehensive

test ban we continue to hold the view expressed in my Government's reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire [see A/7967/Rev.1], namely that "the solution of the problem today is not a scientific and technical question but a matter of policy decision, that of willingness to stop the underground tests".

121. In conclusion, I should like to express the firm desire of my delegation to promote the solution of disarmament problems in co-operation with other delegations.

122. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): This year has witnessed some notable developments in the field of disarmament: first, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] came into force; second, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which opened last year, are continuing; third, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has successfully negotiated and finalized the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/8059-DC/233, annex A].

123. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty on 5 March 1970 is a significant event. It is a cause of satisfaction to all peace-loving States desirous of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. My country has never wavered in its support of the objectives of that Treaty and has expressed its general satisfaction with its provisions. Pakistan voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), commending the non-proliferation Treaty. We welcome the fact that the Treaty has been signed by nearly a hundred States and that over sixty States have ratified it. At the same time it has been our view—a view which we have expressed on a number of occasions—that the effectiveness of the Treaty would depend on the acceptance by the "threshold" nuclear-weapon States of the obligations imposed by it.

124. The primary objective of the non-proliferation Treaty is to limit the number of nuclear-weapon Powers to the existing five and prevent the emergence of additional such Powers. Most of its signatories have neither the intention nor the ability at the present time to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, their acceptance of its obligations is most commendable, in that those States have renounced their sovereign right to such weapons for at least the duration of the Treaty. At the same time, there are some signatories that possess the necessary industrial and technological means to "go nuclear" if they so desire. They have made an outstanding contribution to peace by their voluntary renunciation of the nuclear option.

125. However, there are a number of Member States that have the nuclear option but have so far shown no willingness to forgo it. They have not become parties to the Treaty or undertaken binding commitments to renounce nuclear weapons. Consequently, the non-proliferation régime that the Treaty aims at establishing is not yet in sight. Should those States manufacture nuclear weapons, the existing imbalance of power in their respective regions would be aggravated. Sudden changes in international relations may well be triggered. That situation raises a serious question about the effectiveness of the Treaty. It

¹⁷ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 1A.

also prevents other States, which would otherwise do so, from formally acceding to its obligations.

126. Closely linked to the Treaty are the security assurances extended to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty by three of the nuclear Powers in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). Pakistan and many other non-nuclear-weapon States have on a number of occasions dwelt on the inadequacy of those security assurances and the need to strengthen them.

127. The resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks sustains our hopes of a halt to the strategic arms race and limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems. At the same time, we cannot but express our regret that the appeal of the General Assembly for a moratorium on the further testing and development of those systems, in its resolution 2602 A (XXIV), has not yet produced results.

128. In regard to the talks, the views of the Pakistan delegation were set forth by its Chairman, Sardar Abdul Rashid, in his address to the General Assembly on 29 September 1970, in the following words:

"We earnestly hope that a strategic arms limitation agreement of comprehensive scope, embracing all strategic weapons systems, offensive as well as defensive, will emerge before long through the third round of negotiations in Helsinki. The world cannot but be disappointed if it has to rest content with an agreement confined to mere ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems. . . . Nor are we convinced that either of the super-Powers should make agreement dependent on its own subjective assessment of the intentions of the other in relation to tensions and conflicts in one part of the world or another. While such intentions are no doubt relevant to the generation of mutual confidence or otherwise, it appears to us that, so long as limitation of strategic armaments gives no military advantage to one side over the other, it could be put into effect without prejudice to any side's vital interests or security. One must perforce proceed from the assumption that, whatever the disparity in quantitative terms between the super-Powers, there will always obtain a qualitative parity. Given this fact and verification of any limitations that might be agreed upon, a common or even parallel approach to political problems need not be made a condition for arriving at an agreement" [*1853rd plenary meeting, para. 86*].

129. The report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on its work this year [*A/8059-DC/233*] is particularly important, as agreement has been reached on the third revised version of the joint United States-USSR treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. This important instrument of non-armament has been evolved on the initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States, with the active assistance of all the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and after full consideration of the proposals made and the views expressed in this Committee last year. The understanding and mutual accommodation shown by the sponsors of the

treaty and other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in finalizing its draft text, should provide a model for negotiations on other measures of non-armament and disarmament. Pakistan is gratified to note that most of its views and suggestions, put forward jointly with some delegations, are reflected in the treaty.

130. The treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed. We would have preferred a total prohibition of the military uses of the sea-bed except for installations of a purely passive, defensive nature. But we feared that the time that would be lost in trying to persuade those who were not ready for a treaty of this scope would be fraught with the danger of the world being presented with the fait accompli of nuclear weapons installed on the sea-bed. Given the pressures to develop and deploy new weapons systems as soon as technological breakthroughs establish their feasibility, a failure to compromise and settle for what was politically attainable at present might well have undermined the prospects of achieving even the more limited objective of preventing the emplacement of nuclear weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

131. We hope that the present draft treaty will lead us before long to a more comprehensive demilitarization of the sea-bed. Our hope is strengthened by the incorporation of article V in the present draft of the treaty, by which the parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. This, combined with article VII, which provides for a conference of the parties in order to review the operations of the treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the treaty are being realized will, we hope, lead in the near future to agreement on a more comprehensive prohibition of the military uses of the sea-bed.

132. My delegation had shared the view that the provisions of article III of the treaty, relating to verification, needed strengthening and, in addition to being permitted to verify the observance of the treaty through their own means or with the assistance of another State, the parties should be enabled to have recourse to an appropriate international agency for that purpose. This provision was necessary, first, because most States are not in a position to verify the treaty's observance through their own means. Second, even the provision for verification with the assistance of another State was not adequate, because such assistance might not be readily available to all parties on an equitable basis because of contemporary political realities. Third, the treaty is not only an instrument between the major Powers: it is an agreement among all parties—big and small. Finally, it is an agreement between the major Powers on one side, and the smaller States on the other. As such, it is a compact that restrains the major Powers and protects the smaller States.

133. All these considerations make it imperative that an independent and reliable international body should be established as soon as practicable and entrusted with the task of verification. The United States and the Soviet Union have gone some way in meeting this point of view by incorporating in paragraph 5 of article III of the treaty a

reference to international procedures. We welcome this addition and hope that, in time, it will lead to the establishment of an appropriate international machinery.

134. In view of all that I have said, my delegation has co-sponsored a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.523] by which the General Assembly would commend the sea-bed treaty and would request the depositary Governments to open it for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

135. While progress has been achieved in the three areas of arms control and limitation that I have mentioned, the lack of progress in the more vital areas of the reduction of armaments is a cause for deep concern. The Secretary-General's report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,¹⁸ submitted in July 1969 brought into sharp focus the fact that chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons of mass destruction and pose an equally great, if not greater, danger to mankind. The danger arises primarily from the fact that almost all countries can develop, produce and acquire them. These weapons, which can be acquired by a relatively large number of States, are not subject even to that balance of deterrence which, operating among a very limited number of nuclear-weapon Powers, has so far prevented a nuclear holocaust. These weapons do not require the enormous financial and scientific resources that are needed for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The horrifying picture of the effects of the possible use of such weapons that emerges from the Secretary-General's report makes it imperative that all States accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹⁹ which prohibits the use of all chemical and biological weapons. Also, no time must be lost in prohibiting the development, production and acquisition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and ensuring the destruction of the existing stockpiles without any further delay.

136. Positive and constructive efforts were made to this end in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament but remained unfruitful because the issue of control and verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons could not be resolved.

137. It is the view of my delegation—and we share it with all the other members of the group of twelve non-aligned States in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in the matter of the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling, and for their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States. We recognize the importance of the issue of verification and do not dispute the view that reasonable guarantees and safeguards should be devised to inspire confidence in the implementation of an agreement on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. However, it must be recognized that, in the ultimate analysis, the best guarantee for the observance of an international agreement is the mutual interests of States which are parties

to it. Consequently, while every effort should be made to have a reliable system of control and verification, time should not be lost, and an agreement should not be delayed by the search for a 100 per cent reliable system of control and verification, for no such system can ever be found. What we can hope for is a system of control and verification which would be reasonably reliable. Lastly, it is our view that verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other.

138. In regard to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, its conclusion, regrettably, remains as distant as before. It is the view of independent and competent experts that the reasons which dictated the exclusion of underground tests from the scope of the Moscow test ban Treaty²⁰ are no longer valid. Since all the technology of nuclear weaponry has already been extracted by the super-Powers, and further underground weapons tests, above or below 4.75 threshold, are likely to yield only marginal results in terms of product improvement, which can hardly make a significant difference to the nuclear weaponry of one side vis-à-vis the other, the time is now ripe for the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Consequently, the argument that the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests should await the outcome of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is a weak one and does not altogether convince. If verification is insisted upon as a *sine qua non*, then the constructive initiative of Canada for an international exchange of seismic data and the sophisticated Swedish proposal for verification by challenge provide all the adequate measures to meet all reasonable demands for verification.

139. Turning now to the question of general and complete disarmament, a goal which seems to have been almost lost sight of for the past several years, the representative of Italy, Ambassador Vinci, has rightly drawn our attention to the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been compelled to concentrate so much on partial and marginal measures as almost to exclude the consideration of those pertaining to real disarmament.

140. I should like to pay a sincere tribute to the Italian delegation and to Ambassador Vinci personally for being the first to revive the idea of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The delegations of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the Committee on Disarmament on 27 August [A/8059-DC/233, annex C, sect. 42]. We consider this document to be a carefully thought-out one which brings together all the elements involved. Its adoption with the changes that may be considered necessary or appropriate would enable the General Assembly to consider the disarmament items every year in the long-term perspective and within the framework of general and complete disarmament. As the three-Power proposal was presented towards the close of the session of the Committee on Disarmament this year, that body was not able to discuss it in depth. My delegation would therefore suggest that the three co-sponsors consult with the delegations of Italy and the

¹⁸ *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.69.I.24).

¹⁹ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).

²⁰ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

Netherlands, who also presented their ideas in this regard to the Committee on Disarmament, and with the two co-Chairmen, as well as with all interested delegations, with a view to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at the present session of the General Assembly. We believe that the three-Power proposal, as was so clearly explained by one of its distinguished authors, the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico, Mr. García Robles [1753rd meeting], is by no means rigid and imperative. It will give sufficient flexibility to the two co-Chairmen and the Committee on Disarmament in the matter of selecting and giving priority to measures considered ripe for agreement. The task of promoting a consensus on it at the present session should not prove too time-consuming or difficult. The Committee on Disarmament is almost overwhelmed by its agenda and should not be diverted from its central task of negotiating concrete measures of disarmament to debating a comprehensive programme. Furthermore, it would be more appropriate for the General Assembly, in which almost all States are represented, to pronounce on such a programme, than for a restricted body like the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Action at this twenty-fifth anniversary session would be a fitting inauguration by the United Nations of its Disarmament Decade.

141. My delegation notes with interest that the draft programme of disarmament states under the heading of "Principles" that: "Concerted efforts should be made to associate militarily significant States, in particular all nuclear-weapon Powers, with the negotiations for disarmament."

142. The most crucial disarmament measures, which must be accorded the first priority in any comprehensive programme, are those concerning nuclear weapons. While an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States pertaining to the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons systems will be a step in the right direction, indeed an indispensable first step towards nuclear disarmament, it is incontestable that this goal—that is, nuclear disarmament—will remain unattainable unless all nuclear-weapon Powers participate in the discussions on nuclear disarmament. It was for this reason that the Pakistan delegation stated in the preamble to its draft resolution, presented to the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in 1968,²¹ calling for the start of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), that these negotiations should aim at and lead to negotiations among all nuclear-weapon Powers—in other words, to the participation of France and the People's Republic of China.

143. A little earlier I referred to the statement of the Chairman of my delegation that the world cannot but be disappointed if it has to rest content with an agreement confined to mere ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems while leaving the deployment of new systems untouched. Unless there is a comprehensive scaling down of the strategic nuclear weapons systems and the quantitative as well as the qualitative disparity among the nuclear-weapon Powers is substantially

reduced, the full co-operation of the two nuclear Powers which are not participating or are excluded from disarmament negotiations cannot be secured, and hence nuclear disarmament cannot become a reality. The question that keeps recurring is: how long must the world community see its hopes for nuclear disarmament being doomed to disappointment by the exclusion of the People's Republic of China and by the absence of France from the disarmament negotiations? Certainly the price of China's exclusion, the exclusion of a great Asian and world Power, has become unacceptable.

144. Mr. HSUEH (China) (*translated from Chinese*): In reviewing the work of disarmament for the past year, my delegation finds some noteworthy progress has been made both within and outside the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. It is true that we have not even reached the perimeter of our final goal, which is general and complete disarmament; nor have we made much progress in strengthening international peace and security, which would facilitate the work of disarmament. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of some of our achievements of the past year and previous years, moderate though they may be, has contributed to widening the path, thereby making our final goal more accessible.

145. One of the achievements of the past year to which I have just referred is the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] on 5 March 1970. The importance of this Treaty lies not only in the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons but also in the parties' undertaking to stop the nuclear arms race and to bring about nuclear disarmament. It is hoped that still more countries will be added before long to the already impressive list of some 100 signatures and sixty ratifications of the Treaty and in this connexion, I am pleased to report that the Republic of China signed the Treaty on 1 July 1968 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 January 1970. It is also hoped that effective measures will be taken under article VI of the Treaty, relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to eventual nuclear disarmament.

146. This hope has been stimulated by the fact that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the two major nuclear Powers appear to be progressing in a promising manner. I believe that we have all noted with gratification the reports that the third round of talks has recently begun in a serious, constructive, businesslike and cordial atmosphere. It can be said that no other development in the field of disarmament can have a greater impact on international peace and the future of the world. While there is very little we can do in this Committee to hasten or ensure the successful outcome of the talks, it appears appropriate and desirable for us to give all possible support to the two parties in their arduous endeavours to discharge the awesome responsibility that history has placed on them for the destiny of all mankind.

147. Another noteworthy development of the past year has been the continuing implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco²² and the progressive extension of the prohibi-

²¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session*, agenda item 96, document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2, para. 17, resolution D.

²² Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 634 (1968), No. 9068).

tion of nuclear weapons to the whole continent of Latin America. The final denuclearization of such a large and important region of the world will not only benefit the tens of millions of its inhabitants, but will reinforce the validity of the non-proliferation Treaty and considerably facilitate the work of disarmament. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America for its efforts and to express appreciation for its thoughtfulness in keeping the United Nations fully and promptly informed of its work.

148. I now turn to the progress made in the past year in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Its voluminous report to the General Assembly [A/8059-DC/233] contains a wealth of valuable information and proposals on the question of disarmament and related problems. Like its predecessor, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is proving to be a useful body for research as well as for negotiations.

149. The most important proposal to be submitted may be found in annex A of the report, which contains the third revised text of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. As we all recall, this draft treaty was the subject of extensive debate in this Committee last year. There was general agreement that the preparation of the draft treaty was a timely and welcome development and that its conclusion would constitute a step towards the exclusion of the sea-bed from the arms race. At the same time, different views were expressed on some of the provisions of the draft treaty and proposals made to improve them. My delegation also had occasion to draw attention to the desirability of strengthening the provisions relating to the safeguarding of the rights of the coastal States in the adjacent sea and to the procedures for the verification of the prohibition.

150. As the latest version of the draft treaty shows, almost all the major points raised in this Committee last year have been taken into account. Questions of the scope of application of the prohibition, its geographical extent, and the procedures of its verification have been well clarified, although there may still be room for improvement in the case of one or two provisions. For example, article III, paragraph 5, speaks of verification through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. This provision could perhaps be further clarified. So far as my delegation is concerned, I do not know if the meaning of the paragraph may become clearer when it is translated into Chinese. However, as it stands in the English text, the paragraph seems to mean that, in the matter of verification, the parties to the treaty will be entitled to resort to any of the procedures relating to the peaceful settlement of international disputes provided for in the Charter.

151. After a preliminary examination of the draft treaty, I am pleased to state that my delegation is, in general, in favour of it. It cannot be over-emphasized that the endeavour to conclude this treaty is aimed not only at the

prohibition of the nuclearization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, but also, as stated in the preamble, at their eventual exclusion from the arms race. My delegation therefore attaches great importance to the full implementation of article V with regard to further measures to this end, should the treaty be concluded.

152. Finally, I should like to make a request to the Secretariat, through the Chairman, that the official text of the draft treaty in the Chinese language be made available as soon as possible. This would enable my delegation to make a further study of the draft treaty and to submit it to my Government for consideration at an early date.

153. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has also made considerable progress in the study of the question of chemical and biological weapons. In retrospect, my delegation feels that the debate on this question last year in the First Committee was somewhat beclouded by political attitudes towards the Viet-Nam war and that disproportionate attention was focused on the issue of whether the prohibition should or should not include tear gas and herbicides. It is now clear, as a result of the study made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, that the question of verification with regard to chemical weapons is far more complex and difficult to solve.

154. It has now been convincingly pointed out in a number of documents submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by various delegations that chemical elements produced for peaceful purposes can easily be converted into chemical weapons. It therefore follows that the system of verification of compliance is the most important part of any international convention prohibiting chemical weapons. What has been suggested as the national measure of control and the international measure of consultation and co-operation is no more reliable or effective than a unilateral renunciation of chemical weapons. To conclude an international convention applicable to chemical weapons before a reliable and adequate system of verification concerning the prohibition of such weapons can be devised does not seem to serve any very useful purpose.

155. In these circumstances, the First Committee is confronted by the question whether it is still desirable to insist on the conclusion of a single convention covering the prohibition of both biological and chemical weapons. Is it a wise policy to delay the conclusion of a convention on biological weapons, which now appears to be both politically and technically possible, in order to wait until it is also possible to include chemical weapons in the convention? In the view of my delegation, it is far more desirable to secure what is possible now and to work to achieve what may be possible in the future.

156. The argument that biological and chemical weapons have been traditionally treated together as a group is irrelevant. Those of us who like to talk about the changing world should readily agree that the world also changes in the field of technical development. Moreover, the conclusion of a separate convention on biological weapons does not leave the use and manufacture of chemical weapons unprohibited. Let us not forget that the Geneva Protocol of

1925²³ continues to be valid. It is hoped that more States will accede to the Protocol in response to the appeal contained in General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) and reiterated in its resolution 2603 B (XXIV).

157. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has also spent considerable time in the study of the question of a draft treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. Here again, the question of verification has for many years blocked the conclusion of the draft treaty. Documents of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament attached to its report have confirmed once more, scientifically, that seismological capabilities are, at least at present, inadequate to identify underground nuclear explosions from earthquakes. In this respect, we are indebted to the delegation of Canada, whose working paper containing an assessment of the replies to the Secretary-General's inquiries about seismological information [*ibid.*, annex C, sect. 34] is most illuminating.

158. It is now clear, therefore, that international pressure for the speedy conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear tests has been wrongly applied to those who believe

that verification by national means alone, through seismological monitoring, is technically inadequate. The responsibility for the delay in concluding the treaty lies with those others who, for political reasons, refuse to accept a reasonable number of on-site inspections. It is hoped that this problem will be solved satisfactorily at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But if international pressure could be of any help in this matter, it appears that it should now be applied in the other direction.

159. In making this brief review of the work undertaken on disarmament in the past year, my delegation feels that the decade of the 1970s has had a fair beginning. As to the future, while it is desirable to plan ahead and to lay down a well designed programme of work, it appears still more important to see what is possible at any given moment and translate it into reality. A step forward, however small, brings us closer to the final goal of general and complete disarmament. It is only by making progress step by step in a practical manner that we stand a good chance of achieving our objective.

160. The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat has taken note of the request for the Chinese text of the draft treaty on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, referred to in document A/C.1/L.523.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.

²³ Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138).