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*Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).*

**AGENDA ITEM 32**

**Question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (concluded) (A/7622 and Corr.1 and Add.1, A/7750)**

1. The CHAIRMAN: Following upon the request made by the Soviet representative at our meeting yesterday [1714th meeting] I give the floor to the Legal Counsel of the United Nations.
2. Mr. STAVROPOULOS (Legal Counsel): At the request of the representative of the Soviet Union, the opinion of the Legal Counsel has been requested on the following question:  

“Is it lawful for the First Committee to adopt a political decision on an organizational matter which will become a component part of the consideration by the Fifth Committee of the same organizational matter, along with other component parts of this consideration, such as the request which initiated this organizational matter and the report of the Secretary-General on financial implications?”
3. It is understood that the “political decision” referred to in this question is a decision to be taken by the First Committee whether to recommend that the sea-bed Committee should hold one of its sessions in Geneva.

4. The issue arises because two Main Committees, the First and the Fifth, are simultaneously considering proposals bearing on this question. The Fifth Committee under agenda item 76 on the “Pattern of Conferences” is considering the general question of which United Nations organs may meet in Geneva, while the First Committee under agenda item 32 is considering the specific question of the place of meeting of a session of the sea-bed Committee. Each is acting within its own competence and neither is legally precluded from adopting recommendations on the matter. Should there be a conflict between the recommendations of the two Main Committees, this conflict would be resolved by the General Assembly itself, which alone is competent to take the final decision on the matter.

5. It is likewise within the competence of one Main Committee to make recommendations to another on a matter, aspects of which are being dealt with by each Committee. It is, of course, within the competence of the Committee to whom the recommendation is made to decide what weight it will give to such recommendations in making its own recommendation to the General Assembly. And it is, of course, the General Assembly itself which must make the final decision should differences of views persist.

6. The question put by the representative of the Soviet Union brings out the fact that the Fifth Committee is dealing on a broader basis with a question of principle relating to an organizational matter—the pattern of conferences—while the First Committee is dealing with a possible exception to that principle. United Nations practice, however, makes it clear that Committees are competent to recommend such exceptions, and the General Assembly, acting within its rules of procedure, is competent to decide to make such exceptions.

7. A similar opinion was expressed yesterday by the Secretary-General, and this is only a legal formulation of the same opinion.

8. Mr. MENDELEVICH (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. Chairman, the USSR delegation would like first to thank you for the prompt transmission of our question of Mr. Stavropoulos, the Legal Counsel, and to the latter for his prompt answer.

9. The answer itself, however, does not fully clarify the issue. The Legal Counsel has referred more to the existing practice than to the legal bases for that practice and it is still not clear to me whether it is lawful for the First Committee, setting aside the question of financial implications, to take a political decision on an organizational matter, which is bound to have some influence on the consideration of that organizational matter in the Fifth

Committee, where this political decision will be a component part in the consideration of the entire organizational problem along with such other component parts as the proposal raising this matter and the report of the Secretary-General on the financial implications.

10. We shall, of course, carefully study the Legal Counsel's statement, but we do not feel that it clarifies the legal aspect. The USSR delegation would therefore say that it continues to regard such a recommendation by the First Committee as unlawful. It further requests the Legal Office of the Secretariat to continue its study of the matter, as it may be of great importance for the future practice of the General Assembly and its Main Committees.

11. My delegation does not insist that this study should be carried out today or next week. It realizes that the matter requires serious work and time, but it nonetheless invites the Legal Counsel to continue this study from the point of view of the practical application of such procedure in the work of the General Assembly and its Main Committees.

12. In the circumstances, when this legal study cannot be deemed completed, my delegation believes that any decision taken by the First Committee on the question before us today cannot and must not be regarded as a precedent.

13. In the interests of co-operation and in view of the complexity of the legal problem involved, I have no intention of prolonging this procedural discussion. As surely no one can have any additional arguments to advance, my delegation merely wishes its statement be placed on record and it invites the Legal Counsel to continue his study of the matter, bearing in mind all its possible consequences.

14. The CHAIRMAN: May I take it that the Committee agrees to the proposal made yesterday by the representative of Ceylon [1714th meeting]. I shall read out the proposal:

"The First Committee agrees in principle that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor should hold its 1970 summer session in Geneva. It further agrees that a final decision on the proposal should be taken in the Fifth Committee, having regard to all the relevant implications."

15. Mr. AMERASINGHE (Ceylon): The final decision is not taken in the Fifth Committee. The Fifth Committee makes a recommendation, but it is the General Assembly which takes the final decision.

16. The CHAIRMAN: The representative of Ceylon has, by the statement he has just made, amended his first proposal, as read out by me.

17. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): My delegation does not insist on a formal vote, but it maintains the reservation it made in its earlier statement. It doubts the legality of such a decision, such a recommendation by the First Committee, and asks that it should not be regarded as a precedent and that the entire question should be carefully studied.

18. Mr. HILDYARD (United Kingdom): If this is to be a consensus, I should like to reserve the position of my

delegation with regard to this question pending consideration in the Fifth Committee of the financial implications.

19. The CHAIRMAN: I take it that the Committee agrees with the formulation which I have read out, as amended by the representative of Ceylon.

20. If I hear no objection, it will be so decided.

*It was so decided.*

## AGENDA ITEM 29

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989, A/C.1/992-995; A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.495/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.499, A/C.1/L.501 and A/C.1/L.503)**

### CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTIONS

21. The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue its consideration of the draft resolutions and amendments on agenda item 29, as follows:

(a) The fifteen-Power draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. Amendments to this draft resolution have been submitted by Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom in document A/C.1/L.501;

(b) A revised draft resolution submitted by Malta in document A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1;

(c) A revised draft resolution submitted by Malta in document A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1;

(d) A draft resolution submitted by Ireland, Italy and Japan in document A/C.1/L.499. Amendments have been submitted to this draft resolution by Cyprus and Ghana in document A/C.1/L.503; and

(e) A revised draft resolution which has been submitted by Canada, Ecuador, Iran, Mexico and Nigeria in document A/C.1/L.495/Rev.1.

22. With regard to the draft resolution submitted by Malta in document A/C.1/L.492, the representative of Malta has suggested that in its place the Committee might consider a statement by the Chairman on the subject of the draft. I shall take up this matter after we have dealt with the draft resolutions to which I have referred.

23. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): Mr. Chairman, in accordance with the order which you were good enough to put to the Committee, I should like to give an explanation of the Canadian vote on draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 and the amendments to it of which Canada is co-sponsor [A/C.1/L.501] which were introduced by the representative of the Netherlands at the meeting yesterday afternoon [1714th meeting].

24. We believe that the bilateral negotiations initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union at Helsinki on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems, to which this draft resolution and its amendments refer, are perhaps the most momentous developments in arms control since the war. We well understand and, indeed, are in sympathy with the motives of those delegations which have submitted draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. More particularly, we entirely share with them the desire to do everything possible to avoid another upward turn of the nuclear arms spiral. However, we do believe that, because of the vital importance of these talks which are in their delicate and tentative first stage, the General Assembly should be very cautious about pronouncing itself in any way which might prejudice the future course of these bilateral talks.

25. We feel that the moratorium called for in draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, related as it is to matters which range over the whole spectrum of the balance of the nuclear arsenals of the two Powers and involving as it does the basic security interests of both sides, is a matter more appropriately settled by negotiation than through a declaration of the General Assembly. Moreover, we understand that this particular language will not be supported by either of the participants referred to in the draft resolution.

26. On the other hand, we believe that the amendment with which we are associated in document A/C.1/L.501 is acceptable to both the participants in the strategic arms limitation talks. It deals with the same problem, only, we believe, in a more appropriate fashion, by calling on the United States and the Soviet Union to refrain from any action which might be prejudicial to the aim of substantial agreements on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic armaments.

27. For this reason, we cannot support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 unless this amendment is adopted.

28. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): I am sorry that a somewhat unusual procedure has been followed regarding draft resolution A/C.1/L.490: the sponsors of the amendments have seen fit to introduce them before the draft resolution itself has officially been introduced to the Committee.

29. I now have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, originally sponsored by 12 delegations—those of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia—which have since been joined by the delegations of Ireland, Cyprus and Mali.

30. I shall try to limit my introductory statement to a few comments which may make it easier to understand the contents and scope of the draft resolution and the reasons why we believe that its adoption by the General Assembly would be a decision whose importance can hardly be exaggerated.

31. The first preambular paragraph recalls General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII), in which the General

Assembly last year urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of strategic nuclear weapon systems.

32. In the second preambular paragraph, the Assembly would note with satisfaction—and we are sure that this feeling is shared by everyone—that on 17 November 1969 the Governments of the two nuclear States which I have just mentioned initiated bilateral negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems, as the Assembly had urged them to do.

33. The third preambular paragraph is designed to express the hope, which is surely felt by all the peoples of the earth, that such “negotiations will bring about early and positive results which would pave the way for further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament”.

34. The fourth and last preambular paragraph is designed to put on record what we believe to be a unanimous conviction: that it is necessary to create the most favourable conditions for the achievement of the aim referred to in the preceding paragraph.

35. The content and aim of the sole operative paragraph of the draft resolution are evident from the text: the General Assembly “Appeals to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems”.

36. The reasons why it is highly desirable for the Assembly to take such an unequivocal and insistent stand on the need for this moratorium have been explained and repeated at great length, with abundant data and irrefutable arguments, by various statesmen, scientists and diplomatic and military experts in international affairs.

37. To recall here even the main points of all that has been said and written on this subject would in itself take up the entire time still available to the Committee before the closure of this session of the Assembly. Obviously, therefore, I have no intention of doing so. I shall merely cite three recent statements which, I can safely say, are particularly authoritative.

38. The nineteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs took place from 22 to 27 October 1969 and was attended by more than a hundred scientists from 29 countries, foremost among whom were nationals of the Soviet Union and the United States of America. The final declaration of the Conference contains two paragraphs which I shall read out in their entirety because of their particular relevance to the item dealt with in the draft resolution.

39. Those paragraphs read as follows:

“The prospect of another escalation in the strategic armaments levels of the US and the USSR is now a particularly acute problem because of the possibility of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRV) deployment, which

will lead to a new and very dangerous stage in the steeply ascending spiral of the strategic arms race. Deployment of either of these weapons systems would almost certainly have the effect of introducing large uncertainties into the calculations made by both sides of the level of strategic armaments required to deter a nuclear attack. It would seem virtually certain that strategic force levels would be greatly expanded; this is due to the combination of the assumption by each side that the capabilities of the other would be at the highest possible level with the assumption that its own capabilities are at the lowest level of the range of uncertainty. Such an approach has been used in the past as a pretext to justify very great arms increases. Experience shows that this approach, instead of making the world safer, has resulted in a diminution of the security of all nations. An expansion of armaments will not only increase the waste of resources and the danger of accidental or unauthorized launching of nuclear-armed missiles but will also increase the probability of nuclear war, since one or another of the major nuclear Powers might conclude that there are advantages to be gained by striking first rather than accepting the risk of a first blow by its adversary.

“With these considerations in mind, the Group concluded that early negotiation of an agreement to limit strategic armaments was a matter of highest priority, and that indeed the urgency was particularly great with respect to the deployment of ABMs and MIRVs and the testing of the latter. Action on this problem should be at the top of the agenda of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The Group heartily welcomed the announcement that these talks are to begin on 17th November in Helsinki.”<sup>1</sup>

40. Working Group 3 of the same Pugwash Conference included in its report another paragraph which is a suitable complement to those just cited and reads as follows:

“The deployment of ABM defence testing and deployment of MIRVs needs to be stopped urgently. This could be accomplished in one of several ways: as the first order of business for SALT by tacit agreement, by simultaneous declarations, or by an initiative to halt such activities on the assumption that reciprocal action by the other side will follow. Immediacy is indicated because once a MIRV-ABM era begins it would be extremely difficult to limit strategic arms, and because the difficulties of monitoring a MIRV ban would increase rapidly with additional tests. An early moratorium of limited duration on MIRV testing and ABM deployment could be of great value for this reason and also because it would provide time to negotiate comprehensive agreements in the SALT talks.”<sup>1</sup>

41. I am going to read once more the last sentence of that paragraph of the report of Working Group 3 of the Pugwash Conference in which, as I said, more than a hundred of the most outstanding scientists, particularly scientists from the Soviet Union and the United States, took part. I repeat:

“An early moratorium of limited duration on MIRV testing and ABM deployment could be of great value for this reason and also because it would provide time to negotiate comprehensive agreements in the SALT talks”.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Quoted in English by the speaker.

42. As a second example of a similar opinion, I should like to recall the statement made by the Chairman of our Committee in this room on 17 November, when we began our consideration of the items relating to disarmament. He said, *inter alia*:

“I am sure that I speak on behalf of all Members of the United Nations when I express their deepest and most earnest hopes for the success of the strategic arms limitation talks, which are known as SALT. These bilateral talks could prove to be the most important international conference since the Second World War. Their outcome—and we dare think only in terms of success and not of failure—could be decisive for the future of all humanity. We know that these talks will be difficult and delicate. I would venture to hope that in the discussion which opened today in Helsinki and in the talks to follow in the days to come, the two great Powers might be able to agree, as a preliminary measure, to suspend further work on the testing and development of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems, as called for by the Secretary-General, whether by formal or tacit agreement, by reciprocated unilateral moratorium by each side, or by other parallel action.” [1691st meeting, para. 7.]

43. Lastly, the opinion which I have intentionally left for the end is that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations himself. I would remind you that, in the introduction to his latest annual report, dated 15 September of this year, U Thant particularly stressed that:

“The present situation of relative stability could disappear, even if only temporarily, if new generations of nuclear weapons systems were developed and deployed. This upsetting of the balance, or ‘destabilization’, would create unknown temptations and pressures and greatly increase the danger of possible miscalculation.”<sup>2</sup>

44. And a little further on in the introduction to his annual report, U Thant went on to say that:

“... pending progress in these talks, it would be helpful if they stopped all further work on the development of new offensive and defensive strategic systems, whether by agreement or by a unilateral moratorium declared by both sides. Little or nothing would be lost by postponing decisions to embark on the development and deployment of new nuclear weapon systems in order to explore thoroughly the possibilities of agreement: a very great deal might be lost by failure or refusal to do so.

“I am sure that the peoples of the world would breathe a sigh of relief if the Governments of these two States were to avoid taking any decisions which might prove to be irreversible and which might further escalate the nuclear arms race.”<sup>3</sup>

45. Naturally, the scope of the moratorium suggested in the draft resolution, as regards both its duration and the strategic systems which it should cover, is something which

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 29.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 30.

would have to be decided on and agreed to by the two negotiating Governments.

46. But in the light of valid and extremely alarming considerations of the kind I have just quoted, the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 firmly believe that the United Nations General Assembly would be failing in a moral duty which is incumbent on it more than on anyone else if it did not take a decision on a matter of such gravity in the clear and unambiguous terms contained in the sole operative paragraph of the draft resolution.

47. As has rightly been said, the Helsinki talks may well prove to be the most important event since the end of the Second World War. Similarly, the appeal which we propose that the Assembly should make to the Governments of the two great nuclear Powers will probably become the most significant resolution adopted at this twenty-fourth session of the most representative organ of the international community. The responsibility for achieving this lies entirely with the members of the First Committee.

48. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): I would like to state my delegation's position on the various draft resolutions before the Committee. I shall not dwell on the substance of these texts since my delegation took part in the general debate and explained at that time its views on the questions before the Committee.

49. I now turn to the draft resolutions before us. The first question I should like to comment on is the one just mentioned by the Mexican representative—the draft resolution on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapon systems [*A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2*]. The USSR delegation cannot support this draft resolution. The bilateral exchange of views between the USSR and the United States at Helsinki on the question of strategic weapons is now at a stage where any interference, including interference by the General Assembly, cannot possibly further the negotiations, but might hinder them.

50. The USSR delegation would stress that the Soviet Union is taking a very responsible attitude towards the Helsinki negotiations. The Soviet Union is ready to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem. Resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 calls for practical measures, such as could be taken only as a result of decisions reached in the course of those negotiations. My delegation holds that it would be clearly undesirable to take any decision relating to a matter which is not now before the Committee. I would stress that adoption of the proposals contained in this draft resolution might have an adverse effect on the Helsinki negotiations. Hence, my delegation cannot support this draft resolution. It does, on the other hand, support the amendments to the draft resolution submitted by Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom. These amendments, *inter alia*, call upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to refrain “from any action which might be prejudicial to the achievement of this aim”. My delegation supports that part of the amendment which mentions the need to refrain from any action which might be prejudicial to the success of the negotiations, since its

purpose is to ensure a constructive and favourable outcome of the negotiations now being conducted at Helsinki.

51. That is what I had to say on draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 and on the amendments submitted by a number of countries and contained in document A/C.1/L.501.

52. I would now comment on the draft resolutions submitted by Malta. Let me begin by saying what I think about the issuance of an updated edition of the publication mentioned in the first Maltese draft resolution [*A/C.1/L.492*]. The first edition was published on the initiative of the Secretary-General.

53. I am not now discussing whether or not it would be advisable to reissue this publication. My delegation takes the view that this is not a political question deserving consideration by the First Committee, an organ which considers major political questions. This Maltese proposal merely diverts the First Committee from considering such questions. This is a matter within the administrative power of the Secretary-General, and my delegation strongly objects to its being put before the First Committee to decide.

54. Moreover, the very submission of the Maltese draft resolution seems to cast doubt on the Secretary-General's right to settle certain administrative questions. We would not place the Secretary-General in such a position.

55. Furthermore, it is plain that we cannot consider this question. We do not discuss how many copies of the publication should be printed, how much it should cost, etc. Why should a political organ discuss such matters? It has no need to. Bearing in mind that attempts are being made to induce the Committee to discuss this question, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution if it is put to the vote. It will not support this text in any circumstances.

56. There is another Maltese draft resolution before us [*A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1*], one dealing with radiological weapons. My delegation would point out that this draft resolution raises a new question, which has not been discussed either by the General Assembly or by the First Committee. Before the question can be discussed in this great political forum, it must be carefully studied by States. It touches on scientific and technical matters and requires special study by the competent national organs.

57. Moreover, this draft resolution was submitted during the last few days of our discussion of disarmament questions. I repeat, the problems it raises were not discussed or commented upon in our debates. Furthermore, the draft contains practical recommendations for future action.

58. My delegation believes that it is not possible at the present stage to take any definite decision on the question and that it would be sufficient to transmit all the documents relating to the First Committee's work to the Committee on Disarmament for its general consideration, without the First Committee's taking any decision or making any recommendation on the problem.

59. I now turn to Maltese draft resolution A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1, dealing with laser technology. I would emphasize that this question relates to complex scientific and technological matters and must first be studied by States, so that delegations can express considered opinions in the General Assembly. The question concerns the future development of such weaponry, and is not so urgent that we should have to take a definite decision on it without previous discussion. For these reasons, my delegation believes that all the relevant documents should be transmitted to the Committee on Disarmament and that the latter, in considering all the problems connected with general and complete disarmament and with partial measures to that end could consider this question as well, if it deems it possible, necessary or advisable to do so. There is surely no need for the General Assembly, at this late stage, to examine this important and complicated technical question or to take any decision on it. My delegation therefore will not support the draft resolution in question.

60. I would now explain my delegation's vote on the draft resolution on the disarmament decade submitted by Ireland, Italy and Japan in document A/C.1/L.499. The questions relating to general and complete disarmament and also to partial disarmament measures raised in this draft do not in themselves call forth any objections on our part. We believe that the questions in both these categories must be most carefully examined both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. All these questions are on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, which is considering them and will continue to consider them. Consequently, this part of the draft resolution does not give rise to any doubts or objections on our part.

61. My delegation does, however, object to the attempt to connect these questions with the disarmament decade, thereby setting a definite time-limit for their consideration. These attempts to link the questions of general and complete disarmament and of partial disarmament measures to a definite period of time, the disarmament decade, or to programme the consideration of disarmament questions, offer no justification for proclaiming a so-called disarmament decade. What, after all, is a disarmament decade? Is it a decade of disarmament negotiations or of carrying out disarmament measures? If it is to be a decade of disarmament negotiations, we see no justification for setting a ten-year time-limit. This is an extremely important political problem which is always with us and which all States desirous of having a system of international security should be concerned with.

62. Is it to be a decade of carrying out disarmament measures? That is impossible, for it is first necessary to reach agreement on such measures. Who among us can say how long this process will take? I therefore feel that there is no justification for assigning a definite period of time to the disarmament problem. That is an extremely important and broad problem, directly related to State security, and by proclaiming a disarmament decade we would give our peoples the mistaken idea that the solution of so vital an international problem can proceed according to schedule. In actual fact, it is impossible to set up such a schedule. My delegation feels that there is no possibility of programming the further developments of this international problem, just

as we cannot draw up a diagram of future international events. None of us can tell what course events may take over that decade or the decades following, or over any given period of time. None of us is a prophet in these matters.

63. Moreover, the proposal before us does not mention those particularly urgent tasks in the sphere of disarmament which we have discussed at the current session. We have considered here and attached great importance to the question of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We have proposed the complete prohibition of such weapons—prohibition of their development, manufacture, storage, stockpiling, etc. Is this matter adequately reflected in the three-Power draft resolution?

64. It is not even mentioned therein. In brief, my delegation feels that the draft resolution does not serve the purposes which we pursue with regard to disarmament. Rather, it may even serve to excuse the postponement of some of its aspects, because we shall be told that the disarmament decade is not yet over and that if we fail to consider or decide some questions in the first half of the decade, we can postpone them to the second half. This is hardly in line with our general approach to the vital problem we are now considering—the problem of disarmament—which affects the very existence of States in that it affects international security. We deem it unwise to give this problem a definite time-limit by proclaiming a disarmament decade.

65. In the light of these considerations, the USSR delegation will not support this draft resolution, but will abstain if it is put to the vote.

66. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I should like to make a few very brief remarks on the draft resolutions submitted under agenda item 29, and start, if I may, with some comments on the draft resolution on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. I listened with very great interest to the remarks of the representative of Mexico when he submitted that draft resolution earlier, and, as always, I found him persuasive, clear and lucid. There was one implication in what he said with which I find myself in disagreement. It was the suggestion that those who do not support this resolution have in some way failed to appreciate the importance of the talks now going on at Helsinki, and I should like to assure him that although—as I shall make clear later—my delegation cannot support this resolution, we do agree with him that the talks at Helsinki are possibly the most important international negotiations that have taken place since the Second World War. It is indeed for this very reason that my Government believes that we should refrain from formulating any didactic or restrictive instructions to the parties involved in these talks. So far, there is every evidence that the two Powers taking part in these most important discussions are doing so with sincerity and an obvious determination to succeed, not only in their own interests but in the general interest of arms control and international stability.

67. If the time should come when the General Assembly is unsure of that, then perhaps there might be a reason for taking some action, but I would suggest that for the

moment we have every evidence that the two participants in these talks are determined that they shall succeed. As the representative of Mexico and others have pointed out earlier in the debate, it is very important that these talks should succeed, and I would presume that the aim of the General Assembly in any action it might take would be to help towards that success.

68. The representative of one of the participants in the talks has already said here that action by the General Assembly on the lines of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 would not be welcome, and I think we must take what he has said very seriously. If action by the General Assembly is not welcome to the participants in these talks and if they feel that such action would not help the talks towards success, then I believe that we in the First Committee and the General Assembly as a whole must take that point of view very seriously indeed.

69. However sincere one may be in expressing the hope concerning a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems, that is only one of a dozen or more suggestions one could make to the participants at Helsinki about the way in which these talks might be carried on. Many of us have ideas about the sort of things that would help or hinder the progress of these talks. A moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems is only one of them. There are many other suggestions that we could make.

70. Having that very much in mind, my delegation has therefore co-sponsored the amendment to that draft resolution [A/C.1/L.501]. The amendment is wider in scope than the original draft resolution, which confines itself to a suggestion about a specific technical and political aspect of the talks. The amendment goes further and invites the two participants to do nothing at all that would make success in the talks harder to achieve, and we think that this is a much more useful thing for the General Assembly to do than to confine itself to this one aspect of the talks and to seek to instruct the participants in the way in which they should approach that particular problem.

71. We have therefore co-sponsored the amendment to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, and I should perhaps indicate formally—although it must be clear from what I have just said—that unless this amendment is adopted we cannot support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2.

72. On the subject of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.492, which is the draft resolution submitted by Malta on *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*<sup>4</sup> in the light of what you have said, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of our deliberations this morning, I do not propose to comment at this stage on that resolution, although it may become necessary to do so if there are further developments during the course of our deliberations later today.

73. I should now like to move on to the next two draft resolutions submitted by Malta, contained in documents A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1, on radiological warfare and the possible military applications of laser technology. My delegation understands very well the concern of the representative of Malta about the possibilities of radiological warfare as distinct from the more familiar forms of nuclear weapons warfare, and also about the possible military applications of the new and expanding technology of lasers. These are very exciting developments in one sense but very forbidding in another and, clearly, we must all, especially those of us who work in the arms control and disarmament fields, keep a very careful eye on the way in which these matters develop.

74. I have the greatest respect for these proposals by the delegation of Malta—indeed, I have the greatest respect for any proposal put forward by Ambassador Pardo. As I have said before, much of our work in this Committee is a direct result of his initiatives, and I am now thinking particularly of the question of arms control on the sea-bed. But I do not believe that the question of radiological weapons and the possible military applications of laser technology are going to pose any significant military threat in the very near future.

75. It may be that this will happen in the more distant future, but I think that in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva we already have a very large number of important and urgent issues to which we ought to address ourselves and deal with before we come to expend time, money and resources on these interesting and slightly esoteric concepts of future weapon systems.

76. I am sorry therefore to have to tell the representative of Malta that we cannot support either of the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.493/Rev.1 and A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1 even as amended. I should like to say that I am very grateful to Ambassador Pardo, as I am sure many of us are, for the way in which he has tried to take account of the comments made on his draft resolutions and to meet the preoccupations and concerns of those of us who have expressed them to him. But I really do think that the best we can do at the moment in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is to keep an eye on developments in this field. If they ever seem to be taking the form of a real threat, then we ought to be ready to take action. Indeed, I think it would be very useful if individual members of the Disarmament Committee, now that they have been alerted to this problem by the delegation of Malta, were to initiate studies of these problems in their own capitals. I certainly propose to do so in London.

77. In that light, if we can assure ourselves that the Disarmament Committee will keep an eye on these problems, and if we can be assured that the members of the Disarmament Committee will take care to keep themselves up to date on developments in this field, I should like to propose to Ambassador Pardo that his aim, which I quite understand and with which I fully sympathize, might best be achieved if he were to agree not to press these two draft resolutions to a vote—on the understanding that they would, of course, be transmitted, with the records and documents of this Committee, to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which could then take account of them among all its other preoccupations.

<sup>4</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No. 67.I.9.

78. As far as the other two draft resolutions under agenda item 29 are concerned, I have nothing to say at present, although I may wish to intervene again briefly if there are any developments in the course of our deliberations.

79. Mr. ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil): I have asked for the floor in order to set forth the views of the delegation of Brazil on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 and the amendments thereto presented by the delegations of Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom in document A/C.1/L.501.

80. I really have very little to add to what has been said by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the sponsors of the draft resolution. Brazil and all the other sponsors have presented the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 in the belief that a clearly stated appeal from the General Assembly to the Governments of the USSR and the United States "to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems" would constitute a useful and constructive initiative of the Assembly in connexion with the Helsinki negotiations, which we have all welcomed. By the adoption of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, the members of the Assembly would indicate to the Governments of those two countries what they believe to be an urgent first step in the direction of the limitation of strategic arms systems and nuclear disarmament. If the two Governments decide to heed this appeal—and we are confident that they will do so—they will give proof to the world community of their willingness to co-operate in good faith with international efforts in this field.

81. For the same reasons, we cannot accept the amendments presented in document A/C.1/L.501 and we shall vote against them. We oppose those amendments not because we have no hope that these talks "will, in due course, lead to substantial agreements on the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic armaments", nor because we do not believe that the Governments of the USSR and the United States should "refrain from any action which might be prejudicial to the achievement of this aim", but because we sincerely believe that it would be more useful, constructive, effective and politically meaningful for this Assembly, in clear and unequivocal terms, to make a straightforward appeal to the two Governments concerned to adopt the measures referred to in the operative paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. All we would be doing would be making an appeal; we would not be imposing anything, nor "calling upon", nor "urging", nor even "recommending". We would be appealing to the super-Powers to take a political decision. I fail to see how the General Assembly would be overstepping its competence by merely making an appeal; as a matter of fact, the General Assembly can do no less.

82. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I should like to address a few remarks to the subject covered by the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, introduced by a number of delegations and spoken about by the representative of Mexico, and the draft amendment to it contained in document A/C.1/

L.501, on which the representative of the Netherlands spoke yesterday evening and which was also commented on just now by several other speakers.

83. I should first like to acknowledge the very warm comments we have heard from so many delegations since the opening of the bilateral arms limitation talks at Helsinki on 17 November. In your opening remarks a few weeks ago, Mr. Chairman [1691st meeting], you noted that these bilateral talks could be the most important conference since the Second World War. I sincerely hope that that prognosis proves to be correct.

84. We are all gratified that the hope reflected in General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII), which called for these bilateral negotiations to begin at an early date, has now been realized. I believe that there is also general agreement on what the goals of these negotiations should be. In his message to Ambassador Smith, our chief negotiator at these talks, President Nixon said:

"Today you will begin what all your fellow citizens in the United States, and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it."

85. The draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 appeals to the United States and the Soviet Union to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons systems.

86. I think that it is evident from President Nixon's words that the United States is looking well beyond what is requested of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. Indeed, we have set our sights on an eventual reduction of strategic arsenals. At the same time we must recognize that these negotiations will be extraordinarily complex; we must not look for hasty interim measures that might fail the test of time.

87. If I correctly understood the explanation of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 which was offered by the representative of Mexico, he considers that the language of the draft resolution would appeal, *inter alia*, for a moratorium on test explosions of nuclear weapons. We have already had some experience of such a moratorium and from the point of view of the United States it was not a happy one: it was an interim measure which failed under the test of time.

88. Moreover, the question of nuclear weapon tests has already been discussed in this Committee and a draft resolution, I believe draft resolution A/C.1/L.486 and Add.1 on which the United States made specific comments, has been adopted by this Committee. It seems to our delegation that this overlapping of two resolutions could well cause confusion and complications. To return to the Helsinki talks, very long and careful preparations for these talks have been undertaken on both sides and the process of establishing common ground has now begun. Once that basis has been laid we are confident that the negotiators will attempt to work out between them what is the best of

a variety of possible ways which might be suggested for moving toward the goal which we all want to reach. We do not believe that it would be helpful to the negotiators for this Assembly to attempt to determine, as draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 does, just which path the negotiations should follow.

89. The motives of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 are, of course, completely above reproach. They are motives which are fully shared by my Government, they are the same motives which have led the United States to press so hard for these negotiations and to prepare so carefully and thoroughly for the substantive discussions of these very complex and important problems. But the form in which these praiseworthy motives have found expression in this draft resolution is not, I fear, at all helpful.

90. For these reasons we cannot support the original text of this draft resolution and we intend to vote for the amendment to resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 offered by the delegations of Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom [A/C.1/L.501]. We believe that this constructive rephrasing of the draft resolution is similar in intent to the resolutions that guided the negotiators during the long task of formulating the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The language of this amendment is language which could not in any way contribute to complicating the already complicated problems faced by the negotiators at Helsinki. In its operative paragraph 1, rather than in a preambular paragraph, it clearly and accurately states the objective of the important negotiations which have begun at Helsinki. In its second operative paragraph it calls upon the two Governments engaged in these negotiations, in the same sort of language used during the negotiation of the non-proliferation Treaty, to refrain from actions which could possibly be prejudicial to the attainment of the objectives set forth in paragraph 1.

91. If this amendment is adopted the United States will then be able to give its warm support to the amended draft resolution.

92. Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): I wish to introduce the amendment by Ghana and Cyprus [A/C.1/L.503] to draft resolution A/C.1/L.499. On this occasion I wish to congratulate the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.499 for their endeavour to introduce a resolution in respect of the Disarmament Decade proposed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the work of the Organization for this last year.<sup>5</sup> We appreciate their efforts and we certainly commend what they are doing, but we bear in mind the fact that the Secretary-General clearly stated in paragraph 41 of his report: "The world now stands at a most critical crossroads". That is to say, we are now at particularly critical crossroads and that is why he is calling for a United Nations Disarmament Decade.

93. Previously in a statement he made on 9 May at the opening session of the Conference on the Second United Nations Development Decade, he said:

"I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as

Secretary-General that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to world development efforts."

94. We are, from all aspects, in a critical position particularly regarding the arms race. The development of new nuclear weapons is a matter of the gravest concern and we therefore welcome the Helsinki talks in the hope that they will stop the development of new nuclear weapons; if their development is not stopped the danger is that there can no longer be any agreement. That is the sense of what the Secretary-General has said.

95. The tenth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/L.499 reads:

"*Noting that* in spite of the fact that some limited progress has been accomplished during the past two sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament both in specific fields and in the general approach to the disarmament question, an imbalance still exists between the magnitude of the tasks in front of the Conference and the achievements so far reached, having in mind in particular the danger of a new spiral in the nuclear arms race, . . ."

The delegations of Ghana and Cyprus felt that it would be more pertinently in the spirit of what the Secretary-General has said, if it was made more concise and to the point.

96. We therefore suggested that the following words should be substituted for the tenth preambular paragraph: "*Bearing in mind* the grave dangers involved in the development of new nuclear weapons, through a spiralling nuclear arms race". Now, by some clerical error, the word "new" was not printed, but I believe that it will be included in the new text that is being issued as it is the most important aspect of the phrase. We believe that this paragraph is necessary to bring out the spirit in which this Disarmament Decade will be conducted.

97. Secondly, regarding paragraph 4, which speaks about the fact that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would work towards a comprehensive programme, we find that the words "work towards" are too indefinite; the United Nations, as we know, has been working towards disarmament for the last twenty years or more, so this does not mean anything; we have also been working towards world peace and world order but we have not accomplished either objective.

98. The essence of this idea of the programme is that it must be taken up immediately and worked out. The Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report states that:

"I would hope that the members of the General Assembly could establish a specific programme and time-table for dealing with all aspects of the problem of arms control and disarmament. Useful guidelines already exist in the provisional agenda, adopted on 15 August 1968 by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarma-

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, paras. 42-46.

ment, and in resolution C adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in September 1968.”<sup>6</sup>

99. This draft resolution passes that duty on to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We agree with the idea that that Committee should deal with the programme but we would suggest that instead of saying “work towards a comprehensive programme,” we should say “work out a comprehensive programme and report to the next General Assembly”. We do not minimize the difficulties that exist in working out that programme, but the difficulties could really be accommodated, particularly bearing in mind the new spirit of co-operation between the two super Powers and the general nuclear Powers that has been exhibited during the General Assembly, which we very heartily welcome. Therefore we expect that if the General Assembly gives the directive, the incentive for accommodation on the programme, it will be a great step towards making the Disarmament Decade a success. In this sense, the delegations of Ghana and Cyprus recommend this amendment to the sponsors in the hope that they will accept them and revise their draft.

100. Mr. HUSSAIN (India): The representative of Mexico has already explained in detail the reasons for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 of which India is one of the sponsors. He referred in this connexion to your statement, Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the disarmament debate [1691st meeting] which was welcomed by practically all members of this Committee. He referred also to the Secretary-General’s recommendation in the introduction to his annual report and gave other convincing reasons which do not need to be repeated by my delegation. I should only like to add a point of principle which I mentioned in our general statement earlier [1693rd meeting]. The bilateral strategic arms limitation talks have been welcomed by the entire membership of the United Nations and it is fully recognized by us all that these talks are essentially bilateral in nature. But the members of the General Assembly have an interest more than that of mere spectators in a gallery. Their interest and widespread views about these talks are expressed in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2.

101. It will be recalled that last year in General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII), the General Assembly expressed its views about these talks and it would seem appropriate that it should continue to take an active interest in the manner indicated in our draft resolution. The amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.501 does not fully reflect the degree and nature of the interest and concern in the strategic arms limitation talks expressed in our debates throughout this session and in fact it negates the basic concept contained in the appeal made in draft resolution A/C.1/L.494/Rev.1. The amendment is therefore not acceptable to our delegation and we shall vote against it.

102. Mr. HARMON (Liberia): I returned from Liberia and consultations in Europe yesterday and have been impressed by the conciliatory and reasonable attitude of some of the previous speakers, particularly that of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is extremely

important at this particular time that we, not only in this Committee but also in the United Nations in general, should do nothing to prejudice the negotiations that are now going on at Helsinki. There was general rejoicing not only in Europe but throughout Africa, and I could say the whole world, after having experienced so much concern and tension, on learning that the United States and the Soviet Union had now agreed to sit down and try to adjust their thinking and seek ways and means of accomplishing strategic arms limitation. It is the opinion of the Liberian delegation that we should do all we can to create the sort of atmosphere that will help in any way to make these great Powers realize that it is of the utmost importance to the whole world and to the human race that they should try to reach agreement.

103. It therefore seems necessary, particularly as I examine resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, to say that I was a little concerned about the paragraph of the draft resolution beginning with the word “*Appeals*”. If the members of this Committee recall, when I spoke on behalf of the Liberian delegation during the general debate [1694th meeting] I said that I felt that the time had come when we should put the problem where it really belonged and I made a special appeal to the two great super Powers; but when I read this appeal, particularly the clause “to agree”, I felt that we were treading on dangerous ground. It would therefore seem appropriate, in our opinion, for the representative from Mexico and those who co-sponsored this resolution, to withdraw this draft and submit a modified draft resolution that could be acceptable. In view of the objection of both the Soviet Union and the United States to this draft resolution I felt that it was important to put this appeal directly to the Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico and to ask whether he would be disposed to relieve this Committee of the embarrassment of putting this draft to a vote and whether he and his co-sponsors would be prepared to withdraw it and submit an amended resolution. This is the reason why I thought it was necessary to make this statement because the use of words, sometimes even with good intentions but used out of context, can defeat the real purpose of the objective that is being sought.

104. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): I should like to make a clarification which I think must be made before we proceed any further.

105. The representative of Liberia has addressed me in my capacity as representative of Mexico.

106. But I would beg him to bear in mind that, as the document indicates and as has been said by those who have taken the floor before me, particularly the representatives of Brazil and India, this is not a Mexican draft resolution. It is a draft resolution by the 12 so-called non-aligned or mediating States of the Geneva Committee. Subsequently, as can be seen from Add.1 and 2, these 12 States were joined by three more.

107. U SOE TIN (Burma): The delegation of Burma, together with other like-minded delegations, sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, which has been so ably presented to the Committee this morning by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 42.

108. I do not wish, after hearing what has been said by the delegations of Mexico, Brazil and India, to go into the details of the draft resolution. The draft is precise, simple, straightforward and reflects the general opinion prevailing both within and outside the United Nations, as well as the sentiments and wishes so often expressed throughout the general debate on disarmament items in this Committee. It is in effect only an appeal to the two super Powers.

109. An amendment to this draft resolution has been submitted by five Powers in document A/C.1/L.501. This draft amendment, if adopted, would completely preclude the General Assembly from making an appeal to the super Powers.

110. The changes proposed in the draft are fundamental, and the whole concept of the moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a preliminary measure pending further development of the strategic arms limitation talks is drastically altered. For this reason, the delegation of Burma regrets that, much as it would like to reach an understanding and co-operate with our eastern and western colleagues in the Disarmament Committee, it will vote against the draft amendment. It is the sincere hope of our delegation, and also the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, that those delegations which supported the idea of a moratorium will do likewise and oppose the amendment. If, on the other hand, the draft amendments are carried, our delegation will not be in a position to support the draft resolution as amended.

111. Mr. ZELLEKE (Ethiopia) (*translated from French*): My delegation would like to make a few remarks on draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, of which it is a sponsor.

112. There is no need for me to explain the reasons why we have submitted this draft resolution, as that has been done for me by the preceding speakers; I would merely like to comment on the amendments to it.

113. The five-Power amendments [A/C.1/L.501] are not really amendments; I believe that they should be a separate draft resolution, because they completely change the context and spirit of our own text. If they had been submitted as a draft resolution, my delegation would certainly have voted for them, but although it has no objection to those amendments, they are not in line with the contents of its draft resolution. Hence I shall regretfully have to vote against them.

114. Mr. OLISEMEKA (Nigeria): My delegation wishes to address itself to the draft amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.501.

115. We have carefully considered the proposed amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, of which we are one of the sponsors. We are grateful to the delegations of Canada, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom for their amendments.

116. The sponsors of the amendments represent countries which we highly respect, the views of which we highly respect, with which we share to a large extent the same

views on a broad range of questions and the co-operation of which we very much value. We have worked together with them on many disarmament matters. It is because of this that we cannot but give the most serious consideration to any suggestions coming from them. We wish to assure them we have given careful consideration to the amendments now before us; but like other delegations which have spoken before us, we feel that the changes proposed are not in accordance with either the concept or the spirit of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. Some delegations may feel with certain justification that the amendment as it stands amounts to a new draft resolution. We are inclined to share this feeling.

117. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 ought not to be controversial. It was never intended to be controversial. It is in line with the suggestions made by the Secretary-General in his introduction to the annual report.<sup>7</sup> You, Mr. Chairman, also referred to the subject in your introduction to the general debate on this item [1691st meeting]. A substantial number of delegations who spoke also supported the idea of an appeal.

118. My delegation is convinced that such overwhelming expression of support springs from the awareness of public concern about these weapons and the positive results that could be achieved, if the appeal were heeded, in paving the way for further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. All that the draft resolution seeks to do is to give expression to this widespread and deep feeling.

119. The draft resolution is an appeal to the two super-Powers: it does not claim or seek to be more than that. Those of us who feel seriously concerned about the need for creating the most favourable climate possible in order to achieve results in the field of nuclear disarmament believe we have the right, indeed a moral right, to make this appeal. It is our sincere hope that this appeal will not go unheeded by those to whom it is directed.

120. The General Assembly has an interest in the current bilateral talks at Helsinki. This has been clearly demonstrated during the discussions in this Committee. We all, without exception, welcomed the commencement of these talks. If we now address an appeal to both parties to the talks it is because we sincerely wish to see created the necessary conditions that will assist and lead to a successful outcome to the talks. We feel that such an appeal is both opportune and timely. It is an appeal with which every member of this Committee should associate himself.

121. The proposed amendment completely ignores this point. It is our wish that the sponsors of the amendment will join us in the appeal. We therefore hope that they will reconsider their amendment. We also hope that they will not leave us in a position in which, without any alternative, we would be compelled to vote against the amendment. We would very much regret to have to do so, but we would if they insist on their amendment.

122. Mr. HAYMERLE (Austria): We have studied with great attention the text of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

and Add.1 and 2. We not only appreciate the spirit which guided the sponsors of this draft resolution, for we fully share their wish to bring to a halt all further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

123. In this connexion, we should like to pay a special tribute to the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, for introducing the draft resolution to this Committee in such a persuasive manner, and to the other speakers, co-sponsors of this draft resolution, who have taken the floor before me.

124. We feel, however, that there is no basic contradiction between the objectives of this draft resolution and the amendment introduced yesterday by the representative of the Netherlands [A/C.1/L.501]. On the contrary, if we wish to follow the most realistic way to advance our common cause, we see some merit in following that outlined in document A/C.1/L.501. We have just heard the statements made by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union. We must be aware that in this matter the co-operation of the two great Powers is indispensable. We attach the greatest importance to the strategic arms limitation talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. In our view, a positive result would constitute a turning point in the entire history of disarmament. We therefore wish to contribute to the most favourable atmosphere for an advance in and successful conclusion of this task.

125. It is with these considerations in mind that the Austrian delegation is prepared to vote in favour of the draft amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.501. We hope or, if I may say this in a more optimistic way, we are convinced that through this proposal we shall best achieve the objectives contained in draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, to which we fully subscribe.

126. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I should like to make a few comments on the draft resolutions to which I did not refer a few moments ago, in particular, draft resolution A/C.1/L.499 introduced by the delegations of Ireland, Italy and Japan, and the draft resolutions introduced by the representative of Malta.

127. With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/L.499, we feel that this is a clear and positive resolution. We think that it would be most useful if it were approved at this session of the General Assembly.

128. The Soviet representative has indicated different sentiments on this score, and he has very lucidly expressed his reservations with regard to the value of elaborating a precise time-table or schedule for general and complete disarmament. In general the United States delegation shares the reservations expressed by Ambassador Roschin. We do not feel that time-tables of this sort are useful. In fact, we feel that the effort to elaborate them not merely tends to waste the time of what should be a negotiating body, but the effort can and often does introduce unnecessary divisions and disputes over matters which are premature and not ripe for serious negotiation.

129. For this reason, we would hope that an amendment of the sort suggested by the delegations of Cyprus and

Ghana, which would, on the face of it, have the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "work out" before the next session of the General Assembly, rather than "work towards", a comprehensive disarmament programme would not be adopted. Without such an amendment but in the language put forward originally as explained most lucidly yesterday by Ambassador Vinci [1714th meeting], we do not feel that the dangers and the problems which were so clearly set forth by the Soviet representative would in fact arise to impede our work at Geneva. We shall therefore be able to give warm support to draft resolution A/C.1/L.499.

130. With regard to the draft resolutions put forward by the representative of Malta, I would only associate our delegation first of all with the tribute paid to Ambassador Pardo by Lord Chalfont, and also with the views and suggestions which Lord Chalfont put forward concerning the appropriate disposition of the subsequent suggestions in those draft resolutions.

131. Mr. PORTER (United Kingdom): I should like to say a very few words about draft resolution A/C.1/L.499 and about the amendment to that draft resolution which has just been proposed in document A/C.1/L.503.

132. My delegation in general shares the preoccupations which have been expressed on this subject by my United States and Soviet colleagues. Nevertheless, we feel that draft resolution A/C.1/L.499 is useful and we are prepared to support it.

133. However, we do not consider that a resolution which would commit the Committee to "working out" a comprehensive programme at this time as distinct from "working towards" such a programme would be useful, because it would divert the Committee from other urgent work on substantial questions of arms control and disarmament. We cannot therefore support the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.503.

134. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): I should like to state briefly the position of the Yugoslav delegation regarding the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.501, which has been sponsored by five countries. Yugoslavia is one of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, to which the amendment refers. It is our sincere belief that a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-systems at this stage could only be beneficial towards creating a favourable climate and for achieving the aims of the strategic arms limitation talks, as well as for progress in the field of disarmament in general. We fail to see any harm in the General Assembly expressing such a view and in its making an appeal to that effect to the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America.

135. I should like to recall that my delegation clearly expressed this position of Yugoslavia in the general debate in its statement of 19 November [1694th meeting]. Since this is my delegation's position, I regret that I must disagree with the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.501 and I do not wish now to discuss its merits as another approach or as another draft resolution, but simply as an amendment to the draft resolution contained in document

A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2. Its present formulation clearly tends to change the basic idea of our draft resolution and we therefore have no choice but to oppose it; we shall vote against it.

136. With regard to further arguments in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, I wish to state that I am in agreement with what has been said in this connexion by the representatives of Mexico, Brazil, India, Burma, Ethiopia and Nigeria who have preceded me and I shall refrain from repeating them in order not to take up the time of the Committee unnecessarily.

137. Mr. MEHDI (Pakistan): My delegation would like to speak on the amendments proposed in document A/C.1/L.501, sponsored by five countries, which seek to modify the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2, of which my country is one of the co-sponsors.

138. The views on the two documents have already been very ably stated by other sponsors of document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2; I shall therefore be very brief. My delegation is inclined to share the opinion that the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.501 seek to make substantial changes which detract from the spirit in which document A/C.1/L.490 and Add.1 and 2 was conceived. This draft resolution is merely an appeal to the two super-Powers to agree to a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems. My delegation shares the view that the amendments seek to introduce a new concept, the purpose of which could perhaps best be solved by a new draft resolution. It is because of this that my delegation regrets its inability to vote for the amendments contained in document A/C.1/L.501.

139. Mr. MAURTUA (Peru) (*translated from Spanish*): The Peruvian delegation wishes to refer to draft resolution A/C.1/L.499, simply in order to point out that paragraph 6 of the draft resolution allocates the resources freed by disarmament to a special objective, an application which would distort the economic purpose of disarmament.

140. Moreover, we feel that the operative part is timid, because it speaks only of the possibility of using the freed resources for the benefit of the developing countries, not of the need to do so. At the same time, it overlooks the fact that economic and social development is not achieved by giving preferential consideration to scientific and technological progress and that there are, on the other hand, certain basic economic needs which must be met urgently and must not be ignored in a resolution of this kind.

141. I merely wish to point out that one of the preambular paragraphs of the draft reads:

*“Believing that the security and the economic and social well-being of all countries would be tremendously enhanced as progress is made towards the goal of general and complete disarmament,”*

Yet at the same time, paragraph 6 states:

*“Recommends . . . that consideration be given to channelling a substantial part of the resources freed . . . to . . . economic development . . .”*

142. But this draft resolution emphasizes scientific and technological development to a degree that is unusual in drafts of this kind. We should very much like to see the part of paragraph 6 which reads: “. . . and, in particular, their scientific and technological progress” deleted. I am not making a formal proposal but merely drawing the attention of the sponsors of the draft resolution to this matter, which obviously needs to be considered.

143. Mr. VINCI (Italy): Yesterday I said that the sponsors of the draft resolution A/C.1/L.499, that is to say, the delegations of Ireland, Italy and Japan, would be glad to give clarification on that draft if necessary.

144. This morning, in a statement by the Soviet representative, we heard some reservations which were shared in part by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom. I shall try to take up the various points that were put forward by Ambassador Roschin. I am sorry I do not have the full text before me, because I could then give a better and, perhaps, more convincing clarification; but I shall try my best to explain what is contained in our draft resolution. I hope this may in some way dispel his reservations.

145. I understand that the Soviet delegation objects strongly to any time-table or time-limit in the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I would draw the attention of the Soviet delegation to the fact that there is no such time-table in our draft resolution. On the contrary I tried yesterday [*1714th meeting*] to explain as clearly as possible that, in our proposals, we were leaving that aspect of the question flexible and open.

146. I could, perhaps, explain even better by recalling some of the points I mentioned in my statement yesterday; I said, as a matter of fact, that we did not want to go too far or present too much. I said that we know by experience that, while schemes and designs that are too ambitious do not give any real help around the negotiating table, negotiations carried on without some insight into the process which is being followed, or the final goals of the same negotiations, give rise to doubt and scepticism.

147. Furthermore, they risk remaining fruitless, creating imbalance and producing mere technical results, devoid of real political meaning. What we have in mind is to trace some outlines of the work which will be undertaken at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. I went on to say that that is why it seems to us that the correct approach should be based—and, here, I think we concur with the Soviet delegation—on pursuing negotiations on collateral measures, the implementation of which could pave the way for the beginning of a real disarmament process.

148. In other words, we are trying to promote—even more than has been done before—these partial measures, while having in mind at the same time what we have to pursue, namely, actual disarmament.

149. I do not think therefore that we have any quarrels on this point with the Soviet delegation and I might perhaps make it even clearer when I recall that we have also, in some measure, emphasized what has been done by the

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. As a matter of fact, in my own statement yesterday, I said that we believed that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might capitalize on the agreement which has already been reached on this approach—and we meant what has been already achieved at Geneva and which is reflected in the report which was submitted to the Committee [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>8</sup>—guided by the new resolution. Here, again, we do not say that we have to plan at once and I do understand when Ambassador Roschin says we cannot predict, but I have confidence in the foresight of the Soviet delegation here and at Geneva. Therefore, even if we cannot predict every single event or fact, or whatever might happen in international events, there might at least be some clear view of what might happen in the future.

150. We therefore spoke about having the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament guided by a new resolution, which would enable it to make progress during the next year along the lines we suggested. Furthermore, I stated that we hoped that in so doing we would come closer to an understanding on how the comprehensive programme should be worked out, so as to provide in realistic but effective terms a helpful incentive to further negotiations on disarmament.

151. I should like to repeat my conclusion of yesterday when I expressed the belief that if the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were able to report next year that significant progress had been achieved in this direction it would encounter the most gratified response of the General Assembly and of the peoples of the world.

152. I should like to draw the attention of the Soviet delegation to the fact that there is nothing that can be construed as setting down a time-table for the comprehensive disarmament programme.

153. There is another point which was raised and that was that the Soviet delegation objects to any link between the Disarmament Decade and the Development Decade. Here again, I should like to point out that we have not spoken of a close link. As a matter of fact, in my statement yesterday, I also spoke about the connexion which exists between disarmament and economic and social development, in particular in the developing countries. What do we mean by that? We mean, very simply, that if we can release important material and human resources from armaments, we would certainly have available the means to bridge the gap between the north and the south, and between the developed and the developing countries.

154. One final point which was raised by Ambassador Roschin was connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons. If I understood him correctly, he said that he would have liked to see something advocating the elimination of these weapons. I should like to draw his attention to paragraph 2 of our draft resolution, in which we speak about the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction. I think that should be clear enough to dispel some of the reservations which have been put forward by the representative of the Soviet delegation. I hope that, having

clarified these points, the Soviet delegation, as well as the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom, will feel in a position to support and vote in favour of our draft resolution. I should like to make a distinction here: I understand that the United States delegation is ready to support warmly and vote in favour of our draft resolution and I want to express my gratitude for that statement.

155. I turn now to the amendment submitted by the delegations of Cyprus and Ghana, and contained in document A/C.1/L.503. First of all, I should like to thank the representative of Cyprus, Ambassador Rossides, for the warm expressions of appreciation he has conveyed to the delegations of Ireland, Italy and Japan for having introduced our draft resolution. Regarding these amendments, we think that our draft resolution in its present form should have met the expectations and wishes of most delegations and that it could have been approved as it stands; at the same time, since we wish to meet some of the desires of other delegations, in this case, of Cyprus and Ghana, I should like to say that, as far as the amendment is concerned, the preambular paragraph which reads:

*“Bearing in mind the grave dangers involved in the development of new nuclear weapons, through a spiralling nuclear arms race,”*

in my own view expresses the same concept as that contained in our tenth preambular paragraph which said “. . . having in mind in particular the danger of a new spiral in the new arms race”. Nevertheless, we are ready, in spite of the fact that the concept was already there—and I speak here for the three delegations which sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/L.499—to go along with that amendment and to accept it.

156. As far as the second amendment is concerned—and I refer to point 2 of document A/C.1/L.503—it proposes to replace, in paragraph 4, third line, the word “towards” by the word “out”. On this point the sponsors of the draft resolution would like to say to the sponsors of that amendment that we accept the expression “working out” instead of “working towards”, on the understanding that the report called for in the last line of paragraph 4 would be a progress report, in case it might appear unrealistic for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to present a comprehensive programme to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

157. I hope that these clarifications will satisfy most of the representatives who have raised points on our draft resolution, and that with the amendments which we are ready to accept the draft resolution we are submitting to the Committee will be supported and adopted by a significant—if possible an overwhelming—majority.

158. Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (*translated from Spanish*): I should like to say just a few words concerning draft resolution A/C.1/L.495/Rev.1, sponsored by the delegations of Canada, Ecuador, Iran, Mexico and Nigeria.

159. Anybody interested in writing the history of disarmament negotiations within the United Nations system can easily find the birth certificate of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in General Assembly resolu-

<sup>8</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

tion 1660 (XVI) and 1722 (XVI). In the former, as will be recalled, the General Assembly urged the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world could regard as satisfactory. It then expressed the hope that the negotiations would be started without delay and would lead to an agreed recommendation to the General Assembly.

160. The negotiations were successful, and the delegations of the two States I have mentioned sponsored a draft resolution submitting to the General Assembly the recommendation it had requested of them. That draft resolution became resolution 1722 (XVI), in which the General Assembly endorsed the agreement that had been reached by the Soviet Union and the United States on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, which later became known as the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

161. These two resolutions contain, as I said, the birth certificate of the Committee. In view of the agreement reached this year by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States, as Co-Chairmen of the Committee, to increase the membership of that negotiating body to 26, it would seem that the General Assembly must now adopt a new resolution to which future historians will attach the same significance with respect to the 26-member Committee as to resolution 1722 (XVI) for the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

162. This is the main purpose of draft resolution A/C.1/L.495/Rev.1; in addition, under its terms the General Assembly would cordially welcome the eight new members of the Committee and, last but not least, express its conviction that, to effect any change in the composition of the Committee of Twenty-six, the procedure which by unanimous agreement was followed at the sixteenth session

of the General Assembly should be observed. It is a procedure which safeguards both the positions of the two principle nuclear Powers and the authority, functions and powers of the General Assembly in matters relating to disarmament.

163. My delegation hopes that draft resolution A/C.1/L.495/Rev.1, the result of long and patient negotiation, will be adopted unanimously by the First Committee.

164. Mr. HUSSAIN (India): I merely wish to announce that India and a few other countries have submitted amendments to draft resolution A/C.1/L.499. We shall introduce them at the afternoon meeting when the document is available.

165. The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning, I should like to express the hope that we can conclude consideration of the disarmament items as soon as possible. Tomorrow afternoon we hope to commence with the consideration of the last item on our agenda—the item on outer space. I hope therefore that between now and tomorrow afternoon the Committee will be able to take action on the various draft resolutions on disarmament items.

166. I should also like to remind the Committee that the first item, “The strengthening of international security”, has not yet been finally disposed of. The general debate on that item was concluded on 28 October, and delegations have had sufficient time for consultations from 28 October until now. I would therefore appeal to those who are thinking of submitting proposals in connexion with the item on international security to do so without delay, so that we may proceed as rapidly as possible and conclude the work of this Committee by the deadline, that is, 12 December.

*The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.*