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**GENERAL DEBATE (*continued*)**

1. Mr. CUHRUK (Turkey) (*translated from French*): A number of important questions dealing with disarmament are now before us, including measures concerning the cessation of the arms race, the implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, chemical and bacteriological warfare, and finally the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>1</sup> annex A]. It is true that in the last few years considerable efforts have been made in certain essential sectors of disarmament and armament control in order to reduce the grave risks flowing from an excessive accumulation of armaments and more particularly from the nuclear arms race.

2. Such efforts have taken the form of a number of important instruments, of new initiatives and useful and constructive proposals. The Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, are among the most important of the international instruments adopted under the aegis of the United Nations in order to prevent further armament and limit the scope of the arms race. However, we must admit that all these measures, however important they may be, are of limited scope and that the solutions of the true problems of disarmament are still subject to considerable uncertainty. To advance towards solutions we obviously need a continued impetus, a certain evolution of events and a constant reappraisal of our approach to the problems.

3. However, in the meantime the nuclear arms race continues at an accelerated pace with all the sacrifices, incalculable risks and grave peril that this implies for the security and peace of the world.

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969*, document DC/232.

**Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).**

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989, A/C.1/992; A/C.1/L.490)**

**Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (*continued*) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991; A/C.1/L.487, A/C.1/L.488, A/C.1/L.489, A/C.1/L.491):**

(a) **Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);**

(b) **Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655);**

(c) **Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (*continued*) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.486)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (*continued*):**

(a) **Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);**

4. As the dialectics of nuclear weapons teaches us, because of escalations, and of the counter-escalations which inevitably and immediately follow the concept of security is now no more than an illusion. To quote our Secretary-General, we can say that: "As the spiral of the nuclear arms race goes up, the spiral of security goes down".<sup>2</sup>

5. Today we are confronted by precisely such a situation of escalation and counter-escalation. Despite the encouraging signs that are beginning to appear, we believe that it is on the basis of that situation that we have to tackle the problems relating to armaments and the different approaches that have to be adopted in order to solve them. In those circumstances what is most urgent is that we should persist unremittingly in our efforts and go resolutely forward to our objectives, using whatever opportunities are offered us by the development of events. In that connexion we cannot sufficiently stress the importance of the negotiations on the limitation and possible reduction of nuclear strategic weapons which have begun in Helsinki between the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union.

6. Turkey has always believed in the usefulness of negotiations among the States having nuclear weapons and in the advantages that might result from such negotiations for the limitations of armaments and for disarmament. Therefore, it was with a feeling of true satisfaction that we welcomed the opening of the negotiations on strategic arms. We understand and appreciate the importance of the reasons behind the historic decision of the two super-Powers. At this stage we can only express our hope that these preliminary negotiations will progress and lead to effective and lasting results within the framework of the policies that made the organization of such talks possible.

7. At this time I think it would be useful to recall the obligations assumed by the great Powers under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, namely, "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date" [see resolution 2373 (XXII), annex I, article VI].

8. The dialogue on strategic arms which has just begun seems to us positive proof of the existence of that political goodwill mentioned in the Treaty.

9. In this connexion I think we should also note the close ties that exist between the limitation of strategic nuclear arms on the one hand and the other measures of disarmament and control of weapons on the other. If, as we hope, the Soviet-American talks succeed, those ties might have a decisive effect on the chances of achieving our disarmament objectives, international security and the economic and social progress of the world.

10. Given the close ties between the strategic arms talks, the other measures for disarmament and general and complete disarmament that are being examined in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we feel also that it would be useful to consider the establishment, at an

appropriate stage in the negotiations, of relations with the Committee whose mandate is, *inter alia*, to ensure a balance in the various measures relating to the problems of the limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. One of those problems is obviously the complete cessation of tests. Since the conclusion of the Moscow partial test ban Treaty the situation concerning underground nuclear tests has remained unchanged. Yet the Moscow Treaty, by its very objectives, was intended also to prohibit underground tests. However, as we know, certain political and technical difficulties have prevented any change in the situation. Today, circumstances seem more propitious as far as those two main fields in which there were difficulties are concerned, for it would seem that the important progress made in the seismic detection techniques should provide new ways of overcoming, at least partially, the important obstacles relating to verification. As we read in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232], constructive proposals were made concerning the cessation or the limitation of nuclear weapons tests. We think it would be most desirable that all those proposals should be carefully studied in order to arrive at some system for a complete prohibition of tests, which would be one of the essential prerequisites for nuclear disarmament.

11. I should like now to comment briefly on chemical and bacteriological warfare. The report of the special group of experts set up by the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 2454 A (XXIII)<sup>3</sup> tells us of the immense progress achieved in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons and of the grave threat they constitute to mankind. Obviously we have here a very highly developed category of weapons which needs constant attention and vigilance on our part. We feel that the report of the group of experts gives us a very useful basis for examining and deciding what we as Governments can most effectively do in the matter. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as we read in its report, thoroughly discussed that important aspect of the question both as regards existing instruments and new measures that might be adopted to avert the danger. Many constructive proposals were presented to the Conference.

12. I have in mind more particularly the draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare presented to the Committee by the United Kingdom delegation [ibid., annex C, section 20]. However, before dealing with that draft I should like to dwell for a while on an important international instrument concerning the prohibition of the use in war of chemical and bacteriological weapons, namely, the Geneva Protocol of 1925.<sup>4</sup>

13. This Protocol, to which Turkey has been a party since 1929, has, despite the fact that almost half a century has elapsed since it was adopted and the respect it enjoys as an international instrument, been acceded to by only 49 countries. In these circumstances, and in view of the importance of its provisions, we believe that the number of

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 28.

<sup>3</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

<sup>4</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

accessions to the Protocol should be speedily increased. My delegation would be ready to support any suggestion towards that end. It is recognized that, as it stands, the Geneva Protocol is not a complete instrument. For example, it does not contain provisions to prevent the production, development, stockpiling and transfer of those weapons, nor does it include control machinery. Those important omissions may explain the ever-increasing desire for new approaches in order to strengthen the Protocol as an international instrument, or to set up a new and more satisfactory international agreement that would no longer be limited to the prohibition of the use, but would include also prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling, of all chemical and bacteriological weapons. We too are prepared to support any serious effort that might be made along those two lines.

14. We also view with favour the draft convention submitted by the United Kingdom to prohibit the production and to destroy all existing biological weapons, whilst confirming the implicit prohibition in the Geneva Protocol of the use of such weapons for hostile purposes. The United Kingdom draft has, at the same time, the advantage of providing for machinery to deal with complaints, although the formula recommended does not quite meet all the requirements of an elaborated system of verification. However, my Government regards that formula of verification as a useful element which is absent from the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist Governments of Eastern Europe [A/7655].

15. It obviously has to be recognized that the setting up of a complete and detailed verification system in as important and complex a field as that of biological weapons is not an easy matter. That is why we feel that it might be helpful if a group of experts were to examine the whole problem of verification in that field, so that the essential characteristics of an effective system of control could be worked out, as the Japanese delegation suggested in the course of our discussions [see ENDC/PV 424].

16. To conclude my remarks on the subject of chemical and biological weapons, I should like to add that, whilst noting the difference between chemical and biological weaponry and recognizing the difficulty of distinguishing between the different chemical agents as far as concerns the use—peaceful or warlike—for which they might be intended, we do believe that in principle both categories of weapons, chemical and biological, should be dealt with in one single legal instrument. But we really have no hard and fast view on the matter.

17. I come now to another aspect of disarmament which is also of great importance, namely, the prevention of an extension of the arms race to the sea-bed and ocean floor. As we know, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has devoted much of its time to the consideration of that question. The problem was at the very heart of the work of the Committee. The two Co-Chairmen, the representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the United States, submitted separate draft treaties to the Committee aimed at the denuclearization of the marine environment and the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in that environment. After a number of discussions in the Committee, a new draft, this time a joint

one, was submitted to the Conference, and ultimately became the text now submitted to us [A/7741-DC/232, annex A]. We have heard the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament make very detailed statements on this draft. To express our view on that important work resulting from the initiative of those two nuclear super-Powers, I should like first to say that we appreciate that draft treaty and attach great importance to it as a new measure intended to avert an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor. Therefore, we wish to express our deep satisfaction to the two Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the very important initiative they have taken in submitting such a draft treaty to us.

18. As for the objectives of the draft, they correspond basically to the views of the Turkish Government. We have always held that the international submarine zone must be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes. The prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in that area therefore accords with the views we have always advocated. The denuclearization of the vast areas beneath the seas and oceans, and the prohibition of the emplacement thereon of weapons of mass destruction are certainly a step forward and at the same time, should make a great contribution to the solution of the problems of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament.

19. However, we are constrained to recognize that as yet the effort made is still only limited in scope, conventional weapons being, for the moment, excluded from the draft treaty. Apart from that important omission, which will have to be corrected as soon as possible, it seems to us that certain provisions of the treaty may prove to be more or less controversial, in particular articles I and III, which contain its most important clauses.

20. Article I defines the scope of the obligation concerning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the limit of the zone to which this obligation is to apply. That limit is defined in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone;<sup>5</sup> that is to say, the limit laid down is a distance of 12 miles from the base line defined in that Convention.

21. As far as we are concerned, we have no particular difficulties regarding article I of the draft treaty, as conceived and worded at present, if the majority of Governments represented here are willing to accept it. However, we note that the insertion in the text of the definition of the contiguous zone given in the Geneva Convention does give rise to difficulties for certain countries. Since, when all is said and done, the treaty can be applied to the sea-bed only beyond a coastal zone of 12 miles, we think a further effort to simplify the text might prove useful in making it more acceptable to the majority of delegations.

22. We say this because the Turkish Government always considers it most important that international treaties on disarmament should be acceptable to the widest possible number of countries, since that should to a large extent

<sup>5</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 516 (1964), No. 7477.

dispel the fears and suspicions that countries assuming international obligations might legitimately entertain about those refusing to assume them.

23. Article III, concerning the right to verification, on which my delegation wishes to dwell more particularly, seems to us the most controversial and ambiguous of the treaty. We should like to say first that an adequate system of verification is essential to any treaty concerned with disarmament such as that which we are now considering; for inspection and verification are indispensable for the protection of those countries which scrupulously abide by their commitments against the non-compliance with, or secret violation of, the obligations imposed on them by treaties. Therefore, while recognizing that the provisions of article III are the fruit of long and laborious efforts, we feel that they are neither adequate nor satisfactory.

24. In fact, the right to verification, which is recognized for all parties to the treaty as a guarantee of the implementation of the obligations, can, in practice, prove useless unless the countries concerned do not themselves possess the material means whereby to carry out the verification provided for in the Treaty, and we very much doubt that the majority of countries have those means at present.

25. With regard to the assistance of another contracting party, that cannot always be regarded as assured in advance, since it will, by definition, be optional and will depend on numerous factors and on variable conditions which Governments might prefer not to accept.

26. Finally, article III, apart from its vagueness and imperfections regarding the means of having recourse to the right of verification, also seems to lack precision regarding the protection of the rights and interests of coastal States under international law as regards the exploitation of the resources of their continental shelf.

27. The Turkish delegation therefore feels that some modification should be made in the present wording of article III in order to make the text more constructive and better adapted to the needs of States and to the wishes of the international community. Constructive proposals and suggestions have already been made in this connexion which, we believe, could make article III more effective, particularly as regards the guarantees that should accompany the exercise of the right of verification.

28. Thanks to the statements of the two Co-Chairmen, our discussions on the draft treaty concerning the sea-bed have been imbued with a desire to achieve trusting co-operation. It is that desire which has led us to make our few comments emphasizing the need to strengthen the international nature of the draft before us; for we feel that this treaty, those that preceded it and those that will follow, must, in our space age, be regarded as great structural agreements of our world which will represent the common history of mankind, symbolized by the United Nations.

29. Mr. POLYANICHKO (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. Chairman, in your introductory statement opening the present debate you expressed confidence that the discussions "will proceed

both on a very high level and also in all necessary depth" [1691st meeting, para. 14]. Our delegation notes with satisfaction that the general debate on disarmament problems is indeed proceeding in a businesslike spirit, with the very active participation of an overwhelming majority of the delegations. If all delegations show goodwill and a high sense of responsibility, the Committee will be able to take decisions which will provide a useful basis and guidelines for subsequent negotiations on disarmament, including general and complete disarmament which continues to be both our ultimate objective and the stimulus to achievement of partial, but at the same time, important and far-reaching agreements.

30. It seems to our delegation that two most important events, coinciding with our work here, will facilitate the achievement of such agreements and will contribute in considerable measure to the easing of international tension. We refer, first of all, to the opening in Helsinki of the preliminary discussions of the problems connected with negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on restraining the strategic arms race and, secondly, to the ratification by those Powers of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

31. In connexion with the talks in Helsinki, we consider it appropriate to recall that the Soviet Union has repeatedly submitted proposals aimed at the elimination of means of delivery. The most important distinguishing feature of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament<sup>6</sup> submitted by the Soviet Union in March 1962 was the provision it contained for a radical elimination, from the first steps towards disarmament, of the possibility of an attack with the use of nuclear weapons. For it is precisely the elimination of the means of delivery, including missiles, that was already proposed at the very first stage, with the exception of a strictly limited, agreed amount of global (intercontinental missiles), anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles which are at the disposal of the Soviet Union and the United States.

32. Our delegation, like many of the delegations before us, would like to express the hope that the Helsinki talks will lead to a mutually acceptable sensible decision.

33. Noting with satisfaction that the Soviet Union and the United States have ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, we appeal to other countries too—above all the "near-nuclear" countries, that is, those having a highly developed technological potential in the nuclear field—to follow the example of the two great Powers and make efforts to ensure that this important Treaty, worked out as the result of lengthy and complex negotiations, may be put into force as soon as possible.

34. The entry into force of that Treaty will open up prospects for the attainment of new international agreements, above all in the field of nuclear disarmament, that is, the non-use of nuclear weapons, cessation of their production, the reduction and elimination of their stockpiles, and so forth.

35. As a result of the intensive development of new types of toxic substances and methods for their military uses,

<sup>6</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 90, document A/C.1/867.

there has been a sharp increase in the power of chemical and bacteriological weapons, their striking effects have expanded, and the eventual possibilities for production of this type of weapon of mass destruction have increased enormously.

36. The production of chemical and bacteriological weapons on any scale is considerably simpler and cheaper than that of nuclear weapons. Any State possessing a well-developed chemical and pharmaceutical industry and an industry for enzyme production is in a position to produce chemical and bacteriological (biological) substances for military purposes on a large scale.

37. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic fully shares the conclusion contained in the report of the Secretary-General

“... that the existence of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons contributes to international tension and that their further development spurs the arms race without contributing to the security of any nation”.<sup>7</sup>

38. Recognizing the threat to mankind represented by chemical and bacteriological weapons, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic consistently and resolutely advocates the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war. An important step on the path to attainment of this objective would be the accession by all States to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and its strict observance. We therefore consider most important the proposal of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland [A/C.1/L.488] that the General Assembly should address an appeal to all Governments which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol in the course of 1970, that is, on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signature of that document and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

39. Firmly advocating the strengthening of the authority of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the accession to it of all States, our delegation is convinced that the time has come to take a qualitative new step forward in the matter of the prohibition not only of the use of chemical and bacteriological types of weapons, but also that of their development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their subsequent elimination.

40. For this reason the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has co-sponsored a proposal entitled “Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons” [A/C.1/L.487] and, together with other delegations of the socialist countries, has submitted to the First Committee for consideration a corresponding draft convention [A/7655]. We are profoundly convinced that the adoption of such a convention would contribute to

removing the threat of the unleashing of a chemical-bacteriological war, would serve to strengthen peace and the security of peoples, and would create a favourable political climate for the solution of other disarmament problems.

41. After attentively following the discussion on this question, the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has come to the conclusion that a general agreement is emerging both on the need for an unswerving and comprehensive fulfilment of the Geneva Protocol and on the question of the prohibition of the production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles. However, there are some differences of opinion as to how this should be done.

42. We for our part, are in favour of the settlement of questions connected with chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons simultaneously, and we cannot agree with the proposal for a stage-by-stage solution to problems concerning chemical and bacteriological means of waging war, that is, to dealing first with biological weapons and after that with chemical ones.

43. We have based our position and continue to do so on the fact that although there are some differences between the effects of chemical and bacteriological types of weapons, which was the basic conclusion of the representative of the United Kingdom, they have far more common features than distinguishing ones, and it seems to us that this view is shared by many delegations.

44. It may be recalled that last year when, at the suggestion of Poland, the question of preparing a report on the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological weapons was considered, an attempt to separate the one from the other was unsuccessful. It was rejected. At that time it was decided to entrust the Secretary-General with the preparation of a report on the effects of the possible use of both chemical and bacteriological means of waging war.

45. We note with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of the members of the Committee on Disarmament were in favour of joint consideration of questions of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. That approach was also favoured by many delegations during this debate.

46. We should like to point out that the attempt to deal only with biological methods of warfare at present, postponing the problem of the full prohibition of chemical weapons to some indefinite time in the future, also raises serious objections for the following reason: it is a known fact that the danger of the use of chemical weapons is much more real, for chemical weapons have already been used in the past.

47. It is no accident that chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare have been considered jointly for many decades, and the prohibition of the use of these types of weapons is a single universally recognized norm. This approach to the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons is also the basis of the Geneva Protocol, as well as a number of resolutions of the General Assembly on the subject.

<sup>7</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*, Introduction, para. 13 (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).



48. Nobody can deny that both these types of weapons are weapons for mass destruction of human beings having one and the same purpose, since they are aimed at defeating the enemy's manpower and the peaceful population and at destroying living matter.

49. Another argument in favour of joint consideration of questions concerning chemical and biological substances is that in a large number of cases it is practically impossible to draw a distinction between the two types of agents. In the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on this question we find the following statement:

"All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical."<sup>8</sup>

50. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic believes that at this time favourable conditions have arisen for solving the problem of full elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. This is convincingly borne out by the deep interest in this question manifested by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, demonstrating a high sense of responsibility and a desire for effective agreement of an international legal character.

51. This session of the General Assembly should, in our view, recognize the urgent need for conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons, and should instruct the Committee on Disarmament to speedily make the necessary preparations for drafting such a document, fully taking into account the draft convention submitted by the delegations of nine socialist countries.

52. That is the basis of draft resolution A/C.1/L.487, of which the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a co-sponsor. We appeal to other delegations to support that draft.

53. The Ukrainian delegation has already pointed out in this Committee the great importance of excluding large stretches of the sea-bed and the ocean floor—constituting about five-sevenths of the earth's surface—from the sphere of the arms race, and of preserving that area exclusively for peaceful purposes. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic considers that the Soviet-United States draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/1774-DC/232, annex A]<sup>9</sup> is an important step in the field of partial disarmament measures.

54. The problem of demilitarization of the sea-bed is becoming timely especially now when the practical exploration of the sea-bed is beginning, and the danger arises that this new environment of human activity may be used not in

the interests of peace but for purposes of war and for the arms race. Experience shows that it is much more complicated to halt the arms race when it is already under way than to prevent the spread of that race to those environments which were formerly inaccessible to man but which are gradually being opened up, thanks to the achievements of science and technology. Experience has already borne out the realism and value of effecting partial measures to prevent the arms race in environments new to man, such as the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 1967. The previously mentioned draft treaty proposes the solution of the most important part of the problems of demilitarization of the sea-bed, namely, the prohibition of the emplacement of the most dangerous types of weapons there. At the same time, the draft treaty emphasizes that it represents "a step on the path to the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the area of the arms race" and that parties to the treaty are resolved to continue negotiations concerning further measures to that end.

55. The draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof is in keeping with the purposes and principles of our Organization as set forth in the United Nations Charter; and is also in conformity with the principles of international law. It in no way infringes upon the interests of either large or small countries, nor encroaches upon their sovereign rights or their previously assumed obligations, nor does it violate the principle of the freedom of the high seas. All of these conditions are reflected both in the fifth article of the preamble and in operative article II, paragraph 2, of the text of the draft treaty.

56. The defence of the interests of all States is also contemplated in the provisions of the draft treaty envisaging a definite system of control over its fulfilment by the States parties to it. That system ensures effective verification of the implementation of the treaty and the equal rights and opportunities of every State to take part in carrying out such control, without at the same time erecting any obstacles to those activities on the sea-bed and the ocean floor which are not prohibited.

57. In view of the foregoing, the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic considers that the conclusion of the above-mentioned treaty would be a new important contribution towards solving the problem of limiting the scope of the arms race and a vivid example of the way to bring about the practical application of the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which stipulate the obligation to continue negotiations on measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

58. During the present debate great attention has been devoted to the question of prohibition of underground nuclear weapons tests. The Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water undoubtedly plays a decisive role in removing the possibilities for the perfecting of nuclear weapons, as

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

<sup>9</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

well as in reducing the radio-active contamination of our planet.

59. However, underground nuclear tests have still not been prohibited, although all the necessary conditions exist for outlawing that category of nuclear tests as well. The solution to this problem is blocked by the unrealistic position of certain Powers which unjustifiably demand the establishment of a system of inspection and international control over the prohibition of underground tests. Today, many States, including the Western Powers, have reliable and effective scientific and technical means of detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. We are profoundly convinced that if the Western countries show a realistic approach, the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection for effecting control will be rapidly and dependably solved. In this connexion, we do not consider that the co-sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3 take such a realistic stand. In principle, our delegation takes a positive view of the idea of a voluntary exchange of national seismological data, including such exchange within the framework of the so-called "detection club" proposed by Sweden. The fact is, however, that the above-mentioned draft resolution virtually implies an obligation to exchange seismological data in the future as well.

60. Moreover, the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic cannot but point out the nature of the formula contained in the first operative paragraph of the draft, which is discriminatory towards socialist countries that are not members of the United Nations, and in particular towards the German Democratic Republic. The inconsistency of such a position is all the more obvious if we compare the above-mentioned draft with draft resolution A/C.1/L.486. Essentially, both drafts deal with the same subject, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, and a number of delegations are co-sponsors of both drafts. However, draft resolution A/C.1/L.486 contains the formula which is well-known to all of us.

61. This contradiction speaks for itself. It underscores the untenability of the above-mentioned discriminatory formula.

62. These are the views which the delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic considered it necessary to set forth on a number of questions concerning disarmament.

63. Mr. EL GOULLI (Tunisia) (*translated from French*): When in August of 1945 mankind entered the age of nuclear warfare, scholars and scientists, writers and politicians were divided into three different schools of thought. The moralists and theologians saw in the diabolical weapon that had devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki the fact that at last "warfare would kill war". According to them, peace would be saved by the threat of ever more horrible warfare. The pessimists, especially those who had read Clausewitz, announced the approach of the apocalypse. History, they said, teaches us that wars have always been total as far as the technical means and the means used by those who wage them are concerned, so that, in the case of a nuclear war, there was no reason for supposing the means employed

would not include atomic energy. The third school, that of the realists, has sought to find a middle road and, above all, to find solutions to immediate problems. They know that technical progress has not succeeded in changing men's hearts. The political life of nations, to be sure, depends on technology; but it also depends on societies and on men, that is, it depends on reason.

64. You will not be surprised if I say that both by temperament and by conviction Tunisia belongs to the realistic school. Atomic weapons have not brought about any radical change in the behaviour between nations. It is true that they have played a very important role in the course of events, but they have not led to the suicide of peoples, any more than they have ensured peace and justice. We are not saying this to silence the prophets of salvation or doom, but merely to draw from it a lesson on method.

65. In this era that we measure in years or even in tens of years, politics unfortunately do not exclude violence, whether within nations or in relations between States. Neither alliances nor traditional armies have disappeared. More than ever, all means are resorted to—except one, the use of which might prove fatal.

66. But it is clear that tacit agreement among adversaries to avoid a thermonuclear disaster is not sufficient to guarantee peace. Since the invention of atomic weapons, the stockpiling of military weapons by States has not slowed down and the strategic balance is maintained only by dint of a frenzied arms race. Apart from the risks inherent in such a policy, it is not in keeping with the interests even of those who pursue it, for in the nuclear era security is no longer ensured by vast deployment of armed men and the marshalling of the maximum amount of *matériel*: an invulnerable deterrent force is sufficient for the needs of defence.

67. To speak today of the limitation of armaments in a realistic way means, whether we like it or not, that we must at this stage accept that peace in the world will for the time being—and we trust that some day an end can be put to those words "for the time being"—depend on the existence of national nuclear forces. We appreciate the importance of the objections that might be made to this approach, but here we must distinguish the important from the essential. As we see it, what is essential is that the super-Powers embark on the path to true disarmament. It is of less importance today to speak of the ambitious but doubtless distant idea of general and complete disarmament than it is to seek opportunely a selective limitation of weapons by concentrating on a number of special key points both in the nuclear and in the conventional fields.

68. A limitation of atomic weapons in a few, but very effective, selective agreements is, in the eyes of my delegation, the most appropriate way of sorting out the convergent elements contained in the proposals made in the last few years and of removing the obstacles created by the diversity of legal concepts. Furthermore, to judge by the direction of the agreements and draft agreements achieved or discussed in the last few years, it is this policy of stages and pragmatic approach that has prevailed. It has been applied in two very precise directions; first of all, the action

taken must be such that the present situation will not deteriorate and, secondly, the conditions of nuclear balance must, by appropriate and successive measures, be improved.

69. The first of those objectives evokes the idea of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed in 1968, was welcomed by my Government as a considerable step towards the establishment of peace, and Tunisia did not hesitate to sign the Treaty. We believe that that agreement has truly contributed to creating favourable conditions and a new atmosphere which have since allowed of further progress in other fields of disarmament. It is encouraging that ninety-one countries have already signed the Treaty, and we rejoice at the very recent decision of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, a potential nuclear State, to sign that document too before the end of the year. That courageous attitude of a State non-Member of our Organization should be carefully pondered and emulated by many other countries.

70. The second objective of the regulation of nuclear arms, as we said, is to improve the conditions of the existing balance, avoiding any change that might threaten its relative stability.

71. The partial prohibition of nuclear tests in 1963 was a gratifying event. But the agreement contained the promise that an attempt would be made to end underground tests also. However, not only has an agreement not been achieved in that field, but, what is worse, according to the *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1968-1969* published in Stockholm, the annual rate of nuclear test explosions has increased since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water.

72. We know that as methods of detection are at present, long-distance registrations still do not enable us to identify violations, and it is still on the question of control that all aspects of disarmament founder. We are among those who believe that the Canadian document, ENDC/251/Rev.1, in annex C of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232],<sup>10</sup> does open the road to an agreement. Tunisia is gratified at the recent initiative from Ottawa to set up a world-wide exchange of seismic data to facilitate the achievement of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We greatly hope that the initiative will in this specific case assist us in overcoming the difficult problem of control, whose complexity and importance we realize, since ideological and juridical factors are involved. Above all we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will at its forthcoming meetings re-examine the question of verification in a spirit of interdependence, at a time in history when a broader and less intransigent view is taken of the notion of sovereignty.

73. Still in the nuclear field, we have followed with great interest the opening in Helsinki of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms and their possible reduction.

74. Although these are still only preliminary talks, we think that they commit the two super-Powers to follow a

road from which it will be difficult for them to draw back and on which the future of peace on our planet must rest. For the first time, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to open a discussion on the over-plentiful atomic arsenal which constitutes the very essence of their power, but which digs deep into their budgets and which has hitherto barred any true disarmament. My delegation joins all those that have spoken before it here and have expressed the hope that that conference will be a true milestone in the new era that we hope will follow the post-war period.

75. The hopes we place in the Helsinki talks are all the more serious because the Committee on Disarmament has submitted to us a draft treaty which appears in annex A to the report and which relates to the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. We should certainly have preferred a more complete prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes, as was expressly recommended by the General Assembly. Some of the aspects of the draft are still controversial, as we have noted from the debate that has been going on for the past three weeks in our Committee. A number of delegations have made some useful proposals, particularly the suggestion that an international verification body should be established so that States parties would not have to rely entirely on the two nuclear Powers. But here again we are among those who believe in compromise and are loath to adopt the "all or nothing" attitude. We welcome the draft and we trust that the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will be willing to improve it, taking into account the ideas suggested in this debate.

76. Tunisia ardently hopes for an agreement to be reached in this matter, because, regrettably enough, the Mediterranean, which we share with many other peoples, has already for some time been the theatre of a new rivalry which endangers the populations of coastal countries.

77. Unfortunately for mankind, it so happens that peace is based on the balance of power, particularly in the Mediterranean where this has always been an essential factor. Even in ancient times the history of Athens and Sparta, of Rome and Carthage, of Caesar and Anthony, is filled with tragic events. In the Middle Ages and the centuries that followed, the policies applied in the Mediterranean depended on what was happening among the armies of the European States. In the other camp the Sultan was just as interested in what was happening in the West and on the seas from Gibraltar to the Dardanelles. Thus throughout history—and nothing has changed in the present era—the idea of Mediterranean balance has been a part of the general notion of world balance in Europe, Africa and Asia. If some change were to take place in this nerve centre of the world, universal peace, and certainly that of the coastal States, would be most seriously threatened.

78. Tunisia therefore earnestly hopes that the balance that has been missing in that region lately can be restored, so that its peoples, who have proved themselves in the history of mankind, can be saved.

79. I should like to draw attention to what the Secretary-General, in the chapter on disarmament in the introduction

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*



to his annual report, called a "ray of light", namely the ratification of the Treaty of Tlatelolco,<sup>11</sup> which established Latin America as a "denuclearized zone". Once again, selective disarmament by stages has proved to be the effective course. After the denuclearization of the Antarctic in 1967, we hope that we shall move toward a similar development in Africa. All those agreements, which have thus far covered non-nuclear-weapon zones, maintain the *status quo* and forbid the arms race in those zones. We trust that at some later stage, when the political climate is conducive to it, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake negotiations on regions that already possess atomic weapons, without thereby changing the relationship of forces and utilizable logistic areas.

80. Before concluding my remarks on nuclear disarmament, I should like to refer briefly to item 31 of the agenda of the General Assembly, namely the "Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States". I wish to thank the Secretary-General and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the quality of their reports, which will prove most useful in working out a general policy to ensure that nuclear technology contributes to the economic and scientific progress of the developing countries.

81. The elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons is another highly complex aspect of disarmament. Tunisia heard with satisfaction of the progress achieved in this field in the Committee on Disarmament. The Secretary-General's report on this subject,<sup>12</sup> prepared with the assistance of qualified experts who unanimously approved the document, provides a solid basis for the search for satisfactory solutions.

82. At present we have before us two draft conventions, one submitted by the United Kingdom [*ibid.*, annex C, section 20] and the other by the Soviet Union [A/7655]. We also have a draft declaration submitted by twelve countries [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 30]. But President Nixon has just announced that his country was unilaterally renouncing all use of biological weapons and all forms of biological war. Better still—and this is a new aspect of disarmament—he stated that the United States intends to eliminate all existing stockpiles of biological weapons. Finally, he announced that he had recommended to the United States Senate that it ratify the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

83. My delegation welcomes that most happy initiative, which we consider to be a most important step towards the establishment of peace and a gesture which redounds to the honour of the United States Government.

84. We hope that all these efforts will lead to others and that concessions by all may lead to the conclusion of an agreement respected by the entire international community.

85. At the beginning of my statement I spoke of the need for a selective limitation of conventional weapons. My delegation feels, in fact, that there is a flagrant contradiction between the technique which nuclear industry and research have acquired and the increasing development of conventional weapons. Importance is still obstinately being attached to the number of troops, although the experts stress the futility of these evidences of a bygone era. If we imagine a land battle between nuclear Powers using tactical atomic weapons in the place of strategic bombings, are we not deluding ourselves? The belligerents will not stop at half measures. The gradual slipping into total war would seem so unavoidable that many experts take it as a foregone conclusion. For the nuclear Powers—I shall deal with the case of the developing countries later—there is no half-way between peace and annihilation.

86. I have mentioned the contradiction regarding conventional weapons. There is also the tremendous squandering of manpower and money. Modern weapons, tanks, aircraft, missiles and the like, are expensive everywhere, and unlimited research to improve them makes them even more expensive.

87. Bearing in mind this squandering and also desiring to see a relaxation of tension in the world, my country is ready to welcome any proposal, whether from the East or from the West, which would lead to negotiations between the members of the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO on the balanced reduction of conventional weapons. We would hope that such discussions could take place concurrently with the American-Soviet negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. If the international climate were conducive, such talks could cover the tactical nuclear weapons with which the forces in Europe are equipped.

88. Another aspect of conventional weapons I should like to mention is the frenzied race between the countries of the third world which import weapons costing more than \$1,500 million per year.

89. My country has preferred to invest in its economic development and to allocate to its army only a very small proportion of its budget—probably one of the smallest percentages in the world. We regret that this aspect of conventional weapons has not been considered adequately by the international community. Its dangerous and ruinous nature is nevertheless obvious. It is dangerous because the supply of weapons enables the exporting Powers to gain at relatively low cost, political influence in the countries importing them, and that dependence becomes greater in the case of highly advanced technical *matériel* such as aircraft and electronic equipment. It is dangerous, too, because the stockpiling of modern weapons, in certain explosive areas, is impossible to control, and none of us knows when and where and against whom they will be used.

90. And, as I said, it is ruinous because many countries which benefit from foreign assistance become involved in very high expenditures, which are not only wasteful but cause political tensions harmful to economic and social progress.

91. It is on this note that I should like to conclude my statement. Possessing as they do a wonderful abundance of

<sup>11</sup> Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

<sup>12</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

resources and the knowledge needed to use them, the great Powers could prove their idealism if they agreed on progressive disarmament and devoted some of the vast sums they spend in manufacturing death-dealing devices to helping other human beings, by agreeing to take their knowledge beyond their own frontiers to develop industries, irrigate fields and teach children to read and write.

92. But this challenge is not limited to preserving peace in the world, vital though that task is. There is also the creative explosion of entire cultures. The populations of various countries may be poor but they often possess the most ancient traditions, abounding in creative genius. If those who are forced by their wretchedness to bow the knee at present could raise themselves up and make full use of their talents and their historic cultural aptitudes, how much richer and more exciting could they make this world for all of us!

93. To achieve that we propose that substantial capital sums—and in particular some of the savings achieved through the limitation of armaments—should be allocated to a special assistance fund which could, for example, be administered through the United Nations. A country would then be aided no longer only by the East or the West but by the whole world community.

94. The poverty that disfigures more than half the world is at the very doorstep of well-endowed countries. We hope that they will take upon themselves the tasks that must still be completed, and no task is more stirring or more necessary for a peaceful world than that of limiting expenditure on armaments and aiding over half the inhabitants of the earth to attain a better life. That is a task worthy of an era and of a generation.

95. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): When I spoke in this Committee on 18 November I referred to the Canadian working paper [A/7741-DC/232,<sup>13</sup> annex C, section 35] of 8 October concerning the right of verification of the sea-bed treaty, I stated then:

“For our part we are proceeding with consultations with a view to submitting an amendment based on our working paper. We shall be submitting this shortly in order to facilitate a detailed discussion of the draft treaty text here.” [1692nd meeting, para. 124.]

I repeated the pledge that I had given in Geneva that the Canadian delegation is “willing to do our best to try to reach an agreement on textual changes which would make the draft sea-bed treaty generally acceptable”. [Ibid., para. 129.]

96. Since I last spoke, Mr. Chairman, you stated last Wednesday in reply to the point of procedure raised by the Ambassador of Brazil, that “. . . it would be in order for any delegation to submit suggestions or proposals in writing in any appropriate form such as a working paper.” [1701st meeting, para. 72.]

97. In response to your suggestion, Mr. Chairman, and in order to facilitate further consideration of the text of the

sea-bed treaty [A/7741-DC/232, annex A] in this Committee, I should like to take this occasion to report the progress which has been achieved so far in the consultations which we have been conducting with regard to draft article III of the sea-bed arms control treaty.

98. As a result of those consultations I submit today a revised working paper on article III of the draft treaty contained in annex A of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. That working paper is contained in document A/C.1/992 of 27 November 1969. It has the support of several delegations, which will no doubt make their views known as the discussion of the text develops. It does not, of course, purport to meet the views and concerns of all delegations. What I do believe is that the content of this working paper goes a long way to meet the criterion of general acceptability which we have been seeking and to which I referred in my previous statement. In particular, in our view, it meets the essentials of the position reflected in the Canadian working paper [ibid., annex C, section 35] which we submitted in Geneva in the following respects:

(a) It provides not only for observation, which does not infringe the rights of coastal States, but also for procedures of inspection by mutual consent if reasonable doubts arise, including the participation of all the parties that might be interested;

(b) If the observation or inspection gives rise to reasonable doubts, then States parties to the treaty have a right to invoke international procedures, including the good offices of the Secretary-General, for assistance;

(c) If necessary, States parties to the treaty have a right to recourse to the Security Council in accordance with provisions of the Charter;

(d) They have a right to full or partial assistance as may be necessary to assist in verification;

(e) All verification activities, as paragraph 6 of the working paper [A/C.1/992] states specifically, must be with due regard for “the sovereign or exclusive rights of a coastal State . . .”.

99. I need hardly emphasize the importance of the time factor, and it is with that in mind that I have put the proposal in written form, as you have suggested, Mr. Chairman, even though our consultations are not complete, in the hope that it will assist the possibility of the General Assembly’s completing work on the sea-bed treaty at this session. Needless to say, our consultations will continue with any and all who wish to be in touch with us about this important matter.

100. While I am speaking, I should like to explain the introduction of another draft resolution [A/C.1/L.491], this time dealing with the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. This is, in effect, a revised version of the draft resolution contained in document ENDC/266 of 26 August 1969 [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, section 31] which Canada submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and which is appended to the report of that Committee.

<sup>13</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

101. We had in mind then, as we do now, that the Assembly requires an opportunity for further study and negotiations at Geneva before pronouncing on the substance of the difficult problems raised in the excellent report of the Secretary-General on the whole problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, an important proposal dealing with biological warfare was introduced by the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva [*ibid.*, section 20]. Subsequently, here in New York, the Soviet Union and certain socialist countries introduced a draft convention dealing with both chemical and biological warfare [A/7655].

102. A draft resolution [A/C.1/L.488] has been introduced by Hungary, Mongolia and Poland which substantially contains most of the text of the draft which the Canadian delegation submitted in Geneva. But that draft resolution omits reference to the United Kingdom proposal on biological warfare and omits reference to what we believe is the only way in which progress can be made on the foundations of the Geneva Protocol and the work done at the last session in Geneva, namely, by taking into account the various proposals put forward both in the Assembly and in Geneva; more particularly the United Kingdom draft convention and the draft convention of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as the Secretary-General's report.

103. This is not, in our view, an unimportant distinction. We agree with draft resolution A/C.1/L.488 that the most important step that the Assembly should take is the reaffirmation of support for the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the adherence to it through ratification by as many States as possible. In this connexion we particularly welcome the statement made by President Nixon on 25 November initiating Congressional action on the ratification of the Geneva Protocol and announcing the intention to renounce biological weapons.

104. Where we part company with the draft resolution of the three delegations is that we believe that our text does not seek to prejudice in any way the differing positions on substance held by various delegations, and that as paragraph 2 of section C makes clear in our draft resolution [A/C.1/L.491], this Assembly will request the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give "urgent consideration to reaching agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare"—I repeat "the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare"—taking into account all the proposals made.

105. That language, I believe, is responsive to the views expressed by many delegations that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should be asked to study the problem as a whole, but not overlooking any of its constituent parts. In other words, where progress needs to be made is not just by banning weapons, but by dealing with the means of making those weapons, on a basis of reciprocity and with verification.

106. Needless to say, the Canadian delegation stands ready on this, as on all other proposals before the Committee, to

seek a reasonable consensus which, of course, is the only way in which progress on arms control and disarmament can proceed.

107. Mr. GHASUS (Afghanistan): "In order to promote"—and I am quoting the provisions of Article 26 of the Charter—"the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources", the States Members of the United Nations, fully aware of the incalculable dangers which the existence, development and stockpiling of armaments present to the world community, entrusted the Security Council with the task of formulating plans for setting up a system of armaments control.

108. As a corollary to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, the Security Council was asked to seek the most appropriate ways and means of scaling down the armaments of nations with a view to creating the necessary conditions for a secure and lasting peace.

109. However, soon after the establishment of the United Nations it was realized that the Security Council, under the prevailing circumstances, was not in a position properly to discharge its mandate in the domain of disarmament. It therefore became evident that in order to seek tangible advances on matters of disarmament, the instrumentality of other United Nations organs should be more adequately explored. That belief was further confirmed when attempts by major Powers carried out mostly outside the framework of the United Nations proper did not yield any positive results in the field of disarmament.

110. The post-war climate of mistrust which prevented the two super-Powers, possessors of formidable arsenals of nuclear and conventional weapons, from initiating any meaningful measure of disarmament prompted the General Assembly to play a more active part in that respect. That was, of course, a sheer necessity.

111. The development and sophistication of nuclear weapons had reached such enormous proportions, and the prospects for any agreement between the nuclear Powers seemed so remote that the community of nations, profoundly desirous of contributing to the reversal of the arms race, had to resort to the possibilities provided by Article 11 of the Charter, which confers important functions on the General Assembly in matters related to disarmament. It was, needless to say, readily understood that no real progress in the field of disarmament could be achieved without the agreement of the super and big Powers. But the very survival of the human race being at stake, it was imperative for the world community to associate itself more closely, as a measure of self-preservation, with the endeavours aimed at breaking the stalemate. It was acknowledged that the moral weight of the community of nations expressed through the General Assembly would be in itself a positive factor, influencing favourably the course of events in the field of disarmament.

112. The efforts of the General Assembly were instrumental in prompting the United States and the USSR to present in 1961 their joint statement of principles on

<sup>14</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

disarmament to the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.<sup>15</sup> During the same session it was decided that for the implementation of these principles a negotiating body should be created. Thus the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament came into being. Its composition, agreed upon by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, was endorsed by the General Assembly [*resolution 1722 (XVI)*]. Since its establishment the Committee on Disarmament has remained the main forum for disarmament negotiations where the gap between the opposing views of the super-Powers was often narrowed down by the contributions of the other members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, particularly its non-aligned members.

113. As the present report of the Committee on Disarmament [*A/7741-DC/232*]<sup>16</sup> indicated, the Governments of the USSR and the United States of America, the two Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament decided, during the summer of 1969, to expand its composition by the addition of eight new members. Without questioning the motives of the Co-Chairmen, we are among those who are of the opinion that the procedure followed for the expansion of the Committee on Disarmament was, to say the least, quite unusual. A careful examination of the provisions of resolutions 1660 (XVI) and 1722 (XVI) of the General Assembly, which laid the groundwork for the establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, confirms us in our belief that any change in the composition of the Committee on Disarmament should have received the prior endorsement of the General Assembly. I wish to say in this connexion that we support the views expressed by the representative of Mexico and will support any draft reflecting that position. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations but an instrument of the United Nations, working under its auspices and reporting regularly to the General Assembly.

114. We hope that the action taken in Geneva, bypassing the General Assembly, does not mean that in the view of the major Powers the usefulness of this body in matters of disarmament has decreased. If, on the one hand, it would be unrealistic to think that progress in disarmament is feasible without the agreement of the super-Powers; on the other hand, the universality of the problem and the legitimate interest of all States in disarmament negotiations make it essential that the catalytic powers of the General Assembly be advantageously used to pave the way leading to general and complete disarmament.

115. The General Assembly, as the principal organ of the United Nations, has to indicate the issues which in the view of the world community should receive priority consideration. These priorities may not necessarily coincide with the priorities of one or both of the super-Powers, but in view of their great responsibility towards the non-nuclear world on matters of disarmament it is incumbent upon them to seek, in co-operation with all concerned, the most appropriate means of attaining these aims. Thus the General Assembly

could continue to play its important role in orienting the search and in providing the necessary momentum. As a consequence of what I have just said, it is probably advisable to think seriously of resorting, at intervals, to the instrumentality of the United Nations Disarmament Commission for reviewing the work done in the limited period of the time usually allocated to disarmament during the annual meetings of the General Assembly, and agreeing on new directives in the field of disarmament.

116. In reading through the report of the Committee on Disarmament and its annexes one cannot fail to recognize the complexities of the matters discussed in that forum. We cannot but agree with all those who have rightly noted the seriousness of the efforts made by the members of the Committee on Disarmament during 1969 with a view to finding acceptable solutions to the difficult problems facing the disarmament forum in Geneva. However, the facts of international relations being what they are, the progress registered has not been proportionate to the zeal of the negotiators. Apart from a few encouraging developments related to some partial or collateral measures, no concrete results have been reported in the field of disarmament proper. The Secretary-General, in the introduction to his annual report, describes the status of disarmament during 1969 in the following manner:

"In the field of disarmament the past year has seen little progress. Indeed, some of the momentum and promise of previous years seems to have been lost. The world is standing at what may be regarded in the perspective of history as one of the decisive moments in the grim challenge of the nuclear arms race."<sup>17</sup>

Had it not been for the beginning of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in Helsinki, another year would have come to an end without any steps being taken towards limiting and reducing the threat of nuclear weapons.

117. The delegation of Afghanistan therefore wishes the negotiators in Helsinki full success. We hope that their endeavours will lead to tangible results in the field of vertical non-proliferation. We further hope that while the Helsinki negotiations are going on the two super-Powers will not take any steps contrary to the aims and purposes of the talks in the universal interest of mankind.

118. The extension of the nuclear test ban treaty to all environments as a collateral measure of disarmament is considered to be closely related to SALT, which intends to seek the reduction and limitation of strategic nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the cessation of their sophistication and development. It is widely believed that the progress made in SALT will facilitate the conclusion of such a treaty. The advances achieved in the seismic methods of detection and identification of underground events and the possibility of arrangements regarding international exchange of seismic data will be, we hope, additional factors contributing to the solution of the problem of verification and control which has avowedly marred until now agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty.

<sup>15</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.*

<sup>16</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

<sup>17</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 26.*

119. The necessity of concluding a test ban treaty has always figured high on the list of our priorities. The General Assembly by its resolution 1762 A (XVII) condemned all nuclear weapon tests and asked for their cessation immediately and not later than 1 January 1963. We believe that conditions are presently ripe for taking the necessary political decisions leading to an early agreement on a test-ban treaty covering all environments. It would be consonant with the wishes of the majority if the nuclear-weapon States, as a provisional measure pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, agreed on a moratorium with regard to all underground tests.

120. The delegation of Afghanistan considers the joint draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*] presented by the United States of America and the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament to be a positive collateral measure of disarmament. The draft treaty would not only extend the area of arms control but would have, like all past and future agreements on disarmament, a beneficial impact on further negotiations aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons and would undeniably contribute to the lessening of international tensions. Recognizing the complexities involved, we welcome this initiative as a first step towards the demilitarization of the new area of man's environment.

121. Important improvements to the present text have been suggested in Geneva and during our debate here. We agree with some of the previous speakers that the provisions of article I, which deals with the limits of the area of the sea-bed and its subsoil to which the prohibition will apply, need to be clarified further. The present formulation, which hinges on the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, does not provide a solid basis for defining the area precisely. The disclaimer clause incorporated in the body of the draft may not be a practical way of removing the difficulties inherent in article I. On the contrary, it may give rise to claims and counter-claims leading to conflicting interpretations which could hamper the practical application of the treaty itself.

122. In order to realize the objective of reserving the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction exclusively for peaceful purposes and the exploitation of its resources for the benefit of mankind, it is essential that in this first contractual instrument pertaining to the sea-bed and the ocean floor the area be delimited without ambiguity. Some interesting suggestions in connexion with article I were made on 20 November 1969 by the representative of Argentina [1695th meeting] and on 24 November 1969 by the representative of Morocco [1697th meeting]. Their views and the observations of the representative of Burma [ibid.] regarding article III on the all-important problem of verification deserve thorough consideration. We hope that the proposals and/or amendments put forward to the present text will be duly taken into account in the elaboration of the final text in co-operation with the sea-bed Committee.

123. It is a matter of satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament was able this year to give serious consideration to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of warfare.

124. We welcome the report of the Secretary-General, prepared with the assistance of a group of experts in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use.<sup>18</sup> That thought-provoking study has succeeded in highlighting the horrifying facts of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the magnitude of the dangers involved in the possible use of these indiscriminate weapons of mass destruction, which in war will disseminate death among combatants and non-combatants alike, and can well impair the health of generations yet unborn, and whose development and deployment, we are told, are less costly than in the case of nuclear weapons. The report confirms the timeliness of reaching a decision to ban not only the use but also the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

125. Two draft instruments are at present before the Committee in this respect: a draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare presented by the United Kingdom [A/7741-DC/232, *annex C, section 20*], and a draft convention on chemical and bacteriological weapons submitted by nine socialist countries [A/7655]. Those two drafts have a number of elements in common. It would be advantageous if the Committee on Disarmament could thoroughly examine the two texts with a view to merging them into one draft treaty. The Committee on Disarmament could be asked to submit the new draft treaty to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session.

126. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the delegation of Afghanistan is of the opinion that the strict observance by all States of the provisions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 remains the most important guarantee against the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in war. May I be allowed to say that we noted with appreciation the statement of President Nixon on 25 November, announcing that he had decided to submit the Geneva Protocol to the United States Senate for formal ratification.

127. It is a cause for disappointment that the concept of non-use of nuclear weapons has not received a greater measure of acceptance. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States against each other and against non-nuclear-weapon States will constitute the first positive element of a system of negative security assurances which is lacking in the present non-proliferation régime.

128. To achieve nuclear parity may serve the immediate interests of the super-Powers. It undeniably has also its logical side. But a balance based on nuclear deterrence cannot by itself guarantee the non-use of atomic weapons. A change in the international situation, an advance by one or the other of the super-Powers in nuclear technology may upset this precarious balance and bring about a nuclear catastrophe.

129. In all likelihood, in the absence of concrete arrangements banning the use of nuclear weapons and in view of

<sup>18</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).



the limitations of the present test ban Treaty, the improvement and stockpiling of nuclear weapons will continue, and the spiral of the nuclear arms race will maintain its upward trend. It is appropriate in this connexion I believe to give serious thought to the following profound words used by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report: "As the spiral of the nuclear arms race goes up, the spiral of security goes down."<sup>19</sup> It is against the use of nuclear weapons that mankind seeks protection. Any steps taken towards the non-use of nuclear weapons will make the world a safer place for all.

130. For obvious reasons, since the explosion of the first atomic bomb, nuclear disarmament has been in the forefront of our preoccupations. Of late the proliferation of conventional weapons has assumed such proportions that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly should start giving serious consideration within the framework of general and complete disarmament to the question of conventional disarmament.

131. The conventional arms race is most alarming to us. The horizontal and vertical dissemination of conventional weapons disturbing the balance of power in various regions of the world diverts the already meagre resources of the developing countries from high-priority economic and social sectors to the unproductive domain of armaments.

132. The safety and sovereignty of the developing countries can primarily be endangered by the use or threat of use of these weapons. This state of affairs could embolden countries to start local wars which could lead to greater conflagrations.

133. In the beginning of this intervention I referred to Article 26 of the Charter, which prescribes the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources. Regrettably, that provision of the Charter has never been upheld. The arms race continues unabated. We are told that at present the total world expenditure for armaments is at the rate of almost \$200,000 million per year. The Secretary-General has stated in his annual report that the diversion of enormous resources and energy, both human and physical, from peaceful economic and social programmes to military purposes has been one of the main causes of the failure of the first United Nations Development Decade.

134. We, therefore, wholeheartedly support his proposal that the decade of the 1970s, which has already been designated as the Second United Nations Development Decade, be dedicated as a disarmament decade.

135. It is of paramount importance that during this decade an all-out effort be made to reach the goal of general, complete and universal disarmament under effective international control. The phased approach to this problem has to be accelerated. It is necessary that in the coming years concrete ways of allocating the resources released by disarmament to the economic and social development of developing countries be found and agreed upon.

136. Disarmament is a universal problem but obviously no one can deny the great and special responsibility of all the nuclear Powers towards the community of nations in the matter.

137. Mr. AZZOUT (Algeria) (*translated from French*): Among all the questions discussed by our Committee, the problem of disarmament remains permanently important and urgent. For in dealing with that problem, we are inevitably led to raising two vital aspects of international relations: the safeguarding of international peace and security founded on justice, on the one hand, and the ever-growing imbalance between the highly developed countries and the developing countries on the other.

138. All the efforts of the international community over recent years have been directed towards replacing the fatal scourge of war by the possibility of serene and peaceful coexistence among all States. Unfortunately, those efforts have not always vindicated the hopes and trust invested by the peoples in the attainment of disarmament, which would deliver the world from the threat and fear of general conflict.

139. The technical difficulties of disarmament—which quite obviously we cannot overlook, but to which some would like to reduce the question—can in no way serve as a cover for the absence of the political will to bring about genuine disarmament. To limit general and complete disarmament to statements of principle or to the preparation of a plan which would elude the essential problems would obviously mean marking time and turning our back on general and complete disarmament.

140. International peace and security, which in the final analysis means the national security of each State, cannot be based on the always precarious balance of terror, still less upon a super-balance of terror. The arsenals of weapons, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, which are constantly being renewed because of technical improvements, far from giving their possessors any security, constantly threaten the security and national independence of all countries, particularly small countries.

141. Where the security and existence of nations are at stake any valid and lasting solution must be a universal one. That means that the participation of two other Powers—which are nuclear Powers moreover, and permanent members of the Security Council with all the prerogatives that the Charter confers upon them in the maintenance of international peace and security—must be effectively ensured.

142. Speaking at this stage of the general debate my delegation need not discuss in detail the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament [A/7741-DC/232<sup>20</sup>]. That document makes it quite clear that the Committee does not seem to be moving towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In its resolution 1772 (XVI) the General Assembly entrusted to that Committee the task of undertaking, as a matter of urgency, negotiations with a view to the conclusion of the treaty. But eight years have passed and the essential objective of

<sup>19</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 28.

<sup>20</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.

that resolution seems to have been relegated to the background while the emphasis is being put more and more upon the balance of armaments. Such an attempt to restrict the scope of general and complete disarmament by reversing priorities leads finally to our losing sight of what is essential and to confining the discussion of a matter of universal interest to a *tête-à-tête* between the two great Powers. Such a conception, which by the way is not our own and which we do not share, is illustrated by the way in which the Geneva Committee was expanded. The Committee, which was set up by the General Assembly, has had its membership increased to twenty-six without reference to the body which established it. Everything takes place as if the international community as a whole—of course with the exception of the two great Powers—lived by proxy and as if all important decisions were not its business. I shall not repeat the arguments put forward in that connexion by many speakers, particularly by the delegation of Mexico [1691st meeting], although they seem to us to be altogether irrefutable. Suffice it to say that the General Assembly, which consists of sovereign and equal States, is not a rubber stamp and that its participation in decisions should not be challenged by the institution of irregular procedures. Cocteau has said: “When we are overtaken by events, we must pretend we organized them”, and I suppose we could take up such an attitude at this session, were it not for the precedents already established in this respect and for the fear of seeing such procedures repeated. Our final attitude in no way affects our confidence in the new members, particularly the non-aligned members who will support the difficult but stubborn and continuing efforts of those of their own group who preceded them. We should like to express to them our gratitude and our confidence in them for the praiseworthy efforts they have consistently made in this field of activity.

143. The Committee has before it various draft conventions of vital importance, whose implications for the international situation and whose direct interest for our respective nations are obvious to all. Such drafts need to be thoroughly studied by our Governments. Our delegation will, therefore, confine itself to preliminary comments on the documents before us.

144. First, the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof [A/7741-DC/232, *annex A*], the pacific intentions of which have been repeatedly emphasized, should, we think, put demilitarization, not denuclearization alone, as its first essential requirement. To be effective and to meet the aspirations of the small countries which expect such an undertaking to usher in a new era, the draft convention must in all logic be part of a necessary peace without which nothing enduring could be achieved.

145. At the present stage of technology, the drafts of the two great Powers concern those Powers themselves in the first place, but at the same time they do affect directly, the national interests of a great number of States, particularly when the notions of the contiguous zone and the continental shelf are involved.

146. The treaty must be clear enough to avoid interpretations which will inevitably lead to conflicts and which might threaten the sovereign rights of States.

147. We hope that the draft is not final, for it can be very much improved, and that the gaps in it, both as regards types of weapons not specified in the treaty and guarantees of verification, will be filled when the General Assembly is in a position to express its views.

148. Under the item entitled “Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States” the Algerian delegation would like to raise a point which seems particularly worth noting. It is generally recognized that nuclear power can make an important contribution to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries and the report of the Secretary-General on this subject [A/7568] represents a positive contribution to knowledge of the possibilities offered by advanced technology to the developing countries. The possession and mastery of that most costly technology, and international financial assistance to developing countries, should be considered in terms of new and adequate criteria.

149. Such assistance must not be made subject to any discriminatory conditions. The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency is quite unambiguous as regards the services made available to its members.

150. No condition can or should therefore be imposed on any member whether that member is equipped with nuclear weapons or not and, above all, no obligation is imposed on any member to accede in advance to international agreements.

151. There remains the need for the urgent suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests.

152. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we feel that the Moscow Treaty<sup>21</sup> should be extended to cover underground tests as rapidly as possible. The Treaty was a modest milestone on the road to the international regulation of armaments. It was more important in changing the political climate to which it gave rise than in terms of its contents. In signing that Treaty, the nuclear Powers gave up tests which were no longer of any use to them but continued to carry out underground tests because such tests were of some use to them. The alleged technical difficulties fail more and more to conceal the absence of any peaceful desire to reach a comprehensive treaty. The conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons is an urgent measure for which our Committee has been calling for several years now. The Secretary-General should be thanked for preparing his report on that problem. It seems to my delegation that of the various texts before us the Soviet text is the most acceptable [A/7655].

153. Be that as it may, any convention must above all strengthen and complement the Geneva Convention of 1925.<sup>22</sup> Scrupulous respect for such a convention will undoubtedly be a step towards general and complete disarmament.

<sup>21</sup> Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed on 5 August 1953.

<sup>22</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24).

154. Mr. FARACE (Italy): I have asked for the floor only to comment briefly on the Canadian working paper related to item 29 which has been circulated this morning [A/C.1/992].

155. The Italian delegation wishes to support the position that has been expounded by the representative of Canada in advocating a revision of article III of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed of nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction [A/7741-DC/232, annex A].<sup>23</sup>

156. The ideas expressed by Ambassador Ignatieff on the crucial question of verification run along the same lines as those indicated by the Chairman of the Italian delegation in the statement he made at the meeting of this Committee on 20 November [1695th meeting], where he stressed the necessity of making further efforts to find a larger basis for consensus on this subject. In our view, the international character of these procedures should be strengthened. We think that the Canadian paper offers a satisfactory compromise. We are also convinced that, in the light of the clarification you, Mr. Chairman, gave the other day about the way to proceed with respect to the draft treaty annexed to document A/7741-DC/232, the Canadian working paper

is very helpful in widening and advancing the process of negotiation on a problem of direct concern for all countries here represented.

157. The Italian delegation wishes to put on record at once that it fully supports the proposal contained in document A/C.1/992. May I therefore ask the Committee Secretary to add the name of Italy to the working paper introduced this morning by the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff.

158. Since I have the floor, I should also like to make a very short reference to the statement made by the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Eschauzier, at this Committee's meeting of 25 November [1699th meeting]. In expressing the great satisfaction of his Government at the decision of the Federal Republic of Germany to sign the non-proliferation Treaty, he explained the position of the Netherlands on the subject of ratification of that Treaty by the non-nuclear-weapon States members of EURATOM. In subscribing fully to that statement, I can add that the Italian Government, motivated by the same purposes, will for its part equally strive to promote negotiations for the conclusion of the required verification agreement between EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*

<sup>23</sup> Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1962, document DC/232.