



CONTENTS

Agenda items 29, 104, 30 and 31:

Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued)

Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (continued):

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons;

(c) Report of the Secretary-General

Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued)

Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (continued):

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General;

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General;

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General . . . . . 1

Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).

**AGENDA ITEMS 29, 104, 30 AND 31**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7639, A/7681 and A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/989)**

**Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (continued) (A/C.1/988, A/C.1/989, A/C.1/991):**

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/7741-DC/232);

(b) Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons (A/7655; A/C.1/L.487);

(c) Report of the Secretary-General (A/7575)

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (continued) (A/7741-DC/232; A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.486)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (continued):**

(a) Implementation of the results of the Conference: report of the Secretary-General (A/7677 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2);

(b) Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control: report of the Secretary-General (A/7678 and Add.1-3);

(c) Contributions of nuclear technology to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries: report of the Secretary-General (A/7568 and A/7743)

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kolo (Nigeria), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (translated from Russian): Pursuant to the initiative of nine Socialist countries, including the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly is considering the important and urgent question concerning the "Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons". The representative of the Polish People's Republic has already introduced this important document (A/7655) to the Committee on behalf of all the co-sponsors.

2. The proposal of the Socialist countries is a continuation and development of their efforts in the struggle for observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925<sup>1</sup> prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. That proposal is dictated by the interests of strengthening international security and has a clear-cut objective: to guard mankind against the horrors of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons by prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons through their complete destruction.

3. The need for an immediate settlement of this problem is obvious. It is necessary because the continuous perfecting, production and stockpiling of reserves of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons creates, as stated in the letter of the Socialist countries [ibid.]:

"... a potential threat that mankind may become the victim of a chemical and bacteriological war which would

<sup>1</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva, 17 June 1925.

have grave consequences on the entire process of the development of civilization and on the future of all mankind.”

At present there is no more powerful and dangerous weapon in the world than nuclear, as well as chemical and bacteriological, weapons. Although these kinds of weapons have different effects their common feature is that they are weapons of mass destruction. As was stressed by the Secretary-General in his introduction to the annual report on the work of the Organization dated September 1968:

“In some respects they [*chemical and bacteriological weapons*] may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons. Almost all countries, including small ones and developing ones, may have access to these weapons, which can be manufactured quite cheaply, quickly and secretly in small laboratories or factories.” [A/7201 and Add.1, para. 30.]

4. A study of the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the consequences of the possible use shows the extremely dangerous character of this kind of weapons. The report states further:

“All weapons of war are destructive of human life, but chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons stand in a class of their own as armaments which exercise their effects solely on living matter. The idea that bacteriological (biological) weapons could deliberately be used to spread disease generates a sense of horror.”<sup>2</sup>

5. The strength of the effects of these weapons is confirmed by the statements of scientists as follows:

“The fear today is that the scientific and technological advances of the past few decades have increased the potential of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to such an extent that one can conceive of their use causing casualties on a scale greater than one would associate with conventional warfare.”<sup>3</sup>

6. The dangerous nature of chemical and bacteriological weapons also lies in the fact that their effects are not limited to the zone of war operations but can spread quite rapidly to the population of areas in the rear. Moreover, it is very difficult to detect chemical and bacteriological weapons in the early stages of their use, as is stressed in the report of the Secretary-General. This weapon of mass destruction is doubly dangerous because it can remain active over a long period of time and threaten the lives and health of several generations. For instance, it is well known that at the beginning of the Second World War Siberian plague bacilla were spread on the small island of Gruinard off the north west coast of Scotland, and that even now, after more than a quarter of a century, the island is still closed to visitors. Scientists maintain that it will remain closed for more than a hundred years.

<sup>2</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use: Report of the Secretary-General*. United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24, para. 371.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

7. In speaking of chemical and bacteriological weapons it should be stressed in particular that there is practically no defence against them. The report of the Secretary-General states:

“Mass disease, following an attack, especially of civilian populations, could be expected not only because of the lack of timely warning of the danger but because effective measures of protection or treatment simply do not exist or cannot be provided on an adequate scale.”<sup>4</sup>

8. With regard to chemical weapons, as is stressed in the report of the Secretary-General,

“... it would be enormously costly in resources, and administratively all but impossible to organize adequate protection for a civilian population against the range of possible chemical agents.”<sup>5</sup>

9. On the basis of thorough study of the question of the possible consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, 14 authoritative international scientists, chemists, physicians, bacteriologists and microbiologists reached the conclusion that

“Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live. This overriding danger would apply as much to the country which initiated the use of these weapons as to the one which had been attacked, regardless of what protective measures it might have taken in parallel with its development of an offensive capability.”<sup>6</sup>

10. This conclusion of the scientists is a serious warning to all mankind against the frightful tragedy which may befall it if lethal chemical gases and poisons and equally deadly viruses, microbes, bacteria and other biological agents should be put to use.

11. Man, who has conquered many dreadful diseases, has at the same time created an enormous number of chemical and bacteriological agents which in a few seconds or as the result of long-term effects can destroy millions of people. In the face of these invisible, lethally dangerous enemies, human beings are virtually defenceless.

12. In the light of the facts presented in the report of the Secretary-General, the words of those who try to present chemical and bacteriological weapons as “humane” have a cynical ring. No, a weapon exclusively intended for killing people, and moreover for mass-killing, has never been humane. It has always been and remains a barbarous weapon. One must sink to the basest depths to call such a weapon humane. In the Geneva Protocol of 1925 it is stressed that the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world.

13. The legitimate anxiety of the peoples of our planet are aroused by reports of the growing development, produc-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 11.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 375.

tion, stockpiling and testing of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the imperialist countries. The peoples are disturbed by their policy providing for the emplacement of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in their military bases in all parts of the world, which imperils the lives of millions of people.

14. Despite the heavy shroud of secrecy which surrounds everything connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons, certain facts have become known which give further proof of the extraordinarily dangerous nature of this weapon of mass destruction. A few months ago the newspapers throughout the world carried the news that as the result of a small leak of a lethal nerve-paralysing gas at the American military base on Okinawa, 24 people became ill and were hospitalized. Last year at an experimental base in Utah an incident occurred involving poison gas causing the death of 6,000 sheep and threatening the lives of the people in the surrounding areas. There are also well-known facts concerning accidents occurring during the transport of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the dangerous consequences of plans for elimination of so-called obsolete poison gases without application of the necessary precautions. One can readily imagine the tragedy which would result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in wartime if even an unfortunate accident with this type of weapon under conditions of peace constitutes such great danger to human beings.

15. Recognizing the dangerous nature of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons which threaten all peoples with incalculable disasters, mankind has resolutely condemned these barbarous weapons. As the report of the Secretary-General points out:

“No form of warfare has been more condemned than has the use of this category of weapons.”<sup>7</sup>

16. Already at the end of the last century steps were taken, through international agreements and legal documents, in order to prohibit the use of this kind of weapons. It is well known that the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 prohibited the use of poisons and poisoned bullets, and a separate declaration of The Hague Convention of 1899 condemned “the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”

17. The use of poison gas by imperial Germany in the First World War aroused such strong indignation that measures were taken to prohibit both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The result of these efforts was the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925, prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare. This Protocol has withstood the test of time and has proved to be a serious deterrent factor against the use of this type of weapons in the Second World War. As is well known, following the Second World War a number of other States also adhered to the Geneva Protocol. Its international significance was confirmed, on the proposal of the socialist countries, by resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly in 1966 (resolution 2162 B (XXI)) and in 1968 (resolution

2454 A (XXIII)). These resolutions condemned the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, called for strict observance by all States of the principles and aims of the Geneva Protocol, and invited all States to accede to it.

18. Unfortunately, to date not all States have adhered to the Geneva Protocol. Some of them have even withdrawn the question of its ratification from the agenda of their legislative bodies. The most they are willing to do is to discuss ratification and even then only occasionally. At the same time, one of those States, the United States of America, has had a provision in its military code since 1956 stating that it is “not a party to any valid treaty prohibiting or limiting the use of toxic or non-toxic gases, fumes or inflammatory materials or bacteriological means of waging war”. At the end of 1960 the efforts of the military and diplomats blocked the adoption by the Congress of the United States of a resolution confirming the statement of President Roosevelt that:

“The use of such weapons is recognized as unlawful by the public opinion of all civilized mankind. I categorically declare that in no circumstances shall we resort to such weapons if our enemies do not use them first.”

19. The question legitimately arises: why do some Western countries not wish to ratify the Geneva Protocol? Evidently because they wish to have a free hand in using these weapons.

20. However, when it became clear, for example, that the use of such a chemical substance as DDT caused certain damages to the flora and fauna of the United States, a proposal was made and adopted immediately for legislation prohibiting its excessive use. We welcome such measures, but the question remains: why does that country not at the same time join the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and why does it not agree to complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons?

21. All these facts are a source of great anxiety to the international community since such a policy in the field of bacteriological (biological) weapons constitutes a serious danger for many countries and peoples and for the cause of peace and international security throughout the world.

22. The peoples of the world judge the position of States regarding the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons by the attitudes of those States to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which we fully support. In our time, when these weapons have become tremendously powerful, when as a result of their development the armaments race is being intensified, one cannot stand on the sidelines regarding this important international document and refuse to support measures to strengthen the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the production of these weapons and their exclusion from arsenals of *matériel* for waging war.

23. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was and remains the most complete international document prohibiting the use of all kinds of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

24. We note with satisfaction and support the proposal of the Secretary-General, contained in the introduction to the

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, that it is necessary

“To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future.”

That conclusion is based on the views of distinguished scientists of various countries of the world, including scientists of the four great Powers which are permanent members of the Security Council. The task is to ensure that all States respond to the appeal of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic and join or ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in 1970, the forty-fifth anniversary of the adoption of that document.

25. At the same time we consider that, in strengthening the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and fighting for its observance, it is essential to take the following important step towards prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction—to conclude a corresponding convention, as is also proposed by the group of socialist countries. Only through strengthening the Geneva Protocol, through prohibiting the development of chemical and bacteriological weapons and eliminating their stocks from the arsenals of States can the peoples of the world be protected against these terrible weapons of mass destruction.

26. We are convinced that the peoples of the entire world will welcome the conclusion of such a convention, since it is in their interests and in the interests of peace and international security.

27. The draft convention [A/7655] proposed by the socialist countries—in contrast to the British proposal [A/7741-DC/232, annex C, para. 20] as has been rightly pointed out by the representatives of many countries—is fully in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretary-General calling on all countries to reach an agreement on the cessation of the development, production and stockpiling of any chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for military purposes and on ensuring their effective elimination from military arsenals.<sup>8</sup>

28. In the view of the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic a convention which imposes upon its participants not only moral, but also legal obligations is the best form of international document for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and providing for their destruction.

29. Article 1 of the proposed convention imposes the commitment upon each of the States Parties to it “not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons.”

30. The purpose of this article is to halt the production of this barbarous weapon of mass destruction, since stock-

piling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons only increases the danger that they may be used.

31. However, since it may be assumed that over many years enormous stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons have been accumulated, in order to remove the threat of their use it is essential to take the next logical step and destroy or divert to peaceful purposes all previously accumulated chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the possession of States. It is precisely the attainment of this objective that is provided for in article 2 of the draft convention.

32. Articles 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the draft convention also contain important obligations whose fulfilment would lead to cessation of the production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and destruction of the existing stockpiles.

33. The draft convention gives no advantage to any one of the parties; all peoples stand to gain by its conclusion.

34. The conclusion of the convention would lead to the exclusion from the arsenals of States of one type of weapon of mass destruction. It would constitute an important step on the path to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. It would lead to deeper confidence between peoples and a sounder international climate in general. It would make it possible to use scientific discoveries in the fields of chemistry and bacteriology (biology) only for peaceful purposes in the interests of all mankind. The use of chemistry and bacteriology in the fight for life, against death, against diseases prematurely taking millions of lives—that is the noble task of scientists. The draft convention would serve the realization of the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and tie the hands of those forces which nurture monstrous plans for the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

35. At the beginning of the debate certain delegations commented on the text of the draft convention. The co-sponsors of the draft who have spoken before me have already clarified a number of questions. I should like to comment briefly on the remarks concerning the inadequacy of the system of control over observance of the draft convention's provisions. First of all, it is noteworthy that the need for stricter control systems was pointed out by those delegations which, for instance, during the debate on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons advocated a weaker control system, arguing that control may become a means for finding out industrial secrets of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Now, during the discussion of the draft convention, they are in favour of stricter control. Isn't such an inconsistent position evidence of unwillingness to reach agreement? As is well known, the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries provides that every party to it will bear international responsibility for observance of its provisions by its legal and physical persons and assumes the obligation to take legislative and administrative measures to attain the objectives of the draft convention. We are convinced that any Government is able to fulfil these obligations. Moreover the draft convention contains the obligation of the parties to consult and collaborate with one another in solving any

<sup>8</sup> *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1969, document DC/232.*

problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of the convention. This is entirely sufficient, since it can hardly be supposed that any controllers are necessary for attainment of the objectives of the convention. That is not only superfluous, but simply impossible since it would be necessary to put a controller in every pharmacy, every house, and even in individual garages where secret production of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of waging war could be organized.

36. The Byelorussian delegation considers that if no artificial obstacles are deliberately placed in the way of the conclusion of the draft convention it can be speedily adopted by the General Assembly. A solution in the United Nations of the question of prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and dissemination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is called for by Soviet and other scientists who represent world public opinion. Effective international prohibition of all these types of weapons was demanded by the International Conference of Communist and Worker's Parties held in Moscow in June 1969.

37. The adoption by the General Assembly at the present session of a decision supporting the proposal for conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction would, in the view of the socialist countries, including the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, be a serious contribution to the cause of peace and would be in accordance with the interests of all mankind.

38. Mr. ESCHAUZIER (Netherlands): Among the items on the agenda of this Committee questions of arms control and disarmament have always been of particular interest to the Netherlands delegation. Over the past years my delegation has been at pains to make positive contributions to the debate on those questions whenever it was in a position to do so.

39. Today I am taking the floor with an acute sense of the special responsibility which is due to my country's membership in the enlarged Committee on Disarmament. The Netherlands Government regards the Committee as the focal point for negotiations on matters of arms control and disarmament. It is anxious to maintain the Committee's character fully as a negotiating body. On the basis of our recent experience, we are confident that the balanced increase in its membership in no way impairs its effectiveness. On the contrary, I venture to say that there are encouraging signs of a greater impetus to the Committee's activities as a result of its more representative character and the ensuing diversification and greater openness of its deliberations. Of course, in dealing with highly complex and delicate problems, changes tend to be gradual and subtle rather than sudden and conspicuous.

40. Bearing this in mind, I think one can detect in the Committee's report [A/7741-DC/232]<sup>9</sup> an intimation of an incipient new mood. I am expressing myself with due caution and it is far from me to be over enthusiastic and optimistic. But the fact that a fruitful working relationship

has been established between all the participants in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should not be belittled or easily dismissed.

41. Each time we resume the debate on questions of disarmament we are painfully reminded that the problems we are grappling with have eluded us time and again. Few, if any items on our agenda, seem to conform as disconcertingly to the recurring cycle of an ebb and flow, alternating between a relapse into despondency and the onset of a renewal of hope. A year ago my delegation gave voice in this Committee to its regret that, after a promising beginning, the favourable opportunities had deceptively slipped from our hands. The section on disarmament in the introduction to the Secretary-General's report<sup>10</sup> which was published some time ago is also tuned in a minor key. It is therefore a cause for relief that, after many months of stagnation, there are at least some indications that the tide may have turned.

42. By far the most important recent event, anxiously awaited by the world at large, is the decision of the Governments of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to initiate preliminary talks on the limitation of strategic armaments. May it prove to be an auspicious omen that those talks started in Helsinki on the very day this Committee began its deliberations on the question of general and complete disarmament and related matters. One could easily be tempted to elaborate on the significance of this long-delayed event and speculate on the portents for the future.

43. However, at this very early and exploratory stage, it seems wise to exercise some restraint, in particular in making specific recommendations. The present moment is one of suspense. The negotiations will undoubtedly prove to be a long drawn-out process, demanding imagination, flexibility and the utmost perseverance of both sides and the patience of the world. After all, it takes two to agree. Under no circumstances ought they to be denied the benefit of the doubt, granted that some observers may be inclined to an attitude of cautious scepticism. I submit that what counts now is that the two major Powers are at long last engaging in a dialogue which may lead to a new, more rational relationship in the strategic balance. The most encouraging factor, which can hardly be over-estimated, is that both Powers recognize that there is more security in arms limitation than in increasing the quantity and the sophistication of their nuclear arsenals.

44. On previous occasions the Netherlands delegation has given prominence to that fundamental point and underlined the urgent need to curb the nuclear arms race in order to forestall the threat of a possibly irreversible destabilizing effect. Any measure of progress in the strategic arms limitation talks may also be expected to improve the prospects for other arms control projects. This will equally apply to the hopes and endeavours directed to the establishment of a more secure and stable relationship in Europe. A year has gone by since the NATO countries, assembled in Reykjavik in June 1968, signalled their readiness to enter into negotiations with the members of

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A.*

the Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced force reductions. So far, no response has been forthcoming. The appeal by the Warsaw Pact countries issued at Prague some weeks ago for the holding of a conference on European security and co-operation does not mention concrete measures of arms control and arms limitation in Europe. In the view of my Government such measures must be an essential element in any programme for discussions on European security and co-operation.

45. It is therefore the sincere hope of my Government that the bilateral talks on strategic arms limitations between the two Powers, whose policies and capabilities are of crucial importance for European security, will set the scene for a dialogue between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on arms control and arms limitation in Europe.

46. The same may be true regarding security problems of a wider—and it is to be hoped world-wide—scope, and eventually the result may well be a better world-wide political climate. However, to complete the picture, this is less likely to occur if some nuclear-weapon States remain standing aside.

47. The mere fact that the strategic arms limitation talks are taking shape may be an incentive to overcome the present impasse concerning the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The reverse is also true. Many members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament affirmed that early entering into force of the non-proliferation Treaty would, in view of its article VI, stimulate progress in negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. This seems to show that the catalytic effect works both ways. The two major weapon Powers have now served notice on the world of their intent to negotiate in good faith on the question to which top priority is given in article VI. This undertaking and the chances of its success are being considerably reinforced by the announcement to the world yesterday that the two major nuclear Powers have now ratified the non-proliferation Treaty. My delegation hopes that that significant event will induce those non-nuclear-weapon States which have so far withheld their signature to set aside their hesitations. In particular, my delegation reiterates its appeal to the key countries, possessing the technical and economic capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, whose signature and ratification are essential for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty. It is therefore a great satisfaction for the Netherlands Government that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has decided to sign the non-proliferation Treaty at an early date. In order to enable timely ratification by the non-nuclear-weapon States members of EURATOM, my Government will strive actively to promote negotiations for the conclusion of a verification agreement between that organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

48. The preamble to the non-proliferation Treaty recalls the determination of the parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, to seek to achieve the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. It thus gives further urgency to the need for negotiations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The

report of the Committee on Disarmament shows that it made a considerable effort to achieve progress in that field. The discussion in depth which took place, thanks to special contributions from several delegations, covered the broad range of scientific and technological, as well as political factors pertaining to this subject.

49. In particular, the delegation of Sweden took a commendable initiative in submitting a working paper containing possible provisions for a ban on underground weapon tests. The inclusion in this paper of a particular model of verification, namely, inspection by invitation, centred attention on the unresolved controversy which accounts for the present stalemate. The argument whether or not a limited number of on-site inspections is indispensable continues unabated. Regrettable as this situation may be, it is imputable to certain factors which cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

50. It would therefore seem that a prerequisite for a better climate of understanding and mutual trust is closer co-operation between the major Powers within the framework of an increasingly efficient international exchange of seismological data. We therefore welcome the willingness of the Soviet Union to take part in a so-called detection club.

51. My delegation also endorses the seismic investigation proposal [*ibid.*, *annex C, sect. 16*] which was first made by the United States during the twenty-third session of the General Assembly [*1630th meeting*]. We suggest that the first experiment, which was carried out last September, should have a systematic follow-up. Such experiments and a comparison of the results registered in participating countries will facilitate further analysis of seismological characteristics. Thus a basis may be provided for systematizing worldwide use of the information released on underground explosions. We sincerely hope that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be prepared to participate in such a programme.

52. This leads to the question of what kind of action the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament could most appropriately take at its next sessions. As we see it, the role of the Committee on Disarmament should be twofold.

53. First, it should concentrate its efforts on promoting international co-operation through the exchange of seismological data in order to improve scientific methods for the evaluation of seismic events. A working paper to that effect, in the form of a questionnaire addressed to governments [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sect. 15*], was submitted to the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by Canada. My delegation is pleased to co-sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3 submitted to the First Committee by Canada and a number of other delegations. In the second stage, when sufficient information and experience are available as a result of the proposed inquiry by the Secretary-General, the organizational aspects of an international data exchange might also be examined.

54. Secondly, the Committee should further explore the potentialities of proposals which have been or may be made by members of the Committee concerning a limitation or a complete halt of underground explosions for weapon purposes.

55. The order in which I have listed those tasks is not unintentional. My delegation submits that there is a clear interconnexion between both exercises, but that the success of the latter will most likely depend to a large extent on progress made with regard to the former.

56. An international agreement not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test explosions would have to contain an explicit exemption for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It therefore appears to my delegation that the language proposed in article I, paragraph 3, of the Swedish working paper [*ibid.*, *sect. 6*], would be very appropriate.

57. Turning now to the question of chemical and biological warfare, I wish in the first place to express our sincere appreciation and admiration to the Secretary-General, his assistants on the United Nations staff and the members of the group of consultant experts for the excellent report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*.<sup>11</sup> An appropriate motto for the report would be a slight alteration of a quotation from the late Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring*, namely that the need for survival "gives us the right to know". The report of the group of experts presents to the public a large amount of relevant facts and considerations. It deserves the widest possible distribution and in this connexion I am happy to state that a Dutch translation is being prepared, to be issued in a series of publications of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which already includes the Secretary-General's report. My delegation deems it of particular importance that paragraphs 21 to 31 and table 5 included in paragraph 193 of the report contain an authoritative classification of chemical and biological weapons and their main characteristics and properties. The report also dispels the notion that chemical and biological weapons are the poor man's atom bomb, notably in paragraph 373 and in the remarks on chemical and biological weapon systems in paragraphs 33 to 36.

58. The Committee on Disarmament devoted considerable attention to two facets, the non-use or no-first use of chemical and biological weapons, and the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

59. As to the first question, I think I am not amiss in saying that members of the Committee agreed that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 should remain intact and the validity of its norms and principles should in no way be weakened. The Netherlands delegation cautioned against taking any action which might undermine the authority of the Protocol and thus deter States which have not yet adhered to it from doing so. It is within that perspective that my delegation has carefully examined the working paper presented by 12 members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and attached as document ENDC/265 of 26 August 1969 of the Committee's report [*ibid.*, *sect. 30*]. In all fairness and candour I must admit our concern that the proposed declaration, in its present form, contains certain elements which may have the very consequences we want to prevent. The present wording of

the declaration raises complex legal questions, such as the existence and the scope of customary rules and their relation to contractual rules of international law. Moreover, the declaratory character of its operative part may be regarded by some Governments, in particular by prospective signatories, as an extensive interpretation of the Geneva Protocol.

60. Just to give one more example, the term "international armed conflict" would appear to require further elucidation in order to exclude a too restrictive connotation.

61. Lest I do not make myself sufficiently clear, I should like to reiterate my delegation's position, as stated in the First Committee at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly on 22 November of last year. We said: The norms and principles . . ." of the Protocol "have not lost their value; on the contrary, my delegation hopes that they will be strictly observed by all States. The Protocol should . . . be supplemented by an additional agreement or agreements reflecting the realities of the present and . . . anticipating future developments." [*1617th meeting, para. 19.*]

62. If that premise is accepted, historical arguments and the previous statements and negotiations in the past should not be overlooked. However, they are of only relative value in the search for procedures that hold out the best hope to achieve the goal we have in mind. My delegation hopes that consultations will be undertaken to modify in certain respects the draft declaration contained in document ENDC/265. I wish to assure the sponsors that I am offering my comments in a constructive spirit of co-operation, sharing as I do their ardent desire that this Committee should agree on a generally acceptable course of action.

63. I should now like to dwell on the second facet of the problem under review; namely, the elimination of chemical and biological weapons. In the opinion of my delegation, it would be unproductive to pursue the argument whether or not there exists an unbreakable interconnexion between both categories of weapons. Some progress in one field is better than no headway at all. Of course, it would be ideal if both chemical and biological weapons could effectively be eliminated by a single convention, with the necessary safeguards. But even by the most optimistic assessment that remains a formidable undertaking.

64. My delegation therefore sees considerable merit in the revised draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare, and the accompanying Security Council draft resolution, submitted by the United Kingdom in Geneva and attached to the report of the Committee on Disarmament as document ENDC/255/Rev.1 of 26 August 1969 [*A/7741-DC/232, annex C, sect. 20*]. The United Kingdom paper commends itself, *inter alia*, because it contains a first attempt to outline a possible complaint procedure and an arrangement for investigation. Nothing would preclude the Committee on Disarmament, while examining the United Kingdom working paper, from starting similar negotiations on chemical weapons. That is not to say that we reject out of hand more comprehensive proposals such as the draft convention submitted by nine delegations in document A/7655. However, like some previous speakers, we fail to understand why that proposi-

<sup>11</sup> United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

<sup>12</sup> Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1962.

tion to eliminate both chemical and biological weapons was not submitted to the Committee on Disarmament, where at least an examination in some detail could have taken place.

65. To sum up, my delegation therefore shares the conclusion reached by the delegation of Canada: namely, that in view of the limited time at our disposal the Committee on Disarmament, at its next session, ought to apply itself to a detailed study of all questions relating to chemical and biological warfare, taking into account the views expressed in the course of the present debate. My delegation will also examine draft resolution A/C.1/L.487 that has just been submitted in that light. We are looking forward to the submission of a draft resolution which our Canadian colleague, Ambassador Ignatieff, announced in his statement on 18 November at the 1692nd meeting. As one of the like-minded delegations to which he referred, we would be privileged to participate in the drafting of such a resolution.

66. I should now like to make some observations on the draft treaty banning the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor [*ibid.*, *annex A*]. My delegation welcomes as a timely and important act of self-discipline the agreement between the two major Powers to prevent an extension of the nuclear arms race to the ocean floor. The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have reminded us that this non-armament measure is by no means an empty gesture, since it is actually within the capability of both Powers to emplace nuclear weapons on the sea-bed. Its significance can therefore certainly not be minimized.

67. It is satisfying that after a searching debate in the Committee on Disarmament the two Co-Chairmen were prepared to make certain amendments to the original draft in order to meet some of the wishes of various members. The revised text is a considerable improvement over the previous one; but some issues, to which not only members of the Committee on Disarmament but other delegations also attach great importance, still remain open.

68. I shall now briefly review some further changes which would seem to be commendable, both for the sake of greater clarity and from a substantive point of view.

69. First, my delegation agrees with a point in regard to article I which was first made by, I think, the representative of the United Kingdom. It would indeed have been much simpler to mention the twelve-mile coastal zone instead of referring to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Perhaps it would also be preferable to delete the words "objects with", or, alternatively, to speak of objects "carrying" or "containing" nuclear weapons, terminology conforming more closely to article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

70. Secondly, recognizing the concern of some Governments that the treaty may encroach on existing rights, we suggest that more emphasis could be given to article II, paragraph 2, by incorporating the so-called disclaimer clause in a separate article.

71. Lastly, I come to what appears to be the crucial issue for many delegations, namely, the question of verification. By and large, my delegation shares the views of those who feel that both a verification and a complaint procedure could be spelled out in more detail, and that some form of internationalization is desirable. In response to this widely felt need, the Co-Chairmen have taken a first step by including in article III a reference to the provisions of the Charter and the right of recourse to the Security Council. If no further changes were made in article III, we would deem it indispensable to include in article V an explicit provision that the question of verification shall also be reconsidered at the time of the review conference. However, we remain hopeful that a more precise and generally acceptable verification procedure will be elaborated before the end of this session. My delegation stands ready to participate in consultations with other delegations to seek a workable formula on this sensitive question. An agreement on this score would go a long way towards obtaining general support for the draft treaty as a whole.

72. In resolution 1722 (XVI) endorsing the agreement which had been reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at that time on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, the General Assembly recommended that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account, *inter alia*, paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

73. Many speakers in the current debate have deplored the fact that a different order of priorities has gradually been established by a shift of emphasis from disarmament to questions of arms control and arms limitation. In conclusion, I should therefore like to restate in this forum the position my delegation took when the same subject was raised in the Committee on Disarmament.

74. In our view, the ultimate objective must be the establishment of a world order of law in which national armaments will be generally and completely abolished. Of course, this presupposes radical changes in the political and legal structure of the international community. It is evident that we shall have to travel along an arduous road before this goal can be achieved.

75. Meanwhile, however, in our imperfect world as it stands, we must spare no efforts to prevent the situation from becoming worse. While remaining acutely mindful of the grand design we should, therefore, constantly explore ways in which, outside the framework of general and complete disarmament, more modest agreements or measures may help to curb the arms race or to decrease the risks of an outbreak of war. In so doing, we ought to maintain a certain flexibility of choice without losing sight of the ultimate objective. If this premise is accepted, it becomes obvious that measures of non-armament may well be a prelude to and a catalyst for actual disarmament measures.

76. Paragraph 37 of the report of the Committee on Disarmament reflects the Committee's reasoned conviction that it ought to continue to give the highest priority in its

work to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, with due consideration to maintaining a balance among various measures to prevent armament and to limit armament and of disarmament.

77. Far from regarding that statement as disappointing, as some may, my delegation regards paragraph 37 as one of the key sentences in the report. My delegation would hesitate to impose a too rigid programme of work on either the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or the competent organs of the United Nations. We have to face the sad fact that in matters of such political import, matters dealing with security and disarmament, the international community lacks an over-the-horizon radar or the sophisticated navigational precision equivalent to that required for making a landing on a predetermined target on the moon. It is still mainly by the simple means of approximation and dead reckoning, and I pray, a lucky star for taking our bearings, that we must endeavour to set a course which may eventually lead us out of the Ocean of Storms into a Sea of Tranquillity.

78. Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*translated from Russian*): First of all, I should like to join in the congratulations addressed yesterday by the Chairman of our Committee to the Government and people of the United States on the successful completion of the flight of Apollo 12 in outer space and the lunar landing of the courageous astronauts. I wish to express the Soviet delegation's admiration at the achievements and courage of the United States astronauts, Charles Conrad, Richard Gordon and Alan Bean who made the complicated and daring flight in outer space and the landing on the moon. We should like to join other delegations in congratulating the astronauts on the satisfactory conclusion of the flight and the achievement of this outstanding scientific experiment.

79. I should also like to make a brief statement in regard to the event announced yesterday by the Chairman of the First Committee, Ambassador Shahi. I refer to the ratification by the Supreme Soviet of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connexion we also wish to express our satisfaction at the fact that the President of the United States has signed instrument of ratification of that Treaty.

80. It would be no exaggeration to say that the final approval of that Treaty by the legislative bodies of the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, is of enormous significance. We hope that other States will also take the necessary steps so that this agreement may come into effect and be included among the international treaties in force as soon as possible.

81. The entry in force of the Treaty will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the international situation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which has already been signed by about ninety States, will prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons and substantially lessen the danger of a nuclear war. This Treaty is an important measure in the efforts for settlement of other urgent problems in the field of disarmament. It will thereby serve to strengthen confidence between States and to ease international tension.

82. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is unquestionably in the interests of all peace-loving peoples. The hopes of the peoples of the world for the safeguarding of peace and security and the freeing of mankind from the horrors of thermonuclear war are placed in that Treaty.

83. We are convinced that the efforts of countries in connexion with the preparation of this important agreement have been crowned with success to the benefit of all the peoples of the world.

84. At the present stage of the First Committee's discussion of questions of disarmament, the Soviet delegation would like to follow up its considerations stated on 17 November [1691st meeting] by setting forth in greater detail the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and also to touch on some other matters.

85. The awareness of the growing threat of the possibility that a war may be unleashed in which chemical and bacteriological weapons would be used is becoming increasingly widespread among the peoples of the world. This is primarily connected with the fact that in a number of countries intensive development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons is taking place and tests are being carried out on ever newer forms of these weapons. The progress made in chemical and biological sciences brings great benefits to mankind, but at the same time makes it possible to create increasingly destructive chemical and bacteriological methods of waging war.

86. In the world today hundreds of thousands of tons of poisonous substances are produced every year. The accumulated stockpiles of these materials are more than enough to cause incalculable disaster to men, to the entire population of the earth, and to the animal and plant life of our planet. The adoption of measures for the final prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war is a vitally necessary, urgent step.

87. It is precisely for that reason that the group of socialist countries proposed the inclusion on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly of the question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of such weapons [1693rd meeting]. On 18 November the representative of Poland, Ambassador Kulaga, introduced this proposal in great detail.

88. We are gratified to note that the question of the need for the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of waging war is drawing the attention of the participants in this session of the General Assembly. This is clearly demonstrated by the debates on disarmament questions now taking place in this Committee.

89. In the past mankind has erected a number of barriers to the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The most important of them is the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and bacteriological methods. This important international agreement

has played a role in the prevention of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war. The significance of the Geneva Protocol has been confirmed in recent years, as is demonstrated by the large number of States which have adhered to it. The United Nations General Assembly, in a whole group of its resolutions, has stressed the important role of the Geneva Protocol, condemning the action of States running counter to the objectives and principles of that agreement and calling on those countries which have not yet done so to sign and ratify it.

90. In July of this year Secretary-General U Thant in the introduction to his report<sup>13</sup> addressed an appeal to all States

“... to accede to the Geneva Protocol of 1925;

“To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents...”

and to

“... reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.”

91. Thus, along with the need for further strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the urgent need now arises to take the next step: to ensure the prohibition at the international level not only of the use, but also of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of waging war. Such a step would make it possible to settle once and for all the problem of the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from the life of man.

92. In the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*, submitted to the General Assembly, attention is drawn to the danger involved in the employment, under contemporary conditions, of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Those who would take the risk of employing this type of weapon could not predict what the effects of their use would be from the standpoint of their immediate action or, more particularly, from that of their long-term effect on man and his environment.

93. What would happen should any country resort to the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, that is, if it should artificially and by force provoke infectious diseases in the event of the use of bacteriological weapons? In such a case that country would prefer to use the strongest type of such weapons at its disposal and one against which its potential enemy would have developed no counter-measures.

94. The same applies to chemical substances. Even if their use were initially local in character, winds, fall-out and the natural movements of water could lead to the dissemination of toxic chemical substances far beyond the borders of the

area of their initial use and, of course, the long-term effect of their employment might be extremely unfavourable to man.

95. An important conclusion of the Secretary-General's report is that not only the use, but the very process of development, testing and storage of chemical and bacteriological substances constitutes a danger. It creates a climate of distrust and suspicion in the relations between States, exercising a most unhealthy influence on the international situation. Even at the purely technical level it entails a serious threat to human society. In recent years there have been a number of unfortunate incidents connected with chemical and bacteriological weapons. The representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic has drawn our attention today to the fact that on the island of Okinawa 24 persons were injured, as the result of a leakage of nerve gas. It is well known that such repositories of toxic substances also exist in other parts of the world. That means that mortally dangerous gases are transported over great distances, and there is no guarantee that any kind of unfortunate incident may not result in extremely grave consequences which might affect millions of people. An accident to a plane, ship or train transporting toxic chemical substances or bacteriological weapons could turn into a catastrophe for great masses of people. In the last four years, according to reports in the American press, 39 population centres in the United States had to be evacuated because of the wrecking of trains transporting toxic chemical substances.

96. Another dangerous aspect of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is that countries that continue to develop and produce them, in case of failure of their military action with other forms of weapons, might risk the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) substances. Having started with small-scale operations, such a country, as it became more involved in a conflict could go on to a broader use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Having first resorted to the employment of toxic substances against the vegetation, for instance, it might then begin to use them against people as well. Having taken the risk of beginning to use so-called tear or harassing gases, a country is capable of going so far as to use the most lethal highly toxic substances.

97. The report of the Secretary-General states that “Once the door was opened to this kind of warfare, escalation would in all likelihood occur, and no one could say where the process would end”.<sup>14</sup>

98. And as the introduction to the report indicates: “... the situation will remain threatening so long as a number of States proceed with their development, perfection, production and stockpiling [of these weapons].”<sup>15</sup>

99. These were the considerations underlying the initiative of the group of socialist countries in proposing that the General Assembly consider the item entitled “Conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their destruction” as an important

<sup>13</sup> *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use*. United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.69.I.24.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 13.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 8.

and urgent question. This initiative is a continuation of the efforts made by the socialist States for many years with a view to achieving a final prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war.

100. What is the specific nature of the draft convention [A/7655] proposed by the socialist countries?

101. It has already been pointed out here that the basic provision of the draft convention is contained in article 1, which provides that each State Party to the agreement shall undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire by any means whatsoever chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The task consists in completely barring the way to the creation and possession of these means of waging war.

102. Article 2 of the draft convention provides for the destruction or diversion to peaceful uses of all previously accumulated stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons at the disposal of the States Parties. It is well known that among the chemical substances which might be used as weapons there are some which could also be used in peace-time production. The draft convention provides for the destruction of those substances which cannot be used in peace-time production, and diversion to exclusively peaceful uses of those suited to this purpose.

103. Thus, the first two articles of the draft convention aim at the elimination from human society of one of the dangerous forms of weapons of mass destruction, and consequently at the solution to the problem of abolition of chemical and bacteriological means of waging war.

104. Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the draft convention contain provisions concerning control over its observance. The implementation of control in the case of chemical and bacteriological substances is extremely complicated and hardly feasible from the practical standpoint. This situation was set forth in detail today by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR. This situation derives primarily from the fact that the production of chemical and bacteriological substances necessary for peaceful purposes is at times indistinguishable from production of the same means used for military purposes. Under these circumstances, carrying out control of an international nature would be tantamount to the intrusion of foreign personnel in the chemical and biological industrial enterprises of States. Therefore, it appears more advisable from the practical standpoint to leave the implementation of control to the national Governments, which would see to it that not a single firm, not a single legal or physical person of their country on the territory of that State or outside its borders would engage in the production of chemical or bacteriological (biological) weapons. Accordingly, the Governments would bear international responsibility for compliance with that provision, and this is the system provided for in article 4 of the draft convention.

105. In order to strengthen this provision, article 5 of the draft convention requires that the parties to it undertake as soon as possible, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to adopt the necessary legislative and administrative measures which would prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological

(biological) types of weapons and would provide for their destruction.

106. Article 6 of the draft convention provides a system for clarification of problems which might arise concerning fulfilment of the conditions of the agreement. This refers, among other things, to cases where one of the Parties to the convention may have any kind of doubts with regard to the strict compliance with its provisions by other Parties.

107. Articles 4, 5 and 6 as a whole contain a system of guarantees ensuring compliance with the convention on the part of the States Parties.

108. I should like to remind the Committee, in view of the difficulties of carrying out control, the agreements in past years concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons did not contain any conditions with regard to verification. Nevertheless, they were operative international treaties. This applies, for example, to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In this sense the proposed convention goes further, and this is an additional guarantee that it can become an effective international agreement.

109. One important aspect of the draft convention is the fact that it refers to both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. These two types of weapons must, in our view, be considered together. It would be unjustified to separate them both because of their nature—namely, from the scientific standpoint—and from that of political considerations. Contemporary science is often unable to make a strict distinction between chemical and bacteriological weapons. The scientists who participated in the preparation of the previously mentioned Secretary-General's report write: "All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, as knowledge advances, be treated as chemical."<sup>16</sup>

110. It is no accident that chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare are traditionally considered together. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 deals with both. Many scientific works dealing with this subject also do not separate chemical and bacteriological types of weapons, regarding them as the same problem. Here in the United Nations as well these means of waging war have always been examined together. They are also dealt with as a single problem in the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological weapons.

111. In this connexion, we consider that many delegations are entirely justified in criticizing the approach to the solution of the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons expressed by the United Kingdom, which suggested to the Committee on Disarmament that it examine the question of the prohibition only with reference to biological weapons.

112. We should like to say in this connexion that we disagree with the representative of the Netherlands, who said that we must begin with a first step—prohibition of biological weapons—and after that, prohibition of chemical ones. Should we take this course, prohibiting one weapon,

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

we would thereby virtually give the go-ahead signal for the development of the other, that is, for chemical weapons. But in fact, in present day conditions—and we must say and stress this particularly—in present conditions, chemical weapons—in view of the stockpiles already accumulated and in view of the fact that they are already included in the armaments of many States of the world—are a particularly dangerous type of weapon today. Therefore, to separate these two kinds of weapons, as proposed by the representative of the United Kingdom and as advocated today by the representative of the Netherlands, would be most inappropriate and, I would say, even dangerous. This has been pointed out both by a great many delegates in their statements here and in the report of the Secretary-General on the question of the possible effects of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

113. Throughout the course of its existence the United Nations has examined the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in one form or another. This examination has become particularly active in recent years. The General Assembly has adopted useful resolutions and decisions, such as resolutions 2162 B (XXI) and 2454 A (XXIII). Following the appeal of the first mentioned resolution, a whole group of countries comprising Argentina, Ghana, Iceland, Lebanon, the Mongolian People's Republic, Madagascar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Syria, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and others acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In conformity with the second of those resolutions, the Secretary-General drafted his report entitled *Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and the Effects of Their Possible Use* which has received the highest praise in the statements of many delegates here in this Committee, and outside it.

114. The adoption by the General Assembly of the proposal by the group of socialist States for a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and providing for their destruction would thus be the next important logical step by the United Nations towards the solution of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The entry into force of the convention would be crowning achievement of the United Nations in its efforts for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of waging war, since those types of weapons would be completely eliminated from human activities. It would have a positive influence on the state of international relations, increase confidence among States and peoples, and would pave the way to the conclusion of other agreements on disarmament problems. It would be no exaggeration to say that a convention excluding a whole group of weapons from military arsenals—and, moreover, one of the most dangerous groups—would acquire truly historical significance. It would be a serious contribution to the cause of peace and would be in accordance with the interests of all mankind.

115. Yesterday a group of delegations submitted to the First Committee a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.487] on the previously mentioned convention which is now available to all delegates who are members of this Committee. The draft resolution draws attention to the need for the speediest possible conclusion of the convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and

bacteriological (biological) weapons and providing for their destruction. The draft resolution contains a request to the Committee on Disarmament to undertake urgent negotiations in order to reach agreement on the text of such a convention. The adoption of that resolution by the General Assembly would, in our view, favour the attainment of the objective we have set: complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) means of waging war. We hope that the draft resolution will gain widespread support among the delegations in this Committee and among all the Members of the United Nations.

116. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would like to draw the attention of the members of the First Committee to the immediacy and urgency of this problem which is now before us. As is well known, as long ago as 1968 the Soviet Government included the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in its Memorandum "Concerning Urgent Measures to Stop the Arms Race and Achieve Disarmament".<sup>17</sup> The development of events in the recent period since the publication of that document has shown that the concern of the Soviet Government with the problem of this type of weapon was well founded. Since then, this problem has unquestionably become even more urgent. It is quite obvious that we must not waste time. We must reach a complete liquidation of chemical and bacteriological (biological) types of weapons before it is too late. We hope that the Member States of the Organization will pay due attention to this initiative; and that the desired objective of ridding mankind of the threat of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare and a chemical and bacteriological catastrophe will be achieved.

117. The Soviet delegation would also like to deal with a matter already mentioned in the statements of several delegations—that of an international exchange of seismological data—and to refer to the draft resolution on this item [A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3] submitted by the delegation of Canada and the delegations of several other countries. We have already set forth the position of the Soviet Union on this problem in our statement of 17 November. The Soviet side is ready to undertake on a voluntary basis an exchange of its seismological data with other parties to a treaty on the general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and also to participate in an international exchange of these data within the framework of the so-called "detection club" at one time proposed by Sweden. However, the participation of States in an international exchange of seismological data must not impose any obligations on the participants in such exchange to have international inspection carried out on their territory, and the evaluation of the data compiled must be made not by some international body but by each State for itself.

118. However, as can be seen from operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution introduced by the delegation of Canada and other delegations, in this case it is a question of accepting the recommendation of the General Assembly requesting States to provide comprehensive and detailed information on their seismographic stations, as a first step

<sup>17</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes*, agenda items 27, 28, 29, 94 and 96, document A/7134.

towards an exchange of seismological data. In this connexion, there is a strict deadline for the provision of such information: 1 May of 1970. The draft is worded in such a way that the supplying of information on seismographic stations will serve as a basis for the introduction of compulsory exchange of seismological data.

119. An extremely serious negative aspect of the draft resolution submitted by Canada and several other States is the fact that it contains a discriminatory formula with regard to socialist States non-Members of the United Nations, and, in particular, with regard to the German Democratic Republic. The draft resolution provides for the supplying of information on seismographic stations of the States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency or of the International Court of Justice. Thus in fact States which are not members of those international organizations, but are parties to important international agreements, are denied the possibility of taking part in this measure. Such a discriminatory formula is inadmissible. It is all the more objectionable in so far as in this case we are dealing with the implementation of measures concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, in other words, a question that is directly linked to the Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. Yet this Treaty, as is well known, contains a formula allowing for the participation of all States, and the German Democratic Republic is accordingly a fully equal party to that Treaty. Yet now the German Democratic Republic, which is a party to the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments, is excluded from the number of potential participants in further measures relating to the full prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. There are those who still do not wish to take account of the realities of our time, and in particular of the fact that in the centre of Europe for over twenty years there has been a successfully developing independent sovereign State, the German Democratic Republic.

120. For these reasons the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.485 and Add.1-3 is unacceptable to the Soviet delegation, and that is what we wished to explain to the members of the First Committee.

121. In our debates the question of peaceful nuclear explosions has been mentioned in connexion with the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on this problem [*A/7678 and Add.1-3*]. We should like to give our view on that question.

122. The Soviet delegation has carefully studied that report and the replies of States to the questions of the Secretary-General. We consider that, on the basis of the analysis of those replies, the report draws a correct and well founded conclusion, namely, that the International Atomic Energy Agency [*IAEA*], in view of its technical experience and statutory provision, is the international body which can effectively ensure the execution of tasks in connexion with the carrying out of such explosions. That conclusion is fully in accordance with the view of the IAEA itself as set forth in the report of its Board of Governors, which stresses that the function of the international body referred to in article V of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation is within the

framework of the technical competence of the Agency and falls within its statutory obligations. That report, as is well known, received the support of all the member States of the IAEA, which unanimously approved it at the General Conference of the Agency and transmitted it to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. This clearly and specifically expresses the attitude of the majority of the States of the world to this problem.

123. That view is fully supported by the Soviet Government which, in its letter to the Secretary-General, pointed out that the IAEA as constituted at present possesses the necessary qualifications to discharge its duties relating to the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions in conformity with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The letter indicates that the Soviet Union for its part intends, in full awareness of its responsibility, to carry out its obligations, in conformity with the Treaty, to render services in this field.

124. In this connexion we should like to note that the Agency has already begun some practical work in the field of studying the possibility of applying nuclear explosions to peaceful uses by starting to compile and summarize scientific and technical information, organizing meetings of specialists on specific economic and technical aspects of this problem. Needless to say, the possibility of using such explosions must be examined in the right perspective taking into account that, as the report of the Secretary-General points, out, the technology in this field is in the initial stage and further research is required. We should like to say that the Soviet Union, wishing to contribute to this useful work of the IAEA, recently transmitted to it several scientific and technical reports of Soviet scientists examining the possibility of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. As the Soviet delegation stressed at the General Conference of the IAEA, the Soviet Union will continue to forward such information to the Agency in the future.

125. We consider that the United Nations might express satisfaction with the work carried out by the Agency in this field, contributing to progress and improving the well-being of man.

126. These are the additional ideas which the Soviet delegation considered it necessary to express on the disarmament problems being examined in this Committee.

127. Mr. YOST (United States of America): I should like first of all to acknowledge with appreciation, on behalf of the United States delegation, the congratulations which our Chairman and members of the Committee extended yesterday and today to the United States Government on the successful return from the moon of the Apollo 12 astronauts, Charles Conrad, Richard Gordon and Alan Bean. I shall certainly convey your congratulations to Captain Conrad, Captain Gordon and Captain Bean.

128. Similarly, my delegation appreciates the fact that our Chairman called attention yesterday morning to the signing, by the Chief Executives of the USSR and the United States, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We hope that the deposit of the United States and Soviet instruments of ratification will take place in ten days' or two weeks' time in the three depository capitals. As the

Government of the United Kingdom deposited its instrument of ratification on 27 November 1968, United States and Soviet deposit of their instruments of ratification will complete one of the requirements for bringing the non-proliferation Treaty into force. The other requirement, of course, is that forty other States ratify the Treaty. Over 20 States have already taken this step and we are sanguine that other States will soon follow their example, thus bringing the non-proliferation Treaty into force at an early date.

129. At the time of his signature President Nixon made the following statement:

“I have today signed the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent on 13 March 1969. This Government is thus completing the process of ratifying a major international agreement designed to make our world a safer home for all mankind.

“The negotiation and ratification of this Treaty spans the Administrations of three Presidents and reflects our country’s dedication to the cause of peace. It is my earnest hope that ratification of the Treaty by the necessary number of additional States will soon occur so that it may enter into force at an early time.

“This Administration seeks equitable and meaningful agreements to limit armaments and to resolve the dangerous conflicts that threaten peace and security. In this act of ratification today this commitment is demonstrated anew.”

130. Many of those present can recall the extensive efforts of this Committee as well as of the predecessor of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in negotiating the non-proliferation Treaty. Much was said about the need for restraints on nuclear-weapon Powers as well as on non-nuclear-weapon Powers to reduce the danger of nuclear war through proliferation. Article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty constitutes recognition that both kinds of restraints are necessary. We believe that both should be approached in a spirit of reason, compromise and careful negotiation.

131. It is fortuitous that the non-proliferation Treaty has been given fresh impetus around the same time that an important step was taken in Helsinki last week in starting the negotiations on strategic arms limitations. This brings to mind that the non-proliferation Treaty does not stand isolated as an arms control measure, but is related to the efforts we are engaged in here to bring the armaments race into check.

132. Finally, I wish to call to the attention of the members of this Committee an important statement issued by President Nixon earlier this morning. The President referred to a comprehensive study of chemical and biological defence policies and programmes which had been carried out at his direction. He went on to say:

“This study has now been completed and its findings carefully considered by the National Security Council. I am now reporting the decisions taken on the basis of this review.

“(a) Chemical Warfare Programme: As to our chemical warfare programme, the United States reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical weapons, and extends the renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals.

“Consonant with these decisions, the Administration will submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent to ratification, ‘The Geneva Protocol of 1925’, which prohibits the first use in war of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare’. The United States has long supported the principles and objectives of this Protocol. We take this step toward formal ratification to reinforce our continuing advocacy of international constraints on the use of these weapons.

“(b) Biological Research Programme: Biological weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences. They may produce global epidemics and impair the health of future generations. I have therefore decided that:

- (i) The United States shall renounce the use of lethal biological agents and weapons, and all other methods of biological warfare;
- (ii) The United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety measures;
- (iii) The Department of Defense has been asked to make recommendations as to the disposal of existing stocks of bacteriological weapons.

“In the spirit of these decisions, the United States associates itself with the principles and objectives of the United Kingdom draft convention which would ban the use of biological methods of warfare. We will seek, however, to clarify specific provisions of the draft to assure that necessary safeguards are included.

“Neither our association with the convention nor the limiting of our programme to research will leave us vulnerable to surprise by an enemy who does not observe these rational restraints. Our intelligence community will continue to watch carefully the nature and extent of the biological programmes of others.

“These important decisions, which have been announced today, have been taken as an initiative toward peace. Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction. By the examples we set today, we hope to contribute to an atmosphere of peace and understanding between nations and among men.”

That concludes the statement issued by President Nixon this morning.

133. Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I wish on behalf of my delegation to congratulate Ambassador Yost on the most important statement he has just made. The ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty is of course a major development which is bound to bring closer the entry into force of this important international agreement.

134. Perhaps of even greater significance is the President’s statement on chemical and biological warfare. I shall of

course study that statement with great care, as we all shall. But even at first hearing I can say at once that the President's statement is one which the United Kingdom Government most warmly and sincerely welcomes. It cannot fail, I believe, to give great impetus to our work in the field of arms control and disarmament. I am especially appreciative of the reference in the President's statement to the initiative taken by my own Government in the field of bacteriological warfare. However, this is not a moment for any national pride of authorship. The question of biological warfare has come to occupy a place foremost in our minds

and the United States initiative is a great encouragement to all of us who want to make it impossible to contemplate using this kind of weapon as an instrument of war. As the President has said: "Mankind already carries in its own hands too many of the seeds of its own destruction." [*see para. 132 above*]. I hope and believe that the step which the President of the United States has now taken will lead us to further progress in controlling and eventually abolishing the whole armoury of weapons of mass destruction.

*The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.*