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1. The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker on the list for this morning's meeting, I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to a draft resolution which has just been circulated in document A/C.1/L.450 and which is co-sponsored by six delegations.

2. Mr. BORCH (Denmark): On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.446, I should like to make some observations on the criticism voiced in this Committee at previous meetings by the representatives of Saudi Arabia, India, the United Arab Republic and Syria, and by other representatives yesterday.

3. May I say by way of introduction that we have listened attentively to the objections raised to our proposal, and may I emphasize that we do respect the underlying motives. A common feature is, however, that the scope of the draft resolution has been misinterpreted and overrated and that, starting from what we believe are erroneous premises, the opponents of the proposal have, so to speak, anticipated the course of events.

4. Let me point out that the proposal is strictly confined to a request to the Secretary-General to ascertain the position of Member Governments on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all imports and exports of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war. Furthermore, we wish to ascertain the views of Member States on publication of such information by the Secretary-General and on the practical measures to be taken to that end.

5. It would thus be quite clear from the text of the draft resolution that the proposal is of very limited scope and of a purely procedural character and does not in any way whatever affect the substance of the matter. In the very recognition of the fact that we are here dealing with questions affecting the legitimate security interests of Member States, we considered that the right approach would be to afford Member States the opportunity to state, after careful consideration in their respective Governments, how and on what terms it would be feasible to establish such an arrangement. In the light of the replies to such an inquiry, it would then be possible to ascertain whether there would be any basis for going ahead with the idea and consider how an arrangement could be elaborated.

6. The arguments which have been raised in the course of the debate are, in fact, examples, of such objections as should be incorporated in the sum total of the data it is proposed to collect. Any critical remarks that may be put forward would serve the very purpose we have in mind: to find out whether it would be possible to work out a proposal for a registration arrangement. Only when the answers have been provided will it be possible to decide whether it would be feasible at all to make a substantive proposal. Therefore we submit that it is premature at this juncture to level criticisms at a possible proposal for registration, inasmuch as the draft resolution does not go any further than to invite Member States to furnish advice, supplementary information and critical remarks of any kind.

7. In our conception such comments thus belong to the next phase of developments, and therefore the sponsors would at this stage not find it right to enter into a detailed debate with the representatives of the countries I have just mentioned with regard to the arguments they have raised against a proposal the substance of which lies in the future.

8. Let me once again underline that the step envisaged now is, indeed, of a very modest and preliminary nature. The sponsors want only to ascertain the views of Member States on a very complex but also highly significant set of problems. That is all there is to the proposal—neither more nor less. It is our hope that Member States will understand what the real content of the proposal is.

9. Finally, I should like, however, to stress as emphatically as possible that the sponsors have never had the slightest intention of discriminating against States which have to import weapons. The sponsors belong to that group of States themselves. We fully agree that measures which would place any State or group of States in an unfavourable position in relation to other States should not be taken.

10. I have found it necessary to make these comments because the sponsors of the draft resolution are anxious to dispel any doubts about the nature of our proposal.

11. Mr. MESTIRI (Tunisia) (*translated from French*): In taking up again this general debate on disarmament that has now become a tradition, perhaps we should ask ourselves exactly what meaning we attach to the aim that we are trying to achieve. An individual or collective conscience that for one reason or another is unable to act must at least try to understand, and to understand is an act of lucidity whereas we are dealing here with a tangled skein of means and ends. An observer unfamiliar with our present world but aware of the history of mankind could not but be astonished at our naïveté in wishing to deprive political entities of what had been up to now the basis and concrete expression of their existence. Thus, strangely forgetting the uninterrupted chain of wars that link the most remote origins of society to the living present, we perceive—as if in a vision—the possibility, and even the practical necessity, of renouncing our instruments of violence, as though by an extraordinary historic transmutation we had suddenly become the angels of a miraculous Eden.

12. For a peaceful people such as ours, the idea of glorifying war or of setting ourselves up as the bad conscience of mankind is far from our minds, but the teaching of history, the experience of our times and our way of thinking force us to agree with Camus that honesty is still the only cure for the plague.

13. We are all the more inclined to do our duty in this way within the Organization because ever since we have been a Member we have seized every opportunity to contribute to strengthening it through the promotion of international peace and security. So far as the limitation of the arms race is concerned, Tunisia signed and ratified the 1963 Moscow Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.¹ My country also adhered to the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare²—and the representative of the Soviet Union was good enough to refer to that fact. Finally, we welcomed as a considerable contribution to peace the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]; we have signed that Treaty and hope soon to ratify it.

14. Furthermore, I am sure that you know that my country, living at peace with itself, its neighbours and the world, has one of the smallest armed forces on the African continent, and that it devotes the major portion of its resources and its efforts to the creation of a prosperous, just, harmonious and peaceful society.

15. It is our profound conviction that within States and as between States, war is not provoked by armaments. It is the clash of aspirations, of interests, of dreams, and in our day, of ideologies, that impels States to war and, for that purpose, to the research, manufacture, perfecting and accumulation of weapons. Thus we do not think we are opening a philosophical debate in this Committee when we wonder whether violence can be reduced. Properly understood, we think this question is highly political in its significance and its scope. In practical terms, what we have to do is to enquire into the means that can be used to reduce violence in whatever form it may appear. But who among us here could sincerely believe that by eliminating the weapons of combat, whether rudimentary or highly developed ones, we would at the same time eliminate the reason for fighting and the will to fight?

16. We do not deny that the stopping of the arms race and the process of disarmament are a contribution, even a considerable contribution, to the task of promoting peace. However, the basis of action for the consolidation of peace must relate to the causes of conflict, if by “peace” we understand not simply the absence of war, but also, and above all, co-operation, even interdependence among nations, free from all economic, social or political recriminations. If that is our understanding of the concept of peace, then we should perhaps, in the sad light of reality, reappraise our strategy for its realization.

17. It would be sheer complacency on our part if we were to feel that in “a world divided between rich and poor, East and West, into ideological blocs and conflicting ambitions”—to quote the words used in the speech that our Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs delivered before the General Assembly [*1685th plenary meeting, para. 9*]

peace would reign from the very day the arms race was stopped and general and complete disarmament achieved.

18. If we try to view things at all clearly, we see that dissatisfaction is the dominant characteristic in international relations since the end of the Second World War. In three ways at least peoples and States all over the world do not seem ready to resign themselves to the *status quo* created by the war.

19. Politically, we are witnessing the breaking-up of a bipolar system that arose after the victory of the anti-Hitlerian coalition, particularly of the gigantic war effort of its two most powerful members that has since been borne

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

² League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

out by their supremacy over their allies and protégés in their dual superiority in nuclear weapons.

20. Geographically, none of the demarcation lines inherited from either the war or from local conflicts immediately after the war seems to be regarded as a definite frontier.

21. Economically, we have reached the point where all disadvantaged humanity is challenging, even tragically refusing to accept, a state of affairs established without its knowledge and at its expense.

22. We see evidence of that ingenuity—I would even say that genius—of man in confronting each hostile situation in history with the most appropriate means, in the fact that what should have been “nuclear peace” has not succeeded in stifling the cries of the dissatisfied.

23. Behind the apparent stagnation seemingly due to the bipolarity of the international situation prevailing since the war and consolidated by the nuclear balance between the two super-Powers, we can easily discern a historic stage in power relationships. The situation is after all a classical one that mankind experienced long before the Moscow-Washington confrontation, when Athens faced Sparta and Rome Carthage. It is a situation in which two States, surpassing all others in power at a given moment in history, are incapable of, indeed do not want, either a struggle to the death or a complete agreement, and are thus condemned, especially in a nuclear age, to agree to a combination of tacit understanding and open rivalry. As a result, their structure is flexible and allows the medium-size and small countries to exercise a free choice and to attempt to influence the course of world affairs.

24. The dissatisfaction among a great number of peoples and States, the confrontation of hostile sister-States armed with weapons more destructive than at any previous time in man's history, and the way history goes on in spite of everything—those are the essential features of the international situation, the context within which the problem of disarmament lies.

25. I have set forth the views of my delegation on the first feature of this situation. On the second—the arms race involving the most advanced nuclear weapons, together with their delivery vehicles and anti-missile defence systems—we may note that the prospect of planetary suicide has brought a certain rationality into the strategic relationship between the two super-Powers, a rationality that seems more than ever to confirm the famous saying of Clausewitz that “war is not only a political act, but a genuine instrument of policy, a way of pursuing political relations and of achieving them through other means”.

26. Everything has happened, in fact, as if we had sought at first to make war impossible by turning it into a means for absolute destruction, and then, having defined and determined the impossibilities of the case—or rather the sole and essential impossibility, namely collective suicide—we had developed a strategic and political dialectic of a definitely coherent nature.

27. We think that there is occasion for congratulation on the results of that rational attitude. Its results are positive:

the Moscow Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water; the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—and those results have been regarded by the majority of the world's States as so many contributions to peace. We deplore, however, the persistence of certain obstacles, certain old ways of thinking, certain irrational fears and suspicions that still prevent the super-Powers from coming to a complete meeting of minds. With our Secretary-General, U Thant, we believe that:

“Whatever the path to national and international security in the future . . . it is certainly not to be found in the further spread and elaboration of nuclear weapons.”³

28. Would it not then be absurd to continue to increase the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and to perfect and deploy anti-missile systems? In these two areas, as in many others, agreement is possible. Within a reasonable period of time, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament could and should, we believe, succeed in concluding treaties on at least the following questions.

29. First, the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. In accordance with the views expressed in the report of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Stockholm, a summary of which appears in the annex to the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee,⁴ and in agreement, also, with the representative of Sweden and with our Secretary-General, whom I wish to quote once again, it is our view that:

“ . . . progress in the identification of seismic events has reduced to manageable proportions the issue of verification of a comprehensive ban. It is indeed to be hoped that improved instrumentation, international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, and the use of statistical methods can provide a control system sufficiently reliable to deter parties to an agreement from violating such an agreement.”⁵

30. The second question is the limitation of the systems of delivery of strategic offensive nuclear weapons, and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. Agreement on that subject between the two great Powers is, we believe, all the more desirable and necessary since the futility of the race seems obvious in the light of the fact that it is, on the one hand, boundless and, on the other, hardly likely to ensure one State's superiority over another. While expressing our satisfaction at the goodwill shown recently by the leaders of the great Powers, we are none the less firmly convinced that more can and must be done to put an end to the arms race in offensive and defensive strategic missile systems.

31. The process set in motion by the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should make it possible to develop a more fruitful and productive dialogue.

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 26.

⁴ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, section 6.

⁵ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 22.

32. These measures and others that should lead to general and complete disarmament would of course have as their final goal solely the creation of an atmosphere of peace—peace itself must be promoted by the elimination of the causes of dissatisfaction of peoples and States. We agree with the representative of Brazil [1611th meeting] that the circle made up of the two aims—disarmament and an atmosphere of peace—is a vicious circle. We nevertheless believe that, in view of the organic cohesion of the means and ends in the case we are considering, we should state that momentum comes with movement and that the circle will therefore have to be broken at some place in its circumference if things are to be set in motion.

33. Moreover, other measures will have to be included such as the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, described by our Secretary-General as “weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror”,⁶ and the elimination of all foreign military bases, whatever their origin or nature. My country, which is situated on the coast of a sea which has of late become the object of dangerous rivalries, views this last measure as an important and appropriate way of reducing international tension, which has been aggravated by the events of last August in Eastern Europe. Tunisia, which made sacrifices of which all are aware to have the military base of Bizerta converted into a centre of economic and industrial development, has a sense of great satisfaction at having made this appeal to good sense and at its results in the future—a future which will not be radiant simply because nations have renounced their instruments of war. The effort to be undertaken would nevertheless allow us—apart from creating an atmosphere of peace—to mobilize the forces freed of the tasks of war in order to apply them to the development of the needy peoples. Our hope is that the nuclear Powers in particular will heed the appeal of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States concerning a massive contribution by those Powers—and particularly the ones that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—to the economic progress of developing States by means of the use of nuclear energy. If there cannot be true and immediate equality of partners, justice can be obtained by the mediate system of compensations. The non-nuclear-weapon States signatories to the Treaty on non-proliferation have renounced one of the elements of their sovereignty. Therefore let justice be done to them on other levels.

34. True justice—real equality between the poor and the rich peoples, the weak and the strong States, political systems of one type and political systems of another, the justice of satisfaction, of co-operation and peace in the positive sense—is clearly not to be counted among the possibilities of the immediate future.

35. But must not the needy countries themselves make an effort in the sphere of disarmament? The fact is that they do not always do so. A number of under-developed peoples nurture the ambition of one day possessing the nuclear weapon, and even more developing nations are devoting too much of their resources or of the assistance which they receive to providing themselves with so-called conventional armaments. That aspect of conventional disarmament does not appear to have been sufficiently pondered by the

international community. But its ruinous nature is obvious, and concrete measures should be taken to discourage this catastrophic trend. The United Nations could, for example, refuse to allow its various organs to give assistance to any under-developed nation which devoted more than a certain percentage of its budget to armaments—say 5 or 6 per cent.

36. That would be a considerable contribution towards ensuring that the under-developed countries avoided the temptation of resorting to the process which leads from armament to dependence on the provider of the weapons, and then perhaps to alignment pure and simple—which paradoxically, would have exactly the opposite effect of what the Governments which were arming themselves were seeking at the outset.

37. For we, the countries of the third world, must recognize one truth: a disadvantaged people is not sufficiently armed, whatever its military potential, whereas a people with few weapons can be formidable in defending its territory if it has succeeded in creating a prosperous, just and homogeneous society.

38. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): At the 1610th meeting of this Committee on 18 November I stated the views of the Pakistan delegation on the final document of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277 and Corr.1]. I should now like to set forth briefly the position of my delegation on the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament⁷ and the Soviet memorandum concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament [A/7134].

39. This disarmament debate is taking place against the background of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex] and its signature by some eighty-three States and the recommendations made by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17].

40. Only one nuclear-weapon Power and two non-nuclear-weapon States have so far ratified the Treaty, but we have no doubt that before long the requisite number of instruments of ratification will be deposited with the depositary Governments and the Treaty will come into force.

41. Pakistan voted in favour of resolution 2373 (XXII), adopted on 12 June this year, which commended the Treaty. We made our position clear in this regard at the twenty-second regular session of the General Assembly, and again at the resumed session in June this year.

42. Speaking on United Nations Day in Rawalpindi on 24 October 1968, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that, on its part, Pakistan fully endorsed the basic objective of the non-proliferation Treaty, which was to prevent any further spread of nuclear weapons. While endorsing the Treaty's objective, Pakistan, he said, believed that its value and effectiveness would depend upon the extent of adherence that it would command, particularly from the near-nuclear States. In joining those who commended the

⁶ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

⁷ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231.

Treaty, Pakistan had made it clear that its signature would depend on inescapable regional considerations.

43. That statement of the Foreign Minister, like others made on behalf of my Government, is an expression of our conviction that the non-proliferation Treaty has been an important forward step towards the goal of lessening the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons.

44. The conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty gave a momentum to disarmament negotiations. That momentum could have been sustained by the adoption of measures which logically should follow it. The conviction is strongly held by non-nuclear-weapon States that it is now the turn of the nuclear-weapon Powers to demonstrate by deeds the good faith of the pledge given by them in article VI of the Treaty to take effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and for nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union and the United States can do so by:

First, entering immediately into bilateral talks to limit the strategic nuclear arms race;

Second, reaching agreement in principle to end underground nuclear weapon tests above a specified and verifiable size.

45. Unfortunately, no progress has been made so far towards either of those objectives. The current report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not a reassuring document. All that it signifies is that the agenda for the further work of the Committee was adopted at its last session. But even here, priority regarding various measures within each agenda item remains unsettled. Paragraph 17 of the report no doubt gives first place to a consideration of: "Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". This is a general item and the explanatory note under that heading lists the various measures that may be discussed. But no order of priority between them has been indicated.

46. It is therefore now for the General Assembly to lighten the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in this regard and help it to save much valuable time and avoid a protracted procedural debate. The Assembly could do so by endorsing resolution C of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which recommends the following measures in order of priority:

"(a) The prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

"(b) The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty ...;

"(c) ... cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

"(d) The reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems." [See A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III), resolution C.]

47. That is the order of priority indicated in resolution C which we would like the General Assembly to endorse for

consideration by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and adoption by that body in order to save time on what would otherwise be a long procedural debate.

48. The first of these measures, that is, the limitation of offensive strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, can evidently be taken up only by the two super-Powers. But it is a matter which concerns all of us because it would signal a trend towards the stoppage of an otherwise open-ended, prohibitively costly, and, in the judgement of those connected intimately with the development of strategic nuclear-weapon systems, a largely futile nuclear arms race.

49. We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will, as strongly urged by the representative of Canada [1625th meeting, para. 78], commence their talks before the end of the present session. The General Assembly could provide a stimulus by unanimously endorsing resolution D [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III)] adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States at the instance of the Pakistan delegation. That resolution, *inter alia*, emphasizes the special responsibility of the two super-Powers to prevent the imminent danger of the escalation of the strategic nuclear arms race to new levels.

50. There is no need for my delegation to stress why those bilateral talks should constitute the first order of business in disarmament negotiations. Other representatives have already pointed out their overriding urgency and fundamental importance to progress towards nuclear disarmament, in particular towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons use. Unless the super-Powers are able to reach agreement on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons, appeals to them by the rest of the world will not in the slightest make either side desist from testing and developing more sophisticated nuclear warheads in order to attain superiority over the other.

51. We support the suggestion made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal [1609th meeting], that consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of a ban on underground tests should proceed parallel to the bilateral talks between the super-Powers. Our hopes of progress towards ending such tests have been revived by the remarkable work of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm, which has developed a reliable system of detecting moderate and large-yield underground explosions without on-site inspections.

52. This is a breakthrough for which the Institute is entitled to our gratitude. It has opened the way to a political decision by the nuclear-weapon Powers to ban underground nuclear-weapon explosions of moderate and large yields which are verifiable. Such a decision can be taken without waiting for the art of seismologic detection to be so perfected as to do away with the need for on-site inspections for yields below ten kilotons in hard rock.

53. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on disarmament could play a most helpful role in promoting agreement in principle among the nuclear-weapon Powers to ban underground testing above an agreed verifiable size and also in promoting governmental talks at the technical level which

could thereafter be held to lay the basis for the negotiation of a limited underground test-ban agreement. In the context of this question of cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests, it is necessary to refer also to the interconnected question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Resolution L adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, has linked the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

54. That resolution expresses the conviction that there is an:

“...urgent need, on the one hand, to obtain a comprehensive test-ban treaty, prohibiting in principle all nuclear explosions,” and “on the other hand, to create, in a separate international instrument, a régime, aiming at regulating and controlling, internationally, all explosions for peaceful purposes as exceptions from the general prohibition under the comprehensive test ban...” [See A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (IV).]

55. My delegation subscribes to the view that an international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions should be established within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. While providing access to the required technology, however, such a régime should also guard against the danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons. Evidently, it would be self-defeating for the United Nations on the one hand to try to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons by a treaty and on the other hand to make further proliferation certain by disseminating vital information for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. It is therefore imperative that for a State to be given the benefit of access to the technology of nuclear explosions and the right of participation in international supervision of such explosions, that State should renounce the manufacture of nuclear weapons by a binding multilateral agreement and accept the international safeguard system to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or to other nuclear explosive devices. Unless that requirement is met and a balance established between rights and obligations, it is difficult to see how the régime for peaceful nuclear explosions may not be converted into a régime for the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

56. Consequently, the Pakistan delegation firmly maintains that those non-nuclear-weapon States which renounce nuclear weapons through credible instruments should be entitled under an international régime to have access to the knowledge, and be enabled to apply the technology, of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well as to participate in the supervision machinery.

57. Paragraph 17 of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament contemplates discussion of the non-use of nuclear weapons. Last year the Pakistan delegation voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII) expressing the conviction that it is essential to examine the question of the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In paragraph 23 of the same report it is stated that members of the Committee had an extensive discussion on that matter, with reference apparently to the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union. The discussion has obviously been inconclusive.

58. While we shall continue to support any well-considered initiative to promote the objective which the Soviet Union has in view, this is one of those facets of the whole disarmament question which bring into focus the inadequacy of the present negotiating process. Any measure of such large scope as a credible convention for the non-use of nuclear weapons can be promoted only in a political environment different from the one provided at present for the disarmament negotiations. I shall have more to say later about the need for strengthening the credibility of these negotiations.

59. In pursuance of the recommendation in paragraph 26 of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, the delegations of Poland, the United Kingdom and seventeen other countries, including Pakistan, have sponsored the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6. My delegation would like to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for suggesting in part II of his introduction to the annual report for 1967-1968⁸ such a study, which is indeed overdue.

60. He has pointed out that chemical and biological weapons are as much weapons of mass destruction as nuclear weapons and may be even more dangerous because they are cheaper and far easier to obtain.⁹

61. In recent years scientific advance has made it possible to manufacture new and even more destructive chemical and biological weapons. The world community must therefore take urgent cognizance of that fact and make every effort to ban their production and eliminate their existing stockpiles. To that end the proposed study is the first step.

62. Pakistan is a party to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,¹⁰ done at Geneva. We voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI) calling on all States to observe the provisions of the Geneva Protocol and inviting universal accession to it.

63. My delegation shares the belief that the proposed study by experts would be a valuable contribution to the further consideration in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of the problems connected with chemical and biological weapons and that its wide dissemination would warn and mobilize public opinion throughout the world against such horrible methods of warfare. We also favour enlarging the scope of the study to include an indication of the nature, means of delivery and effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological—including biological and microbiological—means of warfare.

64. The report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament deals in one sentence only—that is in para-

⁸ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*.

⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 30.

¹⁰ League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

graph 28—with the problem of regional arms limitation. We note that views were expressed but no conclusions were reached.

65. In this Committee the delegations of Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway have submitted the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.446, which proposes ascertaining the position of Member Governments (a) on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all imports and exports of conventional armaments, and (b) on authorizing the Secretary-General to collect and publish at regular intervals information on the transfer of such armaments.

66. We are not unaware of the exacerbation of regional tensions and conflicts as a result of competition and rivalry in the acquisition of conventional arms. We listened attentively to the statement of the representative of Denmark at the 1616th meeting of this Committee. The draft resolution seems to be envisaged as only a preparatory step looking towards a possible arrangement for registration of arms shipments in the future. We appreciate the good intention of the sponsors—which is to entail limitation of purchases through publicity—and we also note their assurance that this will not interfere with arms purchases serving legitimate defence interests of States.

67. But it is difficult to see how the registration of arms transfers would promote the objective in view, namely, the easing of local tensions and conflicts. Some considerations are compellingly evident in this regard:

First, competition in acquisition of conventional armaments is generally the consequence and not the cause of local tensions and conflicts.

Second, in spite of governmental control much of the arms traffic remains secret and clandestine and figures given for publication are likely to be misleading.

Third, the proposal is bound to be discriminatory against non-arms-producing countries. In fact, it could even worsen regional imbalances by operating even among non-arms-producing countries to the advantage of those which are relatively more industrialized than their neighbours.

68. Above all the draft resolution does not take into account the global and regional alignments and policies of the great armed Powers.

69. For all those reasons my delegation would like to support the appeal by the representative of Saudi Arabia to the four sponsors not to press their draft resolution to a vote.

70. The subject of regional arms limitations on conventional armaments figures both in the Soviet memorandum [A/7134] and in President Johnson's message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.¹¹ While we welcome the concern with the subject shown by the two super-Powers we remain sceptical that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be able to give the matter the kind of consideration that it demands.

71. The question of how to evolve agreements on regional limitations of conventional armaments is again one of those which do not lend themselves to a technical or formal discussion that is removed from political realities and in which all countries of the region, if not the entire membership of the United Nations, do not participate. This is again an illustration of the inadequacy of the present negotiation process. In a rarefied discussion, the temptation will be irresistible for the participants to put the cart before the horse—if I may be permitted the use of a homely phrase—and concentrate on the outward manifestation rather than the underlying causes of regional disputes. Is it not unrealistic to assume that such a discussion would lead to any positive results?

72. On general and complete disarmament also, the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in paragraph 31, makes it clear that the Committee merely exchanged views without making any progress. The item has been put last on the agenda of the next session of that Committee in paragraph 17 of the report. It is indeed deeply regrettable that because of circumstances the Eighteen-Nation Committee has not been able since 1964 to devote its attention to this its most urgent task. The goal established in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), namely, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, is no nearer now that it was then. The question of reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments is a matter of the greatest importance and priority to all non-nuclear-weapon States. It calls for their direct participation in disarmament negotiations. Pakistan in particular considers that the vital interests of the countries of our region, namely, those of security, territorial integrity and development, demand immediate settlement of international disputes and the conclusion of agreements on reciprocal reductions of armed forces and armaments.

73. We note that eight of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee have submitted a draft resolution [A/C.1/L.448] requesting that body "to pursue renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament . . . and . . . to see how in particular rapid progress could be made in the field of nuclear disarmament". The Eighteen-Nation Committee is further requested in that eight-Power draft resolution to continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral disarmament measures.

74. While we appreciate that effort by the eight sponsors in response to the general sense of frustration felt by all Member States at the lack of progress on a treaty on general and complete disarmament since 1962, and at the absence even of discussions since 1964, we wonder whether the crowded and complex agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will in fact enable that body to address itself seriously to this matter in 1969 or even in the following year. This situation prompts me to make a few observations on the roles of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee on the question of disarmament.

75. It is inevitable that the two super-Powers should lead and even dominate the deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation

¹¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 4.

Committee on Disarmament. As has been pertinently pointed out in this debate, the principal work on the non-proliferation Treaty, like that on two similar agreements in previous years, was done outside that Committee. The mediating and contributory role of the eight countries that are not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact is becoming increasingly constricted in view of the fact that the two sides find it more expedient to negotiate directly, despite their differences. Neither side is prepared to tolerate that any progress towards disarmament should affect the military balance between them and give even a temporary advantage to the other. Proposals put forward by the eight Powers to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty to ban certain categories of underground tests have been ignored.

76. To the direct question put by the representative of Yugoslavia [1607th meeting] to the members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, asking them to tell us sincerely and openly what stands in the way of progress, we have the answer of the representative of Sweden [1609th meeting] that the nuclear-weapon Powers have not wanted any infringement on their freedom of action since the Moscow Treaty in 1963. Therefore, the basic fact, as the representative of the United Kingdom told us [ibid.], is that progress can be made only if there is agreement between the nuclear-weapon Powers. Consequently, perhaps only a marginal role at best is left for the general membership of the United Nations in the solution of the question of disarmament, even though this question is of the most vital importance to all of them.

77. For obvious reasons, the First Committee—which is a purely deliberative body and is burdened by a heavy agenda—finds itself precluded from making any significant contribution. Is it therefore surprising that a mood of discontent should be widespread among the Members of the United Nations? It has been given cogent expression by the representatives of Iran, Sudan, Peru and a number of other countries in this debate.

78. The Disarmament Commission was established with the consideration that all Member States must be provided with a real opportunity to play a role in disarmament, which is inseparably linked with peace. The Commission has not met since 1965; it is therefore time that it did so. General and complete disarmament cannot remain the exclusive province of the great Powers alone or even of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. The reduction and limitation of armed forces, conventional armaments and military budgets, regional limitations of armaments and the vital question of security affect the supreme interests of all States. In matters of such important significance representation cannot be delegated. It must be exercised directly, continuously and as a matter of right. My delegation therefore believes that a session of the Disarmament Commission is overdue. We are sincerely of the view that, if held, it will in no manner prejudice the coming into force of the non-proliferation Treaty.

79. I reserve the right of my delegation to speak at a subsequent meeting on the action to be taken in connexion with the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States.

80. Lastly, I revert to the larger question of providing the appropriate environment for disarmament negotiations. This object cannot be fulfilled as long as these negotiations remain divorced from certain realities. The non-participation of France and the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from these negotiations detract in no small measure from their significance. For example, for real progress to be made in any negotiations on the question of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and on measures to eliminate such weapons, the contributing role of China is indispensable. If substantive progress is to be made towards those and other established goals, priority needs to be given to securing the full participation of France and China in the effort towards disarmament. The most obvious and in our judgement the only way to enlist China's co-operation is to restore immediately the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.

81. The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting I call upon the Secretary of the Committee, who has been requested to make an announcement.

82. Mr. VELLODI (Secretary of the Committee): I believe you are going to suggest, Sir, that this afternoon's meeting of the First Committee should be cancelled and in those circumstances I have been asked to announce that there will be a meeting at 3 o'clock this afternoon in this room of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.425/Rev.1 and Add.1-4 on the item concerning the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

83. The CHAIRMAN: As members of the Committee have heard, I intend to suggest that the meeting fixed for this afternoon should be cancelled. The reason is that the remaining four or five speakers in the general debate have informed me that they are not ready to speak this afternoon and have asked if the general debate could be concluded tomorrow morning instead of this afternoon, as was decided last week.

84. Since we are not behind schedule, because we had planned to dispose of the item now under consideration on 9 or 10 December, I think that the postponement of the general debate for one meeting would not in any way delay our work. Therefore, if the Committee has no objection, I propose that we should conclude the general debate tomorrow morning and start consideration of the draft resolutions tomorrow afternoon; then we shall be in a better position to know when we shall be able to proceed to the vote—towards the end of the week or on Monday, 9 December, or at the latest Tuesday, 10 December.

85. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Committee so decides.

It was so decided.

86. The CHAIRMAN: I have just been informed that Mauritania has added its name to the list of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-6, bringing the number of sponsors of that draft resolution to twenty-one.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.