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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *(continued)* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, L.444 and Add.1-5, L.445 and Add.1, L.446, L.448)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *(continued)* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1-2)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament *(continued)* (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament *(continued)* (A/7134 and A/7223; A/C.1/974; A/C.1/L.443)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference *(continued)* (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277, A/7327; A/C.1/976)**

1. Mr. ECOBESCU (Romania) *(translated from French)*:  
The indivisibility of international peace and security,

resulting directly from that interdependence which is a characteristic of the world of today, demands the establishment of a universal system of peace and collective security. This is the concept underlying the Charter, and, indeed, of the United Nations reason for being. This is the concept that gives meaning to the lofty purposes which the United Nations has embraced and which are defined with great precision in Article 1 of the Charter. These purposes are: to "maintain international peace and security . . . develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . achieve international co-operation in fields of common interest and harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends".

2. The establishment and maintenance of world peace and security presuppose, above all, the loyal adherence of all Member States to the purposes of the United Nations and faithful observance by them of the fundamental principles and rules of contemporary international law. Consequently, adherence to the Charter is a manifestation of intention on the part of States whose very nature, significance and implications are such that it goes beyond the simple acceptance of a legal instrument. It is primarily an option. It entails extremely serious and highly responsible legal, political and moral obligations, obligations which apply to all and which affect the relations and ties among all the Members of the United Nations and with regard to each one of them.

3. In signing the Charter, States have undertaken to co-operate in achieving the purposes of the United Nations and to observe the fundamental rules and principles which should govern international relations and which are as indivisible as peace and security. These are: respect for international sovereignty and independence, equality of the rights of States, non-intervention in the affairs of others, and renunciation of the threat or use of force. Only by strict observance of these basic principles and rules of law can the spirit of legality and justice in international relations be maintained and the inalienable right of every people to decide its own fate be guaranteed. To apply these principles unflinchingly, to implant and cultivate them so that they may become part of international life—that is an endeavour of decisive importance for developing international relations based on mutual trust, for bringing nations closer together in greater friendship, for the promotion of co-operation and the strengthening of world peace.

4. The essential condition for the maintenance of world peace and security is the elimination of force, particularly in its most brutal form—war—as a means of settling disputes among States. The Charter, that code of conduct of the entire international community, proclaims in its Preamble

the determination of the United Nations "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind... and for these ends... to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used...".

5. To institute an international climate and international relations governed by the force of law rather than by the law of force—that is the supreme commandment of the Charter, to which we have committed ourselves.

6. Since we must eliminate force and war from international life—a responsibility incumbent on all countries—effective measures must be taken to destroy the actual means of waging war: I mean disarmament measures.

7. The discovery of nuclear energy and the subsequent manufacture of weapons of mass destruction have greatly increased the danger of a war of annihilation. With the appearance and development of nuclear weapons mankind has entered upon a period of its history where its very existence is threatened. Consequently, in our time the question of disarmament has acquired global dimensions. This essentially new situation of necessity requires entirely new methods and remedies. It would be a great mistake to think that an outdated approach could be used with regard to so different a problem, as it would be a mistake to have recourse to methods and ideas of the past to deal with the complex and varied tasks of the present.

8. The logical and obvious conclusion is that we must achieve general disarmament, and primarily nuclear disarmament. It may be said that our generation has no more serious or more urgent task than that of harnessing atomic force to serve mankind and ensuring that it is never again used for destruction.

9. From the outset, the United Nations has favoured this radical method. The first resolution adopted by the General Assembly over twenty years ago called, as we all know, for the adoption of measures aimed at excluding atomic weapons and all weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals. Later, on 20 November 1959, in its resolution 1378 (XIV), the General Assembly said that the question of general disarmament "is the most important one facing the world today".

10. Unfortunately, disarmament negotiations have failed to yield the results desired by the peoples.

11. Worse still, during the same time the manufacture of arms has spiralled at an increasingly faster rate from year to year. The nuclear States have accumulated such capabilities of destruction that there is an estimated equivalent of 100 tons of trinitrotoluene for every inhabitant of our planet. Whereas ten years ago the nuclear stockpiles amounted to the equivalent of 10,000 megatons, today they're estimated at over 1 million and will soon, according to the experts, reach the figure of 100 million megatons.

12. In these circumstances radical measures are called for—measures aimed at stopping the arms race, resolute action to contain and eliminate the nuclear threat. In the conviction that general disarmament and more particularly

its main component—nuclear disarmament—is the best way to ensure equal conditions of peace and security for all countries, Romania has been consistently advocating the abolition of nuclear weapons, cessation of their manufacture, and the reduction and ultimate destruction of all stockpiles of such weapons.

13. With the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], the efforts to achieve disarmament and negotiations of new agreements in this sphere have reached a new and different stage. For the first time, the obligation of States to take effective disarmament measures has been recorded in a number of provisions which, owing to the efforts of a great many States, including Romania, have been incorporated in an international agreement. Under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty the States Parties expressly undertake:

"to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

14. In accordance with the obligations imposed on them by the provisions of the Treaty, the nuclear Powers have a special role and a high duty as regards the achievement of these aims. I believe that, if the purposes of the Treaty are to be attained and if it is to become a truly viable instrument, as conceived during the negotiations on it, the nuclear Powers must resolutely proceed to stop the arms race, reduce their stocks, and finally, eliminate these weapons of mass destruction.

15. The agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee<sup>1</sup> giving priority to nuclear disarmament measures, and the USSR Government's memorandum dated 1 July 1968 [*A/7134*], which is on this session's agenda and which contains suggestions that offer a basis for negotiations of future disarmament measures, provide an opportunity for practical discussions leading to disarmament agreements, agreements made all the more necessary by the increasingly dangerous acceleration of the arms race.

16. Gradual progress in achieving mankind's desire for general disarmament would release immense resources which are so badly needed to speed up the process of development in which so many countries and peoples are engaged. If expenditures on armaments were reduced, the funds thus released could be used to support the efforts of the developing countries and speed their economic and social progress. At the same time, the conditions resulting from disarmament would be such that tens of thousands of scientists, researchers and experts whose energies are now devoted to manufacturing means of destruction would be able to devote their intelligence, knowledge and creative energy entirely to productive purposes and to serving peace and national well-being.

17. Because of its complexity and its many implications, general disarmament cannot become a reality overnight. I am certain, however, that it would be much easier to

<sup>1</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, paragraph 17.

achieve if we first adopt measures of lesser scope which would produce a *détente* in international relations and lead to the limitation and reduction of armaments. For this reason, the Romanian Government believes that the efforts to achieve general disarmament should be accompanied by partial and transitory measures aimed at reducing the danger of war.

18. In my delegation's view the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of an international convention to that effect, as a top priority measure, would have a favourable influence on disarmament negotiations and also on other current efforts to prevent and eliminate the possibility of a world conflagration.

19. Banning underground nuclear tests would have a direct effect on the nuclear arms race. We share the majority view in this debate that an agreement on the cessation of such tests must be concluded without delay.

20. Another measure that would meet the concern of peoples to avoid use being made of nuclear arms is to set up zones free of nuclear weapons, naturally provided that this measure is accompanied by an undertaking on the part of the nuclear Powers not to employ such weapons and to accord appropriate safeguards. Such zones, which would promote mutual trust and good-neighbour relations among States and which could be gradually extended, give us a preview of a world of tomorrow wholly liberated of the burden of nuclear weapons and constituting in fact one vast denuclearized region.

21. For these reasons, my country welcomed the conclusion of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.<sup>2</sup> It has always supported proposals for the establishment of such zones in different parts of the world, such as the proposals concerning central and northern Europe, Africa and other regions. Romania itself has put forward proposals, which are still in effect, to transform the region in which it is situated—the Balkans—into a zone of peace and good neighbourliness, free of nuclear weapons.

22. As may be seen from a goodly number of General Assembly resolutions, the idea of denuclearization is not new in the United Nations. The practical results attained thus far, however, are far from satisfactory. Surely it is high time to give more attention to this question.

23. Where collateral measures are concerned, the General Assembly and the Geneva Eighteen-Nation Committee have repeatedly considered the proposal for the elimination of military bases in foreign territory and for the withdrawal of foreign troops back within their national frontiers. The presence of these bases and troops in the territories of other States generates tension and anxiety and has a baneful influence in the international situation as a whole. Convinced that such a measure would be beneficial, my delegation once again advocates the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops. The statements made here and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are usually transmitted to the Eighteen-

Nation Committee; from there, in the form of brief mentions in the Committee's report, the question is referred back to the General Assembly. In this way specific measures and practical action are postponed from year to year. I believe that we have reached a stage where we must proceed to act.

24. Working unceasingly as it does for the outlawing of all weapons of mass destruction, Romania is in favour of strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.<sup>3</sup> The course to follow is prescribed in General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI), calling for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol, condemning all actions contrary to those objectives and inviting all States to accede to the Protocol.

25. My delegation notes with satisfaction that draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-5, introduced by the Polish representative and calling for a study on chemical and bacteriological weapons, once again invites all States to observe and accede to the said Protocol.

26. The establishment of a régime ensuring the exploitation for exclusively peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction—a subject placed before the United Nations a year ago on the happy initiative of the Maltese delegation<sup>4</sup>—has aroused general attention. If this action is to be successful, measures must be taken in good time to prevent the military spirit from invading the ocean depths. My delegation is therefore in favour of prohibiting the use of those areas for military purposes and of concluding an appropriate international agreement to that effect.

27. I should now like to expound my delegation's position on the important question of security safeguards.

28. Security, that indispensable attribute of national independence, guarantees the full realization of the sovereign right of States to act in international relations as independent legal persons. At the same time, security is a fundamental premise for the free development of any people, a decisive factor in the practical realization of a nation's inalienable right to decide its own fate, dispose of its resources, and fully develop its material and human potential, and to solve its problems according to its own will and in conformity with its own interests and desires. Security is thus one of the basic values which international law must protect, even as it must promote the economic and social progress of peoples, safeguard the peace, and favour the establishment of normal good-neighbour relations and peaceful co-operation among all countries, whatever their size, military might or degree of development.

29. The acute problem of security safeguards for non-nuclear countries and the urgent need to settle it satisfactorily are closely related with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, since States which renounce such weapons under the Treaty are fully entitled

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

<sup>3</sup> League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138.

<sup>4</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 92, document A/6695.

to genuine safeguards of their security. There is thus every justification for the request that, pending the elimination of all the nuclear weapons in existence—i.e., the complete disappearance of the danger of nuclear war—countries not having such weapons should be accorded guarantees ensuring their security. It is therefore imperative that the nuclear Powers should undertake the solemn obligation, first, not to use such weapons in any circumstances against States not having them and, secondly, never to threaten these States with such use.

30. In terms of the rules of international conduct the request of the non-nuclear countries for a guarantee that they will never be subject to nuclear attack or a threat of such attack is based on the fundamental provisions of the United Nations Charter and on the generally recognized rules of international law. It is in line with the fervent wishes and efforts of mankind to eliminate force as a means of settling disputes among States.

31. Prohibition of the use or threat of force is a principle which mankind, after long experience, has adopted as a basic postulate of international legality. That this is so is proved by the commitment which all States accept under the Charter to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”. [Article 2, paragraph 4.]

32. Similarly, acceptance by the nuclear Powers of a commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against countries which do not have nuclear arms would be in complete accord with the provisions of the Declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons adopted by the General Assembly on 24 November 1961 [resolution 1653 (XVI)]. In this Declaration, the use of nuclear weapons is described as being contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter. It is further stressed in the Declaration that any State using such weapons

“... is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization”.

33. The recent Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, whose importance has been emphasized by many speakers in the current debate, has shed much light on the special need for security safeguards. Thus, it is stated in the Declaration adopted at that important gathering:

“The participants of the Conference noted that there was a general acceptance of the fact that the future of mankind cannot be secure without the complete elimination of the use or threat of use of force in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The Conference agreed that peace and progress could not be safeguarded for any nation unless security of all nations is assured. The Conference stresses the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era”. [See A/7277, paragraph 17, resolution N.]

34. Reflecting as it does the great and profoundly disturbing reality of the nuclear age, the message of the Geneva

Conference is an invitation to action. It is an appeal to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, to persist in their efforts and their common search, in a spirit of co-operation and mutual understanding, in order to settle the burning question of security safeguards as it should be settled. That is a complex and difficult task; but we are convinced that it must and can be accomplished. The responsibilities are great and the possibilities are far from having been exhausted. This question, which commands the permanent attention of the United Nations, demands a contribution on the part of all. Its rapid solution depends on the political will of States, and, first and foremost, the political will of the nuclear Powers.

35. It has become clear from the general debate in the Assembly and our discussions in this Committee that there is great interest in regional measures for a lessening of tension and disarmament.

36. Being a European country, Romania attaches special importance to European security. My Government is convinced that the assurance of European security represents one of the most important political problems facing that sorely-trying continent, a problem whose implications affect the international situation as a whole. Hence, while its solution is of direct concern to the European countries, it also concerns all the peoples of the world.

37. Numerous proposals and suggestions for attaining that aim have been put forward, and this in itself attests to the great importance of the problem and to a keen desire to find the best ways and means of solving it.

38. A broad programme of realistic and constructive measures, which are fully valid and timely today, is to be found in the Declaration on the strengthening of peace and security in Europe adopted on 5 July 1966 at the Bucharest meeting of the socialist countries parties to the Treaty of Warsaw. The Declaration states:

“The peoples of Europe, who have made and are making a tremendous contribution to mankind’s progress, can and must create in their part of the world a climate of *détente* and international mutual understanding which would enable each people and each country to employ its material and spiritual resources in conformity with its will and decision.”

39. The Declaration also emphasizes that a prerequisite for progress in relations among European countries, as of course among all States, is respect for the sacred right for every people to decide its own fate without outside interference and to follow that path towards development which best answers its will, its wishes and its fundamental interests. The establishment of a durable framework for peace and security in Europe presupposes—and I again quote the Declaration—international relations, resting on renunciation of the threat or use of force and the need to settle international disputes solely by peaceful means, “based on principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and respect of territorial integrity. European States should strive for effective measures to prevent the menace of an armed conflict in Europe, and to strengthen European collective security. Realization of the common striving of all European nations presupposes the responsibility of each

State, big or small, irrespective of its socio-political system, and its contribution to the development of proper co-operation between sovereign, independent and equal States.”

40. As the present situation clearly demonstrates, European security cannot be achieved unless we gradually remove the sources of tension and the anachronistic situations which hamper the free development of co-operation; discuss to good effect the pending problems; and identify and take advantage of every opportunity to increase understanding friendship among nations. That is why we believe that the European States are in duty bound to act in such a way as not to hinder but rather encourage and promote a *détente*, so that they can exploit their creative potential without having to fear that their peaceful work may be undone by war and conflict.

41. Adoption of measures resulting in a military *détente* is of the greatest importance in building up in Europe a system of inter-State relations in which the security of one is the security of all. The countries signatories of the Bucharest Declaration have expressed their will to persevere in their efforts to achieve partial disarmament measures and arrest the arms race, measures which should result in bringing about European security and strengthening the peace and security of the world. The programme set out in that important document includes: elimination of foreign military bases, withdrawal of all troops stationed in foreign territory back within their national frontiers, reduction of the armed forces of the two German States to an extent and in a manner fixed by mutual agreement, establishment of denuclearized zones and the commitment by the nuclear Powers not to use nuclear weapons against the States in these zones, cessation of flights by foreign aircraft carrying nuclear warheads over the territories of European States and of the entry into the ports of these States of foreign submarines and surface vessels carrying nuclear weapons.

42. In its conviction that the establishment of a lasting system of peace and security in Europe must result from the unremitting efforts of all the nations on the continent, Romania has been making its own contribution by resolutely working for bolstering inter-State relations on a new basis, eliminating sources of tension and hostility which may endanger peace, developing co-operation at all levels and maintaining the dialogue as an indispensable factor in the promotion of mutual trust and improvement of the European political climate.

43. I would now comment on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a subject which has been the centre of attention in our debates in recent years.

44. A rich source of progress and well-being, the use of atomic energy in the various sectors of production and research offers immense possibilities for economic development throughout the world. All countries are aware of the broad prospects opened up by this remarkable attainment of the human intellect. No national development programme can henceforth ignore the benefits of this inexhaustible source of energy.

45. The right of every State, big or small, having or not having nuclear weapons, to carry on research and utilize

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on an equal basis and without any discrimination is, like the right to dispose freely of its own resources, one of the inalienable attributes of its sovereignty.

46. The negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*] and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States have made it plain that States want a set of rules which, while calling for measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, do not infringe the imprescriptible right of States to make use of nuclear energy for scientific, technical and economic development.

47. Owing to the sustained efforts of non-nuclear countries, including Romania, this fundamental right has been sanctioned by the non-proliferation Treaty, article IV, paragraph 1 of which reads:

“Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of this Treaty.”

48. At a time when society increasingly depends on scientific and technological discoveries for development, atomic energy could not remain in the sole possession of one country or a small group of countries; on the contrary, it must be the common property of the entire international community, so that all peoples may enjoy its benefits. That, of course, is the reason for the intensified international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

49. If such co-operation is to be fully successful, it must not be hindered in any way by political, economic or any other conditions.

50. The conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty has established a legal and political framework for peaceful international co-operation in the nuclear field. Under article IV, paragraph 2 the Parties to the Treaty “undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. At the same time, those Parties which are in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, “to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world”.

51. The right of States to enjoy the benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions for their economic development is governed by the provisions of article V of the Treaty. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty “shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty

so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.”

52. The provisions I have mentioned are of particular importance for States not having nuclear weapons which commit themselves under the Treaty to maintain that status. These States have the duty as well as the right to engage in building up an international network for the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, a network from which they must not be directly or indirectly excluded. The nuclear Powers have the duty of according to non-nuclear States good access to the achievements of nuclear science and technology, and to the equipment and materials required for their application.

53. The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other institutions and specialized agencies must play an important part in promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the atom. The Romanian delegation believes that the relevant resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be followed by practical action and translated into reality.

54. These are the comments that my delegation wished to make on the disarmament question at the present stage of our work.

55. As in the past, Romania will continue to take part in the efforts to draft and implement disarmament agreements which would protect the vital interests of all countries and thereby strengthen world peace and security.

56. Mr. LOPEZ (Philippines): As a nation that has been and continues to be a potential victim rather than a perpetrator of war and that is essentially a spectator rather than a protagonist in the arena of disarmament, the Philippines has only a brief statement to make on the questions relating to disarmament—brief, but we hope adequate to the purpose.

57. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, at its session from 16 July to 28 August 1968, adopted a provisional agenda which included:

“1. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

“... ”

“2. Non-nuclear measures.

“... ”

“3. Other collateral measures.

“... ”

“4. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”<sup>5</sup>

58. Paragraph 21 of the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament reads as follows:

“The Committee agreed that first priority in its work should be given to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. In this session, and pursuant to

the recommendations of the General Assembly in resolution 2373 (XXII), the Committee pursued negotiations on such measures. Several delegations made useful contributions.”

59. In the introduction to his last annual report, the Secretary-General dwelt at some length on the successful conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*]. He described that Treaty as “. . . ‘the most important international agreement in the field of disarmament since the nuclear age began’ and as ‘a major success for the cause of peace’ . . .”<sup>6</sup> The Secretary-General pointed out that the Treaty was not an end in itself but a step towards disarmament, the parties to the Treaty pledging themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. He further suggested that it would be desirable for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up with firmness of purpose those more urgent questions which are amenable to early agreement, such as the comprehensive test ban treaty.

60. During the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, one of the aspects of the treaty to which the non-nuclear-weapon States gave special emphasis was the principle of the balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations on the basis of which the nuclear-weapon States are expected to pursue negotiations in good faith. In the course of the debate, most of the non-nuclear-weapon States underlined the need for nuclear disarmament as a consequence of the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This view was reflected in resolution 2373 (XXII), which explicitly referred to this objective in one of its operative paragraphs.

61. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, in resolution C, requested that the General Assembly at its twenty-third session recommend that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should begin not later than March 1969 to undertake negotiations on nuclear disarmament, with a view to:

“(a) The prevention of the further development and improvement of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles;

“(b) The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as an important step in the field of nuclear disarmament, and as a matter of high priority;

“(c) Reaching agreement on the immediate cessation of the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and the stoppage of the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

“(d) The reduction and subsequent elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.” [*See A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III).*]

62. That resolution resulted from the debates in plenary and in Committee I of the Conference, which had focused attention on the need for nuclear disarmament as a concomitant to the adoption of the Treaty on non-proli-

<sup>5</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 15.

feration. The discussions during the Conference were of the same general import and tenor as the debates during the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly. Our Committee, in considering the items on disarmament, has laid emphasis once again on nuclear disarmament as an urgent matter.

63. It is clear then that the focal point of interest in the question of disarmament at the present time is the consideration of measures looking towards nuclear disarmament. The deliberations of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the statements of the Secretary-General, the discussions at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly, the deliberations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the statements now being made in our Committee, all attest to the top priority given to nuclear disarmament.

64. At the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly my delegation declared that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was not an end in itself, but only a means to an end, which is nuclear disarmament. It remains our view that the adoption of the Treaty should pave the way towards further agreements on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a halt in the production of fissionable materials, a reduction in offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles and, ultimately, the limitation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Again, our delegation, speaking before Committee I of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, stated that any other order of priority which might be agreed upon by the nuclear Powers in the course of their negotiations would be acceptable. We reiterated our view that general and complete disarmament under effective international control could best be achieved through a step by step process under which the balance of power would be maintained, so that no undue advantage would be gained by, nor prejudice results with respect to, any of the Powers or groups of Powers involved in the negotiations. In the same manner, nuclear disarmament should proceed step by step, without disturbing the existing balance of power, under an agreed system of verification and control. Such a process would create confidence among the nations engaged in disarmament negotiations and would be our best guarantee of international peace and security.

65. At this juncture, however, it may be asked, what is the outlook for progress in nuclear disarmament? Does the present climate in international relations, resulting from recent events, tend to hamper negotiations? Should we allow these events to obstruct or slow down negotiations? The answers to these questions do not come easily.

66. A great many of the policy statements made during the general debate in the General Assembly deplored the recent events in Central Europe. How far have these events arrested the momentum towards nuclear disarmament? It is true that the non-proliferation Treaty has received eighty-two signatures but until two days ago there had been only two ratifications of the treaty. It was therefore most gratifying to hear at the meeting of our Committee on 27 November [1623rd meeting, para. 37] that the United Kingdom, one of the nuclear Powers, had ratified the treaty. This comes at a time when some of the Powers which, at the resumed twenty-second session of the General

Assembly, had strongly advocated the adoption of the treaty have indicated an intent to delay ratification. The events in Central Europe and the consequent hesitancy of the Powers to ratify the treaty have deterred many States not yet signatory to the treaty from making a decision to sign it. Other States, industrially and technologically advanced enough to become nuclear Powers themselves, have now come up with new proposals, and the entry into force of the treaty seems to be receding into the uncertain future.

67. These are discouraging developments, particularly to small States like my own, whose only wish is to pursue their programmes of social and economic development unhampered by international crises and tensions, and which signed the treaty in the firm belief that it would enhance humanity's chances of avoiding a nuclear disaster.

68. Indeed, at the moment the prospect appears dim. Yet, we should take comfort from the words of the Secretary-General, who, in paragraph 193 of the introduction to his last annual report has written:

“There should be an avoidance of the all too obvious temptation to use the events in Czechoslovakia as grounds for an intensified build-up of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Such a course would only compound the madness of the existing nuclear arms race. The only reason which could induce either the Soviet Union and its allies, or the Western Powers, to attack the other would be a pervading fear by one side of a pre-emptive strike by the other. This fear is fed by, and grows proportionately with, the increase in the offensive military power of the two super-States. It is, clearly, the build-up of excessive military power beyond any reasonable demands of defence which has become the most ominous threat to world peace.”

69. It may be added that the practice of making negotiations on nuclear disarmament contingent on contemporary political events, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, is a double-edged sword which can be wielded by one Power or another to delay negotiations and postpone agreement. Moreover, the assumption that this practice can actually influence the political conduct of the nuclear Powers is at best conjectural. Once we accept the principle that the salvation of mankind from nuclear catastrophe has first priority in the work of the United Nations, we are under the obligation to accept the corollary principle that nuclear disarmament negotiations must be shielded so far as possible from extraneous influences or considerations. In other words, since nuclear disarmament is the highest, the most urgent goal of humanity—quite literally, an end in itself—it follows that the negotiations to achieve it should have a pattern, a pace and a momentum of their own, determined by the overriding urgencies of life and death for humanity, rather than by the day-to-day events of international life.

70. We in this Committee are well aware that progress in disarmament will come only when the great Powers decide that the time is ripe to reach agreement on disarmament measures. We know that repeated plaintive pleas and moral exhortations will not avail to move them if they feel that the time to negotiate has not arrived. We base this realistic

assessment on the experience of past disarmament negotiations. Nevertheless, such an unsentimental view of disarmament negotiations does not justify a defeatist attitude. Under no circumstances can the United Nations admit failure in discharging its primary responsibility to save mankind from a nuclear holocaust. My delegation hopes, therefore, that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, at its forthcoming session next Spring or sooner will muster the major effort required to overcome the obstacles that have resulted from recent events.

71. We are heartened by the statement of Mr. Foster of the United States before our Committee on 19 November 1968 [1611th meeting, para. 7] that the provisional agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which accords first priority to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, has received the strong support of his Government, and that the United States will participate actively in the work of the Committee and play a leading role in exploring such arms control measures as may have become ripe for agreement. We may, therefore, be justified in hoping that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will be able to submit an encouraging report to the next session of the General Assembly.

72. Mr. BURNS (Canada): The Canadian delegation has listened with much appreciation to the eloquent and urgent plea which the representative of the Philippines has just made for the effective continuation of disarmament negotiations. I myself shall be speaking about the resolutions adopted by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, and I shall also have something to say on the subject commented on by the representative of the Philippines.

73. This Committee has heard several statements about how the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States should be implemented, and how its work should be given continuity, as was requested in its resolution N [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (V)].

74. The Canadian delegation supports some of these suggestions and agrees that steps should be taken to ensure that the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States is followed up. But we regret that we are unable to agree with some of the suggestions advanced by other delegations. I shall comment on these and try to explain our objections.

75. Before discussing the suggestions and proposals in question, I should like to quote some striking observations which were made by the representative of Peru in his statement at our meeting on 18 November:

“This Committee meets every year, drafts resolutions and recommendations, asks for its records to be transmitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and talks and talks and talks. Yet all this paperwork and all this oratorical effort have no influence on the stage we are going through in regard to nuclear disarmament. . . .

“Nevertheless, some progress has been achieved. . . . When the great Powers come to an agreement among themselves . . . they present us with a fait accompli . . . the only Powers whose word matters are the United

States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France, and outside the Organization the People's Republic of China.” [1610th meeting, paragraphs 66 and 67.]

76. Although progress is slow, I do not believe that many of the delegations here will agree entirely with the pessimistic conclusions of the representative of Peru. The United Nations and its agencies have played a major role in negotiations on the Treaty on outer space<sup>7</sup> and current discussions on peaceful uses of the sea-bed. We recall, also that quite important amendments to the draft treaty on non-proliferation were effected through the representations of the eight non-aligned nations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and it was further amended when it came before this Committee in May and June of this year. It is indeed true, on the other hand, that unless the great nuclear Powers can agree on a disarmament measure, no progress on that measure is possible—and there are, unfortunately, too many proposals on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of this Committee on which, up to now, there has been no great-Power agreement.

77. One of the most unfortunate of these failures to agree is that the two nuclear super-Powers have until now not set a date to begin strategic arms limitation talks as they agreed to do last July. I tried to stress this point during my earlier intervention in this debate, and the majority of the representatives of other countries who have spoken have expressed similar concern. I make no apology for repeating that we think this delay is unfortunate in itself and also potentially harmful to progress on other aspects of disarmament. It may be relevant here to remind the nuclear-weapon States signatory to the Treaty on non-proliferation that article VI of the Treaty obligates them “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date”. It would be difficult to formulate a clearer obligation to start strategic arms limitation talks immediately. And in this connexion what the Philippine representative has just said about not allowing other events to interfere with negotiations for halting the nuclear arms race seems to me to be very significant. Many countries are waiting for the major nuclear Powers to demonstrate their good faith in arms limitation matters and to most delegations here the only way to show such good faith is to proceed as soon as possible with strategic arms limitation talks.

78. These negotiations are an essential prelude to progress on other aspects of disarmament, and they are a vital element in building up the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States. They are the disarmament negotiations most likely to yield positive results in the relatively near future. I submit that very little can be accomplished in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament if the two major nuclear Powers fail to begin strategic arms limitation talks prior to the reconvening of the Eighteen-Nation Committee at Geneva. I would thus hope that these talks could start before the end of the present session of the General Assembly or, at the latest, early in 1969.

<sup>7</sup> Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

79. It is the conviction of the Canadian delegation that the States represented here which take a true and serious interest in disarmament—and I think that the majority of us do—have an important and eventually effective role to perform. It is not correct to suggest that the great nuclear Powers are indifferent to the opinion of the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Persistent and determined advocacy in this forum of disarmament and arms control measures which can slow down the arms race and reduce international tension can affect the attitudes of the great Powers, and bring about desired results. It is not a rapid process, but it is not as slow as the dropping of water on a stone, which, as we know, wears it away at last.

80. The representative of Yugoslavia, in his statement on 13 November, asked the delegates representing their countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to “tell us openly and sincerely what prevents them from making progress”. [1607th meeting, para. 20.]

81. It is disagreement between the great Powers that stands in the way of progress, and while the great Powers are not likely here and now to give us long explanations of their differences, these are exposed in the records of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, and of this Committee. But we should not think that these differences are necessarily permanent and immutable. They have yielded to persistence and sincerity in negotiation in the case of the Moscow test limitation Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. And the impulse of the great Powers to come to agreements is strengthened by the exhortations of the rest of us, who are not great or even middle Powers, but who believe in the absolute necessity of saving humanity from the scourge of war—and especially the calamity of nuclear war.

82. Speaking on the question of the security of States not possessing nuclear weapons, the representative of Yugoslavia mentioned the Articles in the United Nations Charter which were intended to provide for the security of Member States, and said that “it is possible for a State which is threatened or attacked to call upon the international body which is the United Nations and to request its aid and assistance against the threat or the use of force”. [Ibid., para. 31.] He then referred to the reasons for the impotence of the United Nations in situations in the past—its inability to act in cases in which the Charter seems to intend that it should. He alleged that it would be hypocritical not to see that the guarantees to non-nuclear States do not raise the level of security that non-nuclear States need. He has apparently not taken into consideration the fact that in promoting Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and in making the declarations they did, the great Powers, whose disagreements had produced the impotence of the United Nations, were in that resolution agreeing together to protect the nations not possessing nuclear arms which had become parties to the non-proliferation Treaty from attack by nuclear weapons or the threat of it.

83. Apparently Yugoslavia does not believe the great Powers meant what they solemnly declared. But it is those same great Powers which will hold the keys to safety, whether within or under any arrangement to be made outside the United Nations. The representative of Yugo-

slavia suggested that there should be a conference whose first step would be to produce a “multilateral instrument containing guarantees given by the nuclear Powers to the non-nuclear Powers”. [Ibid. para. 35.] The Canadian delegation respectfully suggests that before such a conference could be considered, we should have a better idea of what there would be in the “multilateral instrument” which presumably the great nuclear Powers would have to sign—and presumably their signatures would make their obligations to protect the States without nuclear arms credible; their declarations in connexion with the Security Council resolution 255 (1968) apparently did not make it credible.

84. If there is not to be a conference, is there any other way in which the concerns as to their security of the States which do not possess nuclear weapons can be brought before the nuclear Powers? I suggest that there is a very simple way. Article 34 of the Charter says:

“The Security Council may investigate any . . . situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.”

Well, many of the States not possessing nuclear weapons feel strongly that the possession of these weapons by other States does endanger their security. So, reading this Article of the Charter in a broad sense, the Security Council could and should deal with this “situation”. And, in fact, it has already attempted to do so, in its resolution 255 (1968) of 18 June of this year.

85. The Canadian delegation suggests, with deference, that the States not possessing nuclear weapons which are particularly concerned about this matter should get together and bring the question again before the Security Council, arguing their case for the insufficiency of the action already taken, and setting out, in a concrete and complete proposal, what they think the nuclear Powers should do in order to give them satisfactory assurances for their security. The question could be debated there, without being under the pressure of time which an outside conference suffers from, and if, with the agreement of all parties, the solution should be found to be the execution of another international instrument, then that could be done.

86. I shall now revert to a suggestion which the representative of Yugoslavia made in an earlier part of his speech, as follows:

“Do the results achieved thus far by the Eighteen-Nation Committee justify the [United Nations Disarmament] Commission’s total passivity? Would it really be a waste of time to try to revive the Commission and, through its authority, to give impetus to the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, *inter alia*?” [Ibid., para. 17.]

87. As we all know, the United Nations Disarmament Commission is identical in composition with the Committee we are sitting in. Therefore, its competence in matters of disarmament would be just the same as that of our Committee, which nobody questions. The representative of Ghana said, in our meeting of 21 November:

“In the view of my delegation, the Disarmament Commission, activated to embrace all States of the world, and meeting at suitable intervals, can provide a useful stimulus for agreement on specific issues by the nuclear Powers. The major Powers can then be locked up, as it were, until they reach agreement on these limited issues. The agreement they produce will then be examined by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which will forward its recommendations to the General Assembly. Thus the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament will become the workshop and the Commission the talking shop. At present the Committee seems to combine both roles, and this is not very efficient.” [1614th meeting, para. 50.]

88. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, as a rule, meets from late January until just before the General Assembly convenes—that is, during seven or eight months. Quite often there has been a recess from about mid-May to mid-June. If it is really desired by a majority of the United Nations Disarmament Commission members, the Commission might hold sessions about half way through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament sessions, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee’s problems and proceedings could be reviewed with the participation of the representatives in that body, and further advice and recommendations could be offered. I believe that this is a practical suggestion to, so to speak, close the information and consultation gap of which the representative of Ghana complained—a complaint with which a good many of the members of this Committee probably sympathize. It would be unnecessary to create a new organ to provide the desired consultation; we should make proper use of the existing United Nations Disarmament Commission.

89. I now turn to the suggestion that a special or *ad hoc* committee should be created to ensure the continuity of the work done by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. What follows is our preliminary reaction to the proposals of the representative of Italy, made in his statement on 18 November. He suggested a United Nations committee on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and set out in clear fashion his view as to what that committee should occupy itself with. He said:

“We are firmly convinced that such a committee would not interfere with the work of any existing agency or institution, but rather, by being an important instrument of co-ordination, it would usefully co-operate with those agencies and bring them assistance to attain their goals in the peaceful application of nuclear energy.” [1609th meeting, para. 124.]

90. We regret to have to say that in regard to the usefulness of such a projected committee Canada takes an opposite view from that of the Italian delegation. We think it could not avoid interfering with the work of other United Nations bodies dealing with aspects of the utilization of nuclear energy. If it is really to co-ordinate, it must have authority to say what these other bodies should or should not do. In other words, another echelon of decision and control would be interposed between the General Assembly and the bodies in question.

91. There are, by my count, no less than eight special or *ad hoc* committees that have been created by the General

Assembly. Do permanent representatives here really want another special committee to occupy their time, for doubtful advantages?

92. In the view of the representative of Italy, the following agencies have more or less to do with nuclear energy, and their work in this respect might need co-ordinating: IAEA; the World Bank and other financial agencies; the United Nations Development Programme; UNESCO; FAO; WHO; and possibly later UNCTAD, UNIDO, ICAO and IMCO. Before deciding that co-ordination between those agencies is needed, the Canadian delegation would like to see evidence that lack of a special new co-ordinating body is hampering them in whatever portion of their work is related to the use of nuclear energy or technology. For the present we consider that the co-ordinating function in matters relating to the international aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy belongs to IAEA, as provided for in article III of its statutes, particularly paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4. Also, according to article III B, paragraph 3, it is to

“Allocate its resources in such a manner as to secure efficient utilization and the greatest possible general benefit in all areas of the world, bearing in mind the special needs of the under-developed areas of the world”.

93. As far as we are aware, there have been no serious complaints concerning how IAEA has been carrying out those duties, within the limits of the funds available to it. We do hear from the annual report that there is a shortage of funds, but that is common to many other United Nations bodies and agencies which are trying to work for the particular benefit of the less-developed countries.

94. We understand that an alternative to the creation of a new special committee on peaceful uses of nuclear energy is being considered by some delegations. It would be to give the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in addition to its existing function of considering measures of disarmament, first, the duty of following the implementation of the conclusions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; secondly, the Disarmament Commission would be expected to study possibilities of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and, thirdly, it would suggest how to co-ordinate the activities of international organizations working wholly or partially in this field. The Canadian delegation considers that the Disarmament Commission could quite reasonably carry out the first new function suggested, as far as measures of disarmament or arms control are concerned, but feels there is no reason for it to take the second and third proposed functions, which properly belong to IAEA, the Economic and Social Council and the Second Committee of the General Assembly.

95. Resolution N of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17(V)] invites the General Assembly “to consider the best ways and means for the implementation of the decisions taken by the Conference, and the continuity of the work undertaken . . .”. Having rejected the solutions that either an *ad hoc* committee or the United Nations Disarmament Commission should undertake that task, the Canadian delegation feels obliged to explain how, in its view, the

invitation of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States expressed in resolution N can be dealt with.

96. Some of the resolutions of that Conference call for actions to be taken by Member States, more especially by the nuclear Powers; others by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament; others by IAEA; another by the Secretary-General of the United Nations; one by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The General Assembly, we would suggest, might pass a resolution calling on the Secretary-General to transmit the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to the Member States, requesting them to inform the United Nations in time for consideration at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly of the steps they have taken to meet the recommendations of the Conference. He should also be requested to send other resolutions, as appropriate, to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and to the appropriate agencies, calling on them also to report progress achieved in meeting the recommendations in their reports to the next session of the General Assembly. That, we believe, would be the most direct and effective method of putting the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to the Member States and United Nations agencies which should implement them.

97. Mr. BECK (Hungary) (*translated from Spanish*): In this statement the Hungarian delegation would like to discuss item 96, entitled Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference. It is not our intention to comment on all the problems raised by the Conference or all those related to it in one way or another. We simply wish to explain our position on some of the more important questions.

98. Before I begin, I should like to outline my delegation's point of view. We feel we must do so, even though we have to repeat facts that are generally known.

99. My delegation represents a small country which after approximately four centuries of colonial or semi-colonial dependence only achieved complete independence and sovereignty at the end of the Second World War. Since that time it has been developing rapidly. Nevertheless, in *per capita* income we lag behind more than one of the so-called developing countries, to use the terminology current in the United Nations.

100. One or two decades are not sufficient time to blot out the entire heritage and all the consequences of age-old colonial and semi-colonial dependence. I may add that foreign trade produces more than a third of Hungary's national income and the proportion is increasing every year. Thus Hungary belongs to the same group as the majority of the States Members of the United Nations: it is one of the small countries.

101. The consequence of this situation is that our vital interest compels us to follow a policy aiming at international peace, security and co-operation.

102. Turning to the item under consideration, I should like first and foremost to deal with some of the problems related to security. We are convinced that security will not

be complete, either for great or for small countries, until we have general and complete disarmament with adequate control. For that reason we feel that every step along the road to disarmament is a step nearer to security, both for ourselves and for States generally; and consequently we support it. We consider that everything that makes for and smooths the way towards disarmament is in the interests of security, and hence we support it.

103. Hungary, like the majority of Member States, cannot hope to acquire nuclear weapons with its own resources in the foreseeable future. We are handicapped by our limited economic means (and this is true even of the relatively developed small countries), the level of our industrial and technological development, and many other factors. If any of us was able to accept and did accept financial burdens which would be disastrous for our national economy yet are an unavoidable part of nuclear research and arms manufacture, the result would not be an increase in security but, as has so often been repeated in the course of the debate on disarmament, an increase in the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust.

104. Even a relatively limited proliferation of nuclear weapons would increase that likelihood, and lessen the prospect of disarmament. Hence it is in our interest to prevent proliferation, to work for the entry into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to organize control. This is our primary concern for three reasons: first, it increases our security because it lessens the danger of a nuclear conflict. Secondly, it smooths the path to disarmament. I shall deal with the third reason later.

105. The Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States was most useful, if only because its debates on security contributed to a better understanding of this extremely complex problem. It is now clearer to all of us that the problem is complex, and why. At this point I must explain at once that my delegation cannot share the view of those representatives who have preceded me and have spoken of the chief claims of the non-nuclear States, the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, their common will, their unity, consensus among them and so on. Nor can it share the view of the speaker who said that States were divided into two categories: nuclear and non-nuclear. His conclusion was that the problem of security was likewise to a certain extent divided into two, and was different for the two categories. Obviously that is the truth, but it is not the whole truth; and if we overlook the other part, the result will be a distorted picture.

106. Among the non-nuclear-weapon States we find not only small and developing countries, such as my own country, Hungary, but also countries which because of their size, their actual or potential economic resources, their industrial and technological level and other relevant factors can, if they so desire, possess nuclear weapons within a short or a long period of time, but at any rate in the foreseeable future.

107. When we consider the problems relating to security, we cannot disregard the evolution of the world and look exclusively at the situation as it stands today. We cannot look at the world divided into two parts without taking

into account the possible directions and the nature of the constant change.

108. One of the representatives who spoke earlier drew our attention to the fact that of the “peripheral countries”, as one might call them, only two, Canada and Sweden, have signed the non-proliferation Treaty. Among the countries in this category are some—and they are to be found in all continents—that obviously would like to assure themselves of at least the possibility of procuring nuclear weapons.

109. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons does not guarantee our security. We want and we demand other steps along the road to complete disarmament. Article 6 of the Charter imposes that obligation on us. But it is a condition of these later steps that the Treaty should enter into force and that the control system laid down in the Treaty should materialize. An even more important condition is that the States parties to the Treaty should include those I have just mentioned. Is it conceivable that the nuclear Powers are going to adopt nuclear disarmament measures while other States are securing the possibility of developing or obtaining nuclear weapons? Small countries like mine, which constitute the majority of the Members of the Organization, are in a position to exert pressure on the others to sign and ratify the Treaty; and our interest requires that we do so.

110. I should now like very briefly to comment on the questions relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Much of the research on this subject and virtually all the complex of basic research, call for vast financial resources, to say nothing of other requirements. Apart from the senselessness of the repeating research already carried out, the small and developing nations do not and are not likely to possess the necessary funds or the scientific, technological and human resources essential for such research. There is no doubt, however, that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is becoming a more and more important factor in the life of all peoples. It is in the interest of all of us small and developing nations to ensure that the findings of research and the peaceful methods of utilization based on such research, together with the means thereto, do not remain the exclusive possession of the nuclear Powers.

111. Nuclear research and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are to some extent bound up with military knowledge and may even be tied in with uses for military purposes. This applies not only to explosions carried out for peaceful purposes. Increase in our security and the approach to disarmament presuppose that no peaceful use of nuclear energy whatever will increase the number of nuclear Powers. This is the third reason why we attach such importance to the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty and the setting up of the control system embodied in it.

112. And now, finally, I would like to outline the views of my delegation on a few points relating to the outcome of the Conference of the Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The Conference had not yet ended at Geneva when the twenty-third regular session of the General Assembly began; and many of us who participated in the Conference hurried over to New York. It seems to us vitally important and

necessary that all the material of the Conference, such as the declaration and the resolutions, should be transmitted as soon as possible for examination by the Governments of the Member States and of all interested agencies within the United Nations family. Once we have before us the results of that examination, we shall be in a position to take appropriate action at the next session.

113. We have listened to the debate with the utmost attention, and particularly to all the representatives who have proposed and supported the establishment of a committee to implement the tasks arising out of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation is not convinced by the arguments advanced; on the contrary, the effect of all of them has been to stiffen our opposition.

114. For example, one of the most important tasks of the committee would be to supervise the implementation of the resolutions of the Conference by various interested bodies. These are, when all is said and done, the United Nations specialized agencies and other organs. But the specialized agencies operate on the basis of their own constitutions, and the General Assembly cannot give them instructions. Moreover, the members of the specialized agencies are the same States which are also Members of the United Nations. Hence it is they, in other words for practical purposes the participants in the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, that can and must perform the task; and the arguments of the advocates of a committee are particularly unacceptable in respect of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As we know, IAEA is not strictly a specialized agency but an international organization doing extremely important work as a contribution to all aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It has accumulated a vast fund of experience and has shown itself to be a highly competent body. What are we to think of the argument of one of our colleagues to the effect that if IAEA were to be entrusted with the implementation of some of the recommendations of the Conference, it could not at the same time be entrusted with their execution and control of it? What we would like to know is why the States members of IAEA could not supervise the execution through its General Conference or some other of its organs. Why could they not do the same as we do ourselves in the General Assembly of the United Nations, namely control the implementation of our resolutions through the machinery of the Organization, in other words the Secretariat?

115. Finally, if the proposed committee is to have first and foremost a political role, why should the Assembly or the First Committee have to set up a committee restricted in size in which my delegation and those of many other countries would not have an opportunity to participate? We have no intention of renouncing our right to participate in working out political evaluations, engaging in political debates, or adopting decisions.

116. In brief, the proposed committee would either perform a portion of the functions of the General Assembly and its Main Committee, or it would simply duplicate the work of other bodies.

117. I could carry this analysis of the arguments further, but perhaps it will suffice for the time being.

118. Consequently, my delegation cannot support the proposal to set up such a committee. However, I feel it might be useful to give serious thought to one of the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and to recommend the Secretary-General to set up a group of experts to prepare a report on the contribution which nuclear technology can make to the Economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries. Here I am citing resolution G in document A/7277.

119. In the course of the debate in this Committee, the opinion has been expressed on several occasions that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, co-operation by those States, the search for solutions, etc., must not come to an end, but that in one way or another we must ensure the continuity of these efforts.

120. To conclude its statement, my delegation would like to comment on that. A few days ago we heard it stated in the debate that the Conference allowed the States in general associated with the United Nations to meet with those that are excluded from the Organization and from international conferences. The speaker, expressing his gratification, added that it had been a step in the direction of collective diplomacy and should be encouraged. This is fully in keeping with article IX of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides that the Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. My

delegation nevertheless does not view this statement with any satisfaction, because it does not tally with the facts. The facts are, as everyone knows, that one non-nuclear State that is not a Member of the Organization but is in a position by its own means to acquire nuclear weapons and was able to take part in the Conference of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States did not sign the non-proliferation Treaty and, as we know, it is anxious to possess nuclear weapons.

121. However, another non-nuclear State likewise not a Member of the United Nations and also in a position to procure nuclear weapons by its own means, a State which has signed the non-proliferation Treaty and accepts all the obligations arising out of it, including of course control, was unable to participate in the Conference. My delegation wishes it to be known that it protests vehemently and will have nothing to do with such manoeuvres.

122. The delegation of Hungary is convinced that the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the debates here in the First Committee, and the resolutions we adopt, will help ensure the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty by the overwhelming majority of States, and that its entry into force will be quickly followed by a series of effective measures leading to the goal desired by all peoples, namely, general and complete disarmament.

*The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.*