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**Chairman: Mr. Piero VINCI (Italy).**

*In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Galindo Pohl (El Salvador), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

**AGENDA ITEMS 27, 28, 29, 94 AND 96**

**Question of general and complete disarmament: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)\* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.443, A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-4, A/C.1/L.445 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.446, A/C.1/L.448)**

**Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)\* (A/7189-DC/231, A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1)**

**Elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (*continued*)\* (A/7189-DC/231)**

**Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning urgent measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament (*continued*)\* (A/7134, A/7223, A/C.1/974, A/C.1/L.443)**

**Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: Final Document of the Conference (*continued*)\* (A/7224 and Add.1, A/7277 and Corr.1, A/7327, A/C.1/976)**

1. Mr. HSUEH (China) (*translated from Chinese*): The fundamental truth about disarmament cannot be too often

repeated. It is that disarmament is part and parcel of the over-all work for peace. Disarmament cannot proceed without growing confidence in the maintenance of peace, nor can questions relating to disarmament be solved without reference to the general conditions of world peace. As reliance upon force in international relations gives rise to the arms race, only by the establishment of the rule of law among nations can it be stopped. Only when peace with justice prevails over the world will disarmament ever be achieved.

2. Therefore, the United Nations has provided the best opportunity ever available to accomplish the work of disarmament. Its Charter contains all principles that embody the rule of law among nations. The Organization is equipped with the machinery designed to keep international peace with justice. It would be a futile attempt to seek disarmament if the principles of the Charter were allowed to be violated or the framework provided by the United Nations were discarded.

3. This is the basic attitude with which my delegation views the questions relating to disarmament. We believe that the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], approved by the General Assembly in June 1968, is a significant achievement in the work of disarmament. If it has so far failed to produce the momentum expected of it, it is not because its provisions are inadequate, but because the subsequent development in international relations has been unpropitious. In particular, resort to the use of force in eastern Europe has dealt a serious blow to the confidence that accompanied the conclusion of the Treaty. A nuclear Power is allowed to threaten the security of a neighbouring country in violation of the principles of political independence and territorial integrity and of non-use of force, for which the United Nations stands. A dubious doctrine has been invented to replace the principles of the Charter. As a consequence, those countries which have signed the Treaty become hesitant to ratify it. Others appear to have second thoughts about adhering to it. If, in the discussion of the questions of disarmament at this time, the General Assembly allows this state of affairs to continue unchecked, not only the future of the non-proliferation Treaty but the work of disarmament as a whole will be doubtful and jeopardized.

4. A few concepts that have grown out of the conclusion of the Treaty also need to be clarified in the light of the Charter of the United Nations. Following the conclusion of the Treaty and especially in relation to the convening of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, there appeared to be a tendency to think of the world as divided into two opposing groups—the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. Such thinking is not only unwar-

\* Resumed from the 1617th meeting.

ranted but dangerous. Even if the world were so divided, it would not be in the interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States to perpetuate such a division. My delegation is glad to hear in the present debate firm views against this thinking. The world is unfortunately not united. But it is not divided along the line between the possession and the non-possession of nuclear weapons. In the maintenance of peace and security, all States loyal to the principles of the Charter have a common interest, whether they possess nuclear weapons or not. In the last analysis, the line of division among States is still between an overwhelming majority of them which love peace, on the one hand; and a few others which attempt to dominate the world by force and those which condone or give help in such an attempt, on the other.

5. There has been a feeling that, by accepting the obligations under the non-proliferation Treaty not to acquire nuclear weapons, the non-nuclear-weapon States would be placed at a disadvantage in matters of national security and prestige. My delegation does not share that feeling. Only in 1967, the General Assembly, by resolution 2342 A (XXII), endorsed with enthusiasm, the Secretary-General's report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> It is pertinent in this connexion to recall the conclusion in that report to the effect that the acquisition and further development of nuclear weapons do not add to national security but could be economically ruinous. As to national prestige, the Charter of the United Nations encourages all Members to fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter. Membership in the so-called nuclear club is surely no yardstick in this respect. In the eyes of the people, a Government which seeks for them higher standards of living and better conditions of progress and development is held in higher esteem than another bent upon making nuclear bombs at any cost for blackmail and other military purposes.

6. It is the policy of my Government not to acquire nuclear weapons. We have, along with more than eighty other Governments, signed the non-proliferation Treaty. By devoting itself to the promotion, with considerable success, of the economic well-being and social justice of the people, my Government faithfully responds to the wish of the peace-loving Chinese people and truly represents their will. It thereby offers to the Chinese people on the mainland a powerful alternative to the communist régime which has managed to set off a few nuclear explosions by forcing the people to go without pants. Only those who do not understand the Chinese people and who underestimate their ability to assert themselves would be awed by those few explosions and move in a scurry to seek accommodation with the communist régime. Some of them go so far in their desire to appease the régime as not even to hear its cries of fear—out of fear of the people—, one of such cries assuming the form of denouncing the non-proliferation Treaty as a “big fraud and big plot of the United States imperialists and Soviet revisionists in their counter-revolutionary global collusion”.

<sup>1</sup> Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

7. Still another issue relating to the non-proliferation Treaty is the search for measures to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against nuclear attack or blackmail. This question has been extensively discussed at different forums, including the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States held in Geneva two months ago. My delegation notes with interest the various ideas put forward on that subject. One idea would be for all the non-nuclear-weapon States to seek an assurance of their security through a general convention to be concluded with all nuclear-weapon States.

8. My delegation does not know how much such a convention, if concluded, would add to the guarantees of security already provided in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). But, in the present state of international affairs, it would be more a prayer than a reality that the collective assurance given in such a convention would be operative and reliable. It appears to my delegation that, if all the nuclear-weapon States would act collectively in their relations with the non-nuclear-weapon States, then the question of security guarantees either would not arise or would become insoluble.

9. It is perhaps possible to find measures within the framework of the United Nations to strengthen the Security Council resolution. It may be desirable for this Committee, with the help of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, to continue the search for such measures. In the meantime, the Security Council resolution provides the well-defined but reliable assurances of security based on the collective security system of the United Nations. By reaffirming the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognized in Article 51 of the Charter, it takes into account the possibility of regional action against nuclear attack envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. It also meets the need for security, within the framework of the United Nations, of those non-nuclear-weapon States which may continue to believe that the policy of non-alignment still plays a role in the present international situation. As the resolution was adopted in connexion with the conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty, it naturally limits its application to the States parties to the Treaty. However, it appears obvious to my delegation that the resolution subtracts nothing from the collective security for all Member States provided in the Charter.

10. A discussion of these issues pertaining to the non-proliferation Treaty points to the conclusion that it behooves all Members of the United Nations to ensure respect for and strict observance of the principles of the Charter. This is the only basis on which the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty may be attained and the work of disarmament may proceed. It is also clear that all issues connected with disarmament in general and with the Treaty in particular can best be settled within the framework of the United Nations and not outside it.

11. The entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty will indeed be a stride towards the goal of disarmament. We shall then be able to leave the question of the proliferation of nuclear weapons behind us and to turn our efforts to measures aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the reduction and elimination of all nuclear stockpiles, and,

finally, general and complete disarmament. At the same time, we shall find ourselves in a better position to undertake international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. Such must be the programme of our future work.

12. We are very much encouraged by the report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament now before us, in which the hope was expressed<sup>2</sup> that one or more of the measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament would become ripe for agreement at an early date. My delegation wishes to pay tribute once again to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for the useful work that has been and is being done. I am sure that all of us look forward to further good news from that Committee.

13. According to its report, the Eighteen-Nation Committee held a useful and valuable discussion regarding the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. The conclusion of such a treaty would be an important step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race. But, for a number of years, it has been impeded by the question of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. In this connexion, a summary report by seismological experts who met in Sweden earlier this year, appended to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament report,<sup>3</sup> may be of special interest to the members of this Committee. While giving encouraging hope for further improvement in the detection and identification of underground explosions by seismological means, the experts in their report point out areas where positive identification by such means remains inadequate.

14. Like many other delegations, my delegation possesses no technical information to contradict this conclusion. The views put forward by the experts confirm the doubts raised about the sweeping statement often heard in this Committee that a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests can now be monitored by national means alone and that there is no need for on-site investigations. If a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is to be concluded at an early date as desired by the majority of Member States of the United Nations, it is hoped that the question of detection and identification of underground tests will be examined and solved reasonably on the basis of technical requirements and not on political grounds.

15. Before the manufacture of nuclear weapons is stopped and the stockpiles of nuclear weapons are reduced and finally eliminated, it would be futile to conclude a treaty or any number of treaties whereby the use of nuclear weapons is prohibited or the nuclear Powers undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Treaties based on this kind of concept have never prevented war, nor will they prevent a nuclear war. The tragic irony must be still fresh in our memory that the Second World War broke out only about ten years after the signing of the pact outlawing war. Instead of continuing the discussion of the conclusion of such treaties in this Committee or in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, it is more desirable for us to concern ourselves with more practical measures directly

aimed at nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

16. Another question that keeps coming up on our agenda is the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The issues involved in the question have been thoroughly discussed and clarified in this Committee in the past years. Another debate this year would be more significant and more to the point if the item were extended to cover the countries of Eastern Europe. While this Committee is asked to continue to give its attention to the military bases in countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, some 600,000 foreign troops have been added to Eastern Europe, to set up new military bases there against the expressed will of the people concerned and, as I have pointed out earlier, in violation of all the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. I submit that, in discussing this item, the United Nations should not neglect or discriminate against the countries of Eastern Europe, which are also Members of the United Nations.

17. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the report of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [A/7277 and Corr.1] before this Committee. The Conference has, within the short span of a month, adopted twelve resolutions of substance covering a large number of important questions.

18. Most of the resolutions relating to security and disarmament adopted by the Conference are self-executing and do not seem to require specific action by the General Assembly. One of them, however, lists a programme of work which the General Assembly is asked to recommend to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for implementation. I refer to resolution C contained in paragraph 17 of the report of the Conference. My delegation believes that the programme of work for the Eighteen-Nation Committee as proposed in that resolution is logical, constructive and realistic. It also consists of measures which have been discussed in this Committee and have received the attention of its members. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the sixteen Latin American countries which took the initiative in introducing the resolution and to the other countries which later joined the co-sponsorship at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation will vote in favour of any proposal calculated to implement the request made by the Conference in that resolution.

19. The largest contribution made by the Conference seems to be in the field of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Most of the resolutions in that respect are related to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and will no doubt be carefully considered and implemented by the relevant bodies of the Agency. A few others fall within the jurisdiction of the General Assembly of our Organization, such as the request for an expert report on all possible contributions of nuclear energy to the economic and scientific advancement of the developing countries and the proposed establishment of a nuclear technology research and development programme. Those proposed measures will probably have to be considered by this Committee in consultation with the Second Committee, but my delegation will be pleased to support their implementation.

<sup>2</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 25.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, document DC/231, annex I, sect. 6.

20. The peaceful uses of nuclear energy apply mainly to the economic development of the world and are the concern of a number of international organizations. The relevant resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States have already referred to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as to the work of the United Nations. As peaceful nuclear activities develop, there will be a proliferation of projects, programmes and funds in this field. That is the kind of proliferation which will be most welcome. However, we should bear in mind that the financial and material resources for such projects, programmes and funds established by the various international bodies come from the same source—mainly, the limited number of developed countries. Therefore, it may be necessary to set up a centre for co-ordination, preferably non-political and within the International Atomic Energy Agency, in order to avoid waste through duplication of activities.

21. It will be a happy day for the whole world when all items relating to nuclear energy disappear from the agenda of this Committee and, so far as the United Nations is concerned, appear on the agenda of the Second Committee of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. We look forward with great expectations to the arrival of that day.

22. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I have to inform the Committee that Australia and Ethiopia have joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-4, bringing the number of sponsors to nineteen. Similarly, Denmark has joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/L.447 and Add.1, which now has ten sponsors.

23. Mr. FAKHREDDINE (Sudan): One has often felt, as a representative of a small country, a certain sense of inadequacy when speaking on questions relating to disarmament, but one is encouraged sometimes by the realization that the representatives of the great Powers acknowledge that the smaller nations have a role to play in this respect.

24. Mr. Mulley, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, addressing this Committee on 18 November said:

“The basic fact is that progress towards nuclear disarmament can only be made if there is agreement between the nuclear Powers, although I readily concede the right and proper concern of non-nuclear-weapon States to exercise all their powers of persuasion to achieve such agreement.” [1609th meeting, para. 40.]

25. Thus we persevere, for it is here in the United Nations that we, as representatives of the under-developed and disarmed countries, can make our voices heard, if not always heeded. To be sure, we do not often speak with one voice, yet when we do we are clearly set apart from the powerful and the privileged. There is indeed a difference between the nuclear and the non-nuclear States, if only in the realization, pointed out [1607th meeting, paras. 26-29] by the representative of Yugoslavia in his statement on 13 November, that the problem of security for the smaller nations is different from that of the major Powers, for since

our economic and other resources would never be adequate to meet the threat of occupation by a nuclear Power, and since we often cannot isolate ourselves from the deleterious effects of a war that may involve us without necessarily being primarily directed against us, our only means of attaining security is either to join one of the opposing camps or to try somehow, by our united efforts, to obtain a measure of security which does not rely on armed force.

26. The first course of action would seem to be self-defeating since in the end it would lead to a greater and more dangerous confrontation between the two major Powers, with the attendant danger of collision and inevitable catastrophe for the whole world. The only course that seems to be left open for the small nations is to pursue their collective effort—a course of action that would lead to the reduction of tension between the major Powers. This is by no means an easy task in the face of the prevalent belief that only power is the ultimate guarantee of security; the actions of most of the major Powers especially seem to lend support to that belief.

27. Thus, while the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty was hailed in all the major capitals as a milestone on the road towards nuclear disarmament and the eventual goal of a peaceful world, the expenditure on armaments during the same period continued to increase. According to a recent publication by the Institute for Strategic Studies, the strategic deployment of United States forces continues to have two main objectives: first, maintaining the ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor or group of aggressors in the course of a nuclear exchange; and, second, the limitation of damage to the population and industrial capacity of the United States in the event of a global nuclear war.

28. Given those two strategic objectives, it seems logical for the United States to pursue the development and sophistication of its delivery vehicles, its missiles and anti-missile missiles and the best means of their deployment to achieve the goals of superiority and relative security that it seeks. This course of action calls for a constant and continuing effort to attain its ends, since the other side probably has similar objectives. It appears, therefore, that there is an essential contradiction between maintaining the deterrence and pursuing disarmament. The belief in military might as a guarantee of security remains so firm that one sometimes has the impression that the great Powers, tending to equate disarmament with a state of insecurity and vulnerability, would not, left to themselves, seriously pursue a policy that would lead to genuine disarmament. We like to think, indeed we hope, that the smaller nations, acting through this Organization, would provide the catalytic influence that would make genuine disarmament possible.

29. In *The United Nations and Disarmament, 1945-1965*, an account prepared by the United Nations on disarmament negotiations and deliberations from 1945 to 1965, it is stated that

“The main responsibility for disarmament naturally falls on the great Powers, and this responsibility has extended to their recommending the most appropriate forum for negotiations. The relationship of a particular disarmament conference to the United Nations has largely

depended on the policies of the major Powers and on the circumstances prevailing at the time of its establishment. It has also been affected by the increase in the membership of the Organization from 51 in 1945 to 122 at the end of 1966.”<sup>4</sup>

30. Perhaps there should now be a shift of emphasis in this pattern. The United Nations has through the years provided the forum where a moderating, though admittedly minor, influence has been brought to bear on the position that the only guarantee of peace is mutual deterrence. The extent of this influence is difficult to gauge. Yet one is aware that, although our debates here have not received wide enough dissemination through the mass media to influence popular thinking, they have served to create some awareness among politicians, and in government circles, of the will and determination of most of mankind to avoid war. Our steadfast and persistent pursuit of disarmament negotiations has served to foster the hope that a lasting peace may be possible and ultimately attainable through disarmament.

31. It does not seem a vain hope that the influence of the United Nations on disarmament negotiations between the great Powers might be more effective if it were pursued with more diligence. The attitude of the great Powers will remain, of course, crucial and decisive, but there is no reason to suppose that their attitude will not be more responsive to a really determined effort by the United Nations.

32. In reviewing the history of disarmament, one may discern some evidence of the trend to greater participation by the United Nations and more involvement of the smaller nations, which should continue to be encouraged as a healthy and progressive development. Thus, while the Atomic Energy Commission of 1946 and the United Nations Disarmament Commission of 1952 comprised the Security Council members plus Canada, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament was established in response to the recognition that “all States have a deep interest in disarmament . . .” [*See General Assembly resolution 1722 II (XVI), second preambular paragraph.*]

33. It cannot be denied that in the six years of its existence the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has done valuable work, but it is precisely those six years that have witnessed the change in the pattern of the membership of the United Nations, a change which, we consider, should be reflected in disarmament forums as it has been in all the organs and bodies of this Organization. In that respect one sometimes wonders whether the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is not too restricted to give adequate expression to the views of States other than its members. One is also aware, on the other hand, that the General Assembly, or its First Committee, cannot devote enough time or concentrate enough effort for the views of the membership to have any direct bearing on disarmament negotiations.

34. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States has been very useful in providing a temporary remedy for this situation. Its success should indeed point the way towards further similar efforts. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-

Weapon States was mainly and almost by definition a forum for the smaller nations. Its deliberations and conclusions have, therefore, tended to reflect mostly the preoccupations of those nations. In that respect, it is certainly not without significance that seven of the resolutions of the Conference were concerned with international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. Yet the Conference has also been useful in delineating the means and methods for the attainment of more security and stability for the world in general in the context of nuclear non-proliferation. In considering the means for the implementation of the decisions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the delegation of the Sudan is inclined to favour the suggestion that special machinery be set up for that purpose. Such a step would, in our view, fill the hiatus that has existed between the negotiating functions of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the general debates and decisions of the General Assembly.

35. We shall therefore support any initiative that has this purpose in view, as we shall indeed support all efforts that could help to realize the prospects for a peaceful and disarmed world.

36. We acknowledge in this regard that the memorandum by the Soviet Union of 1 July 1968 [A/7134] is worthy of the closest study, but on the widest possible basis. We hope indeed that we shall have time for this discussion in the near future.

37. Mr. PORTER (United Kingdom): I have asked for the floor very briefly today to inform the Committee that the United Kingdom has now ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

38. When announcing this in the House of Commons this afternoon, Mr. Mulley made the following statement:

“As the House knows, Her Majesty’s Government consider it vitally important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by bringing the Non-Proliferation Treaty into force at an early date.

“As foreshadowed in the Queen’s Speech, and in order to give renewed impetus to the Treaty, we are today depositing our instruments of ratification. We hope that other States will follow our example as soon as possible.”<sup>5</sup>

39. Mr. EL BOURI (Libya) (*translated from French*): Mr. Chairman, as I am speaking in this Committee for the first time, I take pleasure in expressing, on behalf of my delegation, our gratification at your election to the Chairmanship of this important Committee. We take particular satisfaction in your election in view of the cordial relations and sincere co-operation between our two countries, facing each other across the Mediterranean. I am sure that with your ability and your great experience of international affairs, you will continue to conduct our work with every success. I would also congratulate the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

40. Men have always been concerned with the problem of disarmament, even before the creation of the United

<sup>5</sup> See *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Weekly Hansard, No. 776* (London, H.M. Stationery Office), vol. 774, No. 21, col. 501.

Nations. To live in peace, sheltered from the threat of war and mass destruction, is the unanimous desire of all the nations of the world. But peace and disarmament are indivisible. Since the explosion of the first atom bomb at Hiroshima and in view of the steady progress in the discovery and development of weapons of mass destruction, it has become imperative to stop the arms race.

41. In its resolution 1378 (XIV), the General Assembly has stated that the question of disarmament "is the most important one facing the world today". The main reason for this feeling of urgency is that mankind is aware of what would be the disastrous consequences of a nuclear war, whose destructive power would know no frontier or boundary and which would reduce the world to ruins and ashes.

42. That is why we, of the small defenceless nations which have always borne the brunt of the struggles and rivalries of the great, raise our voice—the voice of all mankind—before this high international tribunal in order to urge those who make peace and war to look for ways of stopping the mad arms race and thus saving future generations from the threat of extinction.

43. Ever since its founding, the United Nations has been concerned with disarmament, and in recent years its efforts in that regard have been devoted largely to nuclear disarmament. Despite all difficulties and all political and military obstacles in this highly complex matter, the United Nations has some notable achievements to its credit. Foremost among these achievements are: the Moscow Treaty on the partial banning of nuclear weapon tests,<sup>6</sup> the Treaty for the Denuclearization of Latin America<sup>7</sup> and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII), annex*], which was approved at the resumed twenty-second session. This last instrument has been hailed as the most important agreement on nuclear disarmament yet concluded and as a great step forward on the arduous path to general and complete disarmament.

44. This Treaty, which has been signed by more than eighty countries, has not come into force and has not been ratified by the great Powers which were its principal authors.

45. I take pleasure in congratulating the United Kingdom representative on the pleasant news he reported a little while ago.

46. Again, a number of nations which have the technical capability for nuclear production have not yet decided to sign the Treaty. Consequently, there is a certain scepticism regarding the value and effectiveness of that instrument. Only the great Powers can restore international confidence in the Treaty and dispel the prevailing uncertainty and doubts concerning it.

47. We have heard it said in this hall that the non-proliferation Treaty was not an end in itself but a stage on the

<sup>6</sup> Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480, 1963, No. 6964).

<sup>7</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 91, document A/C.1/946.

way to disarmament and that each party to the Treaty had undertaken to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty for general and complete disarmament under international control. My delegation unreservedly supports this view. It feels, however, that the step most urgently needed is the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all media.

48. In the preamble to the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, which is mentioned in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the parties have expressed their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons and to continue negotiations to this end.

49. In its resolution 2373 (XXII) on disarmament, the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to pursue negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests underground and to report to it at the twenty-third session.

50. My delegation is happy to note that the Eighteen-Nation Committee held "a useful and valuable discussion" regarding this important matter, as it notes in paragraph 22 of its report, which is before us. Nevertheless, and without going into detail, I would say that it has not been able to overcome all obstacles in its search for the best and most appropriate means of ensuring that a treaty banning nuclear tests will be respected by the signatories.

51. The Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to study the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons arrived at the following conclusion, as set down in its report:

"A comprehensive test ban treaty... would also contribute to the objectives of non-proliferation and would clearly help to slow down the nuclear arms race."<sup>8</sup>

52. Obviously, the chief obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear testing is the detection and verification of the origins of underground explosions. It must be said, however, that the technical means for determining whether a given phenomenon was a seismic shock or a nuclear explosion have been greatly improved. This may be seen from the summary of the report by a group of seismologists from ten countries, including four nuclear Powers. These experts meeting under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm, examined the technical aspects of detecting underground testing and their report is before us. The crux of it is:

"that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from interfering earthquakes. This provides a new situation in test ban control."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1), paragraph 92.

<sup>9</sup> See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, annex 1, section 6.

53. This new situation will greatly facilitate the task of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is true that some tests might escape the detection networks; in that case, it would be reasonable to adopt additional control measures. My delegation feels that any delay in concluding this treaty would allow the nuclear Powers to develop their nuclear weapons still further and increase their stockpiles, thereby exposing the world to a still greater danger of radioactive fallout.

54. I have mentioned underground nuclear test banning as one of the most urgent and useful measures that could be taken to arrest the nuclear arms race. At the same time, cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, destruction of their stockpiles and liquidation or reduction of all nuclear weapons are measures which must be taken if mankind is to be freed of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe.

55. My delegation associates itself with the conclusion in paragraph 91 of the Secretary-General's Report on the effects of possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons:

“The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase of the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them . . . security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament.”

56. If progress is to be made in disarmament negotiations and new practical measures are to be evolved, the great Powers must, above all, once again manifest their goodwill and show that they are ready to meet the sincere desires and join in the efforts of the international community.

57. The total prohibition of nuclear testing, the destruction of all nuclear stockpiles and the complete destruction of nuclear weapons and means of delivery are the fondest wishes of terrified mankind; such measures would ensure world security, including the security of the nuclear Powers themselves, and would lead to the paramount goal, which is general and complete disarmament and world peace.

58. The nuclear arms race has been following a classical course; it can do nothing either for the security of the participants or for world peace. It results in a mad waste of the financial and technical resources which the world in general, and the countries of the third world in particular, so badly need. As the USSR representative justly emphasized in his statement here on 12 November 1968 [*1606th meeting*], in 1967 the sum total of military expenditures exceeded \$160 thousand million, and according to some estimates had actually reached \$200 thousand million.

59. These enormous sums are expended on the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, preparations for war and domination at a time when two thirds of the world's population need food, medicine and education.

60. At its eighth session, the General Assembly adopted a declaration which reads in part:

“We, the Governments of the States Members of the United Nations, in order to promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social progress and development, stand ready to ask our peoples, when sufficient progress has been made in internationally supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings achieved through such disarmament to an international fund, within the framework of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in underdeveloped countries” [*resolution 724 A (VIII)*].

61. While I cannot cite exact figures, there can be no doubt that some resources, possibly limited, will be released as a result of the partial nuclear disarmament that has been or soon will be achieved.

62. Very valuable and certainly timely studies have been made of the economic consequences of disarmament; however, they have not received all the attention they deserve.

63. It is only natural that, parallel with the negotiations on the conclusion of other treaties in nuclear matters, thought should be given to yet other measures for the utilization of part of the resources released for the economic and social development of the developing countries. The same idea was expressed by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in resolution J, as follows:

“ . . . the financial resources and fissionable materials that would be released by the adoption of nuclear disarmament measures should also be used to serve the economic development of the developing countries, and especially their technological and scientific progress.” [*A/7277, paragraph 17.*]

64. My delegation is also convinced that the United Nations should take up the question of the military utilization of marine areas.

65. It takes the view that the sea-bed and the ocean floor should be exempt from military uses and installations; beyond question, that is an essential condition for the rational exploration and co-ordinated and profitable exploitation of those regions for the benefit of all mankind. True international co-operation is possible only if we prohibit military installations on the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Any use of those areas for military purposes would deal a death blow to international co-operation in exploring and exploiting marine resources, spur on the arms race and create new sources of international tension. The United Nations must take the necessary measures without delay, particularly bearing current activities in mind.

66. Such measures would help to strengthen international peace and security and would constitute a step towards general and complete disarmament.

67. In our view, such measures should logically include the prohibition of military installations and the placing of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as also tests of weapons and establishment of military bases in those areas.

68. I would stress that in recent years the General Assembly has devoted great attention to measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. We must not, however, overlook the danger of chemical and biological weapons which, as the Secretary-General says in the Introduction to his Report, are also “weapons of mass destruction regarded with universal horror. In some respects they may be even more dangerous than nuclear weapons because they do not require the enormous expenditure of financial and scientific resources that are required for nuclear weapons.”<sup>10</sup>

69. This question has been examined by our Committee more than once and deserves to be studied in detail, so that this danger may be eliminated by ensuring respect of the Geneva Protocol<sup>11</sup> on the part of all States, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 (XXI) inviting all States to accede to the Protocol.

70. Having spoken briefly to some of the issues on our agenda, I should now like to make an equally brief comment on the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. My delegation, one of the original authors of resolution 2153 B (XXI) of 17 November 1966 convening the Conference, is happy to note that the Conference, which was attended by representatives of ninety-six countries, has served its purpose and has furnished an appro-

<sup>10</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, paragraph 30.

<sup>11</sup> Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, dated 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

priate forum for non-nuclear-weapon countries to hold a free exchange of views on problems which endanger their survival, thus opening up the prospect of using nuclear force for the well-being and not the destruction of mankind.

71. The conclusions of the Conference, as contained in document A/7277, deserve the full attention of the General Assembly. My delegation supports all efforts to establish an organ which would continue the work begun by the Conference and, above all, seek a solution to the question of security safeguards and co-ordination of work on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

72. In conclusion, I would say that it is certainly in the interest of all countries, as well as of world security, to spare no effort in seeking a solution to disarmament problems as a whole. However, achievement of this goal requires more than concentration on disarmament questions; at the same time, we must eliminate sources of tension in a world in which force is used as a means of imposing solutions in international relations and also as a means of domination and territorial expansion. World peace cannot be achieved unless it is founded on justice and respect of the fundamental principles of our Charter.

73. The CHAIRMAN (*translated from Spanish*): I thank the representative of Libya for his congratulations addressed to the Chairman of the First Committee and the other officers.

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*