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1. Mr. PETERSEN (Denmark): This year's debate in the First Committee on questions of disarmament takes place against a background which is different from that of previous years. The fact that the non-proliferation Treaty¹

¹ Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex).

has become a reality and has already been signed by a substantial majority of the Member States should hold out new hopes for nuclear disarmament. Who will have to bear the greatest responsibilities under the non-proliferation Treaty is a moot point, but it is a fact that all parties have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, and the chief responsibility for honouring that commitment lies with the nuclear Powers. The Danish delegation has noted with satisfaction that this item has been placed at the top of the provisional agenda of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.²

2. In my view, attention should be focused on two subjects. The first one is the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. We are confronted today with the existence of stockpiles of nuclear weapons whose destructive power is beyond human comprehension. This state of affairs must be brought to an end, and my Government urges the USSR and the United States to initiate at the earliest possible date the negotiations which, as announced earlier this year, they intend to hold on these vital questions.

3. Another question concerning which the time has now come for effective action is that of a complete test ban. If a treaty to this effect were concluded it would be a valuable supplement to the non-proliferation Treaty because it would in practice prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons as well as further development of existing types of weapons. I am fully aware that the crux of the matter remains with the problems of verification. There is good reason to point here to the progress achieved in detection seismology. I think that the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm took a remarkable and commendable initiative in convening in the summer of 1968 seismologists from East and West to assess the present state of the art of seismic test-ban verification. The experts ascertained that it is now possible to distinguish large and medium-sized underground explosions from interfering earthquakes. If no agreed solution can be found at this juncture to the problem of the yet uncovered area of verification, it should be possible, as proposed earlier, to establish a ban on underground testing above an agreed verifiable size, and at the same time to initiate international co-operation further to improve detection seismology.

4. It is obvious that nuclear armaments present by far the greatest problems, but that must not divert our attention from non-nuclear measures. In this connexion, I shall refer

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 17.

to two subjects of great concern to the Danish Government: one is the problem of chemical and biological warfare, the other the question of the increasing volume of arms shipments.

5. As members of this Committee will know, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, in which the matter of chemical and biological warfare was raised by the United Kingdom and Poland, recommends in its report to the General Assembly this year³ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and biological means of warfare. Bearing in mind the excellent manner in which the Secretary-General, assisted by experts, performed a similar task on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons, I am confident that we may expect an account which will open the eyes of the public to the enormous dangers inherent in the development of biological and chemical weapons and point to the urgent need for stopping the production of such weapons. For the reasons I have stated, Denmark is among the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3, submitted by Poland and others.

6. Reverting to the Secretary-General's report on nuclear weapons⁴ I am glad to announce that, in conformity with the recommendations in General Assembly resolution 2342 A (XXII), the report has been translated into the Danish language and published in Denmark.

7. I come now to the question of arms shipments, and take this occasion to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.446, submitted by Denmark, Iceland, Malta and Norway. The draft resolution follows up views expressed during the twenty-second session of the General Assembly by the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Denmark who, in his statement in September 1967 in the general debate, said:

"The Danish Government believes that an international agreement to limit the trade in conventional weapons would be highly beneficial. This goal cannot be reached in the near future, but a useful first step might be an agreement to exchange information through a United Nations organ on the international trade of conventional weapons. To this end the Secretary-General could make inquiries with all Member States and report their views to the twenty-third session of the General Assembly." [1562nd plenary meeting, para. 90.]

8. As disarmament questions were dealt with only summarily at last year's session, the Danish delegation considered it inexpedient to add to this Committee's discussions on disarmament an extra problem which, although not entirely alien to the Committee, had not previously been the subject of a detailed debate in the Committee.

9. The sponsors feel, however, that arms transfers, because of their bearing on security and their economic impact, are of such crucial importance to the Member States of the United Nations that we should be more conscious of the

implications for international peace and security of such arms transfers. In accordance with these views, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark again brought up the question of registration of arms transfers in his statement in the general debate on 8 October of this year. [1685th plenary meeting.]

10. The sponsors realize that the political and practical problems involved in registration are so many and so complex that immediate establishment of an arrangement for registration would not be feasible, let alone desirable, without careful preparation.

11. As members of this Committee will know, the idea of registration is not a new one, but strangely enough the dangers inherent in arms transfers seem to have evoked less interest following the Second World War than they did in the inter-war period. This is perhaps due to the fact that the trade in arms was then, to a much greater extent than it is today, in the hands of private producers and not subject to a large degree of Government supervision, as it is now. For several years the League of Nations published a *Statistical Yearbook of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition*, which by the standards of that time contained detailed information about country imports and exports of weapons and ammunition. We fully realize that the idea of registration current in the inter-war period cannot be transferred to the world of today with its far more complex political and technological problems unless the international community lends its active assistance to the establishment of a registration arrangement.

12. In the formulation of the draft resolution, therefore, we had two aims in mind: to word the proposal in such a manner that the greatest number of Member States could be expected to accept the underlying objective; and to enable all Member States, through the procedure outlined in the draft resolution, to assist in shaping a registration arrangement which, while satisfying its purpose, would meet the wishes and views of the greatest possible number of States.

13. As will be seen from the draft resolution, it is proposed to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to ascertain the position of Member Governments on undertaking an obligation to register with the Secretary-General all imports and exports of conventional arms, ammunition and implements of war, and on authorizing the Secretary-General to collect and publish information on such arms transfers. Last, but not least, the Secretary-General should obtain the views of Member States as to what practical measures should be taken to bring about a registration arrangement.

14. It is not the aim of the draft resolution—and that should be quite clear from its text—to impose upon Member States any kind of obligation to furnish information about arms deliveries. The sole object is to ascertain their views on the questions mentioned.

15. As I have already indicated, the idea of registration is not alien to this Committee. I am thinking of the draft resolution, submitted to the twentieth session of the General Assembly by the delegation of Malta, requesting the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to take up

³ *Ibid.*, para. 26.

⁴ *Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.IX.1).

the question of arms transfers between States with a view to making recommendations to the General Assembly about the establishment of a publication system through the intermediary of the United Nations.

16. I want to stress that in bringing up this matter again, while restricting it to a request to the Secretary-General to make an inquiry as mentioned, the sponsors of the proposal in draft resolution A/C.1/L.446 wish to enlist the active participation of all member States in exploring the possibilities of achieving universal adherence to some form of registration arrangement. Another purpose of the proposal is to enable all member States to present any views they may have as to the practicability of establishing an arrangement safeguarding as many interests as possible.

17. We believe, as is stated in the preamble, that publication of information about transfers of arms and ammunition could help to promote relaxation of tensions and foster relations of mutual trust between States. We think, moreover, that publication would entail limitations on arms transfers, because continued secrecy about the military build-up of individual countries would tend to increase the insecurity in neighbouring States and lead to unnecessary purchases of arms. Finally, we share the view that a registration arrangement would make member States more conscious of the implications of international arms transfers, and only when that has been accomplished will it be possible to ascertain whether, and to what extent, arms transfers are tantamount to reduced international security and, if that appears to be the case, how such a situation could be reversed.

18. In that connexion I wish to stress that the draft resolution does not in any way imply that there is something odious in the purchase and sale of arms; and that it is not, of course, the intention to interfere with arms purchases serving the legitimate defence interests of States.

19. In discussions on an arrangement for registration of arms transfers it has sometimes been argued that such an arrangement would present greater drawbacks to the importing countries than to the producer countries, because the latter could acquire weapons without registration. If one keeps in mind that there is nothing reprehensible in arms purchases as such, and that the aim of the draft resolution is to avoid unnecessary purchases of arms, the drawbacks of a registration arrangement can hardly be claimed to be any greater to the importing country than to the producer or exporting country.

20. Some people contend that a weakness in official registration of arms transfers is that transfers which are kept secret because they are intended for rebellions or the like would escape registration. That argument should not, or course, be ignored; but I think that the greater the openness we achieve about lawful transfers the more difficult will it be to keep secret the transfers which are intended for rebellions or similar purposes. Finally, the possibility that secret and illegal transactions in arms would escape registration should not make us refrain from establishing a registration arrangement if it is otherwise recognized that it could help to avoid superfluous purchases of arms and, at the same time, benefit the cause of *détente* and promote mutual trust among nations.

21. In his statement on 23 October in the General Assembly's general debate the representative of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic expressed the view that the proposal concerning arms transfers would "divert us" from the road to disarmament, and he characterized the proposal as:

"... another clumsy attempt to create the impression that the United Nations is dealing with the problem of disarmament, and thus to divert the General Assembly from the problems confronting it concerning disarmament and the strengthening of peace." [1704th plenary meeting, para. 55.]

22. I can assure the delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic that the aim of the sponsors in making this proposal is not—and I repeat, not—to place obstacles in the way of other disarmament measures, among which we can enumerate several which we consider much more important than this limited proposal.

23. As will be seen from the draft resolution, we propose a step which would not in the first instance take up time in international disarmament negotiations. The task of making the inquiry would be entrusted to the Secretary-General. And may I add that, although nuclear disarmament measures must be given top priority at present, that should not, in my delegation's view, prevent negotiations on disarmament measures in the field of conventional weapons from being conducted concurrently with negotiations on nuclear disarmament. That is, in fact, the view underlying General Assembly resolution 2342 B (XXII) on the question of general and complete disarmament, operative paragraph 1 of which

"Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at the earliest possible date consideration of the question of general and complete disarmament in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2162 C (XXI)."

In operative paragraph 1 of resolution 2162 C (XXI) one finds the words:

"... to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures . . ."

May I say that that view has heretofore characterized the disarmament negotiations, in this Committee as well in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, and it would be unjustifiable to claim that it has diverted us from more urgent disarmament measures on the adoption of which political agreement could be reached.

24. There is, of course, always a risk that the motives behind the proposal may be misinterpreted and that reference will be made in that connexion to the political situation in various parts of the world. It should be needless to point out, however, that crises and conflicts have up to now, regrettably, been a permanent feature of the international situation and that it is unlikely that any initiative for disarmament would ever emerge if the precondition for its presentation were global peace.

25. May I stress once more that the proposal does not impose any obligations on any State. Its sole purpose is to

enable each of the member States of the United Nations to present, after careful internal consideration, its comments on the question of arms registration. It goes without saying that each country would be expected to present any views that could help to clarify the procedure which would be most expedient in the further consideration of the question of registration.

26. May I emphasize, further, that the proposal does not discriminate against the small Powers. The big Powers have sufficient resources to find out about the arms transfers in which they are interested. It is the small Powers which are kept in ignorance of what is going on. The present trade figures are quite inadequate as a source of information about arms transfers.

27. In concluding my statement concerning the draft resolution, I urge all Member States to support the proposal and to assist in throwing light on any problems involved in the establishment of a registration arrangement by giving as detailed answers as possible to the Secretary-General's inquiry.

28. Allow me, in conclusion, to make a few general observations on the role of disarmament in international politics. The results achieved in the course of the negotiations on disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee cannot conceal the fact that international developments are moving in the wrong direction today. The armaments potential of States is constantly growing. Exact data are not available about total military expenditures throughout the globe, but we know for certain that the vast sums expended on armaments have far-reaching repercussions on social and economic developments. Even in the most wealthy societies, important civilian and humanitarian problems have to be left unsolved because unproductive military expenditures swallow up so large a proportion of national economic resources.

29. That is one side of the matter. Another is the drain on human resources. In addition to the millions of men enrolled in the armed forces, hundreds of thousands of people are engaged, directly or indirectly, in production, trade and transport of weapons and what is otherwise required for the maintenance of the armed forces.

30. Tens of thousands of scientists are working arduously in laboratories all over the world to evolve increasingly lethal weapons. Humanity is faced with an absurd situation. All, or practically all, people realize this. But that does not prevent us from increasing the stockpiles of weapons. It is alarming that world public opinion gives so little attention to the threats hanging over us. Very rarely are the problems of disarmament discussed in our parliaments. They lead a shadow life.

31. The economic and human resources devoted to disarmament, *détente* and conflict research are few and weak compared to those that are put into military tasks. We must all recognize that we are dominated by fear and mutual distrust and that we severely lack, the feeling of international solidarity which alone can save us from a cataclysm.

32. In the final analysis, the crucial point of our deliberations is whether we shall succeed in creating the insight,

understanding and political will which can turn the tide before it is too late.

33. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (*translated from French*): It has long been said that disarmament is one of the most important questions the United Nations has had to deal with since its inception. Notwithstanding the precarious state of equilibrium in the world, the General Assembly adopted not too long ago—at its resumed twenty-second session—a draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [*resolution 2373 (XXII)*, *annex*] which, along with two other previously concluded treaties on disarmament, namely, the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,⁵ and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space [*resolution 2222 (XXI)*], represents one of the first steps, one of the first milestones, on the road to disarmament. Since then, this Treaty has been signed by more than eighty States, which marks another great success on the way to disarmament.

34. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of course an encouraging sign in an international situation fraught with threats and dangers to world peace and security. It is a collateral disarmament measure designed to halt the race for the most destructive and therefore the most dangerous weapons, and a step with vast implications for international peace and security. It is, in fact, the most daring and effective initiative that has been conceived and achieved in this field since disarmament negotiations began, and its implementation will provide security guarantees to every State and to the community of nations as a whole. As we well know, this initiative was favourably and even very warmly welcomed at the outset, so much so that it was sponsored by many countries and their delegations at the United Nations.

35. During the time the Treaty was being drafted, and particularly towards the end of that time, some hesitations and doubts were expressed by a number of countries—even by sponsor countries—regarding security guarantees for non-nuclear States. This trend grew stronger during the current year, to the point where some delegations are now attempting to say that the Treaty contains measures actually intended to disarm already unarmed countries. Although it seems difficult to understand how something could be removed—or rather, taken away—from where it had never existed, it is none the less true that an attempt is being made to create such an impression. Such tendencies are likely to create a state of mind unfavourable to an initiative which, without being in itself a disarmament measure, is none the less a collateral measure which helps to increase the security of States in a world beset by constant tension.

36. Inspired as they are by feelings easy to understand in a world of unpleasant and dangerous realities, some delegations tend to forget the principle, unanimously recognized during the discussions and negotiations on disarmament, that the security of States is a part of disarmament, and that there can be no real and enduring security without general and complete disarmament.

⁵ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964.

37. Assertions such as those made by some delegations during the current discussion, according to which disarmament should be the offshoot of security, and that security should be a prerequisite for disarmament—whereas in fact security cannot effect the course of true disarmament until the latter has got well under way—do not at this juncture, when we are not even ready to begin this process, lead to anything but confusion.

38. Of course, anyone is free to doubt the true value of the guarantees issued by the nuclear Powers in statements to the Security Council and embodied in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). It is easy to ask, too, that these Powers should be more imaginative in formulating guarantees. However, what country can hope to have an absolute guarantee of security in a world which is armed to the teeth with weapons capable of wiping it out? Even the most fully armed countries, even those with large quantities of nuclear weapons, do not have real security in a world armed to the teeth.

39. We wonder, indeed, how the security of a State in such a world could be guaranteed even if it were to be seated on an enormous stockpile of weapons of various types, including nuclear weapons. It cannot be done. That State would simply find itself on an active volcano ready to erupt at any time and destroy the nuclear Powers along with the entire world.

40. At the present time, true and real security guarantees can be sought only in a series of disarmament and collateral measures aimed at general and complete disarmament. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria is of the opinion that it is in this direction alone that the security of individual States and of the international community, as well as world peace, must be sought in the present international situation. To act in the opposite direction, to seek security first in order to achieve disarmament after, is nothing but a paradox that may sound well, but which has no real meaning at the present time. Should such a situation come about, then we could ask: Who cares about disarming, and for what reasons? Who wants general disarmament so much that we must concern ourselves with it now? If every State were guaranteed its security by initiatives taken by other States, the appeal of general and complete disarmament would fade save in connexion with the possibility of using the resources freed by disarmament for peaceful purposes.

41. However, taking the world as it is, we can ask whether some circles involved in the arms race would not gain the upper hand once and for all and force their Governments to continue the arms race, and even the nuclear arms race.

42. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the trend towards seeking security first and only then to pursue measures designed to halt the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race—as is the case with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—is scarcely one which will lead either to security or to disarmament, the former being, as we have already said, one of the functions of disarmament at the present juncture. The emergence of such a trend and such a state of mind can benefit only those who are interested in increasing existing tensions in the world and in creating new ones. Such a trend can only serve the ambitions and interests of potential nuclear Powers.

43. The interests of the European countries, for example, would be ill served if West German militarist circles were allowed to maintain constant tension in Europe. We must not forget that both world wars began on the continent of Europe. The West German militarists do not even need nuclear weapons in order to maintain existing tensions and foment new ones. All they need is to be given the opportunity of acquiring or manufacturing nuclear weapons in the future. Thus they will be able to go on, as they are doing now, rejecting the territorial *status quo* and threatening to change the present-day borders of Europe, by force if necessary. The Minister of Finance of the Federal Republic of Germany did not hesitate to state recently that he feared a denuclearized Europe, an atom-free zone in Europe.

44. The interests of African countries and peoples would certainly not be served if other countries are afforded the opportunity of acquiring nuclear weapons much longer. For the moment, no developing African country wants to become a nuclear Power, nor has it the possibility to do so. However, South Africa is continuously developing its nuclear technology. Failure to arrest this development could have disastrous consequences for the African countries, and especially for the countries of southern Africa.

45. One of the important findings of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States which met at Geneva was that the immediate halt of the arms race and the speedy implementation of the process of nuclear disarmament are the indispensable prerequisites for safeguarding peace and security. This finding is accompanied by the remark that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which the Conference took into consideration, must be followed by disarmament measures, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament [see A/7277, para. 17, resolution N]. Nuclear disarmament measures are thus given priority, but, of course, after implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which, according to the statement issued by the Conference, must be followed by disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, such measures are indispensable for the safeguarding of world peace and security.

46. In the light of these precise details, we are astonished that the representatives of countries which were active sponsors of the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear States are attempting in their statements to this Committee to create an atmosphere and a state of mind opposed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its implementation. Such an attitude would be not only out of keeping with the interests of non-nuclear countries as a whole, but with the conclusions of the Conference itself. To allow the implementation of a measure designed to halt the arms race in an area as important as the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be torpedoed by misunderstandings or vested interests would be tantamount to abandoning the common cause of all the peoples in the international community as a whole. This would be all the more serious since such a measure—the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—should itself be followed up by further collateral measures aimed at limiting the arms race and at achieving disarmament, some of which have been recommended by the General Assembly in earlier amendments.

47. One of these measures—doubtless the most effective one—would be the prohibition of the use of nuclear

weapons, which has for a long time been put forward and upheld by the Soviet Union and has been supported by the vast majority of countries represented in the United Nations. The conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would in fact act as a powerful deterrent for those who might plan to resort to nuclear weapons and would greatly contribute to strengthening the security of States and world peace by dispelling the doubts created by some Powers with regard to their plans with regard to the use of nuclear weapons.

48. Another measure having to do with nuclear disarmament would be the halt in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, and their total liquidation under appropriate international control. Were negotiations to be entered into for this purpose, they might promote understanding on all these measures, which would mark a great step forward towards achieving nuclear disarmament.

49. For many years now, international public opinion has considered that the limitation and reduction of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons would help to lessen international tension and possibly avert the danger of a nuclear war. This measure was discussed at Geneva at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and the overwhelming majority of participating countries supported its adoption.

50. Among the measures considered feasible in the near future was one to prohibit underground nuclear testing, which would totally eliminate the possibility of carrying out nuclear weapons testing in the future and, thus, the further "improvement" of such weapons.

51. All these collateral disarmament measures have once again been brought to the Assembly's attention by the Soviet memorandum of 1 July 1968 [A/7134], along with other disarmament measures. They would contribute to reducing tension and to halting the arms race, as well as to strengthening the security of States. These measures have a new significance because they are in keeping with the appeal made in General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), which welcomes the drafting of the final text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the same time, all these measures are in line with the deliberations of the conference of non-nuclear countries which met at Geneva last September.

52. All these initiatives were favourably received by the majority of delegations, and we are sure that their study—as proposed by the Soviet Union draft resolution [A/C.1/L.443]—would be supported by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament with a view to their being adopted in one form or another following on negotiations by that body. Yet there appears to be some doubt as to the intentions of some delegations which, instead of giving the necessary support to the clear, definite and timely proposals of the Soviet Government so that they might be adopted, are attempting to sow confusion in the discussions by speaking vaguely of the responsibilities of the nuclear States and, more specifically, of certain nuclear Powers. This perhaps enables them to avoid taking a clear and definite stand, without of course taking into account their positions on various specific problems; it may also enable

them to allay certain susceptibilities. However, we are convinced that this does not serve the interests of disarmament and international security.

53. With the apparent intention of contributing to the solution of the serious problems involved in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear disarmament, some delegations have come forward with proposals, which were also raised at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, for the establishment of a special United Nations body—an *ad hoc* committee—which would, according to them, carry out the work initiated by the Conference. This *ad hoc* committee would, according to these delegations, be entrusted with elaborating United Nations policy with regard to the peaceful use of atomic energy, and the study and preparation of measures to be taken in connexion with international security, measures which the Security Council could then implement.

54. Of course, a special body with as broad a mandate as that suggested in these statements would first of all infringe upon the competence of other United Nations specialized bodies which have hitherto done constructive work in this field, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, such a committee would also infringe on the work of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, whose discussions, despite the difficulties it has encountered owing to the present international situation, have helped to bring about such collateral measures of disarmament as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which are first steps on the road to disarmament.

55. Such suggestions, like the one regarding the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee entrusted with duties to be defined by these delegations, could lead only to confusion at a time when the most important question is the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They would certainly lead to the weakening of the efforts required for implementing that Treaty, which has already been signed by more than eighty countries.

56. In short, what seems important at present is to work towards achieving the measures already indicated and, in particular, to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, rather than to fragment our energies and establish bodies which will of necessity infringe on the competence of existing bodies and create an overlapping which is bound to be harmful.

57. For this reason, the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria considers that what should be done now is to increase the efforts to implement the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and to continue to try to bring about what have been defined as supplementary collateral measures, instead of wasting time on research which has already been done or is being done by appropriate United Nations bodies, where we have already achieved some success.

58. The delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria would not want to let slip this opportunity to support the draft resolution submitted by a number of delegations—including Canada, Poland and others—concerning the pro-

hibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons [A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3]. This problem deserves special study, since the weapons in question are becoming increasingly available to all States, thus further increasing their danger in the present situation.

59. I should not like to conclude without mentioning one further question: that of denuclearized zones. We are convinced that the multiplication of denuclearized zones, which is one of the measures considered not only by the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States but also by the General Assembly and in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union, would help to reduce regional tensions and contribute to world disarmament and security.

60. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always favoured the creation of such zones under appropriate conditions, and it is ready to participate in such an undertaking, as has been emphasized on several occasions by the authorized representatives of Bulgaria, including our Prime Minister, Mr. Todor Jivkov, who has dealt with this question for a long time.

61. These are the few comments the delegation of the People's Republic of Bulgaria wanted to make at this stage in our discussion. We are firmly convinced that instead of dissipating our efforts in diverse fields by setting up new bodies, it is now more than ever necessary to redouble our efforts to ensure the prompt and effective implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the adoption of the collateral nuclear disarmament measures which should come after it.

62. The CHAIRMAN: I wish to inform the Committee that Iran has become the seventeenth co-sponsor of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3.

63. Mr. TSURUOKA (Japan): The then Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Takeo Miki, stated on 4 October during the general debate at this twenty-third session of the General Assembly:

"Now that we are living in the nuclear age, the gravest threat to world peace is the danger of nuclear war. Nobody can doubt this. It is a matter of utmost urgency . . . to prevent this danger from becoming a reality." [1682nd plenary meeting, para. 18.]

64. The primary objective of the non-proliferation Treaty⁶ is, of course, to lessen the danger of nuclear war, but this danger cannot be completely prevented by non-proliferation alone. Unless nuclear weapons are eradicated, the spirit and intent of the non-proliferation Treaty will fall short of realization. Therefore the question we must first take up as an urgent matter in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the non-proliferation Treaty is the facilitation of nuclear disarmament, including the complete elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. In this regard the Japanese delegation notes with satisfaction that the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee attached the highest priority to the question of nuclear disarmament when it decided in August 1968 the course of its future work. My

delegation earnestly wishes the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to continue to function efficiently and contribute constructively to the achievement of disarmament, in particular in the field of nuclear weapons.

65. The Japanese Government welcomes the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America have reached agreement to conduct negotiations for the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems. It is of great significance that attention has been focused at long last on this important subject and that those two countries have agreed to initiate steps towards its solution. Here my delegation would like to add a voice in support of the statement made here a week ago by the representative of Canada, that, "we strongly urge that strategic arms limitation talks should commence before the end of the present session of the United Nations General Assembly". [1607th meeting, para. 55.]

66. This is an appropriate question for negotiations between the two countries concerned, but most other questions regarding nuclear disarmament should be treated in international forums, since the experience and the knowledge of many countries are valuable for their solution. The question of a comprehensive test ban is one of them, and is incidentally the one that Japan regards as the most important disarmament measure to be taken following the non-proliferation Treaty.

67. There have been two main obstacles, one of a political and the other of a technical nature, to the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit all nuclear weapon tests, including those conducted underground.

68. I should like to touch upon the political aspect first. One of the reasons why negotiations on this subject have not been successful so far is suspected to be the desire of some nuclear-weapon States to develop, through underground tests, technology for the production and further improvement of nuclear warheads. The fact that the two super-Powers have undertaken to consider the possibility of halting the further deployment of the already very advanced weapon systems augurs well for agreement on an underground test ban.

69. The main technical reason which has been hampering the conclusion of an underground test ban treaty is the conflict of views between the countries concerned regarding the necessity of international control, matters such as on-site inspection, verification and so on. In this regard certain agreements on some scientific points were made with regard to detection and identification by seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions at the meetings which took place in April and June 1968 in Sweden under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research in Stockholm. This was the first time that scientists from the countries most advanced in seismology, including four nuclear-weapon States, got together, and it was agreed that discrimination between nuclear explosions and earthquakes would be possible down to yields of 10 kilotons in hard rock, but studies were inconclusive as to the validity of the discrimination for yields below 10 kilotons in hard rock.

70. It is necessary to improve the seismological method of detection and identification so as to facilitate the question

⁶ See foot-note 1.

of verification. This can be done by various technological efforts, in particular methods of improving surface wave detection. The further exchange of seismological data is also very important. The Japanese Government is willing to continue playing an active role in this field.

71. Next I should like to touch upon agenda item 96, which concerns the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and its final document [*A/7277 and Corr.1*]. This Conference was convened for the purpose of considering important problems of special concern to the non-nuclear countries. These are: the questions of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

72. The prime objective of the Conference was to create a consensus among non-nuclear Powers on the three questions I have just mentioned. I believe that this objective was fairly well attained. What is now required is to implement the decisions of the Conference. It is the task of this session of the General Assembly to formulate the ways and means of implementation. These decisions cannot be implemented by the non-nuclear-weapon States alone. The nuclear-weapon States must share the responsibility in implementing these decisions as they are allowed to maintain nuclear weapons under the non-proliferation Treaty. In order to emphasize this point, let me say that for any realistic and effective implementation to be achieved, the co-operation of the nuclear Powers as well as the non-nuclear Powers is absolutely essential. Only when such co-operation is assured can the interests of the non-nuclear Powers be further promoted in regard to these three questions.

73. The Japanese delegation firmly believes that the General Assembly, in considering what resolution or resolutions should be adopted on this matter, should bear in mind the need for a continuation of co-operation and dialogue between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. In principle, the Japanese Government is in favour of creating a specific body for the implementation of the recommendations of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, if the co-operation of the nuclear Powers in such a body can be expected. However, if the effort to create such machinery at this stage results in exacerbating in any way the differences between the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers, we should not hesitate to leave consideration of this question open for a subsequent session of the General Assembly. Meanwhile, we would hope and indeed expect that through further dialogue between the nuclear and the non-nuclear Powers a realistic understanding could be achieved as to the best means of carrying out the conclusions of the non-nuclear Conference.

74. I should now like to express the views of the Japanese Government on the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, which has attracted in the past few years considerable attention. Since chemical and biological weapons are weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary not only to prohibit their use but also to reach an agreement for the banning of their production and elimination of existing stockpiles under strict and effective safeguards. We are aware that verification of the effectiveness of such measures, including the possible necessity of on-site inspection of production, is a very difficult and

complicated matter. We must, however, face this difficulty and overcome it step by step, for the potential threat of chemical and biological weapons is comparable to that of nuclear weapons. As a first step towards solving this question, the Japanese delegation fully supports the idea of a thorough study of the nature and effects of the use of chemical and biological weapons.

75. Today I have sought to express the views of the Japanese Government on some of the very important issues among numerous disarmament questions. The ultimate goal we envisage is, of course, general and complete disarmament. In order that this goal may be achieved we must not fail to take up whatever collateral disarmament measures may be feasible at a given time. Through this approach and with the fullest co-operation of all States, international tension can be eased, trust between States strengthened, and, consequently, the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States can be assured. We must strive in this way and in all other ways to foster a harmonious international environment in which the most rapid possible progress towards general and complete disarmament can be achieved. It is the firm intention of the Japanese Government to co-operate in and contribute to all international endeavours to that end.

76. Mr. SHAW (Australia): Sometimes in our discussions in the United Nations we have the feeling that we spend too much time on problems which are peripheral or regional. We understand the concern which Members feel about questions which are dear to their hearts and near to their homes, but we tend to lose sight of those problems of greatest universal significance. In short, these are food, population and disarmament.

77. In dealing with the item on disarmament in the First Committee, we bring our minds back to the terrifying implications for all mankind of new weapons of mass destruction and we ponder the crushing economic burden imposed on so many of us by these and also by the more conventional types of armaments. The self-interest, indeed the survival of mankind, requires control of armaments. Yet, we can never forget that the need for weapons arises from instincts which are deeply rooted in mankind, the instinct to compete and the instinct to survive. Self-defence and alliances for mutual protection are natural reactions of groups of mankind living in a world which has not yet attained a universal rule of law. We will move towards disarmament in so far as we achieve this rule of law, and that is one of the principal purposes of the United Nations Charter.

78. That proposition has been illustrated by the course of events of this year. A number of speakers have remarked on the activity of various bodies of the United Nations in their pursuit of aspects of disarmament and in particular the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. They have referred to the difficult, protracted but finally productive debates which went on in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and in the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly here in New York. By the middle of the year we believed that we had made progress in identifying and agreeing on those matters which had to be dealt with in order to achieve an effective non-proliferation Treaty.

79. But the modest optimism which we felt at that time was shattered by the blow to international trust and

confidence which occurred towards the end of August. The Australian Minister for External Affairs summed up the situation in his statement to the General Assembly of 9 October 1968. He said then that events in Europe had

“... brought other countries to consider whether they should strengthen their own defences and their international security arrangements... Questions are being raised throughout the world whether countries can safely enter into further agreements on arms control... The hope for co-operation between the great Powers, on which the peace-keeping system of the United Nations rests and on which the hopes of so many peoples of the world are based, has also been damaged.” [1687th plenary meeting, para. 101.]

Later the Australian Minister said:

“... what hope lies ahead of us? The truth about disarmament is that it is only possible when there is confidence. Frightened nations do not disarm. Nations that do not trust each other do not disarm. Nations that disbelieve what other nations say do not disarm. If any nation comes to this place and proposes to take the lead in a move towards disarmament it can best take that lead by establishing trust—complete trust that its pledged word will be kept, its promises will not be broken, its respect for the principles of the Charter and its observance of the procedure for peaceful settlement laid down in the Charter will be absolute and unvarying. That seems to us to be the path to disarmament.” [Ibid., para. 103.]

80. I refer briefly to the events which prompted these words only because of the statement of the representative of Hungary in this debate on 20 November [1613th meeting] when he expressed concern that the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany was a cause of international tension in Europe. To this I would simply point out that it was not the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany which in August, uninvited, marched across the frontiers of a neighbouring State with which it was at peace. I recall these happenings in a spirit not of recrimination but of regret. Others in this debate, including the representative of Norway yesterday, have remarked on the great set-back which we have suffered from recent events. But we must look forward. As the representative of Finland said on 20 November:

“The uncertainty and the sense of insecurity revealed by the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States calls for concerted efforts to rebuild international confidence.” [1613th meeting, para. 3.]

It is, then, a matter of finding our way back painfully to at least that degree of trust and confidence which existed three months ago. That way back will depend upon deeds rather than words, upon actions and developments which we all watch with anxiety. The main impediment to the recreation of confidence would be other acts and threats which would affect our judgement about the possibility of peaceful co-operation.

81. A first essential is the attainment of conditions which will allow the re-establishment of co-operation between the two great Powers. As the Australian Minister for External Affairs has made clear, so far as Australia is concerned, we see co-operation with the Soviet Union “as a basic necessity

for world peace and as a fundamental of the United Nations Charter”. [1687th plenary meeting, para. 102.]

82. We recall that the difficult path which led to the drafting of the Treaty of 1963 for the partial banning of nuclear tests and explosions,⁷ the Treaty of 1967 on outer space⁸ and the Treaty of 1968 to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons,⁹ led through bilateral talks between Moscow and Washington and then on to wider discussions within the relevant bodies of the United Nations. It is apparent that if there is to be international agreement about the limitation of costly missile delivery systems this is a matter in the first instance for the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. We join with others who express the hope that international conditions will allow these two nuclear Powers to proceed with the discussions which were proposed originally by the United States about the limitation of missile systems on a mutual basis. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States adopted a resolution to this effect [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (III), resolution D].

83. In addition to bilateral discussions between those two great Powers which bear the responsibility for the wielding of overwhelming force, the other road back to disarmament lies in the continuation of the painstaking work already done on detailed and practical measures which would be acceptable to the international community on a wider basis. I refer to the activities of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

84. As the Australian Minister for External Affairs said on 9 October 1968:

“We would welcome and be responsive to any move which would be likely to bring about a reduction in the economic burden that armaments place on the economies of all nations, any move which would replace a system of security resting on the deterrent influence of armed strength by a system resting on the certainty that procedures of peaceful settlement of disputes would be followed. But the smaller nations of the world want more than words. If the approach to disarmament is to be step by step, then each step must be seen to be effective. It is not enough in establishing confidence to promise to perform an act of disarmament or to offer to submit to control. There is the need too for effective inspection and verification to show that the step has in fact been taken and that the control has in fact been applied and obeyed. Above all, there has to be faith that proposals for disarmament are made not to serve the advantage of one but to lessen the dangers of all.” [1687th plenary meeting, para. 104.]

85. It is with these principles in mind that we examine the proposals and documents now before this Committee. A number of our items refer to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We are pleased to note that the Committee has succeeded in

⁷ Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 480 (1963), No. 6964).

⁸ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), annex).

⁹ See foot-note 1.

drawing up an outline for its future work. We hope that this agenda will facilitate the search of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for further measures of disarmament. Australia continues to believe that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate body in which detailed disarmament negotiations should take place. The expertise which this body has developed over a long period benefits all Members of this Organization. Agreement for effective and controlled disarmament should be concluded as soon as they are feasible. Each succeeding agreement increases the value of those which had preceded it.

86. One of the issues which has been on our agenda for many years is the question of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. Australia regrets that the present Treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water has not been accepted by all of the nuclear Powers and that indeed two of them, Communist China and France, continue to test in the atmosphere in defiance of world opinion. The attitude of Communist China in particular causes grave concern to the countries of Asia and the Pacific. Not only has Communist China continued to develop nuclear weapons but there seems no prospect that it will agree to participate in international agreements such as that partial test ban Treaty or the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

87. Australia has watched with great interest recent developments in the field of seismology to see whether they might help the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. With all respect to views expressed here by some other delegations, we are not yet convinced that, in order to ensure compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty, national means of detection would be an adequate substitute for some form of effective international supervision and control. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were to agree with the generally accepted opinion that effective control involving some inspections is necessary the prospects for agreement would be enhanced.

88. A related aspect of this question is the status of peaceful nuclear explosions. In recent years the development of technology by some of the nuclear Powers has indicated the possibility of effective use of nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. This has given rise to discussions as to the most effective means by which the benefits of nuclear explosions could be made available to non-nuclear countries, including the developing countries. As a result of the discussions on the non-proliferation Treaty, and in various United Nations forums, it is now accepted that suitable provisions should be made to this end.

89. Australia is a large country, indeed a continent. Not only do practical possibilities exist for the use of nuclear explosive devices to assist our economic development, but we could use them in conditions of comparative safety so far as neighbouring people are concerned. Some delegations have suggested that a new international body might be set up to control the provision of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. In the view of the Australian delegation this is not a necessary corollary of the accepted proposition that nuclear explosive services should be made available to non-nuclear countries. It is clear, and the non-proliferation Treaty itself makes it clear, that provision for bilateral

arrangements can and should be made. The important thing about the provision of peaceful explosive devices by the nuclear Powers is that this should be carried out under appropriate international arrangements.

90. Speaking on this matter before the First Committee at the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly on 17 May 1968, I said that these international arrangements "need go no further than to provide appropriate assurances on safety and an adequate demonstration that the explosions will not be used for nuclear weapons development". [1570th meeting, para. 28.] In an explanation of vote on the declaration of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States [see A/7277 and Corr.1, para. 17 (V), resolution N], the Australian representative also expressed his understanding on this same point that appropriate and effective international control would, in the Australian view, mean "international observation and such other health and safety measures and such safeguards responsibilities as may be given to the International Atomic Energy Agency". [20th plenary meeting of the Conference.]

91. The delegation of Australia has noted the interest shown by a number of other speakers concerning the need to study the reservation of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. We support the view, as I said in my statement to this Committee on the sea-bed item on 29 October [1589th meeting, para. 87], that the disarmament aspects of this question could appropriately be discussed by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

92. A number of delegations have referred to the comments made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report on the need for a study to explore and weigh the dangers of chemical and biological weapons. The Secretary-General said that such a study

"... could also serve to clarify the issues in an area which has become increasingly complex. Certainly a wider and deeper understanding of the dangers posed by these weapons could be an important element in knowing how best to deal with them."¹⁰

We have noted that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament agreed to recommend¹¹ that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. The Australian Government supports the proposal for the appointment of such an expert group. We note that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3 have given substance in operative paragraph 1 to the views of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and of the Secretary-General. Australia, which has been a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol¹² since 1930, supports a constructive approach to this question, free from the emotive and propagandist overtones

¹⁰ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Supplement No. 1A*, para. 32.

¹¹ See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1967 and 1968*, document DC/231, para. 26.

¹² Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, done at Geneva on 17 June 1925 (League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. XCIV, 1929, No. 2138).

which some delegations have introduced into our discussions. It would seem to us that the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/L.444 and Add.1-3 provide an adequate basis for a study of the questions involved and that it may not be wise for this Committee to attempt to prejudge the nature and results of that study by setting out detailed terms of reference.

93. Concerning the question of the elimination of foreign military bases in the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Australian delegation agrees that this subject might be discussed in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. As the Australian representative pointed out in this Committee on 18 December 1967, the question in our view is:

"intricately bound up with the sovereign right of States to conclude such arrangements with other States as they may consider necessary for their own security, and no doubt this aspect would have to be considered in any Disarmament Committee study of this question."
[1555th meeting, para. 93.]

It is clear that the presence of foreign troops and military bases without the invitation of the State concerned is a very different matter.

94. A number of delegations have referred to the memorandum [A/7134] dated 1 July presented by the USSR which is referred to in document A/C.1/L.443 and which is known to member countries, not least because it is attached to the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. Obviously many of the issues which are included in the Soviet memorandum are proper subjects for study by the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and by Governments generally. All members of this Committee have their own views on how various disarmament questions should be solved, but none of us would expect that our own views, whatever importance we attach to them, should necessarily be the subject of a welcoming resolution by the General Assembly. Moreover members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have ample opportunity to have their proposals considered appropriately under the agreed agenda of that Committee.

95. Having discussed some of the particular subject items on our agenda, I should like now to turn to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, the report of which is contained in document A/7277 and Corr.1. When the proposal was first made for the convening of such a conference Australia abstained on the resolution that was adopted [General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI)]. We had some doubts as to the efficiency of a conference which did not include the nuclear Powers as full participating members. When it was decided to proceed with the holding of such a conference, Australia participated with other Member States and sent appropriate experts to assist in the discussions. We believe that the Conference served a useful purpose in bringing together a wide range of views on matters affecting security, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

96. Some of the issues that were faced by the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States were particularly difficult. On the question of further assurances for the

non-nuclear Powers several draft resolutions were introduced but in the end only one of them was able to command a substantial measure of support—that which basically reaffirmed the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

97. On this matter we have to be realistic and recognize that at this particular juncture it may not be possible to achieve any new system of security arrangements beyond that which the major Powers were able to agree upon under the Charter itself and under Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968.

98. This issue is closely related to the question of controlled and balanced disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. In this context I recall the words of the leader of the Australian delegation to the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States on 11 September 1968. He said:

"It is not necessarily in our common interest to concentrate our attention solely on reducing the threat of nuclear aggression in isolation from other more conventional forms of aggression. If we do that I think we might find ourselves threatening to disturb a situation of relative equilibrium which, though anything but perfect, is not something to be upset unless we are quite sure of what we are heading for." [5th meeting of Committee I.]

99. To this extent the Australian delegation would not favour the holding of a security conference in an attempt to work out some new declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons. We believe that recent discussions in this field have shown, understandably in our view, that whatever the fears and preoccupations of non-nuclear Powers such a declaration would be unenforceable and would not provide the security for which non-nuclear countries are striving.

100. We have listened with interest to the proposals that have been made by a number of delegations for the establishment of a committee to continue the work of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States and perhaps to prepare for further conferences. In this connexion we think it pertinent to recall that the declaration of the Conference did not include a proposal to that effect because it was not possible to reach general agreement on it. We do not see the need to create separate machinery in the form of a new committee which would compete with those organs already existing to deal with these issues. We are not persuaded by arguments that such new machinery would not duplicate the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and other bodies referred to in the resolutions of the Conference.

101. Following the introduction of proposals at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States that a new organization, or a new United Nations special committee, be established to oversee the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Australian representative said:

"We recognize that these proposals are made as a responsible move to meet the great problems of accelerating and enlarging the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. But these problems are specifically those for which the International Atomic Energy Agency was established."
[4th meeting of Committee II.]

102. Concerning the wide range of matters relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, this statement remains the Australian position. We have noted that the General Conference of IAEA held recently in Vienna took into account the views expressed at the Geneva Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. The Agency will no doubt remain mindful of the views of its membership, which is broadly the same as the membership of the United Nations itself. Concerning other disarmament and security aspects, the United Nations would seem competent to deal with these, through the First Committee, through the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and perhaps through the United Nations Disarmament Commission at some future date.

103. We think it would be appropriate for this Committee to recommend to the General Assembly that the resolutions of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States be noted and that, where appropriate, they should be drawn to the attention of the relevant international organizations, such as the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and IAEA. In our view, if the Secretary-General were to appoint, as recommended by the Conference, an expert panel to examine the wide range of possible peaceful uses of nuclear energy, such a study should be carried out in close co-operation with IAEA. The suggestions made by the Conference will be taken up in the reports of the appropriate bodies and we shall consider their comments. Further consideration of all the questions raised by the Conference resolutions might be the subject of an agenda item at a subsequent session of the General Assembly.

104. Although the non-proliferation Treaty is not formally on the agenda of this Committee, it is clear that recent events have had an effect upon the consideration of the draft by many nations. If that Treaty is to become an effective instrument, the atmosphere of trust will have to be reinstated. Furthermore, if the non-proliferation Treaty, or any other international instrument in the disarmament field, is to serve the purposes which are sought, it must be widely accepted by those on whom its ultimate success will depend.

105. In conclusion, I would say that Australia tries to take a realistic and practical view of this great world problem of how to achieve controlled and effective disarmament. We acknowledge and respect the special responsibilities of the great nuclear-weapon States and we would welcome the attainment of conditions of trust within which they could resume their co-operative efforts for further measures of disarmament. We are aware also of the responsibilities of all Member States. We believe that we have a common interest in the preservation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly those relating to the independence of nations and their territorial integrity, sovereignty and freedom from interference from outside. Strict adherence to those principles would provide the best hope for progress

towards a world community in which we might be spared the dangers and the burdens of the arms race.

Organization of work

106. The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting I should like to make a statement.

107. Members of the Committee will recall that at the 1588th meeting, on 28 October, it was decided that the discussion on disarmament would be interrupted on a date to be fixed by the Chairman after consultations, in order that the Committee might take up the invitation aspects of the consideration of item 25—the Korean question. As I stated at the time, it was understood that all relevant proposals relating to the invitation aspects, such as those contained in documents A/C.1/L.422 and Add.1-3, A/C.1/L.423 and A/C.1/L.424, would be considered at that time.

108. On that basis, and after having held consultations with a number of delegations, I propose to interrupt the debate on disarmament on Monday, 25 November, so that the Committee may take up those proposals. We could then start the debate on Monday morning, continue it on Monday afternoon and night and bring it to a close at noon on Tuesday, 26 November. That would enable the Committee to have explanations of vote and proceed to the actual voting on Tuesday afternoon. I would hope that we would not need to meet on Tuesday night to complete such statements. In that case the vote would take place on Wednesday, 27 November, by noon at the latest, so that on Wednesday afternoon, if not in the morning, the Committee could resume discussion of item 26, dealing with the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and on the items relating to disarmament. In order to follow that schedule it would further be my intention to propose at the first meeting, on Monday morning, 25 November, that we should close the list of speakers at 1 p.m. on that same day.

109. I regret very much having to propose such a strict schedule to the Committee, but I feel that we have no option, in view of the fact that there is less than a month before the end of the session and we have not yet been able to complete consideration of any of the items assigned to us. I therefore count very much on the understanding and co-operation of all members of the Committee.

110. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee so decides.

It was so decided.

111. The CHAIRMAN: I would invite members of the Committee who wish to take part in the discussion which is to start on Monday morning to give their names to the Secretariat.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.