



General Assembly

Seventy-seventh session

First Committee

27th meeting

Tuesday, 1 November 2022, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Pieris(Sri Lanka)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 90 to 108 (continued)

Action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: This morning the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and draft decisions submitted under agenda items 90 to 108. We will be guided by the same procedure agreed upon at our meeting on 28 October (see A/C.1/77/PV.25). We will begin by hearing from the delegations that requested the floor to explain their votes after the voting on the draft proposals submitted under cluster 2, entitled “Other weapons of mass destruction”, as listed in informal paper No. 1/Rev.2. Thereafter, the Committee will take action on the draft resolutions and draft decisions under cluster 2 and then will consider the proposals that are contained in informal paper No.2/Rev.2, which has been circulated to delegations electronically. I would like to remind delegations that an additional meeting of the Committee will take place this afternoon at 3 p.m. in this conference room to facilitate the progress of our work.

Mr. Turner (United States of America): I would like to explain in advance our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”. Like most every United Nations Member State, the United States places great value on preserving the integrity and independence of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism. In recent years,

we have seen the use of chemical weapons in Iraq, Malaysia, Russia, Syria and the United Kingdom. That, combined with the experience of the coronavirus disease pandemic and the risk that revolutionary advances in the life sciences might be misused for biological weapons, underscores the need for effective international mechanisms to investigate the possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons.

In the First Committee in 2020 and 2021, the Russian Federation proposed draft resolutions (A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 and A/C.1/76/L.54) that would have seriously undermined the Secretary-General’s Mechanism. Fortunately, a cross-regional group of countries defeated the draft resolutions by an overwhelming margin. This year, however, Russia has once again submitted a draft resolution that would have an identical impact in terms of undermining the integrity, independence and impartial character of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism. The draft resolution — specifically operative paragraph 3 — would launch a formal process for United Nations Member States to critique the guidelines and procedures of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism without a compelling reason.

The existing technical guidelines and procedures, which have been endorsed by the General Assembly, already contain a provision for being updated, when and if necessary. Currently, any Member State can share its views with the Secretary-General or nominate consultant experts to provide assistance. The existing guidelines and procedures have functioned well, most recently in the investigation of the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2013. There is no need to create a

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new procedure, especially one that could easily become politicized and weaken the credibility of the Mechanism. It is worth noting that the specific language calling for this type of review was rejected overwhelmingly by the First Committee in 2020 and 2021.

Russia's actions in various multilateral arms control forums raise further concerns about the underlying intentions of the draft resolution. For example, at the August 2021 Meeting of Experts of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC), Russia issued a paper that insisted that all requests by BWC States parties for an investigation must go through the Security Council, where Russia, of course, enjoys the right of the veto. The paper also proposes creating a duplicative, competing investigatory mechanism. It is clear that Russia does not intend to stop with the first step of critiquing the technical procedures and guidelines of the Secretary-General's Mechanism. Instead, Russia will continue to press to steadily strip away the Secretary-General's prerogative to lead any review process in an objective manner.

For these reasons, the United States will against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, as a whole, as well as operative paragraph 3. We strongly encourage other delegations that value maintaining a strong, independent Mechanism to do likewise.

Mrs. Hofírková (Czechia): I would like to deliver an explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons".

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the States members of the European Union (EU). The following countries also align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Georgia, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom.

We have taken note with concern of the draft resolution proposed by the Russian Federation (A/C.1/77/L.69). This is the third consecutive year that Russia has submitted such a proposal. The two previous ones (A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1 and A/C.1/76/L.54) were rejected by a wide margin of votes from all regions. The aim and purpose of the initiative remains unchanged, and it risks undermining the Secretary-General's

Mechanism. The EU member States fully support the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) as key pillars of the international rules-based system and the Secretary-General's Mechanism and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons as key components of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

In particular, the EU is a long-standing supporter of the Secretary-General's Mechanism, as an independent international instrument to carry out investigations in response to the possible use of chemical, biological or toxin weapons. A crucial aspect of its guidelines and procedures is that they authorize the Secretary-General to decide autonomously whether to launch an investigation, whereby prior approval from the Security Council is not required. That independence of the Mechanism is a vital guarantee for United Nations Member States in that, if they request an investigation into the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons, the launch of the investigation cannot be blocked by another Member State for any reason, owing to political motives.

At this time, the EU does not see a specific need to update the guidelines and procedures of the Secretary-General's Mechanism or to take a first step in that direction for the following reasons.

First, the draft resolution proposed suggests that the guidelines may need to be adapted in the light of scientific and technological developments that have been made since their endorsement in 1990. Russia has never specifically identified such developments. The draft resolution does not mention that the guidelines were actually reviewed and updated in 2007. Furthermore, the guidelines worked adequately in a real-world situation in 2013 with regard to investigations in Syria where the Al-Assad regime used chemical weapons under the political protection of the Russian Federation. Moreover, the capstone simulation exercise conducted in September 2022 under the auspices of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) demonstrated the operational readiness of the Mechanism. It is therefore unclear why there should be a pressing need to start a process possibly leading to a review.

Secondly, we question the motives behind the proposal. On numerous occasions in the past, it has been shown that the objective of Russia is not to strengthen the Secretary-General's Mechanism but to undermine

its independence. For instance, at the 2019 Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Russia criticized any further development and strengthening of the Secretary-General's Mechanism. In 2020, Russia carried out measures opposing the work done by the UNODA with the help of several United Nations Member States to strengthen the Secretary-General's Mechanism. At the 2021 BTWC Meeting of Experts, a total of three working papers proposing the establishment of new investigative mechanisms or instruments were submitted in view of the ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BTWC. Incidentally, two of those proposals were made by the Russian Federation. We consider it key to ensure that the results of the BTWC Review Conference are consistent with the way in which the only currently existing instrument for the investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons works.

This year, we see no change in the ulterior motive behind the draft resolution. For these reasons, we do not support the proposed draft resolution, which raises serious concerns in both form and content, and we will vote against it. We call on all States not to support it.

Ms. Mustafa (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic has taken the floor in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55. For the eighth consecutive year, its sponsors have pushed it towards extremism and away from a balanced and neutral character. Its language has increased in its disregard for the position of many Member States, as if it were the sponsors' own draft resolution. We had hoped that the draft resolution would address Syria's success in the total elimination of its chemical programme, reflect my country's continuous cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and not blindly disregard the fact that terrorist groups, such as Da'esh, Al-Nusra Front and other affiliated groups such as the White Helmets, have actually used chemical weapons in Syria against civilians and the Syrian Arab Army.

The delegation of the Syrian Arab Republic participated in the first and only round of negotiations organized by the sponsors of the draft resolution. My country's delegation, along with many other delegations, expressed our main concern about the politicization of the draft resolution, which is what we

reject, as we believe in the importance of maintaining the neutrality and integrity of our Organization. However, the Polish delegation maintained the pre-negotiation version of the draft resolution without any amendment. It ignored the delegations' concerns about the text. The Polish delegation also cancelled the second round of negotiations, which was supposed to be held on 12 October. My country's delegation regrets the attitude of the delegation that is introducing the draft resolution, as it still uses new language that my delegation and many other delegations reject for logical and objective reasons.

I would like to highlight some of the controversial aspects retained in the draft resolution and on which we circulated our comments on 19 October. As was the case last year, the draft resolution refers to the unjust decision issued by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which is illegitimate given that it was adopted by only 45 per cent of the States parties to the CWC. That is in contradiction to all other resolutions that were unanimously adopted. It also creates a precedent in the history of the Organization against one country that has voluntarily acceded to the CWC and met all the obligations thereunder. The draft resolution refers to the OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, which has adopted defective methods of work and relied entirely on open sources and false and misleading information provided by terrorist organizations. Therefore, its conclusions lacked credibility and were not accepted by the Security Council, and its mandate has not been renewed since 2017.

Nevertheless, to date, the delegation of Poland insists on referring to the reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism in the draft resolution. The draft resolution also refers to the Investigation and Identification Team, which was illegally established through the manipulation of provisions of the CWC. It is not acceptable in any way that voting would become a means to introducing amendments to the CWC, to which the States parties have acceded, based on its ratified provisions and mandate which does not include the responsibility of the Organization to identify those who use chemical weapons.

Once again, the introducer of the draft resolution insists on retaining the paragraph on Syria's initial declaration notwithstanding its technical nature, while ignoring the fact that the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) was established to assist the Syrian

side. Significant time and effort have been dedicated to addressing a number of issues pertaining to the declaration, which are still under discussion between the Syrian National Authority and the DAT. There are no final conclusions on those issues yet and therefore prejudicial conclusions cannot be drawn about them.

The country introducing the draft resolution has continued to broadly politicize the text by targeting other countries, such as the Russian Federation. That represents a dangerous escalation that could worsen in the future — any country could be targeted and accused of using chemical weapons. This year's draft resolution also takes note of decision C-26/DEC.10 of the twenty-sixth Conference of the States Parties, of 1 December 2021, entitled "Understanding regarding the aerosolised use of central nervous system-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes".

My delegation expressed its deep concern in The Hague about the hasty submission of the draft resolution, which presents legal ambiguities and technical doubts, constituting as it does a breach of the CWC. Taking all of this into consideration, we believe that the draft resolution is biased and non-objective and has strayed far from its technical purpose. My delegation will therefore vote against the politicized paragraphs, that is, the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 18. We will also vote against the draft resolution as a whole, because it contains those politicized paragraphs. We call on Member States to vote against those controversial sections in order to ensure that the draft resolution is neutral and based on consensus, and to protect the work of the United Nations from the politicization that certain States parties to the OPCW try to impose on it.

In conclusion, my delegation categorically rejects the baseless accusations made by the representative of Czechia on behalf of the European Union. She also used certain terms that are lacking in diplomatic courtesy and reflect political ignorance.

Mr. Padilla González (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The delegation of Cuba would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction". While we agree with its overall objectives and remain fully committed to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, we regret that

we are unable to support the draft resolution this year because it remains unbalanced.

We reiterate that the sole text that we have in the First Committee to consider the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention should contain balanced language, which would once again enable a consensus-based adoption of the text. This year, the Cuban delegation will again abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 and vote against the sixth preambular paragraph and operative paragraphs 2,3,4,5 and 18.

Once again, the draft resolution ignores the fact that the Syrian Government has cooperated in the destruction of all its chemical weapons and production facilities. We reiterate that outstanding technical issues concerning Syria's declaration should be resolved in the context of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and in line with its procedures, without bias or politicization. We reiterate our objection to creating hasty mechanisms that are not consensus-based, without considering the opinions of all States parties to the Convention. That sets a very negative precedent.

With regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 3, we remain opposed to the singling out of any one particular State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention for the use of such weapons, without an independent, impartial and comprehensive investigation, conducted by the OPCW, based on reliable proof and evidence collected on site, in line with the Convention. Concerning operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 18, we believe that elements that do not enjoy consensus in the OPCW should not be considered here in the First Committee. We underscore that the Committee is not mandated to endorse or take action on the outcomes of reports submitted to the Security Council that are not based on a thorough on-site investigation, in line with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3, which was adopted at the fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, held in 2018, was not supported by all States parties to the Convention. The decision goes beyond the privileges granted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat in line with the Convention and attempts to change its technical mandate.

We urge States to end this politicization and polarization, which affect the work of the OPCW and the full implementation of the Charter. At the same

time, we reiterate our categorical rejection of the use of chemical weapons and advocate their full, irreversible and verifiable destruction.

Mr. Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): As a State that has been involved with the Chemical Weapons Convention from its inception, the Russian Federation firmly believes that this international legal instrument is a key part of chemical disarmament and non-proliferation. We have consistently advocated for strengthening it. However, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) now faces an extremely complex situation. The OPCW was once an authoritative international structure. In 2013, it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It was a forum in which decisions were always made by consensus. The organization has ended up being divided as a result of politicization, a blurring of mandates and a departure from the provisions of the Convention. A number of States for all intents and purposes have reformatted the organization to fit their own narrow geopolitical circumstances.

A clear example of the politicization of the work of the OPCW is the draft resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is considered in the First Committee every year. Year after year, we and a number of other States have called on the authors of the document to finally start taking it seriously and to make the necessary efforts to re-establish its formerly consensus-based nature. No one has any illusions that that will be easy, but a failure to act in this situation is the very height of irresponsibility.

This year our calls once again fell on deaf ears. Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 saw only a single round of consultations, while specific proposals for improving the text made by Member States, including the Russian Federation, were simply ignored. The draft resolution contains politicized language with baseless accusations aimed at various States parties to the Convention acting in good faith. That is wholly unacceptable. It is a road to nowhere. And there was not even a hint in the draft resolution of an appeal to the last remaining State possessing chemical weapons, the United States, to complete the process of destroying its chemical stockpiles as rapidly as possible. That is blatantly unbalanced.

The Russian Federation continues to believe that the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons

Convention had no legal basis for conferring attributive powers, which are non-existent and not provided for in the Convention, on the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The decision of the fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention and all subsequent actions based on it are therefore in direct violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Charter of the United Nations.

The new operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, based on decision C-26/DEC.10 of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the States Parties, makes reference to chemical agents that act on the central nerve system. In our view, that is incompatible with the Convention's provisions. Instead of our constructive proposals for formulating within the OPCW an overview of those types of chemicals and exactly what compounds come under that category, the United States decided to impose a vote on the decision.

With regard to our rejection of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, we have repeatedly voiced our opinion during this session of the First Committee and at The Hague. I will therefore simply say the paragraph in question is a fantasy created by its authors with no relation to reality, just as it was last year. The Russian Federation urges all responsible Member States to support the Chemical Weapons Convention and vote against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, which in its current form is nothing more than a tool for deepening the current schism in the OPCW, further blurring its mandate and undermining the foundation and principles of the Convention.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that we are not prepared to agree with transforming the OPCW into a tool for exerting political pressure that works only in the interest of a single group of States. We will continue to make every effort to re-establish the rule of international law, support the integrity of the Convention and resume the regular work of the OPCW.

Mr. Kulkarni (India): India has supported draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", given the high importance that India attaches to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and all its provisions in addressing concerns regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons. India has always maintained that any use of chemical weapons

represents a complete disregard for humankind and is reprehensible and contrary to the provisions of the CWC as well as accepted international norms. India is against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anybody and under any circumstances. The perpetrators of such abhorrent acts must be held accountable.

India attaches great importance to upholding the integrity of the CWC and avoiding the politicization of issues related to it. With regard to any allegations of use and the consequences in that regard, we believe that the provisions and procedures laid down in the Convention should be strictly adhered to by the OPCW and that concerns should be addressed on a basis of cooperation among all parties concerned. The draft resolution traditionally received consensus support, so it is a matter of regret that its consensus nature has been negatively affected by the inclusion of contentious issues in its operative part. We hope that will change for the better in the future.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.74, “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction”, India attaches great importance to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as the first global and non-discriminatory disarmament convention prohibiting an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. India would like to underline the important role of international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities and the related exchange of scientific and technical information, as provided for in article X of the BWC. India believes that the full and effective implementation of article X of the Convention is important for generating equitable benefits for States parties, especially developing countries. The ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the BWC, to be held later this year, will be an opportunity to engage on all aspects of the BWC, including various areas that have been under discussion in the framework of the Convention. India believes that any matter relating to obligations under the BWC should be addressed according to the provisions of the Convention and through consultations and cooperation among all the parties concerned.

India has underlined that the financial stability of the Convention is essential to its full and effective implementation. India urges all States parties to make their annual assessed contributions in full and on time. The budget of the BWC must be supported through

contributions by States parties. India looks forward to the review of the decision on the establishment of a working capital fund by the ninth Review Conference of the BWC.

Mr. Sivamohan (Malaysia): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, which we thank Poland for submitting. Malaysia reaffirms its condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Any use or threat of use of such abhorrent weapons of mass destruction is totally unacceptable and in flagrant contravention of international law, in particular the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As a State party to the CWC, Malaysia remains firmly committed to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention. The CWC is a landmark instrument proscribing a type of weapon of mass destruction, and its compliance and verification provisions are important in assuring the global community of the effectiveness of the Convention. There can be no impunity for the re-emergence of chemical weapons, and those responsible must be held to account. That is vital to the preservation of the established international norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Malaysia reiterates its full support for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as the sole body mandated to undertake investigations with regard to the use of chemical weapons. The OPCW plays a critical role in ensuring the attainment of the CWC’s overarching objective, namely the complete exclusion of any possibility of the use of chemical weapons. The cooperation of all the parties concerned is essential in facilitating the OPCW’s impartial and thorough investigation of any incident.

We have taken note of the decision adopted during the Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, held in June 2018, which empowered the OPCW with an attribution mandate. Nonetheless, my delegation reiterates that every decision and action taken at the OPCW must remain within the parameters delineated by the provisions of the Convention. It is vital for the OPCW, a technical organization held in high esteem, to be protected from politicization or any other extraneous influence in discharging its responsibilities.

Consistent with its position during previous sessions of the First Committee, Malaysia will abstain in the voting on operative paragraphs 2, 3, 5 and 18 of the present draft text. Malaysia further notes the inclusion of a new operative paragraph 6 on decision C-26/DEC.10 of the twenty-sixth session of the Conference of the States Parties, entitled “Understanding regarding the aerosolized use of central nervous system acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes”, of 1 December 2021. Having supported that decision, my delegation will vote in favour of operative paragraph 6. We will also vote in favour of the draft resolution as a whole.

Ms. Nam (New Zealand): I take the floor to explain New Zealand’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

New Zealand remains a strong supporter of the Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism and the essential complement it provides both to the Chemical Weapons Convention and in particular to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Regretfully, New Zealand is once again obliged to vote against the draft resolution. A vote against the draft resolution does not reflect any lack of support at all for the mechanism itself but rather our concern that the draft resolution again seeks to politicize and undermine the mechanism, as well as the existing international framework governing chemical weapons. We are disappointed that the overwhelming opposition to the draft resolution on the same topic in 2020 and 2021 did not result in the draft resolution being dropped altogether. We also regret that the draft resolution again fails to acknowledge the developments that have taken place in respect of the Secretary-General’s mechanism, for example the updated technical appendices to its original guidelines and procedures, the maintenance of a list of qualified experts and the holding of relevant training courses. New Zealand cannot support a draft resolution that misrepresents the important developments that have taken place to ensure that the mechanism remains fit for purpose, as proved, for example, by its use in 2013 in Syria. For those reasons, New Zealand opposes draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69 and will vote against it.

Mr. Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Iran reaffirms its strong

support for and commitment to the CWC as a unique multilateral agreement that has not only codified and reinforced international norms against chemical weapons but also made remarkable progress in their elimination, while also providing a framework for international cooperation and exchange in scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities among States parties, for peaceful purposes.

Concerning the draft proposal, it is essential to preserve the CWC’s effectiveness, and its implementing institution, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), should be upheld and promoted. Indeed, the draft resolution is expected to serve that purpose. However, it is unfortunately being used for political ends rather than to contribute to the CWC’s implementation. It is being used to highlight controversial issues and deepen divisions among States parties rather than to move them towards consensus. The draft text contributes to further confrontation and polarization among States parties, rather than uniting them around the main objectives of the CWC. It advocates a particular point of view on issues on which opinions differ substantially among member States, rather than providing an opportunity for balanced and professional detachment from such positions. It has been drafted in such a manner as to align with specific political views that are held only by a group of States parties, thereby polarizing the OPCW and attempting to shape the Technical Secretariat into a political organ rather than a technical implementation body.

The Islamic Republic of Iran condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. However, the condemnation of a State party to the Convention that has extended its unprecedented cooperation to the OPCW by destroying its chemical stockpiles in the shortest possible time is not acceptable, because such condemnation is based on unproved assumptions and unsubstantiated claims. A strict observance of the principles of impartiality and independence and the preservation of the integrity of the chain of custody are of the utmost importance in conducting investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons and drawing a reliable professional conclusion. Some of those principles were not observed in preparing the related reports. Instead of relying on authorized information, conclusions were based on speculation, assumptions, remote assessments, interviews held with certain people and the receipt of information from open sources and terrorist groups.

That seriously undermines the reliability and credibility of the reports and their conclusions.

My delegation will vote against the draft resolution, as several of its paragraphs are highly politicized and reflect decisions that we cannot support. We hope that the politicization of the draft resolution and of the work of the OPCW will be put to an end, thereby enabling the Committee to adopt a consensus-based resolution on the CWC's implementation at its future sessions. To revive a consensus-based draft resolution, as in the past, Iran and a group of countries offered constructive proposals, based on the language agreed by the CWC and the OPCW. But unfortunately, as in previous years, none of them were reflected in the draft resolution.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.11, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol". I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.11 was submitted on 22 September by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.11.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,

Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Israel, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.11 was adopted by 182 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliot (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 was submitted on 12 October by the representative of Poland. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.55.

The Chair: Separate votes have been requested on the sixth preambular paragraph and on paragraphs 2,

3, 4, 5, 6 and 18 of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55. We shall now begin the voting process. I shall put those paragraphs to the vote, one by one. I now put to the vote the sixth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Uzbekistan

The sixth preambular paragraph was retained by 117 votes to 7, with 33 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against; the delegation of Equatorial Guinea informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I now put to the vote paragraph 2.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Zambia

Against:

Armenia, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,

Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zimbabwe

Paragraph 2 was retained by 88 votes to 10, with 63 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against; the delegation of Equatorial Guinea informed the Secretariat that it had intended to abstain.]

The Chair: I now put to the vote paragraph 3.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen

Against:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran

(Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 3 was retained by 114 votes to 9, with 31 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.]

The Chair: I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bhutan, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 4 was retained by 114 votes to 8, with 33 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.]

The Chair: I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 5.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Bolivia (Plurinational State of), China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 5 was retained by 107 votes to 9, with 38 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.]

The Chair: I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 6.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,

Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen

Against:

China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 6 was retained by 117 votes to 5, with 31 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.]

The Chair: I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 18.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,

Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic

Abstaining:

Algeria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Togo, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Operative paragraph 18 was retained by 111 votes to 7, with 38 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Belarus informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.]

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,

Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against:

China, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Mongolia, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, as a whole, was adopted by 156 votes to 6, with 18 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.60, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.60 was submitted by the representative of India on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.60. The additional sponsors are listed on the e-deleGATE

portal of the First Committee. The Comoros, Eritrea and Zambia have also become sponsors.

The Chair: The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.60 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.64, entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.64 was submitted by the representatives of France and Germany on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.64. The additional sponsors are listed on the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. The Comoros has also become a sponsor.

The Chair: A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,

Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Türkiye, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Iran (Islamic Republic of), Syrian Arab Republic

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.64 was adopted by 180 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69 was submitted by the representative of the Russian Federation on 13 October. A statement on the programme budget implications of the draft resolution has been issued as document A/C.1/77/L.78 and is available on the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.69. The additional sponsors are listed on the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

The Chair: A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, China, Congo, Cuba, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia

Operative paragraph 3 was rejected by 63 votes to 27, with 70 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Madagascar informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, as amended, as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

Against:

Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining:

Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eswatini, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,

Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, as amended, as a whole, was rejected by 65 votes to 30, with 77 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Madagascar informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chair: We will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.74, entitled "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction".

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Ms. Elliott (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.74 was submitted by the representative of Hungary on 13 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/77/L.74.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the First Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.74 was adopted.

The Chair: I now call on delegations wishing to explain their vote or position after the vote.

Mr. Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran): Iran abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.64, entitled "Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive resources". My delegation fully supports the main objective of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.64 and a comprehensive approach to protecting radioactive sources and nuclear facilities, not only during armed conflict but also against any sporadic attacks or sabotage in both war and peacetime.

However, in order to preserve global consensus on the issue, it is important to avoid overloading the text of the draft resolution with unrelated matters. The topic of nuclear security is mostly technical in nature and properly dealt with at the General Conference of

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, the subject matter of the draft proposal has already been covered by draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.60, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”. We encourage the sponsors to refrain from introducing issues into the draft resolution that are technical and that should be considered exclusively within the IAEA.

In the light of that, it would be advantageous to change the relevant preambular paragraph to include protection against armed attack and sabotage. We have discussed our textual amendments with the main sponsors of the draft and we expect those proposals to be incorporated into the draft to be submitted next time.

We support and voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”. The draft resolution contains particularly positive paragraphs that among other things condemn any use of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins as weapons by anyone, anywhere and at any time, and urge for holding those responsible for any such use to account. The draft resolution urges all States parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention to prioritize full compliance with all of their obligations undertaken pursuant to those Conventions. It also contains paragraphs calling on States parties to the BWC to continue their efforts to strengthen that agreement, including by resuming multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory, legally binding protocol to the Convention dealing with all articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner through effective verification measures, among other things.

Last but not least, the draft resolution contains paragraphs encouraging Member States to assess the effectiveness of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons and the implementation of its guidelines and procedures, while taking into account the relevant provisions of those Conventions.

We would like to underline that the world has consistently seen the Security Council and the Secretariat abused by the United States and Western countries. We believe that the independence and impartiality of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism are imperative. Given that the Mechanism is very

much dependent on the financial contributions of some Western countries and that the United States has been assertive in its influence over the Secretariat’s functions and makes every attempt to use the Security Council and the Secretariat to realize its destructive policies, it is hard to believe that the Secretary-General’s Mechanism can remain independent and impartial. It is our belief that under the BWC, it is Member States that decide how to handle any Convention-related issues. It would therefore not be appropriate to utilize the Secretary-General’s Mechanism.

Ms. Narayanan (India): With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”, we recognize the efforts of the Russian Federation in submitting a revised version of the draft resolution. However, it still falls short of our expectations.

India is a State party and attaches the highest importance to the Convention on Chemical Weapons (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and all their provisions. India has maintained that the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be dealt with as the CWC and the BWC provide. The CWC has a comprehensive verification regime and detailed provisions for dealing with any alleged use of chemical weapons.

As for the BWC, India has called for the negotiation of a comprehensive and legally binding protocol providing for an effective universal and non-discriminatory verification mechanism. India has always supported upholding the integrity of those two conventions and dealing with specific instances based on their provisions. India believes that matters relating to the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be addressed within the framework of the respective conventions.

India would like to reiterate its call for negotiating a verification protocol for the BWC, which in our view is the only way to strengthen the norms and verification process regarding the use of biological weapons. India therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69.

Mr. Louafi (Algeria) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft

resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

Since its accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Algeria has always been one of its advocates, and we strongly support the implementation of its provisions in order to achieve the Convention’s goals and universality fully and effectively. That is in line with our firm position rejecting all weapons of mass destruction. Algeria also maintains its steadfast support for the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons throughout the world, which is one of the main objectives of the Convention. Algeria condemns in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons by any party and in any circumstances.

Regrettably, my country’s delegation was unable to support the draft resolution for the fourth year in a row and abstained in the voting on its preambular paragraph 6 and operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 18. The approach of those paragraphs to some issues is not balanced and is based on controversial and non-consensus resolutions. We also regret that the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 did not engage in sufficient and intensive consultations to reach a common position among Member States, despite repeated calls in previous sessions to that end. My delegation believes that the ongoing politicization of the draft resolution will only undermine its credibility. The attribution of responsibility for incidents of the alleged use of chemical weapons has to be based on independent, evidence-based and transparent methods established by the competent relevant multilateral forum.

Algeria believes that progress on the elimination of chemical weapons can be achieved through the spirit of dialogue and cooperation that marked the adoption of the Convention itself. It is imperative to maintain that spirit, and achieving the goals of the Convention requires consensus-based, responsible cooperation. A divided approach among CWC member States, and the polarization of their work reflected in repeated votes on draft resolutions, including in the General Assembly, does not serve States’ collective interests in implementing the goals of the Convention. Algeria therefore calls for greater cooperation and for exploring all appropriate and necessary ways and means to launch a constructive dialogue that can ensure appropriate solutions, ease tensions and resolve outstanding issues once for all.

Mr. Sun Yiliang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): China voted against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, as a whole, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”, and voted against or abstained in the voting on its paragraphs pertaining to Syrian chemical weapons and central nervous system-acting chemicals. In that regard, China would like to briefly elaborate on its position. China is of the view that draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55 fails to embody the principles of comprehensiveness, objectivity and a balanced approach and does not take full account of the parties’ input. In that regard, these are our primary concerns.

First, the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons has a bearing on the realization of the goal of a world free of chemical weapons and on the purposes of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Article I, paragraph 3, of the Convention and its Verification Annex expressly provide for the destruction of all abandoned chemical weapons for the sake of advancing the purposes and goals of the Convention in a comprehensive and balanced manner. Considering that Japan’s destruction of its abandoned chemical weapons has repeatedly failed to meet the deadlines, the relevant issues should be reflected in the draft resolution.

Secondly, dialogue and cooperation are the only effective way to resolve the issue of Syrian chemical weapons. The creation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) of its Investigation and Identification Team is not in compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its investigation has been unable to reach conclusions that can withstand historical or factual tests. China is opposed to instrumentalizing and politicizing the issue of Syrian chemical weapons.

Thirdly, decision C-26/DEC.10, on central nervous system-acting chemicals, adopted at the twenty-sixth Conference of States Parties to the OPCW, has a bearing on the substantive obligations of States parties. In view of that, amendments should be initiated in accordance with article XV of the Convention rather than by forcing a vote on relevant decisions at an OPCW meeting. That runs counter to the implementation of the decision and undermines the Convention’s authority.

Fourthly, China has always maintained that in strict accordance with the provisions of the Convention, dialogue and consultations should be held to establish

the truth of the Navalny incident. We are opposed to the presumption of guilt by certain countries, let alone the arbitrary imposition of sanctions or pressure.

China shared, in a constructive manner, its observations during the consultations on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, but they were not taken into consideration, which we regret.

This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention will be held next year. China is firmly opposed to the use or threat of use of chemical weapons by any country, under any circumstances, firmly upholds the authority and effectiveness of the Convention and calls on parties to strengthen dialogue and consultation in order to steer the OPCW back to the tradition of consensus-based decision-making and to work together for the swift realization of a world free of chemical weapons, as provided for in the Convention.

Mr. Sharoni (Israel): I would like to express Israel's explanation of vote after the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction".

The prevalent use of chemical weapons by Syria, which has unfaithfully acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and has vowed to forgo its entire chemical weapons programme, has been clearly stipulated, *inter alia*, in numerous reports by the Joint Investigative Mechanism and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The recent report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission clearly stands with numerous reports and statements made by the OPCW Director-General concerning gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Syrian declaration. Syria's serious acts must be addressed clearly and firmly in order to prevent the further erosion of the absolute norm against the use of chemical weapons. In that regard, Israel fully supports the important work of the IIT in carrying out the task of attributing the chemical attacks to their actual perpetrators.

The use of chemical weapons is a deeply concerning development, especially in the light of the ambitions of State actors and non-State actors to acquire and use such capabilities. Such cases demonstrate the erosion of the chemical taboo and that terrorists are motivated

to follow suit. It is vital to step up efforts to deal with the challenge effectively and curtail any chance of the future use of chemical weapons by State and non-State actors alike. At this point in time, it is also evident that the residual chemical capabilities of Syria, including for research and development, must be fully dismantled. Any other course of action will allow Syria to continue its shameful pattern and eventually rehabilitate its chemical weapons programme.

Lastly, for its part, Israel voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, owing to its long-standing support for the annual resolution on that topic and the goals and purposes of the CWC, which Israel signed in 1993. Israel maintains close dialogue with the OPCW and is a State party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Mr. Sánchez Kiesslich (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): I would like to explain Mexico's abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons".

We take note that the draft resolution, the subject of which was considered by the First Committee in 2021, was once again submitted by the Russian Federation. We regret that once again neither the scope of the draft text nor whether there was a need to change the Mechanism's guidelines this year were clarified, especially following the explanations that were provided to all the membership on 18 October by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Similarly, doubts remain about the implications of the draft resolution for the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction with regard to its next Review Conference.

I would like to make it clear that Mexico once again expresses in the strongest terms its condemnation of the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons by any actor, under any circumstances. We remain committed to the implementation and the universalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, in particular the strengthening the latter through a verification protocol. We reiterate our support for the work of the OPCW and the independence and effectiveness of the Secretary-General's Mechanism.

Mr. Turner (United States of America): I take the floor in explanation of vote after the voting on behalf of 48 countries, including the United States, on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”. Our respective countries voted in favour of the draft resolution, as we believe that it accurately reflects the objectives and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), provides a factual accounting of the repeated use of chemical weapons, and supports the courageous work of the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in its quest for the truth and to follow the evidence and attribute responsibility to those who use chemical weapons.

As we celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC this year, we remain steadfast in defending and preserving the Convention and the norm against the use of chemical weapons. That is the resolve of the many who are determined to see an end to the threat of use and the use of chemical weapons and to hold to account the few who seek to normalize such use. It is regrettable that, 25 years after the adoption of the CWC, we must continue to express condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. The draft resolution once again rightfully highlights the grave concerns about chemical weapons use, as seen in Syria, Malaysia, Iraq and the United Kingdom, as well as in Russia with the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny. It is unfortunate that a few countries prefer to look the other way, ignore the issue or simply state that the facts on chemical weapons use in the draft resolution must be deleted, as if to whitewash away the incidents of chemical weapons use and pretend that they never happened. The United States and the sponsoring States aligned with this statement will not allow that to happen — not now, not ever. Chemical weapons use will not be tolerated and there will be no impunity. We recall in that regard the commitments made by participating States to the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and encourage others to join.

Nearly every country in the world is party to the CWC, and the vast majority of those nations comply with their obligations. Syria, however, has flouted its international obligations by repeatedly using chemical weapons against its own people. It is not politicization to state the facts. The OPCW Investigation and

Identification Team (IIT) has attributed four separate chemical weapons attacks to Syria, in addition to the four separate chemical weapon attacks attributed to Syria by the former OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. We look forward to the release of future IIT reports. We also call on the Syrian regime to immediately permit the OPCW Declaration and Assessment Team to return to Syria in order to resolve discrepancies and help to ensure the verified elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons programme. Similarly, the Russian Federation must comply with its CWC obligations. The international community has been waiting for more than two years for Russia to provide a full accounting of the poisoning of Mr. Navalny with the Novichok agent on Russian territory. And let us not forget Russia’s attempted assassination of the Skripals in Salisbury, United Kingdom, with a Novichok agent. Russia must explain those uses of chemical weapons.

On 24 February, Russia launched its unjustifiable and unprovoked further invasion of Ukraine. Since then, Russia has continuously and falsely accused Ukraine of using or planning to use chemical weapons against Russian troops, while providing zero evidence. We call on Russia to immediately end that war of aggression and further call on Russia in the strongest possible terms to refrain from using chemical weapons in Ukraine. The obligations of the Convention apply to all its States parties. If we fail to act, others may be emboldened to use chemical weapons in the future. We must continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms all uses of chemical weapons by any State or non-State actor and to hold accountable all those who would use such weapons.

Mr. Guerra (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

The goal of the Secretary-General’s Mechanism is to investigate allegations brought to its attention concerning the possible use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law, as mandated by the General Assembly and the Security Council. The Secretary-General’s investigations must be carried out in accordance with the guidelines and procedures endorsed in 1990 by the General Assembly and updated in 2007. The cooperation dating back to 2013 between the Organization for the Prohibition of

Chemical Weapons and the United Nations, in line with the mandate provided by the General Assembly, and the Security Council has made it possible for the Secretary-General to establish the United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, whose final report was submitted in December 2013 (see A/68/663).

With regard to biological weapons, and given that the Biological Weapons Convention does not have its own verification mechanism, the Secretary-General's Mechanism is a basic tool for taking action when the use of such weapons is alleged. Argentina firmly believes in bolstering the Convention as a relevant instrument by strengthening mechanisms to provide follow-up on its compliance and implementation, preserving the legitimate rights of States parties to industrial and technological development for peaceful purposes and promoting the periodic updating of the Convention's recommendations in line with scientific and technological advances. As such, we believe that support for any decision that might affect the Secretary-General's Mechanism must be as broad as possible.

Ms. Lipana (Philippines): The Philippines co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.60, on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in recognition of the importance of national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and the technologies related to their manufacture. That emphasizes the necessity of robust strategic trade management at the national level, as well as international cooperation in reinforcing global non-proliferation norms. Accordingly, we established the Strategic Trade Management Office, which implements our relevant non-proliferation obligations, including the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, the Philippines remains committed to the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Philippines has been pursuing capacity-building in terms of understanding and operationalizing the Secretary-General's Mechanism, including through regional workshops conducted through the Biological Weapons Convention, its Implementation Support Unit and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, for officials of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including experts from the Department of Health, the

Research Institute for Tropical Medicine and others. The Philippines remains open to discussing measures to improve the Secretary-General's Mechanism, as long as such measures do not undermine its independence and technical competence.

Mr. Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.11, entitled "Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol", which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other similar gases and bacteriological methods of warfare, remains a key component of the international legal arms control architecture and organically complements the obligations of States under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Furthermore, the Protocol constitutes the basis of operations for the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, established by the General Assembly, which the United States and its NATO allies are baselessly accusing us of attempting to undermine. We just had the privilege of seeing the real state of affairs reflected in the results of the voting.

Against the backdrop of well-founded suspicions about the development of biological weapons, the United States has demonstrably refused to support the draft resolution on the 1925 Geneva Protocol — the only arms control instrument that prohibits the use of biological weapons. That comes on top of Washington's consistent statements expressing its reluctance to withdraw its reservations related to maintaining its ability to use the types of weapons of mass destruction that come under the purview of the instrument. There is an insistent lack of willingness to provide Member States with an opportunity to share their opinion on the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, which leads one to question the motives underlying that kind of behaviour by the United States of America. In that context, we would also like to recall that, in order to dispel the remaining serious questions that we have for Ukraine and, above all, of the United States concerning its compliance with the provisions of the BWC in the context of Washington's military and biological activities in Ukraine, Russia initiated a consultative meeting of States parties in September of this year in accordance with article V of the Convention.

At that meeting, instead of comprehensively addressing the detailed and specific claims made concerning compliance with the provisions of articles I and IV of the Convention, the American and Ukrainian delegations chose to waste participant countries' time with hollow demagoguery. As such, we were left with no other choice other than to invoke article VI of the BWC at the Security Council last week (see S/PV.9171) to investigate Ukraine and the United States for violations of the Convention. Furthermore, the United States remains the sole State possessing chemical weapons and has yet to destroy its stockpiles of toxic agents. Washington's failure to support draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.11 is a matter of the utmost concern for all United Nations States Members and only confirms the need to compel Ukraine and the United States to disclose their bioweapons programmes and demand that the United States destroy its remaining chemical-weapon stockpiles. It also demonstrates the need for updating and revising the procedures and guidelines of the Secretary-General's Mechanism, about which many Member States still have serious concerns, which they already expressed today. For our part, we will continue our efforts to maintain the relevance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, including by maintaining the effectiveness of the Secretary-General's Mechanism, regardless of what others might say about us in that regard.

Mr. Aydil (Türkiye): I am speaking in explanation of Türkiye's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.55, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction". My delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution, and its related paragraphs, in line with its principled position and strong support for the full and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which in our view constitutes an essential pillar of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Türkiye reiterates that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and in any circumstances is a crime against humanity. We condemn in the strongest terms the re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world. The case of Syria continues to be a matter of particular concern in that regard.

The draft resolution reflects the objectives and goals of the CWC. It provides a factual account of repeated uses of chemical weapons in recent years and supports the work of the Technical Secretariat

of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) aimed at identifying facts based on solid evidence and attributing responsibility to those responsible for their use. The impartiality, objectivity and professionalism of the OPCW Technical Secretariat in investigating chemical-weapon attacks in Syria and other places is highly commendable, as it contributes to our collective efforts to ensure accountability and combat impunity. To date, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) has attributed four separate chemical-weapon attacks to the Al-Assad regime. That is in addition to the four separate chemical-weapon attacks attributed to the regime by the former OPCW-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. We look forward to the next reports of the IIT concerning the chemical-weapon attacks in Syria.

I would like to remind the Committee that in accordance with Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Syrian regime has an obligation to provide immediate and unfettered access to personnel designated by the OPCW. We call on the regime to comply with its obligations under the Convention. On a related note, we would like to caution against efforts to discredit the OPCW investigations, which would undermine the global norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Lastly, I would like to underline the importance of accountability. If we fail to take united action, the perpetrators will be only emboldened to use chemical weapons again in future. We must therefore continue to condemn any use of chemical weapons in the strongest possible terms and hold all who use such weapons accountable.

Mr. Choffat (Switzerland): I would like to provide an explanation of our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.69, entitled "Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons", which we voted against. Switzerland would like to put on record that its explanation of vote before the voting in 2021 (see A/C.1/76/PV.17) remains entirely valid. That explanation of vote emphasized that the draft resolution would not achieve its stated aim of strengthening the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons but would in fact be counterproductive, as it risks undermining the Mechanism's independence as well as the authority of the Secretary-General.

The Chair: We have heard the last speaker in right of reply under cluster 2, “Other weapons of mass destruction”. The Committee will now turn to informal paper No.2/Rev.3, beginning with cluster 3, “Outer space (Disarmament aspects)”.

I will now call on delegations wishing either to make a general statement or to introduce new or revised draft resolutions under cluster 3, and I would like to remind speakers that these statements are limited to five minutes.

Ms. Hamilton (United States of America): As an urgent but initial measure to address one of the most pressing issues related to space security, the United States has introduced resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing. Such destructive anti-satellite missile tests, which create thousands of pieces of debris, present a risk to all countries’ use of outer space. We have benefited from three rounds of informal consultations with Member States in addition to discussions with regional groups and bilateral engagements. The draft resolution is now better than when we first distributed it, and it includes edits that respond to the feedback that we received. We are also pleased that so far, 49 other States are joining us as sponsors of the draft resolution.

Over the past two decades, the world has seen several ground-based anti-satellite missile tests destroying satellites in orbit. One recent destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile test created 1,785 pieces of trackable debris. Because of the risk to the outer-space environment and to the use of space by all countries, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution calls on all countries to commit to refraining from conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests. We view the draft resolution as meeting three key objectives. It meaningfully limits the deliberate creation of new orbital debris; it is easily understandable without extensive new definitions; and it addresses the greatest near-term threat to space security. Importantly, the United States believes that the language and voluntary commitment that the draft resolution calls for meet the criteria for transparency and confidence-building measures as outlined in the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (see A/68/189).

We recognize that the draft resolution is limited to a single threat to the outer-space environment and that the

commitment is not proposed in a legally binding treaty text. However, we believe this is an important first step that we can take right now to rein in the destructive testing of direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, which have contributed to instability in outer-space activity, raised the potential for conflict and threatened to limit the extraordinary economic potential of human action in space. We also believe that operative paragraph 2, which calls this an urgent and initial step, and operative paragraph 3, which calls on countries to continue discussions on the issue, demonstrate our commitment to ensuring that the draft resolution is only a first step. The United States recognizes that many countries do not intend to develop direct-ascent anti-satellite missile capabilities. However, the declaratory value of such a draft resolution is not dependent on whether a country is developing or has developed such a capability. By making such a commitment, including through the draft resolution, supporters contribute their voices in order to identify this concept in the international community as an emerging norm.

The United States believes that its draft resolution on destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests would enhance international security and is a first step towards preventing conflict from occurring in outer space, including an arms race in outer space. We encourage all countries to join us in voting yes on the draft resolution to help us establish a norm against those destructive tests, which threaten all countries’ ability to use outer space.

Mr. Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The peaceful exploration of outer space should serve as an effective means of addressing many global issues, including economic development issues. However, the risk that space could be turned into a beachhead for aggression and war has recently become very real. A number of States and their allies are on course to deploy weapons in outer space. They are ramping up the potential to use force on outer space objects by both kinetic and non-kinetic means and to use outer space as a theatre for taking military action.

Against that backdrop, there is a heightened relevance to initiatives designed to prevent an arms race in outer space and ensure that it is used for peaceful purposes. Based on the decision of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978, the Russian Federation has consistently maintained a policy aimed at preventing the weaponization of space and reaching agreement on

a principled resolution that would prevent an arms race in outer space — a full and comprehensive ban on the deployment of weapons in outer space and on the threat or use of force against outer-space objects or with their help.

In the past few years we have proposed a range of initiatives aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. In our view, the most effective of them is to develop a multilateral legally binding instrument in that area. To that end, in 2008 the Russian Federation and China presented for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer-space objects. In 2014, a new version of the document took into consideration the concerns and proposals of a number of States. It is still on the negotiating table at the Conference on Disarmament, it is comprehensive and is a good basis for developing an appropriate multilateral instrument.

As an intermediate step, we support the international initiative and political commitment on no first placement of weapons in outer space, which is currently the only actually functional tool for keeping outer space free of weapons, and more than 30 States have fully signed up to it. In support of that initiative, together with a broad range of sponsors we are submitting for the First Committee's consideration draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.67, on no first placement of weapons in outer space. The draft resolution has already been established within the United Nations as an annual General Assembly resolution since 2014. We have also submitted to the First Committee draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.71, on improving transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) in outer space. In order to implement the provisions of resolution 76/55 and facilitate the consideration of issues related to TCBMs in the specialized United Nations forums, the updated draft resolution encourages the Secretary-General to seek the opinions and proposals of Member States on practical ways to implement TCBMs, as outlined in 2013 by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities, and to submit a comprehensive report summarizing Member States' considerations to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session. We should recall that the Secretary-General's most recent such report (A/72/65) on TCBMs in the United Nations system containing such Member States' considerations was prepared in 2017. We hope that the draft resolution will once again be adopted without a vote.

There is another no less important draft resolution (A/C.1/77/L.70) that we are submitting with a wide range of sponsors, on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The draft document has undergone a number of changes. To build on resolution 76/230, which was adopted last year, and in line with the recommendations in the report of the Secretary-General (see A/77/80), we included in the updated draft resolution a proposal to take our work to the next key stage in this area. It will suggest the establishment of a governmental group of experts to conduct research and make recommendations on substantive elements of a multilateral legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space. We believe that in the wake of the conclusion of the activities in 2019 of the Group of Governmental Experts on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, there is an urgent need to resume that work. We hope that the new group will be able to begin its work at the end of 2023, after the conclusion of the final session of the Open-ended Working Group on so-called responsible behaviour in outer space in August of next year. That will provide an opportunity to use the momentum established for an Open-ended Working Group and its insight in the next phase, involving the preparation and agreement on recommendations for the elements of a legally binding instrument on prevention of an arms race in outer space. We call on all Member States to support our draft resolutions.

Mr. Padilla (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation supports and has sponsored draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.3, on "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", A/C.1/77/L.67, on "No first placement of weapons in outer space", A/C.1/77/L.70, on "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and A/C.1/77/L.71, on "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities".

We advocate for the legitimate right of all States to use outer space solely for peaceful purposes as the common heritage of humankind, on an equal footing and without discrimination. We reiterate the urgency of strengthening the legal regime governing outer space. In that regard, we support negotiating and adopting a multilateral instrument that seeks to prevent and prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space. The draft treaty submitted by Russia and China at

the Conference on Disarmament is a good basis for such negotiations.

At the same time, we support voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures related to outer-space activities, although they are no substitute for the adoption of a legally binding instrument in that area. We support and promote the policy of no first placement of weapons in outer space. We urge member States to vote in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.3, A/C.1/77/L.67, A/C.1/77/L.70 and A/C.1/77/L.71 and for the paragraphs on which separate votes have been requested.

Mr. Sun Yiliang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation supports the statement made by the representative of the Russian Federation on the draft resolutions jointly proposed by China and the Russian Federation. China co-sponsored draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.70 and A/C.1/77/L.67. We support the language in the fifth preambular paragraphs of the two draft resolutions on building a community with a shared future for humankind, as well as of operative paragraphs 8 to 12 of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.70, on the establishment of a Group of Governmental Experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Regrettably, a handful of countries requested votes on those draft resolutions and the paragraphs in question. It should be pointed out that in the first two years after the predecessors of these draft resolutions included references to a community with a shared future for humankind, no country rejected them. It was not until 2019 that certain countries requested separate votes on the relevant paragraphs. That is outright political manipulation. Those countries are attempting to obstruct the draft resolution and deliberately create confrontation and division merely because it was China that put forward the concept. They are so obsessed with a Cold War mindset and ideological bias that they oppose anything Chinese. In essence, they are seeking supremacy within the United Nations. I would like to emphasize that expressions used in United Nations documents reflect the collective wisdom of all Member States. They are not the property of any country. Today a handful of countries may vote against anything Chinese, while tomorrow, they may oppose other countries' ideas at will — ideas that are positive and constructive and that reflect the shared interests of the broad membership. That is not the way things work in the world, let alone at the United Nations.

The expression “community with a shared future for humankind” is a neutral term, without any ideological undertones. In the context of relevant draft resolutions, the concept is entirely consistent with the international consensus on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in line with the increased exploration and use of outer space as a common interest of all humankind, as affirmed in the Outer Space Treaty. The concept of a community with a shared future for humankind is open and above board. It is an embodiment of true multilateralism and has been widely supported and recognized by the international community. In the past three years, certain countries have been determined to contradict it. That arbitrary practice is unpopular and has been rejected by an overwhelming majority of Member States every year. China firmly opposes the constant attempts of some countries to provoke confrontation this year. We call on all delegations to vote in favour of the relevant paragraphs, jointly resist such efforts to assert dominance and defend the equal right of every Member State of the United Nations to put forward ideas, contribute to the United Nations cause and safeguard true multilateralism.

Operative paragraphs 8 to 12 of draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.70 call for the re-establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The Group of Governmental Experts is a long-standing working mechanism of the United Nations, and the Group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space did productive work from 2018 to 2019. Experts from various countries conducted in-depth and substantive discussions on all aspects of relevant international legal instruments, culminating in valuable draft reports. The United States participated in the Group's work, but ultimately, and single-handedly, it blocked the adoption of its report. This year, China, together with 20 other sponsors, put forward draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.70, proposing to re-establish the GGE on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which will build on the work of the previous Group. That process, and the work of the Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, can complement and reinforce each other and jointly serve the overarching goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and maintaining security there.

Certain countries' cynical attempts to obstruct the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts are yet another act aimed at asserting dominance that

should be jointly resisted by the vast majority of Member States. We call on all States to support draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.70 and A/C.1/77/L.67, as a whole, as well as all of the paragraphs they contain.

The Chair: Before the Committee proceeds to take action on the draft resolutions and draft decisions in cluster 3, “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”, we will hear from delegations wishing to explain their position on those drafts.

Mr. Kulkarni (India): This is an explanation of vote before the voting on draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”.

As a major spacefaring nation, India has vital development and security interests in space. India remains opposed to the weaponization of outer space and has not resorted to an arms race in outer space. We have consistently advocated for preserving outer space as an ever-expanding frontier for cooperative endeavours. India continues to support the substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and we remain committed to adopting a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space that is universally acceptable, verifiable and multilaterally negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

Subjectivity in the interpretation of space behaviours and perception of threats, how they are understood and the application of such determinations, has been a matter of concern for us. We have concerns about who will make assessments about responsibility or the lack of it for space activities or operations and the basis on which they will be made. We also have concerns about the appropriate verification of space behaviours using current technology and access to such technology.

The means for an unbiased assessment of space behaviours that are accepted and understood by consensus and that are immune to politicization are a related matter of concern. Therefore, even as we participate constructively in the Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours, established pursuant to resolution 76/231, we feel compelled to abstain in the voting on draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27.

Mr. Vorontsov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The Russian Federation views the decision

of the United States to make a political commitment to refraining from conducting destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing and the initiative to submit draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62 on that matter as a particularly declarative step, considering that it comes after the United States’ necessary testing, at least as long ago as 2008, of anti-satellite missiles capable of striking outer-space objects. That initiative, outlined in the eponymous draft resolution, is simply inadequate as a guarantee of peaceful activity in outer space and a solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space.

We have already noted that undertaking such a commitment does not presuppose a renunciation of the production or development of the anti-satellite missile systems in question. Furthermore, and paradoxically, neither does it prevent them from being used, including in combat. That means that the capacity still exists. However, the draft resolution does not include a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite missiles that are non-destructive or provide for their destruction when they already exist. The draft resolution has nothing to say about that. As a result, the universalization of that initiative would create an advantage for a specific group of States that already possess such means, while all of the rest, primarily developing States, would be discriminated against. Indeed, the United States is attempting to replace real diplomatic efforts with grand public gestures and yet another round of half measures. Given that, openly and for quite some time now, the United States has opposed the development of an international legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space, these attempts to convince the international community that its initiative will contribute to such an agreement are even more cynical.

What must be done will not be achieved with words, but rather with deeds that demonstrate a dedication to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The best confirmation of that dedication would be through United States participation in negotiations on a legally binding instrument containing a guarantee not to place weapons in outer space and against the threat or use of force against or by outer space objects. We call upon the United States to rejoin such efforts.

Moreover, we believe that an important and genuine confidence-building measure would see the United States and its allies making a political commitment to the no first placement of weapons in outer space. In lieu of such a step, the decision by Washington seems

to be nothing more than a manoeuvre of some kind to attempt to divert the attention of the international community from its actual efforts, which are clearly and unambiguously set out in the United States policy documents on outer space. The United States Defense Space Strategy and its Space Force doctrine clearly and unambiguously set out its aims — military domination and supremacy in outer space. Outer space itself is viewed as an arena for confrontation.

The Russian Federation calls upon all responsible Member States to vote against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, because it is purely declarative in nature and does not seek to address genuine outer space security issues.

Mr. Balouji (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position on draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27, entitled "Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours". Our position regarding the subject and the proposal under consideration, as expressed over the past two years, remains valid, and we disagree with the approach. Iran will vote against draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27.

We will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, entitled "Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing", for the following reasons. Iran considers the suggestion of undertaking a political commitment not to conduct destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile tests as discriminatory and insufficient and a major deviation from the right approach that would guarantee the exclusively peaceful uses of outer space, as well as the long-awaited goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, as agreed upon by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978. The draft resolution lacks the required rejection of the development and manufacture of those anti-satellite systems, their combat use and non-destructive anti-satellite tests. Furthermore, the elimination of weapons of that kind that are already available is not envisaged. As a result, if that initiative becomes universal, advantages for a certain group of States that are already in possession of such means would emerge, while others, primarily developing countries, would find themselves being discriminated against. All of that is exacerbated by the absence of a definition of anti-satellite missile weapons and their testing, as well as of a verification mechanism relative to the political commitment.

We attach great importance to the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive, legally binding instrument for the purposes of the prevention of an arms race in outer space that would contain guarantees of no weaponization of outer space and no threat or use of force against space objects. We call upon all States Members of the United Nations to proceed with the development of such an instrument as soon as possible in order to preserve outer space as a peaceful environment for the benefit of all humankind. Iran has continued to co-sponsor the annual draft proposal on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We believe that the United States proposal should be understood in relation to its actual behaviour. The United States Army obviously seeks military supremacy in outer space, and the Government itself has continued to carry out several malicious activities that endanger the safety and security of outer space. In those circumstances, it is hard to believe that there are good intentions behind this hypocritical proposal.

Regarding the two draft resolutions on the no first placement of weapons in outer space and transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, as contained in documents A/C.1/77/L.67 and A/C.1/77/L.71, respectively, while my delegation will vote in favour of those two draft resolutions. I wish to put on record that our previously announced position on them remains valid.

Mr. Turner (United States of America): I take the floor to make a statement about draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.3, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Although the United States delegation will not oppose the draft resolution, we continue to be concerned about its linkage between the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the commencement of negotiations on fundamentally flawed legally binding outer space arms control proposals. In particular, we note the draft resolution's reference to the draft treaty put forward by Russia and the People's Republic of China, which was introduced in 2014 at the Conference on Disarmament and which the United States opposes. Our most recent critique of their space arms control treaty is contained in document CD/2129, of August 2018.

What our position with respect to the draft treaty proposed by Russia and the People's Republic of China does not change is our continued desire to avoid the extension of future conflicts to outer space or our long-standing support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for outer

space activities. We have repeatedly noted in the First Committee and other forums that clear, practicable and confirmable TCBMs, implemented on a voluntary basis, have the potential to strengthen the safety, stability and sustainability of outer space activities for all nations. To cite one current example, we are aware of the impending uncontrolled re-entry of the People's Republic of China's Long March 5B rocket stage. We regret the lack of transparency and information-sharing by the People's Republic of China with respect to the risks associated with uncontrolled re-entries such as that one. President Biden's National Security Strategy states that we must lead in updating outer space governance, establishing a space traffic coordination system and charting a path for future space norms and arms control. The 2021 Space Priorities Framework also states that as space activities evolve, the norms, rules and principles that guide outer space activities must also evolve. The United States will lead in the responsible, peaceful and sustainable exploration and use of outer space.

We again point to the importance of the consensus report of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (see A/68/189). We encourage all nations to continue to review and implement, to the greatest extent practicable, the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the 2013 GGE report, through the relevant national mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with their national interests. The United States would prefer that the space domain remain free of conflict. But as the United States has repeatedly noted, both the People's Republic of China and Russia are aggressively developing and deploying technologies that are designed and intended to extend future conflict to outer space. Hollow and hypocritical efforts, such as the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space that cannot be confirmed or verified by the international community, are not the answer. We will also continue to take a leading role in substantive discussions on space transparency and confidence-building measures at the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and other appropriate forums.

Ms. Petit (France) (*spoke in French*): I have the honour to deliver this explanation of vote on behalf of France, the United States and the United Kingdom on draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.67, entitled

"No first placement of weapons in outer space", and A/C.1/77/L.70, "Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space". We will vote against them and urge all delegations to do the same.

The United States, the United Kingdom and France look forward to continuing to engage constructively and pragmatically with other Member States in order to enhance the safety, stability, security and sustainability of space activities. The safety and security of the space environment is threatened by increasingly dangerous and destabilizing behaviours. We therefore support the ongoing work to improve transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space.

Resolution 76/231, entitled "Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours" and introduced last year by the United Kingdom, established a comprehensive and inclusive process for discussing current threats to space security and how to mitigate them through norms, standards and principles of responsible behaviour. We also welcome the United Kingdom's proposed decision (A/C.1/77/L.27) this year to keep the item on the General Assembly's agenda at its next session. We encourage all Member States to use the framework provided by the Open-ended Working Group on reducing space threats to make further progress in preventing an arms race in outer space.

In order to advance that process, the draft resolution proposed by the United States entitled "Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing" (A/C.1/77/L.62) offers additional practical and pragmatic ways to improve transparency and confidence-building among States. We believe that it could help to address issues related to the space environment caused by such missiles, which pose a major threat, as they can create multiple pieces of long-lived debris in valuable orbits for hundreds of years. On the other hand, the draft resolutions proposed by the Russian Federation do not adequately address those threats. Above all, we would like to point out that the no-first-placement initiative still presents a number of significant problems.

First, it does not adequately define what constitutes a weapon in space. The widely recognized dual-use nature of space systems makes it difficult to develop a viable definition. For example, civilian satellites can be used as weapons, including in the event of a deliberate collision or by using debris recovery or satellite repair

capabilities. Secondly, it does not contain any features that would effectively confirm a State's compliance with the political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space, owing to difficulties in verifying the nature of capabilities and intentions in outer space. Finally, it contains language that has no meaning or relevance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the Outer Space Treaty or multilateral arms control and disarmament, such as the expression "a common effort towards a community of shared future for humankind" in the fifth preambular paragraph.

With regard to the draft resolution calling for further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we are concerned about the fact that the proposed course of action actually hinders efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. It provides neither an effective definition of what constitutes a weapon in outer space nor provisions for the adequate verification of compliance with the measures it proposes. The draft resolution ignores the links between satellites, the data they provide and the ground-based systems on which our security depends. It does not address the issue of ground-based defence systems, which are just as likely to cause an arms race in space as machines in orbit.

The proposal to relaunch the Group of Governmental Experts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in 2023–2024 conflicts with the current Open-ended Working Group's process. We believe it would be prudent to allow the Open-ended Working Group to conclude its work before discussing the nature and format of a follow-up process for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which would also exclude most Member States from discussions that concern all States, whether they possess or use space capabilities or not. We further note that the proposed Group of Governmental Experts is limited to the consideration of legally binding measures, whereas the Open-ended Working Group is mandated to consider legally binding and non-binding proposals. Real threats to the space environment and space systems do exist, but they are not addressed either by the draft resolution on no first placement or by the draft resolution on further practical measures to prevent an arms race in space.

Mrs. Hofírková (Czechia): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the member States of the European Union (EU). The following countries also align themselves with this statement: North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Iceland, Norway and Canada.

I take the floor to explain our vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/77/L.70, "Further practical measures on the prevention of an arms race in outer space", and A/C.1/77/L.67, "No first placement of weapons in outer space". We will vote against those two draft resolutions and call on other Member States to do the same.

The EU and its member States are actively engaged in promoting the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis for all, for present and future generations. The EU and its member States remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is essential to strengthening international security and stability and safeguarding the free exploration and long-term use of the space environment for peaceful purposes. All EU member States therefore supported General Assembly resolution 76/22, regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We share the view that we need further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. However, any ambiguity in defining the question of what constitutes a weapon in space will affect all objects that are placed in space or that possess the capability to affect objects in outer space that in one way or another could be considered weapons if used in an aggressive manner.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.67, entitled "No first placement of weapons in outer space", we remain concerned about the fact that the initiative still does not respond adequately to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence between States with a view to concretely strengthening space security. We reiterate that the no-first-placement initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer space is. That continues to render the draft resolution ineffective and fails to address the threats and security risks emanating from the ability of space systems to interfere with other space systems. Ambiguities related to the capabilities of certain objects and the intentions behind their use could lead to misinterpretations, misunderstandings and miscalculations and could consequently increase the risk of conflict in space. Furthermore, with space being increasingly contested and congested, we remain concerned about the continued development and testing of anti-satellite weapons and the Russian Federation's repeated threats to target commercial satellites.

We underline the importance of addressing such dangerous and highly destabilizing developments promptly, comprehensively and as part of international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space — something that the draft resolution does not do sufficiently. In that regard, the EU and its member States welcome and support the new draft resolution proposed by the United States on “Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing” (A/C.1/77/L.62) as a pragmatic, concrete and measurable step forward.

Without excluding the possibility of adopting new legally binding instruments in the future, the EU and its member States believe that an approach based on behaviours is the most pragmatic and immediate way forward to improve space security today. The EU and its member States underline that future legally binding frameworks in the scope of space security should be effective and verifiable and should aim to cover all relevant threats.

We believe that such discussions are best further elaborated within the existing work of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on reducing space threats. Within that OEWG, efforts are discussed to set up norms of responsible behaviour in space as a first step on the way towards adopting a legally binding instrument. Starting up a new parallel process, such as that proposed by the Group of Governmental Experts in draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.70, would undermine the ongoing work within the OEWG. It is therefore too soon to decide on new working formats on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, as the OEWG is only halfway through its work.

The EU and its member States continue to be fully committed to engaging actively and constructively in advancing space security and space governance.

Mr. Li Song (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I wish to make a statement in explanation of China’s vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62 and draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27.

China will vote against draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, entitled “Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing”. I have already fully explained China’s attitude towards, and position on, that draft resolution, but I wish to emphasize that such an initiative is hypocritical and one-sided. It does not constitute any constraint or limitation on the United States-led space strategy for the development of advanced military capabilities in outer space. The

initiative in question does not address the development, production, deployment or use of anti-satellite weapons, or anti-missile weapon systems and other outer space systems in broader areas with anti-satellite weapons capabilities and potential. It is therefore not a comprehensive, just or balanced solution to the anti-satellite weapons issue.

China welcomes all arms-control initiatives that are genuinely conducive to achieving the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space, but is opposed to any practice of expanding unilateral military superiority under the pretext of arms control. The United States, as the main sponsor of the draft resolution, is on the one hand crudely obstructing the re-establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and persistently evading a comprehensive, non-discriminatory and legally binding solution. On the other hand, it is deliberately promoting a parochial arms-control initiative that is meaningless in terms of self-restraint, repeating the same old pattern of military expansion first, arms control later, as during the Cold War. The motives and sincerity of the initiative are questionable, and its significance for international arms control is limited. The United States initiative is deceptive and will lead to a departure from our overall goal and general direction towards establishing a long-term international consensus to prevent the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space. China therefore calls on all parties to distinguish between right and wrong and to vote prudently.

China also opposes draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27, entitled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours”. China participated in the discussions of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) in an open and constructive manner. However, we regret to note that the United Kingdom — the main sponsor of the draft decision — has opposed the re-establishment of the GGE on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, on the grounds of a so-called lack of inclusiveness and ruled out discussions on a comprehensive and non-discriminatory legal instrument on arms control in outer space, revealing that the process advocated by the United Kingdom is neither comprehensive nor inclusive in nature. Such arbitrary and hegemonic behaviour must be resolutely resisted at the United Nations.

The current discussions in the OEWG demonstrate that there are still major differences among the parties on how to understand and define responsible conduct

in outer space and on the application of relevant international law, thereby further exposing the fundamental flaws of the initiative itself, such as its strong subjectivity, the duplication of topics and the loss of focus in discussions. It remains to be seen whether Western countries, as the main driving force behind the process, will eventually be able to accommodate the principled positions and reasonable proposals of non-Western countries in order to make the process truly inclusive and broadly representative. In view of what I have said and based on China's position on resolution 76/231, which is cited in the draft decision, China has decided to vote against draft decision A/C.1/77/L.27.

Mr. Siddique (Pakistan): With respect to draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, entitled "Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing", my delegation wishes to make the following explanation of vote before the voting.

At the outset, we thank the lead sponsor for the initiative and its outreach with a view to improving the draft text. My delegation has consistently maintained that the primary litmus test of the relevance and value of such an initiative is whether and to what extent it contributes meaningfully to the universally shared goal of preventing an arms race, and the placement of weapons in, outer space. We note the positive references contained in the draft text, including the reaffirmation of the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space; the need to maintain outer space as a peaceful and sustainable environment for the benefit of all; the promotion and strengthening of international cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes; and the reference to article IX of the Outer Space Treaty contained in the fourth preambular paragraph. We also agree with the general spirit of paragraph 3 in calling on all States to take further steps that could contribute to legally binding instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. However, we wish to point out a number of gaps in the current draft.

First, the text shies away from incorporating several expressions of concern over the growing arms race in outer space and the various urgent threats to and from outer space, including its weaponization and how those developments impede progress towards negotiating a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Secondly, the international community has for decades prioritized the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament has been prevented from commencing negotiations on that long-standing agenda item. We see no reason as to why addressing threats from all forms of anti-satellite weapons systems cannot be examined during the long-overdue negotiations on a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Thirdly, the framing of the proposed political commitment limits itself in crucial aspects. It singles out only one type of anti-satellite weapons system, namely, direct-ascent missiles, rather than envisaging all anti-satellite weapons systems. Moreover, it is aimed at preventing testing and does not incorporate prohibitions on the development, production, deployment or use of that single anti-satellite weapons system. As long as such systems continue to be produced and deployed, threat perceptions among States will persist, as will their attendant consequences, including an enhanced arms race in outer space.

Fourthly, in the arena of an arms race, capabilities of various types remain central to all considerations. The commitment to not test one type of anti-satellite weapon can prevent neither the development of other weapons and anti-satellite weapons systems nor their non-destructive testing. We continue to believe that the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space should be pursued in a holistic rather than a piecemeal manner. We are not averse to the idea of adopting more than one legally binding measure as part of that comprehensive approach, but each measure should clearly contribute to the larger goal of preventing an arms race in outer space and fulfilling the cardinal principle of undiminished security for all.

Fifthly, we have continued to point out that the core principles of existing international space law, in particular those enshrined in article I of the Outer Space Treaty, should be spelled out clearly in the text:

"The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries".

We are disappointed that the central tenet of existing space law is not accurately reflected. We do not agree with any derogation of that fundamental principle.

Lastly, it is imperative to preserve and further strengthen the international consensus on using outer space for peaceful purposes only. Any suggestions about the applicability of international law on armed conflict to outer space detract from that essentiality. Every effort must be made to ensure that the uniquely peaceful character of outer space is preserved. Turning it into a realm of conflict or contest goes against the grain of existing international space law and does not serve security or stability in outer space or on Earth. For those reasons, my delegation has decided today to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. Hegazy (Egypt): I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote before the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/77/L.62, entitled "Destructive direct-ascent anti-satellite missile testing".

Given the fragility and volatility of the outer-space environment, we believe that it is now more necessary than ever to ensure that the United Nations sends a clear signal expressing its determination to address this alarming threat to the security of such a strategic domain, which has a direct impact on almost all aspects of life.

Egypt will support the draft resolution, in line with its principled position on supporting all credible efforts that complement existing initiatives and are aimed at formulating rules that can pave the way for the conclusion of legally binding instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. We share the position that the initiative should

be a first step towards laying out legally binding rules that would not be limited to direct-ascent missiles but would cover the prevention of an arms race in outer space in its aspects. Those include, first, the placement of any weapons, defensive or offensive, in outer space; secondly, the targeting of satellites or any outer-space assets through ground capabilities; and thirdly, the use of satellites or outer-space assets as weapons to attack other such assets or ground targets, including infrastructure.

The initiative should also pave the way for the commencement without further delay of negotiations on a legally binding and comprehensive treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in a manner that can preserve international security and that of future generations. We urge the sponsors of the draft resolution to accommodate the concerns I have mentioned and to take concrete steps to formulate a comprehensive, verifiable and legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space that would enable us to consider the initiative positively in the future.

The Chair: Given the time left for this meeting and in accordance with the provisions of rule 128 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the Committee will proceed with the voting on the draft proposals contained in cluster 3 at 3 p.m. today in this conference room.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.