



General Assembly

Distr.: General
10 December 2020
English
Original: Arabic/Chinese/English/
French/Russian/Spanish

Seventy-fifth session First Committee

Compendium of submissions

Note by the Chair

1. The Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) held its meetings during the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly against the background of a serious and unprecedented health crisis that made it necessary to take important measures in order to safeguard the health and safety of delegates and the staff of the Secretariat, while fulfilling the responsibilities attributed to the Committee.
2. The physical distance guidelines and constraints related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic had an impact on the logistical resources available for the work of the Committee, with a decrease in the number of meetings and thus the shortening of its programme of work.
3. As a result of these circumstances, and in order to make it possible for all delegations to express their views on all items on the agenda, the Chair proposed to the Member States that, without setting any precedent, written submissions* for the general debate, thematic discussions, in explanation of vote and in exercise of the right of reply would be included in a compendium, to be issued as an official document of the Committee.
4. The Committee adopted this decision regarding the modalities of work for its seventy-fifth session at its plenary meeting of 6 October 2020.
5. It is my hope that the present compendium will be a valuable instrument for all delegations that have taken part in the deliberations of the seventy-fifth session of the First Committee, and might also serve as a tool for future occasions when circumstances might make such an approach useful.

Agustín Santos Maraver (Spain)

* The statements contained in the present compendium are circulated in the languages of submission only and without formal editing, and are reproduced as shared by the concerned delegation.



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Section I

Written submissions for the general debate

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**Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, the Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
New York, 16 October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

At the outset we would like to join others in congratulating You and the members of the Bureau on your election. You can count on full support and cooperation of our Delegation.

Azerbaijan aligns itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and in our national capacity we would like to add the following remarks.

Mr. Chair,

As the coronavirus with its devastating impact continues to spread across the globe, forcing all of us to adapt usual methods of work to the current circumstance, we appreciate the efforts to ensure smooth functioning of the First Committee, which is an important platform and forum for open debate on disarmament-related issues and global threats to international peace and security.

The challenges facing the world today continue to affect millions of people around the world increasing instability and seriously diminishing trust and confidence. In times like this it is especially important to reaffirm our common commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and norms of international law in order to preserve and maintain international peace and security

Mr. Chair,

Nuclear disarmament is a critical element of global efforts to make the world safer, to strengthen peace and security, as well as to promote confidence. Azerbaijan supports efforts aimed at achieving this goal, which ultimately should lead to the world free of nuclear weapons and nuclear danger. As one of the State Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Azerbaijan remains committed to this cornerstone document and fully abides by its obligations. We are looking forward to the convening of the 10th NPT Review Conference and a successful outcome of this meeting.

We strongly believe in the multilateral efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in all its aspects and stand ready to continue our support to existing relevant international instruments.

Mr. Chair,

Azerbaijan continues its consistent efforts at the multilateral and bilateral levels to ensure closer coordination and cooperation in the implementation of its obligations in the areas of arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Azerbaijan regularly engages in information-sharing, submits reports and receives on-site inspections, as well as evaluation and observation visits, under the OSCE Vienna Document 2011 on CSBMs, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the OSCE Document on SALW and Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfer, among others.

Although it is recognized that arms control and confidence- and security-building measures had a positive influence on the overall political stability and security environment in the OSCE area, they nevertheless failed to effectively contribute in conflict situations, especially in the region of the South Caucasus. Albeit deplorable, this should have been quite expectable given, on the one hand, a stark contrast between the stated words and actual deeds on the ground and on the other hand, a total absence of respect for the basic norms and principles of international law that guide inter-States relations.

Mr. Chair,

In early 1990s, Armenia used military force against Azerbaijan to fulfill its long-nurtured plan of seizing our territory. This well-prepared aggression resulted in seizure of the significant part of my country, including Nagorny Karabakh, the seven adjacent districts and some exclaves. These territories, turned into “grey zone”, left outside of application of international treaties, including any CSBMs or arms control mechanisms, remained under Armenian occupation for over past 30 years. The war claimed lives of tens of thousands of people and caused considerable destruction of civilian infrastructure and property in Azerbaijan. The occupied territories were ethnically cleansed of all Azerbaijanis, while more than 1 million people were forced to leave their homes.

Accompanied by the deliberate policy of Armenia to derail the peace process, its inflammatory and warmongering statements and consistent provocations on the ground, including the deliberate attacks in April 2016 and July 2020, the incursion of the sabotage-reconnaissance group into the territory of Azerbaijan this August and purposeful actions aimed at changing the demographic, cultural and physical character of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, leaves no doubt that the ultimate goal of Armenia was to consolidate the occupation and achieve the annexation of the territories of Azerbaijan under the cover of cease-fire and peace process.

The lack of adequate reaction of the international community to provocations, aggressive actions and unlawful activities by Armenia, notorious double standards and selectivity with regard to the universally recognized obligations and commitments under international law only contributed to Armenia’s sense of impunity and permissiveness.

As we speak, detrimental consequences of the above-mentioned gross violations by Armenia are glaring on the frontline. Armenia is using weapons and military equipment that it has been illegally transferring to and accumulating in the occupied territories, in order to continue its aggression against Azerbaijan. The armed forces of Armenia subjects major cities of Azerbaijan (Yevlakh, Goranboy, Beylagan, Tartar, Barda, Aghdam, Aghjabadi and others) and the critical civilian infrastructure of a regional importance located far away from the combat zone to intensive shelling. Civilian objects, such as hospitals, medical centers, school building and kindergartens, as well as graveyards are not spared.

As a result of the armed attack by Armenia that began on 27 September 2020 and is currently ongoing, thus far 47 Azerbaijani civilians, including children and elderly have been killed, 222 civilians have been hospitalized with various injuries, more than 1 669 private houses, 84 apartment buildings and 301 civilian facilities have been destroyed.

In order to repel military aggression by Armenia and to ensure the security of civilians and densely populated residential areas, deep inside the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan, the armed forces of Azerbaijan undertake counter-offensive measures within the right to self-defence and in full compliance with the international humanitarian law. **Azerbaijan acts on its sovereign soil**, and takes adequate and proportionate measures to repulse the imminent threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity and security of its population.

The Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan informed that the armed forces of Armenia use “Touchka-U” tactical missiles, “Scud” tactical ballistic missiles, multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS), including “Smerch”, “URAGAN” and “GRAD”, as well as other heavy artillery to target densely populated residential areas and other civilian objects in Azerbaijan.

There is nothing surprising in Armenia’s apparent disregard for the universal rules of civilized behavior. The reports and evidence indicate that Armenia is extensively using massively destructive methods of warfare and weapons prohibited under the international law, such as cluster munition. The evidence collected before and throughout the current hostilities clearly indicates that Armenia actively recruits foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries to use in combat against Azerbaijan. For this purpose, Armenian diaspora organizations operating in various countries under the guise of charity and non-governmental organizations raise funds and collect other material means to finance terrorist activities and support the aggression of Armenia and attacks of its armed forces against the civilian population in Azerbaijan. According to international media reports, thousands of ethnic Armenians from different countries, including from Lebanon, Greece and France, have already arrived in the conflict zone or in the process of deployment.

Despite the humanitarian ceasefire agreed during the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan and Armenia in Moscow on 9 October 2020, with the mediation of the Russian Federation, to exchange the prisoners of war and bodies of dead, effective as of 12:00 on 10 October 2020, the armed forces of Armenia continued to attack densely populated areas and the positions of the armed forces of Azerbaijan. Immediately after the establishment of the humanitarian ceasefire, the armed forces of Armenia fired at the Aghdam and Tartar districts of Azerbaijan, attempted an attack in the direction of Hardrut and Jabrayil and subjected to missile attack the city of Mingachevir.

On the night of 11 October 2020, an apartment building in the central part of Ganja, located approximately 40 km away from the frontline once again came under the missile attack by the armed forces of Armenia with Scud type ballistic missiles that have an enormous destructive power. The strike was carried out from Vardenis district of Armenia against Azerbaijani civilians beyond the combat zone. The missile hit completely destroyed the apartment building and its residents were left under ruins. 10 civilians, including 4 women, were killed and 34 civilians, including 16 women and 6 children, were severely injured. Three of these children lost both of their parents. This is nothing but an act of terrorism committed against innocent civilians that once again reveals the true face of Armenia.

The Republic of Azerbaijan strongly condemns these acts of aggression by Armenia and calls on the United Nations, its Member States and the international community as a whole to take decisive steps to force the aggressor Armenia to comply with international law and bring it to account. The act of aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan is a blatant violation of fundamental norms and principles of international law, international humanitarian law, as well as the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of 1993, demanding the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forces of Armenia from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

Armenia's attacks directed at civilians, the murder and injuring of civilians and attack that caused indiscriminate or disproportionate harm to civilian and civilian objects in Azerbaijan amount to war crimes under the international humanitarian law, for which Armenia bears full liability and which also incur individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrators.

Azerbaijani nation has been patient enough with the continued occupation of its territories and pinned its hopes on the change of the mindset of the current Armenian regime, including with the support of the Minsk Group. Unfortunately, these expectations have not realized and we see no other way to restore Azerbaijan's infringed territorial integrity. The Azerbaijani nation, like many other countries in the world, seeks no land of its neighbors, but will not yield an inch of hers to anyone!

BANGLADESH

Statement by H.E. Ms. Rabab Fatima, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bangladesh to the UN 14 October 2020

Mr. Chair,

I warmly congratulate you and Members of the Bureau on your election to the First Committee. I assure you of my delegation's fullest support and cooperation in discharging your responsibilities.

Bangladesh aligns itself with the statement delivered by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Allow me to share a few thoughts in my national capacity.

Bangladesh holds a strong record on disarmament and non-proliferation. Our commitment to general and complete disarmament is total and unwavering. It is anchored in our Constitution, and in the pledge of our Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to work towards "relaxation of tension, limitation of armaments and the promotion of peaceful coexistence in every part of the world." Guided by this principle, Bangladesh continues to remain at the forefront in assuming higher obligations under all major multilateral disarmament treaties.

Mr. Chair,

Since the adoption of the first resolution of the UN on the recommendation by the First Committee - Resolution 1 (I) entitled, "Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy, 75 years have elapsed. Sadly, the promise of disarmament remains elusive. Even today, we continue to live in the constant fear of nuclear catastrophe. We must do more to change the course.

The Covid-19 has significantly impacted the work--procedurally and substance-wise, of the disarmament machinery, the First Committee too, as we see it today. In the days ahead, we would need to put greater efforts to overcome this.

Mr. Chair,

Bangladesh believes that the ultimate guarantee of international peace and security lies in the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we consistently and strongly support the global quest for a nuclear-weapons-free world. To attain that overarching objective, we ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). We are encouraged to see the steady progress in its ratification. We call upon member states to come forward so that this critical instrument may enter into force at the earliest.

We continue to call for the realization of the commitments enshrined in other key instruments aimed at nuclear disarmament, including the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Due to the pandemic, the much-awaited Tenth Review Conference of the NPT had to be postponed. Member States should utilize the extra time to constructively engage with a view to producing a meaningful, tangible, and sustainable outcome.

We must multiply our efforts for rapid entry into force of the CTBT and commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). We share others' concerns over the protracted impasse in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) due to the lack of consensus on a programme of work over the past two decades. We hope to see more creative and forward-leaning discussions towards a possible solution to this longstanding problem in the days ahead.

Mr. Chair,

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, in her address to the General Assembly this year, underlined the importance of benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear technology by developing countries. Bangladesh wishes to emphasize that

there should not be any impediment to pursue the inalienable rights of all States to develop, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including medical science.

We also recognize that such rights come with certain responsibilities. In constructing the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, Bangladesh has remained deeply committed to its responsibilities and continued to follow the highest IAEA standards.

Mr. Chair,

We reiterate our abiding support to the Chemical Weapons Convention and underscore the importance of upholding the credibility and integrity of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPCW). As an elected member of the Executive Council of the OPCW, we are playing our part towards global efforts for chemical disarmament. We have made financial contributions to support the project to upgrade the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store to construct a new facility called the OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology.

Bangladesh reiterates its full support to the Biological Weapons Convention and looks forward to working together to strengthen the Convention so that it can robustly face future challenges.

Mr. Chair,

Bangladesh remains committed to fulfilling her obligations under the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) and its Protocols that she is a party to. Bangladesh remains concerned over the continued use of anti-personnel mines, including in our neighboring Myanmar.

Since 2017, we drew the Committee's attention to the use of anti-personnel mines by the Myanmar authority against their own people, including the forcibly displaced Rohingya community who took shelter in Bangladesh fleeing persecution. The report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission repeatedly mentioned Myanmar's extensive "use of landmines at the border". This is one of the reasons preventing voluntary repatriation of the Rohingyas. Unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.

We reiterate our call to the Myanmar authorities to take urgent necessary steps to ensure mine clearance, declare a moratorium on the production of landmines, and end civilian casualties.

Mr. Chair,

Rapid technological development, including artificial intelligence and biotechnology, continues to redefine the nature of our disarmament discourse. ICT has brought immense benefits to our peoples. But our increasing dependence on digital technologies more so due to the pandemic, has created new vulnerabilities. The growing malicious use of ICTs, by both state and non-state actors, are endangering international security in our highly digitized world. Such actors are even exploiting the global health crisis by targeting critical establishments necessary for mitigating this pandemic. No Government can tackle these challenges alone. Bangladesh strongly rejects the illegal or malicious use of ICTs, including social networks, for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security.

Therefore, the need for the UN to continue its norm-setting role for a globally accessible, free, open, and secured cyberspace is now more than ever. Bangladesh remains steadfast to contribute to safeguarding ICTs from malicious activities.

Mr. Chair,

We are committed to a peaceful, safe, sustainable, open, and accessible outer space environment. With the launch of the Bangabandhu-1 satellite, Bangladesh now has an enhanced stake in preventing an arms race in outer space. While trust and confidence-building measures can be useful for preventing the weaponization of outer space, there is no denying the importance of concluding a legally binding international instrument for this.

We also need to scale up our efforts towards capacity building of developing countries to contribute to the debates and developments in the outer space sphere in an inclusive and transparent manner.

Bangladesh notes that small arms and light weapons and their trafficking continue to threaten peace, safety, security and sustainable development across the globe. In this regard we have consistently supported the adoption of Programme of Action on SALW and call for speedier implementation of the PoA. For that, we need to minimize the gaps through effective multilateral cooperation and mutual assistance.

Mr. Chair,

We remain committed to upholding internationally agreed disarmament norms and strengthening the UN Disarmament Machinery. We reiterate the importance of convening the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-IV) for giving further impetus to the disarmament machinery in an evolving and complex global context.

Bangladesh also calls for increased participation of women in disarmament discourses – both at the national and global levels- to advance the women, peace, and security agenda.

Mr. Chair,

The pandemic has taught us that it is development not armament that can ensure global peace and security. We should be able to apply this lesson in the disarmament domain. As a nation in development transition, Bangladesh has legitimate interests in advocating for channelling the massive resources deployed for arms build-up to deserving priorities of sustainable development and sustaining peace. Unfortunately, that is not happening. Last year, the world rather saw the biggest spike in military spending in a decade. We must work towards reversing this trend. This year, in the face of challenges of COVID-19, we are in greater need of resources to build back better. We urge for repurposing military expenditure cuts to address the new challenges brought out by the pandemic particularly in the fields of education and health.

We believe that despite enormous challenges, stalemates, and painstakingly slow progress in their works, the UN disarmament machinery remains the best way to chart a way forward to achieve our shared goals. To underpin our engagement at the UN, we would redouble our efforts to strengthen all the disarmament and arms control regimes to ensure a safer and better world for our future generations.

I thank you.

Statement by Canada – General Debate

Delivered by H.E. Leslie Norton
Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations in
Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament
New York, 14 October 2020

Chair,

I congratulate you on ably chairing this committee in these unusual times, and I assure you of my delegation's full support.

This is a First Committee like no other.

The pandemic has shown us that even an expected crisis can progress rapidly and have unexpected effects. We need to take that realization into the realm of disarmament and international security, to appreciate the fragility of any human-devised system, especially when subject to unprecedented pressures, or cascading events. It reminds us of how calamitous it would be if we let international peace and security slip away for want of honest effort, compromise and a sense of the global good. In such a scenario, there will be no "vaccine" to help restore our world.

Nuclear weapons remain a fact of life, 75 years after their only use in war in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The inhibition against their use appears shakier today than it has in decades. For Canada and so many others, this is an alarming trend.

Canada supports and understands the need for nuclear deterrence, but this does not stop us from advocating tirelessly for policies and practices to eliminate nuclear weapons. We will continue to work positively and constructively towards a meaningful outcome to the next Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

This approach underpins our advocacy for entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and for the extension of New START. We wish to see further advancements in risk reduction measures and in nuclear disarmament verification, and the long-awaited launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Canada believes that all states possessing nuclear weapons must take concrete actions to advance disarmament. These states have seen advantage in possessing nuclear weapons; now, they must also demonstrate their readiness to dispense with them.

The unprecedented impact of COVID-19 has reinforced the need to mitigate biological threats. The 2021 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Review Conference will offer us an opportunity to strengthen implementation. Canada is doing its part to limit global biological threats. As a supporter of Action 10 ("Readiness to investigate alleged use of biological weapons") and a champion of Action 11 ("Develop framework to respond to any use of biological weapons") of the Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament, we are working to strengthen both the BTWC and the Secretary General's Mechanism. Canada is also working with more than twenty countries to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity for pathogens of security concern, enhance surveillance and diagnostic capabilities, and improve capacities to mitigate biological threats.

On chemical weapons, despite some positive developments, serious challenges remain for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Canada supported the addition of new chemical warfare agents, including the Novichok-type weapon used in Salisbury in 2018, to the CWC's Annex on Chemicals. Two years later, we were shocked to learn of the abhorrent use of a Novichok in the assassination attempt against Alexei Navalny. We deplore the Syrian Arab Republic's use of chemical weapons and their failure to date to complete the declaration or destruction of its weapons. For this reason, we endorse the OPCW Executive Council decision condemning three such attacks and seeking to bring Syria into compliance with the Convention. We will continue to work with the vast majority of states in upholding the global norm against the use of chemical weapons.

Canada promotes the sustainable use of outer space for all states. Space infrastructure is vulnerable to a range of threats, both in space and from Earth. Anti-satellite weapons tests (ASAT) can create long-lasting debris which

pose a hazard to all space users. We see merit in exploring a possible agreement to end ASAT tests with the potential to cause space debris.

Canada believes that cooperation among all member states is key to ensuring the safe, secure and sustainable use of outer space while maintaining international security. Transparency and early communications enable us to explain our intentions. Such measures build confidence and trust, and improve security and stability. Consequently, we support further development of international norms of responsible behavior as a pragmatic way of reducing misunderstanding, misinterpretations or miscalculations between states. In this context, we welcome the UK resolution on “Reducing Space Threats through Responsible Behaviours”. In the long term, we remain open to the possibility of a legally-binding instrument related to space security, once we have strengthened trust and confidence between states.

Canada is now a State Party to the Arms Trade Treaty and we encourage all major arms exporters and importers to join the Treaty. We recognize that the diversion of conventional weapons has devastating consequences on human rights and international security. We will continue to strengthen our national export control system to tackle diversion, including through international cooperation with States Parties. Canada supports discussions within the ATT on post-delivery verification and other mitigation measures to prevent diversion.

We welcome the enhanced focus on gender in the 2019 Oslo Action Plan for the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. To measure the progress achieved in the Action Plan’s implementation, it is important that all States Parties submit their annual transparency reports.

Canada has been pleased by the progress of the UN Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) related to cybersecurity, despite delays caused by COVID-19. We believe that greater recognition of the applicability of international law, as well as the adoption and implementation of voluntary cyber norms of state behaviour and confidence-building measures, are required to enhance stability in cyberspace. Similarly, we look forward to the contributions of the UN cyber Group of Governmental Experts to advancing international peace and security in cyberspace.

In seeking to strengthen responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, we commissioned research on the gender dimension of cyberspace, available on the UNODA OEWG portal. This research looked at how to increase the meaningful participation of women in international and national discussions, negotiations, strategies and capacity-building programs related to the use of ICTs in international security. We have also supported the Women in Cyber fellowship program, along with fellow donors Australia, New Zealand, the UK and the Netherlands. This program has allowed 30 women diplomats to participate in OEWG negotiations.

Canada supports equal participation and leadership opportunities for women and men in disarmament fora, which is why we are a Champion of Action 36 (“Full and equal participation of women in decision-making processes”) of the Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament. We also believe in the importance of assessing the possible gendered impacts of weapons.

In conclusion, while the pandemic has not always shown our societies at their best, it has proven that multilateral institutions can rise to meet extreme challenges, and that states can engage collectively, if not always perfectly, in support of the broader global good. We hope that this example might influence our exchanges and decisions during this First Committee, in the interest of greater peace and security for all states.

Thank you.

Déclaration du Canada - Débat général

Prononcée par S.E. Leslie Norton
Ambassadrice et Représentante permanente du Canada auprès des Nations Unies
à Genève et de la Conférence du désarmement
New York, le 14 octobre 2020

M. le Président,

Je vous félicite de la compétence avec laquelle vous présidez cette commission en ces temps inhabituels et je vous assure du plein soutien de ma délégation.

Cette réunion de la Première Commission ne ressemble à nulle autre.

La pandémie nous a montré que même une crise prévisible peut progresser rapidement et avoir des effets inattendus. Nous devons prendre conscience de cette réalité dans le domaine du désarmement et de la sécurité internationale, afin d'apprécier la fragilité de tout système conçu par des humains, en particulier lorsqu'il est soumis à des pressions sans précédent ou à des événements en cascade. Cela nous rappelle combien il serait désastreux de laisser la paix et la sécurité internationales nous échapper faute d'efforts honnêtes, de compromis et de sens du bien commun. Dans un tel scénario, il n'y aura pas de « vaccin » pour aider à restaurer notre monde.

Les armes nucléaires restent une réalité, 75 ans après leur unique utilisation lors d'une guerre, à Hiroshima et Nagasaki. L'inhibition contre leur utilisation semble plus fragile aujourd'hui qu'elle ne l'a été depuis des décennies. Pour le Canada et tant d'autres, il s'agit d'une tendance alarmante.

Le Canada soutient et comprend la nécessité de la dissuasion nucléaire, mais cela ne nous empêche pas de plaider inlassablement en faveur de politiques et de pratiques visant à éliminer les armes nucléaires. Nous continuerons à travailler de manière positive et constructive pour que la prochaine conférence d'examen du Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire aboutisse à un résultat significatif.

Cette approche sous-tend notre plaidoyer en faveur de l'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires et de l'extension du Traité New START. Nous souhaitons voir de nouvelles avancées dans les mesures de réduction du risque et dans la vérification du désarmement nucléaire, ainsi que le lancement tant attendu de négociations sur un traité d'arrêt de la production de matières fissiles. Le Canada estime que tous les États possédant des armes nucléaires doivent prendre des mesures concrètes pour faire progresser le désarmement. Ces États ont vu l'avantage de posséder des armes nucléaires; maintenant, ils doivent également démontrer qu'ils sont prêts à s'en débarrasser.

L'impact sans précédent de la COVID-19 a renforcé la nécessité d'atténuer les menaces biologiques. La conférence d'examen de la Convention sur les armes biologiques et à toxines (CABT) de 2021 nous donnera l'occasion de renforcer sa mise en œuvre. Le Canada fait sa part pour limiter les menaces biologiques mondiales. En tant que partisan de l'action 10 (« Disposition à enquêter sur les allégations d'utilisation d'armes biologiques ») et champion de l'action 11 (« Élaborer un cadre pour répondre à toute utilisation d'armes biologiques ») de l'Agenda pour le désarmement du Secrétaire général, nous nous efforçons de renforcer à la fois la CABT et le mécanisme d'enquête du Secrétaire général. Le Canada collabore également avec plus de vingt pays pour renforcer la biosécurité et la sûreté biologique des agents pathogènes qui suscitent des préoccupations en matière de sécurité, améliorer les capacités de surveillance et de diagnostic, et renforcer les capacités d'atténuation des menaces biologiques.

En ce qui concerne les armes chimiques, malgré certaines avancées positives, de sérieux défis persistent en ce qui concerne la Convention sur les armes chimiques (CAC). Le Canada a soutenu l'ajout de nouveaux agents de guerre chimique, notamment l'arme de type Novichok utilisée à Salisbury en 2018, à l'annexe sur les produits chimiques de la CAC. Deux ans plus tard, nous avons été choqués d'apprendre l'utilisation odieuse d'un agent Novichok dans la tentative d'assassinat d'Alexei Navalny. Nous déplorons l'utilisation d'armes chimiques par la République arabe syrienne et le fait qu'elle n'ait pas encore terminé de déclarer ou de détruire ses armes. C'est pourquoi nous approuvons la décision du Conseil exécutif de l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) qui condamne trois attaques de ce type et cherche à amener la Syrie à respecter ses obligations

en vertu de la Convention. Nous continuerons à travailler avec la grande majorité des États pour faire respecter la norme mondiale contre l'utilisation des armes chimiques.

Le Canada encourage l'utilisation durable de l'espace pour tous les États. Les infrastructures spatiales sont vulnérables à toute une série de menaces, tant dans l'espace que depuis la Terre. Les essais d'armes antisatellites (ASAT) peuvent créer des débris de longue durée qui constituent un danger pour tous les utilisateurs de l'espace. Nous pensons qu'il est utile d'étudier un accord possible pour mettre fin aux essais antisatellites susceptibles de provoquer des débris spatiaux.

Le Canada estime que la coopération entre tous les États membres est essentielle pour garantir une utilisation sûre, sécurisée et durable de l'espace extra-atmosphérique tout en maintenant la sécurité internationale. La transparence et une communication précoce nous permettent d'expliquer nos intentions. De telles mesures renforcent la confiance et améliorent la sécurité et la stabilité. Par conséquent, nous soutenons la poursuite de l'élaboration de normes internationales de comportement responsable comme moyen pragmatique de réduire les malentendus, les mauvaises interprétations ou les calculs erronés entre les États. Dans ce contexte, nous nous félicitons de la résolution britannique sur la « Réduction des menaces spatiales par des comportements responsables ». À long terme, nous restons ouverts à la possibilité d'un instrument juridiquement contraignant lié à la sécurité spatiale, une fois que nous aurons renforcé la confiance entre les États.

Le Canada est désormais un État partie au Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA) et nous encourageons tous les grands exportateurs et importateurs d'armes à adhérer au traité. Nous reconnaissons que le détournement d'armes conventionnelles a des conséquences dévastatrices sur les droits de la personne et la sécurité internationale. Nous continuerons de renforcer notre système national de contrôle des exportations pour lutter contre les détournements, notamment par le biais de la coopération internationale avec les États parties. Le Canada soutient les discussions au sein du TCA sur la vérification après livraison et d'autres mesures d'atténuation pour prévenir le détournement.

Nous accueillons avec intérêt l'accent accru mis sur l'égalité entre les sexes dans le plan d'action d'Oslo de 2019 pour la Convention sur l'interdiction des mines antipersonnel. Pour mesurer les progrès réalisés dans la mise en œuvre du plan d'action, il est important que tous les États parties soumettent leurs rapports annuels de transparence.

Le Canada s'est réjoui des progrès du Groupe de travail à composition non limitée (GTCNL) en matière de cybersécurité, malgré les retards causés par la COVID-19. Nous pensons qu'une plus grande reconnaissance de l'applicabilité du droit international, ainsi que l'adoption et la mise en œuvre de normes volontaires de comportement des États et de mesures de confiance sont nécessaires pour renforcer la stabilité dans l'espace cybernétique. De même, nous attendons avec intérêt les contributions du groupe d'experts gouvernementaux des Nations Unies sur la cybersécurité pour faire progresser la paix et la sécurité internationales dans l'espace cybernétique.

En cherchant à renforcer le comportement responsable des États dans l'espace cybernétique, nous avons commandé une recherche sur la dimension du genre dans l'espace cybernétique, disponible sur le portail du GTCNL du Bureau des affaires du désarmement. Cette recherche a exploré les moyens d'accroître la participation significative des femmes aux discussions, négociations, stratégies et programmes de renforcement des capacités internationaux et nationaux relatifs à l'utilisation des TIC dans le contexte de la sécurité internationale. Nous avons également soutenu le programme de bourses « Femmes dans le domaine de la cybersécurité », en collaboration avec d'autres donateurs comme l'Australie, la Nouvelle-Zélande, le Royaume-Uni et les Pays-Bas. Ce programme a permis à 30 femmes diplomates de participer aux négociations du GTCNL.

Le Canada soutient la participation égale et les possibilités de leadership pour les femmes et les hommes dans les tribunes sur le désarmement, c'est pourquoi nous sommes un champion de l'action 36 (« Participation pleine et égale des femmes aux processus de prise de décision ») de l'Agenda pour le désarmement du Secrétaire général. Nous croyons également en l'importance d'évaluer les éventuelles répercussions des armes sur les femmes et les hommes.

En conclusion, si la pandémie n'a pas toujours montré nos sociétés sous leur meilleur jour, elle a prouvé que les institutions multilatérales peuvent relever des défis extrêmes et que les États peuvent s'engager collectivement,

sinon toujours parfaitement, à l'appui du bien mondial au sens large. Nous espérons que cet exemple pourra influencer nos échanges et nos décisions au cours de cette Première Commission, dans l'intérêt d'une plus grande paix et sécurité pour tous les États.

Merci.

General debate

Statement by
H.E. Mr. Jukka Salovaara
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland
to the United Nations

Mr Chair,

Let me congratulate you on your election as chair of the First Committee, and assure you of the full support of my delegation.

In addition to the statements by the European Union and the Nordic countries, allow me to make the following national remarks.

Mr Chair, dear colleagues,

The circumstances of our meeting this year are indeed quite exceptional. Not only in terms of practical arrangements here in New York, but of disarmament diplomacy and multilateral cooperation overall. The pandemic has forced severe restrictions on our work just as efforts to maintain international peace and security are needed more than ever.

Against this background, it is all the more important that we take full advantage of the opportunity for direct dialogue provided by this Committee session. This year, more than ever, we must focus on what is most essential: securing existing commitments and ensuring their implementation in practice. For this, dialogue and the trust it engenders, are key.

Strengthening the international arms control architecture requires trust and confidence among states, assurance that agreements are complied with, and accountability where that is not the case. It requires strong multilateral institutions and effective national implementation, supported by international capacity building efforts. Advancing all of these should be our main aim this autumn.

Mr Chair,

What are the steps that we most urgently need to take?

In **nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament**, our focus must remain on ensuring a successful NPT review. Despite practical constraints, work has continued on different fora to prepare the ground for concrete progress at the review conference. This Committee session is an opportunity to review the results to date.

For progress in nuclear disarmament, ambition and realism are needed in equal measure. The Stockholm initiative has managed to successfully combine both approaches. The result is a package of practical and achievable measures that we hope will gather broad support. The CEND has facilitated a new kind of dialogue and engagement between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. We are pleased to participate in both initiatives and welcome especially the strong focus on risk reduction on both fora.

In a volatile environment, the predictability and stability that effective arms control instruments can bring is more important than ever. The New START treaty with its comprehensive transparency mechanisms is a case in point. We welcome the ongoing dialogue between the United States and Russia and hope it will lead to concrete results: the extension of New START and continued dialogue on broader limitations, including on non-strategic nuclear weapons. We encourage China to join in the discussions on future arrangements.

Strengthening cooperation on nuclear security is also essential. Nuclear terrorism, for one, is a challenge we need to tackle together. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, with its focus on practical, hands-on

cooperation has proven a valuable tool for its broad membership. We encourage all countries, not yet members, to join the initiative.

Regarding **chemical weapons**, our most urgent priority is to uphold the norm against the use of chemical weapons and to ensure that those that violate it are held to account.

The attempted assassination of Alexei Navalny in Russia is yet another stark reminder of how chemical weapons continue to be used in blatant disregard of international law. Earlier this year, the first report of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team confirmed the responsibility of the Syrian regime for three attacks in Syria, in 2017. We have condemned these attacks and all others – in Iraq, Malaysia and the United Kingdom – in the strongest possible terms. But condemnation is not enough. Actions must have consequences. Those responsible must be held accountable.

The first step towards accountability is attribution. Over the past two years, the OPCW has diligently implemented the tasking given to it to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons, and has done so in a professional, impartial and objective manner. For this, the dedicated OPCW staff deserves our full support and respect.

Instead, we have witnessed deliberate attempts to undermine the integrity of the organisation as a whole. This is simply unacceptable. Without strong institutions, there can be no effective treaty implementation. By undermining the independence of treaty organisations, we undermine the treaties themselves.

Going forward, it is our duty to ensure that the OPCW has the support and resources needed to implement its mandate in full. But even then, final responsibility for achieving accountability rests with the UN Security Council. We are yet to see the Council fully shoulder this responsibility.

On **biological weapons**, we should use the momentum created by the COVID-19 pandemic to agree concrete measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. A first step should be to improve implementation of the confidence building mechanisms already in place under the Convention. We should also consider adopting additional transparency measures, in order to increase trust and reduce the risk of dangerous misperceptions.

A new, pragmatic approach is needed to address the growing risks to **space security**. We need to come together to jointly define what constitute risks and threats in outer space, and seek practical means to address these. For this, an open and inclusive dialogue is needed, with the participation of all states, whether spacefaring or not. This is why we are pleased to support the new initiative “Reducing Space Threats through Responsible Behaviour”.

Raising the profile of **conventional arms control** is one of the many merits of the Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament. On conventional arms, our task is clear: to ensure effective implementation of commitments made under the different instruments. In this, international assistance is often essential.

Finland is pleased to cooperate with UNIDIR on weapons and ammunition management and to support the valuable work of NGOs and civil society on small arms and light weapons, including by funding the UN Trust Facility, UNSCAR. We are also currently preparing a contribution to the new Salient Fund.

As a longstanding supporter of humanitarian mine action we welcome the ambitious Oslo Action Plan, and especially its strong focus on gender. In Oslo, Finland presented a joint working paper on monitoring gender mainstreaming in the Mine Ban Convention. By setting the bar high on gender mainstreaming in the Convention we hope to not only improve its implementation, but also to set a positive example for the entire disarmament sector.

For the Arms Trade Treaty, promoting national implementation and the universalisation of the treaty remain key priorities. With 110 States Parties so far, progress on universalisation has been remarkable. In implementation, continued focus on diversion is called for. Here synergies can be sought with the work of the seventh Biennial Meeting of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, with its focus on countering diversion.

The ATT has a pioneering role as regards gender-based violence. We are very pleased that the importance of combatting gender-based violence and mainstreaming gender are increasingly highlighted also in the implementation of other arms control instruments. This is a key part of implementing our commitments under Security Council resolution 1325.

In its twentieth anniversary year, the Women, Peace and Security agenda remains as relevant as ever – and is increasingly recognised as such also in the arms control sector.

Similarly, the role of young people deserves additional attention in arms control and disarmament, just as it does in the broader context of the UN's work on peace and security.

In the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on **Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems**, our aim is an effective normative and operational framework, adopted by consensus by all parties to the process. It is an ambitious aim, but one that Finland will fully strive for. The 11 Guiding Principles are an excellent basis on which States can continue building a practical outcome.

We welcome the continuation of the work of the GGE and the constructive discussions that took place at the September meeting. The aim is still to achieve concrete results by 2021. With patience and flexibility on all sides, we will be able to reach an outcome all parties can commit to. We should strive for nothing less.

Mr Chair,

With our overall objective in mind – strengthening the rules-based international system and the institutions that work to uphold it – we look forward to working with you and all delegations to make this session a success.

Thank you, Mr Chair.

SEUL LE PRONONCE FAIT FOI

**Intervention de M. Yann HWANG
Ambassadeur, Représentant permanent de la France
auprès de la Conférence du Désarmement
Chef de la délégation française
au nom du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord,
des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de la Fédération de Russie, de la République Populaire de Chine et de la France**

« DEBAT GENERAL »

La France a l'honneur de présenter à la Première Commission un état d'avancement du processus de dialogue P5 entre les cinq Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires reconnus par le Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire (TNP) : la Chine, les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, la Fédération de Russie, le Royaume-Uni et la France.

La France a repris la coordination du processus P5 en septembre 2020. Nous exprimons notre sincère gratitude au Royaume-Uni pour son travail fructueux en tant que coordinateur du processus P5 en 2019-2020.

Au nom du P5, nous souhaitons réaffirmer notre engagement envers le TNP, sous tous ses aspects, alors que nous célébrons cette année le 50e anniversaire de son entrée en vigueur. À cet égard, nous souhaitons rappeler la déclaration conjointe de nos ministres des affaires étrangères du 5 mars 2020, à l'occasion du cinquantième anniversaire du TNP, dans laquelle nous célébrons les contributions incommensurables que ce traité historique a apporté à la sécurité et à la prospérité des nations et des peuples du monde.

Le TNP a constitué le fondement des efforts internationaux visant à contenir la menace, qui reste actuelle, d'une prolifération des armes nucléaires dans le monde et a ainsi servi les intérêts de tous ses Etats parties. Nous nous réjouissons également des bénéfices extrêmement variés apportés par les utilisations pacifiques de l'atome, tant pour l'électricité que pour la médecine, l'agriculture ou encore l'industrie et réitérons notre plein soutien à l'élargissement de l'accès aux bénéfices de l'énergie nucléaire et de ses applications à des fins pacifiques.

Nous restons attachés, dans le cadre du TNP, à la poursuite de négociations de bonne foi sur des mesures efficaces en matière de désarmement nucléaire et sur un traité de désarmement général et complet sous un contrôle international strict et efficace. Nous soutenons l'objectif ultime d'un monde sans armes nucléaires, avec une sécurité non diminuée pour tous. En contribuant à atténuer les tensions internationales et à créer des conditions de stabilité, de sécurité et de confiance entre les peuples, le TNP a apporté une contribution essentielle au désarmement nucléaire. Le TNP contribue à créer les conditions qui sont essentielles pour progresser davantage en matière de désarmement nucléaire.

La conférence d'examen du TNP, reportée à 2021, sera une occasion unique de célébrer son succès et de réaffirmer l'engagement de la communauté internationale à maintenir son autorité et son caractère central. Nous continuerons à soutenir le président-désigné et le Bureau dans leurs efforts pour que la conférence d'examen se tienne dans les meilleures conditions possibles.

Nous reconnaissons la valeur de la contribution du P5 pour préparer le terrain en vue d'une conférence d'examen réussie. Nous intensifierons nos efforts, en tenant compte du contexte de la pandémie de COVID, afin de finaliser notre travail de préparation en vue de la Conférence d'examen, en mettant en oeuvre la feuille de route conjointe approuvée lors de la Conférence de Pékin de 2019 et les priorités définies lors de la Conférence de Londres de 2020 :

1. Le dialogue sur les doctrines est un élément essentiel de la feuille de route du P5. Tout en renforçant la transparence et la confiance, il peut contribuer à la stabilité stratégique. Nous avons confirmé notre intention d'organiser un événement parallèle pour présenter nos doctrines nationales lors de la conférence d'examen. Nous nous efforcerons de poursuivre et d'approfondir notre dialogue sur la réduction des risques stratégiques en vue de la conférence d'examen et au-delà.
2. Nous réaffirmons que nous sommes prêts à négocier, à la CD sur la base du consensus et avec la participation de tous les pays concernés, un traité non discriminatoire, multilatéral et internationalement et effectivement vérifiable - sur l'arrêt de la production de matières fissiles. Dans ce contexte, nous poursuivrons nos discussions sur les questions liées au FMCT.

3. En ce qui concerne le glossaire des principaux termes nucléaires, qui constitue une contribution précieuse à la réduction des risques et au renforcement de la confiance mutuelle, nous confirmons que la deuxième édition est en cours de finalisation et sera publiée à temps pour la conférence d'examen.

4. Réaffirmant notre attachement aux buts et objectifs de la zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est, nous souhaiterions que les discussions entre les pays de l'ASEAN, ainsi qu'entre le P5 et les pays de l'ASEAN sur le protocole au traité sur la zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est se poursuivent.

5. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement à partager avec la communauté internationale les nombreux avantages de la technologie nucléaire et de ses applications à des fins pacifiques, et à poursuivre nos contributions aux projets de l'AIEA ou aux projets de développement bilatéraux. Nous organiserons un événement parallèle du P5, axé sur les utilisations pacifiques, lors de la conférence d'examen.

6. Enfin, nous réaffirmons notre engagement à présenter nos rapports nationaux de mise en oeuvre en vue de la Conférence d'examen, sur la base du cadre commun agréé en 2013.

La France est honorée d'avoir l'importante responsabilité de coordonner le processus du P5 dans la perspective de la Conférence d'examen et fera tout son possible pour soutenir les efforts du P5 en vue de renforcer la stabilité stratégique sur le long terme.

**Statement by H.E. Yann HWANG
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament
Head of the French Delegation**

On behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China and France

“GENERAL DEBATE”

France has the honour to report to the Committee on the state of play in the P5 Process of dialogue between the five Nuclear Weapon States recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

France has taken over the coordinatorship of the P5 Process in September 2020. We express our sincere gratitude to the United Kingdom for its successful work as coordinator of the P5 process in 2019-2020.

On behalf of the P5, we wish to reaffirm our commitment to the NPT, in all its aspects, as we celebrate this year the 50th Anniversary of its entry into force. In that regard, we wish to recall the joint Statement by our Foreign Ministers of 5 March 2020, on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the NPT, in which we celebrate the immeasurable contributions this landmark treaty has made to the security and prosperity of the nations and peoples of the world.

The NPT has provided the essential foundation for international efforts to stem the looming threat, still existing now, that nuclear weapons would proliferate across the globe. In so doing, it has served the interests of all its Parties. We also celebrate the astonishingly diverse benefits of the peaceful uses of the atom, whether for electricity, medicine, agriculture, or industry, and we reiterate our strong support for broadening access to the benefits of nuclear energy and its applications for peaceful purpose.

We remain committed under the NPT to the pursuit of good faith negotiations on effective measures related to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. We support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons with undiminished security for all. By helping to ease international tensions and create conditions of stability, security and trust among nations, the NPT has made a vital contribution to nuclear disarmament. The NPT continues to help create conditions that would be essential for further progress on nuclear disarmament.

The NPT review conference, postponed to 2021, will be a unique opportunity to celebrate its success and to reaffirm the commitment of the international community to upholding its authority and centrality. We will continue to support the

President-designate and the Bureau in their efforts to ensure that the Review conference takes place in the best possible conditions.

We recognize the value of a P5 contribution to prepare the ground for a successful Review Conference. We will step up our efforts, taking into account the COVID Pandemic context, in order to finalize our preparation towards the Review Conference, implementing the joint roadmap agreed at the 2019 Beijing Conference and the priorities identified at the 2020 London Conference:

1. The dialogue on doctrines is an essential element of the P5 roadmap. Whilst increasing transparency and confidence, it can contribute to strategic stability. We have confirmed our intention to hold a side event presenting our respective doctrines at the Review Conference. We will seek to continue and deepen our dialogue on strategic risk reduction up to and beyond the Review Conference.

2. We reiterate our readiness to negotiate, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty– a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – in the CD on the basis of consensus and with the participation of all relevant countries. In this context, we will continue our discussions on FMCT-related issues.

3. On the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms, which is a valuable contribution to risk reduction and enhancing mutual trust, we confirm that the second edition is under finalization and will be published in time for the Review Conference.

4. Reaffirming our commitment to the aims and objectives of the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone, we would welcome further discussions among ASEAN countries as well as between the P5 and the ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty.

5. We reiterate our commitment to share with the international community the many benefits of nuclear technology and its applications for peaceful purposes, and to continue their contributions to IAEA or bilateral development projects. We will host a joint P5 side event focusing on peaceful uses at the Review Conference.

6. Finally, we reaffirm our commitment to present our respective national implementation reports to the Review Conference, based on the common reporting framework agreed in 2013.

France is honored to have taken up the important responsibility of coordinating the P5 process in the run-up to the Review Conference and will do its utmost to sustain the P5 efforts towards enhancing strategic stability in the long run.

SEUL LE PRONONCE FAIT FOI

**Intervention de M. Yann HWANG
Ambassadeur, Représentant permanent de la France
auprès de la Conférence du Désarmement
Chef de la délégation française**

DISCOURS GENERAL

Monsieur le Président,

Ma délégation vous présente ses félicitations pour votre élection à la présidence de cette 1ère commission, et tous ses vœux de succès dans cette tâche importante.

La France s'associe à la déclaration de l'Union européenne, et souhaiterait présenter les remarques complémentaires suivantes à titre national.

Nous assistons à un retour de la compétition stratégique internationale et à l'émergence de nouvelles formes de conflictualité. Ces évolutions préoccupantes se doublent d'une contestation directe des institutions internationales et des normes censées encadrer le recours à la force et la course aux armements. Nous sommes convaincus de l'importance de définir un nouvel agenda pour la maîtrise des armements. Un agenda dans lequel la France souhaite s'engager pleinement et encourage ses partenaires européens à s'engager à ses côtés. C'est indispensable à la fois pour sauvegarder les instruments existants, avec l'extension que nous souhaitons du traité New Start qui lie les Etats-Unis et la Russie et la modernisation du Document de Vienne que nous appelons de nos vœux. Et pour nous doter d'instruments nouveaux, suite à l'effondrement du traité FNI.

En parallèle, nous continuons d'être confrontés à la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs, ou à leur réémergence. Il faut traiter cette menace pour notre sécurité collective.

Cette dernière est ébranlée par la remise en cause des instruments de désarmement. Remise en cause par ceux qui violent les normes de désarmement auxquelles ils ont souscrit : l'utilisation avérée d'armes chimiques en Syrie, et encore récemment en Russie, est inacceptable. Elle constitue une menace d'une extrême gravité. Les violations caractérisées de la CIAC ne peuvent rester sans réponse. Au nom de cette même sécurité collective, nous avons porté au nom de 40 délégations la décision « Contrer la détention et l'emploi d'armes chimiques par la République arabe syrienne » qui a été adoptée par le Conseil exécutif de juillet dernier. Nous avons aussi demandé à la Russie que toute la lumière soit faite sur les circonstances et les auteurs de la tentative d'assassinat d'un opposant politique à l'aide d'un agent neurotoxique de la famille des « Novitchok », développé par la Russie.

Ainsi, le renforcement de l'OIAC est une bonne nouvelle, en particulier la mise en place de l'équipe d'investigation et d'identification qui a produit un premier rapport éclairant sur les agissements du régime syrien qui a brisé ce tabou fondamental. Il est maintenant primordial que des mesures soient prises. Il faut rétablir la crédibilité du régime d'interdiction totale de l'arme chimique. Il faut punir les responsables de ces crimes. C'est l'objectif du partenariat international contre l'impunité d'utilisation d'armes chimiques, aujourd'hui rejoint par 40 partenaires et l'Union européenne.

Sur l'Iran, la France demeure pleinement engagée, avec ses partenaires E3, au soutien de la mise en oeuvre de l'accord de Vienne. La France est très préoccupée par les mesures nucléaires prises par l'Iran en violation de ses engagements au titre du JCPoA et appelle l'Iran à revenir au respect plein et entier du JCPoA.

La vérification est un acquis majeur de l'accord et nous soutenons fermement le travail de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, qui doit pouvoir faire plein usage de son mandat. Nous resterons vigilants à ce que l'Agence trouve des réponses satisfaisantes aux demandes de clarification qu'elle pourra adresser.

En matière balistique, l'Iran continue de développer son programme national, en violation de la résolution 2231 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, à augmenter le nombre de tirs de missiles conçus pour être capables d'emporter une arme nucléaire et à moderniser ses capacités. L'Iran doit y mettre fin immédiatement, ainsi qu'aux transferts illicites de missiles et technologies balistiques vers les acteurs étatiques et non-étatiques de la région, comme l'exigent les résolutions du CSNU.

S'agissant de la Corée du Nord, force est de constater qu'elle n'a pas pris les mesures qui s'imposaient. Son programme nucléaire reste opérationnel, comme l'indiquent les rapports successifs de l'AIEA. Son programme balistique est en plein développement, comme le démontrent les tirs de missiles balistiques répétés au cours de l'année écoulée ainsi que la présentation de nouveaux missiles balistiques, toujours plus sophistiqués, le 10 octobre dernier. Aucun geste sérieux n'a été consenti dans le sens de leur démantèlement, alors que les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité l'exigent.

Monsieur le Président,

Monsieur le Président, les grandes échéances de 2021 seront lourdes et déterminantes :

1 - L'année prochaine s'ouvrira par un événement phare et très attendu, la conférence d'examen du TNP, dont nous espérons qu'elle puisse se tenir dans les meilleures conditions possibles dans le respect des contraintes liées au contexte sanitaire. Le TNP sert notre sécurité collective. Pour la France, l'enjeu central sera simple : réaffirmer son autorité et sa primauté qui sont contestées. A l'occasion du 50ème anniversaire, nous devons tous reconnaître que ce traité est un succès indéniable et constater cette évidence. Le TNP est le déterminant de notre stabilité stratégique. Il est le seul traité permettant d'éviter la prolifération des armes nucléaires et de réduire toute possibilité de confrontation nucléaire, tout en apportant à chacun les bénéfices des usages pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire.

L'agenda que défendra la France repose sur trois axes :

- d'abord le respect strict de la norme centrale que constitue le TNP, que nous appelons tous les Etats à mettre en oeuvre, avec une attention égale pour ses trois piliers ;

- ensuite par un approfondissement du travail normatif du désarmement nucléaire : nous continuerons de promouvoir la seule voie réaliste qui est celle de l'approche graduelle. Le FMCT doit retrouver la centralité qu'il mérite dans les travaux du TNP. La question de l'universalisation du TICEN également. La vérification du désarmement nucléaire est une autre voie dans laquelle nous devons renforcer nos efforts, et la France y participe aux côtés de l'Allemagne.

- enfin, il faudra conduire des travaux concrets pour la réduction des risques stratégiques et pour le renforcement de la confiance et de la transparence sur les arsenaux et les doctrines nucléaires des Etats dotés du P5 et au-delà. Ceci constituera l'une des priorités de la France dans le cadre de sa présidence du P5, en même temps que la poursuite de la mise en oeuvre de la feuille de route agréée.

2 - La France préparera activement la **9ème Conférence d'examen de la Convention sur l'interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines**. La pandémie du Covid-19 doit nous servir de leçons et compte tenu du danger que fait peser la menace biologique intentionnelle, nous devons oeuvrer pour une coopération opérationnelle entre Etats parties à la Convention. Cette enceinte bénéficie d'importantes contributions de substance qui permettent d'appréhender des enjeux importants comme la persistance de la menace biologique à travers le monde.

3 - Dans le domaine des armements conventionnels, La problématique des **systèmes d'armes basés sur les technologies émergentes dans le domaine des SALA** est d'importance majeure et nous saluons l'adoption des « onze principes directeurs » en 2019 par les Hautes Parties Contractantes de la Convention sur certaines armes classiques. Nous nous tenons prêts à travailler, dans la perspective de la conférence d'examen de la CCAC en 2021, afin d'approfondir ces principes directeurs et de préciser comment ceux-ci peuvent servir de fondement au développement d'un cadre opérationnel et normatif qui soit robuste mais également universellement accepté.

Monsieur le Président, il convient donc de préparer efficacement le terrain du désarmement lors de cette première commission. La France compte prendre sa part de cet effort collectif en présentant plusieurs résolutions et initiatives :

- Avec l'Allemagne, nous portons la résolution quinquennale relative à l'UNIDIR, à l'occasion du 40ème anniversaire de l'institut. Nous réitérons tout notre soutien au travail de l'Institut qui pour continuer d'exercer pleinement son mandat doit reposer sur une base financière soutenable. Nous appelons tous les Etats membres à continuer de rejoindre le consensus sur cette résolution clé. L'Institut nous aide à penser un agenda sérieux et crédible du désarmement;

- La France porte également, avec l'Afghanistan et Australie, la résolution sur la lutte contre la menace que représentent les engins explosifs improvisés. La lutte contre les EEI, qui ont fait plus de 60000 tués ou blessés sur les 10 dernières années, constitue un défi prioritaire pour tous ;

- La France va présenter, conjointement avec l'Allemagne, la résolution biennale visant à prévenir l'acquisition de sources radioactives par des terroristes. Il importe que la communauté internationale puisse continuer de se montrer unie sur ce sujet et que l'ensemble des acteurs concernés se mobilise pour veiller au renforcement de la sécurité et de la sûreté des sources radioactives ;

- La France apporte aussi tout son soutien à la résolution portée par le Royaume-Uni visant à réduire les menaces dans l'espace par l'adoption de comportements responsables. Les menaces spatiales vont croissantes et avec elles les risques d'incompréhensions, de perceptions erronées et de mauvais calculs. Il devient donc urgent de réduire ces menaces et ces risques et d'avoir une compréhension commune des normes de comportements responsables dans l'espace ;

- En matière de cybersécurité, il est à présent temps de travailler à une option de long-terme, constructive, coordonnée et inclusive qui permettrait de poursuivre les travaux menés au sein des groupes onusiens sur l'application des normes et de développer les initiatives en matière de renforcement capacitaire. A cet égard, La France, conjointement avec plus d'une trentaine de partenaires, soutient l'établissement d'un programme d'action pour promouvoir des comportements responsables dans le cyberspace.

Cette 75ème session de la 1ère commission de l'AGNU s'ouvre dans un contexte difficile, que le contexte sanitaire ne contribue pas à aider. Notre expérience nous a néanmoins montré que des efforts sérieux de négociation, de bonne foi, permettent de progresser dans le but de consolider l'architecture de droit et de sécurité collective, sur laquelle reposent la paix et la stabilité internationales.

Dans cette perspective, la France est convaincue que davantage de dialogue transrégional est nécessaire. Il nous incombe de sortir des logiques de stigmatisation et de reprendre le chemin exigeant du consensus, qui est au fondement même d'un multilatéralisme efficace.

Les déclarations françaises relatives aux segments thématiques seront mises en ligne.

Je vous remercie.

**Statement by HE Yann HWANG
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France
to the Conference on Disarmament
Head of the French Delegation**

“GENERAL DEBATE”

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation congratulates you on your election to the chairmanship of this First Committee, and wishes you every success in this important task.

France associates itself with the declaration of the European Union, and would like to make the following additional comments in its national capacity.

We are witnessing a return to international strategic competition and the emergence of new forms of conflict. These worrying developments are coupled with a direct challenge to the international institutions and norms that are supposed to govern the use of force and the arms race. We are convinced of the importance of defining a new agenda for arms control. France wishes to fully commit to this agenda and encourages its European partners to commit to it. This is essential both to safeguard existing instruments, with the extension that we would like to see of the New Start Treaty between United States and Russia, and the modernization of the Vienna Document that we are calling for. And to equip ourselves with new instruments, following the collapse of the INF Treaty.

At the same time, we continue to be confronted with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, or their re-emergence. This threat to our collective security must be addressed.

Our collective security is undermined by the challenge to disarmament instruments. Challenged by those who violate the disarmament norms to which they have subscribed: the proven use of chemical weapons in Syria, and again recently in Russia, is unacceptable. It constitutes an extremely serious threat. There must be a response to the serious violations of the CWC. In the name of this same collective security, we have, on behalf of 40 delegations, supported the decision “Countering the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic” which was adopted by the Executive Council last July. We also called Russia to shed full light on the circumstances and perpetrators of the attempted assassination of a political opponent using a nerve agent from the “Novichok” family developed by Russia.

Thus, the strengthening of the OPCW is good news, particularly the setting up of the Investigation and Identification Team which has produced a first enlightening report on the actions of the Syrian regime which has broken this fundamental taboo. It is now essential to take action. The credibility of the regime of total ban on chemical weapons must be restored. Those responsible for these crimes must be punished. This is the aim of the international partnership against impunity for the use of chemical weapons, now joined by 40 partners and the European Union.

On Iran, France remains fully committed, with its E3 partners, to supporting the implementation of the Vienna agreement. France is very concerned by the nuclear measures taken by Iran in violation of its commitments under the JCPoA and calls on Iran to return to full compliance with the JCPoA.

Verification is a major achievement of the agreement and we strongly support the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which must be able to make full use of its mandate. We will remain vigilant to ensure that the Agency finds satisfactory answers to any requests for clarification it may receive.

With regard to ballistics, Iran continues to develop its national programme, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231, to increase the number of missile launches designed to be capable of carrying a nuclear weapon and to modernize its capabilities. Iran must put an immediate end to this, as well as to the illicit transfers of missiles and ballistic technologies to States and non-state actors in the region, as required by UNSC resolutions.

With regard to North Korea, it must be noted that North Korea has not taken the necessary measures. Its nuclear programme remains operational, as indicated in successive IAEA reports. Its ballistic programme is in full development, as demonstrated by the repeated ballistic missile launches over the past year and the presentation of new ballistic missiles, increasingly sophisticated, on 10 October last. No serious gesture has been taken to dismantle them, as required by Security Council resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, the major deadlines of 2021 will be heavy and decisive:

1 - Next year will open with a much awaited flagship event, the NPT Review Conference, which we hope can be held under the best possible conditions, while respecting the constraints linked to the health context. The NPT serves our collective security. For France, the central challenge will be simple: to reaffirm its authority and primacy, which are contested. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary, we must all recognise that this treaty is an undeniable success and acknowledge this obvious fact. The NPT is the determinant of our strategic stability. It is the only treaty that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduces the possibility of nuclear confrontation, while bringing the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all.

The agenda that France will defend is based on three main points:

- Firstly, strict compliance with the central norm of the NPT, which we call on all States to implement, with equal attention to its three pillars;

- secondly, by deepening the normative work on nuclear disarmament: we will continue to promote the only realistic way forward, which is the gradual approach. The FMCT must regain the centrality it deserves in the work of the NPT. The issue of universalization of the CTBT also needs to be addressed. Verification of nuclear disarmament is another path in which we must strengthen our efforts, and France is participating in it alongside Germany.

- Finally, concrete work must be carried out to reduce strategic risks and to strengthen confidence and transparency on the arsenals and nuclear doctrines of the P5 States and beyond. This will be one of France's priorities during its presidency of the P5, together with the continued implementation of the agreed roadmap.

2 - France will actively prepare the 9th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The Covid-19 pandemic must serve as a lesson for us, and in view of the danger posed by the intentional biological threat, we must work for operational cooperation between States Parties to the Convention. This forum benefits from important substantive contributions that help to address important issues such as the persistence of the biological threat throughout the world.

3 - In the field of conventional armaments, the issue of weapons systems based on emerging technologies in the field of SALA is of major importance and we welcome the adoption of the “Eleven Guiding Principles” in 2019 by the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We stand ready to work, in view of the CCW Review Conference in 2021, to further develop these guidelines and to clarify how they can serve as a basis for the development of a robust but also universally accepted operational and normative framework.

Mr. Chairman, it is therefore necessary to effectively prepare the ground for disarmament in this First Committee. France intends to play its part in this collective effort by presenting several resolutions and initiatives:

- Together with Germany, we are bringing forward the five-year resolution on UNIDIR, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Institute. We reiterate our full support for the work of the Institute which, in order to continue to fully exercise its mandate, must be placed on a sustainable financial basis. We call on all Member States to continue to join consensus on this key resolution. The Institute is helping us to think about a serious and credible disarmament agenda;
- France, together with Afghanistan and Australia, also supports the resolution on combating the threat of improvised explosive devices. The fight against IEDs, which have caused more than 60,000 deaths and injuries over the last 10 years, is a priority challenge for all;
- France will present, jointly with Germany, the biennial resolution aimed at preventing the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorists. It is important for the international community to continue to show unity on this subject and for all the actors concerned to mobilise to ensure that the security and safety of radioactive sources is strengthened;
- France also fully supports the resolution put forward by the United Kingdom aimed at reducing threats in space through responsible behaviour. Space threats are increasing and with them the risks of misunderstandings, misperceptions and miscalculations. There is therefore an urgent need to reduce these threats and risks and to develop a common understanding of the norms of responsible behaviour in space;
- With regard to cybersecurity, it is now time to work on a constructive, coordinated and inclusive long-term option that would allow the continuation of the work carried out within UN groups on the application of standards and the development of capacity building initiatives. In this regard, France, together with more than thirty partners, supports the establishment of a programme of action to promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace.

This 75th session of the 1st Committee of the UNGA opens in a difficult context, which the health context does not help. Nevertheless, our experience has shown us that serious negotiation efforts, in good faith, allow progress to be made in order to consolidate the architecture of law and collective security, on which international peace and stability are based.

In that perspective, France is convinced that more transregional dialogue is needed. It is incumbent upon us to move away from the logic of stigmatization and return to the demanding path of consensus, which is at the very foundation of effective multilateralism.

The French statements relating to the thematic segments will be posted online.

Thank you very much.

**Statement by
H.E. Mohammad Koba
Ambassador/Deputy Permanent Representative
of the Republic of Indonesia
on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement

at the First Committee General Debate
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I am honored to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). I congratulate you and other Bureau members on your election, as well as assure you of NAM full cooperation.
2. NAM expresses concern at the increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs. NAM further stresses the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and urges all States to devote resources made available from there to address the new challenges for the international community in the fields of development, poverty eradication and the elimination of the diseases that afflict humanity, including the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. NAM reaffirms its principled positions on nuclear disarmament, which remains the agreed highest priority for the UN in the area of disarmament in accordance with the Final Document of SSOD-I. NAM remains extremely concerned at the threat to humanity posed by continued existence of nuclear weapons and of their possible use or threat of use. The situation in the realm of nuclear disarmament continues to be characterized by an alarming impasse. The Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) have not made progress in eliminating their nuclear weapons. The role of nuclear weapons in their security policies has not diminished. NWS are modernizing their nuclear arsenals and planning research on new nuclear warheads or have announced their intention to develop new delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, as provided for in the military doctrines of some NWS, including the latest United States Nuclear Posture Review. NAM is deeply concerned by this dismal state of affairs, as a result of non-compliance by NWS with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings, as well as the abrogation of some previously-agreed arms control and disarmament agreements and the threats it poses to the non-proliferation regime and for international architecture of security.
4. The international community has waited too long for the realization of goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons and the launching of negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. It has become obvious that existing approach adopted by NWS, the so-called step-by-step approach, has failed to make concrete and systematic progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Despite tangible and indisputable positive developments on nuclear non-proliferation in past decades, forward movement on nuclear disarmament continues to be held hostage by misguided notions, including strategic stability. It is time to take a new and comprehensive approach on nuclear disarmament.
5. NAM reiterates that the convening of UN High-level International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, as decided through the General Assembly (GA) resolutions, would provide an important opportunity to review progress made in nuclear disarmament and to further promote this noble objective.
6. NAM welcomes multilateral efforts towards nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NAM takes note of adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 7 July 2017. It is hoped that, when entered into force, the Treaty would contribute to furthering the agreed global objective of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

7. NAM stresses the importance of enhancing public awareness about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons, the necessity for their total elimination, and the advantages of nuclear disarmament for international peace and security as well as for sustainable development. In this regard, NAM welcomes UN annual meetings and activities for the observance of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.
8. NAM reiterates its deep concern over the greatest threat to peace and security posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and those military doctrines of NWS and NATO that set out rationales for the use or threat of use of such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon-States. Such doctrines cannot be justified on any grounds.
9. NAM once again renews its strong call upon NWS to fully and urgently comply with their legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons without further delay, in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner.
10. NAM also calls on NWS to immediately cease their plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish, or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.
11. NAM expresses concern that the strategic dialogue between the NWS has remained limited and there are no negotiations underway for further strategic nuclear arms reductions beyond the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2021. NAM calls for the renewal of the commitments agreed within the framework of said Treaty. Nonetheless, NAM expresses grave concern over the US Nuclear Posture Review and its National Security Strategy, which goes against legal obligations and undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and threatens international peace and security. NAM also expresses its concern over the termination of the INF Treaty and its serious implications on the international peace and security as well as the efforts towards nuclear disarmament.
12. NAM reaffirms the urgent need for conclusion of a universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory and legally binding instrument to effectively assure all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances as a matter of high priority, pending the achievement of total elimination of nuclear weapons. NAM expresses concern that despite this long-standing request by non-nuclear-weapon States to receive such legally binding assurances, no tangible progress has been achieved.
13. NAM reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again, is the only absolute guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences arising from their use.
14. Furthermore, NAM calls upon NWS to reduce immediately the operational status of nuclear weapons, including through complete de-targeting and de-alerting in order to avoid the risks of unintentional or accidental use of such weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

15. NAM believes that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing and are essential for strengthening international peace and security. Non-proliferation derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. Pursuing non-proliferation alone while ignoring nuclear disarmament obligations is both counterproductive and unsustainable. NAM emphasizes that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.
16. NAM States Parties to the NPT regret the failure of 9th NPT Review Conference to reach consensus on a final outcome document despite efforts made by NAM delegations, and call upon the NWS to demonstrate political will to enable the 2020 Review Conference, which had to be postponed due to the inevitable consequences of COVID-19 pandemic and will

now be convened in early 2021, to have concrete recommendations on achieving nuclear disarmament, the ultimate objective of the NPT.

17. Recalling the opposition expressed by US, UK and Canada at the concluding session of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, NAM States Parties to the NPT express their disappointment that as the result of such opposition, consensus on new measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) was not achieved. This could undermine efforts towards strengthening NPT regime as a whole. NAM State Parties to the NPT reemphasize the special responsibility of co-sponsor States of 1995 resolution on the Middle East in implementation of that resolution and are concerned that the persistent lack of implementation of the 1995 Resolution, contrary to the decisions made at the relevant NPT Review Conferences, undermines the effectiveness and credibility of the NPT and disrupts the delicate balance between its three pillars, taking into account that the indefinite extension of the Treaty agreed at the 1995 Review Conference is inextricably linked to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
18. In this regard, NAM welcomes the adoption of GA decision 73/546 on Convening a Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other WMD which led to the holding of its first session in November 2019 under the Presidency of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the successful outcomes of that Session as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document [A/75/63](#). NAM calls upon all States of the region, without exception, to actively participate in this Conference and negotiate in good faith and bring to a conclusion a legally-binding Treaty on the establishment of the Zone. NAM State Parties to the NPT also stress that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the NPT, as well as other relevant decisions on the subject, adopted within the context of the Review Conferences, remain valid until the objective of the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East is achieved and that the implementation of decision 73/546 is without prejudice to the validity of aforesaid resolution and decisions and shall not also be construed as their replacement.

Mr. Chairman,

19. NAM is of the firm belief that non-proliferation policies should not undermine the inalienable right of States to acquire, have access to, import or export nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes.
20. NAM reaffirms the inalienable right of each State to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy, including the sovereign right to develop full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes without discrimination. NAM once again reaffirms the sovereign right of each State to define its national energy policies. NAM stresses that any decisions on multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel cycle shall be made by consensus and without prejudice to the inalienable right of each State to develop a full national nuclear fuel cycle.
21. NAM recalls the successful conclusion of nuclear negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and E3/EU+3, resulting in the finalization of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on 14 July 2015 adopted by Security Council resolution 2231. NAM calls for its full implementation by all its participants and underlines that this agreement shows once again that dialogue and diplomacy are the most appropriate means to resolve such issues, as NAM has always advocated.
22. NAM once again reaffirms the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attacks or threat of attacks, including using information and communication technologies, against peaceful nuclear facilities – operational or under construction – pose a great danger to human beings and environment, and constitute a grave violation of principles of the UN Charter, international law, and resolutions of the IAEA General Conference.

23. NAM recognizes that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and nuclear security rests with individual states. Any multilateral norms, guidelines or rules in nuclear security should be pursued within the framework of the IAEA. NAM continues to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist and emphasizes that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security must not be used, as a pretext or leverage to violate, deny or restrict the inalienable right of developing countries to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.

Mr. Chairman,

24. NAM believes that Nuclear-Weapon-Free zones (NWFZs) established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone treaty as well as Mongolia's Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In the context of NWFZs, it is essential that NWS provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone under any circumstances. NAM calls upon all NWS to ratify related protocols to all treaties establishing NWFZs, withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations incompatible with their object and purpose, and respect the denuclearization status of these zones.
25. NAM reiterates its full support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD. As a priority step to this end, NAM reaffirms the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council Resolution [487 \(1981\)](#) and paragraph 14 of the Security Council Resolution [687 \(1991\)](#) and the relevant GA resolutions. NAM calls upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone. Pending its establishment, NAM State Parties to the NPT demand on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without precondition and further delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council Resolution [487 \(1981\)](#) and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.
26. NAM State Parties to the NPT reiterate their profound disappointment that the 2010 action plan on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other WMD has not been implemented. They strongly reject the alleged impediments for not implementing the 2010 Action plan on the Middle East and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. This runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1995 Resolution, which constitutes the original terms of reference of establishing this zone. It also violates the collective agreement reached at the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
27. NAM supports the draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East" which urges all Parties directly concerned to seriously consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. NAM hopes that the traditional consensus on this resolution, which prevailed from 1982 to 2017, would be restored.
28. NAM also stresses the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament. NAM expresses concern at the decision of the United States to not seek ratification of the CTBT, as announced in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, taking into account the special responsibility of NWS for the realization of the entry into force of the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

29. NAM States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC) note with satisfaction the effective operation of CWC, as the only comprehensive multilateral treaty banning an entire category of WMD, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. They urge United States, as the only remaining State Party, to take every necessary measure to ensure its compliance with the “Detailed plan for the destruction of Chemical Weapons remaining after the final extended destruction deadline of 29 April 2012”, in the shortest time possible, in order to uphold the credibility and integrity of the Convention. They express deep regret for non-adoption of the report of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to Review the Operation of the Convention owing to lack of consensus and politicization on some issues. They call for promotion of international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention without any discrimination and restriction.
30. NAM States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) consider that the Convention represents an important component of the international legal architecture related to WMD. They recognize that the lack of a verification system continues to pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the Convention. They call for the resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory legally binding Protocol, dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the Convention, including through verification measures. They urge the party rejecting negotiations to reconsider its policy. They further emphasize the need for enhancing, without restrictions, international cooperation, assistance and exchanges in toxins, biological agents, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes without any discrimination, in conformity with the Convention.
31. In the context of UN Security Council resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#) and its subsequent resolutions, NAM underlines the need to ensure that any actions by the Security Council do not undermine the UN Charter, existing multilateral treaties on WMD, and international Organizations established in this regard, as well as the functions, power and role of the GA. NAM cautions against the continuing practice of the Security Council to utilize its authority to define legislative requirements for Member States in implementing its decisions. In this regard, NAM stresses that the issue of acquisition of WMD by non-State actors should be addressed in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner by the GA, taking into account views of all Member States.
32. NAM reaffirms the need to prevent emergence of new types of WMD, and therefore, supports the necessity of monitoring the situation and triggering international action as required. In this regard, NAM welcomes the adoption of the GA Resolution [72/23](#) entitled “Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of WMD and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament”.
33. NAM continues to affirm the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and relevant parts, components, and ammunition for their self-defense and security needs. NAM expresses its concern about unilateral coercive measures in this area, and emphasizes that no undue restriction should be placed on transfer of such arms.
34. NAM remains deeply concerned over a wide range of security, humanitarian and socio-economic consequences arising from the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). NAM calls on all states, in particular major producing States, to ensure that supply of SALW is limited only to governments or to entities duly authorized by them. NAM also underlines the need for a balanced, full and effective implementation of the Program of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, and in this regard, stresses the urgent need to intensify efforts to promote international cooperation and assistance.

35. NAM continues to be concerned over the negative implications of development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems and threat of weaponization of outer space that have, inter alia, contributed to further erosion of an international climate conducive to strengthening of international security. The abrogation of ABM Treaty brought new challenges to international peace and stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. NAM remains seriously concerned at the negative security consequences of deployment of strategic missile defense systems, which could trigger an arms race(s) and lead to further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.
36. NAM rejects the declaration by the United States in 2018 that “Space is a war fighting domain” or “the next battle field” and accordingly reemphasizes the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), inter alia, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under this agenda item as early as possible, taking note of a draft treaty on the “Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT), presented jointly by Russia and China in the Conference on Disarmament on 12 February 2008 and updated in 2014. Taking note of the substantive progress made through the discussions of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established pursuant to GA resolution [72/250](#), as reflected in the draft final report of this GGE, and expressing strong disappointment that consensus on the draft final report of the GGE was blocked by its member from the United States, NAM notes that it could have represented a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally-binding instrument.
37. NAM continues to reaffirm the need for a universal, comprehensive, and non-discriminatory multilateral approach toward the issue of missiles in all its aspects, negotiated multilaterally within the UN. Any initiatives on this subject should take into account security concerns of all states and their inherent right to peaceful uses of space technologies.
38. NAM strongly rejects the cases of illegal or malicious use of new Information and Communications Technologies, including social networks, for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security, and may adversely affect the integrity of the infrastructure of States to the detriment of their security. NAM calls for the intensification of efforts towards safeguarding cyberspace from becoming an arena of conflict, and ensuring instead its exclusive peaceful uses, which would enable the full realization of potential of ICTs. The development of any international legal framework to address such issues should be pursued within the UN with the active and equal participation of all states.
39. In this context, NAM takes note of GA resolutions [74/29](#), and [73/27](#) and welcomes the decision contained therein on convening an open-ended working group (OEWG) acting on a consensus basis, to continue, as a priority, to further develop rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of States and ways for their implementation. NAM emphasizes the need for the OEWG to continue studying the possibility of regular institutional dialogues; studying how international law applies to the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) by States, for which NAM recognizes the need for further work, as well as confidence-building measures and capacity-building. NAM also takes note of the conclusions of the GGE on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE), in its 2013 and 2015 reports, that international law, and in particular the UN Charter is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.
40. NAM stresses the importance of ensuring that the use of such technologies be fully in accordance with purposes and principles of the UN Charter, International Law and especially, the principles of sovereignty, sovereign equality, non-interference in internal

affairs, refraining from the threat or use of force in international relations, peaceful settlement of dispute, respect for human rights, and adhering to the well-established principle of peaceful coexistence among States.

41. NAM is of the view that Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) raise a number of ethical, legal, moral, technical, as well as international peace and security related questions, which should be thoroughly deliberated and examined in the context of conformity to international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law. In this regard, NAM States Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) take note of the adoption by consensus of the 2019 Report of the GGE on LAWS and have agreed that there is an urgent need to pursue a legally-binding instrument on LAWS.

Mr. Chairman,

42. NAM is concerned at continuous erosion of multilateralism in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. NAM is determined to continue promoting multilateralism, as the core principle of negotiations in these areas and as the only sustainable approach to address these issues, in accordance with the UN Charter.
43. Enhancing the effectiveness of UN disarmament machinery is thus a shared objective. Based on its existing rules of procedure and methods of work, this machinery has produced landmark treaties and guidelines. NAM believes that the main difficulty lies in lack of political will by some states to achieve progress, particularly on nuclear disarmament.
44. Expressing its deep concern on the continued lack of adequate representation from NAM countries in UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), NAM requests the Secretary-General and High Representative to undertake steps to ensure proper, balanced, and equitable representation in that office. NAM calls for transparency and strict application on the principle of equitable geographical representation, including in particular in the composition of groups of governmental experts established in the field of disarmament and international security. NAM also underlines the importance of transparency and openness of the work of such groups.
45. NAM reaffirms the importance of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and reiterates its call on the CD to agree by consensus on a balanced and comprehensive program of work without any further delay, taking into account the security interests of all states.
46. NAM also underlines the importance and relevance of the UNDC, with universal membership, as the sole specialized and deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery, to consider various problems in the field of disarmament and submit concrete recommendations to the GA. NAM expresses grave concern at the inability of the UNDC to convene its organizational and substantive sessions in 2019, in a formal setting, and expresses hope that, by addressing all underlying issues among concerned delegations, the UNDC will hold its substantive sessions in 2021, in a formal setting, so as to fulfill its mandate, by adopting agreed substantive recommendations.
47. For its part, NAM stands ready to engage constructively on advancement of issues on the UN disarmament agenda and the ways and means of strengthening the disarmament machinery. NAM underscores the importance of convening the SSOD-IV, as it would offer an opportunity to review, from a perspective more in tune with current international situation, the most critical aspects of disarmament process, and to mobilize international community and public opinion in favor of elimination of nuclear and other WMD and of control and reduction of conventional weapons. In this regard, NAM welcomes the GA endorsement of the report of the Open-Ended Working Group on SSOD-IV and the substantive recommendations contained therein, and stresses continuing of consultations on next steps for convening of SSOD-IV.

48. NAM hopes that all Member States will also offer their constructive input and support on the following eight resolutions that it is presenting before them, namely:

- **Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation;**
- **Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament;**
- **Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control;**
- **Relationship between disarmament and development;**
- **Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium;**
- **Measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;**
- **Convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;**
- **United Nations regional centres for peace and disarmament.**

49. In closing, NAM underlines the imperative of political will by everyone. NAM is positive that with political courage and working together cooperatively, the First Committee will contribute tangibly in building a more secure and peaceful world.

Thank you.

(Please check against delivery)

Statement by
H. E. Mr. Majid Takht Ravanchi,
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations

Before the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair,

I would like to express my warmest congratulations on your election to the Chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the NAM.

Mr. Chair,

During the last decade, the nature of threats to international security has changed significantly. With protracted conflicts causing large-scale human suffering, the international security environment, unfortunately, continues to deteriorate. The use and the threat of use of force arise in different parts of the world. Global military spending and arms competition are increasing, and the tensions of the cold war era have returned to the world that has grown more complex. Besides the continued threat of WMDs as well as the offensive policies of specific states, new threats including the possible weaponization of artificial intelligence, cyberspace, and outer space are emerging. In today's multipolar environment, the mechanisms for dialogue between great powers that once helped to defuse tensions are eroding.

Mr. Chair,

Nuclear disarmament faces some impediments such as a new nuclear arms modernization race and a lack of political will of nuclear-weapon states to reject a nuclear weapon option. Over 14,000 nuclear weapons, costing \$100 billion annually to modernize, maintain and deploy, remain in the arsenals of the nuclear-armed states, and the possibility of their use can result in a catastrophic impact on humanity and the planet. 50 years after entry into force of the NPT and against the clear obligation of NWS on nuclear disarmament, that nominal commitment is yet to be implemented. On the eve of the 10th NPT Review Conference, we should bear in mind that upholding the integrity and credibility of the NPT depends on the full implementation of all the obligations therein, in particular on nuclear disarmament.

In this context, the U.S., the largest holder of nuclear weapons globally, continues to modernize its tremendous arsenal. Just in 2019, the U.S. spent \$36 billion on its nuclear arsenal and confirmed that the latest variant of a low-yield warhead- has been "fielded". It uses this arsenal to threaten other non-nuclear-weapon states and irresponsibly lowers the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, its withdrawal from the INF and the JCPOA and the apparent lack of the will to extend the New Start Treaty have caused immense damage to international efforts towards non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

Supported by the U.S., the Israeli regime is threatening other regional countries in the Middle East with nuclear annihilation. This regime is the only regional obstacle to the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear weapons, a first-ever proposal initiated by Iran in 1974. The international community must utilize every opportunity to compel Israel to promptly accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party without any precondition and place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

I should also highlight another emerging threat in our region which is the incomplete implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement by KSA. It must rescind its current Small Quantities Protocol, as was requested many times by the IAEA Secretariat. Failure to implement the IAEA's safeguards could allow the Saudi Arabia to hide certain nuclear activities without being subject to IAEA inspections. However, Washington has

reportedly given green light to seven U.S. firms to engage with Riyadh in preliminary work on nuclear power ahead of any deal, without any prior-agreement for enforcing non-proliferation norms.

Iran is of the view that 75 years after the use of nuclear weapons by the USA, there is no guarantee that such weapons will not be used again, therefore, a binding norm should be adopted by the GA confirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This should be followed by time-bound nuclear disarmament through concrete measures by the Nuclear Weapon States. Furthermore, pending realization of this goal, provision of NSA to non-nuclear-weapon states and starting negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive convention on a total ban of nuclear weapons are imperative.

Mr. Chair,

Iran condemns any use of CWs by anyone, anytime and under any circumstances. We attach great importance to full implementation of the CWC and urge the U.S. as the only possessor of CWs to comply with its obligations to destroy its chemical arsenal and to withdraw its reservation to the Geneva Protocol without any further delay. Furthermore, the politicized approach of some MPs of the OPCW is a matter of concern.

We are deeply concerned about the clandestine biological weapon programs pursued by some countries. Iran continues to strongly support upholding the authority and full, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of the BWC. While the *Use of Biological Weapons* is contrary to the object and purpose of this Convention, nevertheless, regrettably the Convention does not explicitly prohibit it. This, indeed, is a major legal loophole and deficiency that needs to be rectified.

Mr. Chair,

The recent attempts by the USA to establish a space force as the sixth branch of its armed forces are alarming and triggering an arms race and causing severe insecurity in outer space. This must be stopped. Iran supports all international efforts within the competent bodies of the UN including the CD, with the equal participation of all States, openly and transparently, based on consensus, and taking duly into account the concerns and interests of all States, for the prevention of militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Iran strongly advocates retaining cyberspace exclusively peaceful. Fortunately, the establishment of the OEWG on ICTs in the context of international security was the right choice and we hope that its extension will allude to the incomplete work of the GGEs.

Mr. Chair,

Iran reaffirms the sovereign inherent right of any State to acquire, manufacture, import, and retain conventional arms for its self-defense and legitimate security needs. It is in this context that Iran has developed, based on international law, its home-grown defensive missile capability to deter any threat against our country. However, we are deeply concerned about the continuous flow of sophisticated offensive conventional weapons into the volatile region of the Middle East including the Persian Gulf area.

In this context, the U.S. is by far the world's biggest exporter of arms to the region and Saudi Arabia has become the world's largest arms importer in the last five years, with an increase of 192 percent compared with 2009–13. Arms imports by Israel also rose (354 percent) in the same period.

Last, not the least, Iran underlines the right of all States to enjoy peaceful applications of related technologies enshrined in the disarmament instruments. Additionally, it is necessary to observe the principle of equitable geographical representation in selecting experts to any GGE as well as fellowship programs.

Mr. Chair,

In conclusion, Iran as a penholder will present a draft decision on "Missiles", and we hope that, it will be adopted without a vote.

Thank you.

General Debate
Statement by H.E. Ambassador Stefano Stefanile,
Deputy Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations

Mister Chair,

I would like to start by wishing you and the members of the Bureau a successful holding of this annual session of the First Committee. Rest assured of the full support of the Italian delegation.

Italy fully aligns itself with the statement of the European Union. I would like to add some remarks in my national capacity.

Mister Chair,

The international scenario currently under our eyes is deeply concerning, with heightened international and regional tensions: it is of utmost urgency that we act with determination to safeguard and to strengthen the international architecture on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, preventing a new arms race in any domain. 75 years after the foundation of the United Nations, it is clear to us that effective multilateralism and a rules-based international system are the only tools to preserve the results achieved so far and further advance relevant processes.

Today, after having experienced COVID-19, we must not and cannot turn a blind eye on our collective responsibilities to enhance global security. In many areas of the world, the pandemic has even exacerbated conflicts, with potentially dramatic consequences, especially for the civilian populations. We therefore immediately supported the Appeal launched last March by Secretary General Guterres for a “Global Cease-fire” in all corners of the world. It is time to put armed conflicts on lockdown, while focusing all together on the fight against the corona-virus.

Italy firmly believes that any issue relating to peace and security must be addressed through prevention, mediation, diplomacy. In this exceptional time, we need a collective renewed commitment towards preserving international institutions and instruments, and guaranteeing their proper functioning. For this reason, Italy reiterates its support for the UN disarmament machinery and its three mutually reinforcing fora, which remain central and irreplaceable.

Mister Chair,

Italy reaffirms its firm commitment to disarmament and international security, in particular sharing the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. Our efforts for effective progress on nuclear disarmament are underpinned by our utmost concern for the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons’ use.

50 years after its entry into force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with its three mutually reinforcing pillars, remains the cornerstone of the international regime. It provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Italy supports the efforts to use the remaining time in preparation of the Review Conference as an opportunity to build bridges between the States Parties and assess the substantial progress achieved so far in the framework of this historic Treaty. We stand ready to identify ways to support, uphold and preserve it in the difficult current environment. We call upon States that have not yet done so to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States, without delay and without conditions, and we call on all State Parties to the Treaty to implement all its provisions as well as commitments agreed by subsequent Review Conferences.

Nuclear weapon States bear fundamental responsibilities and we encourage them to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while enhancing transparency on their policies and doctrines. We are convinced that the goal of a nuclear weapon free world and an effective, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament can be attained only through an inclusive and progressive approach, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, based on concrete and effective measures. We welcome the strategic stability dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation and we encourage them to seek further reductions to their arsenals, to extend the New START Treaty and to engage on other arms control arrangements, including with a view to their widening in terms of scope and participants.

A main priority for Italy remains the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It is a crucial component of the global architecture of nuclear non-proliferation. As a staunch supporter of the Treaty, Italy urges all States that have not yet done so, in particular the remaining eight Annex-2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. In the meantime, we call upon all States to respect the moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action that could undermine the objective and purpose of the Treaty.

The immediate commencement of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty dealing with fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices is also of crucial importance to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion of such a Treaty, all relevant States should abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the Conference on Disarmament could also be the framework for the elaboration of recommendations dealing with all aspects of Negative Security Assurances, without excluding the possibility of an international legally binding instrument.

Italy also values all initiatives undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament verification, as important tools to build trust and confidence among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. We support the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament and welcome the work conducted within the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, we would like to reiterate our support for the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on arrangements freely agreed among all the States of the Region.

Mister Chair,

In the context of the international efforts aimed at strengthening the non-proliferation architecture, Italy believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remains a key element. The full implementation of the deal and of all provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is crucial for regional and international security. We are gravely concerned by Iranian disengagement from the JCPoA and we urge Iran to return to full compliance without delay and to provide the IAEA with a full and timely cooperation with respect to all its safeguard-related commitments in order to clarify and resolve any pending issue. We welcome the Joint Statement of Iran and the IAEA dated 26 August and related developments on sites inspections. We are ready to support initiatives aimed at de-escalating the present tensions and restoring the JCPoA's integrity.

The repeated ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, deeply concern us. DPRK's intention to retain and further develop its nuclear and ballistic programmes represent a threat that we cannot ignore. We urge the DPRK to take concrete steps towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, in which the IAEA needs to play a key role. We therefore call on Pyongyang to engage in credible negotiations in this respect and to give tangible proof of its asserted willingness to denuclearize by returning to the NPT, signing and ratifying the CTBT and resuming its collaboration with the IAEA. In the meantime, the international sanctions regime needs to remain in place and be effectively implemented, sustaining the negotiating process towards this goal.

Mister Chair,

Italy remains strongly committed to supporting the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the work of the OPCW. We strongly condemn any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone – be it a State or a non-State actor – under any circumstances. It is imperative to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators of chemical attacks. Italy firmly condemns the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Air Force as concluded by the first report of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). We welcome the OPCW Executive Council Decision taken in July 2020 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and urge the Syrian Arab Republic to take all the measures required by such decision.

We also condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a chemical nerve-agent. Italy welcomes the delivery of the OPCW's analysis and calls on Russia to investigate and to disclose in a transparent manner the circumstances of this chemical weapons attack, to fully cooperate with the OPCW

Technical Secretariat in order to resolve this issue, and ultimately to comply with its obligations as a Chemical Weapons Convention State Party.

The current pandemic has shown how important is for us to work together to improve biosecurity and biosafety. We attach great importance to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), as a fundamental component of the international architecture of the disarmament regime, and to the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism. Operating in a context characterized by fast-paced scientific and technological developments, we should strengthen the BWC and endow it with appropriate mechanisms to assess the potential impact of such developments.

Italy is deeply concerned by the increasing risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors, particularly in relation to terrorist acts. In this respect, we strongly support full and universal implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 and its follow on Resolutions, as well as of all other relevant international instruments. In particular, we underline the importance of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts on Nuclear Terrorism and we encourage all States to become Party to this Agreement and to comply fully with its provisions.

Mister Chair,

Italy is extremely concerned by the indiscriminate humanitarian and socio-economic impacts of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war, as well as improvised explosive devices, especially on civilians and in urban zones. Therefore, we believe international cooperation and victim assistance are keys components of a comprehensive approach to mine action. We should also contemplate gender- and diversity- responsive assistance.

We welcome the results achieved last year in Oslo, on the occasion of the approval of a new Action Plan by the Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, in line with our commitment for a world free of mines. With the same engagement, we are looking forward to participate, next November, to the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lausanne, as another important milestone on the way to a more secure and peaceful world.

We are equally concerned by the extremely serious humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA). In this respect, we support the process led by Ireland, potentially leading to a political declaration aimed at strengthening the collective commitment on this issue.

Furthermore, looking at the protection of civilians and having in mind the data on armed violence, we believe in the importance of countering illicit arm transfers. For this reason, we call for the universalization of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and for the full implementation of all its provisions in order to progress towards a more transparent and responsible framework on this important issue.

Italy also strongly and actively supports the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Annexed Protocols. We attach great importance to their universalization, to full compliance with their provisions, and to the development of any possible synergy among them.

We especially welcome the substantive outcomes of the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, which led last year to the endorsement of the eleven guiding principles. Bearing in mind the importance of applying International Humanitarian Law to all weapons systems, we believe that further discussing this issue is crucial in order to reach consensus on the possible elements of a normative and operational framework.

Mister Chair,

Italy strongly believes that technology development and science progress are critical for the well-being of humanity and have to be seen as an instrument to promote peace and sustainable growth. Working on disarmament and security, we have the great responsibility for assuring the proper framework to these developments, preventing any dangerous or negative use.

From this perspective, we are firmly committed to the long-term sustainability, safety and security of the outer space environment and we believe that a comprehensive and effective international regulatory environment should be elaborated and put in place. In 2019, a National security strategy for space has been approved under the auspices of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, as a part of our National Strategy for Space. Italy remains fully committed to preventing an arms race in outer space and to preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict as essential conditions to strengthen strategic stability.

We believe it is important to develop initiatives that will increase confidence and mutual trust between current and future space actors. In this regard, we would like to highlight the importance of transparency and confidence building measures that can contribute to the security, safety and sustainability of activities in outer space. We encourage further international cooperation to elaborate agreed principles of responsible behaviour.

Along the same line, ICT and the Internet are one of the greatest human achievements of all times: they have already reshaped our lives by offering unprecedented opportunities of societal well-being, economic growth, sustainable development and prosperity that can thrive only in a global, open, free, stable and secure cyberspace. We are therefore committed to supporting the efforts of the international community towards a cyberspace based on the respect of international law and where security, rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights fully apply and are all intertwined. Institutional dialogue is a key tool in this perspective and Italy supports the proposal to establish a Programme of Action on advancing responsible behaviour in cyberspace, providing a one-track path towards consensus between States on such a sensitive issue.

Mister Chair,

Across all these issues, Italy believes that greater interaction with civil society – broadly encompassing academia, NGOs, and the private sector – could make a key contribution to our work.

Moreover, Italy promotes policies and approaches that enable the full empowerment of women and take into due regard the gendered impacts of armed violence and the importance of including women in disarmament negotiations and peacebuilding programs. Italy has so far adopted three National Action Plans to implement UNSC Resolution 1325 that, for the first time, addressed not only the disproportionate impact of war on women, but also their pivotal role in conflict prevention and resolution, as well as in the achievement of sustainable peace.

Thank you, Mister Chair.

Statement by OGASAWARA Ichiro
Ambassador of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament
– General Debate –
October 16, 2020, New York

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, I would like to extend my congratulations to you, Ambassador Santos Maraver, on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this First Committee. I assure you of my Delegation's full support and cooperation.

Mr. Chairman,

This year marks the 75th year since the first use of nuclear weapons. As Prime Minister Mr. SUGA stated in his address at the UNGA, Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never be repeated. With this resolve, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan will spare no effort in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons.

This year also marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, which serves as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The postponement of the 10th NPT Review Conference, by no means, undermines the urgency of the issues regarding nuclear weapons. In order to maintain and further reinforce the NPT regime, it is imperative that the Review Conference produce a meaningful outcome. All States Parties, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, should unite and join forces to realize this shared purpose. Japan is ready to do its fair share in this endeavor.

At the same time, we are undeniably living in a severe and unstable security environment with growing international tensions. The measures that we take to reach our shared goal – the realization of a world without nuclear weapons – must take into account this reality. Realizing a world without nuclear weapons requires nuclear weapon states to take concrete measures.

In this respect, Japan will submit a resolution titled “Joint Courses of Action and Future-oriented Dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons” again this year with some updates. This resolution provides a common denominator on a wide-range of issues related to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation while confronting new challenges. We hope that this resolution will garner wide support from the member States.

Mr. Chairman,

Efforts to increase transparency and accountability through reporting on nuclear arsenals, doctrines and policies, including concrete disarmament measures taken and to be taken, will contribute to increasing trust and confidence among all member States. Concrete actions should be taken to reduce the risks of nuclear detonation occurring either by miscalculation or by misunderstanding. Deepening of substantive discussions towards the FMCT negotiation, various efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT without delay, and disarmament and nonproliferation education are also the examples of actions that can be jointly undertaken by all member States. With regard to the CTBT, on October 1st, Foreign Ministers of the Friends of the CTBT, jointly released video messages, where Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. MOTEGI reaffirmed our commitment to the CTBT to deter nuclear tests.

Japan also underscores the indispensable role of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification, and has made substantive contributions to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

Last November, Japan hosted the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). At the meeting, the NPDI adopted the Joint Ministerial Statement to demonstrate NPDI's commitment to upholding and strengthening the NPT regime. Japan also continues to support the efforts of the CEND initiative as one of the practical approaches for substantive nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, in March this year, Japan organized a meeting with the attendance of government officials both from nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states as well as non-governmental experts, which built on discussions of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, established by the Government of Japan in 2017. The meeting, focused on “hard questions” that are unavoidable in realistically eliminating nuclear weapons.

On arms control, Japan welcomes that the U.S. and Russia have resumed their talks on nuclear arms control, which builds on their efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons from the peak of the Cold War. The U.S. has been committed to effective arms control and has pointed out the importance of an arms control framework involving the U.S., Russia, and China, which targets a wider scope of weapons systems. Japan supports such U.S. efforts. Furthermore, in light of such a positive trend, Japan welcomes and encourages China to continue its efforts to fulfil its responsibility as a nuclear weapon state and an important player in the international community and to engage in bilateral dialogue with the U.S. on arms control as a first step in accordance with the obligation to negotiate in good faith under the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

Japan is deeply concerned about North Korea's continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Japan reaffirms its strong commitment to the goal of achieving complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and related facilities as well as ballistic missiles of all ranges in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. Furthermore, we call on all member States to fully implement relevant UNSCRs.

Mr. Chairman,

We have witnessed the repeated use of chemical weapons in recent years. The use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances is reprehensible and entirely contrary to international norms. In this regard, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has an important role in establishing facts surrounding allegations of the use of chemical weapons and identifying its perpetrators. Japan appreciates and continues to support its professional, impartial and independent work. Japan is also committed to promoting the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and has organized seminars and workshops in partnership with the UNODA for this purpose. In order to ensure the success of the 9th Review Conference of the BWC in 2021, Japan will collaborate with other States Parties to achieve concrete outcomes to strengthen the BWC regime.

Mr. Chairman,

Conventional arms, applied in warfare and used by non-state actors, remain a major source of suffering and loss of life. Member States now need to stand united to work on conventional arms control and disarmament, referred to as "Disarmament that Saves Lives" in the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda. It is for this reason that Japan contributed two million US dollars to Saving Lives Entity, or SALIENT. For the same reason, Japan will submit to the committee the resolution on "The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," to which Japan trusts that Members States will extend their support.

The year 2020 marks the 10th anniversary of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet, severe consequences caused by cluster munitions remain a serious threat to human security. As a major contributor in UXO clearance, Japan will continue its support for further implementation and universalization of the convention, and looks forward to constructive discussions in the Second Review Conference in November. Japan welcomes the ongoing discussions on emerging technologies in the area of LAWS within the CCW framework, and will also continue its contribution to the international rule-making effort.

Mr. Chairman,

While our society is becoming increasingly reliant on space systems, the outer space environment is changing rapidly, and risks against its sustainable and stable use are becoming more serious as outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. Japan supports in principle the idea of preventing an arms race in outer space. We believe that TCBMs are pragmatic and near-term measures to increase trust and prevent misperception and miscalculations in space activities. The international community should reach a common understanding on ways to reduce threats to space systems in order to maintain outer space as a peaceful, safe, stable, and sustainable environment, free from an arms race. Japan underscores the need to characterize responsible behavior, which would be a practical step to further develop and implement norms, rules and principles in outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

I believe we need to focus on implementation, initiative and interaction through proactive, professional, and pragmatic approaches so that we will be able to foster united action at this important juncture.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

STATEMENT
by Mr. Arman Issetov,
Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the United Nations at the General Debate of the First Committee of the
75th session of the UN General Assembly

Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished participants,

I would like to congratulate you, Your Excellency Mr. Agustin Santos Maraver, on assuming the Chair of the First Committee, as well as, the members of the Bureau for their election. We are confident that under your capable leadership, the mandate of this important body will be fully and successfully executed, for which you can count on my delegation's full support at every step.

We align ourselves with the statement delivered by the Kyrgyz Republic on behalf of the States Parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

Mr. Chairman,

The current global security situation remains not only complex and unpredictable, but is seriously complicated by the so called "global dysfunction" the current COVID-19 pandemic has exposed. All that is happening indicates that the world needs to think and act in a unified way.

In these perilous times of geopolitical tensions, **the Manifesto "The World. XXI Century"**, proposed by the First President Nursultan Nazarbayev, becomes especially relevant as offers a realistic view on the world, based on unity, not division, and on cooperation, not rivalry. It says that there will be no winners in any modern war, everyone would be on the losing side.

We all – nuclear and non-nuclear weapons countries – share common responsibility in ensuring global peace and security. Nuclear weapons are no longer an advantage, but a threat, so we should all keep in mind the Reagan-Gorbachev formula that «**a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought**». The issue of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world will always remain a top priority for the humanity.

My President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the General Debate of UN General Assembly reiterated **the bold and unwavering vision of my country to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world**, as well as historic and memorable actions to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and renounce the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal.

Kazakhstan has the moral right to be always at the forefront of international efforts as it is among the few countries that still suffers from nuclear tests. The day of the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear test – August 29 (1991) thanks to the unanimous support of all UN Member States was declared in 2009 an International Day against Nuclear Tests. Annual UN high-level commemorations of this day have become a noble tradition to rally the international community to establish a total ban on nuclear testing through the early entry into force of the CTBT.

Our broad and balanced vision of achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is presented in **the UNGA resolution "The Universal Declaration on the Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World"**, approved by the majority of the UN community in 2015 and was updated in 2018.

This resolution calls for restoring and enforcing of trust and confidence between countries through the progress in disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons with an agreed timeline.

Mr. Chairman,

Kazakhstan, from the time of its independence in 1991, has been at the vanguard of ceaselessly advocating for a world free of nuclear weapons - the deadliest in human history. We were the first country to close the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site, and voluntarily abandoned the fourth largest nuclear arsenal in the world. However, my region and its people still continue to suffer from the horrors of four decades of nuclear tests conducted from 1949 to 1989. To facilitate recovery from the devastation caused, we invite all Member States to support and sponsor the recurring **Resolution on international cooperation and coordination of efforts aimed at the rehabilitation of the population, the environmental restoration, and economic development of the**

Semipalatinsk region in Kazakhstan. We intend to propose this resolution for adoption once again by the UN General Assembly this year.

Mr. Chairman,

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the imperative to strengthen the connections between international security and economic recovery, as amply reflected in Kazakhstan's commitment to the principles of multilateralism. The marginalized poor, and those caught in regions of armed conflict, suffer the most from the pandemic. It has, therefore, become obvious that peace, disarmament, justice, sustainable development and environmental protection are required to adequately address the pandemic.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, in his **Agenda for Disarmament**, has underscored disarmament as a prerequisite for reaching Agenda 2030, which necessitates the total abolition of nuclear weapons.

The current realities of COVID-19 have confirmed, all the more, the UN system's critical stewardship for global anti-crises approaches, which my country will strive to strengthen through a stable system of international relations.

Kazakhstan supports the formation of a more stable system of international relations and multilateral cooperation. Current realities have confirmed the central role of the UN and its agencies at the forefront of global anti-crisis efforts.

In these perilous times of geopolitical tensions, and the catastrophe caused by COVID-19, disarmament by all nuclear weapons states should be the priority of international relations policy. International solidarity is no longer a choice, it is an obligation.

The coronavirus pandemic has also brought to the fore the flawed logic of enormous military expenditures and the modernization of nuclear arms by the leading powers. It is also obvious that our already depleted resources, further diminished by COVID-19, should instead be spent on global public health, climate mitigation, and sustainable development.

Mr. Chairman,

We hope the negotiations between the United States and Russia, held in Vienna, will help restore bilateral dialogue and lead to the successful extension of the **New START Treaty** for the full five years.

Nuclear weapons expansion is alarming in size and diversity. Today, we have **hypersonic weapons, together with land, sea and aerial delivery systems capable of causing irreparable damage. These are frighteningly invincible to even advanced air and missile defense systems.** Furthermore, the secrecy of nuclear weapon states about their nuclear holdings and strategic warheads, make the world all the more dangerous. Thus, Kazakhstan promotes **confidence-building measures (CBMs) between Member States**, as during our seat on the Security Council in 2017-2018.

In fact, CBMs succeeded in stopping the arms race and preventing a nuclear catastrophe in the past century. Today, the world expects from the nuclear powers to follow the visionary example set earlier, which unfortunately have not been fully realized and acknowledged. We should definitely bring political trust and systemic dialogue back to international affairs.

Confidence-building measures remain essential in the process of developing general considerations for preventing the militarization of outer space.

The full and effective implementation and universality of the Arms Trade Treaty and other international instruments will contribute to promote international peace and security by reducing human suffering caused by armed violence.

Due to the lack of progress in disarmament, **the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)** has become a new reality. In the current situation, we believe that further advancing the Treaty is the right path forward for the international community. We should build on our past and accelerate momentum for the speedy entry into force of the Treaty and other disarmament instruments, including **the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).**

Kazakhstan believes that a **voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing**, as observed by the nuclear powers, cannot serve as an alternative to a legally-binding document, such as the CTBT. Hence, an early entry into force of this Treaty would be essential for effective implementation of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

Kazakhstan attaches great importance to strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones by addressing the issues and challenges encountered by them. Consolidating the efforts of nuclear-weapon-free zones appears to be a necessary step towards our common goal – making the world free of nuclear weapons.

We hope that further measures to strengthen interaction between the existing zones will help to consolidate their efforts in establishing new nuclear-weapons-free zones, in particular, in the Middle East and other parts of our planet.

This year, Kazakhstan together with the Central Asian partners, urges support for renewing **UNGA Resolution titled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”**.

We also express the hope for ratifying the **Protocol on Negative Security Assurances to the Parties of the Central Asian Treaty** by the United States.

Kazakhstan stands for further implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We call on all the parties to the JCPOA to show responsibility and fully implement their obligations under the Plan.

Kazakhstan is steadfastly advocating for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, and is ready to share its experience on how it dismantled its own nuclear testing infrastructure.

Nuclear weapons possessing states remaining outside the NPT must join the Treaty without any preconditions as non-nuclear states. We are convinced that national interests and security of any state should not be at the cost of other peace-loving countries.

Kazakhstan was the first country to set the example of forcing governments to halt nuclear tests around the world through its popular movement. The wider involvement of youth can have much greater impact in the future with their zeal and dynamism. This is a very crucial consideration, especially, given **the 50th Anniversary of the NPT** and ensuring the success of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 2021.

Mr. Chairman,

Kazakhstan attaches great importance to **strengthening nuclear-weapon-free zones** by addressing the issues and challenges encountered by them. Consolidating the efforts of nuclear-weapon-free zones appears to be a necessary step in making the world safer from nuclear threats.

This year, together with the Central Asian partners, we urge support for renewing **UNGA Resolution titled “Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia”**.

We continue to express our hope for ratifying the **Protocol on Negative Security Assurances to the Parties of the Central Asian Treaty** by the United States.

As a member of the Semipalatinsk Treaty, Kazakhstan reiterates the need for the development of an international legally binding document on **the provision by nuclear powers of negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states**. The voluntary desire of states to adopt a nuclear-free status should be welcomed and encouraged in every way. Only such assurances can effectively counteract the aspirations of non-nuclear states to possess nuclear weapons, which they see as a guarantee of their own security.

As another important initiative, in 2017, Kazakhstan put forward the idea of convening a meeting of all existing NWFZs. In this regard, in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, **a Seminar on Fostering cooperation and enhancing consultation mechanisms among the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones** was conducted in Nur-Sultan on August 28-29, 2019. Representatives of all existing NWFZs and Mongolia participated in this event.

We hope that further measures to strengthen interaction between the existing zones will help to consolidate their efforts **in establishing new nuclear-weapons-free zones, in particular, in the Middle East and other parts**

of our planet. We believe that **the Second UN Conference on the Middle East Zone** will be successful and will lead to concrete results.

Mr. Chairman,

Kazakhstan is committed and express its readiness to work actively on all other key issues on the Agenda of the First Committee, including the ones of chemical and biological weapons, conventional weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, cyber security and other issues presenting new challenges and threats to international security.

My President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the General Debate of the UN GA has proposed to establish a special multilateral body – **the International Agency for Biological Safety** – based on the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BTWC) and accountable to the UN Security Council.

We are of a view that such a multilateral body will assist us in strengthening the BTWC regime. Kazakhstan is open to actively work with all interested like-minded countries to discuss possible ways of realizing this initiative.

We need to redouble our efforts and join our synergies to generate new impetus where it is needed, in order to achieve a safer and more secure world for all. Kazakhstan stands ready to work with others to usher in a new reality that 2020 demands.

Thank you.

Statement of the Netherlands
delivered by
Mr. Mark Zellenrath, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN in New York
at
First Committee of the 75th session of the
UN General Assembly
General Debate

Chairperson,

Allow me to congratulate you on your election as chair to the First Committee. I would also like to congratulate the Bureau members on the assumption of their positions. The delegation of the Netherlands stands ready to support your work. In addition to the statement delivered by the EU, the Netherlands would like to make the following remarks in its national capacity.

Today, we live in a world which is increasingly multipolar and where new and disruptive technologies continue to emerge. These developments can have disturbing ramifications for our international security environment. Over the course of the past year this environment is further being challenged by the far-reaching consequences of **Covid-19**. Its impact is clearly visible in all parts of the world, transcending time, space and borders. The international community and our institutions have risen to the challenge posed by the pandemic in a manner that we can only applaud. For example, the very effective and timely test kits program of the IAEA, to which we and many others contributed.

At the same time, however, the pandemic forced us to prioritize the somewhat unexpected, while postponing the anticipated. This may have a severe impact on the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. We have seen many important and fruitful fora and expert groups having to reorganize their activities online, and conferences, such as the NPT Review Conference, running into delay, all imperiling the momentum and constraining progress on negotiations vital to our security context.

Multilateralism, and non-proliferation and disarmament in particular, must not fall victim to Covid-19. It remains our responsibility to take stock of where we are, to reflect upon what we have accomplished, and to set new goals in order to address the current challenges to our multilateral and security environment. Last year, we already witnessed the demise of the INF treaty. This year, the JCPOA with Iran is under immense pressure. The Chemical Weapons Convention is under strain as chemical weapons are being used by state and non-state actors, as recent as in the case of Navalny. Also in light of the Covid-19 pandemic crisis, the BTWC seems more important than ever. Furthermore, the shared space surrounding our planet is congested and contested, and can no longer be seen isolated from technological and military developments.

These and other challenges can only be successfully resolved if we use our most important and effective tool at hand: multilateral cooperation. Upholding the framework of treaties and conventions countering current threats is crucial for ensuring a secure and prosperous world. The pandemic, if anything, has made it even more clear that we can only do this together. As noted by our Prime Minister Mark Rutte in his remarks to the UN General Assembly this year, and I quote: *"All countries must take responsibility for the proper functioning of the multilateral system, take a constructive approach, honor the agreements you have made and respect international law."*

The Netherlands will therefore continue to promote multilateralism as the key principle in our **international rules-based system** to address today's challenges and promote international security. Our efforts in a number of areas will therefore be constructive, forward-looking, and building on the fundamentals of the rules-based system. In that regard, the Netherlands supports the UNSG's Agenda for Disarmament and continues to support the role of the UN in addressing these issues.

Firstly, I would like to elaborate on a number of issues in the field of **WMDs**, because it remains of paramount importance that we continue to put our strongest efforts in jointly upholding the existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture.

The Netherlands continues to be strongly committed to the strengthening and implementation of the nuclear **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** - the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. We will actively contribute to a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference via our vice-presidency of the Conference and our chairmanship of Main Committee III. Furthermore, the Netherlands continues to be involved with creative collaboration initiatives such as Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), and topics that give substance to our NPT-commitments. Think of the immediate start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the further development and implementation of concepts such as Nuclear Risk Reduction and Verification. We encourage the P5 to engage in a meaningful and constructive dialogue on these issues.

The Netherlands follows closely the **strategic dialogue** in Vienna, and lately also in Helsinki, between the US and Russia on the **New START Treaty**. We share the US vision that a more ambitious agreement is needed for future strategic stability. Extending New START is a first important step. We call upon all relevant parties, in particular Russia and China, to engage.

It is truly sad to see that the UNSC-resolution 2231, which consolidates the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**, is under increasing pressure today. Iran's nuclear programme must remain under strict international control, for which the JCPOA is the agreed instrument. We call upon all remaining parties to fully implement UNSC-resolution 2231, including the elements on ballistic missile related activities.

Diplomatic efforts to address the proliferation challenges posed by the **DPRK** must be actively supported by the international community. We cannot accept a nuclear DPRK. Until the DPRK takes concrete steps towards complete, irreversible, and verifiable denuclearization, the international community must maintain pressure on the DPRK, including by full and effective implementation of sanctions by all UN member states, while continuing the dialogue.

Together, we all agree that we must uphold the global norm against the use of **chemical weapons**. The Netherlands condemns the recent attack on Alexei Navalny with a nerve agent. We share the conclusion of Germany and France that there is no other plausible explanation for Mr Navalny's poisoning than Russian involvement and responsibility in this matter, and therefore we support the call for sanctions. We condemn Syria for using chemical weapons and urge them to fully comply with the CWC. I would like to seize the opportunity to commend the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) for its first report in which three chemical weapons attacks were attributed to Syria. I look forward to the IIT's second report. The Netherlands has full confidence in the professionalism, impartiality and objectivity of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Technical Secretariat. I take this opportunity to reconfirm my country's full support for the OPCW, including the Fact Finding Mission and the IIT.

Biotechnological advancement, but most of all the Covid-19 crisis, has clearly shown us the grave dangers of biological threats for the entire international community. We must all take a more proactive stance in safeguarding the **Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**. The Netherlands regrets the lack of a verification regime for the BTWC and the lack of contributions being paid to the BTWC. The Netherlands is committed to the strengthening and implementation of the BTWC, including through confidence-building measures and peer review, in order to improve worldwide biosecurity & biosafety. Perhaps the lessons learnt from the Covid-19 pandemic leads states that remain outside the BTWC to accede without delay and we urge States Parties to comply with the BTWC and pay their annual contributions and any other outstanding amounts in full and as soon as possible.

Secondly, new technologies come with great opportunities. Cyberspace, artificial intelligence and technological developments in outer space come with many societal and economic benefits. However, these dual-use technologies can generate security challenges too. Malicious cyber operations disrupting our societies are a real, credible threat. Likewise, we reject the development of fully autonomous weapons systems, which are not under meaningful human control. And, the technology used to clear space debris has a nefarious reverse side as an enabler for anti-satellite weaponry. This inherently links valuable civilian initiatives in this field to discussions on the security dimension of outer space, such as the various resolutions that have been tabled in the First Committee.

We need collective engagement to address developments in **cyber space**. The Netherlands strongly believes that this can be done most effectively by implementation and adherence to the current normative framework as laid out by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) reports of 2010, 2013 and 2015, endorsed by the General Assembly. As such, the Netherlands supports the current multilateral efforts to tackle cyber security threats, in both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the GGE. We need a pragmatic and inclusive approach, in such a way that the work of the OEWG and the work of the GGE will complement and reinforce each other. The recently proposed Programme of Action may provide a promising way forward for a permanent, flexible and inclusive process to build upon the outcomes of the OEWG and GGEs. The Netherlands continues to support the international dialogue on the urgent issue of international cybersecurity and is committed to work towards consensus outcomes.

The Netherlands also reiterates the essential role of multilateralism concerning **Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)** by pointing out that good progress has been made within GGE on LAWS under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 2019. The eleven guiding principles reflect that there is a common understanding among State parties that humans must have some form of control over autonomous weapons to ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. In light of the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW in 2021, discussions need to move forward so that we can continue to make progress on issues like ‘human-machine’ interaction.

It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that **outer space** is both a congested and a contested realm. The Netherlands is deeply concerned about the increasing number of intentional threats that have come with new approaches towards the space domain, including ground-based systems such as jammers and ground-launched Direct-Ascent Anti-Satellite Weapons, as well as space-related threats such as intentional in-orbit manipulation and other proximity operations. Space is an international domain that no country is able to – or ought to handle on its own. Hence, international cooperation on the issue of space security is crucial and we must ensure that the inherent dual-use nature of any space activity in this field does not lead to accidents, misunderstandings, miscommunications or miscalculations. We consider the introduction of transparency and confidence building measures in this domain as an important first step to re-inforce the current normative and legal framework.

Thirdly, the vast number of casualties caused by conventional weapons should serve as a reminder for the need for collective action. The extensive use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature, particularly in urban areas, and the illicit cross-border flow of small arms and light weapons into conflict zones, are painful but clear proof of that. Therefore, the Netherlands remains fully committed to the several conventions and treaties that seek to achieve progress in this field.

As chair of the **Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons**, the Netherlands would like to highlight the 40th anniversary of the CCW and use this opportunity to call on those states not yet party to join this important instrument. It has been challenging to seek new ways of organizing the meetings and to continue discussions under the CCW due to Covid-19. However, the Netherlands deems it vital that we continue to share views and best practices despite the Covid-19 circumstances and continue to address urgent matters under the CCW, such as the cooperation on countering the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) under Additional Protocol II and the clearance of explosive remnants of war under Protocol V.

The increase in victims of **anti-personnel mines**, in particular those of an improvised nature, serve as a reminder that those weapons should never be used by any state or any non-state actor. The

Netherlands therefore fully supports the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and will actively contribute towards its implementation, including the recently adopted Oslo Action Plan. We look forward to Chairing this important Convention, hosting the Meeting of States Parties in the Netherlands in 2021.

In light of this year’s Review Conference of the Cluster Munition Convention (CCM), the Netherlands would like to take the opportunity to stress the importance of the universalization and implementation of the Convention. Only through our work in this convention can we uphold the norm on non-use of cluster munitions.

We underline the importance of implementation and universalization of the **Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)** in order to eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion to the illicit market. We call on all UN member states, who have not yet done so, to join the ATT, as our only legally-binding international instrument to regulate trade of conventional arms. With regards to **Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**, the Netherlands

calls on States to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW. Despite the suspension of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on SALW, the Netherlands continues its efforts to implement the Programme of Action and on other states to follow suit.

Lastly, we should work on improving and modernising our **disarmament machinery**. It is a sad truth that the very Conference that produced vital multilateral disarmament treaties, such as the CWC and the CTBT, is not able to start negotiations on, for example, a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. We have to be creative in order to move forward. The Netherlands has therefore introduced a working paper last year with suggestions on the organization of our work in the CD, namely to go 'back to basics'. We hope that this will be taken at heart at the start of the CD session next year.

It is our shared responsibility that the disarmament machinery functions effectively. The weak **financial status** of several conventions is of great concern to us, because 'no money, no meetings and no implementation support'. We urge all states to meet their financial obligations to those instruments in full and on time.

The Netherlands strongly believes that multilateral cooperation is crucial in order to effectively tackle the challenges that lie before us. To ensure the effectiveness of the international rules-based order surrounding non-proliferation and disarmament and its pivotal multilateral institutions, we need to express our shared commitment, take a constructive, flexible and pro-active stance, and work innovatively. We should not take our security for granted, but actively uphold it. In today's world that translates to: reaching out to other countries for help, sharing information and knowledge multilaterally and keeping an open dialogue.

STATEMENT BY
H.E. JOANNA WRONECKA
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, 12TH OCTOBER 2020

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the Polish Delegation, I would like to congratulate you on the assumption of the Chairmanship of the First Committee of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly. I assure you of full support and cooperation of the Delegation of Poland in the fulfillment of your responsibilities.

Poland fully associates itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Let me highlight several issues in my national capacity.

Mr. Chairman,

The COVID-19 pandemic, the biggest global crisis since the end of the World War II, not only continues to pose a serious challenge to our societies and economies, but also inevitably affects international security regime. However, traditional security threats and dilemmas have not diminished or vanished. We are still facing deterioration of international security environment, growing tensions and challenges to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Therefore, more than ever we need to find multilateral solutions. It can be possible only through building confidence and engaging all the parties in constructive dialogue. Poland declares to actively cooperate with other states with the aim of easing tensions and enhancing international security.

The global pandemic has also had an impact on disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. The Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons scheduled originally for the year 2020 had to be postponed. We believe that the circumstances would allow to conduct the Conference at the earliest possible date in New York and in its full-fledged format, in order to do the in-depth review of the treaty. 50 years after its entry into force, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is still the cornerstone of the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. International community should do its utmost to strengthen, universalize and implement the provisions of the treaty. Poland, as the member of the NPT Bureau and Chair of the Main Committee II, attaches great importance to the successful outcome of the Conference.

The arms control global system has unfortunately continued to deteriorate. As of today, the New START Treaty remains the only non-conventional arms control mechanism in place after the demise of the INF due to its long-lasting non-compliance by the Russian Federation. However, there is a hope that current US-Russian talks on arms control can bring not only the extension of a New START Treaty, but also will create the plausible conditions for negotiations of a new, broader arms control framework which will address all types of nuclear weapons, including its non-strategic component. We also are in favor of extending the dialogue to include China. The aspiration to play the role of a state with significant military potential requires not only expanding one's military strength, but, above all, responsibility based on transparency and trust. We count on a positive reaction from Beijing, which would respond to the numerous voices of the international community on this matter.

Mr. Chairman,

The re-emergence of chemical weapons remains one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. Poland is deeply concerned that despite prohibition chemical weapons have been used around the world in recent years: in Iraq, Malaysia, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Regrettably, lately we have seen further worrisome developments confirming, that the danger of chemical weapons use is real and requires our joint and resolute action. In this regard, we condemn in the strongest possible term the effort to poison Mr. Aleksey Navalny in the Russian Federation. Any breach of international law due to the use of chemical weapons must be properly investigated. We demand the perpetrators to be held accountable. There is no place for impunity here. We must send a clear and univocal signal, followed by tangible steps. The General Assembly must uphold a strong, united and unambiguous signal of support of the whole international community for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the OPCW. This year's Draft Resolution on the Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), that Poland is going to introduce in the United Nations General Assembly, as in previous years, offers an excellent opportunity

to do that. Our efforts to curb proliferation of chemical weapons have brought undeniable success, but we must not be complacent and neglect the remaining challenges in this area.

Proliferation of ballistic missiles, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, remains another serious challenge to international peace and security. In the years 2017-2018 Poland chaired the work of the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missile proliferation (HCoC), which is the major instrument of transparency and confidence building measures. We remain ready in advocating the provisions of the Code as an effective and overwhelmingly supported tool to raise international awareness on the missile proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

We continue to face global security threats evolving in many regions in the world. Complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains an absolute imperative and priority for the entire international community. Therefore, we will not stop calling on North Korean authorities to abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, to immediately cease all related activities, to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards and to fully comply with numerous UNSC resolutions on that matter, as well as to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) without further delay.

On another regional issue of the global security range, we took note of the last IAEA report, as well as of the Joint Statement issued by the Director General Rafael Grossi and Iran in August this year. This should be considered as a positive step in the right direction in order to clarify outstanding issues related to safeguards implementation by Iran. At the same time, we highlight the crucial importance of the full implementation by Iran of its commitments under the NPT as well as JCPOA. Being in breach with the JCPOA's provisions with regard to exceeding the uranium stocks and level of its enrichment is a matter of serious concern and should be swiftly reverted by Iranian authorities to comply fully with the accord.

In that regard, let me assure you that Poland as the newly elected member of the IAEA Board of Governors will spare no efforts to work and cooperate with international community to confirm and strengthen the importance of the IAEA as the crucial organization in safeguarding nuclear materials and technologies as well as in developing peaceful use of nuclear energy worldwide.

Moreover, the effectiveness of the IAEA could be perceived as a good example for the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which definitely needs a new, fresh idea to start producing concrete results, likewise the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York as the part of the UN disarmament machinery.

Mr. Chairman,

The events of this year highlighted importance of a free, open, stable and secure cyberspace. Poland will continue efforts to ensure responsible state behaviour and to implement the strategic framework for conflict prevention in cyberspace. Poland supports cooperation based on application of existing international law, in particular of the entire UN Charter, as well as on the 11 cyber norms of responsible behaviour of States, agreed by the 2015 GGE. Conclusions of discussions within the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) shall pave the way for the next steps focused on implementation of already agreed norms. Therefore, Poland joins and supports initiatives advancing better understanding of States' views on international law implementation in cyberspace as well as promoting confidence measures and capacity building based on actual needs of various States. Examples of such projects are establishment of a National Survey of Implementation of UNGA Resolution [70/237](#) or of a Programme of action on advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

As the space becomes more and more congested, contested and competitive its preservation as a safe, secure and sustainable environment for the peaceful use by all interested and able nations becomes a challenge we must collectively face. Nations' security and wellbeing is increasingly dependent on assets placed in and services derived from space which is a true common good of the twenty-first century. Poland remains committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. A prerequisite for that is a working framework for transparency and confidence-building measures. Therefore, we call on all stakeholders to work out the rules of responsible behavior in outer space without delay and to pave the way to future normative solutions to ensure sustained use of outer space for the benefit of current and future generations.

Mr. Chairman,

Emerging and disruptive technologies enable new methods and means of warfare, raising fundamental questions that cut across traditional concepts of international relations and international law. From security perspective, there are concerns about the ability of new weapons to destabilize security relations and increase unpredictability. This might be the case for example with new sophisticated hypersonic weapons or anti-satellite systems. There are concerns over the potential of new technologies to be used to conduct malicious activities, that fall short of traditional thresholds for use of armed force. Due to the rapidly evolving nature of technology-related challenges, the legally binding instruments might not provide us with adequate solutions. We should rather look for more pragmatic solutions, starting with increased transparency and confidence building measures.

Poland attaches great importance to the work conducted within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). We believe that this Convention remains the most relevant international forum, combining diplomatic, legal and military expertise and involving industry and civil society to examine new developments in weapons technologies. We highly appreciate the work carried out in 2020 by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and further progress on identifying common understandings of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.

We continue to promote responsible policies towards small arms and light weapons (SALW), including their transfers, as well as physical security and stockpile management. Another field of our continuous commitment and engagement is the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. Poland perceives the convention as an important instrument of International Humanitarian Law. Poland, long before becoming the State Party to the Convention in 2012, had been delivering assistance to post-conflict recovery areas and contributing to alleviate the humanitarian problems caused by unexploded ordnance and landmines, being engaged in missions abroad particularly under the United Nations and the European Union auspices.

To conclude, we strongly believe that regardless the limitations posed by the COVID-19, our hybrid 2020 deliberations within the framework of the First Committee will bring no less important results than previously. It would allow us to build on this fundament and give new impetus to the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament issues which remain unchangeable paradigm of the global security architecture.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

FIRST COMMITTEE, OCTOBER 2020

STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE GENERAL DEBATE

Chairperson,

My delegation wishes to congratulate you on your appointment as Chair of the 2020 First Committee Session and to assure you of our full support and cooperation. We further associate ourselves with the statements delivered on behalf of the African Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition.

Chairperson,

As we meet against the backdrop of a global pandemic and an increasing more complex global security environment, we are reminded of 2004 report of the *High level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, entitled “*A More Secure World*”, which presciently concluded that the “...biggest security threats we face today and in decades to come are far beyond states waging wars against each-other. They extend to poverty, infectious diseases and environmental degradation; war and violence within states, the spread of nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons, terrorism and transnational crime”.

The 75th session of General Assembly marks an important moment for the United Nations since its formation in the wake of the Second World War when the nations of the world united in their determination that such a human tragedy should never again be allowed to happen and in their belief that the world’s problems could be resolved peacefully through cooperation.

The need for collective efforts to address global challenges still holds true today. South Africa therefore continues to strongly support multilateralism and the international rule of law, and the non-discriminatory and consistent application of the provisions of relevant multilateral instruments.

We remain concerned that neither the Conference on Disarmament nor the Disarmament Commission were able to engage in substantive work since our last session. The disarmament machinery plays an essential part to achieve the world envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. In the current environment, it essential for the disarmament machinery components to be able to fulfil their respective mandates.

Chairperson,

We fully support the conclusion in the Secretary General’s disarmament agenda that greater efforts are needed to achieve equal, full and effective participation of women in all decision-making processes related to disarmament.

In addition, as the world is working to rebuild economies in the wake of the pandemic, global *military expenditure* continues to grow at an alarming rate. Without oversimplifying the issue, the true cost of such excessive expenditure is that it diverts much needed resources away from investing in the achievement of inter alia the sustainable development goals. We have to keep asking whether investment in peace and prosperity will not better yield the security which drives the military expenditure in the first place.

Chairperson,

Turning to the topic of disarmament to save humanity, this year marks the 75th anniversary of the tragic events which occurred in Hiroshima and Nagasaki which remain a constant reminder of the apocalyptic nature of the use nuclear weapons whether by mistake or intention. The objective of the very first UNGA resolution, adopted in 1946, to ensure “*the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction*” regrettably remains unfinished business.

This also year marks the 50th anniversary of the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT), the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. The only way to preserve and strengthen this key instrument is to build forward, in a balanced manner across the Treaty’s three pillars, without losing or re-interpreting the agreements of the past, notably the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences.

With no outcome in 2015, it is essential we redouble our efforts to ensure that the delayed 2020 Review Conference yields concrete outcomes.

The *Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons* (TPNW) is an historic milestone for nuclear disarmament in that it shares with the NPT the core goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons. As we stated before, the two Treaties are fully compatible and indeed complimentary. We are encouraged that the TPNW is fast approaching the 50 ratification needed to enter-into-force and encourage States that have not done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty.

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones are key to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. We welcome the convening of 2019 session of the *Conference on the establishment of a Middle-East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and other weapons of mass destruction* and call on all countries of the region to actively participate in good faith to achieve progress. The 1995 NPT *Review and Extension Conference's* Middle East resolution and relevant agreements at subsequent RevCons remain valid until fully implemented.

The JCPOA remains one of most important diplomatic achievements in the area of nuclear non-proliferation since the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is an example of global cooperation to address global challenges. We regret the withdrawal of the United States and the re-imposition of national sanctions. We support the efforts of the remaining JCPOA Parties to sustain the Agreement and call full compliance with the terms of the JCPOA and UN Resolution 2231 in order to achieve this goal.

Chairperson,

South Africa is fully committed to the *Chemical Weapons Convention* and believe we all have collective responsibility to uphold the international norm against the production, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons established under the CWC. As with the other Weapons of Mass Destruction, we oppose any use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances.

We the support of the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the only technically competent international authority in the field of chemical weapons. It is essential for Member States to have full confidence in its work, including by ensuring that there is no political interference. It is equally imperative that States are held accountable for any non-compliance with their obligations.

We equally remain committed to the *Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention* and support the work being done in the build-up to the Convention's *Ninth Review Conference* in 2021. This Conference represents an opportunity to enhance the Convention's role in addressing the biological threats facing the world today.

Chairperson,

On disarmament that saves lives, it is worth highlighting the African Union's theme for the year 2020: "*Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa's Development*". It is also fitting that 2020 marks the 20th anniversary of the *Bamako Declaration on small arms and light weapons* (SALW), the first ever African continental initiative to address the scourge of illicit SALW.

South Africa continues to support the full implementation of the *Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention*, the *Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Annexed Protocols*, the *Convention on Cluster Munitions* and the *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT).

The recent *Sixth Conference of States Parties to the ATT*, though held in limited format, was nonetheless important as we were able to note this major conventional arms control instrument's further global universalisation. We trust that with the accession of China to the ATT, other major conventional arms producers, possessors and traders will be encouraged to do the same.

We hope that the postponement of *Seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* will pave the way for a successful *Review Conference* in 2024 and re-invigorate our efforts to eradicate the scourge of the illicit trade in these weapons.

Chairperson,

Efforts to sustain *outer space* as an area for exclusively peaceful purposes through preventative measures to ensure that space does not become an arena for an arms race, forms an essential part of disarmament for future generations. We look forward to renewed efforts during the current session to find common ground and a return to consensus outcomes in this important area.

In conclusion, Chairperson, we therefore trust that our discussions and decisions during this session of the First Committee will pave the way for a proud centenary celebration of the United Nations in 25 years' time. While the issues may remain sensitive and complex during this session, humanity's common good must be our moral compass in finding common ground and creating a legacy for future generations.

I thank you.

Declaración de España
pronunciada por el
Consejero David Izquierdo Ortiz de Zárate

(12 de octubre de 2020)

Sr. Presidente,

Quisiera comenzar felicitándole en el Día de nuestra Fiesta Nacional, y conjuntamente con toda la Mesa por su elección para dirigir los trabajos de esta Primera Comisión.

España se alinea con la intervención de la Unión Europea.

Como señaló hace unos días el Secretario General Guterres ante la Asamblea General, nos encontramos ante un momento fundacional. Las graves consecuencias de la pandemia para todo el planeta, coincidiendo además con el 75 aniversario de la organización, nos sitúan ante la acuciante necesidad de enfrentar con responsabilidad y audacia este reto global.

La seguridad internacional, primer objetivo de esta organización, según el artículo 1 de la Carta, y que constituye el objeto de trabajo de esta Primera Comisión, se encuentra sometida al, probablemente, mayor número de tensiones en las últimas décadas. Por ello, la responsabilidad de todos nosotros para hacer frente de manera constructiva a estas amenazas es todavía mayor, debiendo aprovechar todas las posibilidades para fortalecer y profundizar los instrumentos multilaterales que durante 75 años han servido para solventar nuestras diferencias.

La Agenda de Desarme del Secretario General es un inmejorable ejemplo de la gran importancia que otorga a este ámbito en la agenda global. La interrelación entre la no proliferación, el desarme y los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible es especialmente reseñable y compartimos el enfoque transversal sobre estas cuestiones. Para España es asimismo crucial trabajar por un mayor protagonismo de las mujeres y la igualdad de género en todas las instancias.

El Tratado de No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares constituye la piedra angular del régimen de no proliferación nuclear y España sigue creyendo en su plena vigencia y enorme potencial, tras 50 años desempeñando un papel crucial en la paz, estabilidad y seguridad internacionales. La Conferencia de Examen en 2021 debe servir para profundizar, conjunta y de forma consensuada, en el fortalecimiento de sus tres pilares.

España suscribe el principio de irreversibilidad subyacente al compromiso de eliminar totalmente las armas nucleares, según el artículo sexto del Tratado, como obligación legal internacional. El actual contexto de seguridad internacional, con sus tensiones y condiciones complejas, no es excusa para eludir la obligación de un desarme nuclear universal, irreversible y sostenido en el tiempo. Para ello, debemos seguir trabajando en medidas que se puedan materializar en avances reales. En este sentido, España forma parte de la Iniciativa de Estocolmo, que establece pasos concretos, tangibles y realistas para profundizar en el desarme.

España subraya la importancia y necesidad de que el Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares entre en vigor lo antes posible, reconociendo asimismo la importante contribución de la Organización del Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares a la paz y estabilidad globales. Deseamos referirnos también a la Conferencia sobre la Zona Libre de Armas de Destrucción Masiva en Oriente Medio, celebrada el pasado noviembre. A la relevancia de su celebración hay que unir la voluntad por integrar a todas las partes en su desarrollo.

Otorgamos gran importancia al mantenimiento de la arquitectura de compromisos y tratados de desarme y de control de armas que han garantizado un periodo sostenido de paz y estabilidad. Es necesario asegurar siempre un marco jurídico internacional adecuado para un efectivo control de armamentos. Por ello hacemos un llamamiento a mantener los diferentes tratados multilaterales y bilaterales existentes, tratando a su vez de que dichos instrumentos se adecúen a los tiempos incluyendo las nuevas tecnologías y a todos los actores concernidos.

La posibilidad de que grupos terroristas y otros actores no estatales adquirieran armas nucleares o material radiactivo constituye una amenaza que debemos seguir combatiendo. Destacamos la importancia de la Convención Internacional para la Protección Física de los Materiales e Instalaciones Nucleares, el Convenio Internacional para la Supresión de Actos de Terrorismo Nuclear y las Resoluciones 1540 y 2325 del Consejo de Seguridad.

España subraya su apoyo y compromiso con el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto endosado unánimemente por la Resolución 2231 del Consejo de Seguridad. Entendemos que este acuerdo sigue siendo un elemento clave de la arquitectura internacional de no proliferación y un ejemplo de lo que la diplomacia multilateral puede conseguir. Por ello lamentamos la retirada del mismo de los Estados Unidos. Queremos asimismo recordar que la confianza de la comunidad internacional está estrechamente ligada al cumplimiento estricto del acuerdo por parte de la República Islámica de Irán.

El expediente de la República Popular Democrática de Corea continúa siendo foco de preocupación y un desafío al objetivo común de estabilidad global. Sigue siendo perentorio que la República Popular Democrática de Corea cumpla todas las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad, cese definitivamente los ensayos nucleares y aplique su Acuerdo de salvaguardias con el Organismo Internacional de la Energía Atómica en su camino hacia una desnuclearización completa, verificable e irreversible.

El Tratado de Prohibición de Armas Químicas constituyó un gran logro del desarme. La Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas viene realizando una gran labor, transparente y profesional, desde su creación hasta ahora, y estamos totalmente convencidos de su capacidad y rigor en su trabajo, al que queremos contribuir durante nuestra presencia en el Consejo Ejecutivo.

Vemos con creciente alarma el aumento de casos de utilización de armas químicas en diferentes escenarios. El reiterado empleo de armas químicas en Siria es uno de los mayores atentados contra el derecho humanitario de nuestro presente. España reitera su más firme condena, sin ningún paliativo, de cualquier empleo de estas armas prohibidas, sea cual sea su autor, escenario o motivación. La comunidad internacional debe reaccionar firme y decididamente contra el uso de estas armas, impidiendo la impunidad. España ha participado en todas las iniciativas en este sentido; estuvimos entre los fundadores del Partenariado Internacional contra la Impunidad en el Empleo de Armas Químicas, en 2018 y apoyamos la creación del Mecanismo del Secretario General para la atribución de responsabilidades por el presunto empleo de armas químicas y biológicas.

Esta pandemia ha puesto de nuevo de manifiesto la urgente necesidad de un protocolo de verificación legalmente vinculante para la adecuada aplicación de la Convención para la prohibición de Armas Biológicas y Toxínicas. El aplazamiento de la Conferencia de Estados Partes nos da un margen para reconsiderar el reforzamiento de la Convención tras las lecciones de la pandemia.

La creciente proliferación de armas pequeñas y ligeras supone una amenaza cada vez mayor a la paz, la estabilidad y el progreso, con efectos devastadores en las sociedades donde este fenómeno presenta mayor virulencia. El número total de víctimas de estas armas las convierten en verdaderas armas de destrucción masiva. La interacción entre la violencia armada provocada por una presencia general de estas armas, el crimen organizado y la falta de desarrollo está plenamente demostrada. Esperamos que la celebración en 2021 de la Séptima Reunión Bienal del Programa de Acción contra el tráfico ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras sirva para avanzar en medidas globales contra este fenómeno.

La Convención de Ciertas Armas Convencionales y el programa de acción de las Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras indican el camino a seguir. Debemos profundizar su universalización, porque su aplicación redunda en enormes beneficios para la población, especialmente en áreas de conflicto y postconflicto. En relación con los sistemas de armas autónomas letales, seguimos proponiendo establecer un código de conducta incluyendo medidas de transparencia, creación de confianza e intercambio de información y mejores prácticas, con posibles avances relativas a la inteligencia artificial.

Queremos mencionar asimismo la convención de Minas Antipersonal y la Convención de Municiones en Racimo. Abogamos por establecer sinergias entre las tres convenciones humanitarias mencionadas, en particular sobre

asistencia a víctimas, educación sobre riesgos y remoción de explosivos de guerra. La legislación española establece un régimen de tratamiento común con referencias a las tres convenciones y todas las armas que provocan sufrimientos inhumanos e inaceptables, y ha contribuido a la elaboración del proyecto piloto de la Herramienta de Evaluación de Capacidades contra los Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados del Instituto de las Naciones Unidas para la Investigación del Desarme.

El Tratado sobre Comercio de Armas es un instrumento fundamental para promocionar la transparencia y la responsabilidad en la prevención del tráfico ilícito, contribuyendo de manera clara a la paz y seguridad internacionales y a los Objetivos de la Agenda 2030, especialmente al punto 16.4. Debemos intensificar su universalización y ayudar a los Estados a través del Fondo Fiduciario Voluntario a desarrollar marcos jurídicos e institucionales que faciliten la aplicación nacional del tratado y profundizar en los problemas del desvío de armas.

La ciberseguridad es un creciente protagonista de nuestros trabajos, y debemos aprovechar los importantes avances cosechados por los Grupos de Expertos Gubernamentales y por el Grupo de Trabajo de Límite Abierto. La elaboración de un Programa de Acción para avanzar en la conducta responsable de los Estados en el Ciberespacio supondría un importante paso en la dirección adecuada. Por otra parte, seguimos considerando como prioritario abordar con urgencia la multiplicación de incidentes maliciosos e ilícitos en el ciberespacio.

España defiende un espacio ultraterrestre seguro y sostenible, y promueve su uso pacífico. Consideramos el espacio exterior como un bien común de la humanidad, a utilizarse en beneficio de todos, a través de comportamientos responsables frente a las amenazas que nos preocupan. Subrayamos la importancia del desarrollo de medidas de confianza, transparencia en las actividades allí desarrolladas y nuestro compromiso con la prevención de una carrera armamentística en el espacio exterior. Por ello, nos preocupa el creciente desarrollo de armas antisatélites, incluidas las basadas en tierra, y subrayamos la importancia de tratar estas cuestiones con celeridad, como parte del esfuerzo internacional por prevenir dicha carrera armamentística. Instamos asimismo a todos los estados a abstenerse de destruir objetos en el espacio exterior, pues podrían causar restos peligrosos para la seguridad de las actividades espaciales.

Señor Presidente

Quisiera referirme, finalmente, a la maquinaria del desarme. Se trata de una maquinaria que, desde años, sufre una parálisis que amenaza convertirse en estructural. España no cree que debemos renunciar a la estructura institucional ya existente, sino que debemos hacer todos los esfuerzos necesarios para revitalizarla, siempre desde la aspiración a la universalidad como ideal final de estos esfuerzos. Instamos a la Conferencia de Desarme a que supere sus diferencias y establezca un programa de trabajo basado en el diálogo y la confianza, permitiendo así un pronto regreso a su tarea principal, que es la negociación.

Concluyo, Sr. Presidente, expresando el deseo de que esta Primera Comisión genere un debate abierto que permita acercar posturas y crear mayor confianza entre todos nosotros.

Statement by H.E. Félix Baumann
Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament
On behalf of the De-alerting group:
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Switzerland and Sweden
75th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee

Mr Chairman,

I have the honour of taking the floor on behalf of the De-alerting Group – Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and my own country Switzerland – on the important issue of decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, also known as De-alerting.

The De-alerting Group was established in 2007. Since then, we have consistently called upon those States that maintain nuclear weapons systems on high alert to de-alert them – both as a concrete step toward nuclear disarmament and as a risk reduction measure.

It has widely been recognised that nuclear risks are today higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and that the catastrophic effects of a nuclear weapon detonation, whether by accident, miscalculation or design, cannot be adequately addressed.

It is well known that these risks multiply significantly when nuclear weapons are on high alert – risks such as inadvertent launches due to technical failure or operator error; the possibility of misinterpretation of early warning data; failures of, and false reports by, early warning systems; and use of nuclear weapons by unauthorised actors such as rogue military units or terrorists. Of particular concern is the impact of new technologies – notably cyber – leading to new nuclear risks and exacerbating existing ones.

The heightened risk posed by maintaining nuclear weapons on high alert level has been widely acknowledged, including by former military leaders from those States with the largest nuclear arsenals. We believe the case for urgent action on de-alerting to be compelling.

This is not just a theoretical concern but one substantiated by the significant history of accidents and close calls, particularly on the part of those in possession of the largest nuclear arsenals. Over the past decades, both the US and Russia have received erroneous information from early warning sensors or have misinterpreted warning data. In each case we have been extraordinarily fortunate that disaster has been averted. But given the devastating consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, deliberate or accidental, it is not sufficient to have to continue our reliance on good fortune.

Mr Chair,

It is against this backdrop that the De-alerting Group is again tabling the resolution entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. In view of the constraints imposed on our work by the current sanitary situation and in line with the practice followed by many delegations, the resolution features very limited updates compared to the version adopted in 2018 when it was last submitted.

We note that the resolution introduced by our Group has gradually gained significant support. When run last time, 175 States voted in its favour, and a broad group of States co-sponsored it. This strong

and increasing support sends a clear message about the need to renew efforts to ensure that commitments to reduce the operational readiness of nuclear weapons on high alert are fulfilled.

Taking steps to that effect will be especially important in the context of the tenth NPT Review Conference. De-alerting is a long standing, unfulfilled NPT disarmament commitment, agreed as part of the 13 practical steps of 2000 and the 2010 action plan. We note with concern that commitments made at past Review Conferences are being questioned, and that some nuclear weapon States have moved away from their earlier acknowledgement of the risks of having nuclear forces on high alert. Commitments made with regard to nuclear disarmament, as under other pillars, remain fully valid and are to be implemented.

In this context, it will be important that we collectively work towards an outcome at the Review Conference that provides a path for the implementation of agreed commitments on de-alerting and for the rapid reduction of operational readiness – unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally and ensure that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.

Mr. Chair,

Before closing, the De-alerting Group would like to note the sad and untimely passing earlier this year of Bruce Blair and to pay our respects to him as an outstanding champion and untiring advocate for the lowered launch-readiness of nuclear weapons. His work did much to draw attention to the risks posed by nuclear weapons on high alert levels and to make the case for de-alerting.

Thank you Mr Chair.

United Nations First Committee (Disarmament and International Security)
General Debate Speech
United States of America

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the United States Delegation, I congratulate you on your election as Chair of the First Committee. We also congratulate the other members of the Bureau for their elections, and commit to working with each of you toward a successful session.

As much as we all wish we could operate in the 75th session as we did before COVID-19, the plague unleashed onto the world by the People's Republic of China, has forced us to adjust. As President Trump said in his speech to the General Assembly last month, "In the earliest days of the virus, China locked down travel domestically while allowing flights to leave China — and infect the world," for which it must be held to account.

The UN and the diplomatic community resident here in the City of New York have been forced to consider creative and innovative ways to operate while attempting to respond effectively to 21st century threats to international peace and security. We commend our fellow delegates and the Secretariat for their flexibility and resilience during these unprecedented times. We express our deepest sympathies for people everywhere impacted by COVID-19.

Regarding the First Committee's mandate to address disarmament and international security issues, China is undergoing a crash nuclear weapons build-up completely unconstrained by any arms control limits, with potentially deadlier consequences for the world than COVID-19 – all the while refusing to engage in constructive dialogue. For far too long, China has pretended to be a hero of multilateralism, supposedly deserving a "free pass" in the First Committee from international scrutiny of its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear arms build-up. Mr. Chairman, those days are over.

Mr. Chairman, Russia has long used the UN and other multilateral bodies to launder its bad international behavior. This is especially discouraging, given that the Soviet Union arguably suffered more than any other nation during the Second World War, the "Great Patriotic War", which gave rise to the UN Charter and this institution in the hope of preventing States from employing brute force as their policy choice of first resort. Not so with Russia, it seems. Ask Russia's neighbors for details. In outer space, Russia has twice in recent years tested space-based weapons while at the same time claiming it seeks to prevent the weaponization of space through both legally binding arms control and through its No First Placement resolution in this body. International security is put at risk by failing to challenge Russia's serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations and commitments.

In addition to developing and deploying nuclear weapons that are unconstrained by the New START Treaty, such as exotic nuclear delivery systems and new nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which runs counter to the goal of disarmament, Russia continues to undermine the international security frameworks to which it has agreed. It is a serial violator of its arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation, and European security obligations and commitments. As the United States has documented in our annual compliance reports, Russia has failed to comply with its obligations under not only the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but also the Treaty on Open Skies, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in addition to undertaking activities that raise concerns about its compliance with the nuclear weapons Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Secretary Pompeo has condemned Russia's aggressive and destabilizing behavior in Europe, the Middle East, and around the world. This week, Germany made public the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Technical Assistance Visit report confirming Aleksei Navalny was poisoned by a nerve agent of the Novichok group. The United States has full confidence in the OPCW's findings, which now have independently confirmed the chemical analysis from German, French and Swedish certified laboratories. The United States and our allies and partners have agreed that the Russian Government must provide a full accounting for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny; and reiterate that any use of chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any

circumstances is unacceptable and contravenes the very international norms and standards that all responsible nations seek to uphold and defend.

Further, we call on Russia, who now has requested OPCW assistance to be completely transparent regarding such events; and cooperate fully with the Organization without delay, obfuscation and misinformation from the facts. The poisoning of Alexsei Navalny was a deliberate heinous act – tragically one we have seen before with the attempted assassination of Sergey and Yulia Skripal in Salisbury, UK, in March 2018. While Russia conveniently has requested assistance; it is nearly indefensible to argue that anyone else other than Russia could have taken this action against Mr. Navalny. We condemn such actions; and call on Russia to fulfill its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention by completely declaring and destroying its chemical weapons program under international verification.

There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons. This is critical not only for the viability of our arms control and nonproliferation framework but for international security more generally.

Regarding the New START Treaty, we continue to engage bi-laterally on the way forward on an agreement that addresses all nuclear warheads. While the New START Treaty limits strategic ranged warheads and delivery systems it does nothing to address the thousands of battlefield and theatre ranged systems where Russia continues to build, develop and field nuclear weapons. This dangerous and growing stockpile must be addressed by the members of this body.

While the United States has certified Russia's compliance with New START to the U.S. Congress every year since entry into force, Russia has during this same period invested heavily in novel nuclear delivery systems and nuclear weapons that are not constrained by New START. An arms control treaty that Russia complies with, but which allows it to work to gain competitive military advantage undercuts the fundamental purpose of the agreement. Such deficiencies need to be addressed.

Mr. Chairman, the United States has made concerted efforts over the years to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's entry into force and we look forward to the Review Conference, unfortunately postponed by COVID-19. Negotiated during the height of the Cold War, the NPT remains the cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Treaty also remains essential to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for human health and development. Moreover the NPT's Article VI makes clear that each NPT Party has an obligation "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

The United States has for some time called for a new era of arms control. Why a new era? The reason is clear: The bilateral Cold-War approach to arms control that only constrains the United States and the Russian Federation, while important, is no longer sufficient to address current geopolitical security challenges. A new era must begin with cooperation among the three largest nuclear powers on earth, to build a strong foundation for a future treaty that addresses all nuclear weapons and is rigorously verifiable. Such a treaty is essential to that goal we seek of a world without nuclear weapons.

Without such a treaty, our generation is facing the menacing prospect of a new nuclear arms race among the three largest nuclear powers in the present era, triggered by the continuing actions of China and Russia. With Beijing's overall number of nuclear warheads in its current stockpile, its ever-larger and more sophisticated delivery systems, and its plans to more than double the number of warheads it possesses in this decade, China has indeed emerged as the third largest nuclear power on earth, completely unconstrained by any nuclear arms control agreement. And similar to China, the Russian Federation is engaged in a massive expansion of its nuclear capabilities and the introduction of new exotic delivery systems that also threaten to ignite a new – trilateral – nuclear arms race.

In stark contrast, while the United States has invested in life extension programs and other sustainment activities, we have yet to take the strategic decision to match ongoing Russian and Chinese nuclear build-ups. Instead, and because we value peace, predictability, and stability, we have continued to sound the alarm about this potentially

destabilizing development for international security, and come before you today to seek your assistance in addressing it. If we do not get that assistance we will have to take, unilaterally or in concert with allies, whatever steps are necessary to protect our national security interests.

Mr. Chairman, preventing a trilateral nuclear arms race among the three largest nuclear powers represents a central war and peace issue of our time. Should such a race begin, its scale and intensity could very likely dwarf the bilateral arms race of the Cold War – with potentially dangerous consequences for the peace and security of the entire world. Fortunately, such a trilateral arms race is entirely avoidable.

Every UN Member State, every member of this Committee, has a right, a responsibility, and an existential interest to be heard on this issue. Our three nations should be openly called upon to engage one another on trilateral arms control and lead the way for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. The United States, the Russian Federation, and China need only to embrace a responsible course and take nuclear arms control to the next level without further delay. For its part, the United States stands ready. We must prevent a new arms race and avoid conflict, which is in the interests of all nations. An historic negotiating table is waiting, and it has three chairs around it. It is time for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to sit down with one another, engage in good faith, and reduce nuclear risks rather than heighten them.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your kind attention.

Statement delivered by

H.E Mr. Dang Dinh Quy
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Viet Nam to the United Nations

On behalf of the
 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia,
 Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam

at the General Debate of the First Committee of the Seventy-fifth Session
 of the United Nations General Assembly

Mr. Chairperson,

1. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and my own country, Viet Nam. ASEAN aligns itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

2. We warmly congratulate you and the members of the Bureau on your election. We are proud to have our fellow member, the Philippines, represented in the Bureau. We believe that under the able leadership of the Chair and Bureau, the First Committee will produce a sound outcome. We assure you of our full support in this regard.

Mr. Chairperson,

3. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the United Nations (UN), along with the First Committee's increasing efforts and contributions to the global disarmament. We thank Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Izumi Nakamitsu and of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for their contributions to advancing the UN disarmament agenda.

4. We note the tremendous challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic to the United Nations and each Member State. We also note the new challenges faced in the current international security, as the Secretary-General and many world leaders mentioned during the General Debate of the 75th UN General Assembly. Formidable challenges require formidable efforts by all of us.

Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Chairperson,

5. ASEAN continues to support international efforts toward achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. ASEAN remains concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and the risks posed by their continued existence. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to guarantee against their use and threat of use.

6. ASEAN reaffirms its recognition of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. ASEAN welcomes the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT in 2020. ASEAN calls upon all States Parties to the NPT to renew their commitments towards the full implementation of the Treaty, particularly Article VI, towards general and complete nuclear disarmament. ASEAN calls for dialogue and negotiations in good faith for the success of the upcoming NPT Review Conference in 2021.

7. ASEAN emphasizes the importance of the full and effective implementation of other non-proliferation regimes, including Security Council Resolution 1540. ASEAN calls for greater cooperation on information sharing, capacity-building and technical assistance. ASEAN also calls for greater participation and contribution of industries, academia and international organisations towards non-proliferation endeavours.

8. ASEAN continues to stress the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). All ASEAN Member States have ratified the Treaty. This expresses our steadfast

support for the CTBT and our strong commitments to the international norms against nuclear testing. ASEAN urges the remaining States of the Annex II of the CTBT to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible to expedite its long-overdue entry into force.

9. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic agreement. It contributes towards global nuclear disarmament and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. There is an increasing number of the instruments of ratifications and accessions to the Treaty, including the recent ratification our fellow member, Malaysia, as the 46th ratifying state on 30 September 2020. We believe that once entered into force, the TPNW will contribute further to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

SEANWFZ

10. We reiterate our commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ Treaty) and the ASEAN Charter. We stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty, including through implementing the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the SEANWFZ (2018-2022). We reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and intensify the ongoing efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty. Our ASEAN experts could explore ways to bridge the differences, including the possibility of engaging with the NWS experts. We would continue to submit the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution through the First Committee to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). ASEAN also reaffirms the importance of regional nuclear weapon-free zones to the existing global non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. ASEAN continues to support the ongoing efforts toward the establishment of such zones, including that in the Middle East.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy

11. ASEAN reaffirms the inalienable right of every State to the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy for economic and social development. ASEAN looks forward to the implementation of the Practical Arrangement between ASEAN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded in September 2019, which would provide a framework of cooperation for ASEAN to tap into the experience and technical assistance of the IAEA in the areas of non-proliferation, nuclear safety, security and safeguards and peaceful use of nuclear energy. ASEAN also looks forward to the convening of the 7th Annual Meeting of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) in November 2020.

Korean Peninsula

Mr. Chairperson,

12. The situation on the Korean peninsula remains a concern. We stress the importance of continued peaceful dialogue amongst all concerned parties in order to realise lasting peace and stability in a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and agreements reached among concerned parties. We reiterate our readiness to play a constructive role, including through utilising ASEAN-led platforms such as the ARF in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue amongst the concerned parties.

Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

13. ASEAN continues to call for universal adherence to applicable international legal instruments prohibiting chemical, biological and radiological weapons. ASEAN condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of such weapons by any party under any circumstances, as this constitutes a serious violation of international law. ASEAN welcomes the progress in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles under the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. With the current Covid-19 pandemic and its devastating consequences to socio-economic development and human life, ASEAN stresses the importance of biological security and safety.

Conventional Weapons

14. ASEAN is deeply concerned with the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons globally. Effective regulation and control of conventional weapons is important for peace, stability, and sustainable development.

ASEAN supports the United Nations Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We look forward to its 2021 Seventh Biennial Meeting of States Parties.

Regional Mine Action

15. ASEAN notes the outcome of the Fourth Review Conference of the State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in Oslo, Norway in November 2019. ASEAN commends the role of the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC) to encourage efforts to address explosive remnants of war (ERW). We thank all partners and relevant institutions for their contributions and supports for the ARMAC.

Information and telecommunication in the context of international security

Mr. Chairperson,

16. ASEAN reaffirms our commitment in building a safe, secure and resilient cyberspace. The UN must continue to play a key role in cybersecurity. We welcome the efforts of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), and their productive discussions in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security. We hope that the two mechanisms can continue to work closely and in complementarity with each other.

17. With the current dynamics in the international security environment, ASEAN stresses further the need to preserve and strengthen the UN disarmament machinery and other related multilateral and bilateral mechanisms. ASEAN continues to recognise the important role and the contributions of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in this field.

Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)

18. ASEAN recognises access to outer space as an inalienable right of all States. Exploration and use of outer space must be based on the principle of peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all humanity. They must be carried out in accordance with fundamental principles of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. ASEAN reaffirms that prevention of an arms race in outer space and its weaponization is of vital importance. We urge all Member States to respect and ensure the full implementation of all related UN instruments and relevant General Assembly resolutions.

Mr. Chairperson,

19. ASEAN reaffirms its cooperation with the United Nations toward a peaceful, secure and prosperous world. We can only achieve tangible progresses in disarmament and non-proliferation through constructive dialogue, negotiations and engagements. We reiterate our readiness to contribute substantively to the work of the First Committee in this session.

I thank you for your attention./.

Section II

Written submissions for the thematic discussions

1. Antigua and Barbuda (on behalf of CARICOM)
2. Argentina
3. Australia
4. Bahamas (on behalf of CARICOM)
5. Belize (on behalf of CARICOM)
6. Brunei Darussalam (on behalf of ASEAN)
7. Cambodia (on behalf of ASEAN)
8. China
9. Colombia
10. Côte d'Ivoire (on behalf of the Group of Francophone Ambassadors from Geneva and New York, from Member and Observer countries of the International Organization of La Francophonie)
11. Cuba
12. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
13. Ecuador
14. Egypt
15. France
16. Guyana (on behalf of CARICOM)
17. India
18. Indonesia
19. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
20. Ireland
21. Italy
22. Jamaica (on behalf of CARICOM)
23. Japan
24. Kazakhstan
25. Lao People's Democratic Republic (on behalf of ASEAN)
26. Lao People's Democratic Republic
27. Malaysia (on behalf of ASEAN)
28. Malaysia
29. Myanmar (on behalf of ASEAN)
30. Myanmar
31. Netherlands
32. Nigeria (on behalf of the African Group)
33. Norway (on behalf of a group)
34. Norway
35. Pakistan
36. Paraguay
37. Republic of Korea
38. Russian Federation
39. Saint Lucia (on behalf of CARICOM)
40. Singapore (on behalf of ASEAN)
41. Singapore
42. South Africa
43. Thailand (on behalf of ASEAN)
44. Thailand
45. Ukraine
46. United Kingdom
47. United States (on behalf of the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership)
48. United States
49. Viet Nam

**STATEMENT SUBMITTED
BY
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ON BEHALF OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
ON THE THEMATIC CLUSTER
*OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY*
75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
FIRST COMMITTEE
NEW YORK
30 OCTOBER 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security on behalf of the fourteen Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Mr. Chair,

The region places significant importance on the information communications technology. As a result, CARICOM continues to implement new measures to address current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on security and disarmament measures. Within that context, in the Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community, Cybercrime is listed as an obstacle and a threat to social and sustained economic development in CARICOM. This strategy was borne out of the realization that terrorism and associated violent extremism pose direct risks to CARICOM's vision of integrated, inclusive, secure, and prosperous economies, reflecting sustainable growth.

Today's terrorist and violent extremist organizations utilize modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) as well as globalized trade and travel to extend their reach far beyond their points of origin. Strengthening Cyber Security is seen as a strategy to achieve technological resilience but is also linked to strategies needed to achieve social stability and citizen security. As developments in science and technology continue to transform our daily interactions, we must remain vigilant in our understanding of new and emerging weapon technologies. We also encourage Member States to implement the norms, rules, and principles for responsible behavior, adhering to which will increase stability and security in cyberspace.

In this regard, CARICOM welcomes this Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) as a means to develop a legally-binding framework that can take into account the concerns and perspectives of all states at all levels of consideration of this critical issue. Further, we must ensure that the digital divide is narrowed and that practical and accessible international cooperation features as a priority of the work of this working group. We believe that the OEWG and the Group of Governmental Experts can work in tandem to achieve the Secretary General's mandate of Disarmament for future generations. We recognize that both bodies have significant contributions to the mandate of maintaining international peace and security in the use of ICTs. CARICOM will continue to actively participate in the OEWG and we look forward to the final sessions and concluding reports to map our way forward.

Mr. Chair,

CARICOM has articulated its support for the United Nations Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons as one of the primary international instruments for controlling the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. We look forward to the 7th Biennial Meeting of States in 2021 as an opportunity to build upon the progress made at the 2018 Review Conference particularly, the inclusion of ammunition and further incorporation of armed violence.

Further, at the 3rd RevCon in 2018, States took steps to encourage the collection of gender-disaggregated data on small arms and light weapons. This outcome may have led to the inclusion of language at the Fifth Conference of States Parties of the Arms Trade Treaty where States endorsed a set of recommendations related to implementing the Treaty's gender provisions, including its legally binding criterion to assess the risk of gender-based violence when making arms export decisions. These developments are particularly crucial to CARICOM Member States as we encounter the differing impacts of small arms and light weapons.

Mr. Chair,

While the CARICOM region is not affected by armed conflict, we face tremendous challenges related to armed violence in our countries. As a result, significant resources are diverted from development and, by extension, the implementation of our social and development goals. Security costs can cause a delay in social, education, and infrastructure programs and create an untenable burden for countries that are already heavily indebted and vulnerable to natural disasters.

For CARICOM, the problem of illegal weapons is closely linked to transnational organized crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering. Our region is engaged in efforts to combat the effects of these destructive elements, recognizing the negative impact on our societies as a whole.

CARICOM welcomes the resolution being tabled by Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Non-aligned Movement. With the objective of reducing the ever-widening gap between developed and developing countries, the Non-aligned Movement annually urges the international community to devote those resources made available by implementing disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development. We encourage all Member States to continue to support the resolution titled 'Relationship between Disarmament and Development' as usual.

Mr. Chairman,

Terrorism undermines the fundamental values and principles of the Region. It is one of the most severe attacks on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, good governance, and the tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Like others, we share the view that terrorism poses a serious threat to peace, security, and stability, and endangers the social fabric and economic development of our societies.

As a result, the CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy operationalizes the sub-regions commitment to the global fight against terrorism. It also seeks to promote greater regional and international harmonization of approaches and build networks between relevant agencies to address the conditions that lead to the spread of violent extremism and terrorism.

Mr. Chairman,

We affirm that the goal of disarmament is fundamentally, to ensure that we all live in a safe and secure world. Within that context, CARICOM is of the firm view that the continued consideration of gender perspectives can advance the achievement of disarmament goals, moving away from the traditional perspective, to one that embraces a multi-dimensional and humanitarian approach, with the aim that no woman, man, boy or girl will be left behind.

It is with this in mind that CARICOM welcomes the biennial resolution tabled by Trinidad and Tobago, "Women, disarmament, nonproliferation and arms control," which recognizes the pivotal role of women in efforts to address global peace and security. We urge all Member States to continue to support this critical resolution. It provides an essential link between disarmament and issues that must be addressed for our work to impact the lives of the people in our communities.

In closing, the COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the need to collaborate as a global community as we face shared challenges. The strategies that all governments have had to employ during this crisis have proven that cooperation and securing the involvement of all stakeholders in critical decision-making is the only way to ensure sustainable peace and international security.

CARICOM will continue to work alongside Member States to ensure that there is a wider framing of disarmament and international security issues to address humanitarian and development agendas.

**INTERVENCIÓN ESCRITA DE LA
DELEGACIÓN ARGENTINA
<Debate Estructurado sobre Armas Nucleares>
NUEVA YORK, 30 DE OCTUBRE DE 2020**

La Argentina posee un compromiso claro y sostenido con el desarme y la no proliferación nuclear.

Nuestro país mantiene un activo programa nuclear con fines exclusivamente pacíficos en el marco del más estricto respeto a las normas consagradas en el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación Nuclear de las Armas Nucleares (TNP).

Para la Argentina, el TNP continúa siendo la piedra angular del régimen de desarme y no proliferación nucleares. La próxima Conferencia de Examen, que será presidida por la Argentina, servirá para insistir en la importancia de defender el equilibrio de obligaciones y derechos para los Estados parte que hoy, luego de más de 50 años, continúa siendo válido.

La Argentina forma parte de una región que ha estado históricamente en la avanzada del desarme y de la no proliferación.

Ya en 1991, la Argentina y Brasil establecieron la Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares (ABACC) para aplicar salvaguardias mutuas, fomentado así confianza mutua y de la comunidad internacional sobre la naturaleza exclusivamente pacífica de nuestros respectivos planes nucleares. La ABACC, próxima a cumplir 30 años de existencia, demuestra que existen alternativas válidas para otras regiones donde aún existe la desconfianza.

Incluso con anterioridad a la entrada en vigor del TNP, la contribución a la paz y a la seguridad a nivel regional y global que significó el Tratado de Tlatelolco, de 1967, ha sido real y efectiva. La Argentina llama, una vez más, a los países poseedores de armas nucleares a que revisen las declaraciones interpretativas a los Protocolos del Tratado.

La entrada en vigor del Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares es un objetivo claro y urgente. Es positivo que cada año más Estados están tomando la decisión de firmarlo o ratificarlo. Sin embargo, es probable que la única manera de que este Tratado entre finalmente en vigor sea a través de las ratificaciones de los países del Anexo II.

La implementación de moratorias unilaterales por parte de países poseedores de armas nucleares puede venir a confirmar la naturaleza del TPCEN como norma jus cogens en el derecho internacional. Pero las moratorias no son suficientes cuando ya se cuenta con un Tratado completo, un texto que ha demostrado poder ser una fuerza decisiva para cesar finalmente con los ensayos nucleares y que tiene la capacidad de continuar la vigilancia y el monitoreo activos que serán indispensables para que la Prohibición Completa continúe implementándose.

Es por ello que la Argentina llama a los Estados que aún no lo han ratificado a que reconsideren su posición, siendo una vía esencial para el establecimiento de un marco internacional sólido y estable que contribuye a la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

La Argentina considera que la verificación es fundamental y es aplicable no sólo a los instrumentos de no proliferación sino también en materia de desarme. En este sentido, trabajos en Verificación del Desarme Nuclear como el del Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales de 2018-19 y el que eventualmente se realice en 2021-22 constituyen contribuciones importantes que pueden sentar las bases, en un proceso que cuenta con la formalidad y legitimidad que le otorga su funcionamiento en el marco de las Naciones Unidas, para avances concretos en el desarrollo de un robusto régimen de verificación para futuros acuerdos de desarme multilateral, sin menoscabar los avances realizados en materia de no proliferación.

**INTERVENCIÓN ESCRITA DE LA
DELEGACIÓN ARGENTINA
<Debate Estructurado sobre Otras Armas de
Destrucción Masiva>
NUEVA YORK, 30 DE OCTUBRE DE 2020**

La Argentina tiene un compromiso inequívoco con las políticas de desarme y no proliferación, así como con la cooperación en este ámbito que garantice el derecho soberano a la investigación y al desarrollo de tecnologías con fines pacíficos, en consonancia con los compromisos internacionales y la legislación doméstica.

La Argentina considera que el uso de armas químicas por cualquier actor, en cualquier lugar o bajo cualquier circunstancia es inaceptable y constituye una violación manifiesta de las obligaciones internacionales emanadas de la Convención sobre las Armas Químicas y del derecho internacional y todos aquellos responsables de su utilización deben ser juzgados. Es necesario procurar actuar manteniendo una unidad de propósito y evitar divisiones políticas que lleven al debilitamiento de la Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas. Para ello, deben prevalecer el diálogo y la búsqueda de consensos.

La Argentina reafirma la importancia fundamental de la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Desarrollo, la Producción y el Almacenamiento de Armas Bacteriológicas (Biológicas) y Toxínicas y sobre su Destrucción (CABT) y renueva su compromiso de seguir cooperando de forma activa y constructiva para avanzar en los objetivos de la plena implementación y la universalización de la Convención.

En el marco de la CABT, la Argentina ha presentado regularmente la información referida a las Medidas de Fomento de la Confianza, entendiendo que constituye un mecanismo útil para generar transparencia acerca de las actividades y desarrollos tecnológicos que se realicen en el marco de la Convención. En este sentido, alienta a todos aquellos Estados que aún no las han presentado a que avancen en dicha dirección.

La Argentina mantiene un rol activo en el cumplimiento de la Resolución 1540 (2004), buscando actualizar constantemente su marco normativo, participando de los más importantes mecanismos de coordinación relativos a la no proliferación y a la seguridad tecnológica y física, y mejorando sus capacidades para la efectiva implementación del mandato. En ese sentido, la Argentina ha venido trabajando de manera coordinada con todos los órganos nacionales competentes en la materia para la actualización de su Informe Nacional de Implementación y su Matriz, que fueran presentados en 2019.

**INTERVENCIÓN ESCRITA DE LA
DELEGACIÓN ARGENTINA
<Debate Estructurado sobre Espacio Ultraterrestre
(aspectos de desarme)>
NUEVA YORK, 30 DE OCTUBRE DE 2020**

La Argentina reconoce el interés común de toda la humanidad y el derecho soberano de todo Estado a participar en la exploración y el uso del espacio ultraterrestre con fines exclusivamente pacíficos, y está convencida de los beneficios que su aprovechamiento puede traer al desarrollo humano. Por lo tanto, la Argentina considera que la prevención de la carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre evitaría un grave peligro para la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

El Tratado sobre los principios que deben regir las actividades de los Estados en la exploración y utilización del espacio ultraterrestre, incluso la Luna y otros cuerpos celestes, de 1967, constituye la piedra angular del régimen jurídico internacional del espacio, y desempeña un papel fundamental en el mantenimiento del espacio ultraterrestre para fines pacíficos.

Sin embargo, es necesario tener en cuenta que este Tratado sólo prohíbe el emplazamiento en órbita de armas de destrucción masiva, incluidas las armas nucleares, pero no las armas convencionales y menos aún instrumentos o prácticas que pueden ser utilizadas como armas, tales como las interferencias en las señales desde y hacia las estaciones terrestres o entre satélites, los sistemas anti-satélites o los ciberataques.

Es por ello que la Argentina reconoce que el marco jurídico internacional actual no es suficiente para evitar una carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre y, en ese sentido, considera necesario negociar, en el marco de la Conferencia de Desarme, un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante sobre la prevención de la carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre.

En tanto ello no tenga lugar, la adopción de medidas internacionales de transparencia y fomento de la confianza en las actividades relativas al espacio ultraterrestre es, sin dudas, conveniente y necesaria. Al respecto, la Argentina desea que puedan retomarse las deliberaciones en la Comisión de Desarme sobre la implementación de las recomendaciones del Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales sobre Medidas de Transparencia y Fomento de la Confianza para la Prevención de una Carrera de Armamentos en el Espacio Ultraterrestre y que fruto de dicho intercambio, puedan acordarse recomendaciones.

**INTERVENCIÓN ESCRITA DE LA
DELEGACIÓN ARGENTINA
<Debate Estructurado sobre Armas
Convencionales>
NUEVA YORK, 30 DE OCTUBRE DE 2020
*MISION PERMANENTE***

Las armas pequeñas y ligeras continúan siendo un problema central que afecta la paz, la estabilidad y el desarrollo de las naciones. Su comercio no controlado puede intensificar los conflictos armados y su impacto no sólo se manifiesta en las altas tasas de muertes violentas, sino que también puede manifestarse en la interrupción del acceso a la salud, los mercados, la educación y los derechos humanos.

En este marco, el control de armas constituye un factor clave a la hora de prevenir y reducir la violencia armada.

Es necesario reiterar la importancia de los mecanismos internacionales relativos al tema y la necesidad de explorar sinergias entre ellos, a saber: el Programa de acción para prevenir, combatir y erradicar el tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras en todos sus aspectos (UNPoA) y su Instrumento Internacional de Rastreo, el Protocolo de Armas de Fuego y el Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas (ATT).

La Argentina mantiene un rol activo y un compromiso continuo con el ATT. Ha sido co-autora del Tratado y presidió la VI Conferencia de Estados Parte, realizada bajo procedimiento escrito durante el mes de agosto de 2020.

La Argentina continúa también comprometida con la implementación efectiva del Tratado, así como con los aspectos relativos a su universalización, su aplicación a nivel nacional, la presentación de informes nacionales y la asistencia internacional. Asimismo, destaca el avance que representa dado que es el primer Tratado que identifica y exhorta a los Estados a abordar el vínculo entre las transferencias de armas convencionales y el riesgo de actos graves de violencia de género y actos graves de violencia contra mujeres y niños.

La Argentina mantiene una activa participación en el marco de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales (CCW). En particular destacamos los consensos alcanzados y los esfuerzos llevados a cabo por el Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales sobre sistemas de armas autónomas letales.

La Argentina ha sido y continúa siendo una promotora de las medidas de fomento de la confianza y de transparencia en diversos ámbitos y ha participado comprometidamente en el proceso de establecimiento del Registro de Armas Convencionales. Prueba de ese compromiso fue la Presidencia argentina del Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales establecido en virtud de la resolución [71/44](#).

Asimismo, la Argentina presenta este año el proyecto de resolución titulado “Información sobre medidas de fomento de la confianza en la esfera de las armas convencionales”, para el cual espera volver a contar con el amplio apoyo de la comunidad internacional.

Cluster 3: Outer Space
30 October 2020
Compendium Statement
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

Australia associates itself with the statements of the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan in relation to the strong desirability of progress by the international community on reducing threats to space systems through responsible behaviours.

We commend the draft resolution on “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours” to the Committee as an opportunity to break the deadlock on outer space security in multilateral institutions.

Cluster 5: Other Disarmament Measures and
International Security
30 October 2020
Compendium Statement
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

We all benefit from an open, free and secure cyberspace. This keeps our economies growing, our infrastructure operating, and our governments functioning.

While increased connectivity is integral to implementing the sustainable development goals, it also presents new and complex international security challenges.

Australia welcomes the positive, focused, and constructive discussions taking place in both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE). These discussions are building upon the agreed basis of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace – set out in the reports of the 2010, 2013 and 2015 GGEs - all of which were agreed by consensus amongst experts, and endorsed by consensus by all member states.

These reports cumulatively set out a Framework for Responsible State Behaviour under four interconnected pillars – international law, voluntary, non-binding norms, confidence-building measures, and coordinated capacity building.

Australia is committed to all four pillars of this Framework. We have published [case studies on the application of international law in cyberspace](#); with Mexico and 27 Member States, we have proposed a [Survey of National Implementation](#) of the recommendations of the 2015 GGE report; in the face of the unprecedented challenges posed by the pandemic we have joined the Czech Republic to announce how international law and norms [protect healthcare and medical services infrastructure](#); and have published [norms implementation guidance](#) and examples of [best practice](#) from public consultation.

We were pleased by the wide participation in the OEWG, and the positive and constructive manner in which member states have engaged. Despite the challenges posed by the travel and meeting restrictions of COVID-19, we are making progress, and advancing the discussion on these important issues.

Significantly, we see an emerging consensus in the OEWG within its mandate to study the possibility of establishing regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations.

The exact form of the new mechanism required further discussion. We have heard Member States highlight the importance of regular, institutionalised meetings, under the auspices of the UN, that are inclusive, transparent, democratic, and consensus based.

We have heard Member States call for a mechanism that has a clear, action-oriented mandate with the flexibility to evolve over time; a mechanism that builds upon the agreements of the 2010, 2013 and 2015 GGE reports; that incorporates national reporting on implementation, as well as capacity building on a needs basis.

These discussions are ongoing – and the OEWG is on track to recommend, by consensus, the immediate establishment of a new, inclusive, transparent, action-orientated mechanism under the auspices of UN First Committee; a new mechanism that could provide a forum for both practical cooperation and continued discussion.

We urge all Member States to allow the OEWG to complete its mandate, and make its recommendations by consensus, including on a future regular institutional dialogue, and not squandering the opportunity we have to return to one-track dialogue under the auspices of UN First Committee.

Australia continues to work diligently with all member states to find a path to consensus on cyber issue under First Committee.

As more states seek to exert power through cyberspace, there is increased potential for activities by state and non-state actors to lead to misperception, miscalculation, escalation, and in extreme cases, conflict.

It is only through working together that the international community will rise to this challenge and ensure that we can harness cyberspace for the benefit of all.

**STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
THEMATIC DEBATE: DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
FIRST COMMITTEE
SEVENTY-FIFTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
30 October, 2020**

Submitted by: The Bahamas Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the fourteen Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on the thematic debate on Disarmament Machinery.

At the outset, allow me to reiterate the significance CARICOM attaches to the United Nations disarmament machinery and the work of related mechanisms which fall under it, including the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the First Committee. The growing sense of instability and unease in international security and cooperation, manifest within the Disarmament Machinery itself, reinforces the need for innovative approaches, enhanced dialogue and redoubled commitment toward the goal of disarmament. The realities of the COVID-19 pandemic, which have challenged so much of our efforts, provides us with the opportunity to re-imagine the ways in which we conduct our work to advance our disarmament and non-proliferation goals. While we are disappointed with the postponement of several significant meetings within the ambit of the Disarmament Machinery, including the Disarmament Commission, the 10th NPT Review Conference and the 7th Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, we are hopeful that the extended hiatus will provide Member States an opportunity to engage in meaningful discussions to better position negotiations on critical thematic issues.

CARICOM underscores the need to maintain momentum on progress made within the Conference of Disarmament, and reiterates its support for the 2018 decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish subsidiary bodies on 7 out of the 8 items allocated to it to consider, *inter alia*, “emerging and other issues relevant to the substantive work of the Conference”. We continue to encourage the prompt resumption of negotiations within the CD as it remains a source of grave frustration that significant progress has not been made with respect to the substantive programme of work of the Conference.

It is our fervent hope that within the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission, delegations work steadfastly, in a transparent and inclusive manner, to overcome the paralysis that has prevented a conclusion of agreement in key areas of disarmament deliberations. In this regard, CARICOM reiterates its regret that the Disarmament Commission was unable to hold formal substantive meetings during the past two sessions. We look forward to more robust movement within the current cycle and to engaging in meaningful discussions to build consensus on “practical recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons” as well as on “recommendations to promote the practical implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities with the goal of preventing an arms race in outer space.”

Mr. Chairman,

The Caribbean Community expresses its gratitude to Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and, its appreciation to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, for the invaluable role played by the ODA as coordinator of regional and global disarmament initiatives. We take this opportunity to commend the staging of several virtual events on disarmament and non-proliferation issues, including those related to the NPT, small arms and light weapons, as well as the briefings provided on the work of various security bodies and non-governmental organisations. We also note with appreciation, the UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament which promotes greater understanding of the functioning of the United Nations disarmament machinery and of the other institutions working in the areas of international security, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Our region has benefited from this Programme and has several alumni, with our own most recent 2019 Fellow being from Trinidad and Tobago.

Mr. Chairman,

There can be no sustainable development without security, justice, good governance and peace. CARICOM attaches tremendous importance to the implementation of Agenda 2030 and, within the context of disarmament, SDG 16, which

calls for peace, justice and strong institutions. CARICOM views disarmament as the fundamental link between peace and sustainable development. Regional and global disarmament approaches are mutually complementary and must be pursued simultaneously. In June 2020, Caribbean Ministries of National Security developed a road map for addressing the region's priority actions on combatting the illicit proliferation of firearms and ammunition across the Caribbean in a sustainable manner by 2030 (Caribbean firearms road map). The road map builds on the political commitments and actions adopted by CARICOM leaders at the nineteenth Special Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government on Security in 2019 and will serve as a guiding and consensual document developed and owned by the Member States of CARICOM and the Dominican Republic.

CARICOM commends the stellar contributions of the regional centres, which provide capacity building and a range of training opportunities to Member States upon their request. We wish to highlight our appreciation for the work of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) in Peru, that has over the past year undertaken 60 technical, legal and policy related activities to support Latin American and Caribbean States. This has been provided at the request of beneficiary countries and implemented via international instruments related to conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction. CARICOM values the Centre's expertise in gender and conventional arms control, which has supported the incorporation of gender responsive public policies and programming into small arms control initiatives. We note with satisfaction that the activities undertaken by the Centre during the reporting period reached over 430 women. Many CARICOM countries have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from support extended by the Centre. CARICOM reiterates the importance of synergies in disarmament and arms control and underscores its support for the Centre's holistic focus on gender and Agenda 2030, in particular Goal 16.

UNLIREC also organised a subregional seminar in Trinidad and Tobago in November 2019, which targeted 60 representatives (37 women), from nine Caribbean countries, directly involved in arms control and preventing violence against women and girls. We are pleased to note the fruitful exchange of ideas, and discussions on strategies and possibilities for joint initiatives to address armed violence against women.

CARICOM expresses its appreciation for the voluntary contributions to UNLIREC from the Governments of Canada, Guyana, Germany, Mexico, Panama, Sweden and the United States of America, as well as States contributing to the ATT Voluntary Trust Fund. In this connection, we recall that Antigua and Barbuda became the first CARICOM country to participate in the VTF, holding a regional workshop on ATT implementation in August 2019. We encourage both donors and assistance-seeking States to actively engage with this important mechanism.

Similarly, CARICOM applauds the leading role taken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through its robust verification and monitoring mechanisms, as well as its contribution to radioactive security.

We commend the work of United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), for its independent research on disarmament affairs, which provides an invaluable forum for the dissemination and promotion of disarmament-related information.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM maintains the critical importance of nuclear weapon-free-zones as confidence building instruments which ensure peace and security, strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and advance nuclear disarmament. We therefore commend existing nuclear weapon-free zones in their efforts to attain these goals. In this connection, as States Parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, CARICOM encourages States to continue their support of the triennial resolution on the Treaty.

CARICOM reaffirms its support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and welcomes the 50th ratification, by Honduras this month, which allows the Treaty to enter into force. We are of the firm belief that this Treaty, along with others, foster workable, humanitarian-based approaches to advance disarmament objectives. To date, nine CARICOM States have ratified, the most recent of which was Jamaica in October 2020. We wish to acknowledge the hard work of Member States, relevant UN entities and non-governmental organisations, which contributed to this momentous occasion and look forward to future collaboration with TPNW partners toward its implementation and universalisation. CARICOM recognises the vital contributions of civil society, in particular non-governmental organisations, in the maintenance of international peace and security. Engagement with all stakeholders within the arms industry is critical, especially as we try to respond to new and emerging technologies.

Mr. Chairman,

There is still much work to be done to fulfil our mandates on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. CARICOM remains committed to doing its part to constructively support the critical work of the disarmament machinery and calls on all Member States to demonstrate the required collective will to achieve safe and peaceful world.

I thank you.

**STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF BELIZE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ON BEHALF OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
PLENARY MEETING OF THE DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE (FIRST COMMITTEE)
30 OCTOBER 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the fourteen CARICOM Member States in the thematic debate on Regional Disarmament and Security.

The CARICOM Member States remain committed to contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security through the implementation of our international obligations and through action at the national and regional levels. With security as the fourth pillar of our regional integration process, CARICOM seeks to implement practical and innovative approaches, to collaborate with other member states and institutions to combat the multidimensional and complex security threats posed to our region.

Mr. Chairman,

The effects of the Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19) across the region have been dire and we take the opportunity to applaud the men and women in uniform, for their unstinting dedication to our safety and security.

Mr. Chairman,

The temporary disruptions in cross-border travel, trade, and the general reduction in commercial activities caused by COVID19 have contributed to an overall reduction in serious crimes regionally. We note also, with serious concern, the significant increase in gender-based and domestic violence.

Firearms, Mr. Chairman, still accounts for approximately 75% of murders in our Member States with some countries reporting gun-related homicides as high as 80-85%. During the last decade, the overall seizures of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have increased suggesting that while CARICOM's law enforcement is more efficient at recovering illegal weapons, the proliferation of SALW in the Region remains high. For 2019, security forces in the CARICOM Member States reported the seizure of 2,219 illegal firearms. Except for 2010 and 2012, every year commencing 2011 saw the seizure of over 2,000 illegal firearms, despite the Region's status as a non-exporter, and limited importer. This gives us cause to ponder how many firearms are not intercepted and begs the question, what is the true number of illegal firearms that make it across our borders?

To that end, CARICOM calls on all governments to actively and seriously liaise with firearm manufacturers to take advantage of improved available technology and to incorporate such new technologies in firearms to aid authorities in the fight against illicit activities and so improve the overall safety of our communities worldwide. The rapid advance of technology has enabled us in a little over a decade to vastly improve the speed and efficiency with which we communicate, and conduct business. Applying advanced technological features to firearms to improve track and trace could go a long way in improving efforts to curb the illicit trade in firearms, to prevent violent crime and to support criminal justice.

Mr. Chairman,

Partnerships are an essential means of developing capacity and strengthening frameworks to confront this contemporary scourge. We count in this regard, on the important partners from the UN system, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC).

I wish to highlight important developments in the ongoing productive relationship with the UN bodies and to point to areas where further support will be needed.

In June 2020, a road map for addressing Caribbean priority actions on the illicit proliferation of firearms and ammunition across the Caribbean in a sustainable manner by 2030 was adopted by CARICOM Permanent Secretaries of National Security. The objective of the roadmap is to accelerate and bolster the Caribbean State's efforts to prevent and combat the illicit proliferation of firearms and ammunition in the region. CARICOM notes with appreciation the supporters of the roadmap: the Organization of American States, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the World Customs Organization (WCO), as well as the donor community, including Germany, the United States of America, Canada, the European Union, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Netherlands. UNLIREC will also assist each Caribbean State in developing its own national action plan and will provide technical support for its domestic implementation.

To that end, 154 participants from Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Aruba, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, Curacao, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks & Caicos attended a WCO Caribbean Firearms Roadmap and Customs Training in August 2020. The course is the initial part of a training package that WCO plans to deliver over the next three (3) years to support Caribbean Customs agencies to meet the goals of the Caribbean firearms roadmap.

CARICOM also notes with appreciation the UNLIREC activities during the period June 2019 to June 2020. UNLIREC undertook some 60 technical, legal and policy-related activities to further strengthen the capacity of Latin America and the Caribbean to combat small arms and light weapons trafficking.

The Centre's support has also been focused on armed domestic violence. In November 2019, UNLIREC organized a subregional seminar in Trinidad and Tobago that saw some 60 representatives (37 women), from nine Caribbean countries who were directly involved in arms control and preventing violence against women and girls.

COVID-19 lockdowns have been associated with an increase in armed domestic violence. As a mitigating response measure, the Centre conducted reviews of small arms laws with domestic violence provisions in 22 Latin American and Caribbean States and concluded with recommendations for restricting the ability of convicted domestic violence perpetrators to acquire or renew firearms licenses. Furthermore, as part of its women and disarmament project, the Centre will use the conclusions as a basis for the development of online courses on the prevention of armed violence against women.

CARICOM also notes the important role played by OPANAL in supporting the efforts of the Latin American and Caribbean Region to effectively advance regional disarmament and security. CARICOM registers its continued support to the Agency.

CARICOM reiterates its commitment to the full implementation of the "CARICOM-Security Council Resolution 1540 Implementation Programme," to prevent the transit, trans-shipment, import, export, re-export, or brokering of dual-use materials that can be used in the development of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons and related materials.

Mr. Chairman,

The Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) is currently operational in all CARICOM Member States. APIS is an automated system established to provide officers with pre-arrival and departure manifest data on all passengers and crew members of an aircraft or vessel at each port of entry. Continuous enhancements are being made to the APIS system and will include training and simulation exercises to be conducted with Immigration, Customs, Police, and Intelligence Units to build the capacities of border security and law enforcement officials to enhance the detection and identification of persons of interest and trends/patterns in border security. A similar system known as the CARICOM's Advance Cargo Information System has been established to allow CARICOM Member States to conduct profiling of cargo. The Advanced Cargo Information System (ACIS) was developed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and CARICOM IMPACS.

Mr. Chairman,

Another vital system for the region's security is the Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network (RIBIN). To further advance and enhance the RIBIN in CARICOM Member States, partnership support is needed to purchase an

Integrated Ballistic Information System ‘central server’ to assist with the comparison of images stored within other global ballistic networks such as the Canadian Ballistic Information Network (CIBIN) and the United States’ National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN). Also, the procurement of a BrassTrax Acquisition Station and MatchPoint Analysis Station is also required for the enhancement of the RIBIN.

Mr. Chairman,

Citizen security is of paramount importance to the CARICOM Member States. Guided by our Crime and Security strategy, our Members aim to implement the necessary measures to guarantee individual safety and security. However, our region continues to face the challenge of limited resources with which to confront the various complex and multifaceted security issues some of which originate beyond our borders. We seek meaningful and mutually beneficial partnerships as we strive to increase our institutional efficiency, and human capacity in addressing the complex regional and global issues faced. In this regard, we thank our various partners, regional and sub-regional organizations, and civil society organizations that contribute financial, technical, and other resources needed in the region to achieve our strategic goals.

Thank you.

**Written Statement
Submitted by Brunei Darussalam on behalf of the
Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

**Thematic Discussion on Regional Disarmament and Security
of the First Committee, Seventy-Fifth Session
of the United Nations General Assembly**

**October 2020
United Nations Headquarters, New York**

**Statement on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
For Cluster 6 of the First Committee
(Regional Disarmament and Security)
UN General Assembly, New York**

Mr. Chair,

1. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam.
2. ASEAN notes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic which has alarmingly emphasised fragilities across the world and affected the well-being, economic development and security and stability of our people. Simultaneously, the pandemic has heightened the urgency of focusing on our mutual interests and common security challenges through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).
3. In this regard, ASEAN reaffirms its principles as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in maintaining ASEAN Centrality and upholding a rules-based regional architecture with respect for international law. This includes collectively underscoring the importance of strengthening international and regional cooperation in nuclear disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the elimination, non-proliferation and non-use of chemical and biological weapons, among others.
4. ASEAN believes that the strength and value of multilateralism lie in its inclusivity, rules-based nature and emphasis on mutual benefit and respect. In light of the increasingly complex security challenges facing us today, we remain committed to our collective efforts towards regional disarmament initiatives.
5. ASEAN views transparency and confidence-building measures as important elements in our efforts toward general and complete disarmament, and in improving the regional security environment. Therefore, we reaffirm our commitment to the obligations under disarmament and non-proliferation instruments that ASEAN Member States are signatories or Party to, and value regional platforms and dialogues to facilitate the implementation of our commitments in a balanced manner.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament

6. ASEAN reaffirms its strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, as this year marks the 50th anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force, we urge all States Parties to renew their commitment to the full implementation of the NPT. We look forward to the convening of the NPT Review Conference in 2021 and hope that enhanced dialogue can generate productive outcomes.
7. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) contributes towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and complements existing efforts under nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.

There is an increasing number of ratifications and accessions to the TPNW, including the recent ratification of our fellow ASEAN Member State, Malaysia, as the 46th ratifying state, on 30 September 2020.

8. We reiterate our commitment to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and a region free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone or SEANWFZ Treaty and the ASEAN Charter. We stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty, including through implementing the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the SEANWFZ (2018-2022). The Plan of Action provides a framework for States Parties to fulfil their obligations under the SEANWFZ Treaty.
9. We reaffirm our commitment to continuously engage the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and intensify the ongoing efforts of all parties to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty. Our ASEAN experts could explore ways to bridge the differences, including the possibility of engaging with the NWS experts. We would continue to submit the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution through the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).
10. We also recognise the importance of other regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones to the existing global non-proliferation regime and continue to support the ongoing efforts towards the establishment of such zones, especially in the Middle East.
11. ASEAN urges all concerned parties to resume peaceful dialogue and continue working towards the realisation of lasting peace and stability in a completely verifiable and irreversible denuclearised Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, Pyongyang Joint Declaration and Joint Statement by the US and DPRK leaders. ASEAN reiterates its readiness to play a constructive role including through ASEAN-led platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue amongst the concerned parties.

Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

12. In this endeavor, we advance our efforts among others through collaboration between ASEAN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) particularly after signing the Practical Arrangements (PA) on Cooperation in the Areas of Nuclear Science and Technology and Applications, Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in September 2019 and look forward to its implementation.
13. We underscore the importance of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) and look forward to the convening of the 7th Annual Meeting of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) tentatively in November 2020 and its ongoing implementation of the Five-Year Work Plan.

ASEAN Regional Forum

14. In facing the current regional and global challenges, we reaffirm the important role of the ARF as an inclusive platform that fosters constructive dialogue and cooperation on political and security issues of common concern. We welcome the adoption of the Ha Noi Plan of Action II for the period 2020-2025 by the 27th ARF held on 12 September 2020. We also commend Vietnam, as ARF Chair for 2020, on the provisional measures taken to ensure continuity in the ARF's operations amidst the challenges posed by the pandemic. We look forward to Brunei Darussalam's chairmanship of the 28th ARF and ASEAN Regional Forum Security Policy Conference (ASPC) in 2021.

Mr. Chair,

15. ASEAN believes that our global disarmament efforts will be most productive when our regional cooperation complement them. To this end, ASEAN reaffirms its commitment to working together with the international community in advancing our shared goal of promoting international peace and security.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

STATEMENT BY

HIS EXCELLENCY MR. SOVANN KE
 AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
 OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA
 TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ON BEHALF OF
 THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN)

FIRST COMMITTEE
 THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
 NEW YORK, 23 October 2020

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

I have the honor to address the First Committee today on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country Cambodia.

Mr. Chairman,

We all live with great uncertainty posed by the Covid-19 pandemic and increased political tensions. ASEAN is deeply concerned with illicit proliferation of conventional weapons globally, which contributes to violence and instability and perpetuates poverty, undermining human welfare. Annually, more than 200,000 civilian casualties are caused by the use of small arms in conflict situations. It affects the livelihood and economy of the local people and creates tremendous pressure on the local government as well as the surrounding regions.

ASEAN recognizes that effective regulation and control of conventional weapons is important in maintaining peace, stability, and sustainable development efforts. We reaffirm that the implementation of related international instruments on conventional weapons should be in accordance with fundamental principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, with States bearing primary role. At the same time, we also acknowledge that States have sovereign rights to possess and regulate their conventional inventory for self-defense as well as maintaining national security.

To achieve the goal of disarmament, consistent international action is necessary. In this context, ASEAN takes a keen interest in the ongoing developments of other frameworks and international legally binding instruments, including the Sixth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty. We also look forward to the convening of the Eighteenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention to be held in Geneva, next month.

Mr. Chairman,

ASEAN fully supports the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which could aid global efforts in regulating the flow of such weapons and combating the illicit trade of these type of weapons at the national, regional, and international levels. We look forward to actively engaging in the process of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States Parties, rescheduled in 2021, with the hope that the meeting will deliver fruitful outcomes.

Towards this, ASEAN has been diligently working to reinforce the disarmament machinery in the region and beyond. We continue to address arms smuggling through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Moreover, the annual meetings of ASEAN Police Chiefs enable stronger regional cooperation in transnational crime investigations. At the same time, the ASEAN Forensic Science Institute helps promote the exchange of information on forensic investigations related to illicit arms. Through these mechanisms, ASEAN has been able to work effectively to combat the smuggling of small arms and light weapons as well as other related-transnational crimes in the region.

There is a need to address the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly by armed non-state actors. We fully support efforts to strengthen mechanisms for international cooperation in this regard. ASEAN supports the conduct of the 22nd Annual Conference of High Contracting Parties of the Second Amended Protocol to the Convention on Certain

Conventional Weapons (CCW). ASEAN sees the CCW as the appropriate framework to address potential threats arising from lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), including possible acquisition by armed non-state actors. There is a need for a robust and future-proof legally-binding instrument to address these threats.

Mr. Chairman,

The ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre, located in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was established as a Regional Centre of excellence to address the humanitarian aspects of unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war. The Centre provides medical and rehabilitation assistance to victims and conducts research and community awareness about the danger and incidents posed by landmines. The Centre continues to work closely with the United Nations Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining towards achieving our common objective, of saving lives.

Given the devastating effects of land mines on civilian populations, particularly women and children, it is important that demining projects are developed with a holistic approach to include victim-support and strong community development focus. To this end, ASEAN calls upon all States Parties, particularly developed countries, and the international community to provide necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance for the reintegration and rehabilitation of the victims.

I wish to conclude by reaffirming ASEAN's commitment to combating the illicit trade of conventional weapons. ASEAN calls upon all states to join hands to stop their illegal trading activities to ensure that we all are safe, and our developmental efforts will continue without disruption.

Thank you.

中国代表团在第75届联大一委
关于核裁军问题的专题发言

主席先生，

当前全球战略安全形势严峻复杂，国际核裁军体系面临空前挑战。美国近年来先后出台《国家安全战略报告》、《核态势审议报告》等政策文件，宣称将“大幅增加核武库和有关基础设施投入”，并明确使用核武器的“极端情况包括重大非核战略攻击”，极大降低了核门槛。近期美方内部讨论重启核试验，严重威胁禁核试国际共识。美还发展和部署全球反导系统，寻求在外空部署导弹拦截器、在亚太及欧洲部署中导。这些单边行径致使全球战略安全环境面临冷战以来最严重挑战，严重侵蚀二战以来建立的国际核裁军体系。

核裁军问题事关全人类的前途命运，任何国家都不能将自身利益凌驾于国际社会整体利益之上，让全世界为其错误政策和行径“买单”。国际社会应以共商共建人类命运共同体的历史责任感，构建相互尊重、公平正义、合作共赢的新型国际关系，坚定维护多边主义，维护国际核裁军体系，维护全球战略稳定。

首先，要秉持共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全观。要充分尊重各国正当合理安全关切，通过营造普遍安全的国际地区环境，消除军备竞赛和武器扩散根源。任何国家都有权维护国家安全，但绝不能以牺牲其他国家的安全为代价。国际社会应共同抵制国际安全领域的单边霸权行径。

第二，要继续坚持核裁军国际共识。根据首届裁军特别联大报告及联大有关决议，拥有最大核武库的国家应切实履行核裁军特殊、优先责任。美俄仍拥有全世界90%以上的核武器。美方应积极回应俄方诉求，就延长《新削减和限制进攻性战略武器条约》达成长期性安排，并在此基础上进一步大幅削减核武库，为其他核武器国家加入多边核裁军谈判创造条件。

第三，要降低核武器在国家安全政策中的作用。核武器国家应重申“核战争打不赢、也打不得”理念，承诺不将核武器瞄准任何国家，承诺无条件不首先使用核武器，谈判缔结关于向无核武器国家提供消极和积极安全保证的国际法律文书。我们敦促美方废除核保护伞和核共享政策，全部撤回海外部署的核武器，以增进战略互信，减少核风险。

第四，要维护现有国际核裁军体系。国际社会应认真履行《不扩散核武器条约》（NPT）第六条义务，恪守历届审议大会成果共识，推动第十次审议大会取得成功，加强条约权威性、普遍性和有效性。坚定支持《全面禁止核试验条约》（CTBT）核查系统建设，促进条约生效进程。推动裁谈会在达成全面平衡工作计划基础上，按照“香农报告”所载授权谈判一项“禁产条约”（FMCT）。同时，坚定维护裁谈会、裁审会、联大一委等多边军控裁军机制的权威。

第五，要全面看待核裁军问题。反导及外空、网络、人工智能等新科技军事化运用对战略稳定的影响日益上升。核武器国家应放弃发展或部署全球导弹防御系统，不寻求在亚太及欧洲部署中导，防止外空武器化和外空军备竞赛，共同研究和应对新科技军事化运用对战略稳定的影响。

主席先生，

中国一贯主张最终全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器，恪守在任何时候和任何情况下不首先使用核武器政策，明确承诺无条件不对无核武器国家和无核武器区使用或威胁使用核武器。中国坚持自卫防御的核战略，始终将核力量维持在国家安全需要的最低水平。任何国家只要不首先对中方使用核武器，就不会受到中国核武器的威胁。

中国积极推动五核国加强合作，改善国际安全环境。2019年1月北京会议以来，五核国就核政策与核战略保持对话，就减少核风险、“禁产条约”等开展专家层面讨论。中方牵头的核术语工作组第二阶段工作取得实质成果，积极协调五核国与东盟就《东南亚无核武器区条约》议定书签署问题重启对话。王毅国务委员兼外长并同其他四核国外长一道，在今年3月就NPT生效50周年发表联合声明，重申对条约的政治支持。

中国始终以实际行动支持国际核裁军进程。中国支持《全面禁止核试验条约》宗旨和目标，今年起成为条约第二大会费国。中国恪守“暂停试”承诺，稳步推进国内履约筹备工作，继去年境内多座台站启动数据传输后，今年又启动昆明次声台站核证程序。中国主张裁谈会在达成全面平衡工作计划的基础上，根据香农报告所载授权启动“禁产条约”谈判。中国认为充分有效的核裁军核查措施是最终全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的重要技术保障，将继续积极参与联合国核裁军核查政府专家组工作。

主席先生，

最后，中方愿重申对美方推动所谓中美俄三边军控谈判的立场。中方已多次明确表示反对该建议。中国的核力量与美俄完全不在一个量级。要求中方参加三边谈判，既不现实，也不合理。但是中方不参加三边军控谈判并不意味着不参加国际核裁军努力。中方一直并将继续积极参与联合国、裁谈会、五核国等多边机制框架下的国际军控裁军谈判和讨论。

谢谢主席先生。

中国代表团在第75届联大一委
关于生化武器问题的专题发言

主席先生：

当前形势下，加强《禁止生物武器公约》和《禁止化学武器公约》，对维护国际和平与安全、促进全球经济和社会发展的重要性更加突出。各方应严格履行各自承担的义务，积极开展对话与合作，共同捍卫公约的宗旨和目标，维护公约的权威性和有效性。

主席先生，

新冠肺炎疫情是全人类共同面临的一场大考。单个国家无法独善其身，甩锅、推责消灭不了病毒，单边主义、单打独斗没有出路。我们在合作抗击疫情的同时，也要思考如何共同推进全球生物安全治理，有效应对生物战和生物恐怖主义的现实威胁。在此背景下，我们要充分利用今年底到明年底《禁止生物武器公约》框架下的一系列会议，推动公约审议进程取得实质成果。中方有几点主张：

一是尽快重启《禁止生物武器公约》核查议定书谈判，补齐公约长期缺乏核查机制和监督机构的短板。中方敦促美方停止独家反对重启谈判，以便审议大会就此作出决定。

二是加强建立信任措施机制。美方在境外建设大量生物实验室，不少国家认为相关活动缺乏透明度，难以确保其符合《禁止生物武器公约》的规定。中方主张在达成核查议定书之前，在公约建立信任措施宣布表格中增加境外生物实验室。这有助于缓解国际社会的疑虑和关切。

三是促进生物安全国际合作。疫情暴露出各国都存在能力、资源等方面短板。中方于2016年提出“建立生物防扩散出口管制与国际合作机制”倡议，主要目的就是要平衡好安全与发展的关系，促进生物科技和资源普

惠共享，切实提升全球生物安全能力和水平。从长远看，有必要在联合国框架下，建立公正、包容、非歧视性的全球性防扩散出口管制与国际合作机制。

四是推动生物科技健康、有序发展。充分释放生物科技红利，同时减少生物科技误用、谬用等风险，符合国际社会共同利益。中方2016年提出的制定“生物科学家行为准则范本”自愿性倡议已经过充分讨论，完全可以成为审议大会一项重要成果，希望各方积极支持。

主席先生，

《禁止化学武器公约》是裁军和军控领域最具普遍性的条约之一，但真正实现无化武世界的目标依然任重道远。作为世界上唯一拥有库存化武的国家，美国应切实履行义务，加快库存化武销毁进程。日本遗弃在华化学武器销毁问题同样重要，中方愿就后续工作同日方以及禁化武组织保持沟通。希望日方进一步加大投入，尽快完成销毁工作。

中方一贯坚决反对任何国家、任何人在任何情况下使用化学武器，主张根据禁化武公约规定，对指称使用化学武器的事件开展全面、客观、公正的调查，得出经得起历史和事实检验的结论。

包括中方在内不少国家认为，叙化武问题调查鉴定组的成立和工作都不符合禁化武公约的规定，其提交的报告存在诸多疑点和漏洞。在这样的情况下，一些国家仍然强行推动禁化武组织执理会表决通过相关决定，中方对此严重关切。中方呼吁有关国家停止政治操弄，尽快回到通过对话协商解决指称使用化武问题的正确轨道上来，避免进一步损害禁化武公约的权威和禁化武组织的团结。

主席先生，

中方希望本届联大一委能够协商一致通过“执行《禁止生物武器公约》”和“执行《禁止化学武器公约》”两份决议草案，将本着建设性态度参与相关磋商，希望中方的立场和关切在草案中得到妥善反映。

谢谢主席先生。

中国代表团在第75届联大一委
关于外空问题的专题发言

主席先生：

当前，外空军事化和武器化势头日益加剧，外空安全形势非常严峻。特别是，美国大力推行“主导外空”战略，公然将外空界定为新的作战疆域，专门成立外空军和外空司令部，加速开展外空武器试验和军事演习，并计划在外空部署反导感应器和拦截器。美国这些消极举动的实质是谋求独霸外空和绝对军事优势，不仅严重威胁外空安全，而且给全球战略稳定带来严重消极影响，已成为影响外空安全的最突出因素。在此背景下，防止外空军备竞赛的必要性和紧迫性进一步上升。

主席先生，

国际社会一贯高度重视外空安全问题，联合国围绕防止外空军备竞赛做了积极努力。近四十年来，联大每年就该问题以压倒性多数通过决议。裁谈会、裁审会、联大一委和四委亦就外空问题开展了大量有益工作。在中国与俄罗斯共同推动下，联合国成立“防止外空军备竞赛”政府专家组，就相关国际法律文书要素开展了前所未有的深入、实质性讨论。中、俄提出的“防止在外空放置武器、对外空物体使用或威胁使用武力条

约”草案仍是有关讨论的重要基础，并正在得到越来越多国家支持。令人遗憾的是，美国出于一己私利，为了推行其外空军事战略，不愿接受任何国际约束，长期消极抵制外空军控国际讨论进程，去年还独家阻挡联合国“防止外空军备竞赛”政府专家组通过报告。裁谈会也因此无法就防止外空军备竞赛国际法律文书启动谈判进程。

外空作为全球公域，人类命运共同体特征尤为突出。确保外空和平利用，防止外空武器化和军备竞赛，不仅符合各国共同利益，也是各国共同责任。联合国全体成员国有必要认真评估外空安全形势现状，切实重视防止外空武器化和军备竞赛问题，严格防止外空沦为新的战场。为此，中方愿提出以下几点建议：

一是体现政治意愿。各国特别是航天大国，应认真吸取历史教训，摒弃冷战思维，展现维护外空和平与安全的良好政治意愿，积极参与到外空军控国际进程中来，避免重走核武器“先发展、后裁减”的老路，防止将外空沦为陆海空那样的战场。我们敦促美方停止阻挡外空军控进程，与国际社会一道，在中俄外空军控条约草案基础上谈判达成国际法律文书，从根本上维护外空持久和平与共同安全。

二是坚持多边主义。各方应坚定支持联合国，特别是裁谈会发挥主渠道作用，争取早日谈判达成外空军控国际法律文书，为防止外空武器化和军备竞赛提供根本保障。在裁谈会达成工作计划并正式启动谈判前，可以考虑成立技术专家组，深入讨论未来外空军控法律文书范围、核查、定义等技术性问题。此外，还可考虑在适当时机再次成立联合国外空问题政府专家组。需要强调的是，关于外空问题的任何倡议均应体现开放性和包容性，确保联合国成员国广泛参与并充分发表意见，避免歧视性和排他性。

三是努力增进互信。适当、可行的透明和建立信任措施，有助于增进互信、减少误判，为谈判制定外空军控国际法律文书提供补充，服务于防止外空军备竞赛这一大目标。但需要看到，透明和建立信任措施有其局限性，不能取代外空军控国际法律文书谈判。中方支持各方通过加强沟通对话，不断弥合分歧，扩大共识，为未来外空军控谈判积累有利条件。

中方愿继续与各方共同努力，积极在外空领域践行构建人类命运共同体理念，为维护外空持久和平与共同安全做出贡献。

谢谢主席先生。

中国代表团在第75届联大一委
关于常规武器问题的专题发言

主席先生：

常规武器引发的各方面问题历来为国际社会所关注。近年来，受美国“政治病毒”的影响，地缘政治角逐加剧，地区武装冲突和动荡此起彼伏，武器贸易规模不断攀升，恐怖主义、极端主义和跨国有组织犯罪远未消除，常规武器非法转让和转用的风险有增无减。

正如联合国秘书长古特雷斯在新裁军议程中所言，常规武器军控是“拯救生命的裁军”。联合国“2030可持续发展议程”亦将减少小武器非法流动作为一项重要目标。多年来，国际社会为缓解常规武器非法转让和滥用引发的人道主义问题做出了不懈移努力，取得了积极成果。新形势下，国际社会应进步携手努力，保持常规武器军控领域良好势头，为国际军控进程注入正能量。

主席先生，

中国一贯高度重视常规武器引发的人道主义问题，坚定支持并积极参与国际常规武器军控进程。中方主张在平衡处理各国正当安全需要和人道主义关切的基础上，不断加强和完善常规军控领域的国际法律机制，维护国际和地区的持久和平与普遍安全。

作为中国在军控领域一项重要具体行动，中国于今年7月6日正式加入了《武器贸易条约》。今年8月，中国首次以缔约国身份参加了条约缔约国大会并提交书面发言。这是中国积极参与全球武器贸易治理、维护国际和地区和平的重要举措，进一步体现了中方支持多边主义、推动构建人类命运共同体的决心和诚意。作为条约缔约国，中国将严格履行条约义务，并与各方加强合作，进一步提高条约的普遍性和有效性，特别是向发展中国家提供力所能及的援助。同时，我们也呼吁各国强化负责任的武器贸易理念，不向非国家行为体出售武器，停止借军品出口干涉主权国家内政，切实维护《联合国宪章》的宗旨和原则。

主席先生，

中国高度重视轻小武器非法转让和滥用引发的人道主义问题。中方认为，要妥善解决这一问题，各国应认真落实联合国轻小武器《行动纲领》和《识别与追查国际文书》等各项义务，不断加强各国相关能力建设，持续推进打击轻小武器非法贸易多边进程。同时积极开展国际合作，共同维护国际和地区稳定。

非洲国家是非法轻小武器泛滥的主要受害者。联合国安理会2019年2月一致通过决议，支持非洲落实“消弭非洲枪声”倡议。中国国家主席习近平2018年在中非合作论坛北京峰会上明确支持落实“消弭非洲枪声”倡议。中方于2018年至2019年通过联合国和平与发展基金为支持该倡议资助了约140万美元，愿进一步同非盟及非洲国家开展合作。我们呼吁国际社会进一步向非洲提供帮助，争取早日实现“消弭非洲枪声”目标，为落实联合国“2030年可持续发展议程”创造有利条件。

主席先生，

《特定常规武器公约》在常规武器军控领域发挥着重要基石作用。作为公约及其五个附加议定书的完全成员国，中方一贯支持公约各项工作，忠实履行公约及其议定书义务，积极参与国际交流与合作。

中方积极致力于国际人道主义扫雷援助与合作。中国政府已通过捐款、援助器材、举办培训项目、实地指导等方式，向40余国提供了总额超过1亿人民币的人道主义扫雷援助，培训1000余名专业扫雷技术人员。2015年9月，中国国家主席习近平在联大维和峰会上宣布，中方将在今后5年开展10个扫雷援助项目。中国迄今已提前超额完成所作承诺，共计开展了24个扫雷援助项目，总金额累计超过5500万元人民币。2020年，中方向柬埔寨、老挝援助了价值950万人民币的探扫雷器材和人道主义物资。

主席先生，

中方愿同各方保持交流合作，携手推动常规武器军控领域各项工作取得新进展，为解决常规武器滥用引发的人道主义问题、维护国际和地区的和平与稳定进一步做出积极贡献。

谢谢主席先生。

中国代表团在第75届联大一委
关于信息安全问题的专题发言

主席先生，

当前，我们身处一个前所未有的数字时代。数字经济蓬勃发展，新科技革命和产业变革蓄势待发，各国利益交融、休戚与共。与此同时，数据安全的风险和挑战日益突出，亟需全球性解决之道。当务之急是在各方普遍参与基础上达成反映大多数国家意愿和利益的全球数据安全规则。

为有效应对数据安全风险挑战，切实维护全球数据和供应链安全，推动数字经济发展与合作，中国不久前发起《全球数据安全倡议》，呼吁各国采取措施防范制止利用信息技术破坏或窃取他国关键基础设施重要数据、侵害个人信息，反对滥用信息技术从事针对他国的大规模监控，不强制要求本国企业将境外数据存储在国内，要求企业不在产品和服务中设置后门等。

《倡议》既根植于国际社会既有共识，同时就新问题提出解决方案，希望为制定相关全球规则提供蓝本。《倡议》提出后，得到国际社会广泛关注，很多国家表示《倡议》具有建设性，为重大数据安全问题提供了解决思路。中方愿本着开放、包容的态度，听取各方有益建议，共同推动在联合国、G20等多边框架和地区平台与各方进行有益交流。我们相信，随着时间推移，这一《倡议》一定会得到越来越多国家的认同和支持。中方愿与各方一道，共同打造各方普遍接受的数据网络安全规则，开创和平、安全、开放、合作的网络空间，促进数字经济健康发展，为人类社会进步作出贡献。

主席先生，

因受疫情影响，今年的联合国信息安全开放式工作组（OEWG）和政府专家组（GGE）讨论进程有所滞后。感谢两位主席，劳伯大使和帕特瑞奥塔大使的领导力以及秘书处出色的组织，使得各方通过视频方式，就有关问题进行了非正式讨论，确保了讨论的连续性。我们期待两进程明年能顺利完成谈判进程，如期向第75届联大提交实质性报告。

很多国家正在考虑两进程结束后，如何在联合国框架下推进信息安全问题的讨论。我们高兴地注意到，俄罗斯代表团已提交决议草案，建议建立为期五年的新一届OEWG。与此同时，我们也注意到四十多个国家专门就“机制性对话”提出了建议。中方认为，两个建议的核心有相通之处，就是在联合国内建立一个包容性的机制，讨论、谈判与国际安全相关的信息安全问题，结束目前两个机制并行的局面。

中方一贯主张，应在联合国建立各方普遍参与的、包容性的、持续的信息安全进程，在国际信息安全问题上发挥联合国的核心作用。为此，我们参加了第73/27号决议的共提，要求建立联合国历史上首个各方普遍参与的信息安全进程——OEWG。与此同时，我们对第73/266号有关继续成立GGE的决议投了反对票，因为建立两个授权相近的平行进程不仅是一个重复，也是在制造分裂。经过两年的讨论，越来越多的国家开始赞同中方的看法，主张联合国应该只有一个进程，一个所有国家都能平等参与讨论的包容性进程。

关于未来的“机制性对话”，中方认为应包括以下要素：

一、坚决维护已达成的政治共识，特别是2015年政府专家组报告。与轻小武器“行动纲领”不同，联合国信息安全领域的讨论不是从零开始的。以往达成的共识应该作为今后工作的基础。

二、无论怎样组织具体的会议框架，所有会议的授权都应该包括两部分：一是“向后看”，即讨论各方履行承诺的情况；二是“向前看”，即根据形势和技术发展，制定新的行为准则。

三、“机制性对话”的议题和讨论范围应与时俱进。随着数字技术的发展，与国际安全相关的数据安全问题日益突出。中方希望今后的对话进程中能就数据安全问题开展讨论。

我们希望分别提出两个建议的国家能加强沟通，争取就后续机制形成一致意见。中方愿积极参与相关问题的讨论，为维护联合国在国际信息安全领域的核心地位，推动形成一个普遍参与的、包容性的信息安全多边进程作出自己的贡献。

谢谢主席先生。

Statement of the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons at the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

We are currently witnessing a global strategic security situation that is severe and complex, and the international nuclear disarmament regime facing unprecedented challenges. Over recent years, the US has issued the *National Security Strategy*, the *Nuclear Posture review* and other policy documents, declaring that “significant investment is needed to maintain a U.S. nuclear arsenal and infrastructure”, and substantially lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons by stating that nuclear weapons will be used under “extreme circumstances” including “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks”. Recently the US had an internal discussion about resuming nuclear tests, which severely threatened the international consensus of the moratorium on nuclear testing. The US has developed and deployed a global missile defense system, and seeks to deploy anti-missile interceptors in outer space and deploy intermediate-range missile in the Asia-Pacific and Europe. All these unilateral moves have posed the most severe challenges to the global strategic security environment since the Cold War and severely eroded the post-World-War-II International nuclear disarmament regime.

The issue of nuclear disarmament has a direct bearing on the future of all humanity. No country should be allowed to put its own interests above the collective interests of the international or make the whole world pay the price for its own wrong doing. The international community should have a historic sense of responsibility and work toward a community with a shared future for mankind, build a new type of international relationship featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation, steadfastly uphold multilateralism, safeguard international nuclear disarmament system and uphold global strategic stability.

First, we need to uphold a security concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. We need to fully respect the legitimate security concerns of all countries, create a universally secure international and regional environment as a means to eliminate the root causes for arms race and arms proliferation. Every country has the right to uphold its national security, however it should never come at the cost of other countries’ security. The international community should join hands to resist the unilateral bullying acts in the field of international security.

Second, we should continue to uphold the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. According to the *Final document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly* and the relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly, the states that possess the largest nuclear arsenals have special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament. The US and Russia collectively possess over 90% of the world’s total nuclear weapons. The US should positively respond to the proposal of Russia to make a long-term arrangement on the extension of the New START Treaty, and on this basis further substantially reduce its nuclear arsenal so as to create conditions for the other nuclear-weapon States to join multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Third, the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines should be diminished. Nuclear-weapon States should reiterate that “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”, reaffirm the commitment not to target their nuclear weapons at any State, commit to the no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and conclude an international legally-binding instrument on providing negative and positive security

assurances to all the non-nuclear-weapon States. We urge the US to abolish the policies and practices of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing, and withdraw all nuclear weapons deployed in other countries back home, in order to enhance strategic mutual trust and reduce nuclear risks.

Fourth, we need to safeguard the existing international nuclear disarmament regime. The international community should faithfully implement the obligations of Article VI of the NPT, abide by the consensual outcomes of the previous review conferences, ensure the success of the tenth review conference, strengthen the authority, universality and effectiveness of the NPT. We should firmly support the development of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification system and advance the entry into force of the treaty. We should support the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon Report ([CD/1299](#)), on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced program of work. We should firmly uphold the authority of the CD, the UNDC, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and other UN disarmament machinery.

Fifth, we should approach the issue of nuclear disarmament in a comprehensive manner. The impact of military applications of emerging technologies related to outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence and others have brought increasing repercussions to strategic stability. Nuclear-weapon States should abandon the development or deployment of global missile defense systems, refrain from deploying nuclear weapons in outer space, and collectively explore ways to cope with the impact of military application of new technologies on strategic stability.

Mr. Chairman,

China has all along advocated the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, adhered to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, made a clear commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has upheld a nuclear strategy of self-defense and kept its nuclear force at the minimum level required for national security. In other words, no country would be threatened by China's nuclear weapons if it does not intend to use nuclear weapons against China first.

China has striving to strengthen P5 cooperation and improve the international security environment. Since the P5 Beijing Conference in January 2019, P5 has maintained dialogues on nuclear policies and nuclear doctrines and carried out discussions at the expert level on nuclear risk reduction, FMCT and other issues. The second phase of the P5 Working Group on the Glossary of Key Nuclear Terms led by China has yielded substantive results. China has actively coordinated the restart of dialogues between P5 and ASEAN countries on the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. State Councilor Wang Yi and foreign ministers of the other four nuclear-weapon States issued a Joint Statement in March to mark the Fiftieth Anniversary of NPT, which reaffirmed our collective support to the treaty.

China has all along supported the purposes and objectives of the CTBT, honored the commitment of moratorium on nuclear tests, and steadily pushed forward preparation for the implementation of the Treaty. After starting real-time data transmission of several certified monitoring stations in China, this year it has started the certification procedure of Kunming infra-sound monitoring station. China maintains that the Conference on Disarmament should start relevant negotiations on the basis of a comprehensive and balanced program of work, according to the mandate in the Shannon Report. China believes full and effective verification measures are an important technical guarantee for achieving the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and will continue to take an active part in the work of the new UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion, China would like to reiterate its position on the so-called trilateral arms control negotiations proposed by the US. China has clearly stated its opposition to this proposal many times. I wish to stress again here that China's nuclear force is far below the level of the US and Russia. Asking China to participate in the trilateral negotiation is neither realistic nor reasonable. However, China's rejection of the trilateral negotiation does not mean that we will not participate in international disarmament efforts. Instead, China has been and will continue to take an active part in the international arms control and disarmament negotiations and discussions under the multilateral frameworks including the UN, CD and P5.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement of the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction at the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

Under the current circumstances, to enhance the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) becomes more important to safeguarding international peace and security and promoting social and economic development of the world. All parties should strictly fulfill their obligations under the BWC and CWC, actively conduct dialogue and cooperation, jointly uphold the purposes and objectives of the BWC and CWC, as well as their authority and effectiveness.

Mr. Chairman,

The COVID-19 pandemic is a severe test that all mankind face together. No single country could cope with the pandemic on its own. Scapegoating and shirking responsibilities can never drive away the virus. Fighting alone or resorting to unilateralism leads to nowhere. While fighting together against the pandemic, we should think over how to strengthen global biosecurity governance and jointly deal with the eminent challenges and threats posed by biological warfare and bio-terrorism. In this context, we should make full use of the meetings to be held under the BWC from later this year to the end of next year so as to work for more tangible results in the Ninth Review Conference. To this end, the Chinese side would like to put forward three propositions.

First, resume the negotiation on a BWC verification protocol as soon as possible. In this way, the lacking of a verification mechanism and monitoring body, a long-term weakness of the BWC, could be addressed. We urge the US side to stop standing in the way of negotiations on a BWC verification protocol so that the review Conference can make a decision on this matter.

Second, strengthen the CBMs. The US has built a large number of biological laboratories around the world. Many countries believe that the activities conducted in those labs lack transparency and there is no guarantee that these activities conform to stipulations of the BWC. We propose to add the item of overseas biological laboratories in the CBM submission, pending the conclusion of a verification protocol. This will help diffuse doubts and concerns of the international community in this aspect.

Third, promote global biosecurity cooperation. The pandemic has laid bare the inadequacies all countries in terms of capabilities, resources and so on. The initiative for the establishment of a Non-proliferation Export Control and International Cooperation Regime proposed by China in 2016 is aimed at striking a balance between security and development and ensuring inclusive benefit-sharing of biological technologies and resources, and increasing the level and capability of global biosecurity. In the long run, it is necessary to establish an impartial, inclusive and non-discriminatory global non-proliferation export control and international cooperation mechanism under the framework of UN.

Forth, ensure the sound and orderly development of biotechnology. It is in the common interests of the international community to unleash the benefits of biotechnology while preventing the risk of its misuse and disuse. The voluntary Model Code of Conduct for Bio-scientists proposed by China in 2016 has been widely discussed. It could well become an important outcome of the upcoming Review Conference. We hope all state parties can support this initiative.

Mr. Chairman,

The CWC is one of the most universal treaties in the disarmament and arms control field. However, there is still a long way to go before we can realize the goal of a world free of chemical weapons. As the only country possessing chemical weapons stockpile, the US should earnestly fulfill its obligations and speed up the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpile. Of equal importance is the destruction the Japanese abandoned chemical weapons in China. We are willing to maintain communication on the follow-up work in this field with Japan and OPCW. China calls upon Japan to scale up its input to thoroughly destroy the Japanese ACW as soon as possible.

China has always firmly opposed the use of chemical weapons for any purpose and by any country, organization or individual under any circumstances. We stand for comprehensive, objective and impartial investigations into alleged chemical weapons according to the CWC in order to reach a conclusion that can withstand the test of time and facts.

Many countries including China believe that the establishment of the IIT and its work are not in accordance with the provisions of the CWC. The IIT report contains many controversial conclusions and loopholes. China expresses its serious concern that under such circumstances some countries still try to force a vote on the decision at the executive council of OPCW. We call on relevant countries to stop politicizing this issue and go back onto the right track of addressing alleged use of chemical weapons through conversation and negotiation so as to avoid further damage to the authority of the Convention and solidarity at OPCW.

Mr. Chairman,

China appeals to all parties to work for a unanimous adoption of the draft resolution on “the Implementation of the CWC” and that on “the Implementation of the BWC” at the First Committee of the current session of the UNGA. China will participate in relevant consultations in a constructive manner. China hopes that its positions and concerns can be properly reflected in the drafts.

Thank you, Mr Chairman.

**Statement of the Chinese Delegation at
the Thematic Discussion on Outer Space
at the 75th Session of the UNGA First Committee**

Mr. Chairman,

The militarization and weaponization of outer space is gaining momentum, and the current space security situation is increasingly challenging. In particular, the US has been pursuing a strategy for dominance in space, blatantly termed outer space as a new *war-fighting domain*, and has even established an independent Space Force and the Space Command. The US also plans to deploy missile defense sensors and interceptors in space, and accelerates tests of space weapons and even carried out space military exercises. Such moves by the U.S., which are in nature aimed at seeking hegemony and absolute superiority in space, not only pose threats to space security, but also have severe negative impact on global strategic stability, and therefore are the most prominent factors affecting outer space security. In this context, it has become increasingly necessary and urgent to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

The international community always attaches great importance to space security, and makes great efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space in the framework of the UN. In the past 40 years, the UN General Assembly adopted resolutions with overwhelming majority every year. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN Disarmament Commission, the First Committee and the Fourth Committee of the UNGA have carried out a great amount of work on space security issues. As proposed by China and Russia, the UN established the Group of Government Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which conducted unprecedented in-depth and substantive discussions on the elements of relevant international legally binding instrument. The draft *Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects* proposed by China and Russia remains as an important basis for discussions and is gathering support from more countries. Unfortunately, the US, out of its selfish pursuit of national space strategy, rejects any international constraint on its space military activities and hinders the international arms control process in outer space. The US was the only country that blocked the adoption of a report by the UN GGE on PAROS last year. For the same reason, the CD failed to start the negotiation on a legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

As a global common, the outer space is figured as a community with a shared future for mankind. To ensure the peaceful use of outer space and prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space is not only in the common interests but also the shared responsibility of all countries. It is necessary for all UN members to seriously review the current situation of outer space security, and seriously consider the issue of preventing the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space, so as to prevent outer space from becoming a new fighting domain. In light of this, China would like to propose the followings:

First, show political will. All countries, particularly those space faring countries, should draw lessons from history, abandon the Cold War mentality, and demonstrate the political will in safeguarding the peace and security of outer space through actively participating in outer space arms control, so as to avoid going through the old path of nuclear weapons which is “development first and disarmament later”, and to prevent outer space from becoming a war-

fighting domain like the land, sea and air. We urge the US to stop impeding international arms control process on outer space, and join international efforts for negotiation and conclusion of an international legal instrument based on the draft PPWT proposed by China and Russia, so as to fundamentally safeguard lasting peace and common security in outer space.

Second, uphold multilateralism. All UN members should support the UN, the CD in particular, to play a primary role in starting negotiations on an international legally binding instrument on PAROS at an early date. This is the fundamental assurance for the prevention of the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space. Prior to the adoption of its work program in the CD and the start of formal negotiation, a technical expert group could be set up to carry out extensive discussion on such technical issues as scope, verification, and definition. In addition, a new UN GGE on PAROS could also be considered when appropriate. It should be stressed that any initiative on PAROS should be open and inclusive, and that, to avoid discrimination or exclusiveness, full participation and wide exchange of views among the UN members are required.

Third, enhance mutual trust. Appropriate and feasible transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) are conducive to enhance mutual trust and avoid miscalculation. TCBMs could also be complementary to the negotiation and conclusion of the international legally-binding instrument on PAROS. However, due to their limitations, TCBMs can not replace the negotiation of an international legally-binding instrument on PAROS. China supports all parties to enhance communications and dialogues with a view to converging differences and reaching consensus, and creating favorable conditions for future negotiation on PAROS.

With the vision of building a community with a shared future for mankind in the field of outer space, China stands ready to make continuous efforts with all parties to safeguard lasting peace and common security in outer space.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement of the Chinese Delegation at the Thematic Discussion on Conventional Arms Control at the 75th Session of UNGA First Committee

Mr. Chairman,

The problems caused by conventional arms have always been a great concern for the international community. In recent years, driven by the “political virus” from the US, geopolitical tensions are rising, regional armed conflicts and turmoils are flaring up, the scale of arms trade is expanding, terrorism, extremism and organized transnational crimes is yet to be eradicated. As a result, the risks of illicit transfer and diversion of conventional arms are still increasing.

As the Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated in his new disarmament agenda, the conventional arms control is part of “disarmament that saves lives”. Reducing illicit arms flow is also enlisted as an important goal in *the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. For years, the international community has made unswerving efforts in alleviating the humanitarian problems caused by the illicit transfer and abuse of conventional arms, and achieved positive outcomes in this regard. Under the new circumstances, the international community should join hands in keeping the sound momentum in conventional arms control, and inject positive energy into the international arms control process.

Mr. Chairman,

China attaches great importance to the humanitarian concerns caused by conventional arms, firmly supports and actively participates in the process of international conventional arms control. China believes that the international community should constantly strengthen and improve the international legal mechanism on conventional arms control, on the basis of striking a balance between legitimate security needs and humanitarian concern of all countries, so as to safeguard global and regional lasting peace and common security.

As a positive concrete action of China in the arms control process, China acceded to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on 6 July this year. China participated in the Sixth Conference of State Parties to the ATT in August as a State Party for the first time, and submitted a written statement. This is a significant step taken by China in participating in the global governance on arms trade and safeguarding international and regional peace, which testifies to China’s determination and sincerity in upholding multilateralism and forging a community with a shared future for mankind. As a State Party, China will faithfully fulfill its obligations, and work closely with all parties to promote the universality and

effectiveness of the ATT. In this connection, China is ready to provide assistance to the developing countries within its capacity. Meanwhile, we urge the US and some other countries to stop arms sales to non-state actors, and refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states through arms exports.

Mr. Chairman,

China attaches great importance to the humanitarian concerns caused by the illicit transfer and abuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). China believes that in order to properly solve this problem, all states should actively support and implement the obligations under the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the International Tracing Instrument, continuously enhance capacity building, and take forward the multilateral process of combating illicit trade of SALWs consistently. Efforts shall also be made to carry out international cooperation actively and maintain international and regional stability.

African countries are the main victims of illicit small arms and light weapons. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution unanimously in February 2019 which supports Africa to implement the initiative of “Silencing the Guns in Africa”. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Summit 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced China’s support to the implementation of the initiative. China has provided US\$1.4 million through the United Nations Peace and Development Fund in 2018 and 2019. Standing ready to carry out further cooperation with the AU and African countries in this regard, China also calls upon the international community to provide needed assistance to Africa, to facilitate the implementation of the initiative of “Silencing the Guns in Africa” and create favorable conditions for the implementation of *the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.

Mr. Chairman,

The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) has been serving as the cornerstone of conventional arms control. As a High Contracting Party to the Convention and its five protocols, China has consistently supported the work of the CCW, faithfully implemented the CCW and its protocols, and actively participates in relevant international exchange and cooperation.

China is committed to international humanitarian demining assistance and cooperation. The Chinese Government has provided humanitarian assistance worth over 100 million yuan RMB to more than 40 countries through donation, equipment assistance, training programs and field instructions, and has trained over 1,000 professional demining technicians. At the UN Peacekeeping Summit in September 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China will carry out ten demining assistance programs in the coming five years. China has fulfilled its promise ahead of the schedule. We carried out 24 demining programs and provided assistance worth of more than 55 million yuan RMB. In 2020, the Chinese Government provided demining assistance worth of 9.5 million RMB to Cambodia and Laos which includes demining equipment and humanitarian materials.

Mr. Chairman,

China stands ready to maintain exchange and cooperation with all states, to promote new developments in conventional arms control and make further positive contributions to addressing humanitarian issues caused by the abuse of conventional weapons and safeguarding international and regional peace and stability.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Statement of the Chinese Delegation
at the Thematic Discussion on Information Security
at the First Committee of the 75th UN General Assembly**

Mr. Chair,

We are living in an unprecedented digital age. The digital economy is flourishing, the new technological revolution and industrial transformation is in the making, and countries are more interdependent than ever before. In the meantime, the mounting risks and challenges of data security across the world call for global solutions. What is pressing now is to develop a set of international rules on data security that reflect the will and respect the interests of all countries through broad-based participation.

To effectively respond to the challenges of data security, maintain global data and supply chain security, and promote the development and cooperation of digital economy, China has put forward the Global Initiative on Data Security and called for the following: States should take measures to prevent ICT activities that impair or steal important data of other States' critical infrastructure and jeopardize personal information through the uses of ICTs; States should oppose mass surveillance against other States with ICTs as a tool; States should not request domestic companies to store the data generated and obtained overseas in their own territory; ICT products and services providers should not install backdoors in their products and services.

This initiative is based on the established consensus of the international community and responds directly to emerging questions with a global solution, and hopefully it will provide a basis for international rules-making in this area. After the initiative was proposed, it has drawn extensive attention from the international community. Many countries believe that the initiative is very constructive and offers a solution to major data security issues. China keeps an open and inclusive mind to good suggestions from all sides, and stands ready to have meaningful exchanges with all parties at multilateral and regional platforms like the UN and G20. We believe that with the passage of time, this initiative will be endorsed and supported by more and more countries. China will work with all parties to jointly formulate universally accepted data and cybersecurity rules, forge a peaceful, secure, open and cooperative cyberspace, promote sound development of the digital economy and make contribution to the progress of humankind.

Mr Chair,

Due to the impact of the pandemic, this year's OEWG and GGE processes have lagged behind their original schedules. Thanks to Ambassador Lauber, Chair of OEWG, and Ambassador Patriota, Chair of GGE, for their able leadership and excellent organization of the Secretariat, informal discussions on relevant issues were successfully held through video platforms, which ensured the continuity of discussions. We expect that the two processes can be successfully concluded next year and submit substantive reports to the 75th Session of the General Assembly as scheduled.

Many countries are considering how to advance the discussion on information security under the framework of the UN after the two processes are concluded. We are pleased to note that the Russian delegation has submitted a draft resolution on convening a new OEWG with a five-year mandate. At the same time, we have also noted that some countries have put forward another proposal on "institutional dialogue". China believes that the two proposals have something in common at their core, which is to establish an inclusive mechanism at the UN to discuss and negotiate information security issues relevant to international security and end the current dual track discussions.

China always supports establishment of an inclusive and sustained information security process with universal participation under the auspices of the UN while upholding the centrality of the UN. For this reason, we cosponsored UN resolution [73/27](#) calling for the establishment of OEWG, the first information security process with universal participation in the history of the UN. For the same reason, we voted against resolution [73/266](#) on reconvening GGE, as the establishment of two parallel processes with similar mandates not only creates redundancy, but also incites division. After two years of discussions, more and more countries have come to agree with China's view that there should be only one process in the UN in which all countries can participate in discussions on an equal footing.

With regard to "institutional dialogue" in the future, China believes it should include the following elements:

First, it should firmly uphold the political consensus agreed upon, especially the 2015 GGE report. Unlike "Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects", discussions on information security in the UN do not start from scratch. The consensus agreed upon in the past should serve as a basis for future work.

Second, no matter what kind of meeting framework the discussion will take, the mandate of all meetings including review conference and annual meeting should include two parts. First is "looking backwards", that is to discuss the implementation of commitments by all parties. Second is "looking forward", that is to formulate new norms and rules in compliance with the evolving situation and technological development.

Third, the agenda and scope of discussion of “institutional dialogue” should keep pace with the times. With the development of digital technologies, data security issues bearing on international security have become increasingly prominent. China hopes that the new “institutional dialogue” can include data security in its mandate.

China supports the draft resolution proposed by the Russian delegation. At the same time, we hope the two countries that put forward the two proposals can step up communication and reach consensus on the follow-up mechanism. China is willing to take an active part in relevant discussions, and make due contributions to upholding the centrality of the UN in the field of international information security and promote the establishment of a multilateral and inclusive process on information security with universal participation.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

INTERVENCIÓN DE COLOMBIA
DEBATE TEMÁTICO
CLUSTER ARMAS NUCLEARES
PRIMERA COMISIÓN
75 PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS
NACIONES UNIDAS
Nueva York, octubre 2020

Señor Presidente:

El desarme y la no proliferación de armas de destrucción masiva son principios de la política exterior de Colombia y mandatos constitucionales. Por lo tanto, Colombia aboga por el desarme nuclear general y completo, vertical y horizontal, bajo estricta y efectiva verificación internacional.

Como Estado Parte del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear -TNP-, reafirmamos el total compromiso con este instrumento jurídico, piedra angular del régimen de desarme y la no proliferación nuclear, y con sus tres pilares fundamentales: el desarme; la no proliferación; y la promoción de los usos pacíficos de la energía nuclear, la ciencia y la tecnología nuclear.

Tenemos vigente un Acuerdo de Salvaguardias con el Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica, y un Protocolo Adicional. Subrayamos que el establecimiento de Salvaguardias es un compromiso jurídico establecido en el TNP y la importancia de su cumplimiento por los Estados Parte. Reconocemos al Organismo Internacional de Energía Atómica como la autoridad competente en materia de verificación nuclear.

Adicionalmente, como Estado Parte del Tratado de Tlatelolco, que creó en América Latina y el Caribe la primera zona densamente poblada del planeta libre de armas nucleares, consideramos que mantener nuestros territorios libres para siempre de armas nucleares constituye un aporte significativo para prevenir su proliferación y fomentar la consolidación de una paz permanente.

América Latina y el Caribe también fue declarada “Zona de Paz”. La experiencia y las buenas prácticas acumuladas por nuestra región son un referente político, jurídico e institucional para el desarme y la no proliferación nuclear.

Señor Presidente:

En el 2020 se conmemoró el septuagésimo quinto aniversario de las bombas atómicas de Hiroshima y Nagasaki. A las cuales les siguieron múltiples ensayos nucleares. La historia nos ha mostrado las catastróficas, dolorosas y prolongadas consecuencias humanitarias y medioambientales de cualquier utilización de armas nucleares. Por ello, es fundamental su eliminación total, siendo ésta la única garantía absoluta contra el empleo o la amenaza de empleo de dichas armas. Por lo tanto, las medidas eficaces de desarme nuclear tienen la más alta prioridad.

Este 2020 también marcó el quincuagésimo aniversario de la entrada en vigor del Tratado sobre la No Proliferación Nuclear -TNP- y el vigésimo quinto de su extensión indefinida. Destacamos su importancia y recordamos que el TNP se negoció considerando la devastación que una guerra nuclear infligiría a la humanidad entera y la consiguiente necesidad de hacer todo lo posible por evitar el peligro de semejante guerra y de adoptar medidas para salvaguardar la seguridad de los pueblos.

Compartimos la preocupación por la cualificación de las armas nucleares existentes, por el desarrollo de nuevos tipos de armas nucleares, por el incremento de los riesgos nucleares generados por las tecnologías emergentes, por la proliferación vertical y horizontal, y por la inclusión de nuevos tipos de armas nucleares en las doctrinas militares de algunos Estados.

Señor Presidente:

Creemos firmemente que en esta era de avances tecnológicos, los esfuerzos comunes de toda la comunidad internacional deben centrarse en la cooperación mutua para promover y alcanzar el logro de niveles más altos de desarrollo y prosperidad para todas nuestras sociedades.

En este sentido, formulamos votos para que la X Conferencia de Examen del Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear, aplazada para el 2021, sea una oportunidad para seguir ampliando el alcance de los usos pacíficos de la tecnología nuclear, de tal manera que siga brindando soluciones competitivas a problemas en áreas como la salud y la medicina, la agricultura, la sustentabilidad ambiental y la seguridad alimentaria. Todas ellas fundamentales para avanzar en el cumplimiento de los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible de Naciones Unidas.

Hacemos un llamado a todos los Estados a revitalizar el diálogo, a trabajar en la construcción de los consensos necesarios, guiados por el objetivo, la responsabilidad común e imperativo moral de liberar a la humanidad de la amenaza que representa la existencia misma de las armas nucleares.

Muchas gracias.

INTERVENCIÓN DE COLOMBIA
DEBATE TEMÁTICO
CLUSTER ARMAS CONVENCIONALES
PRIMERA COMISIÓN
75 PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE
NACIONES UNIDAS
Nueva York, octubre 2020

Señor Presidente:

La comunidad internacional ha alcanzado importantes avances en materia de seguridad, pero continúa enfrentando numerosos y graves desafíos derivados de la mutación y capacidad de adaptación de las organizaciones criminales y el mantenimiento de condiciones propias para su multiplicación y fortalecimiento.

En ese marco, el comercio y manufactura ilícita de armas pequeñas y ligeras, junto con el de municiones y explosivos, continúa siendo una preocupación y una amenaza contra la paz, la seguridad, el desarrollo sostenible y la estabilidad mundial, en la medida que grupos terroristas y de delincuencia organizada transnacional tienen acceso a estos elementos a un relativo “bajo” costo y “fácil” transporte.

Las dimensiones del problema demuestran que este es resultado de la conjugación de realidades nacionales con flujos y variables de nivel regional y global, por lo que es imprescindible continuar y fortalecer la articulación de acciones en estos diferentes niveles. En ese sentido, es oportuno fortalecer las alianzas con países con intereses comunes y la participación en modelos de seguridad y cooperación para combatir y mitigar este delito. Lo anterior, en consistencia con los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible, en particular el 16 relativo a Paz, justicia e instituciones fuertes.

Por ello, resaltamos la importancia del Programa de Acción para Prevenir, Combatir y Eliminar el Tráfico Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en Todos Sus Aspectos, y del Instrumento Internacional de Localización. Apoyamos los esfuerzos que conduzcan a su fortalecimiento, a la vez que destacamos la relevancia de la asistencia y cooperación internacional para su plena y efectiva implementación.

Colombia, como uno de los patrocinadores de la Resolución sobre *“El Comercio Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en todos sus aspectos”*, agradece a Japón la presentación del Proyecto y lo apoya plenamente. La Resolución busca seguir fortaleciendo los esfuerzos colectivos en la lucha contra este delito, así como la cooperación internacional en la materia. Colombia espera que cuente con un amplio apoyo y co-patrocinio.

Señor Presidente:

Los mecanismos de seguimiento del Programa de Acción nos permiten examinar su aplicación a nivel nacional, regional y global; revisar evoluciones, desafíos y oportunidades; y fortalecer la acción y el compromiso individual y colectivo con la prevención, combate y eliminación del tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras en todos sus aspectos.

Lamentamos que las circunstancias extraordinarias que hemos vivido este año hayan pospuesto la realización de la séptima Reunión Bienal de Estados.

Agradecemos los esfuerzos y consultas previas realizadas por el Embajador Lazarus Amayo, y expresamos nuestro apoyo a su sucesor.

Formulamos votos para que, aún bajo las actuales condiciones impuestas por la pandemia global del Covid-19, se continúen con vigor los esfuerzos colectivos a nivel internacional, regional y nacional orientados a fortalecer la cooperación internacional en la materia, así como los espacios de diálogo multilateral, como son: el *Programa de Acción para Prevenir, Combatir y Eliminar el Tráfico Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en Todos Sus Aspectos (UNPoA)*, el *Tratado de Comercio de Armas*, el *Protocolo de Armas de Fuego de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional* y, para el caso del sistema interamericano, la *Convención Interamericana Contra la Fabricación y el Tráfico Ilícitos de Armas de Fuego, Municiones y Explosivos y Otros Materiales Relacionados (CIFTA)*. Todos instrumentos centrales del régimen internacional en esta área.

Señor Presidente:

Colombia condena el uso de las minas antipersonal y de los artefactos explosivos improvisados que tantas víctimas y sufrimiento han causado en el mundo.

Colombia ha sido uno de los países con mayor afectación por el uso de minas antipersonal y artefactos explosivos improvisados, que en el país se realiza por parte de Grupos Armados Organizados Ilegales, cada vez más vinculados con el desarrollo y protección de economías ilícitas como el narcotráfico y la minería ilegal.

Colombia le otorga gran importancia a la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Empleo, Almacenamiento, Producción y Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción.

Desde la ratificación de la Convención en el año 2001, el Estado colombiano ha logrado desarrollar una fuerte institucionalidad y marco normativo alrededor de la Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal, que se ve reflejado en los importantes resultados alcanzados.

De los 705 municipios con sospecha de minas antipersonal en Colombia, han sido declarados libres de esta contaminación 407 municipios. Entre 2010 y el 31 de agosto de 2020, se registraron 314.568 personas beneficiarias de actividades de Educación en el Riesgo de Minas. Actualmente están en curso las contrataciones con recursos públicos de 10 comunidades étnicas y 6 asociaciones de sobrevivientes para llevar a cabo jornadas de Educación en el Riesgo de Minas en sus territorios, con enfoque diferencial.

Colombia agradece la comprensión de la comunidad internacional ante este problema de dimensiones humanitarias enormes, así como el apoyo político, técnico y financiero recibido de varios países, organismos internacionales, organizaciones no gubernamentales y otros actores privados. Apoyo dirigido a erradicar este flagelo y garantizar que nuestras comunidades afectadas puedan gozar del derecho al acceso libre, y sin miedo, a sus territorios. Igualmente, agradece los esfuerzos enfocados a la atención a las víctimas y a la educación en el riesgo de minas.

Sin embargo, los retos para liberar a Colombia de Minas Antipersonal y artefactos explosivos improvisados aún persiste, y se requieren mayores esfuerzos y tiempo para cumplir con el objetivo y el compromiso de lograr un país libre de minas antipersonal. Por ello, esperamos seguir contando con el apoyo político para la aprobación de la solicitud de extensión de la prórroga para cumplir con los compromisos establecidos en el Artículo 5 de la Convención, relacionados con la eliminación total de estos artefactos del territorio nacional. Solicitud que hemos presentado y que será considerada en la próxima Reunión de Estados Parte de la Convención, que se celebrará en Ginebra, del 16 al 20 de noviembre del presente año.

Colombia reitera su firme compromiso con seguir avanzando en la plena implementación de la Convención.

De otra parte, agradecemos a Sudán la presentación de la resolución sobre la implementación de la Convención, la cual apoyamos plenamente.

Finalmente, Señor Presidente, Colombia reconoce el impacto humanitario que tiene el uso de armas explosivas en zonas pobladas. Por ello, el año pasado suscribimos la Declaración Conjunta sobre este particular, pronunciada por Irlanda en nombre de varios Estados, y ahora expresamos nuestro respaldo a la recomendación del Secretario General a los Estados para que eviten su uso en zonas pobladas.

Muchas gracias.

INTERVENCIÓN DE COLOMBIA
DEBATE TEMÁTICO
OTRAS MEDIDAS DE DESARME Y SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONAL
PRIMERA COMISIÓN
75 PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE LAS
NACIONES UNIDAS
Nueva York, octubre 2020

Las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones (TICs) son un instrumento extraordinario para el desarrollo económico y social, pero sus usos maliciosos pueden representar también una amenaza a la convivencia social, a la paz y la seguridad internacional.

Las medidas de confinamiento por el Covid-19, nos condujeron a un mundo cada vez más interconectado y dependiente de las TICs. Con ello, también se hicieron más evidentes las vulnerabilidades, y aumentaron los ciberincidentes. Por eso actualmente, nos vemos abocados a abordar de manera colectiva, y con carácter urgente, el tema del comportamiento responsable de los Estados en el ciberespacio.

Sin embargo, por el momento no vemos la necesidad de iniciar negociaciones para un nuevo instrumento jurídicamente vinculante en la materia. Los principios generales y las disposiciones vigentes del derecho internacional, incluido el derecho internacional humanitario, el derecho penal internacional, el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, entre otros, son aplicables al ciberespacio.

Lo que sí resulta perentorio, es avanzar hacia el entendimiento común sobre la manera como aplica el derecho internacional al comportamiento responsable de los Estados en el ciberespacio; para lo cual debemos comenzar por la implementación de las recomendaciones consignadas en los informes de los Grupos de Expertos Gubernamentales (GGE) de 2013 y el 2015, adoptados por consenso por la Asamblea General, y fortalecer las medidas de fomento a la confianza en el ciberespacio.

Debemos cooperar y trabajar conjuntamente para cerrar la brecha digital, así como fortalecer las capacidades para la identificación y efectiva protección de las infraestructuras críticas, entre ellas las de los servicios médicos, que se han visto particularmente afectados durante esta pandemia.

Igualmente, Colombia considera indispensable trabajar de la mano con las múltiples partes interesadas (la sociedad civil, la academia y el sector privado), y contar con el apoyo de las organizaciones regionales.

En relación con el establecimiento de un diálogo institucional periódico con amplia participación, apoyamos y patrocinamos la propuesta de trabajar en un Programa de Acción para encaminar el futuro de las discusiones sobre las TICs y el ciberespacio en el marco de Naciones Unidas.

Continuaremos participando de manera constructiva en las discusiones del Grupo de Composición Abierta sobre información y comunicaciones en la esfera de la seguridad internacional. Agradecemos el liderazgo de su Presidente, el Embajador Jürg Lauber, por su esfuerzo para continuar las discusiones en medio de las restricciones generadas por el Coronavirus. Apoyamos la propuesta de convocar para marzo de 2021 la última sesión del Grupo, lo que nos permitirá consolidar el informe que se presentará a la Asamblea General.

Ahora resulta primordial concentrar nuestros esfuerzos en mantener un entorno digital libre, abierto, seguro, confiable, de acceso universal y pacífico. Un espacio que contribuya al logro de los propósitos de las Naciones Unidas.

(Segment - Machinerie du désarmement)
75^{ème} SESSION DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DES NATIONS UNES

*Objet : Multilinguisme et programme de formation
des Nations unies*

DÉCLARATION ÉCRITE PRÉSENTÉE PAR
LES GROUPES DES AMBASSADEURS FRANCOPHONES DE GENÈVE ET DE NEW YORK,
ORIGINAIRES DES PAYS MEMBRES ET OBSERVATEURS DE L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE
LA FRANCOPHONIE

1. La présente déclaration est prononcée au nom des Groupes des Ambassadeurs francophones de Genève et de New York, originaires des pays Membres et observateurs de l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie.
2. Monsieur le Président, nos pays souhaitent réaffirmer leur attachement profond aux règles élémentaires du multilatéralisme, parmi lesquelles le multilinguisme, facteur essentiel d'une communication harmonieuse entre les États membres de l'Organisation des Nations unies. Favorisant la tolérance, le multilinguisme assure également une participation effective et accrue de tous au processus de travail de l'Organisation, ainsi qu'une efficacité plus grande, de meilleurs résultats et une plus grande implication.
3. Nos pays sont attachés au respect du multilinguisme dans l'ensemble des enceintes de négociations et par l'ensemble des traités et conventions qui adoptent les 6 langues officielles de l'ONU dans leurs règlements intérieurs.
4. La crise actuelle de la Covid-19 a considérablement freiné notre activité et a parfois entraîné le report ou l'annulation de certaines réunions. Si nous nous réjouissons, dans certains cas, du maintien de réunions dans un format virtuel, nous tenions à rappeler que la tenue de telles réunions ne pouvait en aucun cas se faire au détriment du multilinguisme et au principe d'inclusivité garantissant la participation de l'ensemble des États parties sans discrimination liées à d'éventuelles difficultés de connexion ou au décalage horaire.
5. De nouveau cette année, en raison d'un problème récurrent de liquidités dû aux non-paiements par certains États de leurs contributions, exacerbé par les circonstances particulières que nous traversons, le choix a été fait dans le cadre de plusieurs conventions et traités d'organiser des réunions sans interprétation ou sans traduction. Nous regrettons ces choix, car ils ne permettent pas à l'ensemble des États de participer pleinement aux travaux. Nous appelons à une mobilisation générale afin de sauvegarder le multilinguisme et le climat inclusif qui doit caractériser les travaux de ces conventions.
6. Monsieur le Président, nos pays souhaitent réaffirmer leur vif intérêt pour la décision prise d'instituer un programme de bourses d'études sur le désarmement, décision figurant au paragraphe 108 du Document final de la dixième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée Générale, la première consacrée au désarmement.
7. Depuis sa mise en place, il y a 40 ans, le programme a permis de former un grand nombre de fonctionnaires d'États membres, dont beaucoup occupent maintenant, au sein de l'administration publique de leur pays, des postes de responsabilité clés dans le domaine du désarmement.
8. Ce programme essentiel est une réalisation commune importante de cette Première Commission et voit son cursus s'enrichir chaque année. Le programme de formation et la qualité des étudiants sélectionnés par les États en font un rendez-vous incontournable du désarmement.
9. Nous aimerions voir ce programme bénéficier de l'apport du multilinguisme, afin que chaque pays puisse voir ses fonctionnaires d'États avoir le même accès à cet important programme de bourse d'études sur le désarmement. Comme rappelé dans la résolution [A/RES/73/73](#), l'assistance offerte par le programme aux États membres des Nations unies permet aux fonctionnaires de nombreux pays, et notamment les pays en développement, de mieux suivre les délibérations et négociations, tant bilatérales que multilatérales, en

cours sur le désarmement. Cette assistance sera d'autant plus utile si elle bénéficie du multilinguisme, garant d'un multilatéralisme efficace.

10. Enfin, nos pays sont convaincus que cette plus grande accessibilité du programme de formation permettra de favoriser le partenariat et la coopération entre les États et les organismes onusiens présentés à l'occasion de ce programme d'étude.
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**INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE
“ARMAS NUCLEARES”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK. OCTUBRE DE 2020.**

Señor Presidente:

Reiteramos que la eliminación total de las armas nucleares es y debe continuar siendo la mayor prioridad en la esfera del desarme.

A 75 años de los criminales bombardeos a Hiroshima y Nagasaki, existen aproximadamente 13 400 armas nucleares, de las cuales casi mil 800 están en alerta operacional y 3 mil 720 desplegadas, más de la mitad de estas pertenecientes a Estados Unidos.

El logro del objetivo de un mundo libre de armas nucleares se dificulta cuando el mismo perpetrador: Estados Unidos, único Estado que ha usado en dos ocasiones el arma nuclear, líder mundial en la realización de ensayos nucleares, y país que más invierte en dichas armas, viola el espíritu y la letra del Tratado sobre la Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares (CTBT) y del Tratado sobre la No Proliferación, al tiempo que se retira e incumple con otros acuerdos internacionales sobre desarme y limitación de armamentos, como el Tratado de Fuerzas Nucleares de Alcance Intermedio y el Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto con Irán.

Resulta inaceptable e ilegal la modernización de los arsenales nucleares existentes, el desarrollo de nuevos sistemas de armas nucleares, y el fortalecimiento del papel de las armas nucleares en las doctrinas de defensa y seguridad de determinados Estados poseedores.

Reiteramos una vez más, nuestra profunda preocupación por la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear de EE.UU, que reduce el umbral para la consideración de la utilización de las armas nucleares, incluso en respuesta a las llamadas “amenazas estratégicas no nucleares” y posibilita la reanudación de los ensayos nucleares por explosión “para la seguridad y efectividad del arsenal nuclear de Estados Unidos”. Cuba rechaza las posturas militares sustentadas en la disuasión nuclear. Son injustificables e inmorales.

Instamos a los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares a que muestren voluntad política, rectifiquen sus posturas y permitan a la Conferencia Examen del Tratado sobre la No Proliferación (TNP) adoptar recomendaciones sustantivas concretas para avanzar hacia el desarme nuclear.

Reiteramos que la única manera efectiva de evitar el terrible impacto de esas armas, es su eliminación total, de forma verificable, transparente e irreversible y que, mientras tanto, los Estados poseedores deben ofrecer garantías universales, jurídicamente vinculantes, incondicionales y no discriminatorias de que no usarán ni amenazarán con usar armas nucleares contra aquellos Estados que no las poseen, bajo ninguna circunstancia.

Reiteramos además, la importancia de la aplicación de la resolución sobre el Oriente Medio, aprobada en la Conferencia de Examen y Revisión del Tratado en 1995 y apoyamos la Conferencia sobre el establecimiento de una zona libre de armas nucleares y otras armas de destrucción en masa en el Medio Oriente.

Reiteramos el llamado a ratificar el Tratado sobre la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares. Cuba se enorgullece de ser el quinto Estado en haber ratificado este instrumento, de integrar la primera Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares en un área densamente poblada del planeta, de pertenecer a la primera región del mundo en proclamarse como Zona de Paz y de ser miembro activo del Movimiento de Países No Alineados, promotor de la conmemoración del “Día Internacional para la Eliminación Total de las Armas Nucleares”.

Seguiremos oponiéndonos a la imposición de medidas y sanciones coercitivas unilaterales, que limitan el derecho legítimo de todos los Estados a desarrollar la investigación, la producción y el uso de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos. El bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por EE.UU a Cuba es un ejemplo de ello.

Muchas Gracias

**INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE
“OTRAS ARMAS DE DESTRUCCIÓN EN MASA”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK,
OCTUBRE DE 2020.**

Señor Presidente:

Cuba reitera su apoyo a la total y completa prohibición y eliminación, de manera transparente, verificable e irreversible, de todas las armas de destrucción en masa; única garantía absoluta para impedir la adquisición y el uso de esas armas, incluso por terroristas.

Cuba no posee, ni tiene intención de poseer, ningún tipo de arma de destrucción en masa y rechaza firmemente el empleo de esas armas por cualquier actor y en cualquier circunstancia.

Nuestro país, Estado Parte de las Convenciones sobre Armas Químicas y sobre Armas Biológicas y Toxínicas, cumple rigurosamente con sus disposiciones.

Reiteramos el respaldo pleno de Cuba a los regímenes multilaterales de prohibición de armas de destrucción en masa existentes.

Rechazamos también los enfoques selectivos, parcializados y políticamente motivados en la aplicación de la Convención y la creación de mecanismos y procedimientos al margen de su alcance, que modifican el mandato técnico de la Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas (OPAQ).

Es inadmisibles la acusación a un Estado Parte sin pruebas verificadas, sin las necesarias investigaciones profesionales y conclusiones basadas en la experiencia y conocimientos técnicos de la OPAQ.

Para alcanzar los objetivos y principios de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas, urge eliminar todas las categorías de armas químicas. Llamamos a Estados Unidos, único Estado poseedor de este tipo de armas que no ha finalizado la destrucción de sus arsenales declarados, a completar sin más dilación ese proceso, bajo verificación internacional.

La implementación plena, efectiva y no discriminatoria del artículo XI de la Convención continúa siendo uno de los temas pendientes. No se concibe, ni es aceptable que Estados Unidos limite, restrinja e incluso prohíba, en muchos casos, el libre intercambio de sustancias químicas, equipos e información científica y técnica en la esfera de la química con fines pacíficos entre Cuba y otros Estados Partes de la Convención; que constituye, sin excepción, un derecho de todos.

Señor Presidente:

La única manera realmente efectiva y sostenible de fortalecer la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas y de garantizar su implementación integral y balanceada, es a través de la adopción de un Protocolo jurídicamente vinculante que las prohíba e incluya un mecanismo de verificación. De no haber sido por la férrea oposición de Estados Unidos en el 2001, hoy contaríamos con ese instrumento.

La aplicación plena, efectiva y no discriminatoria del Artículo X de la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas, referido a la cooperación internacional con fines pacíficos, también continúa siendo una tarea pendiente, urgente y prioritaria.

Cuba rechaza y demanda la supresión inmediata de las limitaciones y restricciones que impiden el más amplio intercambio, en particular para los países en desarrollo, de los materiales, equipos y tecnología para actividades químicas y biológicas con fines pacíficos, consistente con las disposiciones de las convenciones internacionales concernidas. Un claro ejemplo de ello es el bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por EE.UU. contra Cuba.

Muchas gracias

INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE “ESPACIO ULTRATERRESTRE”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK, OCTUBRE DE 2020.

Señor Presidente:

La amenaza de una carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre, el continuo desarrollo y perfeccionamiento del armamento espacial y la presencia de material bélico en el espacio, atentan contra la realización de las aspiraciones de paz de los pueblos, en particular de los países más pequeños, de beneficiarse del potencial de las tecnologías espaciales para la implementación de Agenda 2030.

Reiteramos nuestro rechazo a la creación del Comando Espacial de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos y la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre, lo que constituye una grave amenaza a la seguridad de todos y al futuro de la humanidad.

Abogamos por el legítimo derecho de todos los Estados a acceder al espacio ultraterrestre en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación; y a beneficiarse de la cooperación en materia de capacitación y transferencia de aplicaciones y tecnología espaciales.

Resulta muy preocupante la utilización de las tecnologías espaciales en detrimento de la seguridad de las naciones, incluida la nutrida red de satélites espías existente, que además de ser incompatible con la paz y el desarrollo, continúa saturando la órbita geostacionaria con gran cantidad de desechos espaciales.

Señor Presidente:

Debemos impedir a tiempo que el espacio ultraterrestre se convierta en un nuevo teatro de operaciones militares. Por tal razón, resulta necesario y urgente el fortalecimiento del régimen jurídico aplicable al espacio ultraterrestre, con la adopción de un tratado multilateral para la prevención y prohibición del emplazamiento de armas en el espacio. En nuestra opinión, ese instrumento debe prohibir también el uso o la amenaza de uso de la fuerza contra satélites u otro tipo de objetos espaciales.

Reiteramos una vez más, que el proyecto de tratado presentado por Rusia y China en la Conferencia de Desarme es una buena base para las negociaciones de un instrumento internacional jurídicamente vinculante.

Lamentamos que Estados Unidos haya bloqueado el consenso en la adopción del informe final del Grupo de Expertos, establecido por la Asamblea General, para presentar recomendaciones sobre los elementos sustantivos de un instrumento legalmente vinculante para la prevención y prohibición de la carrera de armamentos en el espacio. Resulta desalentadora su falta de voluntad política y de compromiso con los tratados multilaterales que ha suscrito sobre la exploración y uso pacífico del espacio exterior.

Señor Presidente:

Reconocemos el valor práctico de las medidas voluntarias de transparencia y fomento de la confianza en el espacio ultraterrestre. Cuba respalda y promueve la política de no primer emplazamiento de armas de ningún tipo en ese medio. Sin embargo, estas medidas, no sustituyen un instrumento legalmente vinculante.

Por último, alentamos a preservar el espacio ultraterrestre como patrimonio común de la humanidad y a implementar los compromisos políticos en consonancia con la Agenda 2030 para el Desarrollo Sostenible.

Muchas Gracias

**INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE
“ARMAS CONVENCIONALES”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK. OCTUBRE DE 2020.**

Señor Presidente:

Resulta lamentable la tendencia al incremento de los gastos militares, que en el último año alcanzó, la cifra record de 1,9 millones de millones de dólares, aumentando en 3,6%, en relación con 2018. Esos recursos deberían destinarse al desarrollo sostenible, a la erradicación de la pobreza, el hambre y el acceso a servicios básicos agua y saneamiento.

Los principales productores continuaron desarrollando armas convencionales cada vez más estratégicas, sofisticadas y mortíferas, profundizando el marcado desequilibrio entre la producción, posesión y comercio de esas armas y atentando contra la estabilidad, la paz y la seguridad internacionales.

Algunos de estos productores continúan transfiriéndolas a actores no estatales no autorizados y desviándolas al mercado ilícito. Al propio tiempo, intentan obstaculizar, incluso a través de la normativa internacional, que los países en desarrollo adquieran y empleen ciertas armas convencionales como las armas pequeñas y ligeras, con fines de legítima defensa.

En ese sentido, reiteramos nuestro compromiso con la implementación del Programa de Acción de las Naciones Unidas para prevenir, combatir y eliminar el tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras en todos sus aspectos (PoA) y los Documentos Finales de sus Conferencias de Examen, en los que se reconoce el derecho de los Estados a adquirir y poseer armas para su legítima defensa y necesidades de seguridad. Urge poner fin a las transferencias ilegales de estas armas e impedir los desvíos a actores no estatales no autorizados, principal fuente del tráfico ilícito.

Los principales productores de armas, en particular Estados Unidos, deben mostrar voluntad política y dejar de obstruir la adopción de una prohibición legalmente vinculante de las transferencias de armas a actores no estatales no autorizados.

Señor Presidente:

Cuba mantiene serias preocupaciones con respecto del Tratado sobre Comercio de Armas. Este confiere privilegios a los Estados exportadores de armas convencionales, en detrimento de los intereses legítimos de defensa y seguridad del resto de los Estados.

El Tratado establece además parámetros subjetivos, fácilmente manipulables, para la aprobación y denegación de transferencias de armas a los Estados miembros e, injustificablemente, no prohibió las transferencias a la principal fuente de tráfico ilícito de armas: los actores no estatales no autorizados.

Cuba reitera que, para erradicar el tráfico ilícito, hay que enfrentar las profundas causas socioeconómicas que lo generan y brindar cooperación internacional y asistencia a los Estados que lo soliciten, de acuerdo a sus necesidades.

Señor Presidente:

Concedemos alta prioridad a la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales y cumplimos estrictamente con sus disposiciones y con los Protocolos Anexos de la Convención de los que somos Estado Parte.

Abogamos por la adopción, lo antes posible, de un Protocolo que prohíba las armas letales autónomas, antes de que comiencen a producirse a gran escala. Deben establecerse, además, regulaciones para el uso de las armas con cierta autonomía, en particular de los drones militares de ataque, que están provocando un elevado número de víctimas civiles. Este tipo de armas son incompatibles totalmente con el Derecho Internacional Humanitario.

Muchas gracias

**INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE
“OTRAS MEDIDAS DE DESARME Y SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONAL”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.
NUEVA YORK, OCTUBRE DE 2020.**

Señor Presidente:

Compartimos el objetivo del desarme general y completo, en particular el desarme nuclear, como la máxima prioridad en esta esfera. Llamamos a la implementación de otras medidas de desarme y seguridad internacionales.

Es necesario un compromiso renovado para avanzar en iniciativas legalmente vinculantes, multilateralmente acordadas, para prohibir la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre, del ciberespacio y las armas letales autónomas; así como regular los drones militares de ataque.

Rechazamos la modernización de los arsenales nucleares, bajo el pretexto de conceptos o doctrinas militares de defensa y seguridad, que continúan amenazando a la humanidad; mientras algunos países poseedores, como Estados Unidos, desconocen deliberadamente los compromisos internacionales en materia de desarme y control de armamentos.

Exijamos a los mayores países productores de armas que antepongan la seguridad y el bienestar de sus ciudadanos a los intereses de los complejos militares industriales. Las cuantiosas sumas destinadas a los presupuestos militares, junto con los progresos científicos y tecnológicos empleados en las armas, deben reducirse y reorientarse hacia la implementación de la Agenda 2030.

Señor Presidente:

Resulta imperativo que los foros y las negociaciones internacionales sobre desarme y limitación de armamentos, tengan plenamente en cuenta las normas ambientales pertinentes y que, en la aplicación de los acuerdos alcanzados, se respete la normativa internacional sobre cambio climático.

Debemos preservar el multilateralismo como principio básico de las negociaciones en materia de desarme y control de armamentos.

Lamentamos que Estados Unidos, uno de los principales países contaminantes y de los mayores productores de armas, no solo no tenga en cuenta la observancia de las normas medioambientales, sino que se retire del Acuerdo de París y amenace el frágil equilibrio de las negociaciones climáticas.

Respaldamos plenamente las labores del Grupo de Composición Abierta de la Asamblea General sobre las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones. Este ha sido un proceso histórico donde los Estados Miembros han tenido la oportunidad por vez primera, de discutir sobre el tema de forma transparente e inclusiva. Respaldamos la continuidad de las labores en este formato.

Reiteramos nuestra gran preocupación por la Estrategia Cibernética del Departamento de Defensa de Estados Unidos, que desde 2018, autorizara el uso de armas cibernéticas ofensivas y operaciones ciberoofensivas, incluso la posibilidad de realizar ataques cibernéticos preventivos para disuadir a sus adversarios. Rechazamos estas doctrinas agresivas, guerrerista y amenazantes, que consideran el uso de la fuerza como una respuesta legítima a un ataque cibernético.

Reiteramos que el uso hostil de las telecomunicaciones, con el propósito declarado o encubierto, de subvertir el ordenamiento jurídico y político de los Estados, como el establecimiento de la Fuerza de Tarea de Internet para Cuba, es una violación de las normas internacionalmente acordadas en esta materia.

Como promedio semanal en 2020, se han transmitido de forma ilegal desde el territorio de Estados Unidos hacia Cuba, 2136 horas a través de 22 frecuencias.

De igual forma, exigimos el fin inmediato del bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por EE.UU. contra Cuba que limita el acceso, uso y disfrute de las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones para el bienestar de su población.

Muchas gracias

**INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO
SOBRE "DESARME Y SEGURIDAD REGIONAL". PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK.
OCTUBRE DE 2020.**

Señor Presidente:

Reiteramos nuestro compromiso con el multilateralismo, como principio básico de las negociaciones en materia de desarme y control de armamentos. Al mismo tiempo, otorgamos gran importancia a las iniciativas regionales y subregionales en esa esfera.

Al pertenecer a la primera área densamente poblada en el mundo declarada como Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares, Cuba reconoce que el establecimiento de zonas libres de estas armas son una contribución eficaz al mantenimiento de la paz y la seguridad regional y mundial, fortalecen el régimen de no proliferación nuclear y contribuyen a la consecución del objetivo del desarme nuclear.

Hacemos un llamado a las potencias nucleares para que actúen bajo las responsabilidades que les compete, respeten el estatuto de las Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares y retiren de inmediato sus reservas y declaraciones interpretativas a los Tratados que establecen zonas desnuclearizadas.

Estados Unidos es el único estado poseedor que no ha ratificado los Protocolos del Tratado de Rarotonga, ni los Protocolos I y II de Pelidaba y mantiene declaraciones interpretativas a los Protocolos Adicionales I y II del Tratado de Tlatelolco.

Apoyamos decididamente el establecimiento de Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares en diferentes países o regiones del mundo. En este sentido, reiteramos la importancia de la aplicación de la resolución sobre el Oriente Medio, aprobada en la Conferencia de Examen y Revisión del Tratado en 1995, con el fin de promover y garantizar la paz y la estabilidad a nivel regional e internacional. Apoyamos, además, la decisión 73/546 de la Asamblea General y la Conferencia sobre el establecimiento de una zona libre de armas nucleares y otras armas de destrucción en masa en el Medio Oriente.

Expresamos profunda preocupación por las graves consecuencias de la retirada unilateral de Estados Unidos del Acuerdo Nuclear con Irán para la estabilidad y la seguridad en el Medio Oriente.

América Latina y el Caribe, fue la primera área densamente poblada en el mundo que se declaró como Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares, por medio del Tratado para la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares en América Latina y el Caribe (Tratado de Tlatelolco). Estamos convencidos de que el establecimiento de Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares reconocidas internacionalmente, fortalece la paz y la seguridad internacionales, así como el régimen de no proliferación y constituye una contribución importante para el logro del desarme nuclear.

Señor Presidente:

Hoy nos enfrentamos a múltiples amenazas, pero la política del actual gobierno de los Estados Unidos es la principal amenaza a la paz, la seguridad y la cooperación entre los países de América Latina y el Caribe. En momentos en que nos enfrentamos al reto global que impone la COVID-19, intentan avanzar sus intereses de dominación, políticas unilaterales e injerencistas que buscan desestabilizar, atizar y promover conflictos.

Continuaremos exigiendo el respeto al Derecho Internacional, a la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y a la Proclama de América Latina y el Caribe como Zona de Paz; así como el apego al multilateralismo en las negociaciones de desarme, incluida la preservación y fortalecimiento de su maquinaria.

Muchas gracias.

INTERVENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. DEBATE TEMÁTICO SOBRE “MAQUINARIA DE DESARME”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK. OCTUBRE DE 2020.

Señor Presidente:

Nuestro país concede gran importancia a la promoción del multilateralismo como principio básico de las negociaciones en materia de desarme y no proliferación, como el único enfoque sostenible para abordar estas cuestiones. Reafirmamos nuestro apoyo al papel central de Naciones Unidas, en particular de su maquinaria de desarme.

Compartimos la profunda preocupación por la erosión de la arquitectura del desarme y sus graves consecuencias. Subrayamos la importancia de preservar los acuerdos existentes sobre el desarme y la regulación de los armamentos, que son resultado de la cooperación internacional y las negociaciones multilaterales, en respuesta a los desafíos que enfrenta la humanidad.

Rechazamos la decisión del gobierno estadounidense de retirarse del Acuerdo Nuclear con Irán y del Tratado sobre Misiles de Alcance Corto e Intermedio, acciones unilaterales de graves consecuencias para la estabilidad y la seguridad internacionales. Lo instamos a renovar el Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas con Rusia (START). Nos oponemos a los intentos deliberados de debilitar y poner fin a las discusiones multilaterales sobre desarme.

Señor Presidente:

Mantenemos nuestra preocupación sobre la creciente proliferación de grupos de expertos de composición limitada que se establecen para examinar temas de alta relevancia.

Cuba exige una aplicación estricta y justa del principio de representación geográfica equitativa, incluso dentro de las propias regiones, en la composición de cualquier Grupo de Expertos Gubernamentales (GGE) establecido en el campo del desarme y la seguridad internacional.

Señor Presidente:

Reiteramos la importancia de que la Conferencia de Desarme acuerde, sin más demora, un programa de trabajo amplio, integral y balanceado, que permita salir del estancamiento que afecta a este órgano y avanzar en las negociaciones de diversos temas de su agenda, en cumplimiento de su mandato.

La falta de voluntad política de algunos de sus Estados miembros, en particular en materia de desarme nuclear, es la causa del estancamiento de la Conferencia. Llamamos a respetar sus métodos de trabajo y reglas de procedimiento acordados y a rechazar la politización de sus trabajos.

Aprovechemos el impulso dado por la adopción del Tratado sobre la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares, para retomar las negociaciones en el marco de la Conferencia de Desarme.

Este foro multilateral está preparado para negociar varios temas simultáneamente, incluyendo un tratado que prohíba la carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre y otro que brinde garantías de seguridad efectivas para los Estados que, como Cuba, no son poseedores de armas nucleares.

Alentamos a que la Comisión de Desarme pueda alcanzar recomendaciones sustantivas en los temas de su Agenda durante este ciclo, en particular en materia de desarme nuclear.

Tenemos la responsabilidad de “preservar a las generaciones venideras del flagelo de la guerra”, salvar el planeta y “crear condiciones bajo las cuales puedan mantenerse la justicia y el respeto a las obligaciones emanadas de los tratados y del Derecho Internacional”.

Muchas gracias

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON
“NUCLEAR WEAPONS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK, OCTOBER 2020.**

Mr. Chairman,

We reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is and must continue to be the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

Seventy-five years after the criminal bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there are approximately 13,400 nuclear weapons, out of which almost 1,800 are on operational alert and 3,720 are deployed, more than half of those weapons belong to the United States.

Achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons becomes more difficult when the same perpetrator of the atomic bombings: the United States, the only State that has used the nuclear weapon twice, the world leader in carrying out nuclear tests, and the country that invests the most in such weapons, violates the spirit and the letter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, while withdrawing from and failing to comply with other international agreements on disarmament and arms control, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran.

The modernization of existing nuclear arsenals, the development of modern nuclear weapons systems, and the strengthening of the role of nuclear weapons in the defense and security doctrines of certain nuclear weapons states is unacceptable and illegal.

We reiterate once again our deep concern over the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, which lowers the threshold for consideration of the use of nuclear weapons, even in response to so-called “non-nuclear strategic threats” and opens the way for the resumption of nuclear test explosions “for the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear stockpile”. Cuba rejects military posturing based on nuclear deterrence. They are unjustifiable and immoral.

We urge nuclear-weapon States to show political will, redress their positions and allow the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference to adopt concrete substantive recommendations to move towards nuclear disarmament.

We reiterate that the only effective way to avoid the gruesome impact of these weapons is their total elimination, in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner, and that, in the meantime, nuclear-weapon States should provide universal, legally binding, unconditional and non-discriminatory assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States that former will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the latter under any circumstances.

We also reiterate the importance of the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty, and support the Conference on the establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East.

We reiterate the call for the ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Cuba is proud to be the fifth State to have ratified this instrument, to be part of the first Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in a densely populated area of the planet, to belong to the first region of the world to be proclaimed a Zone of Peace and to be an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a promoter of the commemoration of the “International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons”.

We will continue to oppose the imposition of unilateral coercive measures and sanctions, which limits the legitimate right of all States to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the US on Cuba is an example of this.

Thank you.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON “OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK, OCTOBER 2020.

Mr. Chairman:

Cuba reiterates its support for the total and complete prohibition and elimination, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, of all weapons of mass destruction; the only absolute assurance to prevent the acquisition and use of these weapons, including by terrorists.

Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to possess, any type of weapon of mass destruction and firmly rejects the use of such weapons by any actor and under any circumstances.

Our country, a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, strictly complies with their provisions.

We reiterate Cuba's full support for the existing multilateral regimes on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

We also reject the selective, biased and politically motivated approaches to the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the creation of mechanisms and procedures outside its scope, which modify the technical mandate of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

It is inadmissible to accuse a State Party without verified evidence, without the necessary professional investigations and conclusions based on the OPCW's experience and expertise.

In order to achieve the objectives and principles of the Chemical Weapons Convention, there is an urgent need to eliminate all categories of chemical weapons. We call upon the United States, the only possessor of such weapons that has not completed the destruction of its declared stockpiles, to complete this process without further delay, under international verification.

The full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article 11 of the Convention remains a pending issue. It is impossible to conceive, nor is it acceptable that the United States limits, restricts or even prohibits, in many cases, the free exchange of chemical substances, equipment and scientific and technical information in the field of chemistry for peaceful purposes between Cuba and other States Parties to the Convention; which is, without exception, a right of all.

Mr. Chairman,

The only truly effective and sustainable way to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and ensure its comprehensive and balanced implementation is through the adoption of a legally binding instrument that prohibits them and includes a verification mechanism. Had it not been for the fierce opposition of the United States in 2001, we would have had such an instrument today.

The full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article 10 of the Biological Weapons Convention, relative to international cooperation for peaceful purposes, also continues to be a pending, urgent and priority task.

Cuba rejects and demands the immediate elimination of the limitations and restrictions that prevent the broadest exchange, particularly for developing countries, of materials, equipment and technology for chemical and biological activities for peaceful purposes, consistent with the provisions of the international conventions concerned. A clear example of this is the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba.

Thank you.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON “OUTER SPACE”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK, OCTOBER 2020

Mr. Chairman,

The threat of an arms race in outer space, the continuous development and improvement of space weapons and the presence of war material in space undermine the realization of the peaceful aspirations of peoples, particularly the smallest countries, to benefit from the potential of space technologies for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

We reiterate our rejection to the creation of the U.S. Armed Forces Space Command and the militarization of outer space, which constitutes a serious threat to the security of all and to the future of humanity.

We advocate the legitimate right of all States to have access to outer space on equal conditions and without discrimination; and to benefit from cooperation in terms of training and transfer of space applications and technology.

The use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations is a matter of serious concern, including the existing large network of spy satellites, which, besides being incompatible with peace and development, continues to saturate the geostationary orbit with large amounts of space debris.

Mr. Chairman,

We must prevent outer space from becoming a new theater of military operations on time. For that reason, it is necessary and urgent to strengthen the legal regime applicable to outer space by adopting a multilateral treaty on the prevention and prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space. In our view, that instrument should also prohibit the use or threat of use of force against satellites or other types of space objects.

We once again reiterate that the draft treaty presented by Russia and China in the Conference on Disarmament is a good basis for the negotiations on a legally binding international instrument.

We regret that the United States blocked consensus in the adoption of the final report of the Group of Experts, established by the General Assembly, to present recommendations on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument for the prevention and prohibition of the arms race in space. Its lack of political will and commitment to the multilateral treaties it has signed on the peaceful exploration and use of outer space are discouraging.

Mr. Chairman,

We recognize the practical value of voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space. In fact, Cuba supports and promotes the policy of no first placement of weapons of any kind in outer space. These measures, however, do not replace a legally binding instrument.

Finally, we encourage the preservation of outer space as the common heritage of mankind and the implementation of political commitments in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

Thank you.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON “CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK. OCTOBER 2020

Mr. Chairman,

It is regrettable the upward trend in military expenditures, which last year for the first time hit a record high of \$1.9 trillion, increasing by 3.6 percent compared to 2018. Those resources should be devoted to sustainable development, access to basic water and sanitation services and eradication of poverty and hunger.

Major manufacturers continued to develop increasingly strategic, sophisticated and deadly conventional weapons, deepening the marked imbalance in the production, possession and trade in these weapons and threatening international stability, peace and security.

Certain manufacturers of these weapons continue to transfer them to unauthorized non-State actors and divert them to the illicit market. At the same time, they try to hinder, including through international regulations, the acquisition and use by developing countries of certain conventional weapons, such as small arms and light weapons for self-defense purposes.

In this regard, we reiterate our commitment to implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the outcome documents of its Review Conferences, which recognize the right of States to acquire and possess weapons for their self-defense and security needs. There is an urgent need to put an end to illegal transfer of these weapons and to prevent diversions to unauthorized non-State actors, the main source of illicit trafficking.

Leading arms manufacturers, particularly the United States, must show political will and stop obstructing the adoption of a legally binding ban on arms transfers to unauthorized non-State actors.

Mr. Chairman,

Cuba remains deeply concerned about the Arms Trade Treaty. This Treaty favors the States that export conventional weapons, to the detriment of the legitimate interests of defense and security of the rest of the States.

The Treaty also establishes subjective and easily manipulated parameters for the approval and denial of transfers of arms to Member States and, unjustifiably, did not prohibit transfers to the main source of illicit trafficking: the unauthorized non-State actors.

Cuba reiterates that, in order to eradicate illicit trafficking, it is necessary to address and face the deep socio-economic causes generating it and provide international cooperation and assistance to States that request it, in accordance with their needs.

Mr. Chairman,

We attach high priority to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and strictly abide by its provisions and by the Protocols annexed to the Convention to which we are a State Party.

We favor the adoption, as soon as possible, of a Protocol banning lethal autonomous weapons even before they are manufactured on a large scale. In addition, regulations for the use of weapons with certain autonomous capabilities must be established, in particular military combat drones, which are causing a high number of civilian casualties. This kind of weapons is totally incompatible with international humanitarian law.

Thank you.

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON “OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK, OCTOBER 2020

Mr. Chairman,

We share the goal of general and complete disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, as the highest priority in this area. We call for the implementation of other disarmament and international security measures.

A renewed commitment is needed to make progress in multilaterally agreed, legally binding initiatives, to prohibit the militarization of outer space, cyberspace and lethal autonomous weapons; as well as to regulate military combat drones.

We reject the modernization of nuclear arsenals, under the pretext of military defense and security concepts or doctrines which continue to threaten humanity; while some nuclear States, such as the United States, deliberately disregard international commitments on disarmament and arms control.

Let us demand that the largest weapon-manufacturing countries put the safety and well-being of their citizens before the interests of military industrial complexes. The large amounts of money earmarked to military budgets, along with scientific and technological advances used in weapons, must be reduced and redirected towards the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Mr. Chairman,

It is imperative that international forums and negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation fully take into account the relevant environmental regulations and that, in the implementation of the agreements reached, international regulations on climate change are respected.

We must preserve multilateralism as the basic principle of negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

We regret that the United States, one of the most polluting countries and one of the largest weapon manufacturers, not only disregards the observance of environmental norms, but also withdraws from the Paris Agreement and threatens the fragile balance of climate negotiations.

We fully support the work of the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on information and communications technologies. This has been a historic process where Member States have had for the first time the opportunity to discuss this topic in a transparent and inclusive manner. We support the continuity of the work in this format.

We reiterate our great concern about the United States Department of Defense Cyber Strategy, which since 2018, authorizes the use of offensive cyber weapons and cyber-offensive operations, including the possibility of launching preventive cyber-attacks to deter adversaries. We reject these aggressive, warmongering and threatening doctrines, which consider the use of force as a legitimate response to a cyber-attack.

We reiterate that the hostile use of telecommunications, with the declared or covert purpose of subverting the legal and political order of States, such as the establishment of the Cuba Internet Task Force, is a violation of internationally agreed norms in this matter.

As a weekly average in 2020, 2,136 hours have been illegally broadcasted from the territory of the United States to Cuba through 22 frequencies.

Likewise, we demand the immediate lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States against Cuba, which limits access to and the use and enjoyment of information and communications technologies for the well-being of its population.

Thank you.

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON
“DISARMAMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK.
OCTOBER 2020.**

Mr. Chairman,

We reiterate our commitment to multilateralism as a basic principle of the negotiations on disarmament and arms control. At the same time, we attach great importance to regional and subregional initiatives in this field.

While being a part of the first densely populated area in the world to be declared as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Cuba recognizes that the establishment of zones free of such weapons is an effective contribution to the maintenance of regional

and global peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes to achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament.

We call on the nuclear powers to act under their responsibilities, to respect the statute of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and to immediately withdraw their reservations and interpretative declarations to the Treaties establishing nuclear-free zones.

The United States is the only nuclear-weapon state that has not ratified the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, or the protocols I and II to the Treaty of Pelidaba and maintains interpretative declarations to the Additional Protocols I and II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

We firmly support the establishment of Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones in various countries or regions of the world. In this connection, we reiterate the importance of the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty, in order to promote and ensure peace and stability at the regional and international levels. We further support decision 73/546 of the General Assembly and the Conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

We express deep concern over the serious repercussions of the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the Nuclear Deal with Iran for stability and security in the Middle East.

Latin America and the Caribbean, was the first densely populated area in the world to be declared as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco). We are convinced that the establishment of internationally recognized Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones strengthens international peace and security as well as the non-proliferation regime and constitutes a significant contribution to the achievement of nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

Today we face manifold threats, but the policy of the current administration of the United States is the main threat to peace, security and cooperation among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. At a time when we face the global challenge posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, they are trying to advance their interests of domination, unilateral and interfering policies, that seek to destabilize, spark off, and promote conflicts.

We will continue to demand respect for International Law, the United Nations Charter and the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, as well as adherence to multilateralism in disarmament negotiations, including the preservation and strengthening of its machinery.

Thank you very much.

**STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC DEBATE ON
“DISARMAMENT MACHINERY”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK. OCTOBER 2020.**

Mr. Chair,

Our country attaches paramount importance to the promotion of multilateralism as a basic principle of negotiations regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, as the only sustainable approach to address these issues. We reaffirm our support for the pivotal role of the United Nations, in particular its disarmament machinery.

We share the deep concern over the erosion of the disarmament architecture and its serious consequences. We underline the significance of preserving the existing agreements on disarmament and arms regulations; which are the result of international cooperation and multilateral negotiations, in response to the challenges humanity is facing.

We reject the decision of the US government to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Short- and Intermediate-Range Missiles Treaty, unilateral actions with serious consequences for international stability and security. We urge the US government to renew the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia (START). We oppose the deliberate attempts to undermine and put an end to the multilateral discussions on disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

We remain concerned over the growing proliferation of expert groups of limited membership that are established to examine issues of high relevance.

Cuba calls for a strict and fair application of the principle of equitable geographical representation, even within the regions themselves, in the membership of any Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) established in the area of disarmament and international security.

Mr. Chairman,

We reiterate the importance that the Conference on Disarmament agrees, without further delay, on a comprehensive, integral and balanced work programme, which will make it possible to overcome the stagnation affecting this body and to move forward in the negotiations of various topics on its agenda, in compliance with its mandate.

The lack of political will on the part of some of its member States, particularly in the area of nuclear disarmament, is the cause of the deadlock in the Conference. We call for respect for its agreed working methods and rules of procedure and for the rejection of the politicization of its work.

Let us take advantage of the momentum generated by the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to resume negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

This multilateral forum is ready to negotiate several issues simultaneously, including a treaty banning the arms race in outer space and another providing effective security assurance for those States, like Cuba, that are not non-nuclear-weapon States.

We encourage the Disarmament Commission to be able to reach substantive recommendations on the items on its agenda during this cycle, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament.

We have the responsibility to “save future generations from the scourge of war,” to save the planet, and to “create conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from the treaties and International Law can be maintained.

Thank you.

**Statement of the Delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
First Committee of the
Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons**

Mr. Chairman,

The world has not forgotten the terrible nuclear holocaust that took place seventy-five years ago.

The United Nations is entrusted with the historic task of magnitude to attain total elimination of nuclear weapons for the sake of security and sustainable development on this planet.

Though the international endeavors for nuclear disarmament have continued for more than half a century, the world has yet to free itself from the nuclear threat and on the contrary, is involved in arms build-up as opposed to disarmament.

Instead of playing a leading role in fulfilling obligations for nuclear disarmament, nuclear states with large nuclear arsenals are scrambling for strategic superiority through modernization of nuclear weapons while making amendments to their respective nuclear doctrines towards lowering the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons.

The recent arms race between major powers for the development of highly sophisticated weaponry is further endangering the already unstable situation of international security.

With the abrogation of the INF Treaty last year and the poor prospects for extension of the New START Treaty – the only and sole nuclear disarmament treaty for the present, a precarious situation is looming large which might give rise to a recurrence of unfettered nuclear arms race dating back to the Cold War era.

All such developments have negative implications on the world peace and security, thereby arousing concern and apprehension of the international community.

Mr. Chairman,

The past history of the DPRK can be termed as one of successive fierce confrontations with the hostile forces which had threatened the sovereignty and the right to existence of the nation, and such external threats aimed at curbing our development and plundering our State continue even today.

As we must possess absolute strength of our own able to prevent and deter the war, we have taken a path of self-development toward a nuclear state by braving through all pressures and challenges.

Accordingly, we have become able to reliably safeguard the security and future of our State and people against any form of high-intensity pressure, military threats and blackmail by the hostile forces.

As a responsible nuclear state, DPRK is committed to making an active contribution to achieving peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and the world at large.

Thank you.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas Debate temático en el Clúster sobre armas nucleares**

7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente:

Cuando conmemoramos los 75 años de los bombardeos atómicos de Hiroshima y Nagasaki, el Ecuador insiste en que el mejor homenaje que podemos hacer a las víctimas de esos bombardeos es la firma y ratificación del Tratado de prohibición de las armas nucleares.

Una vez que se alcanzaron las 50 ratificaciones, el tratado está pronto a entrar en vigor, y el Ecuador continuará promoviendo su universalización.

Ahora con más ahínco llamamos a la eliminación completa de las armas nucleares y condenamos su uso tanto como su amenaza de uso, y su mera existencia, porque desafía la supervivencia de la humanidad.

Ningún país, ni el más poderoso, ni siquiera todos los países juntos, podríamos superar o detener las devastadoras consecuencias de una explosión nuclear voluntaria o accidental.

Por ello la existencia de armas nucleares además de representar un desafío existencial, impide la consolidación de un orden mundial democrático, y constituye una negación de la cultura de paz, de la diplomacia y del sentido de preservación de la humanidad.

Esto contrasta aún más cuando nos encontramos en medio de la mayor crisis de salud Global, debida a la pandemia del Covid-19. Esta crisis debería llevar a los Estados nucleares a replantearse sus prioridades de seguridad, cuando fue un virus microscópico el que arrodilló al mundo, en un contexto en el que el presupuesto invertido en mantenimiento y de armas nucleares solo por el 2019, equivale al presupuesto de 30 años de operaciones de la Organización Mundial de la Salud.

Señor Presidente,

El Ecuador, como parte de la primera zona densamente poblada libre de armas nucleares, insta a todos los Estados a desplegar sus esfuerzos para consolidar Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares en todo el mundo, incluyendo en el Medio Oriente.

Mi país considera indispensable, para un mundo pacífico, un cambio en el enfoque de las doctrinas de seguridad de los Estados dotados de Armas Nucleares, aquellos que las albergan y en aquellos concernidos por la denominada protección nuclear. Consideramos además significativo y lamentable que cuando más dificultades enfrenta el multilateralismo, más se incrementan las narrativas de amenaza nuclear.

El tratado de prohibición se integra y complementa la actual arquitectura de la no proliferación y el desarme nuclear, junto con el Tratado de No Proliferación y el Tratado para la Prohibición Completa de Ensayos Nucleares. El Desarme Nuclear y la No Proliferación Nuclear deben avanzar de manera simultánea, interrelacionada y confluyente. El cumplimiento de las obligaciones de No Proliferación Nuclear nos corresponde a todos los Estados. Lamentamos no constatar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones en materia de desarme nuclear por los Estados poseedores de esas armas.

Finalmente,

Destaco el comunicado conjunto emitido por el Ecuador junto con Malasia y otros 15 países, en mayo de 2020, con el que celebramos los 50 años del Tratado de No Proliferación de armas nucleares. Lamentamos también que la pandemia del Covid-19 haya afectado la convocatoria para el desarrollo de la Conferencia de Revisión del Tratado de No Proliferación, que se postergó para agosto de 2021, y renovamos nuestro compromiso de trabajar para apoyar una Conferencia con resultados que nos acerquen a un mundo más seguro.

El Ecuador expresa una vez más su total rechazo a toda contemplación, planificación o desarrollo de ensayos nucleares. Reiteramos nuestro pleno apoyo a los trabajos de la Organización del Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares e instamos a la comunidad internacional a sumar esfuerzos para lograr la pronta entrada en vigor del referido Tratado.

Gracias señor Presidente.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas**

Debate temático en el Clúster sobre otras armas de destrucción masiva

7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente:

El Ecuador lamenta que al finalizar la segunda década del milenio, todavía no hemos logrado erradicar las armas químicas de la faz de la tierra. Deseo por tanto reiterar el compromiso de mi país con la Convención para la Prohibición de Armas Químicas y la Convención para la Prohibición de Armas Biológicas y Toxínicas, de las que somos parte y defendemos su implementación y universalización.

El Ecuador condena el uso de estas armas por cualquier actor, ya sea estatal o no estatal, por ser contrarias al derecho internacional de los derechos humanos y al derecho internacional humanitario. El Ecuador reitera que no puede existir impunidad en este ámbito en ningún lugar del mundo.

La Constitución ecuatoriana prohíbe, en el artículo 15 el desarrollo, producción, tenencia, comercialización, importación, transporte, almacenamiento y uso de armas químicas, biológicas y nucleares, así como de contaminantes orgánicos persistentes altamente tóxicos, agroquímicos internacionalmente prohibidos, y las tecnologías y agentes biológicos experimentales nocivos, al igual que organismos genéticamente modificados perjudiciales para la salud humana o que atenten contra la soberanía alimentaria o los ecosistemas, así como la introducción de residuos nucleares y desechos tóxicos al territorio nacional.

Así, a la luz de la Constitución del Ecuador, la existencia misma de armas químicas y biológicas es tan inmoral como en el caso de cualquier arma de destrucción en masa, incluyendo las armas nucleares.

En consecuencia llamamos a la eliminación de las armas químicas y biológicas sin más dilación y llamamos también a los países nucleares a desistir de la producción y tenencia de armas nucleares y de proceder igualmente a su eliminación.

El Ecuador es un país de paz y como tal instamos a la comunidad internacional a sumar esfuerzos para la eliminación completa de todas las armas de destrucción masiva, en honor a cada una de las víctimas de estas armas. Pero, más aún, en medio de la mayor crisis global de salud de los últimos 100 años, es indispensable que se acelere dicha eliminación, de manera que podamos orientar esfuerzos y recursos a otros desafíos globales.

Finalmente, aprovecho este debate para reiterar el pleno apoyo del Ecuador a los trabajos de la Organización para la Prohibición de Armas Químicas (OPAQ), y el apoyo de mi país para lograr también un mecanismo de verificación para la Convención de Prohibición de Armas Biológicas y Toxínicas.

Muchas gracias.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas**

Debate temático en el Clúster 3 sobre Espacio ultraterrestre

7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente:

El Ecuador, es el país que –por su ubicación geográfica– se encuentra más cercano al espacio. Valoramos su uso exclusivamente pacífico y nos oponemos por tanto a la **anarquización** del mismo, y más aún a su **militarización**, o incluso a la colocación de cualquier material bélico fuera de la atmósfera.

El Ecuador defiende un sistema internacional basado en las normas y en la igualdad soberana de los Estados. Pero las normas de comportamiento voluntario solo deben ser complementarias al derecho internacional.

Un conflicto en el espacio **solo** podría tener consecuencias devastadoras para la humanidad por lo que reafirmamos nuestro convencimiento sobre la necesidad de contar con un instrumento jurídicamente vinculante que preserve el carácter pacífico del espacio -patrimonio común de la humanidad.

No solo debemos abstenernos de militarizar el espacio sino también debemos abstenernos de **politizarlo**. Por eso hacemos un llamado respetuoso a todas las delegaciones, en Nueva York, a favorecer el diálogo franco en esta materia.

Lamentamos que todas las resoluciones del clúster se hayan sometido a votación, en esta sesión y esperamos que podamos avanzar hacia mayores consensos en el futuro próximo.

Muchas gracias.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas**

Debate temático en el Clúster 4 armas convencionales
7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente,

Mi país comparte y apoya de manera decidida los objetivos del Programa de Acción para prevenir, combatir y erradicar el tráfico ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras en todos sus aspectos. Somos parte del Protocolo contra la Fabricación y el Tráfico Ilícito de Armas de Fuego, sus Piezas y Municiones, que complementa la Convención de las Naciones Unidas contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional.

Reiteramos nuestro firme compromiso con la Convención sobre Municiones de Racimo y promovemos su universalización. Hoy hacemos un llamado a detener definitivamente el financiamiento y la inversión en empresas productoras de municiones en racimo, por tratarse de un arma de particular crueldad que afecta especialmente a los grupos más vulnerables.

Mi delegación rechaza el uso de armas explosivas en zonas pobladas. Asimismo, reitero el compromiso del Ecuador con la permanente aplicación de la Convención sobre el Empleo, Almacenamiento, Producción y Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción. El Ecuador tiene experiencia en este ámbito y por eso decidió plantar sus fronteras con proyectos de desarrollo en lugar de minas.

Rechazamos también el uso creciente y el perfeccionamiento de los vehículos aéreos no tripulados artillados así como de las armas letales autónomas. Apoyamos los trabajos en el marco de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales y creemos que la regulación tan sólo de su comercio internacional no es suficiente.

Sobre el Tratado de Comercio de Armas, el Ecuador está estudiando si en su implementación por los Estados Parte, se supera las deficiencias que el tratado parece tener en su texto. Sin embargo en esta sesión la mera referencia al tratado no implicará la oposición del Ecuador que valorará párrafo por párrafo según su mérito.

El Ecuador es un país de paz y, como tal, defiende los esfuerzos encaminados al desarme universal y completo.

Muchas gracias.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas**

Debate temático en el Clúster sobre otras medidas del desarme

7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente:

El Ecuador rechaza el uso creciente y el perfeccionamiento de los vehículos aéreos no tripulados artillados así como de las armas letales autónomas. La comunidad internacional en sus diversos foros regionales y universales, debe continuar profundizando las implicaciones para el derecho internacional humanitario y para el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos, previendo incluso la prohibición de este tipo de armas.

La militarización de la inteligencia artificial presenta desafíos para la seguridad internacional, la transparencia, el control, la proporcionalidad, y la responsabilidad. No podemos ignorar, por ejemplo, los reportes que se han producido en el sistema de Naciones Unidas, o los elementos que sobre el tema se han incluido en los informes, incluyendo el del relator especial sobre ejecuciones extrajudiciales.

Mi delegación respalda los trabajos que se han venido desarrollando sobre este asunto en el marco de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales. Consideramos que la sola regulación de su comercio no es suficiente. Debemos ampliar todos nuestros esfuerzos en la materia de manera que la Organización de Naciones Unidas pueda producir resultados satisfactorios.

Por otro lado el Ecuador defiende el uso responsable y pacífico de las tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación, pero insistimos en la importancia de favorecer y garantizar la seguridad del ciberespacio. Nada puede quedar por fuera del espectro del derecho internacional, menos aún del derecho internacional humanitario y el derecho internacional de los derechos humanos. El Ecuador reconoce el rol efectivo de la sociedad civil en los avances de esta Organización, en este tema y en todos los temas de desarme.

Agradecemos a Trinidad y Tobago por presentar la resolución bianual sobre Mujeres, desarme, no proliferación y control de armas, que el Ecuador tendrá el honor de copatrocinar. En el 20 aniversario de la resolución 1325 del Consejo, sobre Mujer Paz y Seguridad y a los 25 años de la conferencia de Beijing, el Ecuador reitera la importancia y la necesidad de aprovechar el rol determinante de las mujeres en materia de desarme y construcción de la paz.

Muchas gracias.

**Misión Permanente del Ecuador
ante las Naciones Unidas**

***Debate temático en el clúster 6 sobre Desarme regional
y en el clúster 7 sobre maquinaria de Desarme***

7 de octubre al 6 de noviembre de 2020

Señor Presidente:

El Ecuador apoyará todas las resoluciones del clúster de desarme regional. Mi delegación desea expresar además su aprecio por el trabajo de UNIDIR.

Reiteramos el orgullo de mi país por pertenecer a la primera región densamente poblada libre de armas nucleares. Asimismo, nos enorgullece que haya sido un país latinoamericano el 50 en ratificar el tratado de prohibición de armas nucleares con lo cual dicho instrumento está a días de entrar en vigor.

Debemos, en cambio en el plano universal, resolver la situación de la desgastada Maquinaria de Desarme de la que año tras año esta Comisión con razón se lamenta.

Lamentamos que el covid19 haya sumado a la erosión de la Maquinaria. Una manera de afectar una maquinaria de desarme es resistirse, por ejemplo, a considerar las armas nucleares al menos como anacrónicas, o seguir

postergando la suscripción del Tratado de prohibición de ensayos nucleares. Por otro lado, no podemos olvidar que la Primera Comisión de las Naciones Unidas es también parte de los mecanismos de desarme.

En la sesión anterior mi delegación lamentó que en la Comisión, por falta de tiempo a veces producimos el sentimiento de que el objetivo es aprobar un programa, avanzar en los debates sin verdaderamente escucharnos unos a otros. En esta sesión, en cambio, lamentamos que la pandemia hiciera imposible llevar a cabo este debate en sala, o virtualmente, y que como consecuencia se limite a un intercambio escrito. Respaldamos al buró de la comisión que ha hecho lo posible por facilitar una sesión constructiva.

Para concluir, señor Presidente, una breve reflexión sobre el consenso que mi país plantea año tras año. La delegación del Ecuador sigue creyendo en la importancia del consenso en materia de desarme pero, claro está, nos referimos a esa concepción positiva del consenso, aquella que implica un compromiso común de todos por avanzar y conseguir objetivos comunes recorriendo un camino común en el que buscamos comprender la posición del otro.

Creemos que el descredito que el consenso ahora tiene en muchos es causado por el abuso y la incompreensión de lo que este concepto en realidad Implica: el consenso no es ni puede ser la concesión de un veto universal, ni puede ser identificado con acciones que buscan simplemente negarle a la gran mayoría de la comunidad internacional la capacidad de avanzar en obtener los objetivos del desarme.

El Problema no está en la maquinaria de desarme sino en los ataques permanentes que sufre el multilateralismo. En estos 75 años de la organización que celebramos el mejor tributo que podremos hacerle es mayor compromiso de todos con el sistema multilateral incluyendo el mecanismo de desarme.

Muchas gracias.

The Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons (Cluster 1)

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt fully associates itself with the statements made by the Non-Aligned Movement, the African Group, the Arab Group, and the New Agenda Coalition, and wishes to make the following remarks.

Egypt reiterates its concern over the grave threat posed to humanity and international security by the continued possession of nuclear weapons by a few States, and reaffirms that the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their proliferation, use, or threat of use.

Arguments which set preconditions for, or artificial impediments to, the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations will only lead to the gradual demise of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which we recently celebrated its 50th anniversary. The rising levels of tensions at the global level coupled with rapid technological developments make the risk of intentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons at one of its highest levels since the Cold War era.

The intensified competition among a number of States to develop, test, and deploy faster and more powerful delivery systems such as hypersonic missiles or nuclear powered missiles, in combination with the rising levels of malicious uses of cyber and outer-space technologies, exponentially raises the risk of triggering a nuclear war either intentionally or by mistake.

The continued collapse and erosion of major bilateral treaties of nuclear disarmament and arms control makes any possible progress on implementing the agreed nuclear disarmament obligations extremely difficult to achieve in the foreseen future.

Immediate progress is necessary to restore trust and faith in the current regime. As a first step, the 10th NPT Review Conference has to reconfirm the validity of the all previous commitments and reaffirm the commitment of all States Parties to implement them without any conditionality, and further build on them with practical timebound measures.

Egypt is of the view that the outcomes of the 10th NPT Review Conference should include a declaration by all nuclear-weapon States that “a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought”, combined with agreeing to timebound negotiations on the total, verifiable, and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

The decades-long stalemate in the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as countless similar resolutions, is eroding the credibility and sustainability of the disarmament and nonproliferation regime and multilateral norms, as well as the rule of law at the international level.

This stalemate is one of the root causes of the instability and lack of security in a region that already suffers from chronic military conflicts and arms races, especially taking into consideration the unprecedented spread of armed conflicts and terrorism.

In this regard, we believe that the Conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East which has successfully convened its first session in November 2019 and managed to reach a number of important and significant outcomes as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document [A/75/63](#), represents an important opportunity for the United Nations to take meaningful practical steps in this direction through an institutional inclusive and consensus-based process.

We reiterate that this Conference aims at reaching arrangements freely-arrived-at by the States of the region on the basis of consensus. It is a genuine attempt to achieve a longstanding agreed international commitment in a nondiscriminatory manner that does not aim at singling out any State in the region.

At the holistic level, this process could serve as a platform to address all regional disarmament and nonproliferation challenges with a view to establishing a robust regional security architecture conducive to sustainable peace and collective security through dialogue and diplomacy.

We sincerely hope that all invited States will participate in the following sessions of this Conference, which could lead to a major contribution to the strengthening of the international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime and a breakthrough in addressing the deteriorating security conditions in the region, not to mention its possible positive impact on the forthcoming session of the NPT Review Conference which we all hope would succeed.

In the same vein, we also count on the continued support of all Member States to this initiative, as well as to the resolution that Egypt tables annually on “the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East” which used to be adopted by consensus until the year 2017, and the resolution that we table on behalf of the Arab Group entitled “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”. We consider the support by Member States to be a proof of their commitment to nuclear disarmament as well as to achieving collective security and sustainable peace in the Middle East and to achieving the agreed obligations in this regard.

**بيان وفد جمهورية مصر العربية
اجتماعات اللجنة الأولى: الدورة الخامسة والسبعون للجمعية العامة
جلسة النقاش الموضوعي الثاني: أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى**

السيد الرئيس،

يتضامن وفد بلادي مع بياني المجموعة العربية وحركة عدم الانحياز

السيد الرئيس،

لقد أكدت الدورة الاستثنائية الأولى للجمعية العامة المكرسة لموضوعات نزع السلاح الأولية القصوى لنزع السلاح النووي. ويعد التوصل لمعاهدة حظر الأسلحة النووية عام خطوة تاريخية فيما يخص المساواة بين الأسلحة النووية ، التي تعد أكثر أنواع 2017 أسلحة الدمار الشامل تعارضا مع أبسط المبادئ الإنسانية والقانون الإنساني الدولي، وبين الأسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية، وإرساء قاعدة عرفية هامة في القانون الدولي.

السيد الرئيس،

بالرغم مما تتسم به منطقة الشرق الأوسط من توتر وعدم استقرار مزمنين، وما عانت منه مصر من حروب متتالية اضطرت لخوضها على مدار أكثر من أربعة عقود، فقد أبدت مصر حسن نواياها وانضمت لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية ونفذت جميع الالتزامات التي تفرضها هذه المعاهدة، وكانت أول دولة تطرح مبادرة لتوسيع نطاق فكرة إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية في الشرق الأوسط لتشمل إخلاء المنطقة من أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى. كما انضمت مصر لتوافق الآراء عام 1995 على مقرر التمديد اللانهائي للمعاهدة، بناءً على أن صفقة التمديد تضمنت قراراً لم ينفذ حتى الآن حول إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية وأسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وتطالب مصر بسرعة اتخاذ خطوات عملية تتسم بالجدية لتعديل هذا الخلل الأمني الخطير في المنطقة بسبب استمرار طرف واحد في عرقلة جهود إخلاء المنطقة من أسلحة الدمار الشامل. وتتطلع مصر للتعامل الجدي مع الالتزامات الخاصة بإخلاء الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل بما يحقق الأمن المتكافئ لجميع دول المنطقة، وتعديل الاختلالات القائمة التي لا يؤدي استمرارها إلا للمزيد من النزاعات، وسباقات التسلح، وعدم الاستقرار، وذرائع التدخل الخارجي، وعرقلة تحقيق سلام مستدام

وتعد المشاركة الجادة ب حسن نوايا في مؤتمر إنشاء منطقة خالية من أسلحة الدمار الشامل في الشرق الأوسط الذي عقدت أولى دوراته في نوفمبر المقبل 2019 أولى هذه الخطوات التي طال انتظارها للعمل على إرساء منظومة أمنية متوازنة ومستقرة تحقق الأمن المتكافئ للجميع وتبلي الشواغل الأمنية لجميع دول المنطقة بلا استثناء

السيد الرئيس،

تدري مصر استخدام كافة أسلحة الدمار الشامل من جانب أي طرف وتحت أي ظرف وقد قامت مصر دوماً بإثبات مصداقية مواقفها من خلال دعم القرارات الدولية ذات الصلة ودعم جهود تنفيذ قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1540 للحيلولة دون حصول الفاعلين من غير الدول على أسلحة الدمار الشامل. وتود مصر التنويه إلى أنها كانت الدولة صاحبة السبق في توسيع نطاق مبادرة إنشاء منطقة خالية من الأسلحة النووية في الشرق الأوسط لتشمل أسلحة الدمار الشامل الأخرى

ونود مجدداً أن نبرز التناقض في مواقف بعض الدول التي تطالب بتحقيق عالمية

معاهداتي حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية وتطالب دولاً محددة بالاسم بالانضمام لها، في الوقت الذي تتغاضى فيه تلك الدول عن مطالبة إسرائيل بالانضمام لمعاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية، وتبدي تردداً تجاه دعم مؤتمر إخلاء الشرق الأوسط من أسلحة الدمار الشامل، بذريعة أن الظروف الأمنية والسياسية في المنطقة غير مواتية. بل إن العديد من الدول التي تستمر في المطالبة بتحقيق عالمية معاهدتي الأسلحة الكيميائية والبيولوجية تمتلك هي نفسها أسلحة نووية، أو تنضوي تحت مظلة حماية نووية، وتزعم أن الظروف الدولية غير مواتية لتحقيق تقدم بشأن التخلص من الأسلحة النووية، وتعارض مساواة الأسلحة النووية بالفنتين الآخرين من أسلحة الدمار الشامل من حيث حظر الحيازة والاستخدام، بالرغم من أن الأسلحة النووية هي أكثر أنواع أسلحة الدمار الشامل تدميراً. وتعارضاً مع أبسط القيم الإنسانية ومخالفة لمبادئ القانون الإنساني الدولي. ونذكر تلك الدول بأن المبادئ الإنسانية لا تتجزأ، وبأن أمن بعض الدول ليس أكثر أهمية من أمن دول أخرى، حيث أن جميع الدول متساوية في الحقوق وفي السيادة، وننصح تلك الدول بمراجعة مواقفها التي لا تعبر سوى عن ازدواجية واضحة في المعايير.

**Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 3: Outer Space**

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the statements of the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Outer-space is a shared heritage owned equally by all the peoples of the world, and a common asset for humanity. In today's world, almost all aspects of human activities on earth are either directly or indirectly dependent on outer-space technologies.

Taking into consideration the extreme volatility of the outer-space environment, it must not be allowed to turn into a scene for military conflicts that could have catastrophic implications.

Without prejudice to the possible value of TCBMs as interim measure in the short term, there is a clear need for a legally binding instrument that would complement the existing international legal framework by preventing an arms race in outer space and filling the existing legal gaps in this area, especially taking into consideration the alarming announcements by some States in relation to their plans of weaponizing outer space, in addition to the continued development of weapons designed to attack outer-space assets.

Such a legally binding instrument should have a comprehensive scope that primarily includes four prohibitions:

- 1) a prohibition on the placement of any weapons, defensive or offensive, in outer space,
- 2) a prohibition on any armed attacks against satellites or any outerspace assets,
- 3) a prohibition on any intentional harmful interference that interrupts the normal functioning of outer-space assets, and
- 4) a prohibition on the development, testing, and stockpiling of weapons that are specifically designed for the sole purpose of attacking outer space assets or being deployed or used as a weapon in outer space.

We believe that each of these prohibitions (contained in such a legally binding instrument) can be subject to specific verification measures, using a diversified set of tools that could be supplemented by transparency measures, as well as a mechanism for consultations and dispute-settlement. We also believe that such an instrument can be designed to avoid any infringement on the full utilization of the peaceful uses of outer-space or dual-use technologies by all States for purposes other than weaponization. The required definitions can be easily determined in a manner that would avoid such infringement.

The existing legal framework, especially the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 represents a good basis. Nevertheless, there is a clear need for serious efforts to reach new legally binding instruments that complement the existing legal framework,

considering the relevant significant technological developments and the need for assurances that outer space would remain free of armed conflicts or arms races.

Progress can be achieved through a gradual approach, including through the development of binding rules of States behavior in outer-space.

In this context, Egypt once again recalls the substantive progress made during the discussions of the Governmental Group of Experts established pursuant to UNGA Resolution [72/250](#) which witnessed a remarkable level of depth in the discussions concerning all controversial legal and technical aspects. The unbracketed text of the final report of that GGE is a remarkable effort that can and should represent the basis of future discussions in order not to start from scratch.

Mr. Chairman

Egypt and Sri Lanka have once more tabled their joint annual resolution entitled “Prevention of an Arms Race in the Outer Space”. We count on the support of all Member States to this important resolution which attempts to bridge the gaps and create common grounds for further progress on PAROS.

Moreover, Egypt co-sponsored the two resolutions entitled “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” and “Further Practical Measure for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”.

Egypt reiterates its readiness to support any credible effort that complements the existing initiatives and aims at elaborating rules that would pave the way to conclude legally-binding instruments on PAROS including through prohibiting the weaponization of outer space and actions that may turn it into an arena for conflict.

Thank you.

Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 4: Conventional Weapons
Check Against Delivery

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the statements of the Arab Group, the African Group, and the Non-Aligned Movement under this agenda item, and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt remains fully committed to engaging in any balanced multilateral endeavor that aims to tackle the multiple challenges and threats arising from the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, provided that such an endeavor is consistent with the UN Charter and does not intend to negatively affect the rights of States to acquire their legitimate defense needs.

We continue to fully support the United Nations Programme of Action (UN PoA) on Small Arms & Light Weapons (SALW) as an essential multilateral instrument that contributes to the eradication of illicit trafficking in SALW. Egypt has submitted its national report on the implementation of the (UN PoA) for the year 2020. We also reiterate the importance of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) as a valuable tool in this regard. Furthermore, we look forward to a successful conclusion of the forthcoming Biennial Meeting of States in July 2021, which should mainly focus on “preventing and combating the diversion and the illicit international transfer of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients” as agreed in the third Review Conference in 2018. We also call for close cooperation and coordination between the President of BMS7 and member states concerning proposals and new initiatives to be discussed during the meeting.

Mr. Chairman,

The Middle East and Africa face severe threats due to the increasing illicit flows and intentional transfers of SALW to terrorists and illegal armed groups. It is obvious that this unprecedented flow is conducted with the direct support of a few States that resort to arming terrorists as a tool of their foreign policies, in a clear violation of the UN Charter, international norms, and several UNSC Resolutions, the latest being Resolution 2370 which was adopted unanimously in August 2017.

Some argued that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) was going to be the solution that would stop all illegal flows of conventional arms. In this regard, we reiterate that the ATT's various shortcomings, especially its lack of clear definitions and criteria, largely undermines its possible effectiveness, and makes it possible to abuse this treaty as a tool to manipulate and monopolize the legitimate trade in conventional weapons in a politicized manner, while ignoring the prevention of the intentional supply of weapons to unauthorized recipients such as terrorists and illegal armed groups.

We reiterate our call on the States parties to the ATT to ensure that its implementation is consistent with the UN Charter without any infringement on the rights of States to meet their national security and self-defense needs.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt is one of the States that have suffered the most from the use of landmines. 20% of the world's landmines were planted in Egyptian soil during WWII, and there is a continued need to intensify international cooperation to tackle this major problem. Fully aware of the relevant humanitarian considerations, Egypt imposed a moratorium since the 1980s on the production and export of antipersonnel landmines, long before the conclusion of the relevant conventions including the Ottawa Convention, which fell short of addressing many key elements associated with the threat of landmines.

Mr. Chairman,

It is important to highlight that most of the challenges that we face today with regards to the supply of conventional arms to terrorists and illegal armed groups are not mainly due to a lack of proper export controls or inadequate stockpiles security. They are primarily due to the fact that certain States continue to deliberately supply illicit weapons to terrorists and illegal armed groups and obstruct an international prohibition on the supply of weapons to unauthorized recipients, in contradiction with several principles enshrined in the Charter. This is a phenomenon that requires the immediate attention of and more tangible measures by the United Nations.

Thank you.

Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Other Disarmament Measures and International Security (Cluster 5)

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt reiterates that nondiscriminatory multilateral legally-binding instruments are the most effective measures for achieving sustainable progress in the area of disarmament and international security.

We stress that the continued commitment by all States to previously agreed undertakings and to the rule of law at the international level, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, is a necessary condition for maintaining international peace and security and avoiding chaos.

Taking into consideration the rapid scientific and technological developments in several strategic fields, there are several domains which have a direct impact on international security that are left without any internationally agreed rules to prevent them from turning into scenes of arms races and armed conflicts and to ensure the reliable continuation of the contribution of the relevant technologies to development and welfare.

Cyberspace, outer space, and the weaponization applications of Artificial Intelligence including in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons are prominent examples.

The lack of progress in addressing the severe security threats that arise in such domains is clearly not due to the lack of technical expertise on the part of the international community, but is rather due to the continued misguided belief by some States that an absolute dominance in such domains can be maintained, and thereby resisting any effort towards the

development of equitable rules based international regimes prohibiting the malicious uses and weaponization of such technologies.

In a multipolar world where the relevant technologies are available and accessible to many State and non-State actors, this approach can only lead to an arms race that no one can win, while international security continues to severely deteriorate.

In the area of cyber-security and the possible malicious use of information and telecommunication technologies as a means of warfare, achieving meaningful progress towards establishing a reliable regime based on agreed rules has been stalled for more than a decade. Efforts towards the codification of such recommendations or towards utilizing them as a basis for legally binding instruments continue to be strongly resisted at a time that the international security aspects of ICTs are becoming too important to be left without an international regime that regulates State behavior in this strategic domain.

In this context, we welcome the significant progress within the framework of the OEWG established by resolution [73/27](#), benefiting from its universal and inclusive membership and basing its focus on building on what has already been agreed in the previous GGEs and other relevant multilateral venues. The OEWG witnessed many creative ideas and constructive proposals, including on the future of regular institutional dialogue under the auspices of the UN such as the possible establishment of a UN Programme of Action as a mechanism to followup the implementation of the agreed norms and examining the possible developments of further norms pending an agreement on launching negotiations on a legally-binding instrument.

This initiative on a possible UN Programme of Action on cybersecurity and the international security aspects of ICTs aims at establishing a more concerted global effort under an inclusive UN platform that is action-oriented going beyond the repeated discussions on the basic principles.

We believe that it is time to move forward in the most inclusive and actionoriented manner to elaborate legally binding rules in all these strategic domains. Nonbinding norms and voluntary confidence building measures are interim steps that cannot provide sufficient guarantees in the area of international security and arms control in the long-term.

**Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 6: Regional Disarmament and Security**

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt fully associates itself with the statements of the Arab Group and the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks:

The Middle East remains one of the most volatile regions in the world. The situation continues to worsen with the unprecedented spread of conflicts, proxy-wars, terrorism, and sectarian violence.

Quoting from the Final Document of SSOD-I, which was adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in 1978, “Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry...nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through [...] the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces”.

Today, in the year 2020, there’s a need to recognize that peace and security cannot be achieved in the Middle East under deterrence and the accumulation of weaponry instead of engagement on the establishment of an equitable security architecture that achieves the collective and collaborative security of all the States and peoples of the region.

Serious steps towards the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the Middle East, could have saved the region and the world from devastating wars and horrors, as well as from the chronic country-specific proliferation concerns.

Accordingly, we believe that the Conference on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East which has successfully convened its first session in November 2019 and managed to

reach a number of important and significant outcomes as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General contained in document [A/75/63](#), represents an important opportunity for the United Nations to take meaningful practical steps in this direction through an institutional inclusive and consensus-based process.

Mr. Chairman,

In addition to its commitment to achieving a lasting and fair peace in the Middle east, Egypt has constructively engaged with all international efforts aiming at addressing the challenges related to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation in the region.

Continuing to ignore the severity of the deteriorating security conditions in the region will only lead to further catastrophic consequences. The region is already witnessing a new chapter of a gravely alarming arms race, and we cannot continue to stand idly watching with our hands tied.

We urge all Member States to engage with the ongoing efforts and to honor the relevant previous agreements and undertakings. Missing another opportunity to engage in a constructive, inclusive, and consensus-based process will only mean a call for the continuation of violence and chaos.

Statement of the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate - Cluster 7: Disarmament Machinery

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation aligns itself with the statements of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab Group and wishes to make the following remarks:

Egypt assigns immense importance to the United Nations disarmament machinery and considers disarmament and arms control to be an essential pillar of the UN mandate in preserving international peace and security, which remains the *raison d'être* of this organization.

The stalemate in disarmament efforts is not necessarily the result of defects in the machinery itself as much as it is a reflection of the lack of political will by some States that seek to maintain absolute military dominance and believe in deterrence rather than collaborative and collective security.

Mr. Chairman,

The failure of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to adopt a balanced and comprehensive program of work for over 24 years requires immediate action to rectify this situation. We believe that this can only be achieved through launching negotiations on the verifiable and irreversible total elimination of nuclear weapons with specific benchmarks and timelines.

There is also a need for similar efforts to revitalize the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and to allow it to adopt recommendations on nuclear disarmament. Egypt also expresses its serious disappointment regarding the inability to convene the formal sessions of the UNDC in 2019 and 2020 and considers this to be another very alarming indication of how threatened the UN Disarmament machinery is.

We look forward to a successful SSOD-IV as a landmark event that is urgently needed to address the alarming stalemate in disarmament and go back to the drawing board to revisit the current design of the machinery.

We continue to value the role of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. We reiterate our call for more financial independence for UNIDIR to continue to generate new ideas and to promote practical actions on disarmament.

Furthermore, seeking better synergies and coordination among the First Committee, the CD, the UNDC, and UNIDIR may contribute to a more efficient and effective functioning of the machinery.

We once again commend the Secretary General's timely and valuable Disarmament Agenda. This initiative indicates a clear recognition of the need to enhance the functioning of the disarmament machinery and to bring disarmament back to the forefront of the UN's focus.

We also encourage the active role and contributions of nongovernmental organizations and the civil society in support of the UN's disarmament machinery.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the First Committee has a central role in bridging the gaps and creating momentum and guidance for the Disarmament Machinery. It is our hope that a constructive and a consensual approach will be followed by all Member States in order to succeed in this task, especially under the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this regard, we commend the resilience, constructiveness, and cooperation shown by all Member States and the Secretariat in order to allow the Committee to convene its meetings this year in an efficient manner in spite of these unprecedented circumstances and challenges of the pandemic.

Octobre 2020
Déclaration de la France
« DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE »

La 10ème conférence d'examen du Traité de non-prolifération, dont nous avons fêté cette année le 50ème anniversaire, sera un moment phare de l'année 2021. Il doit être l'occasion de réaffirmer le caractère central du TNP dans le régime de non-prolifération, et de reconnaître les bénéfices immenses qu'il a apportés à la sécurité internationale. Le TNP est l'un des traités les plus universels au monde. Il est le seul traité à permettre d'éviter la prolifération des armes nucléaires et de réduire toute possibilité de confrontation nucléaire, tout en apportant à chacun les bénéfices des usages pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire.

1) Le TNP aura également permis de considérablement limiter le nombre d'Etats qui ont acquis l'arme nucléaire. Toutefois, **la prolifération nucléaire** continue de poser une menace sérieuse à la paix et la stabilité régionale et internationale.

S'agissant de l'Iran, la France reste fermement engagée en faveur du **JCPOA** et de sa préservation. Nous appelons l'Iran à pleinement le respecter, à revenir sur les mesures contraires à ses engagements et à ne pas mettre en oeuvre de mesures supplémentaires qui pourraient aggraver encore la situation nucléaire. Plus largement, notre objectif reste constant : l'Iran ne doit jamais se doter de l'arme nucléaire.

Par ailleurs, l'Iran continue de développer et d'augmenter la précision et la portée de son arsenal de missiles balistiques, qui constituent des vecteurs d'armes nucléaires, en violation de la résolution 2231 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. Il poursuit également ses transferts déstabilisants d'armes conventionnelles et de missiles vers des acteurs non-étatiques dans la région, en violation des résolutions pertinentes du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies. C'est pourquoi nous demeurons mus par la nécessité de construire un cadre d'action dans la durée, qui permette à la fois de s'assurer que l'Iran n'accédera jamais à l'arme nucléaire et qui apporte aussi des réponses à l'activité balistique de l'Iran et à ses actions déstabilisatrices dans la région.

La menace posée par la poursuite du développement des programmes nucléaire et balistique de la **Corée du Nord** demeure intolérable. La Corée du Nord n'a fait aucun progrès dans le sens d'une dénucléarisation complète, vérifiable et irréversible, à laquelle plusieurs résolutions du Conseil de sécurité l'obligent. Elle a au contraire démontré sa détermination à poursuivre ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive et à recourir à la dissuasion comme stratégie d'autodéfense en violation de ces mêmes résolutions. Ses tirs répétés de missiles balistiques encore en 2020, l'annonce de la fin du moratoire sur les essais nucléaires et les tirs balistiques ainsi que la présentation de capacités toujours plus modernes, doivent nous inquiéter et nous encourager à ne pas réduire la pression sur Pyongyang. Nous appelons donc la Corée du Nord à renouer le dialogue et à engager un processus concret et structuré de démantèlement complet, vérifiable et irréversible de ses programmes d'armes de destruction massive et de missiles balistiques de toutes portées ainsi que des programmes associés. Tant que cet objectif ne sera pas atteint, les sanctions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies seront maintenues.

La prolifération nucléaire demeure donc un sujet de préoccupation majeur pour la communauté internationale et doit rester notre priorité collective.

2) Sur le désarmement, la **France se conforme pleinement à ses engagements au titre de l'article VI du TNP**. Elle le fait dans le cadre d'une approche progressive et pragmatique, la seule réaliste, de façon à promouvoir la stabilité régionale et internationale, sur la base d'une sécurité non diminuée pour tous.

Nous partageons l'objectif, à terme, de l'élimination totale des armes nucléaires, quand le contexte stratégique le permettra. Aujourd'hui la France maintient son arsenal à un niveau le plus bas compatible avec le contexte stratégique, conformément au principe de **stricte suffisance**.

Le bilan de la France en matière de désarmement nucléaire est exemplaire et sans égal parmi les Etats dotés – on peut citer le démantèlement irréversible des installations de production de matières fissiles pour les armes nucléaires ; le démantèlement complet de la composante nucléaire sol-sol ; la réduction d'un tiers de la composante océanique et de la composante aéroportée ; le démantèlement irréversible du site d'essais dans le Pacifique, parmi d'autres mesures.

La France accorde une grande importance aux **efforts de transparence**. Elle a précisé la composition de son arsenal nucléaire, soit moins de 300 armes en tout, 4 sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins, trois lots de 16 missiles portés par sous-marins, et 54 missiles aéroportés.

Toutes ces décisions sont cohérentes avec notre refus de toute course aux armements et le maintien de notre dissuasion nucléaire à un niveau de stricte suffisance. La France ne conçoit la dissuasion nucléaire que comme **strictement défensive**, pour protéger ses **intérêts vitaux** dans des circonstances extrêmes de légitime défense, conformément à la Charte des Nations-Unies. Elle est pleinement consciente de ses responsabilités particulières, notamment au titre de son statut d'Etat doté au sens du TNP. Elle expose régulièrement sa doctrine de dissuasion, dans un souci de transparence.

La France accorde par ailleurs des **garanties négatives de sécurité** à tous les Etats non dotés parties au TNP qui respectent leurs engagements de non-prolifération. Elle a soutenu, en prenant des engagements contraignants, la création de zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires en Amérique Latine et dans les Caraïbes, dans le Pacifique, en Afrique et en Asie centrale. Ces engagements ont été confirmés au plus haut niveau de l'Etat français. Nous souhaitons poursuivre le dialogue entre les pays de l'ASEAN et le P5 pour avancer vers la signature du protocole au Traité de Bangkok instituant une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires en Asie du Sud-Est. Les pays de l'ASEAN doivent également se saisir de la question.

La France a repris en septembre 2020 la **présidence du processus P5**, enceinte de dialogue réunissant les 5 Etats dotés de l'arme nucléaire. Consciente des responsabilités spéciales qui incombent aux Etats du P5, la France est convaincue de l'importance d'un dialogue continu dans ce format, en particulier sur les politiques et doctrines nucléaires et les enjeux stratégiques internationaux, pour maintenir la stabilité stratégique et réduire les risques d'escalade involontaire. Tout au long de sa présidence, la France aura à coeur d'avancer vers la mise en oeuvre de la feuille de route du P5, telle qu'agréée dès la conférence de Pékin et 4 réaffirmée lors de la présidence britannique, avec pour objectif de formaliser une contribution positive des Etats du P5 à la conférence d'examen du TNP.

3) Nous estimons dangereux de déconnecter les enjeux de désarmement nucléaire de la prise en compte du contexte de sécurité, caractérisé par des tensions globales et régionales croissantes, l'augmentation des arsenaux, et par la prolifération des armes de destruction massive et de leurs vecteurs.

C'est la raison pour laquelle **la France s'oppose au Traité d'interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN)**. Loin de renforcer l'architecture du désarmement et de la non-prolifération nucléaire, il fragilise au contraire gravement la crédibilité du régime de non-prolifération, en premier lieu le TNP, ne comportant pas de régime de vérification, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui avec le Protocole additionnel de l'AIEA. En effet, le TIAN comporte des dispositions qui nient le caractère central du TNP : ainsi, il ne pose pas comme condition d'adhésion d'être partie au TNP. Il comporte en outre des dispositions bien moins protectrices que le TNP, par exemple sur le droit d'accès au nucléaire civil, qui n'est pas encadré dans le TIAN. Pour ces raisons, la France réitère qu'elle n'entend pas y adhérer.

4) La France poursuivra son action résolue et déterminée en faveur des prochaines étapes réalistes et graduelles du désarmement nucléaire :

Le premier objectif doit être de continuer à réduire de manière vérifiable les stocks issus de la course aux armements menée par l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis pendant la guerre froide. La fin du traité sur les forces nucléaires intermédiaires, les incertitudes sur l'avenir du traité New Start qui expire en février prochain, la crise du régime de maîtrise des armes conventionnelles en Europe laissent entrevoir d'ici 2021 la possibilité du retour à une course aux armements en dehors de tout cadre, comme nous n'en avons plus connu depuis la fin des années 1960. A cet égard, il est essentiel que le **traité New Start** soit prolongé au-delà de 2021 et que des discussions soient engagées sur un instrument à même d'assurer la stabilité stratégique sur le continent européen. La France poursuivra ses efforts visant à l'élaboration d'un agenda international de maîtrise des armements dans lequel les Européens doivent faire entendre leur voix.

L'entrée en vigueur du **TICE** est une autre priorité et nous appelons tous les Etats qui ne l'ont pas déjà fait à signer et ratifier le TICE. La France a été le premier Etat doté à signer et ratifier le TICE, et continue de soutenir activement les travaux de l'OTICE, organe également central pour répondre aux défis que posent les crises de prolifération.

La négociation, à la Conférence du désarmement, d'un **Traité FMCT**, sur la base du document [CD/1299](#) et du mandat qu'il contient, constitue également une étape incontournable et irremplaçable vers un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires.

Un FMCT empêchera le développement quantitatif des arsenaux nucléaires. Il n'y aura pas de monde exempt d'armes nucléaires sans FMCT. Le FMCT est un sujet prioritaire de la feuille de route du P5.

Les échanges sur les enjeux techniques de la **vérification du désarmement nucléaire** entre Etats dotés et non dotés d'armes nucléaires sont également importants pour accroître la compréhension et renforcer la confiance entre les Etats parties au TNP. La France contribue résolument aux travaux du Partenariat international sur la vérification du désarmement nucléaire (IPNDV), a participé au groupe d'experts gouvernementaux (GGE) sur le rôle de la vérification en matière de désarmement nucléaire, et maintiendra cet engagement l'an prochain au sein du nouveau GGE. L'exercice de terrain franco-allemand NuDiVe mené en septembre 2019 était un exercice inédit. Cette coopération a vocation à se poursuivre.

Enfin, les efforts dans le domaine de la **réduction des risques stratégique** doivent se poursuivre. Ils reposent principalement sur la transparence des doctrines nucléaires, le dialogue entre responsables politiques et militaires des Etats dotés ou possesseurs, comme le format P5, les instruments de communication de crise et les mesures de réassurance. Dans le contexte stratégique actuel, la France défendra, avec ses partenaires, plus que jamais une approche réaliste et progressive du désarmement général et complet au titre de l'article VI du TNP/.

Statement by France “NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT”

Courtesy translation

The 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which we celebrated the 50th anniversary this year, will be a landmark moment in 2021. It must be an opportunity to reaffirm the centrality of the NPT in the non-proliferation regime, and to recognize the immense benefits it has brought to international security. The NPT is one of the most universal treaties in the world. It is the only treaty that prevents the proliferation of nuclear weapons and reduces the possibility of nuclear confrontation, while bringing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all.

1) The NPT has also made it possible to considerably limit the number of States that have acquired nuclear weapons. However, nuclear **proliferation** continues to pose a serious threat to regional and international peace and stability.

With regards to Iran, France remains firmly committed to the **JCPOA** and its preservation. We call on Iran to fully comply with it, to reconsider measures that are contrary to its commitments and to refrain from implementing additional measures that could further aggravate the nuclear situation. More generally, our objective remains constant: Iran must never acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran continues to develop and increase the accuracy and range of its ballistic missile arsenal, which are nuclear weapon delivery systems, in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. It also continues its destabilizing transfers of conventional weapons and missiles to non-state actors in the region, in violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. This is why we remain driven by the need to build a long-term framework for action that will both ensure that Iran never gains access to nuclear weapons and also provide answers to Iran's ballistic activity and its destabilization in the region.

The threat posed by the continuing development of **North Korea's** nuclear and ballistic programs remains intolerable. North Korea has made no progress towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization required by the relevant Security Council resolutions. On the contrary, North Korea has shown its determination to pursue its weapons of mass destruction programs and to use deterrence as a self-defense strategy in violation of the above-mentioned resolutions. Its repeated ballistic missile launches again in 2020, the announcement of the end of the moratorium on nuclear tests and ballistic launches, and the presentation of ever more modern capabilities, should worry us and encourage us not to reduce pressure on Pyongyang. We therefore call on North Korea to resume dialogue and to engage in a concrete and structured process leading to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs of all ranges as well as its related programs. Until this goal is achieved, UN Security Council sanctions will be maintained.

Nuclear proliferation therefore remains a major concern for the international community and must remain our collective priority.

2) On disarmament, **France fully complies with its commitments under Article VI of the NPT**. France is doing so within the framework of a progressive and pragmatic approach, the only realistic one, so as to promote regional and international stability on the basis of undiminished security for all.

We share the ultimate goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, when the strategic context so allows. Today, France maintains its arsenal at the lowest level compatible with the strategic context, in accordance with the principle of **strict sufficiency**.

France's record on nuclear disarmament is **exemplary** and unparalleled among the nuclear-weapon States - one can cite the irreversible dismantling of facilities producing fissile material for nuclear weapons; the complete dismantling of the ground-based nuclear component; the reduction by one third of the oceanic and airborne components; the irreversible dismantling of the test site in the Pacific, among other measures.

France attaches great importance to **transparency efforts**. It has specified the composition of its nuclear arsenal, which includes less than 300 weapons in all, 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, three batches of 16 submarine-launched missiles, and 54 airborne missiles.

All these decisions are consistent with our rejection of any arms race and the maintenance of our nuclear deterrence at a level of strict sufficiency. France sees nuclear deterrence only as **strictly defensive**, to protect its **vital interests** in extreme circumstances of self-defense, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. France is fully aware of its particular responsibilities, particularly in view of its nuclear-weapon State status under the NPT. It regularly sets out its doctrine of deterrence, for the sake of transparency.

France also provides **negative security guarantees** to all non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT and that comply with their non-proliferation commitments. It has supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa and Central Asia by making binding commitments. These commitments have been confirmed at the highest level of the French government. We wish to continue the dialogue between the ASEAN countries and the P5 in order to make progress towards the signature of the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries themselves must also take up the issue.

In September 2020, France took over the **presidency of the P5 process**, a forum for dialogue bringing together the five nuclear-weapon States. Aware of the special responsibilities incumbent upon the P5 States, France is convinced of the importance of a continued dialogue in this format, in particular on nuclear policies and doctrines and international strategic issues to ensure strategic stability and reduce the risks of unintentional escalation. Throughout its Presidency, France will be committed to making progress towards the implementation of the P5 roadmap, as agreed at the Beijing Conference and reaffirmed during the UK Presidency, with the aim of formalizing a positive contribution by the P5 States to the NPT Review Conference.

3) **We consider it dangerous to disconnect the challenges of nuclear disarmament from the security context**, characterized by growing global and regional tensions, the increase in arsenals, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

This is why **France is opposed to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)**. Far from strengthening the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, it seriously undermines the credibility of the non-proliferation regime, first and foremost the NPT, nor does it not include a verification regime, as is the case today with the IAEA Additional Protocol. In fact, the TPNW contains provisions that deny the central character of the NPT: it does not set the condition of being a party to the NPT as a condition for accession. It also contains provisions that are much less protective than the NPT, for example on the right of access to civil nuclear energy, which is not regulated in the TPNW. For these reasons, France reiterates that it does not intend to accede to this treaty.

4) **France will continue its resolute and determined action in favor of the next realistic and gradual steps towards nuclear disarmament:**

The first objective must be to continue to reduce in a verifiable manner the stockpiles resulting from the arms race led by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. The end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the uncertainties about the future of the New Start Treaty which expires next February, and the crisis in the conventional arms control regime in Europe point to the possibility of a return to an arms race outside any framework by 2021, as we

have not seen since the late 1960s. In this regard, it is essential that the **New Start Treaty** be extended beyond 2021 and that discussions on an instrument to ensure strategic stability on the European continent be initiated. France will continue its efforts to develop an international arms control agenda in which Europeans make their voice heard.

The entry into force of the **CTBT** is another priority and we call on all States that have not already done so to sign and ratify it. France was the first nuclear-weapon State to sign and ratify the CTBT, and continues to actively support the work of the CTBTO, a body that is also central to meeting the challenges posed by proliferation crises.

The negotiation, in the Conference on Disarmament, of a **Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)**, on the basis of document [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein, is also an indispensable and irreplaceable step towards a world free of nuclear weapons. A FMCT will prevent the quantitative expansion of nuclear arsenals. There will be no nuclear-weapon-free world without a FMCT. The FMCT is a priority topic of the P5 roadmap.

Exchanges on the technical challenges posed by the verification of nuclear disarmament between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States are also important to increase understanding and build confidence among NPT States Parties. France contributes resolutely to the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), has participated in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the role of verification in nuclear disarmament, and will maintain this commitment next year within the new GGE. The Franco-German field exercise NuDiVe conducted in September 2019 was a groundbreaking exercise. This cooperation in this area is set to continue.

Finally, efforts in the area of **strategic risk reduction** must continue. They are mainly based on the transparency of nuclear doctrines, dialogue between the political and military leaders of the nuclear-weapon or possessor States, such as the P5 format, crisis communication instruments and reinsurance measures. In the current strategic context, France will defend, with its partners, more than ever before, a realistic and progressive approach to general and complete disarmament under Article VI of the NPT/.

Octobre 2020 Déclaration de la France « ARMES DE DESTRUCTION MASSIVES »

La lutte contre la prolifération nucléaire, balistique, chimique et biologique appelle une action résolue de tous alors que nous ne pouvons que constater que, cette année encore, le régime de non-prolifération et les normes fondamentales à la préservation de notre sécurité collective qui le composent ont été défiés.

La France condamne avec la plus grande fermeté la tentative d'assassinat de Monsieur Alexeï Navalny le 20 août dernier qui constitue un nouvel exemple de la menace que fait peser la réémergence de l'emploi d'**armes chimiques** sur notre sécurité collective et de l'urgence de restaurer la crédibilité de la norme d'interdiction de ces armes. L'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) a confirmé les résultats des analyses effectuées par la France, l'Allemagne et la Suède : l'attaque contre M. Navalny a été perpétrée au moyen d'un agent neurotoxique militaire appartenant à la famille des « Novitchok » développé par la Russie. Deux ans après l'utilisation par la Russie d'une arme chimique sur le territoire britannique à Salisbury, il s'agit d'un nouvel emploi choquant et illégal d'une telle arme. Le recours à des armes chimiques sur le territoire d'un Etat partie à la Convention pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (CIAC) n'est malheureusement pas un cas isolé. En Syrie, l'utilisation répétée d'armes chimiques par le régime contre son propre peuple depuis 7 ans maintenant est un fait avéré, confirmé à plusieurs reprises par les équipes de l'OIAC. Malgré l'adoption de la résolution 2118 au Conseil de sécurité en 2013, le régime syrien continue de refuser de faire la lumière sur l'état de ses stocks d'armes chimiques.

Au vu de ces évolutions inquiétantes, il apparaît d'autant plus essentiel d'assurer à l'OIAC les moyens budgétaires nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre de son mandat. Nous saluons, à cet égard, la mise en place de l'équipe d'investigation et d'identification (IIT) de l'OIAC, à l'issue de la Conférence extraordinaire des Etats parties de juin 2018, et la publication de son premier rapport en avril dernier sur les crimes commis à Ltamenah en mars 2017 par des unités de l'armée de l'air du régime syrien. La Conférence des Etats parties à la CIAC qui s'ouvrira fin novembre à La Haye étudiera ce cas avec attention, sur la base notamment du rapport du Directeur général de l'OIAC publié le 14 octobre, qui fait suite à la décision du Conseil exécutif de l'OIAC de juillet dernier intitulée « Contrer la détention et l'emploi d'armes chimiques par la République arabe syrienne » et qui conclut que le régime syrien n'a apporté aucun des éléments demandés par le Conseil pour remédier à la situation.

Nous le rappelons avec force : l'emploi d'armes chimiques est inacceptable quel que soit le lieu, la période, l'auteur et quelles que soient les circonstances. A cet égard, l'adoption le 15 octobre, par l'Union européenne, de sanctions en réaction à la tentative d'assassinat de M. Navalny constitue un signal fort sur le caractère inacceptable de cet acte. Notre action ne doit connaître aucune exception ni en Syrie, ni ailleurs. La France est déterminée à oeuvrer, en lien étroit avec ses partenaires, contre l'utilisation de ces armes et pour que les auteurs d'attaques chimiques soient traduits en justice et sanctionnés. C'est en particulier l'objectif du Partenariat international contre l'impunité d'utilisation d'armes chimiques (PICIA) lancé à Paris en 2018 et qui réunit désormais 40 Etats et l'Union européenne.

La France se félicite que le projet de résolution déposé par la Pologne reflète la pertinence du régime d'interdiction de l'emploi d'armes chimiques et la nécessité de rétablir des instruments de prévention d'emploi de ces armes. La France s'est portée volontaire pour être « championne » de l'action de l'agenda du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies intitulée « rétablir le respect de la norme globale contre les armes chimiques ». Nous restons, en effet, convaincus que les violations directes et graves de la CIAC qui se sont multipliées depuis 2013 ne doivent pas rester impunies.

Nous devons également collectivement chercher à préserver la nature et la portée du mécanisme d'enquête du Secrétaire général des Nations unies, instrument international indépendant permettant d'enquêter sur l'utilisation présumée d'armes chimiques et biologiques et qui vise à faire respecter les normes internationales en contribuant à dissuader les États membres des Nations unies, les individus ou les organisations d'utiliser de telles armes. **Nous n'accepterons pas que l'indépendance et l'efficacité du mécanisme du Secrétaire général soient remises en question.**

Le régime global de non-prolifération a été considérablement renforcé par l'accord de Vienne signé en 2015 et qui reste en vigueur. Notre priorité reste de nous assurer que l'Iran n'acquiert jamais l'arme nucléaire et nous poursuivrons, dans cette optique, nos efforts avec nos partenaires, en particulier allemand et britannique, pour mettre en oeuvre de manière rigoureuse et transparente cet accord robuste. Nous le faisons avec détermination et exigence parce que nous devons ramener l'Iran au plein respect de ses engagements au titre du JCPoA. La France l'a dit à de multiples reprises : elle n'accepte pas les violations commises par l'Iran et maintient son exigence de mise en oeuvre pleine et entière de l'accord. L'Iran doit montrer sa sincérité à en respecter les dispositions. Cette exigence concerne toute la communauté internationale et implique un engagement constructif de tous. A ce titre, la prétendue activation du mécanisme de « snapback » par les États-Unis est sans effet en droit puisque les États-Unis ont pris la décision unilatérale de se retirer de l'accord en 2018 et qu'ils ont, par conséquent, cessé d'en être un participant. Les dispositions de la résolution 2231 continuent donc de s'appliquer.

Dans ce contexte, la France salue le travail remarquable effectué par l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) et la déclaration conjointe du 26 août de son directeur général et du vice-président de la République islamique d'Iran, qui facilitera la pleine mise en oeuvre des obligations de l'Iran au titre de l'accord de garanties généralisées et de son protocole additionnel. Nous espérons que l'Iran coopérera pleinement avec l'AIEA pour clarifier toute question que l'Agence pourrait avoir.

Nous appelons également à la pleine mise en oeuvre de la résolution 2231 car force est de constater que l'Iran poursuit le développement à un rythme soutenu de son programme balistique qui contribue à la déstabilisation de la région.

La France reste très préoccupée par la **crise de prolifération nord-coréenne**, seul pays à avoir procédé à des essais nucléaires au XXI^{ème} siècle et dont les arsenaux illégaux nucléaire, balistique et d'armes de destruction massives constituent une menace grave à la paix et à la stabilité internationales. Cette année encore, la RPDC a poursuivi le développement de ses programmes nucléaire et de missiles à marche forcée : elle a entretenu ses installations nucléaires, poursuivi la production de matières fissiles, modernisé ses vecteurs et a effectué plus de quinze séries de tirs de missiles balistiques et de roquettes de gros calibre en violation des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Chaque action déstabilisatrice qu'elle mène lui permet d'engranger de l'expérience et d'améliorer sa technologie, menaçant ainsi profondément et durablement les fondements de notre sécurité collective.

Non seulement la Corée du Nord continue de violer le droit international, de se soustraire à ses engagements au titre du Traité sur la non-prolifération et de défier l'autorité du Conseil de sécurité mais elle continue aussi de développer des méthodes sophistiquées pour contourner les sanctions. Le dernier rapport intermédiaire du panel d'experts, publié en août dernier, l'a clairement confirmé. Nous avons donc plus que jamais besoin d'une mise en oeuvre stricte, entière et universelle des sanctions pour préserver le levier dont nous disposons en vue de négociations sérieuses vers la dénucléarisation complète, vérifiable et irréversible du territoire nord-coréen.

La Corée du Nord dispose également d'un programme chimique et elle a très probablement fait usage d'un agent neurotoxique, le VX, à l'encontre de l'un de ses ressortissants en 2017 en Malaisie. Les capacités de la Corée du Nord doivent faire l'objet de toute notre attention alors que le tabou de l'emploi d'armes chimiques a été levé.

Force est de constater que la Corée du Nord a refusé tout dialogue sérieux sur la dénucléarisation : il est temps que le régime nord-coréen prenne des mesures concrètes pour changer le cours de sa trajectoire et abandonner ses programmes proliférants.

La problématique des **vecteurs** d'armes de destruction massive est également d'importance majeure car le développement illégal de programmes balistiques par plusieurs pays alimente la dissémination de ces technologies. Nous constatons, en effet, avec inquiétude une dangereuse accélération de la diffusion de technologies de missiles sophistiquées, y compris vers des acteurs non-étatiques. La RPDC continue d'aider des pays tiers à développer des technologies de missiles tandis que l'Iran a continué de transférer des vecteurs et technologies associées à des acteurs étatiques et non étatiques au Moyen-Orient, en violation de plusieurs résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité.

Dans ce contexte, il est urgent que nous intensifions nos efforts pour renforcer les arrangements multilatéraux. Nous invitons tous les Etats à rejoindre le Code de Conduite de La Haye contre la prolifération des missiles balistiques (HCoC) et à adhérer aux Directives du Régime de Contrôle de la Technologie des Missiles (MTCR). La France est également favorable à l'élargissement de la participation à l'Initiative de Sécurité contre la Prolifération (PSI) qui est une mise en oeuvre concrète de la **résolution 1540**. Cette résolution et le comité qu'elle a créé, ont permis des progrès dans toutes les régions du monde, contre la prolifération des armes nucléaires, chimiques, biologiques et de leurs vecteurs. Mais la menace a évolué et de nouveaux défis sont apparus. Le rôle du Comité 1540 ainsi que ses capacités d'expertise doivent ainsi être renforcés. La menace de terrorisme nucléaire ou radiologique n'a pas disparu et il est essentiel de poursuivre la coopération internationale face à ce défi commun. La France considère en particulier que la question de la sécurisation des matières nucléaires et radioactives, et notamment celle des sources radioactives, est une priorité. C'est tout l'objectif de la **résolution que la France présente avec l'Allemagne à l'AGNU sur la prévention de l'acquisition de sources radioactives par des terroristes**.

Enfin, nous devons poursuivre nos efforts en vue d'une coopération renforcée et opérationnelle dans le cadre de la **Convention d'interdiction des armes biologiques et à toxines (CIABT)** qui a constitué la priorité de la France lors de notre présidence de la réunion des Etats parties en décembre 2019. Nous devons restés mobilisés en vue de la prochaine Conférence d'examen de la CIABT, unique norme internationale de lutte contre la prolifération biologique et pilier fondamental du régime de non-prolifération en tirant les leçons de la pandémie générée par le COVID-19. Dans ce contexte, tous les Etats membres doivent chercher à renforcer la transparence et la confiance dans le cadre de cette Convention. La France poursuivra notamment ses efforts de promotion d'un mécanisme volontaire de revue par les pairs dont l'objectif est de permettre une évaluation collective et participative de la mise en oeuvre des dispositions de la CIABT par un Etat partie, mais aussi d'accroître la coopération et l'assistance par le partage croisé d'expériences. Elle continuera de proposer une meilleure compréhension par les Etats sur la mise en oeuvre de l'article VII. Enfin, la France a décidé d'endosser le rôle de champion des actions 10 et 11 de l'agenda du SGNU, « se préparer à enquêter sur les allégations d'emploi d'armes biologiques » et « développer un cadre pour répondre à tout emploi d'armes biologiques ».

October 2020
Statement by France
“WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION”

Courtesy translation

The fight against nuclear, ballistic missiles, chemical and biological proliferation calls for resolute action by all, while we cannot but note that, this year again, the non-proliferation regime and the fundamental norms for the preservation of our collective security have been challenged.

France condemns in the strongest possible terms the attempted assassination of Mr. Alexei Navalny on August 20, which is another example of the threat to our collective security posed by the re-emerging **use of chemical weapons** and of the urgent need to restore the credibility of the norm prohibiting these weapons. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has confirmed the results of the analyses carried out by France, Germany and Sweden: the attack on Mr. Navalny was carried out using a military-grade nerve agent from the “Novichok” group developed by

Russia. Two years after Russia's use of a chemical weapon on British territory at Salisbury, this is a shocking and illegal new use of such a weapon. The use of chemical weapons on the territory of a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is unfortunately not an isolated case. In Syria, the repeated use of chemical weapons by the regime against its own people for 7 years now is a proven fact, confirmed on several occasions by the OPCW teams. Despite the adoption of resolution 2118 in the Security Council in 2013, the Syrian regime continues to refuse to shed light on its chemical weapons stockpiles.

In view of these worrying developments, it seems all the more essential to provide the OPCW with the necessary budgetary means to implement its mandate. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), following the special Conference of States Parties in June 2018, and the publication of its first report last April on the crimes committed in Ltamenah in March 2017 by units of the Syrian regime's air force. The Conference of the States Parties to the CWC that will open in The Hague at the end of November will study this case carefully, based in particular on the report of the Director-General of the OPCW issued on October 14, which follows the decision of the OPCW Executive Council last July entitled "Countering the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic" and which concludes that the Syrian regime has not provided any of the elements requested by the Council to remedy the situation.

We strongly reiterate that any use of toxic chemicals or toxins as weapons is unacceptable, regardless of the place, time, perpetrator or circumstances. In this regard, the adoption on 15 October by the European Union of sanctions in response to the attempted assassination of Mr. Navalny is a strong signal of the unacceptability of this act. Our action must not be subject to any exception, either in Syria or elsewhere. France is determined to work closely with its partners against the use of these weapons and to ensure that the perpetrators of chemical attacks are held accountable and punished. This is in particular the objective of the International Partnership against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons launched in Paris in 2018, which now brings together 40 States and the European Union.

France welcomes that the draft resolution carried by Poland on the implementation of the CWC reflects the relevance of the regime banning the use of chemical weapons and the need to restore instruments for preventing the use of these weapons. France has volunteered to be a "champion" of the action of the UN Secretary General's agenda entitled "Restoring compliance with the global norm against chemical weapons". Indeed, we remain convinced that the direct and serious violations of the CWC, which have multiplied since 2013, must not go unpunished.

We must also collectively seek to preserve the nature and scope of the UN Secretary General's Investigation Mechanism, an independent international instrument to investigate the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons, which aims to uphold international norms by helping to deter the use of such weapons by UN Member States, individuals or organizations. **We will oppose any attempt to weaken the independence and effectiveness of the Secretary-General's mechanism.**

The global non-proliferation regime has been considerably strengthened by the Vienna agreement signed in 2015, which remains in force. Our priority remains to ensure that **Iran** never acquires nuclear weapons, and to this end we will continue our efforts with our partners, in particular Germany and the United Kingdom, to rigorously and transparently implement this robust agreement. We are doing so with determination and exigency because we must bring Iran back to full compliance with its commitments under the JCPoA. France has said it repeatedly: we will not accept any violation committed by Iran and maintains its demand for full implementation of the agreement. Iran must show its sincerity in respecting its provisions. This demand concerns the entire international community and implies a constructive engagement by all. In this regard, I would like to recall that the so-called activation of the "snapback" mechanism by the United States has no legal effect since the United States took the unilateral decision to withdraw from the agreement in 2018 and has, therefore, ceased to be a participant in it. The provisions of Resolution 2231 therefore continue to apply.

In this context, I would like to commend the outstanding work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the joint statement of 26 August by its Director-General and the Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which will facilitate the full implementation of Iran's obligations under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol. We look forward to Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA in clarifying any questions that the Agency may have.

We also call for the full implementation of Resolution 2231, as it is clear that Iran continues to develop its ballistic missiles program at a sustained pace, which is contributing to the destabilization of the region.

France remains very concerned by the **North Korean proliferation crisis**, the only country to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century and whose illegal nuclear, ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction arsenals constitute a serious threat to international peace and stability. This year again, the DPRK has continued to develop its forced-march nuclear and missile programs: it has maintained its nuclear facilities, continued the production of fissile materials, modernized its delivery systems, and conducted more than fifteen ballistic missiles and large-caliber rocket launches in violation of the UNSC's resolutions. Each destabilizing action the DPRK takes allows it to gain experience and improve its technology, thereby profoundly and permanently threatening the foundations of our collective security.

Not only does North Korea continue to violate international law, evade its commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and defy the authority of the UNSC, but it also continues to develop sophisticated methods to circumvent sanctions. The latest mid-term report of the Panel of Experts, released last August, clearly confirmed this. Therefore, more than ever, we need strict, full and universal implementation of sanctions to preserve the leverage we have for serious negotiations towards the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korean territory.

North Korea also has a chemical weapons program and most likely used a nerve agent, VX, against one of its nationals in 2017 in Malaysia. North Korea's capabilities must be the focus of our attention as the taboo on the use of chemical weapons has been lifted.

It is clear that North Korea has refused any serious dialogue on denuclearization: it is time for the North Korean regime to take concrete steps to change its course and abandon its proliferating programs.

The issue of **delivery systems** for weapons of mass destruction is also of major importance because the illegal development of ballistic missiles programs by several countries is fuelling the spread of these technologies. Indeed, we note with concern a dangerous acceleration in the spread of sophisticated missile technologies, including to non-State actors. The DPRK continues to assist third countries in the development of missile technologies, while Iran has continued to transfer delivery systems and associated technologies to State and non-State actors in the Middle East, in violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions.

In this context, it is urgent that we intensify our efforts to strengthen multilateral arrangements. We invite all States to join the **Hague Code of Conduct** against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) and to adhere to the **Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)** guidelines. France is also in favor of broadening participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which is a concrete implementation of **Resolution 1540**. This resolution and the committee it created have led to progress in all regions of the world against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. But the threat has evolved and new challenges have emerged. The role of the 1540 Committee as well as its expertise capabilities must therefore be strengthened. The threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism has not disappeared and it is essential to continue international cooperation in the face of this common challenge. In particular, France considers the issue of securing nuclear and radioactive materials, and especially radioactive sources, to be a priority. This is the whole purpose of the resolution that **France is presenting with Germany at the UNGA on preventing the acquisition of radioactive sources by terrorists**.

Finally, we must continue our efforts to achieve enhanced and operational cooperation within the framework of the **Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)**, which was France's priority during its presidency of the meeting of States Parties in December 2019. We must remain mobilized with a view to the next Review Conference of the BTWC, the only international standard for combating biological proliferation and a fundamental pillar of the non-proliferation regime, drawing lessons from the pandemic generated by COVID-19. In this context, all Member States should seek to strengthen transparency and confidence in the framework of this Convention. In particular, France will continue its efforts to promote a voluntary peer review mechanism, which aims to enable a collective and participatory evaluation of the implementation of the provisions of the BTWC by a State Party, but also to increase cooperation and assistance through the cross-sharing of experiences. We will continue to propose a better understanding by States on the implementation of Article VII. Finally, France has decided to take on the role of champion of actions 10 and 11 of the UNSG's agenda, "prepare to investigate allegations of use of biological weapons" and "develop a framework to respond to any use of biological weapons".

Octobre 2020
Déclaration de la France
« ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE »

L'espace est aujourd'hui indispensable, pour ses applications touchant à la vie quotidienne, et pour ses finalités tant civiles que militaires. Cette utilisation croissante de l'espace signifie que notre dépendance envers les moyens spatiaux ne peut que croître.

La France est attachée à la préservation de la paix et de la sûreté des activités spatiales, ainsi qu'au respect des principes clés qui régissent les activités spatiales, notamment ceux de la Charte des Nations Unies et du traité de l'Espace de 1967, telle que la liberté d'accès à l'espace et son utilisation pacifique.

La France est en outre attachée à assurer la sécurité et la viabilité à long terme des activités spatiales, afin de prévenir la dégradation des conditions d'exploitation de l'espace et de préserver l'accès des générations futures à l'espace. La France se félicite à ce titre des progrès enregistrés au sein du COPUOS.

Toutefois, les bénéfices que nous retirons des applications spatiales sont sérieusement menacés par la détérioration actuelle de l'environnement spatial, du fait des risques d'incidents, d'actes délibérés, voire à cause d'actes hostiles qui peuvent aggraver dans des proportions considérables la prolifération des débris spatiaux et menacer notre sécurité et la pérennité de l'utilisation de l'espace. Il est de notre intérêt commun de promouvoir un principe d'utilisation responsable de l'espace.

L'analyse renouvelée de l'environnement spatial, de ses menaces, et de ses risques ont conduit à une adaptation de notre stratégie spatiale nationale. La stratégie de défense spatiale publiée en juin 2019 vise à renforcer notre autonomie stratégique, en particulier en renforçant des capacités militaires actuelles de veille stratégique et d'appui aux opérations; en étendant des capacités de connaissance de la situation spatiale (SSA); enfin en développant d'une capacité défensive dans l'espace. Notre stratégie est défensive et conforme au droit international et à la Charte des Nations Unies. En effet, le développement des activités spatiales doit se faire dans le respect du droit international général, et de la Charte des Nations Unies, qui s'applique dans son intégralité à l'espace extra-atmosphérique.

Le projet de traité visant la prévention du déploiement en premier d'armes dans l'espace déposé à la Conférence du désarmement et les résolutions y afférentes présentées en Première Commission, comportent de nombreuses défaillances. Ils ne comprennent pas de définition de ce qu'est une arme dans l'espace, ce qui, compte tenu de la dualité intrinsèques des objets spatiaux, est une tâche difficile. Ils ne s'adressent qu'à un type exclusif de menaces, occultant les menaces provenant du sol vers la terre, ou encore les menaces résultant de comportements hostiles ou agressifs. Nonobstant son opposition au projet de traité PPWT, la France a contribué activement aux travaux du GGE PAROS, qui a permis de démontrer les limites du PPWT et l'intérêt d'y préférer des mesures de transparence de confiance et de comportements responsables.

Sans s'opposer *a priori* à des approches de type juridique, pour peu qu'elles soient vérifiables, la France privilégie à ce stade des propositions immédiatement applicables compte tenu de la rapide détérioration de l'espace extra-atmosphérique et du caractère urgent de la réponse à y apporter.

A ce titre, la priorité doit être aujourd'hui de promouvoir des mesures de confiance et de transparence, ainsi que l'adoption de normes de comportement responsable des acteurs dans l'espace, notamment une norme d'interdiction de la production volontaire de débris multiples à longue durée de vie.

Nous saluons dans ce contexte la nouvelle résolution portée par le Royaume-Uni et un petit groupe d'Etats, parrainée par la France, relative à la réduction des menaces dans l'espace par l'adoption de normes de comportement responsable. Cette initiative qui s'inscrit dans le cadre du PAROS est bienvenue car elle offre une voie de sortie au blocage qui a prévalu sur le terrain diplomatique relatif à l'espace ces dernières années. En invitant les Etats à présenter leurs politiques spatiales, il vise à augmenter la transparence des activités spatiales, tout en réduisant les risques d'erreurs de jugement ou de calcul. En encourageant les Etats parties à étudier les risques et menaces dans l'espace et de caractériser ce que sont des comportements irresponsables ou responsables, afin d'alimenter un rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, la résolution lance un processus inclusif, graduel et ouvert de définition de normes de comportement responsables. Nous invitons tous les Etats à contribuer activement à ce processus.

October 2020
Declaration of France
“OUTER SPACE”

Today, outer space is indispensable for its applications in everyday life and for both civilian and military purposes. This growing use of space means that our dependence on space assets can only increase.

France is committed to the preservation of peace and the safety of space activities, as well as to the respect for the key principles governing space activities, in particular those of the United Nations Charter and the 1967 Space Treaty, such as freedom of access to space and its peaceful use.

France is also committed to ensuring the security and long-term viability of space activities, in order to prevent the deterioration of the conditions for the exploitation of space and to preserve access to space for future generations. In this respect, France welcomes the progress made within COPUOS.

However, the benefits we derive from space applications are seriously threatened by the current deterioration of the space environment, due to the risks of incidents, deliberate acts and even hostile acts that could considerably aggravate the proliferation of space debris and threaten our security and the continued use of outer space. It is in our common interest to promote a principle of responsible use of space.

The renewed analysis of the space environment, its threats and risks has led to an adaptation of our national space strategy. The French space defense strategy published in June 2019 aims to strengthen our strategic autonomy, in particular by reinforcing current military strategic intelligence and operational support capabilities; by extending space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities; and by developing a defensive capability in outer space. Our strategy is strictly defensive and consistent with international law and the UN Charter. Indeed, the development of outer space activities must be carried out in accordance with general international law and the United Nations Charter, which applies in its entirety to outer space.

The draft Treaty on the Prevention of the First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space tabled at the Conference on Disarmament and the related resolutions presented in the First Committee have many shortcomings. They do not include a definition of what a weapon in outer space is, which, given the intrinsic duality of space objects, is a difficult task. They address only one exclusive type of threat, ignoring threats from the ground to earth, or threats resulting from hostile or aggressive behaviour. Notwithstanding its opposition to the draft PPWT, France has contributed actively to the work of the PAROS GGE, which has demonstrated the limits of the PPWT and the value of favouring transparency, confidence-building measures and responsible behaviour to the PPWT.

Without *a priori* opposing legal approaches, provided they are verifiable, France favours at this stage proposals that are immediately applicable given the rapid deterioration of outer space and the urgency of the response to be made.

As such, the priority today must be to promote confidence-building and transparency measures, as well as the adoption of norms of responsible behaviour for space actors, in particular a norm prohibiting the voluntary production of multiple long-lived debris.

In this context, we welcome the new resolution introduced by the United Kingdom and a small group of states, sponsored by France, on reducing threats in space through the adoption of norms of responsible behaviour. This initiative is welcome as it offers a way out of the stalemate that has prevailed in space diplomacy in recent years. By inviting states to present their space policies, it aims to increase the transparency of outer space activities, while reducing the risks of misunderstanding or miscalculation. By encouraging States Parties to study the risks and threats in outer space and to characterise what constitutes irresponsible or responsible behaviour, in order to feed into a report by the United Nations Secretary-General, the resolution launches an inclusive, gradual and open process of defining norms of responsible behaviour. We invite all States to contribute actively to this process.

Octobre 2020
Déclaration de la France
« ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES »

Les défis relatifs aux armes conventionnelles restent nombreux et complexes. C'est pourquoi, la France reste pleinement investie en faveur du « désarmement qui sauve des vies », selon les termes du Secrétaire général. Il est essentiel, dans ce contexte, que nous puissions collectivement porter nos efforts sur les enjeux suivants :

Le **trafic illicite d'armes légères et de petit calibre** (ALPC) perdure en dépit des efforts pour endiguer ce fléau : un milliard d'ALPC sont en circulation aujourd'hui dans le monde, dont seulement 20% sont déclarées. Ce sont les armes qui tuent le plus puisqu'un demi-million de personnes en sont victimes chaque année. La dissémination incontrôlée de ces armes affecte tout particulièrement les femmes et les enfants. Au-delà de ces victimes directes, le commerce illicite d'ALPC soulève un grand nombre de défis parmi lesquels l'exacerbation de la violence armée et l'alimentation du terrorisme et du crime organisé, et constitue donc une menace pour la paix et la stabilité internationales. Nous devons poursuivre nos efforts car, près de 20 ans après la mise en place du Programme d'action des Nations Unies sur les armes légères et de petit calibre (PoA), il reste encore des progrès à accomplir en particulier pour prévenir et lutter contre le détournement des armes légalement transférées, pour mieux encadrer leur fabrication - y compris artisanale - ou encore pour renforcer la gestion et la sécurité des dépôts d'armements. Dans la perspective de la septième réunion biennale des Etats parties au PoA prévue en juillet prochain, la France aura à coeur de soutenir la pleine mise en oeuvre de ce Programme et de l'Instrument international de traçage (ITI) ainsi que de promouvoir une coopération accrue entre Etats et en particulier à l'échelle régionale pour lutter le plus efficacement contre les flux illicites d'ALPC.

La mauvaise gestion de stocks de **munitions conventionnelles en surplus** est également une source de préoccupation majeure car elle engendre les vols, la corruption, la recrudescence des accidents qui font beaucoup de victimes civiles ainsi que le détournement des munitions au profit notamment de mouvements terroristes. La France souhaite que le Groupe d'experts gouvernementaux puisse se réunir prochainement afin de progresser sur cette importante question, c'est tout l'objet de la décision présentée conjointement avec l'Allemagne dans le cadre de cette AGNU.

Le **Traité sur le commerce des armes** (TCA) contribue à prévenir les flux illicites d'armes classiques et vise une meilleure régulation du commerce légal en créant un partenariat de responsabilité entre exportateurs, importateurs et pays de transit, dans toutes les régions du monde. La France est attachée à la mise en oeuvre de cet important traité qui contribue au renforcement de la sécurité internationale en limitant l'impact déstabilisateur de la dissémination incontrôlée des armes. La France salue les progrès allant vers l'universalisation du TCA et enjoint les Etats qui ne l'ont pas encore fait à le rejoindre dans les plus brefs délais. La France appelle également les Etats à saisir les opportunités offertes par le Traité pour accroître la transparence en matière de transferts d'armements, et renforcer la coopération internationale, notamment en matière de prévention des détournements.

La France est très attachée à la **Convention sur certaines armes classiques de 1980** (CCAC) et à ses cinq protocoles qui contribuent à l'efficacité du multilatéralisme en réunissant en son sein des expertises politiques, juridiques et militaires. Nous devons chercher à préserver cette enceinte, si précieuse au dialogue entre les Etats sur les enjeux relatifs à l'application du droit international humanitaire (DIH). C'est pourquoi, la France appelle tous les Etats n'ayant pas encore signé ou ratifié la CCAC et ses différents protocoles à y adhérer, et rappelle que le respect des obligations qu'ils prévoient est un impératif. Préserver cette enceinte, c'est aussi lui permettre de fonctionner dans les meilleures conditions. A cet égard, la France tient à souligner sa vive préoccupation quant aux difficultés financières que la CCAC connaît en raison du non-paiement ou du retard de paiement des contributions par certains Etats. Chacun doit prendre ses responsabilités pour garantir la viabilité financière de la CCAC. C'est d'autant plus urgent que les Hautes parties contractantes prépareront, en 2021, la sixième Conférence d'examen de cette Convention.

Dans le cadre de la CCAC, la France participe activement aux travaux du Groupe d'experts gouvernementaux (GGE) sur les **technologies émergentes dans le domaine des systèmes d'armes létaux autonomes**. Nous sommes déterminés à poursuivre nos efforts sur les aspects techniques, militaires et juridiques posés par le développement potentiel de tels systèmes. Les onze principes agréés dans le cadre de la CCAC en 2019, qui répondent à l'exigence de garantir l'application du droit international et en particulier du droit international humanitaire, nous offrent aujourd'hui une base solide pour poursuivre les travaux dans cette même enceinte en vue du développement d'un cadre opérationnel et normatif robuste et universellement accepté. La mobilisation de chacun et en particulier celle des experts militaires et des juristes est indispensable pour partager notre analyse des enjeux induits par ces systèmes et de l'application des principes

directeurs, en particulier l'interaction entre l'humain et la machine et l'obligation de rendre compte d'éventuelles violations du DIH.

La menace représentée par les **engins explosifs improvisés** (EEI) persiste : utilisés de manière croissante et indiscriminée dans les conflits actuels et en particulier par les groupes terroristes, ils constituent un danger direct pour les populations civiles, ainsi qu'un risque opérationnel majeur pour les forces armées engagées sur le terrain. La France est pleinement mobilisée dans la lutte contre ces engins et se saisit de chaque opportunité pour renforcer la coopération entre Etats afin de lutter le plus efficacement possible contre les EEI. Outre la coordination du groupe d'experts dans le cadre du Protocole modifié II de la CCAC que la France exerce conjointement avec la Colombie, nous cofinancions l'outil d'auto-évaluation de lutte contre les EEI développé par l'UNIDIR (« *Counter-IED Self-Assessment Tool* ») qui vise à aider les Etats à élaborer des lignes d'actions nationales cohérentes pour faire face à la menace que représentent ces dispositifs. La France soutient l'action 18 de l'agenda pour le désarmement du Secrétaire général visant à renforcer la coordination et la cohérence des actions concernant les engins explosifs improvisés. Cette volonté de promouvoir une action résolue contre l'utilisation des EEI est reflétée dans la **résolution biennale « Lutter contre la menace que représentent les engins explosifs improvisés »** que la France, l'Afghanistan et l'Australie déposent à l'Assemblée générale des Nations unies. Cette résolution rappelle en particulier l'importance de la menace posée par ces engins, encourage les Etats à adopter des mesures nationales de lutte contre les EEI ainsi qu'à renforcer la coopération et l'assistance internationales dans ce domaine.

Depuis plus de 20 ans, la France est fermement engagée dans la mise en oeuvre et dans l'universalisation des **conventions d'Ottawa et d'Oslo** et poursuit une action ambitieuse en matière de déminage et d'assistance aux victimes.

Au cours des deux dernières décennies, 53 millions de mines antipersonnel en stock ont été détruites et le nombre de nouvelles victimes causées par ces mines a diminué de manière significative. Toutefois, le recours aux mines antipersonnel persiste dans certains conflits : nous devons renforcer nos efforts, conformément aux orientations du nouveau plan d'action adopté l'an dernier, pour une mise en oeuvre rigoureuse de la Convention d'Ottawa et le respect de son intégrité afin que le plus grand nombre de pays puissent se déclarer « libres de mines antipersonnel ». La France souhaite également rappeler qu'il est essentiel de garantir le bon déroulement des travaux qui ont lieu dans le cadre de cette Convention et que nous devons, à cet égard, chercher collectivement à assurer le respect des règles du multilatéralisme et du multilinguisme.

Enfin, la France continue de mettre pleinement en oeuvre la Convention d'Oslo interdisant les armes à sous-munitions dont les premières victimes sont civiles et poursuit ses efforts en vue de son universalisation. Celle-ci constitue un enjeu majeur puisque les actuels Etats parties ne détiennent que 10% des stocks d'armes à sous-munitions dans le monde. La France défend une position sans ambiguïté : toutes les armes à sous-munitions sont inacceptables en raison des dommages humanitaires qu'elles causent. Le nécessaire élargissement de l'adhésion à cette Convention et le renforcement de la coopération et l'assistance constitueront ainsi des messages forts que la France entend porter en vue de la prochaine Conférence d'examen de la Convention d'Oslo qui se tiendra à la fin du mois de novembre.

**October 2020
Statement by France
“CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS”**

Courtesy translation

The challenges related to conventional weapons remain numerous and complex. This is why France remains fully committed to “disarmament that saves lives”, using the words of the UN Secretary-General.

It is essential, in this context, that we can collectively focus our efforts on the following issues:

The **illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons** (SALW) continues despite efforts to curb this scourge: one billion SALW are in circulation today in the world, of which only 20% are declared. These are the weapons that kill the most, as they affect half a million people every year. The uncontrolled spread of these weapons particularly affects women and children. Beyond these direct victims, the illicit trade of SALW raises a large number of challenges, including the exacerbation of armed violence and the fuelling of terrorism and organized crime, and thus constitutes a threat to international peace and stability. We must continue our efforts. Almost 20 years after the establishment of the UN

Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), there is still progress to be made, in particular to prevent and combat the diversion of legally transferred weapons, to better control their manufacture - including artisanal manufacture - and to strengthen the management and security of arms depots. With a view to the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States Parties to the PoA, scheduled for next July, France will be committed to supporting the full implementation of the PoA and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) as well as to promoting greater cooperation among States, particularly at the regional level, to combat the illicit flow of SALW as effectively as possible.

The mismanagement of **conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus** is also a source of major concern as it leads to theft, corruption, an increase in accidents that cause many civilian victims as well as the diversion of ammunition in particular for the benefit of terrorist groups.

France hopes that the Group of Governmental Experts will be able to meet soon in order to make progress on this important issue, which is the purpose of the decision presented jointly with Germany at this UNGA.

The **Arms Trade Treaty** (ATT) contributes to preventing the illicit flows of conventional weapons and aims to better regulate the legal trade by creating a partnership for responsibility between exporters, importers and transit countries in all regions of the world. France is committed to the implementation of this important treaty, which contributes to strengthening international security by limiting the destabilizing impact of the uncontrolled spread of weapons. France welcomes the progress towards the universalization of the ATT and urges States that have not yet joined it to do so as soon as possible. France also calls on States to seize the opportunities offered by the Treaty to increase transparency in arms transfers and to strengthen international cooperation, particularly with regard to the prevention of diversion.

France is strongly attached to the **1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons** (CCW) and its five Protocols, which contribute to the effectiveness of multilateralism by bringing together political, legal and military expertise. We must seek to preserve this forum, which is so valuable to the dialogue between States on issues relating to the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). This is why France calls on all States that have not yet signed or ratified the CCW and its various Protocols to accede to it, and recalls that compliance with their obligations is imperative. Preserving this forum also means allowing it to function under the best conditions. In this regard, France wishes to underscore its deep concern about the financial difficulties that the CCW is experiencing due to the non-payment or late payment of contributions by some States. Everyone must assume their responsibilities to ensure the financial viability of the CCW. This is all the more urgent as the High Contracting Parties will prepare for the Sixth Review Conference of this Convention in 2021.

Within the framework of the CCW, France is actively participating in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on **emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)**. We are determined to pursue our efforts on the technical, military and legal aspects posed by the potential development of such systems. The eleven principles agreed at the CCW in 2019, which respond to the requirement to ensure the application of international law and in particular international humanitarian law, provide us today with a solid basis for further work in this same forum towards the development of a robust and universally accepted operational and normative framework. The mobilization of everyone, and in particular of military experts and legal experts, is indispensable to share our analysis of the challenges posed by these systems and the application of the guiding principles, in particular the human-machine interaction and the accountability.

The threat posed by **improvised explosive devices** (IEDs) persists: used increasingly and indiscriminately in today's conflicts and in particular by terrorist groups, they constitute a direct danger for civilian populations as well as a major operational risk for the armed forces engaged in the field. France is fully mobilized in the fight against these devices and takes every opportunity to strengthen cooperation between States in order to combat IEDs as effectively as possible. In addition to coordinating, jointly with Colombia, the group of experts within the framework of Amended Protocol II of the CCW, we are co-financing the Counter-IED Self-Assessment Tool developed by UNIDIR, which aims to help States develop coherent national lines of action to deal with the threat posed by these devices. France supports Action 18 of the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, which aims to strengthen the coordination and coherence of actions concerning IEDs. This desire to promote resolute action against the use of IEDs is reflected in the **biennial resolution "Combating the threat posed by improvised explosive devices"** that France, Afghanistan and Australia are tableting at the United Nations General Assembly. This resolution recalls in particular the importance of the threat posed by these devices, encourages States to adopt national measures to combat IEDs and to strengthen international cooperation and assistance in this field.

For more than 20 years, France has been firmly committed to the implementation and universalization of the **Ottawa and Oslo Conventions** and is pursuing ambitious action in the field of mine clearance and victim assistance. Over the last two decades, 53 million stockpiled anti-personnel mines have been destroyed and the number of new victims caused by these mines has decreased significantly. However, the use of anti-personnel mines persists in certain conflicts: we must strengthen our efforts, in accordance with the guidelines of the new action plan adopted last year, for the rigorous implementation of the Ottawa Convention and respect for its integrity so that as many countries as possible can declare themselves “free of anti-personnel mines”. France would also like to recall that it is essential to ensure the smooth running of the work taking place within the framework of this Convention and that, in this regard, we must collectively seek to ensure respect for the rules of multilateralism and multilingualism.

Finally, France continues to fully implement the Oslo Convention banning cluster munitions whose first victims are civilians and is pursuing its efforts to universalize it. This is a major challenge, since the current States Parties hold only 10% of the world’s stockpiles of cluster munitions. France defends an unambiguous position: all cluster munitions are unacceptable because of the humanitarian damage they cause. The necessary expansion of accession to this Convention and the strengthening of cooperation and assistance will thus be strong messages that France intends to convey in view of the next Review Conference of the Oslo Convention to be held at the end of November./.

Octobre 2020
Déclaration de la France
« CYBER »

Dans un monde en évolution rapide, les usages civils et militaires du domaine cyber se multiplient, représentant d’importants vecteurs de développement mais posant aussi de nombreux défis de sécurité. Les cyberattaques toujours plus nombreuses, complexes et de moins en moins coûteuses nous rappellent à quel point la cybersécurité est une priorité légitime pour les gouvernements mais aussi pour les entreprises et les citoyens qui sont bien souvent les premières victimes de ces actions malveillantes. **Dès lors, les Etats doivent affirmer leur volonté de répondre à ces enjeux par la coopération et par le droit.**

En ce sens, mon pays s’est largement investi dans la promotion de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans le cyberspace. Nous avons lancé un appel à la communauté internationale il y a près de deux ans : l’Appel de Paris pour la confiance et la sécurité dans le cyberspace. Cet appel, qui réaffirme notre aspiration à un cyberspace ouvert, sûr, stable, accessible, unique et pacifique a reçu un très large soutien et nous nous en réjouissons. En effet, l’Appel de Paris est aujourd’hui l’initiative multi-acteurs la plus large au monde. Il est en effet soutenu par plus de 1000 acteurs dont 78 Etats, 648 entités du secteur privé et 349 membres de la société civile, tous rassemblés autour de neuf principes et d’une volonté commune de réaffirmer que le droit international, dont la Charte des Nations Unies dans son intégralité, le droit international humanitaire, et le droit international coutumier s’appliquent à l’usage des technologies de l’information et de la communication.

Il en ressort notamment que chaque Etat est donc tenu de respecter l’obligation de régler ses différends internationaux par des moyens pacifiques. Plus largement, nous appelons chaque Etat à faire preuve de retenue et de responsabilité pour éviter toute escalade dangereuse et favoriser l’établissement de la confiance dans le cyberspace sans que cela ne remette en cause son droit à prendre des contre-mesures en réponse à un acte illicite commis à son égard et dans l’unique objectif de mettre un terme à celui-ci, conformément à ses obligations en droit international.

Par ailleurs, afin de faire respecter les droits des personnes et de les protéger en ligne comme dans le monde physique, les États doivent agir de concert, mais ne peuvent faire l’économie d’engager un dialogue avec le secteur privé, le monde de la recherche et la société civile.

Depuis plusieurs années déjà, le cyberspace est devenu un lieu de confrontation. C’est pourquoi la France a choisi de se doter d’une doctrine d’emploi de ses moyens de lutte cyber offensive et défensive, doctrine officiellement présentée en janvier 2019 par la ministre des Armées Florence Parly. En septembre 2019, le ministère des Armées a également rendu public un rapport qui précise la position française quant à l’application du droit international aux opérations dans le cyberspace. Cette transparence qu’affiche la France est le reflet d’un État qui se veut responsable. Elle s’inscrit en cohérence avec sa conception d’un cyberspace libre, sûr, ouvert, stable, fondé sur la confiance et les règles du droit international.

C'est en faisant preuve de transparence que nous réussirons à bâtir la confiance nécessaire à la coopération. La France **encourage donc chaque État à présenter publiquement son interprétation de l'application du droit international et d'application des normes et principes au cyberspace ou encore sa doctrine d'emploi des moyens cyber** comme nous l'avons fait nous-même.

La France a participé activement aux différents Groupes d'experts gouvernementaux (GGE) des Nations Unies sur la cybersécurité. Ce format a permis de progresser collectivement sur la question de l'applicabilité du droit international dans le cyberspace et sur le développement de normes et de recommandations importantes en matière de comportement responsable des États, à présent considérées comme universelles grâce à l'adoption par consensus du rapport du GGE de 2015 via une résolution de l'AGNU.

La résolution 73/266 de l'AGNU, présentée par les Etats-Unis et coparrainée par les Etats membres de l'UE, a conduit à la création d'un 6e GGE dont la France fait partie. Les travaux actuellement en cours ont notamment vocation à approfondir les normes et recommandations en matière de comportement responsable des Etats identifiées par les GGE passés, pour favoriser leur mise en oeuvre.

Par ailleurs, la France s'est également engagée pleinement dans les négociations du groupe à composition non limitée sur les questions liées à la sécurité du cyberspace (OEWG). Par sa nature, ce groupe permet à tous les États qui souhaitent s'y investir, de contribuer à une meilleure compréhension commune des menaces et des solutions. Son format a permis d'associer à nos réflexions le secteur privé, le monde de la recherche ainsi que les organisations non-gouvernementales, acteurs qui ont aujourd'hui à la fois des responsabilités propres et un rôle inédit mais crucial dans l'appui aux États pour une meilleure sécurité et stabilité de l'espace numérique. L'expérience de l'OEWG doit nous aider à penser la suite de nos échanges à l'ONU.

La France considère qu'un dialogue institutionnel régulier sur les enjeux de cybersécurité, sous l'égide des Nations unies, est nécessaire pour renforcer la confiance et la coopération entre les États dans ce domaine, comme cela a d'ailleurs déjà été évoqué dans le projet de rapport de l'OEWG. Si la France salue les progrès réalisés jusqu'alors dans les différents groupes et souhaite que chacun puisse aboutir à des conclusions substantielles, nous considérons qu'il est à présent temps de travailler à une option de long terme, constructive, coordonnée et inclusive qui permettrait de poursuivre les travaux menés sur l'application des normes et de développer les initiatives en matière de renforcement capacitaire.

En ce sens, conjointement avec plus d'une trentaine de partenaires, nous avons présenté un papier de réflexion le 1er octobre dernier, lors de l'OEWG, portant une initiative visant à créer un « programme of action » (PoA) pour les questions de cybersécurité, sur le modèle du PoA de l'ONU pour prévenir, éliminer, et combattre les trafics illicites d'armes légères et de petits calibres. Concrètement, cette solution prendrait la suite des travaux menés au sein du GGE et de l'OEWG et s'inscrirait dans une optique de long terme. Elle créerait le cadre d'un engagement politique fondé sur les normes et principes déjà agréés, tout en offrant la possibilité de les enrichir progressivement, si cela est nécessaire. Elle permettrait des échanges réguliers entre tous les acteurs concernés, Etats et autres parties prenantes, pour avancer sur des questions prioritaires, en particulier celle du renforcement capacitaire

Il est de notre responsabilité et dans notre intérêt de défendre les cadres d'action et les règles de droit édictés collectivement, en nous engageant pour le renforcement du rôle du système onusien dans cette régulation. Nous espérons donc que le plus grand nombre d'Etats possible pourra soutenir cette initiative afin d'envoyer un message résolu de la communauté internationale alors que les menaces cyber n'ont jamais été aussi fortes.

October 2020 Declaration of France "CYBER"

Courtesy translation

In a rapidly changing world, the civil and military uses of the cyber domain are multiplying, representing important vectors of development but also posing numerous security challenges. The ever-increasing number, complexity and cost of cyber-attacks remind us how cyber security is a legitimate priority not only for governments, but also for businesses and

citizens, who are often the first victims of these malicious actions. **States must therefore affirm their willingness to respond to these challenges through cooperation and the law.**

In that respect, my country has invested heavily in promoting security and stability in cyberspace. We launched a call to the international community nearly two years ago: the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace. This Call, which reaffirms our aspiration for an open, secure, stable, accessible, unique and peaceful cyberspace, has received very broad support, which we welcome. Indeed, the Paris Call is today the largest multi-stakeholder initiative in the world. It is indeed supported by more than 1000 actors including 78 States, 648 private sector entities and 349 members of civil society, all gathered around nine principles and a common will to reaffirm that international law, including the United Nations Charter in its entirety, international humanitarian law and customary international law apply to the use of information and communication technologies.

It shows more particularly that each State is thus bound to respect the obligation to settle its international disputes by peaceful means. More broadly, we call upon each State to exercise restraint and responsibility to avoid dangerous escalation and to promote confidence-building in cyberspace without prejudice to its right to take countermeasures in response to an unlawful act committed against it and with the sole aim of terminating it, in accordance with its obligations under international law.

Moreover, in order to ensure respect for and protection of human rights online as well as in the physical world, States must act together, but cannot avoid engaging in a dialogue with the private sector, the research community and civil society.

For several years now, cyberspace has become a place of confrontation. This is why France has chosen to adopt a doctrine for the use of its cyber offensive and defensive warfare capabilities, a doctrine officially presented in January 2019 by the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly. In September 2019, the Ministry of the Armed Forces also released a report that clarifies the French position on the application of international law to operations in cyberspace. This transparency displayed by France is a reflection of a state that claims to be responsible. It is consistent with its conception of a free, secure, open, stable cyberspace based on trust and the rules of international law.

It is through transparency that we will succeed in building the trust necessary for cooperation. France therefore **encourages each State to publicly present its interpretation of the application of international law and the application of norms and principles to cyberspace, or its doctrine on the use of cyber means**, as we have done ourselves.

France has actively participated in the various United Nations Governmental Experts Groups (GGEs) on cybersecurity. This format has made it possible to make collective progress on the issue of the applicability of international law in cyberspace and on the development of important norms and recommendations on the responsible conduct of States, which are now considered universal thanks to the adoption by consensus of the GGE's 2015 report via a UNGA resolution.

UNGA Resolution [73/266](#), presented by the United States and co-sponsored by the EU Member States, led to the creation of a 6th GGE of which France is a member. The work currently underway is aimed in particular at further developing the norms and recommendations for responsible behavior of States identified by past GGEs, in order to promote their implementation.

In addition, France is also fully committed to the negotiations of the Open-Ended Group on Cyberspace Security Issues (OEWG). By its very nature, this group enables all States wishing to participate to contribute to a better common understanding of threats and solutions. Its format has enabled us to involve the private sector, the world of research and non-governmental organizations in our discussions, players who today have both their own responsibilities and a new but crucial role in supporting States to improve the security and stability of digital space. The experience of the OEWG should help us to think about the future of our exchanges at the UN.

France considers that a regular institutional dialogue on cybersecurity issues, under the auspices of the United Nations, is necessary to strengthen trust and cooperation between States in this area, as already mentioned in the draft OEWG report. While France welcomes the progress made to date in the various groups and hopes that each will be able to reach substantial conclusions, we believe that **it is now time to work on a long-term, constructive, coordinated and inclusive option that would make it possible to continue the work carried out on the implementation of norms and to develop capacity-building initiatives.**

In that respect, together with more than thirty partners, **we presented a concept paper at the OEWG on 1 October with regards to an initiative to create a “Programme of Action” (PoA) for cybersecurity issues**, based on the model of the UN PoA to prevent, eradicate and combat the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. In concrete terms, this solution would build on the work of the GGE and the OEWG and would take a long-term perspective. It would create a framework for political commitment based on the already agreed norms and principles, while providing the possibility of progressively enriching them, if necessary. It would allow regular exchanges between all relevant actors, States and other stakeholders, to make progress on priority issues, in particular capacity building.

It is our responsibility and in our interest to defend the frameworks for action and the rules of law enacted collectively, by committing ourselves to strengthening the role of the UN system in this regulation. We therefore hope that as many States as possible will support this initiative in order to send a strong message from the international community at a time when cyber threats have never been so strong.

Octobre 2020
Déclaration de la France
« MACHINERIE DU DESARMEMENT »

La machinerie du désarmement et ses institutions telles qu'issues de la Session extraordinaire sur le désarmement (SSOD-I) de 1978 nous fournissent un cadre solide qui demeure indispensable à tout progrès sur la voie du désarmement, en oeuvrant par étapes successives en faveur du désarmement général et complet.

Permettez-moi de rappeler l'attachement de la France à la **Conférence du désarmement**, seule instance multilatérale chargée de la négociation de traités de désarmement à vocation universelle. C'est d'ailleurs bien à la CD, ou dans les organes qui l'ont précédée, qu'ont été négociés les grands traités de désarmement, notamment le TNP, la CIABT, la CIAC ainsi que le Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE), auxquels la France rappelle son attachement le plus fort.

La France ne peut que regretter le blocage de la CD depuis de longues années. La mise en place d'organes subsidiaires en 2018 avait permis des échanges très substantiels sur chacun des points à l'ordre du jour de l'agenda, notamment sur le traité d'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles pour les armes nucléaires (FMCT). Ce sujet, prioritaire pour mon pays, est également le plus mûr pour le lancement de négociations. La France soutiendrait une reconduction d'année en année des organes subsidiaires, dans une logique de continuité et d'approfondissement des échanges. Nous soutenons par ailleurs toute proposition permettant d'améliorer l'efficacité de la CD et d'y introduire plus de continuité. En ce sens, la France tient à saluer les efforts intenses entrepris par le P6 cette année et espère que ce mécanisme informel se poursuivra à l'avenir afin de garantir le suivi des travaux. La CD s'ouvrira l'an prochain sous la présidence de la Belgique, à qui nous apportons tout notre soutien. En dépit de l'échec à adopter un programme de travail cette année encore, la France reste convaincue du rôle clé de la CD, qui demeure également une enceinte indispensable pour faire vivre le dialogue stratégique. La crise de la COVID-19 nous a d'ailleurs montré à quel point l'absence de dialogue manquait cruellement et qu'un système multilatéral sans la CD serait bancal.

Permettez-moi également de dire un mot sur la **Commission du Désarmement**. Nous avons pris note du projet de décision déposée par la Russie portant sur la session de l'année 2021 de la Commission du désarmement. Nous estimons qu'il relève, sur de nombreux points, davantage de la Sixième Commission que de la Première Commission. Mais surtout, il existe déjà un projet de décision sur la Commission du Désarmement portée par la présidence sortante, à savoir l'Australie, dont **la légitimité pour présenter la résolution UNDC ne saurait être mise en cause et auquel nous apportons tout notre soutien**.

La France reste vivement préoccupée par les **graves problèmes de financement** que connaissent les enceintes de désarmement depuis des années. Nous déplorons notamment le manque de liquidités dû aux mauvais payeurs et rappelons à ce titre que le paiement des contributions nationales est une obligation. Par ailleurs, la pandémie actuelle a exacerbé ces problèmes de financement. Les surcoûts liés à l'organisation de réunions virtuelles ou hybrides et le respect du multilinguisme pèsent en effet sur les budgets des différents instruments. Cette situation est particulièrement préoccupante car la viabilité financière des instruments de désarmement est indispensable pour garantir leur efficacité. Sans les fonds disponibles, les réunions ne peuvent parfois pas se tenir, ou bien se tiennent dans des conditions insatisfaisantes, ce qui affecte considérablement une mise en oeuvre efficace des traités et des conventions.

Mon pays regrette par ailleurs que le multilinguisme soit menacé par cette situation financière particulièrement instable, qui préexiste à la crise de la COVID-19. Nous rappelons que le multilinguisme n'est pas une option, mais bien un garant d'un multilatéralisme efficace en permettant à chaque Etat de faire participer des experts qui puissent s'exprimer dans la langue de leur choix. Ainsi, disposer en partie du multilinguisme comme d'une mesure d'économie au sein d'enceintes multilatérales n'est pas à la hauteur de nos engagements.

L'Institut des Nations Unies sur la recherche pour le désarmement, l'**UNIDIR**, est un acteur incontournable de la communauté du désarmement qui a su développer une expertise importante, y compris sur les sujets stratégiques émergents comme l'espace et le cyber, pour ne citer que ces sujets. Saluant les travaux de l'**UNIDIR** qui contribuent à notre réflexion collective sur les grands enjeux du désarmement aujourd'hui, nous continuerons d'accompagner l'Institut, qui a apporté les preuves de sa résilience particulièrement en cette période difficile.

Mon pays attache une importance toute particulière à cet institut, puisque nous avons été à l'origine de sa création en 1978 et que nous présentons, tous les cinq ans depuis le début des années 90, une résolution réaffirmant le soutien de la communauté internationale à cette institution. Cette année 2020 est d'autant plus importante qu'elle marque le 40^e anniversaire de l'**UNIDIR**. A ce titre, la France est convaincue que la communauté internationale se doit de réaffirmer son soutien à l'institut, y compris en le dotant d'une structure de financement pérenne et viable, lui permettant de continuer à remplir le mandat que nous lui avons collectivement assigné. Dans ce contexte, le consensus sur cette résolution est d'une importance primordiale et nous souhaiterions pouvoir compter sur le soutien de tous.

Enfin, nous souhaitons ici saluer le travail exceptionnel réalisé par la directrice de l'**UNIDIR**, Mme Renata Dwan, au cours des deux dernières années à la tête de l'institut. Nous lui adressons nos meilleurs vœux dans sa carrière future et souhaitons que la personne qui lui succèdera à ce poste fasse preuve du même engagement dans la préservation de la qualité du travail indépendant de l'**UNIDIR**.

October 2020
Declaration of France
“DISARMAMENT MACHINERY”

Courtesy translation

The disarmament machinery and its institutions as established by the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) of 1978 provide a solid framework which remains vital for any progress on the path to disarmament, using a step-by-step process to work towards general and complete disarmament.

Allow me to reiterate France's commitment to the **Conference on Disarmament**, the only multilateral forum for the negotiation of disarmament treaties with a universal vocation. It was in the CD, or in the bodies that preceded it, that the major disarmament treaties were negotiated, in particular the NPT, the BTWC, the CWC and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to which France reiterates its strongest commitment.

France can only regret that the CD has been blocked for many years. The setting up of subsidiary bodies in 2018 had enabled very substantial exchanges on each of the items on the agenda, in particular on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). This subject, which is a priority for my country, is also the most ripe for the launch of negotiations. France would support a year-to-year renewal of the subsidiary bodies, with a view to ensuring continuity and deepening exchanges. Furthermore, we support any proposal that would improve the CD's effectiveness and introduce more continuity into it. In this sense, France would like to commend the intense efforts undertaken by the P6 this year and hopes that this informal mechanism will continue soon to ensure the follow-up of the work. The CD will open next year under the chairmanship of Belgium, to which we lend our full support. Despite the failure to adopt a programme of work again this year, France remains convinced of the key role of the CD, which also remains an indispensable forum for strategic dialogue. Indeed, the COVID-19 crisis has shown us how badly the lack of dialogue is missing and that a multilateral system without the CD would be flawed.

Let me also say a word about the **Disarmament Commission**. We have taken note of the draft decision tabled by Russia on the 2021 session of the Disarmament Commission. We believe that in many respects it is a matter for the Sixth Committee rather than the First Committee. Most importantly, there is already a draft decision on the Disarmament

Commission carried by the outgoing Chair, Australia, whose **legitimacy to present the UNDC resolution should not be questioned and to which we give our full support.**

France remains deeply concerned about the **serious funding problems** that disarmament for a have been experiencing for years. In particular, we deplore the lack of liquidity due to bad payers and recall in this regard that the payment of national contributions is an obligation. Furthermore, the current pandemic has exacerbated these funding problems. The additional costs associated with the organisation of virtual or hybrid meetings and respect for multilingualism are indeed weighing on the budgets of the various instruments. This situation is particularly worrying as the financial sustainability of disarmament instruments is essential to ensure their effectiveness. Without the available funds, meetings sometimes cannot take place, or are held in unsatisfactory conditions, which greatly affect the effective implementation of treaties and conventions.

My country also regrets that multilingualism is threatened by this particularly unstable financial situation, which pre-dates the COVID-19 crisis. We recall that multilingualism is not an option, but rather a guarantee of effective multilateralism by allowing each State to involve experts who can express themselves in the language of their choice. Thus, having multilingualism as a cost-saving measure in multilateral fora is not commensurate with our commitments.

The **United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, UNIDIR**, is a key player in the disarmament community, that has developed significant expertise, including on emerging strategic topics such as space and cyber, to name but a few. Recognising UNIDIR's contribution to our collective thinking on the major challenges of disarmament today; we will continue to support the Institute, which has demonstrated its resilience particularly in these difficult times.

My country attaches particular importance to this Institute, since we were at the origin of its creation in 1978 and have presented, every five years since the early 1990s, a resolution reaffirming the international community's support for this institution. The year 2020 is all the more important as it marks UNIDIR's 40th anniversary. In this regard, France is convinced that the international community must reaffirm its support for the Institute, including by providing it with a sustainable and viable funding structure, enabling it to continue to fulfil the mandate we have collectively assigned to it. In this context, consensus on this resolution is of paramount importance and we would like to be able to count on the support of all.

Finally, we would like to pay tribute to the outstanding work of UNIDIR Director Renata Dwan over the past two years at the head of the Institute. We wish her all the best in her future career and hope that her successor in this position will demonstrate the same commitment to preserving the quality of UNIDIR's independent work.

Guyana
Statement of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
to the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee) at the 75th Session of the United
Nations General Assembly
on Cluster IV: Conventional Weapons
United Nations
New York
30 October 2020

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the fourteen Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

Mr. Chairman,

Among the several challenges to sustainable development in the Caribbean Community is the high incidence of violent crime. This has reduced citizen security, impeded socio-economic development, eroded confidence in nation building and heightened fear among the population. In this context, CARICOM remains seized of the need to combat the main drivers of criminality in the region among which is the illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their associated ammunition.

Mr. Chairman,

More than 70% of the people who die a violent death in the Caribbean region are killed with a gun. This statistic is even more alarming when we consider that the region does not manufacture, export or re-export small arms and light weapons and their ammunition neither do we import them on a large scale. The region, however, continues to battle the ill effects of the illicit proliferation of these weapons in our territories and is increasingly convinced of the need for heightened concrete action at all levels to combat this scourge which constitutes a serious affront to our development efforts. Our situation is especially challenging given our porous borders, our financial constraints and limited capacities.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM remains a strong advocate of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) conscious of the significant contribution it makes to international and regional peace, security and stability.

The ATT adequately provides for the regulation of the international trade in conventional weapons and addresses critical elements including the diversion of these weapons to illicit markets. CARICOM believes that the object of what the ATT was meant to accomplish should remain foremost in our minds until it is achieved and hereby calls on Member States to strengthen their national control systems and update national legislation, policies and procedures to increase compliance with ATT obligations.

On this note, CARICOM underscores the need for a strong humanitarian element in decisions on arms transfer. As the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated in his new disarmament agenda presented in 2018, “High levels of arms and ammunition in circulation contribute to insecurity, cause harm to civilians, facilitate human rights violations and impede humanitarian access.”

Universalization of the ATT remains a concern for CARICOM and we urge those UN Member States that are yet to ratify the Treaty to do so as a matter of urgency. CARICOM would wish to ensure the Treaty’s universalization and commend those who have recently ratified, accepted, approved of or acceded to the Treaty.

CARICOM is encouraged that the 6th Conference of States Parties (CSP6) to the ATT was held, albeit in an exceptional format, despite the constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. On this note, we applaud the leadership of the CSP6 President, H.E. Ambassador Frederico Villegas of Argentina. The region looks forward to the Working Groups continued work based on the mandate given at CSP5. We welcome the establishment of the Diversion Information exchange Forum as a useful mechanism to further the Treaty’s objectives.

CARICOM expresses its full support to the Chair of CSP7, H.E. Ambassador Lansana Gberie of Sierra Leone.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM also recommit its support for key instruments that address the trade in and misuse of SALW including the UN Programme of Action to Reduce, Combat and Eradicate the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects (UNPoA, 2001) and its accompanying International Tracing Instrument (2005); the UN Firearms Protocol, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Arms Trade Treaty.

We have taken note of the dismal assessment of the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council on SALW. In his report, the SG notes that the destabilizing accumulation, illicit transfer and misuse of small arms and light weapons continue to initiate, sustain and exacerbate armed conflict and pervasive crime. CARICOM urges all Members of this Committee to commit to joint action to tackle this reality.

CARICOM regrets that the seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the UNPoA (BMS7) was unable to be convened owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. We look forward to its convening in 2021 as this forum presents an important opportunity for States to assess progress toward implementing the results of the June 2018 review conference (RevCon3), which included strong statements on many issues, including the need to ensure that gender concerns are mainstreamed in policies on SALW transfers, and on destroying surplus, confiscated, seized and collected SALW.

CARICOM hopes that in the short-term Member States can summon the political will to have deliberations on SALW that are fully practical and that address all aspects of the illegal trade in these weapons, including ammunition, because the vast majority of deaths and injuries due to SALW use occur in criminal incidents. We also urge a continued focus on the evolving challenges related to SALW management, including the impact of new and emerging technologies on weapon design. We look forward to actively participating in the Biennial Meetings of States Parties leading up to RevCon4.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM is pleased with the increasing attention being given to mainstreaming a gender dimension in disarmament processes including those related to conventional weapons. We affirm the view that women have a special contribution to make to disarmament processes as this is evident in our own region where women's influence at the grassroots level has been important in de-escalating tensions in situations of armed violence. Further, we recognize that women are often disproportionately affected by violence in conflict and armed violence situations and believe that this warrants continued attention to the gendered impacts of the trade in conventional weapons. CARICOM was therefore pleased with the level of support for the biennial resolution tabled by the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago on "Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control" and appeals to all Member States for their support of this important resolution.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM is of the view that greater work needs to be done to promote a common understanding of how all disarmament processes, including those relating to conventional weapons, feed into the achievement of the 2030 Agenda, including Goal 16 and its related targets. We have entered the Decade of Action and Delivery for Sustainable Development and we believe that such an understanding would propel our efforts forward with greater intensity and seriousness and would reduce the tendency to politicize these important questions which ultimately aim at engendering peaceful, prosperous and secure societies. On the same note, CARICOM also believes it is imperative to identify the synergies across disarmament instruments as this would aid our implementation and reporting efforts.

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me to also emphasize the need to pay greater attention to the question of divestment from the manufacturing of all types of weaponry as this has direct implications for the sustainability of disarmament efforts.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair, CARICOM reiterates its commitment to fulfilling its obligations under the various international instruments governing conventional weapons and stresses that the success of these instruments requires global commitment and global action.

I thank you.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on
Nuclear Weapons
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly,
October 2020**

The steady erosion of disarmament architecture and landmark arms control agreements over the recent years have exposed the world's military, economic and diplomatic fault lines. We would like to recall that the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (1978) which cautioned that 'Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization' should serve as a beacon of light to continue to guide humanity to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons and to achieve the ultimate objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

2. India's unwavering commitment to nuclear disarmament is well known. India's pioneering global initiative for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954 and for a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as distinct from non-dissemination, in 1965 and the call for proposed negotiations for an international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in 1978, are testimony to India's vision and efforts towards the achievement of this objective.

3. India is firmly committed to universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable nuclear disarmament. India strongly believes that this can be achieved in a time bound manner through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework; India's Working Paper, presented to the Conference on Disarmament in 2007, [CD/1816](#) precisely encapsulates this approach through a number of proposals that are undoubtedly relevant till date. India supports the negotiation of a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the CD.

4. India, as a responsible nuclear weapon State, as per its nuclear doctrine, has followed a policy of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence, based on a no-first-use posture and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. India is prepared to convert these undertakings into multilateral legal arrangements. India is committed to commence negotiations on all three core issues related to nuclear disarmament in the CD. Furthermore, India also remains committed to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Without prejudice to the priority that we attach to nuclear disarmament, we also support the immediate commencement of negotiations in the CD of a non-discriminatory, multilateral internationally and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on the basis of [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein.

5. India's annual resolution, on a "Convention on the Prohibition of the use of Nuclear Weapons", tabled since 1982 in the UNGA requests the CD to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. It reflects our belief that such a multilateral, universal and legally binding agreement would generate necessary political will among States possessing nuclear weapons to engage in negotiations leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Our resolution on 'Reducing Nuclear Danger', tabled since 1998 in the UNGA, has drawn global attention to the hair-trigger alert of nuclear weapons carrying unacceptable risks of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, that would have catastrophic consequences for all humankind. It recognises the need for a review of nuclear doctrines and the need for steps to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting of nuclear weapons. These two resolutions manifest our shared commitment towards the common goal of nuclear disarmament. India requests the continued support of Member States for these two resolutions, which have traditionally enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Membership.

6. India supports upholding and strengthening global non-proliferation objectives. All States need to be mindful of the growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons which poses a grave danger to international peace and security. India has contributed immensely to the global efforts towards non-proliferation and remains committed to do so in the future.

7. India would like to reiterate that the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, negotiated outside the CD, does not create any obligations for India, which is bound solely by the treaties to which it has given its sovereign consent. India believes that this Treaty, in no way constitutes or contributes to the development of any customary

international law. However, India stands ready to work with its signatories to achieve our shared goal of nuclear disarmament.

8. India is cognizant of the value of mutual trust, understanding, political will and dialogue and stands ready to work with all Member States in the collective endeavour towards realizing the goal of nuclear disarmament.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly,
October 2020**

The international community is acutely conscious of the grave danger posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction to international peace and security. India fully shares this concern and takes all necessary steps to address it.

2. India attaches high importance to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which is a unique, non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated and internationally verifiable disarmament instrument and serves as a model for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It has been India's consistent position that the use of chemical weapons, anywhere, by anybody and under any circumstances cannot be justified and the perpetrators of such acts must be held accountable. Any use of chemical weapons is in complete disregard of humanity, is reprehensible and contrary to the provisions of the Convention, as well as accepted international legal norms.

3. With the second largest number of declared chemical facilities to the OPCW, India possesses a significant chemical industry. It ranks among the States Parties receiving the largest number of industry inspections from the OPCW and has an impeccable track record of verification inspections. India believes that the provisions of the Convention must be implemented in a manner that does not hinder legitimate activities.

4. India is deeply concerned about the recent instances of the alleged use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world, including by non-state actors, especially terrorist groups and in this regard, reiterates the need for the full and effective implementation of the Convention. With regard to any allegations of use and consequent measures in this regard, India urges that the provisions and procedures laid down in the Convention be strictly adhered to by the OPCW and the concerns be addressed on the basis of cooperation among all parties concerned. India calls on States Parties to the CWC to undertake appropriate measures to prevent use or threat of use of chemical weapons by non-state actors.

5. 2020 marks the 45th anniversary of the entry into force of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). India attaches high importance to the BWC as the first global and non-discriminatory disarmament Convention, prohibiting an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. India accords high priority to its universalisation and full and effective implementation of the Convention by all States Parties. India has been actively participating in the inter-sessional process, established under India's chairmanship in 2017, to steer and prepare for the Ninth Review Conference of the Convention in 2021. We reiterate our call for institutional strengthening of the Convention, including through negotiation of a comprehensive and legally binding Protocol, providing for an effective, universal and non-discriminatory verification mechanism to strengthen the implementation of the Convention by States Parties.

6. The Covid-19 pandemic has brought to fore the biosecurity threats and consequent need for strengthening cooperation amongst the States Parties to the BWC. India remains ready to cooperate and work together with other States Parties towards this effect.

7. India has enshrined its commitment to supporting international efforts to prevent non-State actors and terrorists from acquiring WMDs and their means of delivery in Indian domestic law through the enactment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2005. Further, India has a robust and effective national export control system. Having faced the scourge of terrorism for many decades, India has consistently highlighted the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, which endangers international peace and security. Recent advances in science and technology including their dual use applications and lowering of the

technical barriers to their acquisition have increased the danger of proliferation and the potential for exploitation by terrorists and non-state actors for hostile purposes. Mindful of these developments, India, through its annual Resolution at the UNGA, titled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, has been drawing the attention of the world towards these threats and the need to strengthen international cooperation to address them.

8. India seeks the support of Member States as sponsors/co-sponsors towards these important initiatives manifest in our annual resolution under this cluster and will continue to work with Member States towards enhancing global peace and security.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on
Conventional Weapons
of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly
October 2020**

Amidst an environment of growing tensions in the global security arena, it is imperative to strengthen our collective commitment to disarmament instruments including the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which is one of the important instruments within the UN framework that offers a unique forum for progressive controls over certain categories of conventional weapons.

2. India is fully committed to the CCW and the humanitarian principles enshrined in the Convention and is a party to all the five protocols of the CCW. The Convention and its Annexed Protocols, while stipulating measures to mitigate humanitarian concerns arising from the use of specific weapons and weapon systems strive to strike a balance with the military necessity of such weapons. We have undertaken requisite measures to ensure the full implementation of our obligations under the CCW and its Protocols. India believes that Universalisation of the CCW remains critical for the success of the Convention and its Annexed Protocols. India calls on all States Parties to make their financial contributions to the Convention, in full and on time, to ensure predictability and sustainability in Convention’s finances.

3. We believe that Amended Protocol II of the Convention strikes a fine balance between humanitarian concerns on landmines and legitimate defence requirements, particularly of States with long borders, such as India. We have fulfilled all our obligations under the Amended Protocol II related, inter-alia, to the non-production of non-detectable mines as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India has been submitting its national annual reports in a timely manner.

4. India supports the vision of a world free of the threat of landmines. India observes a moratorium on the export and transfer of landmines. We believe that the availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform the defensive function of anti-personnel landmines and a change in conventional war-fighting philosophy, will facilitate the achievement of this goal.

5. India believes that AP-II serves as an appropriate mechanism for addressing the issue of IEDs under the CCW framework. India has been affected by the menace of the use of IEDs by non-state actors for the last three decades that have caused casualties of both combatants and civilians and thus we are sensitive to the issue of IED threat mitigation and victim assistance. India is willing to share its best practices with other High Contracting Parties and the United Nations.

6. India is deeply concerned about the challenges posed by illicit transfers of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons (SALW), to terrorists and non-State actors, which pose a major threat to international peace and security. India accords high importance to the UNPOA as the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate illicit trade in SALW. The full and effective implementation of the UNPOA and the ITI is a priority for India, especially as a means for combating terrorism and transnational crime. India looks forward to constructively participating in the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (BMS7) next year.

7. India supports the UN Register on Conventional Arms and the UN Report on Military Expenditures and has submitted its national reports regularly. India has strong and effective national export controls governing the transfer of conventional weapons which conform to the highest international standards and remains committed to preventing illegal transfer of conventional weapons.

8. India is a leading contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and extends assistance to international demining and rehabilitation efforts. During the course of the last one year, India has undertaken specialist training programmes on Counter IED, bomb disposal and demining with numerous partner countries including Australia, Cambodia, Indonesia and Uzbekistan. Our 12-member team of experts participated in a joint counter explosive threat task force training exercise namely, Ardent Defender-2019 at Ontario, Canada. India conducted the Twentieth International Counter IED seminar at our Special Forces Training Centre in February 2020, which was attended by 34 foreign delegates in addition to 135 Indian delegates and 49 start-ups. About 130 personnel from 13 African States participated in AFINDEX, a multinational exercise on demining and unexploded ordinance held in India in March 2020. We remain committed to capacity building and assistance to countries upon request.

9. India, one of the first signatories to Protocol V in 2005, is cognizant of the grave humanitarian concerns posed by the explosive remnants of war (ERWs) and is fully committed to cooperation and assistance in the implementation of Protocol V. We have also been submitting our national annual reports in a timely manner. India attaches importance to cooperation and providing assistance, to various countries, in the implementation of Protocol V.

10. India believes that the CCW is the most appropriate forum to address emerging issues on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). India welcomes the progress made in the discussions at the GGE on LAWS during the last four years and reiterates its support to the eleven guiding principles adopted during the annual meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the CCW in November 2019. It reaffirms India's stance that the work of the GGE on LAWS should continue to be guided by the principles of International Humanitarian Law and human responsibility must be retained across the entire life cycle of the weapon systems.

11. India's ratification of the Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities underscores the importance we attach to victim assistance. India welcomes efforts towards victim assistance and technical cooperation both under the UN mandate as well as on a bilateral basis. The 'India for Humanity' initiative, launched in October 2018 as part of Mahatma Gandhi's 150th anniversary celebrations and with a focus on Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy of compassion, caring and service to humanity, has conducted 13 artificial limb fitment camps in 12 countries and more than 6500 artificial limbs have been fitted till date. India is pleased to convey that, the limb fitment camps, which aim to provide for the physical, economic and social rehabilitation of the affected persons and help them regain their mobility, has now been extended up to March 2023.

12. India has been regularly participating as an Observer in the meetings of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and looks forward to participating in the Eighteenth Meeting of the States parties later this year.

13. In keeping with India's commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, India's Annual Disarmament and International Security Fellowship Programme for young foreign diplomats, that commenced in 2019 includes modules dedicated to conventional weapons and covers the CCW in a comprehensive manner. We believe that disseminating information about the CCW and the objectives that it seeks to achieve would make a meaningful contribution to its full implementation and its universalization.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on
Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly,
October 2020**

India has the honour to introduce under this cluster our draft resolution on the Role of Science and Technology in the context of International Security and Disarmament. India is pleased to note that this resolution has been adopted by consensus at the First Committee for the last three years and attracted co-sponsors across the regions. The resolution, inter alia, encourages Member States to facilitate multilateral dialogue as well as dialogue

among relevant stakeholders and for interested Member States to submit their views on latest developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts.

2. India is deeply aware of the need for enhanced international cooperation and for promotion of peaceful uses of science and technology through relevant means, including technology transfer, sharing of information and exchange of equipment and materials. In this regard, India believes that it is imperative that international transfers of dual-use goods and technologies and high technology with military applications are effectively regulated, keeping in mind legitimate defense requirements of all States.

3. At the same time, India is mindful that the rapid pace of developments in emerging technologies also pose potential challenges for international security and peace. As we all know, cyberspace increasingly touches upon every aspect of our lives. However, technological advancements and increased reliance on ICT are coupled with incremental challenges to the international security through malicious cyber-activity, from both state and non-state actors. In this regard, India remains committed to a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. In this context, we welcome the ongoing discussions in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE).

4. Increasing convergence between various disciplines, e.g. biology, chemistry, computing, engineering, materials science and nanotechnology etc., while providing significant benefits, also poses serious challenges in view of the possibility of their malicious use, including by non-State actors and terrorists. The final document on the 2016 comprehensive review of the status of implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004) noted that the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors is complicated by the rapid advances in science, technology and international commerce that could give rise to a risk of the misuse of such advances.

5. Keeping in view of the cross-cutting nature of these developments, an inter-disciplinary approach is essential to understand their implications as well as to formulate appropriate responses to prevent their adverse impact. India supports and actively participates in discussions relating to emerging technologies in various multilateral fora of the United Nations and specialized agencies, and within the framework of international treaties to which India is a party to. In this context we may also recall the contribution of the Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters which has also kept a number of scientific and technological developments with possible implications for security and disarmament on its agenda.

6. A number of the developments in science and technology are increasingly being contributed to by the private sector, hence it is essential to have a multi-stakeholder approach encompassing the participation of governments, relevant international organisations and private sector to take stock of such developments and develop an appropriate policy-framework to deal with them in all their aspects.

7. India would like to thank the UN Secretary General for submitting the updated report [A/75/221](#), as mandated by the 2019 resolution, on the recent developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts. The report provides an overview of the latest developments, in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Autonomous Systems, Digital Technologies, Biology and Chemistry, Aerospace technologies, Electromagnetic Technologies and Materials technologies. The report also informs the progress made in discussions on these aspects at relevant intergovernmental processes, bodies and instruments and highlights the important role that the United Nations is bound to play in addressing the emerging challenges before they can pose a danger to peace and security.

8. Given the relevance and resonance of this cross-cutting subject and its significance for all Member States, India hopes that Member States would extend their support as in previous years by adopting the resolution by consensus this year. We would also encourage Member States to co-sponsor this resolution and join us in this collective endeavour.

**Statement by India
during the thematic debate on
Disarmament Machinery
at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly,
October 2020**

India is committed to the ideals and principles enshrined in the UN Charter and supports a reformed multilateralism as the driving force to achieve them. While speaking on the occasion of the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations in July this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi reaffirmed India's belief that the path to achieve sustainable peace and prosperity is through multilateralism.

2. India believes that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility for disarmament. The UN disarmament machinery, established by the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I), consisting of the triad of the Conference on Disarmament, the First Committee and the UN Disarmament Commission plays a central role in global disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts. In a world faced with increasing geopolitical uncertainties and conflicts, further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic this year, the crucial need of the hour is to revitalize the disarmament machinery to enhance global peace and security.

3. India attaches high importance to the Conference on Disarmament as the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, as mandated by the final document of SSOD-I. India believes that the CD brings together its Member States in sovereign equality and in full responsibility to negotiate legally-binding instruments on disarmament. We believe that the CD, which consists of militarily significant States including all the nuclear weapon States, has the mandate and membership to commence negotiations on the core items on its Agenda, for strengthening international peace and security. It is a matter of regret, that despite several efforts undertaken during the year by the successive Presidents and Member States, the CD could not adopt a Programme of Work. However, instead of doubting the relevance of the CD and looking for alternate forums to negotiate on disarmament issues, Member States need to demonstrate the necessary political will to adopt a comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work. It is equally important that the Member States avoid politicizing and bringing extraneous issues to the CD to enable it to focus on its negotiating mandate. India stands ready and committed to work with other Member States on all core items on the CD's Agenda, including an FMCT on the basis of [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein.

4. The inability of the UNDC to hold its substantive sessions for two successive years, in 2019 and 2020, are certainly an opportunity lost for deliberations among Member States on crucial issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. We hope that the UNDC will be able to conduct its work next year and make substantive recommendations on the issues on its agenda. The three sessions of the OEWG on SSOD-IV in 2016 and 2017 adopted recommendations by consensus on the objectives and agenda for the SSOD-IV. India looks forward to the convening of the SSOD-IV, which is long overdue and can be an invaluable opportunity to take stock of the progress made in the disarmament machinery and to look at ways to revitalize it.

5. The First Committee, that embodies the international community's faith in multilateralism on issues of disarmament and international security, is an important platform for Member States to voice their views as well as to build consensus towards collective action on these issues. While India would have preferred a First Committee session with full and equal participation of all delegations, it is indeed a matter of satisfaction that the First Committee is able to convene this year, albeit under exceptional circumstances, in a spirit of solidarity and constructiveness.

6. India values the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which celebrates its fortieth anniversary this year, based on the mandate given to it by the SSOD-I, and supports efforts to ensure its long-term sustainability and effectiveness as a research body of global relevance that can make meaningful contribution to the international community's disarmament efforts.

7. In pursuit of our collective security in an increasingly interdependent world, India is committed to strengthening multilateralism through creative diplomacy and plurilateral understanding. India looks forward to working with all delegations to further strengthen the disarmament machinery and institutions with the goal of enhancing global peace and security.

**Statement by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster One: Nuclear Weapons**

New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia aligns itself with the statement of the ASEAN.
2. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, and the 50th year of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, we are still far from achieving one of the initial UN goals: the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
3. Indonesia views with concern that no significant progress has been made by Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in eliminating their nuclear arsenals. Instead, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence still exists along with modernization of nuclear weapons and collapsing disarmament framework. This has resulted in an ever-enlarging trust deficit among countries.
4. The total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the risk of their unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use.
5. Indonesia maintains that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is complementary to the NPT and serves as a major enabler towards our common goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. Indonesia welcomes that the Treaty will enter into force on 22 January 2021, following the ratification and accession by 50 States, as at 24 October 2020.
6. Indonesia will also continue to advocate for the universality of the NPT, which should be made a priority. We urge States, which are not yet parties, to immediately accede to the NPT as non-nuclear States.
7. Nuclear Weapon States must, under all circumstances, not use or threat to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the NPT, including by their complete exclusion of the threat of use of nuclear weapons from all of their military and security bases, concepts, doctrines and policies.
8. Indonesia maintains that the establishment of effectively verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is an integral and essential part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that enabled the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995. The establishment of Middle East zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction is essential to achieving the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament.
9. We hope that countries in the Middle East will advance determinedly to that end. In this regard, Indonesia welcomes the first conference to establish the Middle East Zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in 2019.
10. We view with concern that in the First Committee, there are efforts to reinterpret and backtrack from disarmament commitments, including those already agreed in previous NPT Review Conferences. This goes against the purpose of establishment of the First Committee, which includes: "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction".
11. Indonesia along with Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, and Thailand tabled two resolutions: Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons, and Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Indonesia seeks the support of all Member States for these proposals.
12. Finally, we underline that nuclear disarmament should provide concrete dividends for global prosperity. The Covid-19 and its multi-dimensional implications remind us that protecting humanity cannot be accomplished through nuclear weapons but through global solidarity and channeling resources in the right direction. Only by exercising our responsibilities and collective conscience can the global challenges be addressed effectively.

Thank you.

**Statement by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Two: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction**

New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia reaffirms that the use of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with their massive and indiscriminate destructive capacity is reprehensible and a complete grave violation of the related conventions and all norms of international law. Just as against nuclear weapons, we stand clearly against chemical and biological weapons.
2. Indonesia stresses the universality as well as the full and effective implementation of both conventions against Chemical and Biological Weapons. This is essential in enhancing and maintaining the international security architecture. Therefore, Indonesia has always and will continue to participate constructively in multilateral negotiations to strengthen non-proliferation and to achieve disarmament of WMD in all its aspects.
3. With regard to chemical weapons, Indonesia is deeply concerned that the said weapons remain a threat to mankind. We condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances.
4. Indonesia reiterates its firm commitment on the achievement of complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons, in line with the Chemical Weapons Convention. Indonesia stresses the need for the remaining possessor countries to strictly comply with their obligations as well as double their efforts in expediting the process of total destruction of the (ACWs)? and chemical weapon stockpiles before the determined deadlines.
5. For the Biological Weapons Convention, Indonesia believes that the most credible and sustainable method of strengthening the Convention is through a legally binding Protocol that deals with all Articles of the Convention, including verification regime. In this regard, the resumption of multilateral negotiations aimed at concluding such a protocol is very relevant and essential.
6. We also have to ensure that all initiatives to strengthen the BWC should be pursued on BWC-based agreed modalities. Any steps outside of the BWC's own modalities, and establishment of linkages with external instruments, would create an unnecessary division among the BWC membership. It would hamper the effectiveness of the Convention.
7. Our delegation would also like to share its concern over the financial situation of the Convention. We encourage all State Parties to find a permanent solution to the financial challenges faced by the Convention.
8. Within the national context, Indonesia is currently preparing a biology security bill that will include provisions relating to the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. It will also incorporate the implementation of agreements in the WHO, such as the International Health Regulation and the Influenza Preparedness Framework.
9. Let me close by reiterating Indonesia's determination to continue to work actively for the abolishment of all WMD.

Thank you.

**Statement by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Four: Conventional Weapons**

New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia aligns itself with the statement of the ASEAN.
2. Indonesia remains deeply concerned over the danger arising from the illicit manufacture, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons (SALW), which happen to be the weapons of choice in most conflicts. These weapons have caused an immense loss of innocent lives and property in numerous parts of the world.
3. We call on all major producing states to ensure that the supply of SALW is limited only to governments or entities duly authorized by them. The balanced, full and effective implementation of the Program of Action (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument are essential. In this regard, there is also a need to enhance international cooperation and assistance.
4. Indonesia attaches great interest to preventing the illegal trade in SALW, given its vast border area, and the risk of supply of illegal weapons that can potentially be used by criminal organizations and terrorists. We call for strengthened international, regional and sub-regional cooperation in addressing the illicit flow of SALW, specifically on customs trans-border, information exchange and between law enforcement, border and customs institutions. Indonesia has several laws that separately regulate ownership, licensing and prohibition of possession of firearms.
5. Indonesia is concerned by the humanitarian impact caused by cluster munitions, as one of the most serious threats to millions of innocent civilians in various conflict zones. We call on parties to conflicts to fully respect the international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and not use cluster munitions.
6. As a party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Indonesia reiterates its commitment to the full and effective implementation of the Convention and the Oslo Action Plan. Indonesia has also played an active role in various meetings under the framework of the Convention, national implementation (demining), and with efforts to encourage the universalization of the Convention in the Asia Pacific region. We invite countries outside the Convention to immediately join in. Indonesia also calls on states in the position to do so, to provide necessary financial, technical and humanitarian assistance to landmine clearance operations, social and economic rehabilitation of victims, and ensure full access of affected countries to necessary resources for mine clearance.
7. Indonesia, as the biggest archipelagic country and situated in a region with evolving intra-state security situation, supports strengthened regional and sub-regional efforts in controlling conventional arms, to promote regional and international peace and security.
8. We also acknowledge the need for intensifying joint efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit transfer of conventional arms by involving various cross-country and inter-agency stakeholders. All countries within the region and beyond have a responsibility in cooperating to prevent such illegal practices, which have caused massive humanitarian and economic loss.
9. Regional cooperation is indispensable due to the fact that challenges and problems facing countries in a certain region tend to be inter-linked. In such cases, collective handling by countries of the region is more effective than isolated national measures or imposed external measures.
10. My delegation would also like to affirm that it is the sovereign right of states to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms, their parts and components for their self-defense and security needs. We are concerned about unilateral coercive measures and emphasize that no undue restrictions should be placed by exporting states on the importing states.

11. Lastly, we stress the importance of proportional military expenditure, according to each states' national defense necessity and the principle of undiminished security for all. We also urge the major arms producing countries to reallocate the resources for sustainable development and international cooperation, including in the effort to deal with global health crises, particularly COVID-19 pandemic.

Thank you.

Statement by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Five: Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia aligns itself with the statement of ASEAN.
2. As a country with around 170 million Internet users or 65 percent of its population and ever-increasing digital economy, cyber stability and security are of the utmost importance to Indonesia. Information and communications technology (ICT) has also proven to be a useful and necessary tool to facilitate governments to continue to provide essential public services.
3. The increased number of malicious cyber activities by state and non-state actors, including through proxy, jeopardize cyber stability as well as international peace and security. These activities also endanger crucial socio-economic benefits of ICT. Furthermore, cyber attacks, aimed at critical infrastructures can potentially be threatening to human lives. The COVID-19 pandemic brings even higher risk of cyber attacks, as people's dependence on digital tools increased.
4. Indonesia is of the view that the advancement of new technologies themselves do not represent a threat to international peace and security, but rather, the misuse of ICT and irresponsible behavior of state and non-state actors in the ICT environment.
5. Indonesia wishes to reiterate that all states and entities share common responsibilities to ensure the use of ICTs for peaceful purposes. We wish to reiterate that adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and international law is essential in maintaining peace and stability in the ICT environment.
6. Through its multiple undertakings, Indonesia continues to advance mutual cooperation, best practices and capacities, to help enable an effective edifice on cybersecurity that could ultimately be adopted universally.
7. Mutual understanding, cooperation, collaboration, Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), assistance and capacity building are essential to strengthening security and stability in cyberspace. Bilateral, regional and global efforts, in this respect, must all be supported and seen as complementary, not competing.
8. Indonesia is actively engaged in the Open Ended Working Group on the Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG ICT), including its capacity as the Coordinator of Non-Aligned Movement Disarmament Working Group. Indonesia is also currently among the 25 members the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the context of International Security (UN GGE).
9. Indonesia supports continued discussion and implementation of non-binding norms according to the UN GGE report of 2015. Indonesia reiterates the vital role by the UN and regional organizations in promoting the discussion and implementation of 11 norms, CBMs and capacities on cyber security.
10. Indonesia is of the view that voluntary and non-binding norms serve as an important framework of responsible state behavior. While the gap on ungoverned cyberspace issues needs to be addressed, Indonesia encourages creation of further state and customary practices.

11. Indonesia is open to discuss the application of existing international law in cyberspace, including the possibility of *lex specialis*. Indonesia stresses that the use of cyber space be carried out in accordance with international legal principles, especially related to full respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, human rights, and the UN charter.
12. Indonesia is also among the supporters of the Resolution [73/27](#), which mandated the establishment of the OEWG ICT. During the current OEWG process, we submitted several inputs and proposals, both in national capacity as well as among group of states. Our active contribution is a testament to our delegation's commitment on realizing meaningful and successful outcomes in the OEWG.
13. Indonesia reiterates its support for a multilateral, inclusive and consensual process that belongs to and is driven by all UN Member States. We also look forward to continuing to engaging constructively on the future discourse on ICT in the context of international security.

Thank you.

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee**

**Thematic Discussion:
Nuclear Disarmament**

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Among all disarmament issues, nuclear disarmament continue to remain as the first and foremost priority in the disarmament and international security agenda.

However, the new nuclear arms modernization race and a lack of political will of nuclear-weapon states to refuse the consideration of a nuclear weapon option prevent the world from the achievement of this noble goal. Over 14,000 nuclear weapons that cost \$100 billion per year to modernize, maintain and deploy, and also the possibility of their use can result in an immeasurable catastrophic impact on humanity and the planet. Fifty years after the entry into force of the NPT and against the backdrop of the clear obligation on nuclear disarmament, the gap between that nominal commitment and its implementation is still so wide. While Nuclear Weapons States have failed to comply with their obligations, the non-nuclear-weapon states have proven their compliance to avoid proliferation. On the eve of the 10th Review Conference of the NPT, we should bear in mind that upholding the integrity and credibility of the NPT depends on the full implementation of all obligations therein, in particular on nuclear disarmament.

Additionally, from a socio-economic perspective, it is indecent to see the exorbitant funding spent on nuclear weapons every year while neglecting the most important security risks. The failure is evident, and the COVID-19 pandemic highlights just one of the unfortunate results of such failure.

In this context, the USA is a living example. Despite the fact that this country is the largest holder of nuclear weapons globally, it continues to modernize its tremendous arsenal. Just in 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense confirmed that W76-2 – the latest variant of a low-yield warhead- has been “fielded”. It uses this arsenal to threaten other non-nuclear-weapon states and irresponsibly lowers the threshold of use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, its withdrawal from the INF and the JCPOA as well as the apparent lack of the will to extend the New Start Treaty has caused immense damage to international efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

With the support of the USA, the Israeli regime threatens other regional countries in the Middle East with nuclear annihilation. Nuclear weapons, as the most dangerous weapons in the hands of the most dangerous regime pose the most dangerous threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties in the Middle East. This regime is the only regional obstacle to the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear weapons, a first-time proposal raised by Iran in 1974 that continues to enjoy the decisive support of the international community. We reiterate our call on the international community to utilize any opportunity to compel Israel to promptly accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party without any precondition, place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and, last but not least, participate constructively in the Conference establishing a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

It should be noted that another emerging threat in our region is the incomplete implementation of the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement by Saudi Arabia. Unless it rescinds its current Small Quantities Protocol, as was requested many times by the IAEA Secretariat, it does not provide the IAEA with enough verification authorities. A failure to implement the IAEA’s safeguards at a time when Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities appear to be rapidly accelerating, could allow the Saudis to hide certain nuclear activities without being subjected to IAEA inspections. It is worth mentioning that despite this situation, Washington has reportedly given the green light to seven U.S. firms to engage with Riyadh in the preliminary work on nuclear power ahead of any deal and without any prior-agreement for the enforcement of nonproliferation norms.

Along with other international community members, Iran is of the view that 75 years after the use of nuclear weapons by the USA in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there is no guarantee that such weapons will not be used again. Therefore, a binding norm should and must be adopted by the GA confirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This should be followed by phased nuclear disarmament through the adoption and implementation of concrete measures within a specified timeframe by the Nuclear Weapon States. Furthermore, until the realization of this goal, providing non-nuclear-weapon states with nuclear security assurances is imperative. It is obvious that breaking the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament and commencing the negotiations regarding a comprehensive convention on a total ban of nuclear weapons should be on top of the agenda of the international community.

Notably, large participation with strong support and calls for action towards nuclear disarmament in the annual UNGA high-level meetings on nuclear disarmament is a proof of the necessity and urgency of investing further political will by all States to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world at the earliest date.

The Islamic Republic of Iran remains fully prepared to work with the international community in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

**Statement by Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee
Thematic Discussion:
Other WMDs**

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

On other WMDs, namely, chemical and biological weapons, it is a matter of grave concern that we are still witnessing the use of chemical weapons or pursuing the work on biological weapons.

Given the bitter experience of being exposed to chemical attacks carried out by the Iraqi forces under Saddam's regime in 1980s which claimed the lives of thousands of Iranians and left more than 100,000 casualties who continue to suffer to this day, and based on our religious beliefs as well as the rational calculation of our national interests, WMD have no place in our defense doctrine. Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically condemns any use of such weapons by anyone, anytime and under any circumstance.

We attach great importance to the full implementation of the CWC and urge the only possessor of CWs to comply with its obligations to destroy its chemical arsenal at the earliest date and without further delay. In the same vein, the same SP to the CWC must withdraw its reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol without any further delay. Besides, we are deeply concerned to note the politicized approach of some MPs of the OPCW that has prevented this only competent international authority to conduct a professional and impartial job with regards to the Syrian chemical dossier. We are confident that, if not harnessed, the said approach will increase the gap among the OPCW Member States and will leave a polarized organization distracted from its utmost function, namely, the destruction of CWs in the hand of countries like the USA.

We are deeply concerned about the clandestine biological weapon programs that are pursued by some countries. In this regard, Iran continues to strongly support upholding the authority as well as the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Lastly, while the *Use of Biological Weapons* is contrary to the object and purpose of this Convention, nevertheless, regrettably, its provision does not explicitly prohibit it. This, indeed, is a major legal loophole and deficiency that needs to be addressed.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee
Thematic Discussion:
Outer Space**

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Iran believes that in order to cope with the threat of militarization of outer space, policy discussions and development of legal instruments specifically related to PAROS are especially and deeply necessary. While some years back the possibility of an arms race in outer space was just a potential risk, it has now become a real fact.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. has attempted to dominate space for national military advantage and to control the access of all other countries to outer space. This inclination became visible through the US' withdrawal in 2002 from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) which, as a treaty limitation, banned testing and deploying space-based weapons.

In the same vein, the U.S. introduced anti-satellite weapons in February 2008 and used a modified sea-based theater missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite under unjustifiable and unverifiable claims.

In March 2018, the current US President directed the Department of Defense to trigger the process necessary towards the establishment of a space force as the sixth branch of the United States Armed forces. The US Senate Armed Services Committee approved this proposal in May 2019. The figures specified in the next FYs herald a dramatic increase in the number of personnel as well the budget of this new unit.

My delegation would like to note that despite all these attempts, the U.S. cannot and will not be able to dominate space. However, its destabilizing actions create insecurity in outer space that affects international security globally. The international community should not let the US decide who should use outer space.

Iran emphasizes that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is not enough to make outer space a safer place simply because it does not cover other types of weapons and military activities.

Furthermore, with the stalemate in the CD and incapability of the UN COPUS to start negotiations on PAROS, the international community should find a way to overcome this inaction.

For us, outer space is the common heritage and province of all mankind. Iran strongly supports all international efforts and initiatives within the competent bodies of the United Nations, with the equal participation of all States openly and transparently based on consensus while taking duly into account the concerns and interests of all States for the prevention of militarization and weaponization of outer space. Accordingly, we support the substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body.

Furthermore, we are of the view that setting certain and tangible measures to promote and facilitate international cooperation through the transfer of technical knowledge, technology, and the required equipment is necessary while transparency and confidence-building measures are complementary to each other.

Last but not least, we insist that the monopoly of a few countries or attempting to restrict the peaceful uses of outer space transfer of space-related science, expertise, technology, and services to developing countries should be rejected.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee
Thematic Discussion:
Conventional Weapons

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chairman,

Regarding conventional weapons, the Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms the sovereign inherent right of any State to acquire, manufacture, import, and retain conventional arms for the legitimate purpose of its self-defense and security needs. However, sharing the concerns over increasing global military expenditure in our world which is over-armed and peace is underfunded, we are deeply concerned about the continuous flow of sophisticated offensive conventional weapons into the volatile region of the Middle East, in particular to those who are engaged in aggression against other countries and violation of international humanitarian law, specifically Israel and Saudi Arabia. It was exactly for the sake of preventing the occurrence of such crimes that Iran has been insisting on prohibiting the export of arms to aggressors and foreign occupiers that has exacerbated the security situation, especially in our region.

As for weapons trade, the Persian Gulf states accounted for nearly one-quarter of global arms imports during 2014-2018, almost doubling on average compared to the preceding five years. Unsurprisingly, the United States sold most of these lethal arms. But the real question is: have these vast U.S. arms sales to this region recovered anything even remotely close to the 7 trillion dollars that President Trump himself has acknowledged as having been wasted in our region since 2001?

Enjoying the abundance of wealth brought by petrodollars, some believe that everything can be bought. Certainly, arms can be purchased in abundance. Sadly, even some foreign policies can be bought by the highest bidder, too. But a lesson from all developments in our region is that security and regional stability cannot be purchased.

Despite being surrounded and affected by such a situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to have one of the lowest levels of military expenditure in a region. As a country actively engaged in multilateral fora to manage the side implications of conventional weapons towards international peace and security, we strongly believe in the necessity of prohibiting the export of arms to aggressors and foreign occupiers; intensifying efforts to prevent illicit trade in small arms and light weapons; considering the importance of the full implementation of the ITI and the PoA; a transparent and thorough discussion within the UNGA on humanitarian concerns about the military applications of certain new and emerging technologies and open to equal participation of all States; the strict observance of the inherent right of any State to security and self-defense; reducing global military expenditure; and finally, responsible production and transfer of conventional weapons to meet the actual and legitimate security needs of States.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

**Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee**

**Thematic Discussion:
Regional Disarmament**

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chair,

As a party to all major treaties banning weapons of mass destruction, Iran continues to fulfill its respective obligations under such treaties. We also remain committed to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East proposed by Iran in 1974.

It is unfortunate to see that the strategic region of the Middle East suffers from regional as well as extra-regional sources of insecurity.

At the regional level, besides the threats of foreign terrorist fighters, threats of U.S.-backed regimes in Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which have invaded their neighbors and kept the peoples of Gaza and Yemen respectively under a brutal siege, endangering peace and security in the Middle East. Therefore, to ease this situation, military aids and arms export to these regimes must be stopped, and the inhumane blockades against Yemen and the Gaza Strip must be lifted.

The main extra-regional source of insecurity is undoubtedly the US' illegal and illegitimate policies towards this region. In fact, its key regional objectives are to secure its military bases, to sell more deadly weaponry to the region, and to facilitate the Israeli regime's aggression and occupation. While it feigns support some regional countries, recent incidents truly exhibit how its reckless regional policy causes insecurity and instability in the region.

The Middle East will become more secure only when U.S. troops withdraw from the region. Regional peace and stability can be guaranteed only by the countries in the region, not through U.S. intervention or its economic terrorism. The US' aggressive policy in the Middle East has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. The U.S. has made wrong choices in our region and then has blamed others, particularly Iran.

The US' role in creating and assisting terrorist groups and using them as a proxy against the independent countries of the region has resulted in grave catastrophes. We condemn the terrorist act carried out by the USA in assassinating Martyr General Soleimani, the champion of the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in the Middle East.

Like the U.S., Israel is a source of insecurity in the region. Israel, equipped with WMDs, works towards increasing hostilities and chaos among Middle Eastern countries. Since its inception, this regime has been constantly engaged in brutal and illegal occupation, brazen terrorism, military aggression, and committed countless international crimes. With the backing of the U.S. Israel is the main source and cause of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It refuses to accede to any international instrument banning WMD and mocks the credibility of such instruments that form the components of international security architecture.

The main lesson of the recent developments in the Middle East is that security shall not be achieved with American weapons, and security cannot be purchased from foreign governments.

In conclusion, Mr. Chair, unless there is a collective effort to bring inclusive peace and security to the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf sub-region in particular, we will be engulfed in turmoil. Iran is committed to fulfilling its responsibility in contributing to the preservation of peace and security in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee
Thematic Discussion:
Other Disarmament Measures

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chair,

Iran strongly supports the establishment of international legal norms and rules concerning the prevention of the use of ICT and cyberspace for malicious purposes. We believe that in developing such norms and rules, multilateralism, including the UN's role, should be considered as the core principle of negotiations while setting demand-driven rules under international cooperation and capacity building. They should also be seen as a way to balance the "security" and "development" of all nations. It is worth mentioning that cyberspace activities shall undermine neither the sovereign rights of States nor the public order and security of countries.

Some States with subversive aims attempt to overtly or covertly misuse cyberspace to intervene in the political, economic, and social affairs and systems of other States.

Iran has been among the first victims of the malicious use of ICTs when it was attacked by Stuxnet against its peaceful nuclear program thus marking Iran as the first cyber Hiroshima in the world. Iran strongly advocates retaining this domain exclusively peaceful. We believe that the malicious use of ICTs is threatening not only international relations and security but also States' sovereignty, internal affairs, political stability, economic and social systems, national and cultural values as well as social integrity.

Fortunately, a unique and inclusive process in the format of the OEWG on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security was initiated in 2018. It has proven that its establishment was the right choice made by Member States through Resolution 73/27. As indicated by its mandate in paragraph 5 of the Resolution, the OEWG is in place to remedy the previous less "democratic, inclusive and transparent" processes. We hope that it will be able to submit its progress report to the current UNGA, and the process will allude to the incomplete work done by the relevant GGE.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
to the UNGA 75 First Committee
Thematic Discussion:
UN Disarmament Machinery

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation associates itself with the NAM statement delivered by Indonesia.

Mr. Chair,

On the UN Disarmament Machinery, Iran attaches great importance to multilateralism as the core principle of negotiations in the field of disarmament. We underscore the vital importance and continued validity of the UN's multilateral disarmament machinery established by SSOD-I.

Based on their existing methods of work and rules of procedure, in particular the rule of consensus, the Conference on Disarmament and the UNDC have formulated landmark universal instruments in the past.

It is an undeniable fact that the major problem of the UN Disarmament Machinery, in particular the CD, is the “lack of genuine political will” on the part of certain Nuclear-Weapon-States and their advocates that are unwilling to agree on a balanced, comprehensive, and priority-based program of work.

Mr. Chair,

The US’ negative or abstain votes for years are just one example of this lack of will. It is clear that the US not only lacks the intention to responsibly enter into negotiations for new disarmament or arms control treaties. Its new revisionist policy and repeated withdrawal from several related international instruments, the INF as the latest example, are also a big hurdle to the UN disarmament machinery that erodes their credibility.

Another chronic example of this kind refers to Israel. Every year, resolutions are adopted by the First Committee on creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and on Middle East nuclear proliferation. They require Israel to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty without delay. Machinery was needed to make sure those resolutions are implemented. Unfortunately, there is a clear selectivity on the part of the great powers, which undermines international peace and security.

Mr. Chair,

Iran believes that the existing disarmament machinery, in particular the CD, needs to be fully supported and enhanced. That is a shared objective and a common responsibility.

In this august Committee, we have an opportunity before us to finally and decisively change the course for the betterment of not just our own lives but also those of future generations. We must seize it and with vigor.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons Statement by Ireland

Ireland has a long-standing legacy as an advocate for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, rooted in our deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of a nuclear weapons explosion and the sheer incapability of mounting an adequate humanitarian response.

Ireland has continually expressed concern at the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, and the urgent need for progress to be made. As we collectively face some of the greatest global challenges brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis, it is unconscionable that these indiscriminate destructive weapons have not yet been eliminated.

In the midst of the current global challenges this year, we also marked a number of important anniversaries. On 6th and 9th August, we marked the 75th anniversaries of the US atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This remains the only occasion when nuclear weapons have been used in war, and the testimonies of the survivors, the *hibakusha*, remind us of the critical need to ensure that this is never repeated.

This year we also marked the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). A Treaty with which Ireland has a proud association dating back to our early years of membership of the UN. At that time, Ireland's then Foreign Minister Mr. Frank Aiken vocalised the fears of many across the globe and particularly small nations such as his own, about the existential threat posed by the existence of nuclear weapons. These concerns were magnified by the context of escalating international tensions, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a growing awareness of the impact of nuclear testing. This context serves as a reminder that difficult circumstances do not preclude us from making real progress toward our shared goals.

In ordinary circumstances we would have also marked the 50th anniversary of the NPT at the Tenth Review Conference, intended to be held in April and May of this year. Of course, the postponement of the Review Conference was unavoidable but necessary in light of the pandemic. The additional time until the rescheduled Review Conference affords us an opportunity to intensify our efforts to secure a successful and ambitious outcome.

Ireland is of the view that every effort must be made to avoid a repeat of the failure of the 2015 Review Conference to agree an outcome document. Recommitting to the NPT should be the starting point and not the goal of the upcoming Review Conference. The NPT is the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. Ireland remains fully committed to working with all states to make progress across the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All existing obligations and commitments made under the NPT, including Article VI; the decisions and resolution adopted in 1995, the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals; the 13 practical steps, and the detailed 64-point Action Plan in 2010 remain fully applicable and their implementation is more urgent than ever. The New Agenda Coalition resolution draws attention to these commitments and Ireland strongly urges all States to vote in favour of its adoption.

Ireland does not subscribe to the view that heightened tensions in the international security environment are an excuse to limit ambition or postpone progress. The adoption of a successful outcome at the Review Conference is essential, and maintaining the status quo is not acceptable. Far from being an obstacle, Ireland takes the view that the current international context demonstrates that progress on nuclear disarmament is urgently needed, and motivates us to redouble our efforts to achieve this.

Ireland has continued to build on our legacy in this area, most recently through our ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has recently reached the 50 ratifications required to trigger entry into force in January 2021. The Treaty is the outcome of a two-year process led by States and Civil Society concerned at the increasing risks and catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons use, as well as by the lack of progress on the disarmament commitments contained in the NPT. The Treaty is evidence of the shared desire among many States to make progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. We encourage States that have not yet joined the TPNW to do so.

The TPNW is fully compatible with the NPT, and provides a legal pathway for states to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. The NPT always envisaged a separate legal instrument to provide for nuclear disarmament and the TPNW therefore is the first step in implementing the NPT's nuclear disarmament provisions.

It is deeply regrettable that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has still not entered into force. Ireland continues to strongly support the universalisation of the CTBT and calls individually on each of the eight Annex 2 states who have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT as soon as possible without any preconditions. Furthermore, all States should abide by the moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and refrain from any action or rhetoric contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty.

Ireland underscores the importance of nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security, in accordance with Article VII of the NPT and calls on all concerned States to sign and ratify the relevant protocols to the Treaties establishing nuclear weapons free zones. Ireland supports progress on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery systems. This is integral to the package of measures that secured the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. We continue to call for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 agreement on the Zone. We believe that progress on this key issue can bring vital momentum to our broader disarmament work. We have been encouraged by the adoption of a political declaration at the New York Conference last November by participating States, which expressed their intent and commitment to pursue this issue.

Ireland continues to be deeply committed to non-proliferation as well as disarmament, recognising the crucial role of export control regimes in contributing to a safer and more secure world as well as underpinning essential instruments such as the NPT. In this regard, Ireland attaches great importance to the export control regimes, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The export control regimes have established guidelines and control lists regarding exports of goods and technology that can be used for the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. Ireland believes that it is of the utmost importance that the export control regimes keep up with challenges posed by current, new and emerging technologies. Ireland is concerned by the proliferation of missile technology, as the development, testing or use of ballistic missiles is a destabilising factor. Ireland strongly supports the MTCR and calls on all States to observe its Guidelines. Ireland also calls on all States, in particular those with significant activities in the area of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles, to subscribe to The Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC). Ireland, together with EU partners, continues to actively promote its universality, full implementation, and enhanced and improved functioning.

The work of the International Atomic Energy Agency across the spectrum of nuclear energy, safety and security is indispensable. Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements together with the Additional Protocol constitute the current verification standard and we continue to call for their universalisation as a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Ireland commends the Agency for fulfilling its role including its monitoring and verification activities in the current difficult situation brought about by the global pandemic. We strongly support the activities of the IAEA in developing nuclear-related science and technologies. Ireland was pleased to make a contribution to the IAEA's Marie Curie Fellowship Programme to inspire and support young women to pursue a career in nuclear science and technology, nuclear safety and security, or non-proliferation.

In recent years, we have witnessed many international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements unravel or be undermined. We are currently faced with the very real prospect of a new arms race, with costly nuclear modernisation programmes absorbing vast resources and global and regional geopolitical tensions continuing to rise. The Doomsday Clock is closer to apocalypse than ever – 100 seconds to midnight. The risk of a nuclear weapons explosion, whether deliberately, accidentally or by miscalculation, is as now as high as even at the height of the Cold War.

Ireland believes it is vital to reinforce our commitment to multilateralism to solve global challenges. In this context, international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements takes on an added significance and must be preserved and strengthened.

Ireland believes that the achievements of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty should be preserved, and encourages all parties to exercise restraint and to avoid an arms race.

Ireland recalls the special responsibility of the two states that possess the largest nuclear arsenals for nuclear disarmament and welcomes the ongoing engagements between the US and Russia on strategic arms control. We hope that these talks can lead to an agreement on the extension of New START as a matter of urgency, and for a future agreement on further reductions as soon as possible. In its preamble, New START reiterates both States' commitment to the fulfilment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and the extension of New START would be a demonstration of this commitment. Extending New START is also the most effective way to create time and space for future agreement, including the possibility of a more expansive agreement.

Ireland views the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a major achievement of multilateral diplomacy, an important contribution to nuclear non-proliferation, and a cornerstone of international efforts to support peace, security and economic development in the region, in line with our EU partners. Ireland regrets the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequent steps taken by the US that run contrary to the agreement. We are gravely concerned by Iran's breaches of the JCPOA and urgently call on Iran to return to full compliance with its terms. Ireland welcomes the agreement reached by the IAEA and Iran to facilitate the full implementation of Iran's safeguards obligations and is encouraged by the swift start to implementing that agreement. We continue to call on Iran to provide full and timely access to the IAEA inspectors and extend full cooperation to the IAEA in clarifying all outstanding questions relating to safeguards with the Agency.

Ireland remains concerned about the ongoing nuclear and ballistic missile-related activities of the DPRK, which represent a serious threat to international peace and security. Ireland urges the DPRK to fully dismantle its nuclear programme in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner and demonstrate good faith by immediately signing and ratifying the CTBT as well as returning to compliance with its obligations under the NPT and cooperating fully with the IAEA.

Ireland fully supports the UN Secretary General Guterres' Agenda for Disarmament, as it presents an invaluable opportunity and pathway to address the current issues in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation, and bring it back to its central role in building international peace and security. Ireland is proud to champion Action 1 of the Agenda for Disarmament, on facilitating dialogue on nuclear disarmament.

Ireland will continue to promote efforts to strengthen the application of gender perspectives in multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation, and arms control fora as a significant priority. The meaningful and equal participation of women and men, the involvement of youth, and contributions from across civil society, are of immense value to our work, and Ireland will continue to champion the diversity of voices across all three pillars of the NPT; nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. Ireland will likewise continue to highlight the disproportionate impact of ionising radiation on women and girls.

The scale of the global challenges we currently face must be met with an equally steadfast commitment to work in unity to address them. The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated more clearly than ever that arsenals of destructive weapons afford us no security or safety. The wealth of scientific and medical evidence shows us that we are completely ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation whether by accident, miscalculation or design. The only guarantee of safety from nuclear weapons is their complete elimination, and Ireland will continue to work to achieve this goal.

ENDS

Thematic Cluster on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Statement by Ireland

Ireland is firmly of the view that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have no place anywhere in our world. The presence of these weapons offers nothing to international peace and security and the risk that non-state actors may acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction adds a further dangerous dimension. We regard the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, as key instruments in the international community's efforts to achieve a world free of all Weapons of Mass Destruction. We call on those remaining States who have not yet joined these international instruments to sign or ratify as rapidly as possible.

The use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is a breach of international law and completely unacceptable. The ban on the use of chemical weapons under the Convention on Chemical Weapons is absolute and Ireland condemns in the strongest possible terms any and all use of such weapons. Ireland is deeply concerned that the global effort against chemical weapons is at a critical juncture, given the alarming pattern of use of chemical weapons in recent years, including again this year.

The assassination attempt on Alexei Navalny is abhorrent to all those who value the fundamental principles of democracy and respect for human rights. It adds to a worrying trend in recent years which threatens the global norm of non-use of chemical weapons.

Earlier this year, the first report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' Investigation and Identification Team (ITT) clearly attributed responsibility for a series of chemical weapons attacks to the Syrian Air Force. The Syrian people have been repeatedly traumatized by severe breaches of International Humanitarian Law and international human rights law that has included the use of chemical weapons. The international community cannot remain silent in the face of these breaches of international law and must act to end impunity for these crimes.

Ireland co-sponsored the Decision taken at the July Executive Council meeting in response to the IIT report. This Decision established clear steps to be taken by the Syrian Government in order to return to full compliance with the CWC. We deeply regret the absence of Syria's response to that request. As a State Party to the Convention, Syria is duty-bound to eliminate its chemical weapons programme, and to cooperate with the Technical Secretariat. Syria must cooperate with the IIT, allow access for testing to the sites identified, and immediately stop all use of chemical weapons. Ireland stands ready to support the utilisation of all punitive measures available under the CWC to ensure Syria's compliance. In addition, Ireland supports the EU's restrictive measures on high-level Syrian officials and entities for their role in the development and use of chemical weapons, and will consider additional restrictive measures on persons and entities as appropriate.

It is vital that individuals responsible for any use of chemical weapons anywhere are held accountable. The international community must redouble efforts to prevent impunity; the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is crucial in this regard. Its diligence, professionalism and impartiality while addressing the use of chemical weapons offer a vital first step towards accountability and an end to impunity. Ireland calls on all States to uphold the integrity of the CWC and cooperate fully with the OPCW.

Ireland is also a member of the International Partnership against the Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons and we would like to commend France for its continued leadership of this important initiative. We must continue our collective efforts to enforce the prohibition of chemical weapons use and hold accountable those who are responsible for such abhorrent acts.

Ireland is a committed supporter of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). With the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the issue of biosecurity is now at the top of the political agenda. The pandemic has confirmed the complex and interconnected nature of the issues we must be prepared to deal with in this area, and the importance and benefits of a multilateral and coordinated approach. The ability of the Convention to deal with the increasingly fast-paced nature of modern scientific developments is of the utmost importance. A critical step in this regard is its full and effective implementation, including addressing the use and threat of use of biological or toxin weapons. We remain conscious that the BTWC exists in a scientific context that has altered considerably from the assumptions that underpinned the original text. Ireland is open to considering ways to strengthen the Convention, to build global confidence in compliance, and to ensure effective multilateral response to fast-paced developments in this area.

Given the interconnected nature of the world we live in today, multilateral tools and export control regimes assume critical importance. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime is a key priority for Ireland. Ireland strongly supports key non-proliferation regimes addressing other WMD, including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the MTCR. Effective export controls and multilateral cooperation is crucial to stopping the proliferation of technologies, which can foster the development of WMDs and other devastating weapons. Furthermore, Ireland continues to fully support the comprehensive implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which remains a central pillar of the international non-proliferation architecture, and a key tool in the fight against non-states actors seeking to acquire and use WMD.

To enhance response capability to possible WMD use, the Irish Defence Forces has a successful partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross, providing CBRN training to its humanitarian staff, equipping them with the practical skills they need to survive and deliver their vital services in extreme situations. Ireland remains committed to the important goal of achieving a Middle East Zone free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, based on arrangements freely arrived at by States of the Region. We continue to call for the full implementation of the 1995 resolution and the 2010 agreement on the Zone. Progress on this key issue can bring vital momentum to our broader disarmament work. We have been encouraged by the adoption of a political declaration at the New York Conference last November by participating States, which expressed their intent and commitment to pursue this issue.

Ireland is further concerned by the potentially destabilising effects of hypersonic missiles and believes that it is vital for non-proliferation discussions to take account of emerging developments and future technologies. In this regard, we support the Secretary General's call for moratorium on testing and development of hypersonic missiles and encourage the international community to make every effort to ensure that our ability to regulate emerging developments is not outpaced by technology.

ENDS

Thematic Debate on Conventional Weapons Statement by Ireland

As we meet, the world continues its efforts to combat COVID-19. It is unfortunate that our work has been delayed or curtailed in many forums. In this context, Ireland thanks the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and the secretariats and implementation support units of the conventional weapons treaties and conventions for continuing their critical work during this pandemic. Yet, as we tackle this new challenge, the challenges created by armed conflict remain.

The stark reality is that conflicts around the world have become increasingly urbanised and civilians continue to bear the brunt. This can have devastating implications for individuals and their communities in the short, medium and long term. The interrelationship between disarmament, peace, security and sustainable development is irrefutable. Ireland welcomes that this interrelationship forms a central thread of the U.N. Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament and we are proud to be championing three agenda actions.

Addressing the humanitarian harm from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas remains a priority for Ireland. We remain gravely concerned at the civilian harm caused during active hostilities in populated areas and in particular by the use of explosive ordnance and other explosive weapons. There is well-documented evidence showing that the ways in which explosive weapons are being used in populated areas is having devastating effects. The loss of life and the physical and psychological injuries inflicted on civilians are abhorrent and unacceptable.

The effects extend further to the destruction of critical infrastructure, such as roads, hospitals and sanitation facilities. This infrastructure is vital for immediate humanitarian response and for post-conflict development. This destruction often acts as a catalyst for the displacement of people within and across borders, putting displaced persons and refugees at greater risk of exploitation and abuse.

It is clear that where we cannot prevent or resolve conflict, we must work to strengthen the protection of civilians. In many conflict situations, there are serious concerns regarding how the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) are being translated into policies and practice. Much more must and can be done. That is why Ireland was amongst those countries that took up the call of the UN Secretary General to champion the issue of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA). The starting point must be, first and foremost, full compliance with international law, especially International Humanitarian Law.

Since November 2019, Ireland has led a consultation process to develop a political declaration on EWIPA. While face-to-face work to conclude the declaration has been interrupted by the pandemic, efforts continue to maintain momentum as far as possible. We have been encouraged by the level of cross-regional engagement in this process, which builds on multiple international and regional efforts to enhance the protection of civilians. We encourage all states to participate in this process.

The continued illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons is an issue of deep concern. These illicit flows of arms exacerbate tensions, prolong conflicts, fuel organised crime, and contribute to gender-based violence. The eradication of illicit flows of small arms and light weapons is a prerequisite of sustainable peace and conflict prevention, and an express target of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Ireland is a strong supporter of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and its International Tracing Instrument. The UN PoA is a dynamic, living framework that must evolve and keep pace with new technological developments to address emerging challenges. We look forward to participating at the rescheduled Biennial Meeting of State Parties next year.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the cornerstone of efforts to tackle illicit proliferation and provides states with the basis for an effective and responsible export control system. We welcome steps by the ATT and its working groups to improve reporting and aid transparency. We further welcome the establishment of the Diversion Information Exchange Forum during the Conference of State parties, which will aid states' efforts to tackle issues of illicit transfers and diversions of arms. We are pleased to note that there are now 109 State Parties to the ATT as we continue efforts towards treaty universalisation. We urge all states to join the ATT.

We are conscious of the potential risks posed by emerging weapon technologies, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). They present a variety of complex challenges, comprising legal, military, technical and ethical aspects. We remain engaged in the work of the Group of Government Experts (GGE) on LAWS and of the ongoing work on the elaboration of understandings on the Guiding Principles. It is our steadfast belief that such weapons must always remain under human control and that human accountability, and human accountability only, can ensure full compliance with IHL. The rapid pace of technological advancements necessitates that we accelerate our efforts and agree tangible outcomes. It is our view that working to achieve consensus within the UN system remains the most effective way to address the emerging challenges posed by Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Therefore, it is crucial that those countries most likely to develop these new weapon systems meaningfully engage as we work toward the development of a normative framework.

The cooperation and assistance programmes for humanitarian demining supported by Ireland are directly linked to our commitments under the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention (APLC), the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), as well as Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on Explosive Remnants of War. We welcome the adoption of the Oslo Action Plan at the Fourth Review Conference of the APLC last year and its integrated approach to demining efforts. Ireland has a long history of supporting humanitarian mine action programmes, designed to clear contaminated land and to advance long-term economic development. We are currently in a three-year programme where we are committing €5.5 million to humanitarian de-mining.

As we look towards the Second Review Conference of the CCM later this year, it is crucial that we embed our efforts within a unified approach informed by the objectives of the development, peace, and security agendas. Universalisation, stockpile destruction, and the clearance of contaminated areas, as well as survivor engagement and victim assistance are all crucial for success. Recent reports of the use of cluster munitions have underscored the devastating impacts these weapons can have on communities in the short, medium, and long term. Cluster Munitions are by design indiscriminate, and their use is often in breach of IHL. We condemn all reported incidence of Cluster Munitions use and we call on all states to join the CCM as a matter of urgency.

The issue of Mines Other Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) is one of humanitarian urgency. We remain concerned by the evidence of the humanitarian impact arising from the use of these weapons. Ireland continues to believe that MOTAPM should remain on the CCW agenda in order to adequately address these concerns. Along with many other States, we are committed to promoting an expert exchange of views on MOTAPM within the Amended Protocol II framework, the continued consideration of this issue is of central importance to the protection of civilians

In conclusion, Ireland would also like to express our sincere thanks for the crucial role played by UN agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and by civil society particularly in this most challenging of years. They have contributed immensely to our progress on these old and new challenges in conventional arms, which continue to have the most direct and immediate impacts on people's lives.

ENDS

Thematic Debate on Disarmament Machinery Statement by Ireland

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted our shared fragility and demonstrated how critical multilateralism is to our collective health, prosperity, and security. 75 years on from the foundation of the United Nations, it is our belief that we must all recommit to the vision of its founders, working together to lay the foundations for a better, and more secure future, for all. Ireland regards the focus of this committee, disarmament and international security, as being essential to the achievement of the vision set out in the United Nations Charter, and to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

In the face of the complex global challenges, who can deny that genuine and comprehensive progress on disarmament across the range of weapons of mass destruction and of conventional weapons is needed today more than ever? In this regard, Ireland reiterates the need for an effective UN disarmament machinery, which facilitates our ability to make meaningful progress on our shared objectives. The failure to implement existing disarmament commitments will lead to a further deterioration in the global security environment.

Undoubtedly, this year we are faced with unique challenges. COVID-19 has drastically changed how we live, work and connect with each other. It has prevented many of us from traveling and connecting physically, and has led to the postponement of important meetings. However, we must seize the opportunity to use the additional time to better prepare for postponed meetings and conferences not least by taking advantage of new ways to connect with one another across the disarmament sphere.

In times past, the Conference on Disarmament has played a vital role and made significant contributions to international peace and security. Sadly, the CD has failed to make progress on any substantive work for over two decades. Effective cooperation and engagement on disarmament issues is particularly important in an environment of tension and distrust. We cannot continue to neglect our collective responsibilities. We must step outside the strict silos of national self-interest. It is our duty to uphold and strengthen the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture in the interests of global peace and security and the CD should be at the centre of this work.

Ireland supports the important role of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as a deliberative body of the UN General Assembly on disarmament matters. We deeply regret that the UNDC was again unable to hold formal substantive deliberations this year. We must redouble our efforts to ensure that it is revitalised.

Ireland fully supports Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, and its aim to return multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation to its central role in building international peace and security, as well as situating disarmament in broader global discussions including sustainable development. The Agenda presents us with a unique opportunity to break the stalemate and to facilitate the achievement of the sustainable development goals. Ireland is committed to championing actions including action 1 on facilitating dialogue on nuclear disarmament, action 14 on explosive weapons in populated areas and action 21 on impact of arms on conflict management. Ireland also welcomes the active role taken by the European Union in becoming a supporter of ten actions.

Ireland has always been a strong supporter of active engagement with Civil Society, seeing advocacy and interest groups as valued and vital partners. In those issues which are central to the First Committee's mandate, NGOs and Civil Society play an important role within the framework of Treaties and Conventions, tracking the implementation of State's disarmament commitments, bringing pressure to bear on States through lobbying and the raising of public awareness. They also provide crucial services from victim assistance to capacity building. We must ensure that, even in these challenging times, civil society engagement is prioritised and supported and that the disarmament machinery is inclusive.

25 years on from the Beijing Platform for Action, and 20 years since the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325, it is time for a genuinely equal contribution, by women and men, to the goal of global peace and security. Disarmament has a key role to play with respect to the fulfilment of the Women Peace and Security Agenda. Ireland is among the most active supporters and promoters of gender issues in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. Ireland is committed to equal representation and the meaningful and equal participation at all levels by women and men, and for the integration of substantive gender perspectives across all areas of work. Ireland's Third

National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 reflects this commitment and includes actions related to both conventional and weapons of mass destruction; nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

We welcome the fact that a number of key UN disarmament appointments are currently held by women, and we acknowledge the UN Secretary General's commitment to gender parity at all levels of the organisation. However, as studies like United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research's (UNIDIR): *Still Behind the Curve* publication has shown women remain under-represented across multilateral forums dealing with international security and disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues, and Ireland considers it essential that every effort continues to be made to address this imbalance.

We are proud to co-chair the International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group (DIG). Through our work in the DIG, Ireland, Canada, Namibia, Philippines and UNIDIR took practical steps toward realising gender equality and the inclusion of gender perspectives in the disarmament machinery this year. Earlier this year the DIG published the second edition of the Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack, which provides practical recommendations for equal participation and gender perspectives in multilateral disarmament frameworks. We thank the many Member States and other stakeholders who have contributed to the work of the Group to date and welcome all efforts to prioritise gender issues in disarmament.

Ireland also strongly encourages a proactive approach to promote the participation of youth in disarmament fora. Future generations will inherit the consequences of our action and our inaction on disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control issues. Their voices should be heard. Youth movements can be engaged to provide views from affected communities and under-represented populations, and they can bring fresh and creative ideas to well-established institutions. Ireland welcomes the focus on youth in the UN Secretary General's Agenda for Disarmament, including Action 38, which aims to establish a platform for youth engagement.

Sustained funding is essential for the disarmament machinery to function. We reiterate the strong need for all States to pay their assessed contributions in a timely manner to avoid negative impacts on vital disarmament work.

This year, we celebrate the 40th anniversary of UNIDIR. Ireland commends UNIDIR's for its research on disarmament and international security, which has made an invaluable contribution to our work towards a more peaceful and secure world, over the past four decades. Ireland is pleased to support UNIDIR's important work through unearmarked core funding, and underlines the need for providing a more stable and sustainable financial basis for UNIDIR.

The UN disarmament machinery is dependent on Member States' willingness to compromise and engage constructively. A fully functioning disarmament machinery will bring us closer to achieving a peaceful and more secure world.

ENDS

Italy

Cluster 1: Nuclear Weapons

Italy fully shares the goal of a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons and, in this respect, we restate our strong commitment to preserving and strengthening the disarmament and non-proliferation framework.

50 years after its entry into force, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the international disarmament regime, with its three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Italy supports the efforts to use the remaining time in preparation of the Review Conference as an opportunity to build bridges between the States Parties and assess the substantial progress achieved so far in the framework of this historic Treaty.

The Treaty must be supported, upheld and preserved, especially in today's difficult environment. We therefore invite States that have not yet done so to join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States, without delay and without conditions.

The NPT provides the only realistic legal framework to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, in a manner that promotes international stability consistent with the principle of undiminished security for all. This goal can only be achieved through a gradual approach, by taking effective measures – pursuant to Article VI of the NPT – that involve all the stakeholders in a consensus-based perspective.

We are striving for true progress on nuclear disarmament because of our deep concern over the potentially catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. One measure we are pursuing is the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The lack of progress on the CTBT should be of concern to the entire international community. As a staunch supporter of the Treaty, Italy invites all States that have not yet done so, particularly the remaining eight Annex-2 States, to sign and ratify the Treaty without further delay. In the meantime, we call upon all States to continue to respect the voluntary moratorium on nuclear test explosions and to refrain from any action that could undermine the objective and purpose of the Treaty.

Another key priority is for the Conference on Disarmament to immediately start negotiations for a Treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Such a treaty would be a valuable new element of the international security architecture, which is under growing pressure today. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, all States should abide by a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Italy values all initiatives undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament verification, as important tools to build trust and confidence among nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States. In this respect, we strongly support the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and welcome the work conducted within the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament.

We also wish to mention the potential of Negative Security Assurances and to reiterate our support for the establishment of Zones Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction, particularly in the Middle East, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived and agreed among the States of the Region.

We stress the relevance of risk reduction, which can contribute to alleviating tensions and building the necessary trust and confidence, such as transparency and dialogue on nuclear doctrines and postures, military-to-military dialogues, hotline, “accident measures agreements” and notification of exercises, missile launch notifications and other data exchange agreements, consistently with the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.

Nuclear weapon States bear fundamental responsibilities and we encourage them to seek further reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while enhancing transparency on their policies and doctrines. We are convinced that the goal of a nuclear weapon free world and an effective, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament can be attained only through an inclusive and progressive approach, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, based on concrete and effective measures. We welcome the strategic stability dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation and we encourage them to seek further reductions to their arsenals, to extend the New START Treaty and to engage on other arms control arrangements, including with a view to their widening in terms of scope and participants.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to pose a major threat to international security. The IAEA's system of safeguards is an essential component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the

implementation of the NPT. Italy supports the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, including universal adherence to comprehensive agreements and additional protocols.

In this context, Italy believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action remains a key element. The full implementation of the deal and of all provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is crucial for regional and international security. We are gravely concerned by Iranian disengagement from the JCPoA and we urge Iran to return to full compliance without delay and to provide the IAEA with a full and timely cooperation with respect to all its safeguard-related commitments in order to clarify and resolve any pending issue. We welcome the Joint Statement of Iran and the IAEA dated 26 August and related developments on sites inspections. We are ready to support initiatives aimed at de-escalating the present tensions and restoring the JCPoA's integrity.

The repeated ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, in violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions, deeply concern us. DPRK's intention to retain and further develop its nuclear and ballistic programmes represent a threat that we cannot ignore. We urge the DPRK to take concrete steps towards a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, in which the IAEA needs to play a key role. We therefore call on Pyongyang to engage in credible negotiations in this respect and to give tangible proof of its asserted willingness to denuclearize by returning to the NPT, signing and ratifying the CTBT and resuming its collaboration with the IAEA. In the meantime, the international sanctions regime needs to remain in place and be effectively implemented, sustaining the negotiating process towards this goal.

Italy **Cluster 2: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Italy remains fully committed to effective multilateral action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, which are a growing threat to international peace and security. Securing sensitive materials, especially from access by terrorist networks, and implementing effective export controls continue to be major challenges.

These challenges point to the need for the universal and effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We call upon all States that are not yet parties to ratify or accede to these Conventions without delay and without conditions.

Italy remains firmly committed to supporting the CWC and the work of the OPCW, and reaffirms the need to ensure full compliance with the CWC and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Moreover, we wish to state our full support for the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism, the only existing framework that provides for an investigation of alleged use of biological weapons, which has successfully worked in the past. The international community has a shared responsibility to enforce the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons and support the international non-proliferation regime, which is essential for international peace and security.

We are deeply concerned by the repeated use of chemical weapons in recent years. In the strongest possible terms, we condemn their use by anyone – be it a State or a non-State actor, – anywhere, anytime and under any circumstances. We must respond to this alarming trend, as emphasized by the UN Secretary-General in his 2018 Agenda for Disarmament, by ensuring accountability and continuing to take a clear stance against impunity for such heinous crimes. Therefore, Italy joined and actively participates in the Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, launched in January 2018.

Italy firmly condemns the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Air Force as concluded by the first report of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). We welcome the OPCW Executive Council Decision taken in July 2020 on addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic and urge the Syrian Arab Republic to take all the measures required by such decision.

We also condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the poisoning of Alexei Navalny with a chemical nerve-agent. Italy welcomes the delivery of the OPCW's analysis and calls on Russia to investigate and to disclose in a transparent manner the circumstances of this chemical weapons attack, to fully cooperate with the OPCW Technical Secretariat in order to resolve this issue, and ultimately to comply with its obligations as a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) State Party.

The current pandemic has shown how important is for us to work together to improve biosecurity and biosafety. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is of the utmost importance, as is the need to strengthen the international

architecture to regulate biological weapons. The BTWC operates in a highly dynamic environment, characterized by rapid scientific and technological developments. It is therefore essential to give the Convention the tools and procedures it requires to respond more rapidly to emerging needs and challenges. This is why we value a strong intersessional work program and, in the current cycle, many interesting proposals have been submitted for consideration. We call upon all States Parties to actively participate in the work of the Convention, bringing their constructive contribution to the process leading towards the Review Conference.

Finally, Italy remains deeply concerned by the increasing risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of non-state actors, particularly terrorist networks. This is why we support the full implementation of the 1540 UNSCR, including by increasing national capacities in the implementation of non-proliferation measures.

Italy **Cluster 3: Outer Space**

Today, space-based applications offer unique resources to all of us, also in the domains of economic growth and innovation. The Internet is very much dependent on space. Satellite systems are essential for monitoring land, maritime, and air security, as well as in facing critical issues such as natural disaster management and climate change. In this sense, the space domain enables a number of services, which have become essential for the well-functioning of our economies and for our security.

The sharply increasing number of objects in space, together with our growing reliance on space resources, infrastructures, and activities, are among the major reasons why a comprehensive and effective international regulatory environment should be elaborated and put in place. States must commit themselves to enhancing the wellbeing of humankind by working together for the long-term sustainability, safety, and security of the space environment.

Working on disarmament and security, we have the great responsibility for assuring the proper framework to technological developments in the outer space. In this perspective, we are firmly committed both at the national and at the international level, because we believe that a comprehensive and effective international regulatory environment should be elaborated and put in place. In 2019, a National security strategy for space has been approved under the auspices of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, as a part of our National Strategy for Space. Italy remains fully committed to preventing an arms race in outer space and to preventing outer space from becoming an area of conflict as essential conditions to strengthen strategic stability.

Italy commend the establishment of a dedicated working group on the matter under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). In particular, we appreciate the important work on Long Term Sustainability (LTS) of Outer Space Activities and the adoption of a preamble and 21 guidelines. This important work could represent a solid basis for a more comprehensive voluntary instrument covering, at the same time, substantial aspects of safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities.

Such an instrument would contribute to politically commit nations to globally-shared principles of responsible behaviour, which should serve long-term goals across the full range of space activities. These should include: non-interference in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space; prevention and mitigation of the creation of debris; international cooperation in space; preservation of the integrity of the space environment for all; equitable access to outer space; and transparency in the conduct of space exploration and exploitation activities.

We are also convinced that it is important to develop initiatives aimed at increasing confidence and mutual trust between current and future space actors. In this regard, we would like to highlight the importance of transparency and confidence building measures as a crucial step towards achieving greater safety, security, and sustainability in outer space activities.

Such measures should cover mechanisms of (1) information-sharing related to national space strategies, policies, and programmes, (2) notification regarding space missions and manoeuvres, with a view to reducing the risk of miscommunication and improving space traffic management and (3) consultation with a view to decreasing the risk of disputes.

While not excluding, in the long run, the objective of an international legally-binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we continue to believe that there would be value in agreeing a comprehensive voluntary

instrument within the framework of the United Nations. We therefore encourage further international cooperation to elaborate agreed principles of responsible behaviour in outer space.

Italy **Cluster 4: Conventional Weapons**

Italy strongly supports all international instruments restricting or prohibiting the use of weapons contrary to International Humanitarian Law.

In this context, universalization and effective implementation of the Ottawa and Oslo Conventions are among our priorities. We welcome the results achieved last year, at the occasion of the approval of a new Action Plan by the Oslo Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, in line with our commitment for a world free of mines.

We urge all States that have not yet done so to join the Ottawa Convention without delay, or as an interim step, to comply with the norms of the Convention. We call upon all non-States Parties, in particular major possessors of anti-personnel mines, to follow a self-declared policy of non-use, which will contribute to the universalization of the Ottawa Convention. In that regard we regret the announcement by the United States Government to lift restrictions on the deployment of anti-personnel landmines by US armed forces and call upon the United States to re-examine its decision.

With the same engagement, we are looking forward to participate, next November, to the Second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lausanne, as another important milestone on the way to a more secure and peaceful world.

Italy is extremely concerned by the indiscriminate humanitarian and socio-economic impacts of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and other explosive remnants of war, especially on civilians. Having complied with all the obligations at the national level, we strongly believe in the importance of international cooperation and victim assistance are keys components of a comprehensive approach to mine action. Particularly promoting gender- and diversity- responsive assistance.

As part of our long-standing commitment, a dedicated Trust Fund for Humanitarian Demining was set up by law in 2001 and since then Italy has devoted more than 62 million Euros to Mine Action programmes, with a particular focus on clearance, stockpile destruction, risk education and assistance to victims.

Besides providing financial assistance, we engage in capacity-building, training programmes and sharing of technical demining expertise. Our assistance programmes rely on partnerships with relevant stakeholders, including the UN, other international and regional organizations, civil society, and survivor representatives. In particular, we have established a long-term and fruitful cooperation with the ICRC and the United Nations Mine Action Service.

Italy attaches particular importance to assisting survivors and their families as a fundamental component of humanitarian aid and as a key element in long-term development strategies. In order to be effective, the efforts have to be designed and implemented in a way to be consistent and integrate with humanitarian action as a whole. Assisting victims, their families and communities is an essential component of their path towards a better future, so should be conceived with a holistic perspective and in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

It is essential that victims benefitting from assistance are included in broader development, human rights, and humanitarian programs. These, in addition, need to be implemented according to the principle of non-discrimination, as well as take into account gender and diversity considerations, aiming to adequately address the different needs of different beneficiaries.

We are equally concerned by the extremely serious humanitarian impact of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA). Such impacts are extensive, and include both direct damage, in the form of death and injury, and indirect and long-term effects. Italy considers that the legal framework applicable to the use of explosive weapons in populated areas is clear and that the cardinal rules and principles of International Humanitarian Law must be complied with in all circumstances. It becomes necessary for States and their armed forces to adapt their policies, doctrines, and military tactics to the challenges posed by conducting military operations in populated areas, so to properly take into account civilians vulnerabilities. In this respect, we support the process led by Ireland, potentially leading to a political declaration aimed at strengthening the collective commitment on this issue.

Under this item of our agenda, we want to underline the importance of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and of its Protocols. Their universalization and full implementation remain fundamental goals. We welcome the intersessional work conducted so far in the framework of the CCW, which has allowed in-depth exchanges on several issues of concern, paving the path to the Review Conference.

In the framework of the CCW, Italy welcomes the in-depth work carried out by the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. We especially value the endorsement by the High Contracting Parties, last year, of the eleven Guiding Principles. Italy strongly supports the view that any weapon system, existing or future, must be subject to human control, particularly in relation to the ultimate decision to use lethal force. Human control is essential to ensure compliance with fundamental IHL principles, including the protection of civilian populations. We remain convinced that it would be useful for the GGE to further explore and possibly arrive at a shared definition of the type and level of human control that would be necessary to ensure that the development and use of systems with increasing autonomous functions comply with International Humanitarian Law. We believe that further discussing this issue is crucial in order to reach consensus on the possible elements of a normative and operational framework.

We share the deep concern of the international community at the growing use and impacts of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), which pose serious threats to civilians, humanitarian workers and peacekeeping personnel in conflict afflicted and post-conflict areas. Both preventative and remedial strategies must be pursued to counter such a threat, at national and international levels, starting with the strengthening of appropriate regulatory frameworks.

Illicit, unregulated, or irresponsible transfers of conventional arms have pernicious humanitarian, social and economic effects. Italy is committed to the effective implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the International Tracing Instrument, and the Palermo Protocol, which are fundamental to countering such negative impacts.

The ATT unique contribution towards a more transparent and responsible arms trade, and to countering illicit arms transfers, relies on universalization and effective implementation as two sides of the same coin. We continue to call on all States that have not ratified the Treaty to do so as early as possible and we commend the States that have joined the Treaty during the present year. At the same time, we will also continue to engage constructively in the intersessional work program of the Treaty.

Italy is also concerned by the growing illicit flows of small arms and light weapons, including in the so-called deep web, because they represent the main casualty of victims. We welcome the consensual outcomes achieved so far in this domain and we believe that applying the UN Program of Action provisions also to SALW ammunition would be beneficial. In this context, we wish to reaffirm the fundamental link between sustainable development, peace, and security, as recognized by the 2030 Agenda.

Finally, we reiterate our support for increased partnerships at all levels with civil society and industry, which play a key role in all our common efforts in disarmament and arms control.

Italy

Cluster 5: Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

As highlighted during the general debate, Italy believes that ICT and the Internet are one of the greatest human achievements of all times and as such, they should be cherished by all peace-loving nations and preserved. To achieve this, a global, open, free, stable and secure cyberspace is needed and the work carried out in this Commission is essential to guarantee that. Let us not forget throughout our discussions these coming days that our collective failure to fulfill our mandate might have a direct and negative impact on all our citizens, notwithstanding how abstract and “distant” the issues at hand, *prima facie* may appear to be.

The past 12 months have been very busy in this cyber domain, at the international, European and national level. Italy remains committed to the concept of cyber stability and to the multistakeholder approach, supporting the efforts of the international community leading towards a cyberspace based on the applicability and respect of international law in its entirety, beginning with the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law. We fully support the ongoing work of the GGE and the OEWG also in this regard and look forward to both delivering on their mandate during the first semester of 2021.

Let us dwell on Institutional dialogue that remains a key tool to ensure that security, rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights fully apply in cyberspace. Since Italy is a staunch supporter of multilateralism and working methods that guarantee inclusivity and build upon existing *acquis*, we believe that upcoming discussions on this issue need to be fully exploited. Institutional dialogue needs to be orderly, predictable and inclusive in order to be able to make constructive progress and be time- and financially efficient.

In the cyber domain, we are not starting from scratch. Whilst participating to international discussions – not only within the UN but also in the context of the EU, NATO and the OSCE just to mention a few – Italy has also continued to develop its national architecture and has approved last week legislation which defines its National Perimeter. We are looking at finalising this work during the first semester of 2021.

This vision is also guiding us through our national policy and diplomatic action and we are currently working on the possibility of offering our national position on the applicability of international law in cyberspace. We thank those who have already started doing this and encourage others to follow suit. All of the above-mentioned work builds on our national cybersecurity strategy and action plan, which are also in the process of being revised. We know that similar efforts are being made by many others and the numbers are increasing, as recognition of the importance and pervasiveness of the cyber domain is mounting within all national Administrations.

In this very dynamic context, Italy has decided to co-sponsor the proposal to establish a Programme of Action on advancing responsible behaviour in cyberspace. We believe that at this delicate juncture States need to come together as further fragmentation of the institutional dialogue does not facilitate the active and meaningful participation of many of us. We recognise the need to further discuss the institutional framework, as many provisions, including the purpose, scope, financing, participation and other issues are still not defined. This work needs to be done collectively if the aim remains adoption by consensus, with a view to reverting to a one-track mechanism which we believe would be the best way for most States to address such sensitive issues. We therefore fully support the Programme of Action and salute it as a very sensible, inclusive and balanced project, which can provide us with an operational dialogue focused on implementation, building on our *acquis*.

To conclude, and as testimony of Italy's openness and willingness to ensure the success of this approach, let me flag our availability to work hand-in-hand with all the Member States of the UN as we acknowledge capacity building as a crucial tool to achieve our ultimate goals. Whether in the areas of international law, national legislation and policy, or more technical issues, we believe that regional organizations and dialogue between and among these could be the perfect setting to bring capacity building activities forward, on top of bilateral exchanges.

These activities should facilitate convergence as we are all aiming at universality. So long as we all abide by the principles of neutrality, objectivity, inclusiveness and accessibility and that we work together with academia and other stakeholders who hold much needed expertise, this should be possible. Although referred to other fields, the pandemic has emphasized the importance of a universally respected and reliable scientific community. We think the same is valid for all domains related to cybersecurity, we should be embracing such diversity which will help us to converge towards unity of intent.

**STATEMENT BY
MS DENIESE SEALEY
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF JAMAICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

**ON BEHALF OF THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NEW YORK
30TH OCTOBER 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Fourteen (14) Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on the thematic debate on Nuclear Weapons Disarmament.

Nuclear weapons proliferation remains one of the gravest challenges to international peace and security. CARICOM Member States regret the fact that the quest to achieve nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation has not been able to move from aspiration to accomplishment. Even as we say this, however, CARICOM reiterates its call for Member States to acknowledge and respect each other's legitimate security interests—human, national and collective—to attain international peace, security and development for all.

While countries continue their nuclear proliferation, disregarding the right to life, peace, security and development of non-nuclear weapon States, like those in Latin America and the Caribbean, we continue to lead by example in our pursuit of general and complete disarmament and non-proliferation. Only last week, Nauru, Jamaica and Honduras became the 48th, 49th and 50th countries to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) thereby making it possible for the Treaty's entry into force on the 22nd January 2021, a historic milestone for this landmark Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM recognizes that the entry into force of the TPNW, though important, does not signify the end of our journey towards total disarmament. There is much work still to be done, as States Parties will now be required to implement their positive obligations and abide by its prohibitions. It has not gone unnoticed that none of the nuclear weapons states have signed the treaty. However, we remain ardent supporters of the treaty and will continue to call upon nuclear armed states to engage in nuclear disarmament in good faith. In addition, as noted by ICAN upon the Treaty's entry into force, "we can now call nuclear weapons what they are: prohibited weapons of mass destruction, just like chemical weapons and biological weapons."

CARICOM recalls the impassioned plea of Setsuko Thurlow, a survivor of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, as she shared the horrors of that morning 75 years ago and the impact it continues to have on her and other survivors, to this very day. Her words aptly summed up the heart-wrenching emotions and deep sentiments of the peoples of all countries when she said, "*In our struggle for survival, rebuilding lives out of the ashes, we survivors, or 'hibakusha', became convinced that no human being should ever have to repeat our experience of the inhumane, immoral, and cruel atomic bombing, and that our mission is to warn the world about the reality of nuclear dangers and to help people understand the ultimate evil of nuclear weapons. We have a moral imperative to abolish nuclear arsenals, before they are used again, by accident or by design.*"

The experience of persons who have been victims of nuclear weapons reflect the indescribable human toll that these weapons pose to the survivors and their families. Their unparalleled destructive power represents a unique and existential threat to humanity, one which we are determined to neutralize.

We therefore call on all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to consider doing so. We join with the growing international consensus on this critical issue. Indeed, it is in the interest of all world citizens to eliminate nuclear weapons and to do so in a verifiable way, under international control.

Mr. Chairman,

As non-nuclear weapon States, CARICOM's commitment to securing nuclear disarmament is embedded in the way of life of the people of our region. We are proud to be parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco that gave rise to the first Nuclear Free Zone in a densely populated area. Since its entry into force in 1969 our countries have remained committed to the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons. In essence, prohibition is ingrained in our DNA. As

small island developing states (SIDS) we hold strongly to the view that there are more rational ways to address security concerns than a reliance on nuclear deterrence doctrines that are stubbornly rooted in the constant threat of mutual annihilation.

CARICOM States will continue to call nuclear weapon states to account for their failure to implement their obligations as part of the grand bargain, that is, the complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. This remains a central objective, given the lack of progress in disarmament and the humanitarian consequences that would result from even a limited use of nuclear weapons. After all, like any small island developing state we view the prospect of any nuclear detonation whether by design, accident or negligence as an existential threat that could decimate the entire Caribbean region.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM reaffirms its commitment to the aim of total disarmament in line with the pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We regret that the COVID19 pandemic has delayed the convening of the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty, which was our opportunity to assess the treaty's implementation and State Parties compliance, as well as celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force. However, we are encouraged that tentative dates in January 2021 have been set for the 10th Review Conference to be convened. We look forward to Member States engaging in fruitful discussions on the Treaty's achievements. The Review Conference will also enable us to making concrete decisions to further advance the objectives and implementation of what is the cornerstone of our collective efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and collaborate on advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

CARICOM reiterates its call for all remaining States which have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to commit to signing and ratifying it without delay.

In addition, we are gravely concerned that the only non-proliferation bilateral agreement between the two most heavily armed nuclear weapon states to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons, remains in limbo. With only a little over four months remaining before the New START treaty expires on February 5, 2021, we encourage urgent communication between both parties to arrive at an amicable resolution to the challenges, with a view to extending the New START Treaty. The maintenance of the status quo exposes all of us to a dangerous situation that poses a threat to international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM welcomes the important step taken towards the establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction, in accordance with the 1995 Resolution on making the Middle East a nuclear free zone. The adoption of a political declaration by Member States during the First Session of the Conference on the establishment of this Nuclear Free Zone is a demonstration to the international community of our political will and determination to achieve that objective.

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM is encouraged that although the COVID19 pandemic has affected the work on disarmament, the Office of Disarmament Affairs has remained active and committed to its objectives. Unfortunately, the pandemic is happening at a time when reports indicate that there has been an increase in global military spending and countries are building faster and more accurate nuclear arms, more than at any other point in history.

This development is of serious concern for CARICOM as the strengthening of national nuclear weapons systems diverts resources from the world's biggest threats such as climate change, inequality and public health.

CARICOM therefore concurs with the Secretary-General that "reversing the further deterioration of the international security environment requires a return to the mindset where the pursuit of nuclear disarmament is understood as the best means for preserving peace and maintain stability in times of turbulence".

Mr. Chairman,

CARICOM remains committed to the disarmament agenda and all efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. We conclude with the words of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, that "A deteriorating international security environment and rising nuclear risks continue to demonstrate the wisdom of the adage that the only guarantee against the use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination."

I thank you.

Statement by JAPAN
 – Thematic Debate: Nuclear Weapons –
 October 2020, NEW YORK

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT. At this important juncture, Japan renews its commitment to maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, which serves as the cornerstone of the international regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Japan will spare no effort to achieve a successful outcome of the 10th NPT Review Conference. This year also marks the 75th year of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan reaffirms its commitment to contributing to substantively advancing nuclear disarmament. For this purpose, Japan encourages all states, especially nuclear armed states to implement the following six courses of action.

First is transparency. Increased transparency, through enhancement of the reporting mechanism, the submission of NPT national implementation reports and the discussion of these reports, helps build confidence and trust, and establishes common ground that can facilitate nuclear disarmament. States parties, in particular, nuclear-weapon states, should provide detailed reporting on their disarmament efforts at the 10th NPT Review Conference, which will provide an opportunity to discuss these reports, and use all available opportunities to further explain and share information regarding topics covered in their perspective reports.

Second is nuclear risk reduction. Concrete actions should be taken to reduce the risks of nuclear detonation occurring either by miscalculation or by misunderstanding. Japan encourages all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons to take actions to reduce the risks of nuclear detonation and to make further efforts to this end including transparency and dialogue, hotlines, or information and data exchanges.

Third and fourth are FMCT and CTBT. Substantive discussions towards the FMCT negotiation, various efforts to promote the entry into force of the CTBT without delay through the signing and ratification of the CTBT, continued support for the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO are also examples of actions that can be jointly undertaken by all member States. Japan calls upon all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for the use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices until an FMCT takes effect, adopt and maintain moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions and declare their political will to do so.

Fifth is nuclear disarmament verification. Japan underscores the indispensable role of effective and credible nuclear disarmament verification, and has made substantive contributions to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

Sixth is disarmament and non-proliferation education. Japan encourages all member states to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, efforts in which the young generation can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities, as well as to raise awareness of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons, including through, among others, visits by leaders, youth and others to and interactions with communities and people, including the hibakusha who pass on their experiences to the future generations.

In March this year, Japan organized a meeting with the attendance of government officials both from nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states as well as nongovernmental experts, which built on discussions of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, established by the Government of Japan in 2017. The meeting, focused on “hard questions” that are unavoidable in ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, Japan is deeply concerned about North Korea’s continued development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. Japan reaffirms its strong commitment to the goal of achieving CVID of all of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and related facilities as well as ballistic missiles of all ranges in accordance with relevant UNSCRs. Japan calls on North Korea to take concrete steps towards denuclearization. We also call on all member states to fully implement relevant UNSCRs.

This year, as well as in the past, Japan has submitted to the first committee a resolution “Joint Courses of Action and Future-oriented Dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons.” The resolution focuses on six practical and concrete

actions and stresses the importance of future-oriented dialogue in order to substantively advance nuclear disarmament. This resolution seeks to present a common ground where both nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear- weapons states can work together, which is critical for the success of the NPT Review Conference. We strongly encourage that all UN Member States extend their invaluable support to our resolution. (END)

STATEMENT BY JAPAN
- THEMATIC DEBATE: OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -
OCTOBER 22, 2020, NEW YORK

Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts for arms control, disarmament, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in order to achieve global and regional peace and stability. The use of such weapons must not be permitted under any circumstances and thus Japan reiterates the importance of reinforcing the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions and other relevant regimes.

The international community has made significant progress in preventing the re-emergence and proliferation of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, the repeated use of chemical weapons has become a serious and urgent issue in recent years. The international community must be united in condemning the use of these weapons and perpetrators should be identified and held accountable.

In this regard, Japan welcomes reports issued by the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) and the Identification and Investigation Team (IIT). Their investigative work is essential to establish facts surrounding allegations of the use of chemical weapons and identify its perpetrators in Syria. Japan commends their professional, impartial and independent work and to assist related activities of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW in the country, Japan contributed to the Trust Fund for Syria Missions at the OPCW this year. In addition, Japan welcomes the adoption of the decision related to the first report of the IIT during the 94th session of the Executive Council which requires Syria to fulfill its accountability and will continue to collaborate with other States Parties to the CWC to deal with the actual use of chemical weapons and deter its further use.

The increased threat posed by non-State actors, including by terrorists, is of particular concern and we must prevent chemical weapons and toxic chemicals from falling into their hands. In order to address this challenge, we should work to strengthen the OPCW to maximize its efficiency and encourage the States Parties to implement their national measures. Japan commends ongoing efforts by the Technical Secretariat for this purpose even during the Covid-19 pandemic and will also provide assistance to the countries in need and actively take part in discussions to promote the national implementation of the CWC.

Japan commits itself to the destruction of the abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) as an obligation under the CWC and have invested an enormous financial resources, amounting to approximately 2.6 billion euros from Japan's own account to cover all the related costs for its operation. Although the destruction project entails various challenges and uncertainties, Japan has been making consistent progress with successful destruction of about 58,000 ACW items among 84,000 recovered. Although the project has been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, with the constructive bilateral cooperation and coordination with China, Japan continues to make every effort to advance this unprecedented and difficult project.

It is imperative to recognize that the Covid-19 pandemic has significant relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The pandemic demonstrates the potential of biological weapons to cause detrimental impact on a global scale, and hence may inspire interests in creating biological weapons. To reinforce international prohibition against biological weapons, Japan believes that in the last year of the intersessional programme of the BWC, States Parties should discuss in a cooperative and constructive manner the possible measures to strengthen the BWC and work toward producing concrete outcomes at the 9th Review Conference in 2021. Potential means to strengthen the BWC include the science and technology review process, the improvement of confidence building measures, the mechanism and procedure of the provision of support to states endangered by treaty violation and others. To achieve such outcomes, the meetings of experts scheduled in December this year are of particular importance, and Japan is chairing one of the meetings to facilitate the convergence of views in the field of science and technology review process.

In order to demonstrate commitment to international cooperation and to reinforce the BWC regime, Japan has undertaken a number of initiatives in partnership with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU). In the past a few years, Japan organized capacity-building workshops in Asia to enhance preparedness for and response to the use of biological weapons, and thematic seminars in Geneva to promote dialogue on this topic. Additionally, the online training course to promote national implementation of the BWC was successfully held in September of this year, inviting BWC national contact points in Asia. Japan will continue to organize more international cooperation projects of this kind and hope that many States Parties to the BWC will participate in and take advantage of our initiatives.

The United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological and chemical weapons (UNSGM) is also an important pillar to verify and prevent their use and proliferation. It is also the only available tool to investigate in the case of biological attacks and thus Japan joins call for building stronger capacity to conduct investigation of any alleged use of biological weapons, which was mentioned in the Secretary-General's agenda for disarmament.

Japan also underlines the importance of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which provides the international community with a basis to tackle the threat of WMD proliferation posed by non-state actors. Japan contributed approximately 1 million dollars to the UNODA to promote its implementation, and part of the contribution was utilized for the launch of the Online Training Course on UNSCR 1540. Japan will continue to support the implementation of the Resolution, beyond the next comprehensive review to be adopted in 2021.

Lastly, while these multilateral institutions are indispensable in realizing our common goal of a world free of weapons of mass destruction, it has recently become more difficult to overcome a divergence of opinion and seek common ground in major challenges. Japan emphasizes the need for effort and cooperation between stakeholders to strive towards a common understanding and take effective actions.

(END)

STATEMENT BY JAPAN
- THEMATIC DEBATE: OUTER SPACE -
OCTOBER 29, 2020, NEW YORK

While our society is increasingly relying on space systems, the environment of outer space has been changing rapidly with an influx of new actors and the diversification of activities. As a result, risks against sustainable and stable use of outer space are more serious today than ever before, because outer space is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. Current circumstances make it complicated to distinguish civil activities and military activities. These developments necessitate the international community to bring new ideas and approaches in order to advance our discussions.

As our unwavering basic position, Japan supports in principle the idea of preventing an arms race in outer space. We have participated in substantive discussions on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as well as in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) of the United Nations.

Transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) are pragmatic and near-term measures to increase trust and prevent misperception and miscalculations in space activities, which currently involve a wide range of actors and stakeholders. We believe that it is imperative to reaffirm the significance of TCBMs. The international community should reach a common understanding on ways to reduce threats to space systems in order to maintain outer space as a peaceful, safe, stable, and sustainable environment, free from an arms race. As a means to pave the way in this direction, Japan will promote the TCBMs contained in the recommendations of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Report, which are effective in terms of the goal of PAROS. Japan also believes that the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) could contribute to this endeavor. Further discussions on TCBMs and a common understanding on how we can reduce threats to space systems will help States deepen mutual understanding, and allow them to have a more profound understanding both on threats and risks to space activities and on what could be acceptable parameters for responsible space activities.

In addition to the inherent complexity of defining a weapon in outer space due to the dual-use nature of space objects, it is also challenging to interpret and verify intentions behind certain outer space activities. Japan underscores the need to

characterize responsible behavior, which would be a practical step to further develop and implement norms, rules and principles in outer space, and could prove relatively durable in the face of changing circumstances.

In conclusion, Japan would like to re-emphasize its commitment to ensure the safety, security and sustainability of outer space activities.

(END)

STATEMENT OF JAPAN
- THEMATIC DEBATE: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS -
OCTOBER 23, 2020, NEW YORK

At this time of the global pandemic, Japan would like to emphasize that conventional arms, applied in warfare and non-state actors' offence, remain a major source of human loss and suffering. Scarcity of financial and human resources are reportedly having adverse effect on arms control and disarmament of conventional weapons. Japan, therefore, encourages all Member States to stand united to work on the "Disarmament that Saves Lives" in the spirit of the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda. Having taken various initiatives and provided significant support in this area, Japan remains committed to its continuous contribution to that end.

Small arms and light weapons, in particular, remain major players in armed violence and crimes. It is for this reason that Japan contributed USD two million to Saving Lives Entity, or SALENT, which was launched here in New York a year ago, to support fellow States in advancing their conventional arms control. We look forward to seeing the facility functioning as a vehicle for collaboration among States to address the long-standing issue of small arms and light weapons, preventing diversion and enhancing better control. It is with the same aspiration that Japan, together with Colombia and South Africa, has submitted to the committee the resolution on "The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects," and expects Members States to extend their support to this important resolution. While the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States (BMS 7) on the Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons has regrettably been postponed for a fully understandable reason, we look forward to advancing our discussion in the Meeting in 2021 instead, when the PoA celebrates its 20th anniversary.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Yet, cluster munitions still cause serious consequences in many parts of the world, shedding light on the urgent need for further universalization and effective implementation of the Convention. As a major contributor in UXO clearance, Japan will continue its support in the area, and looks forward to constructive discussions in the Second Review Conference in November.

Japan welcomes the adoption of the Oslo Declaration of a Mine-Free World and the Action Plan 2020-2024 at the Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November last year, where Ms. OMI Asako, then-Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, represented Japan and renewed its commitment to mine action in her statement. Despite the remarkable progress made in the 20-year history of the Convention, the cruelty of landmines and other explosive devices remain major cause of human suffering as well as hindrance to livelihood and development. In an effort to ensure human security, Japan has been continuously providing assistance to tackle various issues caused by anti-personnel mines around the globe. Since 1998, Japan has contributed more than 800 million US dollars to mine action in 51 countries and regions. Japan stands ready to continue its assistance in mine clearance and awareness-raising activities, in order to help the international community to achieve its goal of a world free of mines.

Another remarkable progress in the past year was the adoption of the 11 Guiding Principles on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) in August last year. Japan highly appreciates the adoption as well as further discussion in the meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in September. We consider the Chair's proposal on the three-aspect approach useful to further advance this joint effort in a rather intricate subject, and look forward to further advancement of international discourse and consolidation of potential solutions that uphold the International Humanitarian Law and other relevant international instruments. Japan will continue its active contribution to the exploration towards international rule-making effort within the CCW framework.

Japan highly appreciates that the Sixth Conference of States Parties (CSP6) of the Arms Trade Treaty in August was convened, despite all the difficulties, in an unprecedented written format, with some decisions agreed upon towards significant enhancement of treaty implementation. As a member of the Managing Committee and the Voluntary Trust

Fund Selection Committee of the Treaty, Japan will surely continue to play an active role in promoting treaty implementation, universalization and transparency in arms trade.

Japan assures that it remains committed to its continued contribution to the multiple areas of conventional arms control and disarmament. Through “Disarmament that Saves Lives,” the international community need to address and overcome the current adverse effect on security, and Japan will spare no effort in working to that end together with other Member States.

STATEMENT BY JAPAN

- THEMATIC DEBATE: OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - OCTOBER, 2020 NEW YORK

First, cyberspace is a place where we can freely create and share a wide variety of information and data across borders, regardless of location and time constraints. Anyone who is active in this space is able to create new value and freely interact with other entities. In other words, cyberspace is the foundation of socio-economic development, and a frontier for creating infinite value.

Cyber security is a matter of international peace and security and requires close international cooperation. Japan is committed to cooperating with UN Member States for the common goal of securing a free, fair and secure cyberspace.

The outbreak of COVID-19 seems to be accelerating the trend of mankind’s increased reliance on ICT while accentuating the risks and the problems caused by malicious use of ICTs. Japan cannot condone cyberattacks and malicious cyber activities which take advantage of the crisis, including, as reported, ransomware striking medical institutions and authorities, as well as distributed denial of service attacks against medical research facilities.

It is difficult for any single country to respond to these threats of cyberattack alone. Therefore, countries need to build a rules-based international order in cyberspace, closely collaborating with each other. At the same time, each country needs to act as a responsible stakeholder in accordance with rules and reinforce them by doing so.

All UN Member States agree that existing international law including the UN Charter in its entirety applies to cyberspace. Japan is of the view that UN Member States should renew their commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including respect for human rights, peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibition of use of force, and should explicitly recognize that state responsibility, the inherent right of self-defense as well as humanity apply to cyberspace. Such recognition is important for prevention of conflicts and deterrence in cyberspace. The Security Council should be ready to act under

Chapter 6 or Chapter 7 of the Charter to prevent or to respond to a grave situation involving cyber activities.

Norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace also play an indispensable role to ensure stability and predictability of the international community, complementing the application of existing international law. All UN Member States have agreed to a set of norms regarding responsible state behavior proposed by the Governmental Group of Experts in 2015. They must be respected. Japan strongly supports the GGE process and would like to contribute to building additional layers of common understanding on the agreed content in previous GGE reports. Japan is also actively involved in the discussions at the Open-ended Working Group with a goal to deepen understanding of the past achievements of the GGE and the need for their implementation. Japan hopes that the GGE and the OEWG will play mutually complementary roles and conclude consensus reports respectively.

Second, regarding disarmament and non-proliferation education, Japan believes in the power of education. Education plays a fundamental role in fostering understanding on nuclear weapons and their humanitarian consequences. Disarmament and nonproliferation education is crucial in breaking the current stalemate and making a progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Education helps us to think critically on our own, encouraging us to get into action at the national, social and individual levels. This is why we strongly believe in the power of disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Especially, active engagement of younger generations is essential in realizing our common goal of realizing “a world without nuclear weapons.” The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference highlighted education as a useful

and effective means to advance nuclear disarmament and encouraged all States to implement the 34 recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on “the United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education.” Furthermore, Japan welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on disarmament and non-proliferation education and encourages Member States to continue considering developing and implementing policies and educational programs for young people to increase and facilitate their constructive engagement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Japan firmly believes in the potential of disarmament and non-proliferation education and the power of younger generations to achieve our common goal - realization of “a world without nuclear weapons.” Japan will continue to take the lead on this issue and encourages all Member States to join our effort.

(END)

STATEMENT BY JAPAN
- THEMATIC DEBATE: DISARMAMENT MACHINERY -
OCTOBER, 2020, NEW YORK

Japan strongly recognizes the important role of the UN disarmament machinery, namely, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), which were all established in 1978 by the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-1) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

In particular, Japan appreciates the significant work done by UNIDIR, which marks its 40th anniversary this year. The UNIDIR is increasingly important as an autonomous institution established for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. The institution’s rich expertise on top of its unique status within the United Nations system enables them to provide ideas and advice that could enhance meaningful and interactive dialogues in various multilateral arms control and disarmament fora. This February, Japan collaborated with UNIDIR in organizing a seminar on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. Japan is keen to promote further collaboration with UNIDIR and take advantage of their invaluable expertise.

The CD is the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, which brings together key stakeholders, including all nuclear-weapon possessing countries. As members of such an essential body, it is our shared responsibility to achieve tangible results. However, the CD has been in a stalemate for more than two decades. The CD was not able to agree on a programme of work (POW) during this year’s session.

The CD should be a venue where the Member States are willing to understand divergent views and to compromise while seeking a common ground. Building upon previous negotiations, we need to prioritize substantive discussions on agenda items according to their degree of maturity. From this perspective, Japan reiterates the importance of the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Additionally, we consider that the following could be highlighted as the potential topics for further discussions:

(1) Transparency, (2) Nuclear Risk Reduction, (3) CTBT, (4) Nuclear Disarmament Verification, and (5) Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education. Japan is convinced that advancing substantive discussions on these specific issues will help increase the positive momentum in the CD and is crucial for the adoption of a POW at next year’s session.

In order to make substantive progress, robust cooperation and coordination among CD presidents is indispensable. We expect Belgium, the first President of the CD in 2021, to take proactive, collective and concrete steps by holding informal consultations with all relevant stakeholders and further strengthening P6 coordination. Japan is determined to promote and contribute to such endeavors so that the CD will be able to move forward to fulfill its own mandate.

Japan stands ready to cooperate with the UN and its Member States to make strides towards strengthening the work of the existing disarmament machinery. In this context, Japan hopes fruitful discussions will be made in the 2021 session of the UNDC.

Last, but certainly not least, Japan remains to be a close partner of the UNSG’s agenda for disarmament. Japan believes that the UNSG’s agenda for disarmament provides us with useful perspectives and guidance for promoting disarmament,

including the re-emphasis on effective partnership to take action towards gender equality within relevant bodies, empowerment of women and youth, and cooperation with civil society.

(END)

STATEMENT
by Mr. Zhangeldy Syrymbet,
Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan
to the United Nations
at the First Committee of the
75th Session of the UN General Assembly

Thematic discussions on specific clusters: Nuclear weapons
(19 October 2020, New York)

Mr. Chairman,
Distinguished participants,

This year, the international community celebrates the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations. On this landmark occasion, my country specially urges nuclear-armed states to pledge never to wage a nuclear war and finally to eliminate nuclear weapons by 2045 - the 100th Anniversary of the United Nations.

It was widely acknowledged that the pandemic of COVID-19 has clearly exposed, among other crises that loom ahead of us, continuing vulnerabilities in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It has also confirmed, all the more, the UN system's critical stewardship so important for global anti-crises approaches.

As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has rightly underscored, the elimination of nuclear weapons is vital to something beyond the fate of any single state: the survival of life on this planet.

This year, we also mark the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which has been a fundamental and integral part of the international security and nuclear disarmament architecture. Despite the Treaty's potential, the progress in this dimension is slow and does not meet the expectations of the members of the world community.

Kazakhstan's memorable history of closing one of the largest nuclear weapons test sites and renouncing its nuclear arsenal is well known. The date of closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Tests Site – 29 August – was the beginning of my country's nuclear-free history, and has become a symbol of actions against nuclear testing.

Next year we shall observe the 30st Anniversary of the closure of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site.

Mr. Chairman,

We have to admit that the gap between the nuclear and non-nuclear communities is becoming increasingly wider. This leads to a complete loss of trust and mutual confidence, to greater disagreements and disputes, and more critically, to an extremely more dangerous confrontation in the world. Due to the lack of progress in disarmament, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has become a new reality. This treaty is a strong and important signal that the overwhelming majority of the UN Member States are ready to take concrete action to combat the nuclear threats.

In the last century, we avoided a nuclear catastrophe and a devastating arms race. Today too, we must follow the same visionary example but alas, it is unfortunately being flouted rampantly. Our survival demands the need for political trust and consistent dialogue to generate positive processes. It is only confidence building measures that would help to resolve many current problematic issues, including the preservation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. History shows that such tensions can only be settled by political means and mutual respect of sometimes contradictory concerns.

Reliance on nuclear arsenals can never ensure strategic security but only prompt asymmetric responses, thus crossing lines of no return.

The future of the NPT must not be jeopardized.

Thus, implementing Article 6 of this Treaty, and decisions of previous NPT Review Conferences, are critical.

To conclude, Kazakhstan pledges to continue to collaborate with other Member States to strengthen the global and regional disarmament and non-proliferation architecture.

**Statement on behalf of the Member States of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

Delivered by

**Mr. Daovy VONGXAY, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Lao People's
Democratic Republic to the United Nations**

**At the Thematic Discussion on Cluster 2: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
of the First Committee, Seventy-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
New York, 23 October 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

1. I have the honor to deliver this statement on behalf of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country, the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Mr. Chairman,

2. ASEAN welcomes the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, particularly "ensuring respect for norms against chemical and biological weapons concerns the interests of all humanity". Given the fact that other weapons of mass destruction, if detonated intentionally or by accident, can cause massive loss of life, damage to property and great harm to the environment, ASEAN member States condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of such weapons by any party under any circumstances, as this constitutes a serious violation of international law. Therefore, ASEAN reiterates the need for the international community to fully and effectively implement all treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction.

3. Having recognized the threats and dangers of the existence and use of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, ASEAN continues to call for universal adherence to applicable international legal instruments prohibiting these weapons. In this regard, ASEAN welcomes the progress in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles under the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons (CWC) while emphasizing the importance of full and effective implementation of the Security Council Resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) and other Weapons of Mass Destruction related treaties.

4. All ASEAN Member States are parties to the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention. In this regard, ASEAN invites those States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible. ASEAN recognizes that the Convention remains one of the most successful instruments of disarmament that completely prohibits an entire category of WMD, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in accordance with the international law. ASEAN Member States take our international obligations seriously in this regard. With the current COVID-19 pandemic and its devastating consequences to socio-economic development and human life, ASEAN stresses the importance of biological security and safety.

5. ASEAN strongly believes that the international community should increase its efforts to strengthen international cooperation in order to eliminate chemical weapons and enhance international support to help all victims suffering from the chemical weapons. In this connection, ASEAN commends the OPCW for its unwavering efforts to support the implementation the provisions of the CWC.

Mr. Chairman,

6. As ASEAN Member States are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), we recognize that the BWC represents a critical component of the international legal framework related to WMD. In this connection, ASEAN calls for the resumption of multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory legally binding Protocol, dealing with all Articles of the Convention, in a balanced and comprehensive manner to sustainably strengthen the Convention, including through verification measures. In addition, ASEAN reaffirms its support to the efforts of the international community to prevent terrorists and other non-state actors from acquiring such weapons of mass destruction and their means of distribution by enhancing cooperation in information sharing.

Mr. Chairman,

7. On regional cooperation, ASEAN is also committed to improving regional capacity to address chemical, biological and radiological threats. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting approved the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence Experts in 2018 to strengthen cooperation against chemical, biological and radiological threats.

Under the ambit of the Network, regional chemical, biological and radiological defence experts have gathered over the last two years to build networks as well as share information and best practices through visits and workshops. Practical cooperation in the ASEAN defence sector continues to make good progress since its inception in 2006. At the 13th Meeting held in Thailand on 11 July 2019, ASEAN Defense Ministers adopted and signed the Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Sustainable Security. This year, the ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Three-Year Work Programme 2020- 2022 and the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Group Work Plans 2020-2023 to chart the future direction of practical defence cooperation in ASEAN and share best practices and to make quick contact during chemical, biological and radiological crises, will be finalized and approved.

8. Furthermore, ASEAN acknowledges the defense sector's commitment and contribution to ASEAN's collective response to the COVID-19 pandemic as reflected in the Joint Statement by the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Defence Cooperation Against Disease Outbreaks issued at the ADMM Retreat in February 2020. In this regard, ASEAN welcomed the successful conduct of the ADMM COVID-19 Table-Top Exercise on 27 May 2020 under the ASEAN Center of Military Medicine (ACMM), and the Virtual Workshop on Promoting Scientific Cooperation to Manage Infectious Disease Outbreaks on 30 June 2020 under the Network of ASEAN Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence Experts.

9. In addition, the Regional Secretariat of the EU CBRN Center of Excellence in Southeast Asia has been working to enhance the capacity of the ASEAN Member States in mitigating CBRN-related risks by ensuring cooperation and coordination in South-East Asia and supporting efforts to identify CBRN risk mitigation needs, develop National CBRN Action Plans and formulate and implement regional project proposals. As part of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Workshop on Raising Awareness and Promoting Cooperation on CBRN Risk Mitigation was held in Manila in 2018 for policy professionals, practitioners, security forces, and health experts. Building upon this work, the 27th ARF has also agreed to carry out the ARF Table Top Exercise (TTX) on Response Capabilities to CBRN Incidents, which has been postponed this year due to the pandemic, in inter-sessional 2020-2021.

Mr. Chairman

10. Let me conclude by reaffirming ASEAN's support for the work of the OPCW and the BWC's Implementation Support Unit and by stressing the importance of enhanced international support for States Parties in need of assistance to build national capacity for the implementation of treaties related to weapons of mass destruction in accordance with national and international law and the UN Charter.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman

MALAYSIA
ASEAN STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE
MEMBER STATES OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
(ASEAN)

CLUSTER STATEMENT ON OUTER SPACE
(DISARMAMENT ASPECTS)

OCTOBER 2020

1. This written statement is submitted on behalf of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
2. ASEAN recognizes access to outer space as an inalienable right of all States. We believe that the exploration and use of outer space should exclusively be for peaceful purposes only, and that it is in the collective benefit of humanity. As such, it is important that all activities in the outer space are conducted in accordance with international law and the principle of non-appropriation of outer space.
3. The current global disarmament discourse requires efforts to maintain outer space as a domain of peace and security. Realizing the emerging threats to the rules-based international order, ASEAN reaffirms the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space and its weaponization. In this regard, we urge all Member States to respect and ensure the full implementation of the UN General Assembly Resolution [73/91](#) and previous resolutions on international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space.
4. ASEAN welcomes the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), pursuant to General Assembly Resolution [72/250](#), in which its membership comprised of an ASEAN Member State, Malaysia. While we note that substantive progress was made through the discussions in 2018 and 2019, ASEAN regrets that the GGE failed to agree on a consensus final report. ASEAN believes that the substantive discussions in the GGE could serve as a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an international legally binding instrument on preventing of an arms race in outer space and on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space.
5. ASEAN recognizes significant progress made by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in promoting international cooperation on the peaceful use of outer space. In this regard, ASEAN remains committed to collaborating with Member States of the COPUOS, including by working closely with the Working Group on the "Space2030" Agenda in deliberating its implementation plan. ASEAN also calls for continued action in mitigating the effects of space debris through relevant multilateral fora.
6. As it is incumbent upon all States to ensure that the use and exploration of outer space are exclusively for peaceful purposes, the General Assembly must play a vital role in fostering continued dialogue on current issues and challenges in this field. In this regard, ASEAN emphasizes the urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to commence its substantive work including through the establishment of an ad hoc committee under the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". ASEAN recognizes that the CD has the primary role in negotiating a multilateral agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, without further delay. We believe that the immediate commencement of such work by the CD will contribute to the sustaining of momentum that has been built on this issue thus far.
7. Confidence-building measures play a critical role in preventing an arms race in outer space, and this is recognized by the international community through General Assembly Resolution [72/56](#). On this note, ASEAN will continue to support initiative of this nature, through appropriate platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Space Security Workshop, which was convened three times to date. We look forward to future workshop that will provide opportunities to explore critical issues, including on space security threats and hazards, transparency and confidence-building measures and areas for international cooperation.

8. ASEAN underscores that space science and technology and their applications, such as satellite communications, earth observation system and satellite navigation technologies, provide indispensable tools for viable long-term solutions for sustainable development of all countries. This in turn will improve people's lives as well as contribute to the realization of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

9. Undoubtedly, with increased access to outer space, comes greater responsibilities to the entire UN membership. This further underscores the need for shared understanding and the acceptance of norms developed through multilateral engagement. ASEAN stands ready to engage with all parties in moving the agenda forward.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the written statement submitted by Myanmar on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Nuclear weapons pose an overriding existential threat for the whole of humankind. 75 years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humanity remains disconcerted by the continuing existence and modernization of nuclear weapons.
3. Malaysia has always considered the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts. It is hoped that the 50th anniversary of the NPT's entry into force and the 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension could provide a strong impetus to States Parties in advancing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
4. As the Chair of Main Committee I for the upcoming 10th NPT Review Conference, Malaysia hopes that all States Parties could utilize the platform to reaffirm obligations and past commitments, while striving to reinvigorate the path moving forward.
5. Malaysia is very pleased to recently deposit its instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 30 September 2020. Ratifying the TPNW is a testament of our unwavering commitment and support towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and Malaysia's tangible effort in advancing this longstanding goal.
6. Malaysia also welcomes the recent 50th ratification of the TPNW, which fulfilled the minimum requirement for its entry into force. Malaysia hopes that the political and legal impact of the entry into force of the TPNW on the nuclear disarmament discourse will provide the much needed direction aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons.
7. Malaysia believes that the TPNW will complement, and not undermine, the existing international legal instruments relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) and the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty.
8. The expeditious entry into force of the CTBT is long overdue. Malaysia continues to align itself with other States Parties in advocating the entry into force of the CTBT and urges the Annex 2 States to sign and ratify the Treaty, without further delay.
9. Malaysia is firmly committed to the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Plan of Action. We underscore the urgent need to resolve all outstanding issues in accordance with the objectives and principles of the SEANWFZ Treaty pertaining to the signing and ratification of the SEANWFZ Protocol at the earliest. This is in line with the aspirations of the ASEAN Leaders, as reflected in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2025.
10. As per the Joint Communiqué of the 53rd ASEAN Ministers' Meeting of 9 September 2020, Malaysia will continue to work with other ASEAN Member States to move the process forward. We are also committed to working constructively with fellow ASEAN Member States on the submission of the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution to the First Committee at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly in 2021, following the last substantive submission in 2015.
11. Malaysia recognizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as the fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and its indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. Malaysia also believes that the role and contribution of the IAEA are equally important in facilitating the use of nuclear energy in a safe, secure and peaceful manner.
12. Malaysia remains concerned over the developments in relation to the DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. We stress the importance of continued peaceful dialogue amongst all concerned parties to realise a lasting peace and stability in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. This would require the full and expeditious implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions and agreements reached among concerned parties.

13. On the JCPOA, we regret the status of its implementation and call on all parties to refrain from undertaking any actions that would further undermine the agreement. With regard to the START Treaty, Malaysia welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation, and calls both sides to extend the New START Treaty in the interest of collective security for all.

14. With the growing number of issues and complexities due to continued threats posed by nuclear weapons, it is critical that Member States exhaust all possible efforts to make the necessary progress to preserve the international peace and security, as the status quo is not an option.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON
OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement submitted by the Lao People's Democratic Republic on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. As a staunch supporter of disarmament and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, Malaysia reaffirms its principled position that the universal peace and security can only be ensured through the general and complete disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the only comprehensive multilateral instrument banning an entire category of weapons of mass destruction, providing for a verification system and promoting the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes. Malaysia is committed to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC. In this regard, we are pleased that 98% of the world's declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been verifiably destroyed as confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

4. Malaysia appreciates the important role and continuous work of the OPCW to achieve the objectives and purposes of the CWC, particularly in ensuring full implementation of its provisions. Malaysia will continue to work closely with the OPCW and other States Parties in ensuring the fulfilment of obligations under the CWC.

5. Despite this remarkable progress, Malaysia regrets the recent re-emergence of the use of chemical weapons which is abhorrent and a flagrant violation of international law, especially the CWC. Malaysia condemns in the strongest possible term the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Those responsible for the deployment of such weapons must be identified and held accountable.

6. Malaysia fully supports and commends efforts by the international community to press for universal adherence to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and promote its universalization, as well as the sustained determination of the international community in complying with provisions under the Convention. To this end, Malaysia believes that effective verification measures should be put in place to strengthen the BWC.

7. On that note, Malaysia is committed to its adherence and implementation of the obligations under the BWC. We stand ready to facilitate and participate in the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes, as stipulated under Article X of the Convention. Pursuant to Article IV of the Convention, we continue to undertake the requisite domestic processes towards adopting a national Biological Weapons Bill, which would further strengthen and ensure effective implementation of the BWC in Malaysia.

8. Realizing the grave consequences of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Malaysia calls for all Member States to adhere to the related multilateral instruments with a view to achieving effective progress towards the prohibition and elimination of all WMDs including chemical and biological weapons.

9. As a State Party to the SEANWFZ Treaty, Malaysia will make every effort to ensure that the Southeast Asia region remains a nuclear-weapon-free zone and free of all other WMDs. In this connection, Malaysia will continue to support efforts in promoting peace and stability in the region, in accordance with international law and the principles of the UN Charter as well as the ASEAN Charter.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON OUTER SPACE
(DISARMAMENT ASPECTS)
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Space science and technology gradually become an indispensable part of our daily lives. Outer space exploration has not only stimulated the advancement of science and technology, but also motivated us to enhance our wellbeing. With the increasing number of actors participating in space programmes, both states and private entities, it is of greater importance that the main principles of space exploration are emphasised.
3. These include that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, and shall be the province of all humankind. Malaysia strongly believes in these principles, in guiding our work when it comes to outer space.
4. Malaysia reiterates the importance of inalienable right of all States to explore and use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that it is in the collective benefit of humanity. We also reaffirm that the prevention of an arms race in outer space and its weaponization are of vital importance. All activities in the outer space must be carried out in accordance with international law and in line with the principle of non-appropriation of outer space.
5. Malaysia recognizes the important role of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in ensuring the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. We remain committed to collaborating with all the Member States of COPUOS, including working closely with the Working Group on the “Space2030” Agenda.
6. Malaysia reaffirms the importance of the Group of Governmental Experts’ (GGE) that was established pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution [72/250](#), in which Malaysia is a member. Nonetheless, we deeply regret that during the last session, the GGE failed to agree on a consensus final report. Malaysia hopes that Member States would return to substantive discussions in the GGE, which could serve as a good basis for further negotiations towards adopting an internally legally binding instrument on preventing an arms race in outer space.
7. Malaysia remains committed to ratify and accede to international treaties governing the use of outer space that uphold the legal principles enshrined in the General Assembly resolution [1962 \(XVIII\)](#) of 1963. Malaysia has adopted its 2030 National Space Policy and has commenced the process of drafting national outer space legislation. This process would pave the way for Malaysia to ratify and accede to space-related international instruments, such as the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.
8. Malaysia stands ready to support efforts to strengthen the international framework for science, technology and outer space activities. Malaysia reiterates its full commitment to enhance international cooperation on the peaceful uses of outer space, including with other States, to actualize the goals set.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement submitted by the Kingdom of Cambodia on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Whilst maintaining our efforts to eradicate all weapons of mass destruction, we should not disregard the devastating consequences caused by conventional weapons. In this regard, Malaysia commends the UN Secretary-General for placing particular emphasis on this matter in his Agenda for Disarmament. Malaysia joins the international community in calling for further action to reduce the serious humanitarian impacts caused by conventional weapons, especially on the lives of civilians.

3. As a Signatory State of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), Malaysia will continue to support international efforts at preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade of conventional arms. Malaysia believes that the ATT will strengthen the existing national policies, concerning the control of conventional weapons, while recognising the legitimate right of States to use arms judiciously for security, self-defence, research and trade. To this end, Malaysia will continue to work towards ratifying the Treaty.
4. Malaysia has reviewed its domestic legislation to ensure full and effective implementation of the ATT. We have put in place adequate and stringent domestic laws that include the Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010, Customs Act 1967 and Arms Act 1960, to effectively control the circulation of conventional arms, and to prevent arms from being diverted into the illicit market. Malaysia is also working with the ATT States Parties and international bodies in assessing how we may best meet our obligations pursuant to the Treaty.
5. Malaysia strongly believes that the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) poses a serious threat to international peace and security. In this regard, Malaysia supports the Programme of Action (PoA) and strongly calls for the full, balanced and effective implementation of the PoA to combat the proliferation and misuse of small arms.
6. Malaysia calls for meaningful collective action to address these critical issues, in order to ensure the safety and well-being of global civilians. As such, Malaysia reaffirms its commitment to work closely with all Member States and stands ready to explore opportunities for international cooperation in order to control and reduce conventional weapons.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement submitted by Singapore on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. At a time of the global pandemic, technology plays a crucial role in keeping the society functional. Malaysia has seen an accelerated rate in digitalisation in keeping with measures to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Such technology presents opportunity, as well as vulnerability, due to increased risk of cyberattacks. In this regard, the international community must be prepared to confront the risks with a robust cyber security response, especially in protecting the national security interest.
3. Malaysia believes that with the ever-evolving technological developments across multiple domains, cyber security must be a subject of high priority. Already emboldened by anonymity and further motivated by the increase in users of the digitalised platform, hackers and users with malicious intentions may carry out attacks such as phishing, email scams, data breaches, sending links containing malwares and distributed denial-of-service.
4. Moreover, the increased reliance on information and communication technology (ICT) during this on-going pandemic may present new ways in which cybercrime can be committed. Therefore, we wish to reiterate that continuous coordination and cooperation among States will contribute to an improved management of cyberspace.
5. Malaysia is amplifying its national efforts in addressing cyber risks and threats from both operational and policy perspectives. Our efforts are geared towards increasing expertise, capacities and capabilities in tackling this issue domestically, as well as to cope with the development and ongoing discussions on this matter on the global scale.
6. In this regard, Malaysia is supportive of the initiatives by the Secretary-General in his Agenda for Disarmament on the issue of cyber security and welcomes programmes that aimed to improve capacity building and knowledge transfer to our relevant national agencies towards implementing their respective tasks, in handling the issue of cyber security.
7. Furthermore, Malaysia launched its Cyber Security Strategy (MCSS) on 12 October 2020, which will serve as a 5 year comprehensive strategy encompassing all aspects of Malaysia's cyber security concerns including governance; legislation and enforcement; innovation, industry development, technology security and research & development (R&D); capacity

building and awareness raising; international engagement and cooperation. The launch of this Cyber Security Strategy is a mark of our commitment and positioning cyber security as a main priority in our national security agenda.

8. We welcome the efforts of the OEWG and the GGE, and their productive discussions in the area of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

9. We hope that the two (2) mechanisms would continue to be utilised, through which Member States could constructively engage on various pertinent aspects that include norms-setting, principles, rules as well as legally-binding commitments in cyberspace.

10. Malaysia reaffirms the need for multilateral cooperation in delivering the way forward. We call on all relevant parties to find common ground in addressing areas of common concern moving forward. It is imperative for all parties to ensure that the use of technologies should be fully in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. Respect for sovereignty of all nations as well as human rights should be prioritized in developing such technologies.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement submitted by Brunei Darussalam on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. Malaysia views the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, Semipalatinsk and Mongolia's declaration as vital importance in enhancing global and regional peace. These instruments strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

3. As a founding member of the SEANWFZ, Malaysia reaffirms the significance of such zones and treaties in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world.

4. Malaysia underscores the importance of realizing the overarching objectives of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Protocol, in accordance with the "ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together", adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2015. The accession of the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to the SEANWFZ Protocol remains imperative.

5. Malaysia welcomes consultation and continuous dialogue between ASEAN and the NWS in resolving protracted issues to allow for the signing and ratification of the Protocol by the latter at the earliest. We also reaffirm our commitment to continue working with ASEAN Member States to actively pursue this goal, as well as to maintain the international profile of SEANWFZ by submitting the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution to the First Committee at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly in 2021, following the last substantive submission in 2015.

6. Malaysia believes that the establishment of the Middle East Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDZFZ) will enhance global and regional peace and strengthen WMD non-proliferation among all countries of the region.

7. Malaysia welcomes the convening of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in November 2019 and hopes for more progress to be made in this regard.

8. Malaysia remains of the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones is an integral part of nuclear disarmament and the promotion of regional peace and stability. Malaysia hopes that the 4th Conference of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia to be held in 2021 will contribute to further strengthening collaboration and coordination between the Zones.

9. Malaysia fully supports commitments of the Secretary-General in his Disarmament Agenda to increase efforts in facilitating dialogue between Member States in order to help Member States to return to a common vision and path of an enhanced regional and global peace.

**STATEMENT BY MALAYSIA
THEMATIC CLUSTER ON DISARMAMENT MACHINERY
OCTOBER 2020
UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK**

1. Malaysia aligns itself with the statement submitted by the Kingdom of Thailand on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

2. Malaysia remains an ardent proponent of multilateralism in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament. We believe the need for reinvigorating the UN Disarmament Machinery, including the UNGA First Committee, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC). These machineries would add further impetus to ongoing efforts pertaining to various disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

3. The UNGA First Committee is the realization of the international community's faith in multilateral approaches on disarmament and international security matters. It serves as a main platform in addressing challenges, bridging gaps, and building consensus. It is of utmost importance for all Member States to maintain constructive engagement to ensure the success of this Committee's deliberative process.

4. Malaysia views that the CD needs to re-conquer its relevancy as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. The current deadlock in the CD undermines the credibility of the Conference and erodes the trust of the international community towards disarmament. In order to realize this, Malaysia will continue to engage constructively in the CD to pursue towards an agreed Programme of Work. Malaysia is of the view that it is vital for Member States to exercise flexibility to rejuvenate the stalled multilateral negotiations.

5. Malaysia also welcomes the establishment of supporting bodies such as Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) in facilitating the formulation of substantive work for the CD. In the spirit of inclusivity and transparency, Malaysia believes the membership of the CD should be opened to more UN Member States.

6. Malaysia reaffirms the relevance and importance of the UNDC as the sole specialized and deliberative body within the multilateral disarmament machinery. Malaysia expresses regret at the inability of the UNDC to hold its substantive sessions for two consecutive years, in 2019 and 2020. We hope that the UNDC will be able to commence its work in 2021 and make substantive recommendations on its agenda.

7. Malaysia fully supports the work of the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament for its continued technical assistance for Member States in the Asia Pacific region. We view that these Centres play a vital role in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation, towards the maintenance of peace and security at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. Malaysia looks forward to participating in programmes hosted by these centres in the future.

8. Malaysia once again welcomes the Secretary-General's Disarmament Agenda which provides a clear recognition of the need to enhance the functioning of the disarmament machinery and to bring disarmament back to the forefront of the UN's focus.

75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
First Committee
Statement by
H.E. Mr. Kyaw Moe Tun
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar
For thematic discussion on “Nuclear Weapon”
On behalf of
the Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

29th October 2020

Mr. Chair,

1. I have the honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam and my own country, Myanmar.

Mr. Chair,

2. The year 2020 marks 75th anniversary of the birth of the United Nations. It also marks the 75th anniversary of the first test and the first (and hopefully the last) use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament has ranked high on the agenda of the UN since the first days of it, and it remains so. For more than seven decades, the UN has dedicated a significant amount of time and resources to build a world free of nuclear weapons—a common goal that still remains elusive.

3. The status quo of nuclear weapons, including their vertical proliferations, and current challenging international security environment make the specter of nuclear detonations, whether by accident or design, imaginable. ASEAN reiterates its conviction that the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination.

4. Based on this belief, ASEAN has committed to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter and the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ). Again, we stress the importance of the full and effective implementation of the SEANWFZ Treaty, and the Plan of Action to Strengthen the Implementation of the SEANWFZ (2018-2022).

Mr. Chair,

5. We continue to put a premium on the role of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. The success of this Grand Bargain hinges on all parties to the treaty engaging in full implementation of the treaty, especially Article VI. A consensual final document of the 10th Review Conference is the common goal that we all need to work on.

6. We reiterate that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is another important step in moving towards global nuclear disarmament, and that it complements existing non-proliferation and nuclear weapons related instruments. A number of ASEAN member states have either signed or ratified this treaty, with our fellow member Malaysia being the 46th ratifying state on 30th September 2020. With the total number of ratifications reaching the required 50 state parties for its entry into force on 24th October 2020, it will further reinforce norms against nuclear weapons.

7. ASEAN stresses the importance of achieving the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Since September 2018, all ASEAN members are Ratifying States to the Treaty. ASEAN calls on the remaining Annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible for its entry into force. We stress that any form of voluntary nuclear moratorium is no substitute to the CTBT, pending its entry into force.

Mr. Chair,

8. ASEAN expresses its concern over the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). Being a significant instrument in mitigating the risk posed by nuclear weapons, ASEAN urges relevant parties to peacefully resolve their differences through peaceful negotiations with the view to revitalize this mechanism.

9. ASEAN stresses the importance of continued peaceful dialogue amongst all concerned parties in order to realize lasting peace and stability in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. We urge all concerned parties to resume peaceful dialogue and continue working towards the realization of lasting peace and stability in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, including through the full and expeditious implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, the Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Joint Statement by the US and DPRK leaders. We reiterate our commitment to the full implementation of all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions and note international efforts to bring about the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We reiterate our readiness to play a constructive role, including through utilizing ASEAN-led platforms such as the ARF in promoting a conducive atmosphere to peaceful dialogue amongst the concerned parties.

10. To build a world free of nuclear weapons, it is also important to promote education on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, especially in the context of current challenges to nuclear disarmament efforts of the international community. In this regard, we call upon Member States and international organizations, which are in position to do so, to increase supports for developing countries through knowledge dissemination, trainings, capacity building and experience sharing programmes on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mr. Chair,

11. ASEAN reiterates its unflagging commitments to drive the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. We urge all member states to take tangible steps that can lead to a world free of nuclear weapons.

12. I thank you.

**Statement delivered by
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations in New York
At the First Committee Thematic Discussions on “Nuclear Weapons”
29th October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Myanmar aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair,

2. For the past 75 years, the international community under the aegis of the United Nations has been painstakingly trying to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons. In this long endeavor, a handful of countries have believed that nuclear weapons should be limited, whereas the majority has been of the opinion that the world should have no place for nuclear weapons. But, if we reflect on the journey we have taken, it is hard to deny that we have made significant achievements in the form of ambitious international instruments aiming for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, even though different states have different opinions on them.

3. However, it is regrettable that these hard-won gains are still overshadowed by agendas to preserve nuclear deterrence as means to project power, destabilizing the international security environment. Risks of nuclear weapons, whether by accident or design, have not abated but amplified these days. Concern over this predicament has been repeatedly echoed in the First Committee annually, but to no avail.

Mr. Chair,

4. Myanmar reaffirms its unflagging belief that the absolute guarantee against the threat or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nothing other than their total elimination. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons must be just a provisional measure pending the realization of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Bearing this in mind, Myanmar, together with like-minded countries, has been annually tabling “Nuclear Disarmament” resolution to the First Committee since 1995. This year again, we have put forward this resolution and express our sincere appreciations to all members states that have rendered their support on our resolution.

5. We reiterate that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. This is a very unique treaty that has resulted in the dichotomy between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots in which the latter have agreed not to pursue the path towards nuclear weapons in exchange that the former will take meaningful steps to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. But the progresses made by the nuclear club are still unpromising. We continue to call for nuclear-weapons states to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time.

6. We also call for all member states to work together in good faith with the objective of achieving tangible outcome in the upcoming Review Conference of the NPT, and support efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. Myanmar continues to stress the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and encourages the remaining Annex II states to ratify the treaty for its entry into force.

8. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) contributes towards global nuclear disarmament, and complements other existing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. The forthcoming entry into force of this treaty will significantly strengthen global norms against nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chair,

9. Besides these international instruments, bilateral and regional mechanisms as to nuclear non-proliferation are indispensable for global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. Departures from them are conducive to destabilizing the international security environment.

10. In this regard, Myanmar shares the international community’s desire to see the extension of the New START treaty and concern over the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty.

11. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) plays a vital role for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. We call upon all parties concerned to resolve their differences in a peaceful manner and cooperate in good faith with a view to preserve the JCPOA.

Mr. Chair,

12. Nuclear disarmament is not an optional but mandatory approach that every nation must pursue. To this end, it is imperative for all states to duly implement their obligations under instruments that they are party to. Myanmar will continue to honour our commitments for the realization of the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

13. I thank you.

**Statement delivered by
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations in New York
At the First Committee Thematic Discussions on “other Weapons of Mass Destruction”
29th October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Myanmar aligns itself with the statement delivered by the Lao’s People Democratic Republic on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair,

2. So much attention and resources have been paid to the WMD matters, with a view to their total elimination. Yet, the threat posed by these WMDs are still looming large, not least the menace of nuclear weapons nowadays. Their very existence must be regarded as a destabilizing factor to the international security environment.

3. Myanmar reiterates that members of the international community must work together and redouble our efforts towards total elimination of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction. Heightened tensions and dangers can only be resolved through constructive political dialogue, negotiations and engagement.

Mr. Chair,

4. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is one of the most successful and comprehensive legally-binding international treaty designed to eliminate an entire category of WMD. It has already been more than two decades since the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Under the guidance of the OPCW, significant achievements in terms of universalization of the CWC and destructions of chemical weapons have been realized.

5. It is inspiring to note that over 98% of declared chemical weapons have been destroyed under the verification of the OPCW, and we urge OPCW member states that are still in possession of declared-chemical weapon stockpiles to expedite their destructions in line with the Convention. We must not tolerate the use of such horrific weapons by anyone under any circumstances, and need to continue our endeavor to reach our main goal of the total destruction of all chemical weapons and prevent the re-emergence of chemical weapons and to promote peaceful uses of chemicals.

6. Myanmar, as a State Party, has dedicated herself to the earnest implementation of the CWC and strict adherence to the provisions of the Convention. In this regard, we are also in the process of drafting a national chemical weapon law.

Mr. Chair,

7. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic clearly shows us the unpredictable, uncontrollable and obnoxious nature of infectious agents and their lethality.

8. The Biological Weapon Convention (BWC) has become increasingly relevant for the safety of all of us. We encourage all remaining states outside the BWC to accede to this convention at their earliest opportunities. In addition, appropriate measures must be taken to address the remaining gaps of the BWC to preserve the world free of bioweapons.

9. We welcome the successful conclusion of the 2019 Meeting of States Parties and also recognize the progress and achievements of the meeting. We also welcome 2020 Meetings of Experts which will be held in Geneva in December this year.

Mr. Chair,

10. Myanmar is a partner country of the EU Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (EU CBRN CoE). As part of Myanmar Government’s continuing efforts to meet its international

obligations, the National CBRN Team was formed in 2013 and restructured in 2019. The Ministry of Education as the focal ministry, and relevant Ministries are represented in this National CBRN Team. Myanmar is now developing the National CBRN Action Plan in cooperation with UNICRI, EU CBRN CoE and national CBRN Team members.

11. Myanmar reaffirms our efforts through regional and international cooperation to meet its international obligations for prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction. Myanmar calls for all member states to honour respective international treaties against WMDs and to continue to work towards the prohibition and elimination of all WMDs.

12. I thank you.

**Statement delivered by
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations in New York
At the First Committee Thematic Discussions on “Outer Space”
29th October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Myanmar aligns itself with the statement delivered by Malaysia on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair,

2. To date, only 4 percent of the visible universe has been explored. There still remain countless unknowns in space. For developing countries, reaching to outer space is limited by their pre-existing priorities. However, military doctrines and technologies that can militarize and weaponize space have already existed, and their implications can affect on all of us. We are of the view that with accelerating progresses in new space technologies and capabilities, their potential military applications in space might subsequently lead us into an arms race in outer space, if we do not endeavor to ensure the use of outer space is exclusively for peaceful purposes only.

3. Myanmar welcomes the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), established pursuant to General Assembly resolution [72/250](#), but regrets that the GGE was not able to produce a consensus final report. We recall the report of the previous GGE, established by General Assembly resolution [65/68](#), outlining space transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), which should be implemented by all countries, especially by spacefaring ones.

4. The current basic framework of international space law as created by the Outer Space Treaty is far from enough to address present and future challenges in outer space. Myanmar joins other like-minded states in calling for adoption of an internationally legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). Bearing this in mind, we welcome all constructive efforts and proposals made under the agenda item “prevention of an arms race in outer space”, including the draft treaty jointly proposed by China and Russia. Any differences as to PAROS should be resolved through an amicable manner.

5. In this connection, Myanmar reiterates that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has the primary role in the negotiation of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all of its aspects, and urges all state parties to the CD to do everything they can in good faith to meet this end.

Mr. Chair,

6. It is a matter of time before increasing numbers of countries have increasing access to outer space, and their inalienable rights in space must be only to use space for peaceful purposes.

7. All of us need to act responsibly to preserve our common heritage.

8. I thank you, Mr. Chair.

**Statement delivered by
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations in New York
At the First Committee Thematic Discussions on “Conventional Weapons”
29th October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Myanmar aligns itself with the statement delivered by Cambodia on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair,

2. Disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) rank highest in the global disarmament agenda, but it is a hard truth that conventional weapons have claimed higher numbers of casualties than WMDs, and their proliferations are fueling conflicts worldwide. Myanmar shares the international community's concern over the challenges posed by illicit transfer of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons (SALWs) falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors. We would like to call on states to exchange good practices on preventing, combating and eradicating illicit trade in SALWs in order to develop guidelines in compliance with the UN Programme of Action.

3. At the same time, we wish to stress that conventional weapons are the pillar of national armed forces and it is the sovereign right of all states to develop and possess conventional weapons to maintain a minimum level of credible national security. However, these weapons should not lead to humanitarian consequences.

Mr. Chair,

4. Myanmar supports, in principle, the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Convention and initiatives taken under these provisions. Victim-activated-ammunitions that fall under these two conventions can lead to severe humanitarian impacts.

5. Myanmar delegation, as an observer, attended the Ninth Meeting of State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) which was held in September 2019 in Geneva, Switzerland. Although we are not a state party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), Myanmar has also been participating in the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts.

Mr. Chair,

6. For the first time, Myanmar delegation was represented at the ministerial level to the Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention, held in November 2019 in Oslo, Norway.

7. We have established Mine Risk Education Inter-Agency Working Group since 2012. The Working Group has been coordinating and cooperating with relevant NGOs, INGOs and CSOs for conducting awareness raising campaigns on the risk of landmines around the country and providing financial and necessary assistance to mine victims for their socio-economic rehabilitations.

8. In Myanmar, about one million people have been well informed on the dangers of landmines since awareness raising campaigns began in 2016, with 280,000 educated on the matter in 2019 alone. Moreover, the government is in the process of establishing a National Mine Action Centre and respective Ministries have been studying to organize the National Mine Action Authority to conduct systematic demining. We would like to express our gratitude to the governments of Norway and Switzerland for providing technical assistance on this matter.

9. Myanmar is also working with ASEAN members through ADMM-Plus Expert's Working Group on Humanitarian Mine Action under ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre.

Mr. Chair,

10. Myanmar reaffirms that we will continue to work with regional organizations, the United Nations and relevant stakeholders under the existing frameworks and programmes to stop illicit proliferation of conventional weapons.

11. I thank you.

**Statement delivered by
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations in New York
At the First Committee Thematic Discussions on “Regional Disarmament and Security”
29th October 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Myanmar aligns itself with the statement delivered by Brunei Darussalam on behalf of ASEAN.

Mr. Chair,

2. Disarmament and non-proliferation institutions that all of us have built over the years are integral part of the international security environment. The vibrancy of the former is directly proportional to the stability of the latter. Problems that challenge the international peace and security usually originate within regional context, and thus it is important for all parties concerned to fully follow their respective regional disarmament mechanisms, which can significantly contribute to safeguarding regional peace and security.

3. Regional peace and security are prerequisite for developments, especially for developing countries. Myanmar reaffirms that global and regional disarmament approaches complement each other and should be pursued simultaneously. The regional disarmament approach can also contribute to implementation of global disarmament and non-proliferation instruments through national capacity-building, outreach and advocacy initiatives for respective countries.

4. Myanmar encourages efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures at regional levels, since they are practical measures to reduce tensions among states in their respective regions.

5. Regional nuclear weapons-free-zones play an important role in strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this regard, we reiterate our commitment to preserve the Southeast Asia region as a nuclear weapons-free-zone and a region free of all other weapons of mass destruction as enshrined in the Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone and the ASEAN Charter. We continue to call upon nuclear weapons states to engage with ASEAN members with a view to realize the objective of denuclearization status of Southeast Asia. Myanmar will also continue to support efforts to establish such zones, especially in the Middle East.

6. We reaffirm our commitments to work together with all ASEAN member states to reinforce regional disarmament initiatives of ASEAN.

7. Myanmar stresses the importance of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), its Regional Disarmament Branch (RDB) and the three regional disarmament centers, for their assistances on capacity building of member states to contribute to national and regional efforts towards arm control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and reaffirms our supports to them.

Mr. Chair

8. As we all aspire to strengthen global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, we must not overlook the role of regional disarmament mechanisms. They are usually designed to accommodate specific characters of respective regions in moving towards our common goals. We urge all member states to make their best efforts to enhance regional disarmament measures, and by extension, global disarmament.

9. I thank you.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Nuclear Weapons

New York, 30 October 2020

We currently still find ourselves in the run-up to the tenth NPT Review Conference and the pandemic has made it even clearer that we can only uphold the existing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament architecture if we continue to – jointly – put our strongest efforts in.

The current challenges to international security, stability as well as nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation highlight the necessity of an effective Non-Proliferation Treaty as the cornerstone of our efforts in this regard. The marking of its 50th anniversary this year provides the NPT States parties with an important opportunity to reinforce and develop the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, looking forward as well as back. We should acknowledge the NPT's achievements and be honest in reviewing its implementation – where we have done well, and where we still have work to do. It is the shared responsibility of States Parties to deliver on their commitments across all three mutually independent and reinforcing pillars, to work to identify areas where progress is possible, to cooperate in order to move forward and to search for compromise where necessary.

The Netherlands will actively contribute to a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference via our vice-presidency and our chairmanship of Main Committee III. Our efforts are aimed at upholding and strengthening the legitimacy of the NPT instrument and at bridging existing divides. The effectiveness of the NPT process is of great importance, to accomplish these aims. In this context, the Netherlands also supports the reviewing the NPT review cycles' procedures and working methods to increase the effectiveness of process.

We support pragmatic, inclusive measures including the universalization of the NPT, entry into force of the CTBT and negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We call for the start of negotiations in the CD without preconditions.

The Netherlands supports the various initiatives of nuclear disarmament, including the Stepping Stones Initiative. On disarmament, verification work continues steadily and has seen some productive dialogue between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in IPNDV and the GGE. Nuclear-weapon states share a special responsibility for reaching that objective, by implementing the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty and by taking concrete steps towards disarmament.

We will keep advocating for measures aimed at nuclear risk reduction, such as communication channels, transparency, dialogue about doctrines and increasing decision time in crisis situations. These measures can provide a basis for concrete steps in the context of the tenth Review Conference and beyond. We are encouraged by the discussions on Risk Reduction in the Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament process and look forward to the next steps.

In addition, The Netherlands calls for greater transparency and reporting on nuclear arsenals and inclusive dialogue on nuclear doctrines. In this context, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative will advance a broad set of recommendations for adoption in its landing zone paper at the 10th NPT RevCon. We ask for your support on these NPDI recommendations.

Fundamental to the universal application of IAEA safeguards is the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Only with both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and an Additional Protocol (AP) in force the IAEA can effectively verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material and nuclear facilities in a State.

We also recognize the need for disarmament initiatives that recognize the importance of inclusivity and diversity, especially through equal, full and effective participation of women, and which strive to engage youth through disarmament and non-proliferation education. Knowledge building and transfer in this field can only be done with support for researchers, experts and academics from the NPV community. Especially now that we live in a world where new and disruptive technologies continue to emerge. These developments can have disturbing ramifications for our international security environment. However, new technologies also come with great opportunities.

We need to make sure that the arms control architecture will not further dissolve and we need to support ambitious arms control agreements. We attach the highest importance to the New START Treaty as a crucial contribution to the international security and to the objective of Article VI of the NPT. Through its verification mechanism, the Treaty increases predictability and mutual confidence amongst the two largest nuclear-weapon states, thus limiting strategic competition and increasing strategic stability. The extension of New START beyond 2021 will also allow the negotiation

of a more ambitious successor instrument covering additional nuclear systems and additional parties. We urge Russia, the US and other nuclear-weapon states to take appropriate steps in this direction.

Regional developments do not improve the current picture. We regret the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and the subsequent re-imposition of previously lifted US sanctions. Similarly, the Netherlands remains deeply concerned about Iran's continued violations of its commitments under the JCPOA, and we call on Iran to return to full implementation of the agreement without delay.

We have taken note, with deep concern, of the repeated missile tests conducted by the DPRK and its growing nuclear weapons- and ballistic missile programmes. We condemn all such activities which are in violation of the UNSC Resolutions and pose a serious threat to regional and international security and stability. We deeply regret the DPRK's failure to take concrete steps towards denuclearization.

On a more positive note, we notice that there is still a sense of shared urgency amongst us here, and willingness to take action. Although approaches regarding the modalities and the pace of disarmament efforts differ, this should not stand in the way to finding a way forward. In the discussions on security and stability, all states are stakeholders.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

New York, 30 October 2020

Multilateral institutions play a crucial role in promoting international security and specifically in upholding the global norms against the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Recently, the international community has taken important steps to hold states and non-state actors accountable for the use of these type of weapons. Such effective multilateral action is more needed than ever to successfully address WMD issues, to attach consequences to violations of the WMD treaties and to work towards a safer world.

In 2018 the DG of the OPCW was mandated by the Fourth Special Conference of State Parties to not only investigate if chemical weapons were used in Syria, but also to identify perpetrators, making the OPCW an indispensable, international, multilateral link to bring those responsible to justice and hold them accountable. The Netherlands welcomes and fully supports this decision and I take this opportunity to reconfirm my country's full confidence in the professionalism, impartiality and objectivity of the Director General of the OPCW and the Technical Secretariat, including the Fact Finding Mission (FFM) and the Information and Investigating Team (IIT).

This year can prove to be a landmark year in the history of the OPCW. At the upcoming Conference of States Parties, Member States will decide about sanctions against Syria. The Member States must no longer accept Syria's delaying tactics. Already 7 years have gone by after its accession and still Syria has not fully complied with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), despite of numerous attempts of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW to resolve all the outstanding issues. Syria has had every opportunity to comply, but has chosen to ignore its obligations under the CWC. Much worse, the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against its own population has continued, despite of all efforts by the international community to put an end to this. In July, the IIT released its first report in which three chemical weapon attacks were attributed without reasonable doubt to Syria. This can no longer be tolerated. Steps to advance accountability for these grave crimes must be taken without further delay. The international community cannot stand by idle any longer. We call on all Member States of the OPCW to support action against Syria, both at the OPCW and in other fora like the UNSC and the UNGA.

Last August the world was shaken by an attack with a chemical weapon on Alexei Navalny. The Netherlands condemns in the strongest possible terms the assassination attempt on Mr Navalny, who was poisoned in Russia by a military grade chemical nerve agent of the "Novichok" group, as has been confirmed by three independent specialized laboratories from Germany, France and Sweden, as well by the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. We share the conclusion of Germany and France that there is no other plausible explanation for Navalny's poisoning than Russian involvement and responsibility. We fully support the EU sanctions against six individuals and one entity involved in the assassination attempt on Mr Navalny. The Netherlands calls on the Russian government to do its utmost to disclose the circumstances of this crime in full transparency and bring those responsible to justice.

Meanwhile, we have witnessed continuing politicization of the OPCW along with attempts to question the integrity of the Organisation, thus undermining its work and functioning. The Netherlands strongly rejects these attempts.

With this in mind, we call on all members of the OPCW to allow the Technical Secretariat to do its very important work and vote in favour of the budget for 2021. We must not jeopardize ourselves and cripple the OPCW by blocking the budget. I would like to go even further and draw the attention to the fact that the budget of the OPCW has not increased noteworthy in the last decade, and was not adjusted for inflation. In the end, this will affect the viability of the Organisation. Of course, these difficult times may not be the best moment to start a discussion on this issue, but when the pandemic is behind us, we would welcome an exchange of ideas, so that we can find ways to support and reinforce the OPCW. The OPCW was and still is crucial in ridding the world of chemical weapons. Moreover, in future we need the OPCW as a reliable, capable guard against the re-emergence of chemical weapons.

This year the Biological and Toxine Weapons Convention (BTWC) is celebrating its 45th anniversary. The Covid-19 pandemic has clearly shown us that 45 years after the BTWC came into force, unfortunately many states – including my own country – can further improve on their preparedness and resilience against biological threats. The pandemic has emphasised that with regard to biological threats, the international community is like a chain: we are only as strong as the weakest link. Each individual Member State must take responsibility in ensuring biosecurity and – safety and preventing biological catastrophes like Covid-19, in the future.

The current Covid-19 crisis has underlined the importance of strengthening the BTWC and coming up with a verification mechanism that until now has been missing. In the meantime, we must continue with expanding Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Peer Review in order to guarantee transparency and express confidence in the BTWC. We should be at the stage of carrying out these measures and reviews, rather than having discussions on this matter. Therefore, we urge other States Parties to take part in CBM's and peer reviews and stimulate other States Parties to deploy these instruments.

In order to concretise steps towards worldwide biological security and safety, the Netherlands is determined to make both national and international advancements in the field; through the international role of the Dutch Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), in the framework of the Global Partnership (GP) against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and through various WMD-threats projects we support that focus on capacity-building or improving biosecurity and biosafety. Furthermore, the Netherlands has taken an active role within the GHSA – since we were chair in 2019 – and will continue to do so in the future. We hope to partner up with other States Parties to initiate new international initiatives and cooperative efforts within the field of biosecurity, as it would benefit effective implementation and promotion of the BTWC.

The Netherlands also wishes to stress the importance of taking into account rapid advancements in biotechnology. We strongly support recommendations with regards to structured risk analysis of new technological developments. In this context, the Netherlands, together with Sweden, co-sponsored a working paper by Germany that describes how a scientific and technological experts advisory forum could be set up within the framework of the BTWC.

In the light of the Covid-19 crisis, we can no longer accept the late and non-payment of contributions being paid to the BTWC. The Netherlands is deeply concerned about the continued grave financial situation of the Convention. While more States Parties have paid their contribution this year, a lack of funding is still one of the largest obstacles for the BTWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU). There is still a shortfall of more than 130,000.00 USD, which means that there are currently no sufficient funds for the convening of the 2020 Meeting of States Parties, which has been (re-)scheduled for April 2021. Both the BWC and the ISU cannot be effective without adequate funding: it is pivotal in order to provide assistance to States Parties in need, to hold the mandated meetings in the future and strengthen the BTWC in the process.

We are pleased to witness increasing international awareness of the need for the BTWC and the ISU to remain effective this year. We trust all States Parties that this increased awareness translates into the full and in-time payment of the invoice for the BTWC's contribution that each State Party as well as the payment of any other outstanding amounts in full and as soon as possible. We call upon all States Parties to ensure all their financial obligations are settled and expedite their collective efforts to develop new measures for ensuring the financial sustainability and institutional viability of the BTWC, for instance by increasing the States Parties' contribution or the number of personnel within the ISU (which currently consists of only three employees).

We hope that – contrary to the last Review Conference of the BTWC in 2016 – we can make substantive progress and come up with concrete solutions to strengthen the BTWC in the Ninth Review Conference in 2021. Looking towards this Ninth Review Conference, the Netherlands, again, wants to underline the importance of universality. We hope that a detailed action plan for the purpose of the universality of the BTWC can be drawn up, coordinated by the ISU.

The CWC and the BTWC are two indispensable instruments in our collective pursuit of a safer world. We call on the states that remain outside these Conventions to accede without delay and urge States Parties to comply with the Conventions and their pivotal institutions. Universality of both Conventions is crucial for their success and effectiveness.

Multilateral cooperation is required to make our weakest link as strong as possible and create an international community more resilient against biological and chemical threats.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Outer Space (disarmament aspects)

New York, 30 October 2020

The Netherlands has a great national interest in outer space activities, as these are an essential part of our economy as well as an indispensable part of our national security. On a daily basis, civil and military entities use space-based applications for earth observation, navigation and communication. The Netherlands also participates in various international satellite programs as well as for space launch vehicles. The number of commercial activities related to outer space is increasing at a higher pace than ever before, which in turn pinpoints the need to address related opportunities and challenges within an international and multilateral context.

The opportunities in space may seem almost unlimited but at the same time are very fragile. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that space is both a congested and a contested realm. Apart from economic issues and natural threats, there is an apparent human dimension to certain threats and risks. These do not only concern space safety-related issues, such as unintentional radio frequency interference or accidental collisions between objects in space. Space-based assets have become indispensable enablers for military operations. A growing number of actors has access to this domain, whilst some are increasingly capable of preventing or impeding other actors' access to space. This development has made the space domain more vulnerable than ever.

From a security perspective, the Netherlands is deeply concerned about the increasing number of intentional threats that have come with new approaches towards the space domain. These do not only include ground-based systems of a clearly military nature, such as jammers and *Direct-Ascent* ASATs, but also in-space threats such as *in-orbit* manipulation and other proximity operations that have inherent dual-use characteristics. The security dimension of space also connects to strategic stability, which only further underscores the importance of the international discussions on this issue.

Space is an international domain that no country is able to – or ought to handle on its own. Instead, international cooperation on the issue of space security is crucial, for example in addressing orbital debris. In this regard, we must ensure that the inherent dual-use nature of any space activity in this field do not lead to accidents, misunderstandings, miscommunications or miscalculations in space, because the technology that is required to remove objects in orbit can be directly used to temporarily or permanently disable adversary space assets.

We also believe that promoting awareness and transparency on space security and the impact of this theme on stability, as well as strengthening international cooperation in this domain can contribute to preventing possible future conflicts in space. The Netherlands strongly believes that this can be done by furthering efforts to establish, strengthen, and re-inforce international agreements by means of adequate trust and confidence building measures, space behaviour norms, rules and principles, without excluding the possibility of legally-binding agreements. In this context, the Netherlands is supporting the resolution submitted by the United Kingdom on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours.

It is our view that enhancing space security has a positive impact on global stability, and hence contributes to the overall goals of the United Nations. In line with the EU and its Member States, the Netherlands continues to promote the preservation of a sustainable, safe and secure space environment as well as the peaceful use of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. We remain committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. And, we are making further national efforts related to space security, which are in line with our international legal obligations, an inherent part of our integrated foreign and security strategy.

We believe that the international discussions on outer space, in New York as well as in Vienna and Geneva, can result in constructive and concrete proposals that encourage UN Member States, spacefaring or not, to realise a sustainable, safe and secure space domain. Maintaining the sustainability, safety, and security in space by means of dialogue and cooperation is for the benefit of all on earth. The Netherlands stands ready to contribute to this joint effort.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Conventional Weapons

New York, 30 October 2020

The vast number of casualties caused by conventional weapons should serve as a reminder for the need for collective action. The indiscriminate use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas, the extensive use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature and mines other than anti-personnel mines, and the illicit cross-border flow of small arms and light weapons into conflict zones, are painful but clear proof of that. Therefore, the Netherlands remains fully committed to the several conventions and treaties that seek to achieve progress in this field.

As chair of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Netherlands would like to highlight the 40th anniversary of the CCW and use this opportunity to call on those States not yet party to the CCW to join this important instrument. It has been challenging to seek new ways of organizing the meetings and to continue discussions under the CCW due to Covid-19. However, the Netherlands deems it vital that we continue to share views and best practices despite the Covid-19 circumstances and continue to address urgent matters under the CCW, such as the cooperation on countering the threat of IEDs under Additional Protocol II and the clearance of explosive remnants of war under Protocol V.

We must respond to humanitarian concerns stemming from the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons with wide area effects in populated areas (EWIPA). We support the efforts to find the right collective response to address the humanitarian concerns, which first and foremost is full adherence and compliance with existing international law, namely International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. In that light, we welcome the ongoing elaboration of a Political Declaration, coordinated by Ireland, in order to achieve a better implementation of International Humanitarian Law in reducing civilian harm regarding the use of explosive weapons in populated areas.

As mentioned, the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remains of serious concern to the Netherlands. The growing use of these devices by non-state actors continues to harm innocent civilians, as well as armed forces and peacekeepers. The Netherlands remains committed to prevent the use of IEDs by non-state actors. We need to continue addressing the issue of IEDs, in all different forums, such as in this Committee and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. At the same time, we need to continue our work on IEDs in the CCW. This needs to be placed on a firm knowledge base and with the involvement of all stakeholders in order to take account of various aspects, including counter-IED, force protection but also as part of humanitarian mine action, once hostilities have ceased. The Netherlands also supports the Irish initiative to discuss the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines (MOTAPM) within the CCW in order to make progress in making sure these weapons are used in strict compliance with international humanitarian law.

The Netherlands would like to underline that new technologies come with great opportunities. Cyberspace, artificial intelligence and technological developments in outer space come with many societal and economic benefits. However, these dual-use technologies can generate security challenges too. Malicious cyber operations disrupting our societies are a real, credible threat. Likewise, we reject the development of fully autonomous weapons systems, which are not under meaningful human control. And, the technology used to clear space debris has a nefarious reverse side as an enabler for anti-satellite weaponry. This inherently links valuable civilian initiatives in this field to discussions on the security dimension of outer space, such as the various resolutions that have been tabled in the First Committee.

Under the CCW important progress has been made concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) within the Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS (GGE) in 2019. The Netherlands acknowledges the essential role of multilateralism to address these important matters. The eleven guiding principles, which have been adopted in 2019, reflect that there is a common understanding among State parties that humans must have some form of control over autonomous weapons to ensure compliance with International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law. In light of the Sixth Review Conference of the CCW in 2021, discussions need to move forward so that we can continue to make progress on issues like 'human-machine' interaction.

The increase in victims of anti-personnel mines, in particular those of an improvised nature, serve as a reminder that those weapons should never be used by any state or any non-state actor. We are committed to alleviate suffering caused by these weapons. The Netherlands fully supports the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and will actively contribute towards its implementation, including the recently adopted Oslo Action Plan. We look forward to Chairing this important Convention, hosting the Meeting of States Parties in the Netherlands in 2021. We also contribute to mine action worldwide as a major donor with a view to a world free of anti-personnel mines. As such, we support mine action in the areas of mine clearance, mine risk education and education programmes and victim assistance. In this context, the Netherlands recently launched a new 51 million Euro demining programme, working with five partners in nine countries. Furthermore, we continue our direct support of the work of the United Nations Mine Action Services (UNMAS).

In light of this year's Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munition, the Netherlands would like to take the opportunity to stress the importance of the universalization and implementation of the Convention. Only through our work in this Convention can we uphold the norm on non-use of cluster munitions. We are deeply concerned that these indiscriminate weapons are still being used in conflicts. I would therefore like to reiterate that the Netherlands strongly condemns any use of cluster munitions by any actor.

The Netherlands underlines the importance of implementation and universalization of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This instrument is our only legally-binding international instrument to regulate trade of conventional arms. It plays a crucial role in eradicating the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their diversion to the illicit market. We call on all UN member states, who have not yet done so, to join the ATT. We also call on all UN member states to provide transparency concerning their international trade by submitting their annual report for the UN Register for Conventional Arms. And for those who are States Party to the ATT as well to submit their annual ATT transparency reports. The Netherlands has been supporting the ATT Monitor in that respect for many years. .

With regards to Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), the Netherlands calls on States to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW and their ammunition. We support several projects in this regard. For example by funding the Western Balkans Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Roadmap Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), which was established by UNDP, UNODC and the UN MPTF office as a key funding mechanism for the implementation of the Regional Roadmap for SALW control in the Western Balkans. The Roadmap covers the most important aspects regarding arms control, from stockpile management of weapons and ammunition to mainstreaming gender in SALW control and countering firearms trafficking.

High levels of arms and ammunition in circulation, exacerbated by poor management and controls, contribute to violations of international humanitarian and international human rights law. We therefore see the fight against illicit transfers of ammunition and effective ammunition management as key elements in tackling the illicit trade in SALW.

Despite the suspension of the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on SALWs, the Netherlands continues its efforts to implement the Programme of Action and calls on other states to follow suit.

The Netherlands would like to underline that the importance of commitment. A number of arms control arrangements, such as the ATT, CCM and the CCW, still suffer from insufficient financial support due to unpaid contributions. Financial reform is required. We urge all parties to invest in the arms control framework by paying their contribution on time and in full in order to safeguard our work for the future. By living up to our commitments will we be able to make progress together effectively.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Other Disarmament Measures and International Security
Cyber
New York, 30 October 2020

The far-reaching consequences of Covid-19 have stressed our reliance on digital technologies and the importance of its stability. As people have been asked to be more flexible or work remotely, we must realize that it is the Internet that facilitates these connections throughout the world. Information technology advances innovation and productivity and enables the sharing of ideas beyond borders.

It is no surprise therefore that actions in cyberspace can have a direct impact in the physical world. When cyber operations are directed against critical parts of our infrastructure, governments or societies, the harmful effects will be felt immediately and widely, threatening international peace and security. States must therefore cooperate to protect the rules-based international order and ensure stability both online and offline. Building global understanding on national approaches is fundamental to maintaining long-term peace and security and reducing the risk of conflict in cyberspace.

The Netherlands recalls that existing international law, in particular the UN Charter, is applicable to cyberspace and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and to promoting a free, open and secure cyberspace including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in cyberspace. This has been acknowledged by consensus by this General Assembly.

Both the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) are in full discussion on the important task of furthering global understanding of responsible state behaviour. Both have served well in discussing norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior of states, confidence building measures, capacity building, and existing international law.

The Netherlands believes it is time to explore further steps with regard to implementation. We need a pragmatic and inclusive approach, in such a way that the work of the OEWG and the work of the GGE will complement and reinforce each other. The recently proposed Programme of Action provides a promising way forward for a permanent, flexible and inclusive process to build upon the outcomes of the OEWG and GGEs. Given current ongoing discussions, we believe it is too early to decide on next steps. It may be more fruitful to advance the discussions in the processes that are currently running and to wait for conclusion of those discussions instead of moving forward already.

The Netherlands reaffirms its commitment to strive for consensus in both the UN GGE and the OEWG, in a complementary and coordinated fashion, to promote and further build on the cumulative achievements of the previous UN GGEs. The Netherlands continues to support the international dialogue on the urgent issue of international cybersecurity and is committed to work towards consensus outcomes.

Statement of the Netherlands
on
Disarmament Machinery

New York, 30 October 2020

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact on the Disarmament Machinery. As international travel has grinded to a standstill, meetings have been cancelled or postponed, while the participation in other meetings has been restricted. Nonetheless, parts of the disarmament machinery have also shown to be innovative and resilient in finding ways to ensure that work continues despite the difficult circumstances. The 75th General Assembly First Committee is a case-in-point. But also other parts of the disarmament machinery have shown their steadfast commitment to make progress in difficult circumstances.

We compliment the Six Presidents of the 2020 session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on their close cooperation and coordination aimed at providing continuity for the 2020 session. It is encouraging to note that the Six Presidents of the

2021 session intent to continue this practice of close cooperation. Moreover, the organization of hybrid meetings, allowed the CD to restart its deliberations, when the health situation allowed.

Less encouraging was the fact that despite the coordinated efforts by the successive presidents, the CD was unable to agree in 2020 on the organization of its substantive work. Once again the Netherlands calls upon all Member States of the Conference to focus their attention on the substance on the CD agenda. In this context, we recall our 2019 working paper 'back to basics – the programme of work' which offers a pragmatic way to commence substantive work in the CD at the earliest possible date.

The Netherlands also take this opportunity to applaud the office holders of the various treaty bodies based in Geneva, who have worked tirelessly to accomplish substantive results in difficult times. The successful outcomes of (intersessional) meetings of the Anti-Personal Landmine Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons show that successful meetings can be held using in-person participation supported by digital tools. While the Netherlands recognizes the vital importance of personal contacts and in-person meetings, multilateral diplomacy must not shy away from using all digital tools available to continue its work in times like these. As noted by many delegations during the general debate this is not the time to sit still.

We remain concerned by the institutional and financial sustainability of some parts of the disarmament machinery. In particular, the Geneva-based treaty regimes are a case-in-point. The full and timely payment of assessed contribution by all States Parties must be ensured, while non-payment should have consequences. This is the case here in the General Assembly, and should be the case in all multilateral fora. The Netherlands stands ready to work with other delegations on a sustainable solution for the current financial challenges to ensure the proper functioning of the Disarmament Machinery as a whole.

An effective and functioning Disarmament Machinery – as vital element of the United Nations system and the wider multilateral system – that is responsive to the challenges of today's world requires effective and constructive multilateralism. To this end, we need a pragmatic approach to move forward the disarmament agenda best we can, including by continuing our preparations of those meetings that have been postponed. The Netherlands strongly supports effective multilateralism, because it offers the best guarantee for security, peace and sustainable development.

Gender and diversity remain an important topics for the Netherlands, as these topics are closely linked to the effectiveness and inclusiveness of our work. The equal and full participation of women in deliberations and decision-making should not merely be an ambition. The fact that a simple technical amendment to make the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament gender-neutral could not find agreement this year shows that work remains to be done in this field. Similarly, taking into account gender perspectives in disarmament efforts, including in mine action and when combatting the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, is vital in order to enhance the physical safety of different groups, because security is not gender neutral.

To tackle the multifaceted challenges we are facing in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular those arising from new technological developments, we need a diversity of actors working together towards positive outcomes. Many of these technologies are developed in the private sector, are of dual-use nature and require a high-level of technical understanding. Addressing the concerns stemming from these technologies, while not hindering their peaceful uses is a collective challenges of the international community. Bringing together different perspectives, backgrounds, experiences, and knowledge will enable us to find more creative and innovative solutions to the challenges that we face.

In closing, the Netherlands notes with concern the growing polarization and politicization of disarmament institutions and fora, including this years' First Committee. Year-on-year, we see a growing number of votes being called on resolutions and paragraphs, showing a more divided international community. The introduction of a number of new resolutions, which infringe on the prerogative of officeholders or pre-empt the outcome ongoing processes, will most likely exacerbate this trend.

Effective and constructive multilateralism requires the time and willingness of delegations to build a broad middle ground to make collective progress towards a more safe and secure world. Similarly, we can only move forward if we honour our agreements. Including by honouring our financial commitments, by the full and timely payment of assessed contribution by all States Parties. International cooperation thus starts with international commitment.

Nigeria
Statement by
the African Group
at
The Thematic Debate of the First Committee:
Nuclear Weapons Cluster
75th United Nations General Assembly
New York, October 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. The African Group aligns itself with the Statement of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. The total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the only absolute guarantee against their use or threat of use. In this context, the Group reiterates the urgent need for our planet, including the outer space, to be free of nuclear weapons, as their presence constitutes an existential threat to global peace and the future survival of humanity.
3. Africa supports the principle of complete nuclear disarmament, as the utmost prerequisite for maintaining international peace and security. It is in this spirit that the African Group welcomes the historical adoption of the landmark Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), on 7 July 2017 and looks forward to its entry into force on 22 January 2021 after its ratification by 50 States, thereby making the prohibition of the possession, development, and use of nuclear weapons binding international law. The African Group stresses that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons does not undermine the NPT, but rather complements and strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime with the NPT as its foundation. The Group, therefore, wishes to urge all States to support the TPNW by signing and ratifying the Treaty at an early date. It is hoped that all members of the international community, including nuclear-weapon states and those under the so-called “nuclear umbrella”, would seize the opportunity to pursue the goal of a nuclear-free world in implementation of their obligations under article VI of the NPT.
4. For the African Group, the highest priority remains nuclear disarmament and to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the overall objective of the NPT. The Group restates its deep concern over the slow pace of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with their legal obligations and undertakings under Article VI of the NPT. The Group, therefore, insists on the implementation of all agreed measures and undertakings by the nuclear weapons States in the context of the Treaty.
5. The Group re-affirms the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones across the world to the overall objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They represent a significant milestone towards achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, thereby enhancing global and regional peace and security.
6. In this context, the African Group reiterates its commitment to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which re-affirms the status of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and as a shield for the African territory, including by preventing the stationing of nuclear explosive devices on the continent and prohibiting testing of those weapons in the entire space that constitutes the African continent.
7. In the same vein, the African Group reiterates its deep concern that the 1995 resolution on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East have not been implemented as agreed. The Group strongly welcomes the successful convening of the First Session of the Conference of the States of the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction pursuant to General Assembly Decision 73/546 to negotiate a legally-binding treaty and commends the outcomes of the First Session as reflected in the report of the Secretary General contained in Document [\(A/75/63\)](#).
8. The Group calls on all States invited to the Conference to actively participate in this conference in good faith as a practical step towards implementing the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and creating equitable, sustainable, and non-discriminatory security architecture in the region. The Group stresses that the 1995 resolution remains an integral and essential part of the package as well as, the basis upon which consensus was reached on the indefinite extension of the NPT

in 1995. The Group wishes to highlight the validity of these commitments and obligations until their full implementation.

9. In this context, the Group also expresses its support for the resolutions entitled, “Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East” and the “Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”.

10. The African Group underscores the importance of the continued respect of the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and stressed the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard, through technical assistance and cooperation and maximizing the use of science and technology for socio-economic development, as well as by continuing to ensure commitments of States to the implementation of Safeguards Agreement. The Group stresses the importance of nuclear knowledge sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries, including African Countries, and highlights the potential contribution of nuclear energy in promoting sustainable development and prosperity across the world. The Group stresses that the Technical Cooperation Program of the IAEA, as the main vehicle for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, should continue to be formulated and implemented in accordance with its statute.

11. The Group wishes to emphasise humanitarian considerations in the context of all deliberations on nuclear weapons, particularly its serious concern for the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use or detonation of nuclear weapons, either by accident or as a deliberate action. The Group calls on all States, particularly nuclear weapons States, to take into consideration, the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons on human health, the environment and vital economic resources among others, and to take necessary measures aimed at dismantling and renunciation of these weapons.

12. Achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and particularly bearing in mind the special responsibilities of Nuclear Weapons States is of importance to the African Group. The Group believes that the CTBT offers hope of halting further development or proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing to the goal of nuclear disarmament. The Group acknowledges the overwhelming support of the international community in promoting the entry into force of the CTBT and calls on nuclear-weapon States and those yet to accede to the NPT, which are listed in Annex II of the Treaty and have not yet signed or ratified the CTBT, to do so without further delay.

13. While reaffirming the importance of the work entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Group expresses its concern at the many years of impasse, which has prevented the CD from fulfilling its mandate as the world’s single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The Group calls on the CD to resume substantive work, taking into account the security interests of all States.

Thank you.

NIGERIA
STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE AFRICAN GROUP
AT
THE THEMATIC DEBATE OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE:
OUTER SPACE
75TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NEW YORK, OCTOBER 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. The Group aligns itself with the Statement of the Non-Aligned Movement and wishes to make the following remarks.
2. The present-day role of space technology has become pervasive – indeed, never before have information, communication, banking, navigation, and even political and strategic decision-making been so dependent on space-based technologies. It is for this reason that the outer space and other celestial bodies must continue to be regarded and safeguarded as the common heritage of mankind and must be used, explored and utilized for the benefit and interest of all mankind in the spirit of cooperation.
3. The African Group emphasizes the urgent need for our planet, including outer space, to be free of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, and indeed all other kinds of weapons, as their presence constitutes an existential threat to

global peace and the future survival of humanity. To that end, the Group stresses that outer space, as the common heritage of all humankind, must be explored and utilized exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all States, irrespective of their social, economic or scientific development.

4. The Group recalls the adoption of the African Space Policy and Strategy in 2016, and regards it as an important policy framework towards the realization of an African Outer Space Programme within the framework of Agenda 2063 of the African Union. The Group also welcomes the establishment of the African Outer Space Agency which will be hosted by Egypt. In this regard, the Group reiterates that the immense potential of space technology and applications should be equally beneficial to all Member States and calls on the United Nations to promote equal and non-discriminatory access to outer space for all nations.

5. The Group stresses the importance of the international legal framework that allows for the equal exploration of the outer space based on the principles of non-appropriation and peaceful uses of outer space in conformity with the five United Nations Treaties governing space activities, in particular, the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the activities of States in the exploration and the use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. In this regard, the Group maintains that the recommendations of The Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities continue to represent an important contribution towards maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman

6. The Group recalls the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts, pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly resolution [72/250](#), with the mandate to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of a comprehensive international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the prohibition of intentional destruction of space systems. The Group reiterates that the unbracketed draft report of this GGE which was blocked by one State could form the basis for commencing negotiations of a legally binding treaty on PAROS.

7. The intentional creation of space debris arising from the deliberate destruction of space systems represents a major concern for the African Group due to its consequences on the future of exploration and use of outer space. Therefore, the mitigation of space debris and the prohibition of their intentional creation through the deliberate destruction of space systems should be among the priorities of the work of the United Nations. Challenges related to space activities, in particular, space debris, should be addressed in such a way that it will not jeopardize the development of the peaceful space capabilities of developing countries.

8. While reaffirming the importance of the work entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The Group expresses its concern at the many years of impasse, which has prevented the CD from fulfilling its mandate as the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. The Group therefore calls on the CD to resume substantive work, taking into account the security interests of all States and without further delay.

9. In conclusion, let me reiterate the commitment of African Group towards the peaceful uses of Outer Space. To this end, African Group promise to be constructive in their engagement with other Member States, to fulfill the goal and objective of a peaceful and weapon-free outer space.

Thank you.

**NIGERIA
STATEMENT
ON BEHALF OF THE AFRICAN GROUP
DURING THE**

75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

**THEMATIC DEBATE OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE:
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS CLUSTER**

New York, October 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. The African Group aligns itself with the Statement of the Non-Aligned Movement.
2. The illicit trade, transfer, and circulation of small arms and light weapons and their excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many regions of the world, especially in light of their wide range of humanitarian and socio-economic consequences, particularly on the continent of Africa, remains an issue of concern. The African Group therefore, attaches great importance to the central role of the United Nations Programme of Work (UNPoA) and International Tracing Instrument (ITI) as crucial multilateral instruments dedicated to fighting the illicit flow of Small Arms and Light Weapons and tackling their multifaceted effects, which pose a threat to international peace and security.

Mr. Chairman,

3. African Group recognizes the extensive work done towards addressing illicit trade in SALWs including the Bamako Declaration (2000); the AU Constitutive Act; the Protocol on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (2002); the Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy in Sirte (2004); the Nairobi Protocol, the SADC Protocol (2004); the ECOWAS Convention (2006); efforts in the framework of CENSAD and the Arab Maghreb Union; the African Union Agenda 2063, the Initiative of Silencing the Guns in Africa by Year 2020; and other sub-regional initiatives.
4. Despite these efforts, the African Group wishes to call on all States to fulfill their obligations regarding reporting, technological transfer, and ensuring the unhindered flow of international cooperation and assistance as mandated by the UN. The Group also, urges Member States of the UN from developed economies to render more technical and financial assistance to developing countries in the realization of the overall objectives of the UN PoA and the ITI, with a view to eradicating the illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons. The Group believes such efforts will promote national and regional initiatives and assist efforts at the global level.

Mr. Chairman,

5. The African Group acknowledges the efforts by States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) since its entry into force, as well as the fifth Conference of States Parties held in Geneva, in August 2019. The Group urges States Parties to the Treaty to implement the treaty in a balanced and objective manner, one that protects the interests of all States and not just the major international producing and exporting States, in addition to avoiding any infringement on the legitimate right of States to satisfy their national security and self-defense needs in accordance with the UN Charter.
6. The Group reaffirms the sovereign right of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retains conventional arms, their parts and components for their self-defence and security needs in accordance with the UN Charter. The Group stresses that arms transfers to unauthorized recipients, especially terrorists and illegal armed groups fuels conflicts and illicit trade in SALWs and urges all States to refrain from and prohibit arms transfer to any recipient without the authorization of the competent national authorities of the importing States.

Mr. Chairman,

7. In conclusion, the African Group wishes to restate the critical role that political will and transparency play in addressing international disarmament and security issues. The Group believes that multilateral efforts should be guided by the need to advance the work of the First Committee and enhance the cause of peace.

I thank you.

NORWAY
Cluster One
October 2020

Statement by: Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey.

Delivered by: H.E. Ms. Mona Juul, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Norway

Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of Albania, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey and my own country, Norway.

This year has seen member states plans in the pursuit of disarmament and international security disrupted by COVID19. The NPT Review Conference has been postponed and the disarmament machinery slowed while states and institutions grappled with the effects of the pandemic. We welcome the adoption of online tools to allow us to continue our work and we are pleased that the First Committee could proceed in-person, even in this abbreviated form.

This First Committee, leading into the Tenth NPT Review Conference, is an opportunity to give a new impetus to the discussions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. At the same time, it offers an occasion to draw inspiration from the collective response to the threat from COVID19. We have been reminded that multilateral dialogue and political will can produce beneficial collective actions, and that the current circumstances are not an impediment to achieving results. In this context, we want to share our perspective on what is required to achieve a successful NPT Review Conference and help advance disarmament.

The NPT, which marked its 50th anniversary this year, remains a singular accomplishment. Since 1970 it has been the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, as well as an essential element of international peace and security that has benefited us all.

Its success was not a foregone conclusion, and attention is necessary to ensure its continued relevance and effectiveness. To achieve full Treaty implementation requires active support from States Parties and meaningful and enduring commitments. That is why Review Conferences are important for the Treaty.

In 2021, we should acknowledge the NPT's achievements and be honest in reviewing its implementation – where we have done well, and where we still have work to do.

This also applies to reviewing the NPT review cycles' procedures and working methods. Indeed, an honest assessment of the state of the NPT strikes us as a critical component of a Review Conference outcome.

Likewise, we need to look forward to our common interests in strengthening the Treaty, to maintain commitments, and to narrow differences and find space for compromise to advance our shared goals.

Our approach takes into account the international security environment without losing sight of the risks posed by nuclear weapons. Indeed, the NPT has always been an instrument for pursuing ambitious aims whilst taking into account geopolitical realities. That goal has not changed: to advance and achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

To this end, we support pragmatic, inclusive measures including: universalization of the NPT, entry into force of the CTBT, negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification, measures aimed at nuclear risk reduction, a reaffirmation or tightening of existing negative security assurances, greater transparency on nuclear arsenals, and an inclusive dialogue on nuclear doctrines.

Several resolutions presented at this First Committee aim to further this agenda including on CTBT, verification and joint action and future dialogue. We also recognize the need for disarmament initiatives that recognize the importance of

inclusivity and diversity, especially through equal, full and effective participation of women, and which strive to engage youth.

The establishment of a new GGE on Nuclear Disarmament Verification in 2021-22, and the 2019 consensus report from its predecessor, are evidence that constructive dialogue is possible.

In addition, we note that there are a number of other disarmament efforts being pursued which could contribute towards a positive NPT Review Conference outcome including the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative and the Stockholm Initiative. We also recognize the value of ongoing discussion among experts as part of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative.

We welcome efforts that spur consideration of how to advance nuclear disarmament and build confidence in practical terms. Risk reduction measures can provide another means of creative engagement in the context of the Tenth Review Conference and beyond.

We are encouraged by the result of the session of the Security Council on 26 February this year, which was dedicated to the NPT Review Conference. We regard the joint statement endorsed on this occasion as a helpful contribution to the Conference.

We cannot ignore the international security environment, or fail to recognize the constraints it may impose, but inaction is not an answer. We need to move forward collaboratively in ways that reduce risks, build trust, and strengthen verification and compliance, with a view to achieving further reductions in nuclear weapons.

We encourage the NPT Nuclear Weapons' States to increase their efforts to deliver concrete outcomes at the next Review Conference such as on nuclear doctrines, risk reduction, a FMCT and transparency, and thereby build pathways to further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

All NPT-States Parties have endorsed a commitment towards a nuclear weapon free world, however, the Nuclear Weapon States have a particular responsibility, as outlined in Article VI. Building much needed trust and confidence in this regard is only possible through sustained engagement, across regions, and including all stakeholders.

This First Committee provides us with a chance to exchange views on the challenges and opportunities for progress, to make a frank assessment of what we can do collectively to uphold, implement and strengthen NPT norms, and to lay constructive groundwork ahead of the Tenth Review Conference.

Thank you.

NORWAY
Nuclear weapons cluster
October 2020

Statement by: H.E. Ms. Mona Juul, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Norway

Madam/Mr Chair,

Norway's commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament has been a key foreign policy priority for decades. This was re-iterated by a unanimous decision on April 2016 by the Storting (Norwegian Parliament). It also emphasised that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The NPT has served global security well for 50 years. We must make sure that it continues to do so. The commitments made under the NPT and at earlier Review Conferences remain as valid as ever.

Even in challenging times, we firmly believe that progress is possible, and can take place by focusing on mutually reinforcing building blocks. Although the nuclear-weapon states have the main responsibility for making progress on nuclear disarmament, we, as non-nuclear-weapon states, cannot simply walk away from our responsibility.

Madam/Mr Chair,

One of the key building blocks we have for making progress on the disarmament pillar of the NPT is nuclear disarmament verification (NDV). Norway gives high priority to work on developing credible multilateral solutions to verify future nuclear disarmament. Together with the UK, Norway initiated work on this topic as early as in 2007. Our work showed that nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states can both engage in nuclear disarmament verification without being in breach of their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. We are encouraged to see that the work on NDV is gaining momentum, and that an increasing number of states are engaging substantively in this area.

Last year, resolution [74/50](#) on NDV was adopted with the support of 178 Member States. The resolution called for a new Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) that will start its work next year. The new GGE will, among other, consider the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, which was introduced to the first GGE (2018-19). This concept takes inspiration from the Group of Scientific Experts that was instrumental in laying the ground for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the International Monitoring System of the Treaty. Resolution [74/50](#) also called for the Secretary General to collect the views of the Member States on the report of the last GGE, and we welcome the report by the Secretary General as contained in document [75/126](#).

This year, we are tabling a decision on nuclear disarmament verification to keep the topic on the agenda for UNGA 76. A similar decision was tabled in 2017 and 2018. We hope all states will support this decision.

Norway continues to be actively engaged in the Quad Nuclear Disarmament Verification Partnership and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. In our view, it is crucial to integrate policy perspectives and technical expertise in order to drive progress, and we remain fully committed to this approach. Norway is also working on establishing a funding mechanism that will enable developing countries to participate in NDV activities.

We consider the work on NDV to be an area where progress can be made at the Tenth NPT Review Conference.

Madam/Mr. Chair,

Other building blocks are also crucial for the NPT. These include:

- measures to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons being used;
- confidence-building measures;
- efforts to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons;
- universal adherence to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the

Additional Protocol, which constitute the current verification standard under the NPT;

- the entry into force of the CTBT;
- the start-up of negotiations on, and the adoption of, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT);
- the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear technology to support achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals;

- international efforts to promote nuclear security; and
- efforts to combat polarisation on nuclear disarmament.

Madam/Mr. Chair,

Dialogue on arms control and strategic stability is key to global security. The P5 dialogue is vital to further implementation of the NPT, and we encourage to deepen this dialogue – not least to show transparency.

New START is important to strategic stability and to the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. We are therefore encouraged by talks between the US and Russia to extend the treaty.

We also consider it important for major actors to be part of future arms control regimes, and therefore support the invitation from the US to China to engage in future talks on strategic stability and arms control. Future nuclear arms control treaties should also cover a broader set of weapons.

Madam/Mr. Chair,

Norway emphasises the importance of educating a new generation of arms control and NPT experts. We therefore support the Oslo Nuclear Project (ONP) at the University of Oslo. This project provides research, education and information to the public on topics related to nuclear arms control. There is a need for a dynamic debate on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in our societies.

A new generation of arms control experts will be essential to adequately safeguard the NPT and prepare the ground for future disarmament. This issue is also of the highest importance in the context of the Tenth NPT Review Conference. We are therefore encouraged by Ambassador Zlauvinen's initiative to organise a NextGen seminar, and Norway stands ready to provide support for this seminar.

Norway continues to call for the full and equal participation of women in disarmament and non-proliferation forums. We also emphasise the need to continue to expand capacity building on nuclear disarmament verification, and will work for the establishment of a UN Nuclear Disarmament Verification Fund. We encourage other countries to support this effort.

Madam/Mr. Chair,

There is no fast track to a world without nuclear weapons. We need to pursue a forward-looking and comprehensive agenda, which must include a number of mutually reinforcing building blocks.

Thank you.

NORWAY
Conventional Weapons Thematic Debate
Statement by Norway

Mrs/Mr Chair,

Conventional weapons increasingly affect strategic stability. Rapid technological advances lead to increased range, precision, manoeuvrability and effect. Also, several weapons systems are dual-capable, which could be highly destabilising. Hence, in a world of increasing rivalry, we must redouble our efforts to bolster existing arms control instruments and prepare the ground for future ones.

Mrs/Mr Chair,

Norway prepares to take up our duties as a member of the UN Security Council. As a member we will remain a consistent partner in multilateral cooperation. Protection of civilians will be a main priority.

Last year Norway held the presidency of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and hosted the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo. Together with our partners in mine action we will in the coming years follow up on the

successful outcome of the conference – the Oslo Action Plan. This means contributing to increased progress in survey and clearance of landmines, ensuring that the use of anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature is addressed within the Convention, strengthening the humanitarian protection aspect of the Convention through mine risk education for affected communities and vulnerable groups and ensuring that the gender perspective is integrated in all aspects of mine action.

Annually Norway provides approximately USD 30 mill [NOK 300 mill] to a variety of humanitarian organisations contributing to protection of civilians from mines, cluster munitions and other explosive weapons. We will continue to give high priority to humanitarian action in this field.

Norway will encourage new state parties to join the Mine Ban Convention and we will ask state parties to renew their political commitment to all aspects of the Convention. At the same time, we look forward to the adoption of a new, effective, action plan for the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Lausanne later this year.

Mrs/Mr Chair,

Conventional arms, small arms and light weapons in conflict zones world wide create great pain among civilians. Our response must be to intensify global efforts to combat irresponsible and illegal trade, and use, of such weapons – including ammunition.

Norway is a firm supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty. It has great potential to reduce the human suffering that results from armed conflicts and other situations of violence, and hence indirectly address key protection challenges in conflict-affected communities such as sexual and gender-based violence and protection of children.

Norway continues to support efforts towards effective treaty implementation in order to establish universal norms for a responsible international arms trade. We urge all countries that have not yet done so to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty and to ratify it.

Norway will continue to engage actively in the exchange of export control best practices in the working groups of the ATT. We continue to support capacity-building through financial contributions to ATT's Voluntary Trust Fund.

Mrs/Mr Chair,

Norway takes part in the ongoing discussions and preparations in the diplomatic and civil society circles for an international political declaration aimed at addressing the harm caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. This is an issue about protection, proportionality and compliance with international humanitarian law. We want to extend our gratitude to Ireland for their leadership in this important process.

Thank you for your attention.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Chairman,

1. The international consensus reached at SSOD-I to systematically pursue nuclear disarmament is breaking down. While the international and regional security environment continues to worsen, the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations at the global level is being evaded by constantly shifting the goalposts towards additional non-proliferation measures.

2. In the South Asia region, the exercise of double standards and discrimination in the application of relevant international norms is aggravating the tenuous strategic stability. It is facilitating the hegemonic ambitions and aggressive designs of one regional State that is engaged in a relentless pursuit of strategic domination and willful defiance of international law, as elaborated by my delegation during the general debate.

Mr. Chairman,

3. Pakistan believes that we should be aiming towards a cooperative approach enabling all nations to co-exist in peace, harmony and prosperity, true to the noble ideals of the United Nations. It is highly unrealistic to aspire for absolute security and unrestrained freedom of action for oneself, while expecting others to compromise on their peaceful existence by circumscribing their legitimate security interests.

4. One of the unfortunate victims of this situation is the Conference on Disarmament. A multilateral forum where all Member States are expected to cooperate for building the foundations of a world free from nuclear weapons is falling prey to competition in the security domain, focused on one's military dominance at the cost of others' security. The only result of such policies can be a deadlock. The impasse of the CD is a reflection of this prevailing strategic reality at the global and regional levels.

Mr. Chairman,

5. In order to promote a comprehensive disarmament agenda, a rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory international order needs to be evolved by: *one*, addressing the security concerns of all states; *two*, limiting and rationalizing the stockpiles of conventional weapons; *three*, strengthening the non-proliferation regime by shunning double standards and pursuing equitable and non-discriminatory measures; and *four*, extending negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.

6. Any arms control, non-proliferation or disarmament treaty that does not lead to undiminished security for all states would be a non-starter – as evidenced by the failure of FMCT negotiations to kick off. A treaty which only results in a cut-off in the future production of fissile material would jeopardize Pakistan's security and bring no added value to the cause of nuclear disarmament. The lack of added value is a sentiment that has been expressed by other States as well. It is high time that we move towards the development of a new consensus on this issue that addresses the asymmetries in existing stockpiles of fissile material.

Mr. Chairman,

7. Pakistan remains committed to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament in a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory manner. As recognized by SSOD-I, the objective of this process should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. A nuclear weapons free world would be less stable and less secure if some countries possess disproportionately excessive conventional military capabilities. Nuclear disarmament, therefore, needs to be pursued in a comprehensive and holistic manner in accordance with the principles agreed by SSOD-I.

Mr. Chairman,

8. The issue of negative security assurances has been on the international agenda for more than half a century. Pending nuclear disarmament, the long-standing and genuine aspiration of non-nuclear weapon states to receive legally-binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from all nuclear possessing states should be fulfilled. Pakistan believes that the issue is ripe for treaty negotiations in the CD.

9. During this session, Pakistan will be presenting its traditional draft resolution entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", on behalf of a large number of co-sponsoring states. We look forward to its adoption with the widest possible support.

Thank you.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

Mr. Chairman,

1. The Conventions prohibiting Biological and Chemical Weapons, the BWC and the CWC, constitute two important pillars of the international security architecture. They have made significant contributions to the goal of general and complete disarmament by comprehensively outlawing two entire categories of WMDs. Mr. Chairman,

2. We value the BWC's contribution to global security and its potential for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of life sciences. Our priorities under the Convention include its universalization and the effective and balanced implementation of all its articles, in particular Article-X. Without prejudice to the priority that we attach to the conclusion of a legally-binding Protocol, my delegation continues to engage constructively with the BWC community to explore progress where consensus is possible.

3. On its part, Pakistan remains committed to the full implementation of the Convention. We continue to further strengthen the legislative, regulatory and administrative framework to regulate life sciences in the country. We are enhancing our bio-safety and bio-security regulations. Our export controls on biological agents and toxins are at par with international standards.

4. Pakistan participates actively and contributes constructively to all meetings of the BWC during the current Inter-Sessional Programme. Last year, Pakistan had the honour of chairing the Meeting of BWC Experts on Assistance, Preparedness and Response. We believe Article-VII of the Convention enjoys broad political support and cross-regional convergence. It should therefore be channelled towards concrete deliverables at the next Review Conference in 2021. We would continue to constructively engage with other States Parties during the upcoming Meetings of BWC Experts.

5. Pakistan views the UNSG's mechanism as an important operational tool for investigation. However, neither this mechanism, nor voluntary CBMs can substitute the need for a dedicated verification mechanism for the Convention.

6. Pakistan has always met all its financial obligations under the Convention in full and on time. We support all measures aimed at putting the Convention on a sustainable financial footing.

Mr. Chairman,

7. Pakistan remains committed to the CWC and continues to actively and constructively participate in the work of the OPCW. We firmly believe in preserving the effectiveness, objectivity and credibility of the OPCW and its verification regime. Distortions in the OPCW's mandate that could render it susceptible to political manoeuvring must be avoided.

8. Pakistan condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, under any circumstances. Those responsible for such acts must be identified and held accountable. OPCW's role in dealing with cases of chemical weapons' use must be in strict accordance with the Convention, which unambiguously defines the role of the Technical Secretariat. Extending the Secretariat's remit towards 'attribution' is inconsistent with the technical nature of its work. It is for the States Parties to consider issues of attribution in light of the technical findings of the Secretariat.

9. OPCW should be strengthened to deal with the ongoing and future challenges within the confines of the CWC, while according priority to the complete destruction of declared as well as abandoned chemical weapons. We hope that the practice of decision making by consensus on CWC related issues, both at the UNGA and at the OPCW will be restored.

10. We attach high priority to CWC's provisions relating to international cooperation and assistance as well as peaceful uses of chemistry. Pakistan continues to regularly conduct CWC-related regional and international courses and events on various topics.

Mr. Chairman,

11. Along with the threat of chemical and biological weapons' use by States, their use by non-State actors must also be effectively addressed. Pakistan has taken a series of measures in this regard. Our comprehensive reports to the 1540 Committee provide a detailed matrix on all these procedures, mechanisms and legislations as well as on their enforcement. We also support the Russian proposal for the negotiation of an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism in the Conference on Disarmament.

12. As a mainstream partner in global non-proliferation efforts, Pakistan has also instituted a strong national export control regime that is harmonized with the relevant international regimes including the Australia Group.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Outer Space (disarmament aspects)

Mr. Chairman,

1. Outer space is being explored and used by an increasing number of States, both for civilian and military purposes. While our dependence on outer space applications is on the rise, the risk of its weaponization is also growing.

2. We are becoming increasingly concerned by the threats posed from Anti-Satellite capabilities to regional and global stability as well as to the long-term sustainability of outer space. In the absence of strong legal instruments regulating the testing, development and deployment of ASAT weapons, other states could also follow suit by demonstrating such capabilities. The potential integration of Anti Ballistic Missile systems and their components into space assets adds another worrying dimension to this matter.

3. There is an urgent need to prevent outer space from emerging as a new realm of conflict and arms race. Being a strong proponent of the non-weaponization of outer space, Pakistan reiterates its call on the CD to immediately commence negotiations on PAROS to comprehensively address the gaps in the international legal regime governing the exploration and use of outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

4. The issue of PAROS has been on the CD's agenda for over three and a half decades. It is eminently ripe for commencement of negotiations on a legally binding treaty. The draft Treaty commonly known as PPWT, tabled jointly by China and Russia in 2008, and updated in 2014, provides a useful basis for start of negotiations.

5. The countries presently enjoying dominance in outer space should not be blinded by this perception. Their current technological prowess will not last forever. Other countries are catching up rapidly. And this time, the developing countries will neither carry the burden of non-proliferation, nor will they accept any discriminatory restrictions which hamper their pursuits in outer space. We need to evolve universal and equitable regulations that can guarantee the exclusively peaceful nature of outer space, before it turns into a new sphere of security competition.

6. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 recognized that the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries and shall be the province of all humanity, that is, our common heritage. The treaty prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in outer space, but is silent on the placement of other types of weapons including conventional weapons that could be used to engage targets on Earth or in outer space. Moreover, it does not prohibit the use of force against outer space objects from Earth. These issues need to be addressed in a comprehensive treaty on PAROS, negotiated in the CD.

Mr. Chairman,

7. Pakistan welcomed the establishment of a GGE on Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. A Pakistani expert was part of the GGE and contributed to its work in a substantive and constructive manner. The GGE was quite close to fulfilling its mandate by making recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We were disappointed that consensus could not be reached and the GGE regrettably failed to approve its final report.

8. We note the valuable informal discussions on PAROS that have been held in the CD over the years. These deliberations, together with those held in the GGE, have helped in developing a better understanding of the different perspectives and reinforced our view that the contentious issues concerning PAROS can be resolved during negotiations in the CD.

Mr. Chairman,

9. The General Assembly has also been adopting another important resolution spearheaded by Russian Federation, and co-sponsored by Pakistan every year since 2013, titled “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”. On 28 May 2019, the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and the Russian Federation signed a Joint Statement on “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”. This is a practical manifestation of our commitment to “not in any way be the first to place weapons of any kind in Outer Space” and to “make all possible efforts to prevent Outer Space from becoming an arena for military confrontation and to ensure security in Outer Space activities”. We also encourage other responsible space-faring nations to follow this example.

Mr. Chairman,

10. The 2013 GGE on TCBMs in Outer Space agreed on a consensus report with certain concrete recommendations endorsed by the UNGA. While recognizing the value of TCBMs in promoting trust and confidence among states, Pakistan does not see such voluntary measures as a substitute for legally-binding treaty-based obligations. There are clear gaps in the international legal regime governing the use of outer space with grave security implications. These gaps can only be plugged by concluding a treaty on PAROS that comprehensively prohibits the weaponisation of outer space and also bans the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

Thank you.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Conventional Weapons

Mr. Chairman,

1. The destabilizing effects of conventional weapons on security and stability at the regional and sub-regional levels as well as their humanitarian toll underscore the need for continued action aimed at controlling these weapons.

2. A comprehensive and equitable approach is required which takes into account the priorities and security interests of all States. It is essential that the pursuit of nuclear disarmament does not give way to a destabilizing conventional imbalance of the type that spawned two World Wars during the last century.

3. The final document of SSOD-I provides clear direction in this regard, I quote, “Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all states to protect their security”, unquote.

Mr. Chairman,

4. Several worrying trends are emerging on the conventional weapons horizon. The level and scale of global military expenditures tops the list. The present expenditure on international trade in conventional arms has reached unprecedented levels. Past year saw the largest annual growth in global military spending in a decade. Ironically, while the total budget of the United Nations is less than 1 percent of the world’s total military expenditure, close to 200 times more is being spent on fueling and exacerbating conflicts than preventing them.

5. The reflection of this troubling trend is mirrored at the regional level, in particular in South Asia, where one State’s military spending grossly and vastly outnumbers that of others. This has the potential of fueling instability and jeopardizing the delicate regional balance. The situation is rendered more complex due to the presence of longstanding disputes and stalled political dialogue, which hinder the realization of the goal of durable peace in our region.

6. We remain concerned over the growing transfers of conventional armaments especially in volatile regions that are inconsistent with the imperatives of maintaining peace, security and stability. Moreover, the increasing interplay of such conventional technologies with strategic capabilities continues to complicate and undermine the strategic stability and security of our region. The policy of double standards towards South Asia, based on narrow strategic, political and commercial considerations, must be eschewed.

7. Pakistan, for its part, is committed to the establishment of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, which includes an element of conventional force balance. Pakistan neither wants, nor is engaged in an arms race in the region.

Mr. Chairman,

8. Pakistan has developed the necessary legislative, regulatory, enforcement and institutional mechanisms to address the range of issues relating to conventional arms' regulation. Policy guidelines on exports are in place along with a national evaluation mechanism to regulate trade in these arms. We are taking additional measures to strengthen the enforcement regime, which covers imports and licensing as well.

9. We had welcomed the outcome document of the Third Review Conference of the Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons. We participated actively and constructively in the review conference and remain committed to the implementation of the PoA and the outcomes agreed at its review conferences.

10. Pakistan voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution that adopted the Arms Trade Treaty. As we continue our national review of the treaty, we believe that the ATT's success, effectiveness and universality will depend on its non-discriminatory implementation, in particular the strict adherence by its State Parties to the Treaty's principles.

Mr. Chairman,

11. Pakistan is a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and all of its five Protocols, and remains fully compliant with their provisions. We are proud of our active contribution to de-mining and ERW clearance efforts world over, particularly under UN peace-keeping operations, to which Pakistan remains one of the largest troop contributors. The success of the CCW lies in the delicate balance that it seeks to maintain between humanitarian considerations and the legitimate security interests of States.

12. CCW also provides the most appropriate forum for addressing the issue of Improvised Explosive Devices in a comprehensive and balanced manner. Pakistan shares the concerns about the acquisition and use by non-state actors and terrorists of IEDs as well as various types of conventional weapons.

13. Pakistan presided over the 5th Review Conference of the CCW in 2016 which took important decisions for dealing with several contemporary issues falling under the Convention's purview. As Chair of the 2019 Annual Meeting of CCW High Contracting Parties, we facilitated important substantive outcomes that strengthen the implementation and improve the financial sustainability of the Convention, including the renewal of the mandate of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) for two years and the establishment of a Voluntary Working Capital Fund under the Convention.

Thank you.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Mr. Chairman,

1. The relentless pace of emergence of new weapons, driven by a never-ending strategic competition, constantly facilitated by new scientific innovations, carries serious implications. The rapid development of new weapon systems and enabling technologies poses a threat to peace, security and stability at the regional and global levels.

2. This heightened pace of technological innovations has and continues to change the way international law can and should govern the development, deployment and use of these weapons. Even as the pace of development and use of new weapons technologies remains inevitable, it is essential to develop commensurate norms, laws and rules to regulate them in all their dimensions. Worryingly, governing and regulating the development and use of such weapons under International Law is proving to be a major challenge, as various categories of new technologies and means of war are outpacing requisite regulations and controls.

3. The threats to peace, security and stability at the regional and global levels by such developments are even more urgent and real because these new weapons reduce or eliminate the danger of human casualties for the user states and, therefore, increase the propensity for their use and the enhanced prospects of symmetric and asymmetric responses. The net result is lowering of the threshold for resort to armed conflict.

Mr. Chairman,

4. Within this larger edifice of new and emerging technologies, I would draw attention to two particular issues; Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) and cyber weapons.

5. The development of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) has emerged as a major cause of concern for the international community. LAWS are rightly being described as the next revolution in military affairs that would fundamentally change the nature of war. Their introduction will lower the threshold of armed conflicts; consequently, the resort to use of force will become a more frequent phenomenon. LAWS could also be used in anonymous and clandestine operations as well as for targeted killing in the territory of other States.

6. LAWS would undermine international peace and security. Their introduction would affect progress on disarmament and non-proliferation. Faced with the prospect of being overwhelmed by LAWS, states possessing WMD capabilities would be reluctant to relinquish them, while others would feel encouraged to acquire them.

7. Any weapon system that delegates life and death decisions to machines, is by nature unethical, and cannot fully comply with International Humanitarian Law. The issue of LAWS does not only have legal, ethical and technical dimensions, but also carries serious implications for regional and global security. The developments in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) need to be appropriately regulated in all its dimensions. They should not outpace the evolution of regulations governing them.

8. Pakistan supports the development of an international legally binding instrument stipulating appropriate prohibitions and regulations on LAWS. States currently developing such weapons should place a moratorium on their production and meaningfully engage with the international community in addressing their concerns.

9. Over time, the concerns surrounding LAWS have exacerbated and become more pronounced. The consequences, especially on international peace and security, are too grave to be ignored. The process launched seven years ago within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) can only be sustained if it is result oriented and seen to be heeding the concerns of all member states.

10. As a unique and novel class of weapons that has given rise to multi-faceted concerns, this category of weapons needs to be addressed multilaterally. National regulations and responses are useful but not sufficient. International regulations are needed, including for adequately addressing the serious security dimensions. Besides considering the issue of LAWS in the CCW context, its international security dimensions should be comprehensively addressed by the UN Disarmament Machinery including by the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

Mr. Chairman,

11. Cyber warfare is another area requiring immediate attention. Cyber space is fast emerging as the new domain of warfare. The ability to act anonymously without traditional geographical limitations, coupled with the ability to mass produce cyber weapons cheaply, makes them extremely attractive and dangerous. Several States are developing ICTs as instruments of warfare and for political purposes. The absence of common understandings on acceptable State behaviour with regard to the use of cyber space is greatly increasing the risk to international peace and security. The destructive potential of cyber weapons is rising to a level at par with other weapons of mass destruction.

12. Given the unique differences between the physical and cyber spheres, the extent and scope of the applicability of existing international law and its interpretation requires further elaboration. Moreover, given the unique attributes of ICTs, additional norms also need to be developed in a universal setting. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) remains an appropriate venue for further multilateral work on this topic through the elaboration of a comprehensive international convention. Formulation of a multilaterally agreed, nondiscriminatory international code of conduct would also help in guiding the practical application of international norms and principles governing cyber space.

13. Pakistan welcomes the significant progress made within the framework of the ongoing OEWG, established pursuant to resolution 73/27, which represents the first universal and inclusive forum within the UN auspices deliberating these issues.

14. Pakistan has participated actively and constructively in the meetings of the OEWG and hopes that it would achieve a consensus outcome which would support international community's efforts to ensuring a peaceful, stable and secure ICT environment.

15. Pakistan supports the proposal for the establishment of a new OEWG starting 2021, to continue deliberations on the issue and looks forward to continuing discussions on all relevant aspects of the subject.

Thank you.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Regional Disarmament and Security

Mr. Chairman,

1. The General Assembly has long recognized that international peace and security is co-dependent on stability at the regional and sub-regional levels. In view of this inextricable relationship, the UN Charter acknowledges the value of regional arrangements to ensure global peace and security. In the post-Cold War era, most threats to peace and security arise mainly among States located in the same region or sub-region. International efforts towards disarmament and arms control, therefore, are reinforced and complemented by regional approaches towards this end.

2. The Final Document of SSOD-I, the UN Disarmament Commission, and this Committee's resolutions have repeatedly reaffirmed the need for the simultaneous pursuit of regional and global approaches including agreements in the area of disarmament and arms limitation. The international community has endorsed through these mechanisms and normative frameworks two well-recognized and tested tools, i.e. conventional arms control and Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), particularly at the regional and sub-regional levels.

3. Several regions of the world have benefitted from the application of principles and guidelines in the areas of conventional arms control and evolved appropriate CBMs. It is important to recall and reiterate some of the relevant core principles agreed by the UN in this regard, which include: (i) preservation of balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments and military forces; (ii) the special responsibility of militarily significant States and States with larger military capabilities in promoting agreements for regional security; (iii) undiminished security; and (iv) pursuit of disarmament measures in an equitable and balanced manner.

4. Regional arrangements for disarmament and arms limitation should accord priority to addressing the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances in both conventional and non-conventional spheres. In regions characterized by tensions and disputes, achieving a stable balance of conventional forces through cooperative regional initiatives is imperative.

5. As the General Assembly resolutions and UNDC guidelines have affirmed, CBMs at the regional level have to be tailored to the specifics of the region and should begin with simple arrangements on transparency, openness, and risk reduction, before the concerned States find themselves in a position to pursue more substantive arms control and disarmament measures.

6. Mutually agreed CBMs can lead to the creation of favourable conditions; however, they should not become an end in themselves. Over the long term, CBMs should also contribute towards conflict resolution. However, if with passage of time the conflicts continue to fester then the CBMs may lose their efficacy.

Mr. Chairman,

7. South Asia faces certain distinct challenges arising from the hegemonic pretensions of one regional country. This country, while continuing to acquire destabilizing strategic and conventional capabilities, and developing offensive military doctrines, refuses to engage in a bilateral dialogue on confidence building and risk reduction. It highlights the need, more than ever before, to recognize the clear and present danger posed by such developments. Not just to Pakistan, but to regional and international peace and security.

8. Pakistan desires peace. Peace and stability in South Asia cannot be achieved without resolving the underlying disputes; without agreeing on reciprocal measures for strategic restraint; and without instituting a balance between conventional forces. Our proposals in that regard remain on the table. Pakistan has always supported bilateral or regional initiatives that build confidence, reduce risks, and that conform to the cardinal principle of equal and undiminished security for all.

Mr. Chairman,

9. Pakistan feels privileged to have spearheaded initiatives on regional disarmament, conventional arms control, and CBMs at the UN for several years now. A practical expression of Pakistan's commitment towards promoting these globally agreed goals is reflected through the resolutions which Pakistan tables every year in the First Committee on:

- (1) Regional disarmament;
- (2) Confidence building measures in the regional and sub-regional context; and
- (3) Conventional arms control at regional and sub-regional levels.

10. As in previous years, Pakistan delegation has tabled these three draft resolutions which recognize the significance of regional approaches to arms control, disarmament and confidence building for international peace and stability, and the complementarity between regional and global approaches. We look forward to the continued support of Member States for the adoption of these resolutions this year as well.

I thank you.

Statement by the Delegation of Pakistan
Thematic Debate on Cluster: Disarmament Machinery

Mr. Chairman,

1. The General Assembly, at its First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 (SSOD-I), established the UN Disarmament Machinery by consensus. The key principle set forth by SSOD-I in the context of this machinery is, *I quote*, "The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage." *Unquote*.

2. The fulfilment of this cardinal objective requires that any legally binding measures be considered and agreed strictly on the basis of consensus, with the participation of all stakeholders, allowing all States to safeguard their vital national security interests. Working on this basis, the UN disarmament machinery has produced significant treaties, including those that have comprehensively prohibited two entire categories of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Since 1996, the UN Disarmament machinery has not been able to produce a legally binding instrument. This is a consequence of the competing priorities of different member states. Some States are opposing the commencement of negotiations on new treaties simply because they are in conflict with their strategic calculus aimed at perpetuating their military advantage and preferential positions. Other States are rejecting certain instruments – which because of their inherent discriminatory nature – would negatively affect these States' security disproportionately.

4. At the same time, there are some States that want progress at any cost, irrespective of the impact that it would have on international and regional peace and security, and regardless of whether it would lead to equal and undiminished security for all.

Mr. Chairman,

5. The interplay of these factors has resulted in a deadlock of the disarmament machinery. Pakistan shares the disappointment and frustration felt by many over this state of affairs. However, the disarmament machinery is only a symptom of the malaise, not the cause.

6. The present situation is but a result of the prevailing strategic realities, marked by a lack of political will. It has nothing to do with procedures and methods of work. After all, the same disarmament machinery has been able to produce landmark treaties in the past when the conditions were more propitious.

Mr. Chairman,

7. The situation today is that there is no consensus on the start of negotiations on any issue on the CD's agenda. Among the so-called four core issues, the vast majority supports substantive work on the over-ripe issues of Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances, and PAROS. A handful of states seem obsessed with a partial nonproliferation measure in the form of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty that, without addressing existing stocks, will make no contribution to nuclear disarmament.

8. The challenges confronting the disarmament machinery are not exclusive to the CD. The First Committee and the Disarmament Commission face a similar polarization and lack of consensus to deal with the most pressing issues confronting international peace and security. The growing trends of polarization within the overall arms control and disarmament landscape and the ensuing breakdown of existing agreements is creating further burdens for the overall disarmament machinery.

9. The solution to the impasse of the disarmament machinery cannot be found by seeking action outside established forums, especially when pursued on a non-consensus basis and without the participation of all stakeholders. It is only the CD – where all militarily significant states participate on an equal footing and are able to protect their vital security interests under the consensus rule – that meaningful progress can be achieved.

10. Instead of selective, piecemeal and partial solutions, Pakistan calls for evolving a new consensus. During this year's CD Session, we presented a detailed roadmap for achieving such a consensus, anchored in a rules-based international order, with respect and adherence to international law and through upholding of the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and SSOD-1.

11. My delegation was pleased with the successful outcome of the OEWG mandated to agree on the agenda and objectives of SSOD-IV. A successful SSOD-IV would be an important step towards the revival of the global consensus on general and complete disarmament while taking into account the security concerns of all States.

12. The real challenge, in our view, is how to deal with the political dynamics and developments outside UN conference rooms. As long as the quest for attaining equal security is trumped by hegemonic designs at the regional and global levels, real headway will continue to elude us. Discriminatory revisionism of the global nuclear order, exercise of double standards, and carving of waivers and exceptions driven by strategic and economic motivations, will continue to stand in the way of progress. We must return to consensus-based, cooperative and non-discriminatory approaches that lead to equal and undiminished security for all.

Thank you.

Statement of the Republic of Paraguay
Statement of the Republic of Paraguay during the thematic debate on Cluster 1: Nuclear Weapons of the First
Committee – 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly
October 2020
Armas Nucleares

1. Gracias Señor presidente, en la Republica del Paraguay, la prohibición de las armas nucleares tiene rango constitucional. La delegación de nuestro país fue una de las primeras firmantes del Tratado para la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares, dicho tratado fue aprobado por el Congreso Nacional a través de la Ley No 6456 del 9 de diciembre de 2019; a inicios de este año Paraguay se convirtió en el trigésimo quinto país en depositar el instrumento de ratificación. Nos congratulamos por la pronta entrada en vigor del mencionado instrumento.
 2. **De esta manera**, el Paraguay manifiesta, una vez más, su compromiso irrestricto con el sistema jurídico internacional y los esfuerzos por un mundo libre de armas nucleares. Nuestro país acompaña las iniciativas surgidas en el seno de las Naciones Unidas, tendientes a la universalización del Tratado para la prohibición de armas nucleares, con la convicción de que la prohibición de las armas nucleares y su eliminación son condiciones necesarias para promover la paz y la seguridad internacionales.
 3. Señor presidente, como país abogamos por el desarme nuclear transparente e irreversible, verificable y jurídicamente vinculante para todos los Estados, y apoyamos la universalización y el cumplimiento de los compromisos sobre desarme nuclear y no proliferación y en particular, del Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares, del Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares y del Tratado para la Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares, así como de los Tratados e instrumentos internacionales constitutivos de zonas libres de armas nucleares.
 4. El uso y la amenaza del uso de armas nucleares u otros dispositivos nucleares constituye un crimen contra la humanidad, viola el derecho internacional y el derecho internacional humanitario y atenta contra los postulados de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
 5. El Paraguay augura éxitos a las actividades preparatorias para la Décima Conferencia de Revisión del Tratado de No Proliferación, abogamos por que los esfuerzos en este sentido favorezcan a la elaboración de compromisos específicos en materia de desarme nuclear y no proliferación y expresamos nuestro compromiso de trabajar a favor del éxito de la Conferencia en cuanto las partes acuerden una nueva fecha para su celebración.
 6. Consideramos que el Tratado de No Proliferación es la piedra angular del régimen de desarme y no proliferación y nos adherimos en considerar el derecho inalienable de todos los Estados a desarrollar la investigación la producción y la utilización de la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos.
 7. **Señor** presidente, la universalización y la aplicación de los compromisos internacionales sobre desarme nuclear tienen un medio válido para su aplicación por medio de la cooperación internacional. En este sentido, la cooperación posibilita a países en desarrollo a hacer frente a los desafíos de la implementación de los acuerdos. Es por ello que la cooperación internacional cumple un rol fundamental en la capacitación de recursos humanos, la provisión de recursos económicos y tecnológicos adecuados, la transferencia de tecnologías y buenas prácticas.
- Muchas gracias.

Statement of the Republic of Paraguay
Statement of the Republic of Paraguay during the thematic debate - Cluster 4: Conventional Weapons of the First
Committee – 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly
October 2020
Armas Convencionales

1. Gracias Señor presidente, en nombre del Paraguay tengo el honor de referir algunos comentarios en calidad nacional a modo de contribuir en este debate temático sobre Armas Convencionales.
2. La delegación del Paraguay valora a la universalización de los diversos instrumentos internacionales que regulan las armas convencionales y posibilitan la creación de un marco normativo común en concordancia con los principios establecidos en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.
3. En este sentido destacamos la importancia del Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas. La aplicación de las disposiciones de este son una herramienta útil para prevenir los conflictos y la violencia armada, así como violaciones del derecho internacional, del derecho internacional humanitario y de los derechos humanos. También consideramos que debemos aunar esfuerzos como miembros de la comunidad internacional con fin de contar con normativas que aborden los retos a futuro como la disminución en la existencia de armas convencionales.
4. Señor presidente, el Paraguay, a través de la autoridad competente por la Ley 4.036 del año 2010, emitió en el mes de mayo de 2018 una prohibición general de importación de armas que se encuentra vigente hasta la fecha. Por ello, podemos asegurar que nuestro país no ha importado armas de ningún origen en los últimos 2 años, salvo aquellas adquisiciones dirigidas a instituciones encargadas de la seguridad interior, como son la Policía Nacional o las Fuerzas Militares.
5. No obstante, abogamos por medidas adecuadas que faciliten la total eliminación del tráfico ilegal de armas es por ello que consideramos de principal importancia los esfuerzos en materia de trazabilidad de la importación y la exportación de armas de fuego, y el apoyo al fortalecimiento de los mecanismos tendientes a combatir de manera eficiente al crimen organizado transnacional, especialmente a través de asistencia legal y la cooperación internacional.
6. El Estado paraguayo está avanzando a paso firme en materia de seguridad, con la creación de los juzgados especializados en casos de crimen organizado transnacional, a nivel internacional destacamos la colaboración entre nuestro país y el Programa Global de Armas de la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Drogas y el Crimen (ONUDC), al tiempo de informar que la implementación de una hoja de ruta para el fortalecimiento del sistema nacional integrado para el control del comercio y el tráfico ilícito de armas ha sido aprobada por nuestro país en julio de 2020 y esperamos se ponga en marcha en el corto plazo.
7. Nuestra Delegación resalta además los esfuerzos de los Estados Parte del MERCOSUR y Estados Asociados en el marco del Grupo de Trabajo Sobre Armas de Fuego y Municiones (GTAFM), cuya última reunión se celebró durante la Presidencia Pro Témpore del Paraguay en el MERCOSUR, en mayo de 2020. Asimismo, se congratula con la entrada en vigor, durante la última Presidencia Pro Témpore del Paraguay para el Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), del *Acuerdo Marco para la creación de Equipos Conjuntos de Investigación (ECIs)* en mayo de 2020 con lo cual se hizo hincapié en la importancia de continuar fortaleciendo la cooperación regional con el objetivo de implementar políticas, estrategias y programas comunes para fomentar el intercambio de información y buenas prácticas entre los países.
8. El Paraguay reconoce la importancia de la “Convención Interamericana Contra la Fabricación y el Tráfico Ilícitos de Armas de Fuego, Municiones, Explosivos y otros Materiales Relacionados” para la facilitación regional de los esfuerzos en la materia.
9. En cuanto a la aplicación de los compromisos internacionales sobre armas convencionales, la delegación de Paraguay subraya la importancia de las medidas de fomento de la confianza a nivel regional y subregional; reconoce en la presentación periódica de informes nacionales una herramienta para conocer el estado de implementación de los compromisos internacionales y para facilitar la cooperación de Estados entre sí y con otros actores y valora la labor de las organizaciones internacionales, de la sociedad civil y el mundo académico en pos del desarme y la no proliferación de las armas convencionales.
10. Señor presidente, la universalización y la aplicación de los compromisos internacionales sobre armas convencionales tienen un medio válido para su aplicación por medio de la cooperación internacional. En este sentido, la cooperación posibilita a países en desarrollo a hacer frente a los desafíos de la implementación de los

acuerdos. Es por ello que la cooperación internacional cumple un rol fundamental en la capacitación de recursos humanos, la provisión de recursos económicos y tecnológicos adecuados, la transferencia de tecnologías y buenas prácticas.

Muchas gracias.

**Republic of Korea
Cluster 1 (Nuclear Weapons)**

Mr. Chair,

A world free of nuclear weapons is an aspiration shared by all humanity. Yet the reality is that the leadership and sincerity of nuclear states that gave birth to the NPT in 1969 are being increasingly questioned by many non-nuclear states. Another concerning trend is the erosion of trust among nuclear weapon states. This year, the COVID-19 pandemic has added uncertainty to the already deteriorating international security environment and disrupted the pursuit of disarmament and international peace and security.

Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea firmly believes that the spirit of multilateralism has not waned even amid this challenging time. We also believe that addressing the various challenges toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons should remain one of our top priorities in multilateral diplomacy.

As a strong supporter of the NPT system and as a state in full compliance with the NPT, the Republic of Korea is of the view that priorities and particular considerations should be given to the following elements and areas.

First, we strongly believe that the NPT regime, which has been the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, should remain the solid foundation for our efforts in moving closer towards Global Zero. The 10th NPT Review Conference, which is now postponed to 2021, will be a crucial occasion to reaffirm our strong commitment to the Treaty. While we need to maintain our aspiration high on the outcome of the 10th NPT RevCon, we should also take a pragmatic and realistic approach regarding the Conference. In taking this approach we should respect divergent views among states for a truly sustainable and implementable outcome and also consider the constraints we are facing due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

Second, efforts should be prioritized and further strengthened to bridge the gap and deepen common understanding and trust among states, especially between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). In this regard, Korea welcomes and supports all efforts for greater communication and cooperation between the two groups. Most of all, we believe that the role of the NWS is particularly important in addressing the growing dissatisfaction and mistrust between NWS and NNWS. The P5, in particular, need to show their steadfast and clear commitment for nuclear disarmament by strengthening dialogue on their nuclear policies among themselves. Efforts to implement the P5's commitments under Article Six (6) of the NPT should be combined with their active engagement with non-nuclear-weapon states in various trust and confidence building measures. In this vein, Korea is actively participating in "Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND)" as co-chair of its subgroup.

We also support the ongoing efforts in this regard focused on a pragmatic approach including the "stepping stones approach" initiated by the Stockholm Initiative. We also believe that continuing consultations around issues of nuclear verification, risk reduction, transparency and issues related to new technologies can facilitate understanding between the two groups, the NWS and the NNWS. In this vein, we welcome the work of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Group of Government of Experts on Nuclear Verification which will be reestablished in 2021.

Third, many long-standing issues including the early commencement of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) negotiations and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) should not be overlooked. After more than 20 years of preparation for the negotiations on the FMCT, we believe that it is now time to embark upon the negotiations on the Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament without any further delay. All groundwork is in place including the latest report from the High-level FMCT Experts Preparatory Group. We also call on all non-parties to the CTBT, in particular those on the list of Annex II, to sign and ratify the Treaty at the earliest possible date. Korea is ready and willing to cooperate closely with our partners on these fronts.

Mr. Chair

The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains one of the key issues in international peace and security. Regrettably, the Korean Peninsula Peace Process has been stalled for a while. But we should not underestimate the

milestone agreements reached between the leaders of the Republic of Korea, the United States, and the DPRK in 2018 in an effort to achieve the complete denuclearization and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula.

My Government's resolve to advance the peace process remains unwavering and we sincerely hope that the DPRK will return to the negotiating table so that we may build upon the hard-won breakthroughs that have been jointly achieved. As my President emphasized at the UN General Assembly in September this year, we will continue the dialogue towards achieving denuclearization and bringing lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. The continued support and encouragement of the international community would indeed be most needed and deeply appreciated.

Thank you. /END/

**Republic of Korea
Cluster 2 (Other WMD)**

Mr. Chair,

The devastating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic which are reaching every corner of the globe this year have raised an alarm to the international community to look back on its readiness and preparedness regarding the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Republic of Korea stands in full support of the norms against any use of chemical or biological weapons. And we reiterate the significance of the Conventions against chemical and biological weapons which form the core pillars of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

(Chemical Weapons Convention)

The international community has made significant achievements since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997. More than 98 percent of all declared chemical weapons have been destroyed and verified by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Our collective vision for a world free of chemical weapons, however, is being overshadowed by repeated chemical weapons use around the world, including in Syria, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Russia.

On October 6, the OPCW confirmed yet another use of a nerve agent against Mr. Navalny. The Government of the Republic of Korea notes with serious concern that a nerve agent was used to poison an individual in Russia. The Republic of Korea condemns in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons - anywhere, at any time, by anyone under any circumstances. All those responsible for chemical weapons use must be held accountable for their heinous crimes. This case cannot be an exception. We urge Russia, on whose territory the attack took place, to investigate and to disclose in a swift and transparent manner the circumstances of this chemical weapons attack.

At the same time, it was more than seven years ago that the Syrian Arab Republic joined the Convention but its chemical weapons programme remains unaddressed until this moment. The OPCW's Director-General, Fernando Arias, said in his report on October 6 that the Technical Secretariat is still not in a position to consider that Syria's declaration is accurate and complete. The Republic of Korea urges Syria to fully engage with the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT) to resolve all outstanding issues.

While the Republic of Korea welcomes the adoption of the Decision EC-94/DEC.2 (9 July 2020) by the OPCW Executive Council, we are saddened to see the OPCW's report on October 14 that Syria has not declared anything under paragraph 5 of the Decision. We urge the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the OPCW and to take all actions requested by the Decision to redress the situation.

The Republic of Korea reiterates its unwavering support for the OPCW Syria-related mechanisms, including the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM), the Declaration Assessment Team (DAT), and the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT). The three teams have fulfilled their mandates in a transparent, independent, and impartial way. The Republic of Korea pays tributes to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW for striving to deliver its noble mandates during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Universal adherence to the Convention has been, and continues to be, our utmost priority since the entry into force of the CWC in 1997. Fully convinced that universality of the Convention is critical in ensuring its full implementation, the Republic of Korea urges the four remaining States not Party to the Convention to ratify or accede to it as soon as possible without any preconditions.

Mr. Chair,

(Biological Weapons Convention)

Concerning the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Treaty not only outlaws the use of disease as a weapon but also confirms that such use would be “repugnant to the conscience of mankind” as stated in its preamble. However, advances in science and technology have increased the risks of biological weapons proliferation, by lowering the technical barriers to their acquisition and development by states or non-state actors. The Biological Weapons Convention needs to remain the first international framework for responding to these challenges, based on each state party’s full and faithful implementation of the treaty obligations including information sharing, confidence-building, assistance and international cooperation.

Therefore, this year’s rescheduled Meetings of Experts bear particular importance as they will be the last round of consultations before the 9th Review Conference in 2021. We should be able to assess the achievements during the past inter-sessional programmes and build upon the areas of convergence for the upcoming Review Conference.

In this line, our delegation welcomes in-depth discussions on the development of science and technology, including the suggestion of establishing the Scientific and Technological Experts Advisory Forum with a balanced regional distribution. Also, we are in support of establishing guidelines to assist states that may request assistance in the framework of Article VII. Different sources of incidents, whether an incident is borne by nature or by biological terror, should be put into the context of the scales of how to respond and assist. We also see as necessary to identify the areas and procedures to engage and respond when a biological incident occurs, in cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other relevant UN agencies.

For enhanced biosafety and biosecurity, each state needs to implement the Convention to the full extent. The Republic of Korea is actively implementing its obligations under the BWC by submitting reports on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), enacting domestic legislation, managing a stable export control regime, and building operational capabilities. We are also continuing to carry out regular and frequent onsite inspections of facilities and institutions dealing with pathogens while offering regular safety and security training to relevant personnel.

Last but not least, the Republic of Korea recognizes that international cooperation and assistance efforts for capacity building are necessary at both bilateral and multilateral levels. In this regard, bilaterally, we are offering various assistance programs to developing countries, in cooperation with the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), including the construction of medical facilities and the provision of technical assistance and medical staff training. Multilaterally, the Republic of Korea is also actively participating in capacity building programs through, in particular, the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) and the Global Partnership (GP).

Thank you, Mr. Chair. /END/

**Republic of Korea
Cluster 3 (Outer Space)**

Mr. Chair,

We are living in an era where technology is rapidly advancing, with an increasing number of actors in both the public and private sectors actively engaging in space activities. While this dawning of the new space age heralds both benefits and challenges to the humanity, it is evident that space threats and risks posed by more congested, contested, and competed space activities are growing on an unprecedented scale. In particular, the fear or threat entailed by the military use of space is one of the key factors of a deteriorating international security

environment. In such a situation, ensuring a space environment which is secure, safe and sustainable is an urgent task to be addressed for all. It is indeed one of the common goals of all humanity.

Mr. Chair,

The Republic of Korea, as a space-faring nation, is fully and firmly committed to this goal. Nonetheless, we should face the reality that there are divergent views on how to reach the common goal and what should be urgently pursued collectively for the goal. Persistent mistrust and lack of communication between different perspectives are contributing to deepening the divergence.

The Republic of Korea strongly believes that a step-by-step approach which aims at enhancing trust and building confidence among states will effectively contribute to the convergence of views. We also believe that it is the only realistic approach in paving the way to make sustainable progress towards our ultimate goals of space security, safety, and prosperity.

In this vein, we believe that the newly tabled resolution by the United Kingdom this year fully supported by many countries including the Republic of Korea will be marked as a new foundation in our common efforts. The new resolution itself will constitute a common ground of our global efforts to reduce space threats through norms, rules, and responsible behaviours. We request all countries to join in this audacious attempt.

In order to facilitate mutual understanding and the building of confidence amongst states, we should better utilize the existing bilateral, regional, and multilateral platforms. As indicated in the abovementioned new resolution, the Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations Disarmament Commission can be useful fora where states share their national space security policies, strategies or doctrines, on a voluntary basis. The Republic of Korea is ready to join in this endeavor.

The Republic of Korea also welcomes the efforts made through the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) 2018–2019. Although the GGE has failed to produce its final recommendations, we believe the Group made a valuable contribution to deepening the common understanding across varying views and approaches. Furthermore, we hope the joint panel discussion of the First and Fourth Committees on outer space issue will resume in the coming years which, we believe, will contribute to exploring ways to address the potential challenges facing space security and sustainability altogether.

Mr. Chair,

Taking this opportunity, the Republic of Korea would like to highlight the essential role of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in promoting international cooperation in the peaceful use of outer space.

The issues regarding the peaceful use of outer space have become more diverse and complex with the evolution of space technology and the growing number of space actors and objects. At the same time, space is becoming increasingly relevant to other areas, including efforts to tackle climate change and achieve sustainable development. Therefore, the COPUOS's role as a forum for promoting dialogue and cooperation and addressing emerging challenges in outer space activities is more important than ever.

In this regard, the Republic of Korea welcomes that consensus was reached through a formal written procedure on adopting the draft decisions and actions contained in the document [A/AC.105/L.324](#). It has established a basis for the activities of the Committee next year despite the cancellation of the 59th session of the Legal Subcommittee and the 63rd session of COPUOS due to the COVID-19 and other challenges. The Republic of Korea appreciates the Committee and UNOOSA for their endeavors to ensure the continuity of the valuable activities of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies despite the difficult circumstances.

Mr. Chair,

The Republic of Korea would like to highlight the importance of advancing the “Space 2030” agenda and its implementation plan. This agenda will promote the use of space technologies and applications to further economic growth, sustainable development and prosperity, demonstrating the important role of space in

supporting global development agendas. We hope that the efforts to develop and finalize this agenda will bear fruit by the 64th session of COPUOS next year.

The Republic of Korea is committed to continuing its contributions through its space technologies and activities to various initiatives, including those that address global challenges, promote capacity building, and increase women's participation and empowerment in the area of the peaceful uses of outer space.

As part of these endeavors, the Republic of Korea is planning to hold a joint workshop next year with UNOOSA under the theme "Space for Women". This workshop will provide an opportunity to enhance awareness and further strengthen support for gender equality in the space sector in the Asian region. The Republic of Korea will also continue its support for emerging space-faring nations through the 'International Space Training (KARIST) program' provided by Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI).

Last year, the Member States made a significant achievement in the area of peaceful uses of outer space by adopting the "Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities". Now it is crucial that the States implement them on a voluntary basis, and the Republic of Korea reaffirms its commitment to this end.

In closing, the Republic of Korea reiterates its strong commitment to international efforts to ensure that space activities promote global peace, safety and security, and improve the lives of people worldwide.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. /END/

Republic of Korea
Cluster 4 (Conventional Weapons)

Mr. Chair,

We recall the Secretary-General's statement in March when he has urged countries to "end the war and fight the disease that is ravaging our world," stressing that "the fury of the virus illustrates the folly of war". However, conflict-affected as well as developing countries have observed continuing or escalating armed violence, including gender-based violence. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the urgent need to prevent the diversion of conventional weapons and better regulate arms trade to reduce human suffering, especially that of the most vulnerable. The Republic of Korea reiterates its deep commitment to working closely with the international community to address the challenges posed by conventional weapons, doubled by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

(Arms Trade Treaty and the UN Programme of Action)

The Republic of Korea is convinced that the commitment to establish the highest possible common standards of conventional arms trade by States Parties contributes to maintaining international and regional peace and security and reducing human suffering as well as violence against women and children. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has been a milestone achievement in this regard in fostering well-regulated and legal trade in arms while preventing illicit trade and diversion. The Republic of Korea has been, and remains, a strong supporter of the ATT since its accession to the Treaty.

As part of our endeavour to expand the participation of Asian states in the ATT, we have translated the Treaty Universalization Toolkit and the "Welcome Pack" into ten different Asian languages this year. We will share these documents with our colleagues via the ATT website with the hope that all stakeholders will find them useful for their own bilateral and multilateral outreach activities.

Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, it was inevitable that we could not have as many interactive consultations on the subject matter as we could have in a normal situation. Most notably, we were only able to conduct the Conference of States Parties in written form. Therefore, we all the more welcome the substantive decision at CSP6 to establish the Diversion Information Exchange Forum, which will certainly contribute to taking the ATT implementation to the next level, by facilitating concrete and operational information sharing on diversion cases.

It is also crucial to implement the UN Program of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons, as well as International Tracing Instrument. My delegation looks forward to the 7th biennial meeting of the Program of Action (BMS7) next year, and affirms our support for a successful meeting.

Mr. Chair,

(Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons)

Korea remains committed to the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which strikes a balance between security concerns and humanitarian considerations, including humanitarian restrictions on the use of mines.

We welcome the ongoing efforts by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) to converge on a consensus report for the 2021 CCW Review Conference based on the 11 guiding principles agreed last year at the GGE. We hope that the collective efforts through the GGE process will continue within the framework of the CCW until a consensus is reached on normative and operative frameworks on emerging technologies in the areas of LAWS.

Meanwhile, we share concerns over the financial stability of the disarmament conventions based in Geneva. The ultimate solution to this long-standing issue lies within each High Contracting Party's faithful implementation of its financial obligations.

(Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Treaty)

The Republic of Korea aligns itself with the objectives and purposes of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention while it is yet to accede to the Ottawa Convention at this point, given its unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea reaffirms that, as a State Party to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II of the CCW) (as amended on 3 May 1996), are fully complying with the obligations and relevant norms.

Moreover, my delegation would like to draw your attention to the ongoing efforts for demining operations along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) of the Korean Peninsula under the inter-Korean military agreement signed in Pyongyang in 2018. In this connection, President Moon Jae-in proposed the idea of transforming the Demilitarized Zone in to an international peace zone at the United Nations General Assembly in 2019. In this regard, the Korean government wishes to closely cooperate with the international community, including the United Nations Mine Action Service.

The Republic of Korea is also participating in international efforts to support those affected by landmines by contributing to global mine actions including the UN's joint efforts and will continue to work closely with the international community in this area. Thank you. /END/

Republic of Korea
Cluster 5 (Other Disarmament Measures and International Security)

Mr. Chair,

The development of information and communications technologies (ICTs) has integrated the virtual and physical space surrounding us. Combined with developments such as artificial intelligence and convergence services through the Internet of Things (IoT), state and non-state actors' behaviors in cyberspace have further complicated the international security landscape. In this regard, the Republic of Korea believes that it is essential for the international community to work together to make an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace.

First of all, the Republic of Korea welcomes the productive and ongoing work of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security. The ROK delegation will actively and constructively participate in the deliberations of the OEWG toward a fruitful consensus report.

Second, strongly upholding a rules-based order in cyberspace, the ROK believes that each State should faithfully implement the voluntary, non-binding norms agreed in the 2015 UN GGE report which play an important role in promoting responsible State behavior in cyberspace. Simultaneously, the ROK seeks to clarify and concretize the norms including the principle of due diligence so that each State ensures its diligence not to become a haven of malicious actors.

Third, we believe that the current system of international law, including the UN Charter, is applicable to States' conduct in cyberspace. There are some gaps in its interpretation. For instance, there is no established agreement on what constitutes an armed attack in cyberspace. But the best way to address these gaps is to seek a shared understanding of international law rather than start negotiating a new treaty. Bearing that in mind, the ROK is drafting its position paper on applying international law to cyberspace.

Fourth, it is crucial to develop and implement practical confidence building measures (CBMs). The Republic of Korea believes that the CBMs can limit the risk of conflict deriving from misunderstanding or miscalculation. Indeed, we should continue to develop and implement CBMs to step forward to the peace and stability of cyberspace.

Last but not least, it is important for the international community to place a priority on efforts for capacity building. Malicious actors tend to target developing countries as transit routes for attacks within the global cyber ecosystem. It is crucial that States develop their own defense and resilience capability in cyberspace and support each other to jointly respond to cyber threats. As one of the leading countries in ICTs, the Republic of Korea will continue to actively participate in the efforts to bridge the gap in cyber capacity.

To conclude, the Republic of Korea would like to reaffirm its commitment to contribute to the international community's efforts, including the deliberations at the OEWSG and the GGE, to make a secure and peaceful cyberspace.

Thank you. /END/

Republic of Korea
Cluster 7 (Disarmament Machinery)

Mr. Chair,

In the face of deteriorating international security environment and the COVID-19 pandemic, it is more important than ever that the disarmament machinery of the United Nations continues to serve as a framework for discussing, negotiating, and agreeing on critical international security issues. In this sense, we could see a glimmer of hope in some aspects during the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 2020 despite challenges posed by COVID-19.

First, although the Conference on Disarmament failed again in reaching a consensus on a programme of work in 2020, hope was shed during the Algerian and Argentinian presidency. The Republic of Korea strongly supports in this regard the P6+2 approach taken by this year's six Presidents – the P6 – who have shown cooperative and continuous commitment to working together toward a breakthrough adoption of a programme of work even though it felt short of materializing.

Second, the UN Secretariat was able to provide necessary technical assistance to hold plenary meetings in a “hybrid” setting so that we would not lose both inclusivity and authenticity. We were able to continue to take stock of our discussions on “Making the CD's Rules of Procedures gender-neutral” proposed by Australia, “Participation of Civil Societies in the work of CD” led by Austria, and “New Types of WMDs” suggested by Belarus even under the impact of COVID-19. Moreover, we could make use of this past period to reflect on the *raison d'être* of the CD based on a firm belief that this machinery must carry on its mission regardless of the format. All these efforts mean we do not need to start our work from scratch in 2021. We do hope to build on such groundwork and discussions that we have already built and held.

Now we need to look beyond the pandemic. For multilateralism to continue, we need to apply a fresh lens upon the august body to identify ways to revitalize its work and move forward in disarmament negotiations. In this sense, we need to further narrow down the list of agenda items adopted each year or engage more topical aspects of the core items, focusing on pressing agendas to promote the Conference's effectiveness in addressing current security challenges. Member States could try to reach consensus on non-binding texts first, such as rules, norms and codes of conduct, as a way of advancing substantive discussions on specific items. Establishing subsidiary bodies is also a positive step toward promoting preparatory work for meaningful conversations on core items, as we did in 2018. It would be helpful as well to discuss how to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the CD's current working method.

We cannot afford to waste any more time nor effort in restoring the credibility of the CD. The chance of its success, in this regard, will be readily visible if the CD makes progress in implementing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with considerations to the initiatives outside the CD, such as the Stockholm Initiative and the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND), substantive discussions on risk reduction, and negotiation of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Some of this would need to go a long way in restoring faith in the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

The Republic of Korea stands ready to work with all other Member States committed to proceed with disarmament issues and revitalizing the CD's work. We hope that the entire Membership will work together with a clear set of goals so that the CD can make real and meaningful progress in 2021 and provide the much-needed momentum for a successful outcome of the next NPT Review Conference. We look forward to the active coordination efforts among the P6+2 Presidencies of 2021 and will work closely with them with much flexibility to revive the CD.

(United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research)

The Republic of Korea also believes that the active engagement of civil society and insightful contributions of research institutions can also create a positive momentum in our joint endeavor. In particular, we highly appreciate the role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which marks its 40th anniversary this year, for its contribution to in-depth research across a wide range of disarmament issues, especially by including new areas such as cybersecurity, space, and biological threats, as well as gender issues relating to disarmament. The works of UNIDIR carried out through its research, seminars, networks and publications are meaningful assistance for the CD and for furthering the discourse on disarmament and international security. It is in recognition of this that the Republic of Korea has been a regular funder to UNIDIR's research. Taking this into account, the Republic of Korea will continue to be engaged with its works and continue to contribute to the institute.

On a similar note, my delegation believes that engagement with the young generation can lead to valuable contributions in reviving the disarmament machinery, as young individuals' innovative and forward-looking perspective and input can stimulate the stagnated discussions. Last year, all Member States agreed to adopt a new resolution entitled "Youth, disarmament and nonproliferation" submitted by the Republic of Korea at the 74th session, hoping to bring youth engagement to our attention and to encourage ourselves to seek concrete measures to empower, engage and educate the youth. To enhance such momentum, the Republic of Korea has successfully organized "the 2020 Youth NPT Conference", a youth-led model NPT Review Conference, in July in Seoul and looked at the current status of NPT implementation from youth's perspectives. We will continue to work on such endeavor.

(United Nations Disarmament Commission)

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the sole multilateral disarmament deliberative body for submitting recommendations to the UN General Assembly, could not produce a substantive session last year, and it was again postponed to sometime in 2021 due to COVID-19. The Republic of Korea remains committed to work closely with other nations to ensure that the Commission resumes its work next year.

Lastly, my delegation also welcomes the UN Secretary-General's Disarmament Agenda, which provides us with useful perspectives and ideas. We stand ready to work cooperatively with the Secretariat and other Member States for furthering our work. Thank you. /END/

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Ядерные вооружения»

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Уважаемые коллеги,

Содействие международным усилиям, направленным на скорейшее освобождение мира от ядерного оружия, является одним из приоритетов российской внешней политики. Для достижения этой цели фундаментальное значение имеет Договор о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО), 50-летие вступления в силу которого мы отметили в нынешнем году.

Как государство-участник ДНЯО и один из его депозитариев Российская Федерация неукоснительно соблюдает все положения Договора. На протяжении десятилетий последовательно сокращаем свой ядерный арсенал, а также снижаем роль ядерного оружия в национальной оборонной политике. Оказываем поддержку и делимся своим обширным опытом в сфере развития мирного атома с другими государствами-участниками. Содействуем укреплению системы гарантий МАГАТЭ, обеспечивающей надежную проверку выполнения государствами их обязательств по Договору.

Государствам-участникам следует приложить максимум усилий, чтобы избавиться от проблем, связанных с несоблюдением отдельных положений ДНЯО.

Считаем важным прекратить практику т.н. «совместных ядерных миссий НАТО», проведение которых является нарушением для ядерных государств-членов альянса статьи I ДНЯО, а для неядерных - статьи II.

Отмечаем, что при всей актуальности проблематики ядерного разоружения дискуссии по ней не должны становиться камнем преткновения в коллективных усилиях по укреплению ДНЯО и режима ядерного нераспространения в целом. Ядерное разоружение в соответствии со статьями VI ДНЯО вписано в более широкий контекст всеобщего и полного разоружения и может осуществляться лишь на поэтапной основе при соблюдении принципа неделимости безопасности и учёте всех факторов, влияющих на стратегическую стабильность.

Подчеркиваем важность выполнения решений, принятых в рамках предыдущих обзорных циклов ДНЯО.

Готовы активно взаимодействовать со всеми партнёрами для преодоления сохраняющихся разногласий по ключевым вопросам и стоящих перед международным сообществом проблем, препятствующих дальнейшему укреплению режима Договора.

Придаем особую важность продвижению по пути создания Зоны, свободной от ядерного оружия и других видов ОМУ, и средств его доставки на Ближнем Востоке (ЗСОМУ). Эта тема является одной из самых обсуждаемых на «площадке» ДНЯО. С проведением в ноябре 2019 г. в Нью-Йорке первой Конференции по данному вопросу сделан первый за многие годы практический шаг к созданию ЗСОМУ. Россия активно содействовала её созыву и успешному проведению. Положено начало открытому, инклюзивному диалогу по поиску путей выхода из сложившегося вокруг проблематики ЗСОМУ тупика. Важно, чтобы все ключевые для этого процесса страны подключились к данным усилиям.

Договор о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний (ДВЗЯИ) является одним из ключевых инструментов режима ДНЯО и представляет собой эффективную меру в области ядерного нераспространения и разоружения. К сожалению, открытый для подписания четверть века тому назад Договор до сих пор так и не вступил в силу из-за того, что ратификационные процедуры были осуществлены не всеми государствами из «списка 44». В последнее время и без того непростая ситуация вокруг ДВЗЯИ дополнительно осложнилась ввиду официально провозглашённого отказа от ратификации Договора со стороны США, участие которых имеет принципиальное значение для ДВЗЯИ.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

В последние годы мы являемся свидетелями стремительно деградирующей обстановки в области международной безопасности. При этом система контроля над вооружениями, традиционно служившая

своего рода «страховочной сеткой» для глобальной стратегической стабильности, в настоящий момент переживает беспрецедентный кризис.

На этом фоне не вызывает удивления, что нам всё чаще приходится слышать обеспокоенность со стороны членов мирового сообщества перспективами ядерного разоружения, которые становятся все более неопределёнными.

Россия, как и ранее, готова продолжать вносить весомый практический вклад в освобождение мира от угрозы, которое несет ОМУ, в первую очередь – ядерное. Мы неизменно привержены перспективной цели построения мира, свободного от ядерного оружия, и в полном объёме выполняем свои обязательства по статье VI ДНЯО.

В результате сокращений, проводимых в условиях действия двусторонних договоров с США, суммарный потенциал стратегических вооружений России был последовательно сокращён на 85%. Россия в полном объёме продолжает выполнять свои обязательства по Договору о СНВ 2010 года. К контрольной дате по этому соглашению - 5 февраля 2018 года - мы сократили наш арсенал даже ниже установленных предельных уровней вооружений.

ДСНВ истекает в феврале следующего года. Неоднократно подчёркивали, что выступаем за его продление без предварительных условий. Официальное предложение на этот счёт мы передали США ещё в декабре прошлого года и подтвердили недавно. Убеждены, что продление стало бы разумным шагом, который позволил бы не допустить дальнейшей деградации ситуации в сфере стратегической стабильности, помог бы избежать полного обрушения контрольно-ограничительных механизмов в ракетно-ядерной сфере. Мы смогли бы выиграть время для обсуждения того, как следует выстраивать контроль над вооружениями и военными технологиями в новых условиях, и каков мог бы быть круг участников возможных будущих договорённостей.

Вызывает глубокое сожаление прекращение действия Договора о РСМД в результате выхода из него американской стороны. Причём этот выход был сделан под аккомпанемент безответственной пропагандистской кампании о якобы имевших место «российских нарушениях» Договора, что ни в коей мере не соответствует действительности.

Благодаря Договору о РСМД были ликвидированы два класса ядерных ракет наземного базирования. Теперь же получается, что в договорном плане в области ракетно-ядерного разоружения мир откатывается на 30 лет назад. При этом возникает существенный риск гонки ракетных вооружений в различных регионах. Россия в связи со сломом ДРСМД проявляет максимально ответственный подход. В целях поддержания предсказуемости и сдержанности в данной сфере мы в одностороннем порядке ввели мораторий на размещение наземных ракет средней и меньшей дальности в тех регионах мира и до тех пор, пока там не будут развёрнуты соответствующие вооружения американского производства.

Мы предложили странам НАТО объявить об аналогичном встречном шаге. Конструктивной реакции на эту российскую инициативу не последовало. Тем не менее, взятое Россией на себя обязательство остаётся в силе. По-прежнему считаем мораторий перспективной идеей, которая позволила бы избежать новых «ракетных кризисов» при сохранении возможностей для взаимоприемлемых решений. Призываем всех проявить готовность и политическую волю к диалогу по обеспечению предсказуемости и сдержанности в ракетной сфере.

Со всей ответственностью подтверждаем, что у России не было и нет ракет средней и меньшей дальности наземного базирования. Утверждать обратное – значит создавать заведомо ложную картину и покрывать действия тех, кто несет реальную вину за сложившуюся ситуацию.

Всё российское нестратегическое ядерное оружие – количество которого было сокращено в четыре раза от уровня, которым СССР располагал в 1991 году, - было переведено в категорию неразвёрнутого и остаётся сосредоточенным на центральных базах хранения в пределах национальной территории. На этом фоне у нас не может не вызывать беспокойства сохранение ядерного оружия США на территории неядерных государств Европы и отработка в рамках НАТО практики его применения с привлечением неядерных государств. Мы неоднократно обращали внимание, что такие действия являются прямым нарушением ДНЯО.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Считаем необходимым уделить самое серьёзное внимание развитию дискуссии, в рамках которой можно было бы предметно обсудить все значимые вопросы, имеющие отношение к поддержанию должного уровня международной безопасности и стратегической стабильности на основе принципа равной и неделимой безопасности, без чего было бы затруднительно продвигаться по пути ядерного разоружения. Сюда входят уже упомянутые проблемы, а также такие вопросы, как ничем не ограниченное развёртывание системы глобальной ПРО США, разработка высокоточных стратегических наступательных вооружений в неядерном оснащении, перспектива вывода ударных вооружений в космос, попытки ослабить оборонный потенциал других стран нелегитимными методами экономического давления в обход Совета Безопасности ООН.

Россия открыта к любым идеям о многосторонних переговорных форматах по вопросам предотвращения гонки вооружений, укрепления международной безопасности и стабильности. Исходим из того, что подобные идеи должны реализовываться на основе консенсуса, с учётом законных интересов и озабоченностей всех потенциальных участников. Считаем контрпродуктивными попытки «принуждать» кого-либо к участию в таких дискуссиях с помощью шантажа и угроз и, тем более, создавать здесь искусственные препятствия для развития диалога и взаимодействия по наиболее актуальным на сегодняшний день вопросам.

Считаем контрпродуктивными попытки требовать от ядерных держав безусловного отказа от своих арсеналов без учёта существующих стратегических реалий и их законных интересов в сфере безопасности. Подобные действия противоречат принципам поддержания международной стабильности, равной и неделимой безопасности для всех, ведут к нарастанию противоречий между членами международного сообщества. Поэтому мы считаем ошибкой разработку и продвижение Договора о запрещении ядерного оружия.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

В нынешних условиях как никогда важно сдержанное и ответственное поведение ядерных держав. Именно поэтому мы последовательно выступаем за переподтверждение Россией и США, а также всеми странами ядерной «пятерки» основополагающей формулы о том, что в ядерной войне не может быть победителей, и она никогда не должна быть развязана. Одной из ключевых задач считаем недопущение повторения трагических событий 75-летней давности, когда США подвергли ядерной бомбардировке японские города Хиросима и Нагасаки.

Благодарю за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Другие виды ОМУ»

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Уважаемые дамы и господа,

Конвенция о запрещении разработки, производства, накопления и применения химического оружия и о его уничтожении (КЗХО) вот уже третье десятилетие продолжает оставаться одним из важнейших элементов международной системы разоружения и нераспространения оружия массового поражения. Она обеспечивает решение двух ключевых задач: ликвидации целого класса такого рода оружия и создания прочных барьеров, препятствующих производству, применению и распространению химического оружия. Российская Федерация стояла у истоков создания КЗХО и последовательно выступает за её укрепление. Наша страна добросовестно выполняет обязательства, взятые на себя в соответствии с этим международным договором. Мы еще в сентябре 2017 г. досрочно уничтожили крупнейший в мире арсенал химоружия – порядка 40 тыс. тонн под должным международным контролем. Этот факт был подтвержден Техническим секретариатом Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО). Призываем последовать нашему

примеру США, у которых имеются все финансовые и технологические возможности для скорейшей ликвидации остающихся запасов отравляющих веществ.

Нынешняя ситуация в ОЗХО вызывает серьёзную озабоченность. Сохраняющийся в Организации раскол вследствие политизации её деятельности и навязывания вопросов, выходящих за правовое поле Конвенции, размывание мандата ОЗХО, отход от практики консенсуса и принятие путём голосования неправомερных решений мешают эффективной реализации целей и задач Конвенции и серьёзно вредят репутации Организации как независимого экспертного органа по вопросам химического оружия.

Принятие в июне 2018 года на 4-й спецсессии Конференции государств-участников КЗХО решения о наделении Технического секретариата ОЗХО «атрибутивными» полномочиями по определению виновных в применении химического оружия является неправомερным. Деятельность созданной в развитие этого решения «атрибутивной» Группы ОЗХО по расследованию и идентификации (ГРИ) противоречит КЗХО и вторгается в исключительные прерогативы Совета Безопасности ООН.

Отправной точкой для расследования ГРИ являются доклады Миссии по установлению фактов применения химоружия в Сирии (МУФС), методы работы которой вызывают много вопросов. В своей деятельности МУФС опирается на свидетельства, получаемые дистанционным путём от оппозиционных правительству Сирии групп; расследования проводятся без соблюдения чётко прописанной в КЗХО процедуры последовательности действий при обеспечении сохранности вещественных доказательств (chain of custody), т.е. сбор доказательств только экспертами Миссии на месте происшествия. Есть вопросы и к кадровому составу МУФС, в него в основном входят представители стран Запада и их союзников.

Ярким примером могут служить выводы доклада МУФС по итогам расследования резонансного химинцидента в г. Дума 7 апреля 2018 года. Документ написан в антисирийском ключе для его последующей передачи на рассмотрение «атрибутивного механизма». Заключение отдельных специалистов Миссии о постановочном характере этой провокации, подтверждающие достоверность информации на этот счёт сирийского правительства и российских военных, были проигнорированы, а в основу этого документа легло мнение неких «экспертов», привлечённых со стороны. Попытки разобраться, восстановить истинную картину произошедшего блокируются.

Опубликованный 8 апреля с.г. первый доклад ГРИ по химинцидентам в Аль-Латамне в марте 2017 года с выводами о якобы причастности военно-политического руководства Сирии к этим событиям подтвердил опасения относительно ангажированного характера работы этой структуры. Документ получился крайне предвзятым, необидительным, непрофессиональным и технически недостоверным. Он воспроизводит политически мотивированные методы работы МУФС, а также бывшего Совместного ОЗХО-ООН механизма по расследованиям в Сирии.

Высока вероятность того, что на площадке ООН США и их союзники вынесут проект «карательной» резолюции по Сирии, основанной на выводах по сути сфабрикованного доклада ГРИ. Исходим из того, что принятие на международных площадках санкционных мер в отношении Дамаска, базирующихся на бездоказательных обвинениях в использовании химоружия вооружёнными силами Сирии, категорически неприемлемо.

В СБ ООН и ОЗХО постоянно поступают данные о подготовке сирийскими боевиками очередных хматтак или провокаций. Террористы имеют собственную технологическую и производственную базу по синтезу полноценных боевых отравляющих веществ, а также разветвлённые каналы поставок их прекурсоров. Существует риск рецидивов «химтерроризма» и за пределами Сирии. Поэтому сейчас крайне важно отказаться от политических амбиций и сосредоточиться на противодействии реальной угрозе «химического» терроризма.

Решительно отвергаем безосновательные обвинения со стороны Великобритании в причастности российских граждан к инцидентам с токсичными химикатами в г. Солсбери и г. Эймсбери. Они имеют лишь одну цель - ввести в заблуждение мировое сообщество. Одним из свидетельств этому является отказ Лондона от правового сотрудничества с Россией по «делу Скрипалей». Никаких доказательств Великобритании не представила.

В аналогичном контексте рассматриваем ситуацию вокруг российского блогера А.Навального. Все наши обращения к германской стороне о налаживании взаимодействия, в т.ч. по линии правоохранительных органов и медицинских учреждений, проигнорированы. Вместо этого Берлин решил пойти по пути Великобритании в инспирированном против России «деле Скрипалей», выдвигая голословные обвинения в

жанре «мегафонной дипломатии». При этом игнорируются положения КЗХО, в которых чётко прописаны обязательства государств-участников по взаимодействию для прояснения проблемных вопросов. Всё это только укрепляет наше убеждение в том, что германская сторона не заинтересована в прояснении обстоятельств произошедшего, а вся эта история используется с целью закрепления за Россией образа нарушителя КЗХО для оправдания заранее спланированных в отношении нашей страны санкционных мер.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Прилагаем усилия по укреплению Конвенции о запрещении биологического и токсинного оружия (КБТО), которая должна оставаться надёжным инструментом сокращения угрозы использования биологических агентов в качестве оружия и способствовать развитию международного сотрудничества в биологической сфере в мирных целях.

Эффективность Конвенции может быть обеспечена только посредством выполнения всеми государствами-участниками её положений в полном объёме. Достижению этой задачи способствовало бы принятие юридически обязывающего Протокола к Конвенции с эффективным механизмом проверки.

Призываем эффективно использовать намеченные на декабрь совещания экспертов КБТО в целях рассмотрения конкретных предложений по улучшению осуществления Конвенции и их подготовки к дальнейшему согласованию на Девятой обзорной конференции КБТО в 2021 г.

В данной связи считаем весьма востребованными и российские предложения, пользующиеся широкой международной поддержкой и имеющие практическую направленность. В частности, речь идёт о нашей инициативе по созданию мобильных медико-биологических отрядов для оказания помощи в случае применения биологического оружия, расследования такого применения и содействия в борьбе с инфекционными заболеваниями различного происхождения. Основанная на положительном опыте работы российских специализированных противоэпидемических бригад, в т.ч. их участия в ликвидации эпидемии Эболы в Западной Африке, наша концепция мобильных отрядов позволила бы обеспечить реализацию положений Ст. VII КБТО (помощь и защита от биологического оружия), Ст. X (международное сотрудничество в предотвращении и борьбе с эпидемиями) и Ст. VI (расследование предполагаемого применения биологического оружия).

Мы также предлагаем учредить в рамках Конвенции Научно-консультативный комитет, который будет осуществлять анализ состояния дел в сфере биобезопасности и вырабатывать по просьбе государств-участников рекомендации на этот счёт. Убеждены в своевременности и востребованности этого предложения.

Отмечаем, что в настоящее время режим КБТО подвергается дополнительным испытаниям в связи с наращиванием военной медико-биологической активности некоторых государств за пределами своих национальных границ. В данной связи мы предложили усовершенствовать формат мер укрепления доверия в рамках Конвенции путём включения в форму отчётности информации о ведущейся за рубежом военно-биологической деятельности, чтобы повысить транспарентность и способствовать уверенности в соблюдении КБТО. В принципиальном плане призываем тех, кого это касается, отказаться от милитаризации здравоохранения. Рассчитываем также на активное задействование предусмотренного КБТО консультационного механизма для урегулирования всех вопросов, которые имеются или могут возникнуть в связи с реализацией положений Конвенции.

В условиях отсутствия осязаемого прогресса в деле укрепления КБТО появляются новые идеи, нацеленные на формирование альтернативных механизмов и инструментов, безусловно подрывающих режим Конвенции. Выступаем против так называемых «добровольных оценочных посещений» (peer review) микробиологических объектов двойного назначения, которые призваны «заменить» верификационные меры в рамках КБТО. За этим предложением кроется обширное поле для субъективизма и манипуляций.

Считаем, что все друзья КБТО должны всячески поддерживать идущую в рамках Конвенции межсессионную работу, содействовать сближению позиций делегаций, чтобы ускорить принятие и осуществление мер, способных уменьшить угрозу биологического оружия. Никакой реальной альтернативы такому процессу в рамках международного договора, в котором участвует 183 государства, просто нет. Все решения должны приниматься по результатам переговоров между государствами-участниками.

Любые попытки навязать государствам непонятно кем разработанные проекты в условиях отсутствия транспарентности и инклюзивности абсолютно неприемлемы. Еще более недопустимо переписывание положений КБТО в таком ключевом аспекте как расследования в связи с жалобой какого-

либо государства на нарушение Конвенции, включая возможные утверждения о применении биологического оружия.

В этой связи считаем недопустимыми попытки использовать механизм Генсекретаря ООН (МГС) по расследованию случаев возможного применения хим- и биооружия в ущерб КБТО. Обращаем внимание на необходимость актуализации принципов и процедур МГС. В этих целях мы вносим на рассмотрение 75-й сессии ГА ООН по пункту повестки дня «Всеобщее и полное разоружение» соответствующий проект резолюции.

Призываем государства-члены ООН поддержать данный проект и войти в число его соавторов.
Спасибо за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Космос (разоруженческие аспекты)»

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Космос – достояние всего человечества. В этой связи общей задачей мирового сообщества является обеспечение исследования и использования космического пространства в мирных целях, во благо и в интересах всех стран. Именно этим руководствовались государства-члены ООН, когда в 1978 году на Первой специальной сессии ГА ООН по разоружению закрепили в качестве одной из ключевых мер по разоружению предотвращение гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве (ПГВК) и проведение соответствующих переговоров в соответствии с духом Договора о космосе 1967 года. Указанные цели ежегодно подтверждаются в резолюции ГА ООН по ПГВК, которую Российская Федерация неизменно поддерживает и выступает соавтором.

Вместе с тем вынуждены констатировать усиливающиеся тенденции по пересмотру данных установок, что чревато дестабилизацией ситуации в области безопасности космической деятельности и международной безопасности в целом. В 2020 г. ряд государств продолжил реализацию курса на использование космоса для проведения боевых операций и размещение в космическом пространстве ударных систем вооружений. Причём такая линия закреплена официально в соответствующих национальных доктринальных документах.

Наиболее далеко идущие установки зафиксированы в обновлённой «Оборонной космической стратегии» и доктринальном документе Космических сил США. В них ставится цель достижения военного превосходства (superiority) вплоть до тотального господства (supremacy) в космосе. Космическое пространство рассматривается сугубо как арена ведения боевых действий. Деятельность Космических сил США сфокусирована на повышении готовности к проведению военных операций в космосе, причём не только для сдерживания, но и «принуждения». В качестве их основной цели рассматривается ограничение доступа и свободы действий «противников» в космическом пространстве, а также при необходимости снижение эффективности их военного потенциала как на Земле, так и в киберпространстве.

Более того, речь идёт о проведении как оборонительных (включая активную оборону), так и наступательных (включая действия превентивного характера) военно-космических операций. Для навязывания воли США Космическим силам предписывается применять силу (в т.ч. «для физического уничтожения военного потенциала противника») или угрозу силой в космосе, из космоса или в отношении космоса. Допускается использование военного космического потенциала и для поражения наземных целей в любой точке Земли, т.е. против любого государства.

Параллельно США и их союзники продолжают наращивать потенциал силового воздействия на космические объекты (как кинетического, так и некинетического). В частности, речь идёт об оружии направленной энергии, средствах радиоэлектронной борьбы, а также потенциальном задействовании «спутников-инспекторов» и «спутников-ремонтников» в качестве противоспутниковых средств. Вызывает вопросы нацеленность стран НАТО на вывод в космос в ближайшие годы масштабной группировки малых

спутников. Видим возможность использования данных средств в качестве «космических мин» для нанесения ущерба космическим объектам других стран, включая Россию.

Особого внимания требуют конкретные практические усилия США по созданию группировки ПРО космического базирования (в т.ч. средств перехвата). Соответствующие задачи закреплены в «Обзоре политики США в сфере противоракетной обороны» от 17 января 2019 г.

Подобные установки и действия США, осуществляемые при поддержке и в координации с их союзниками по НАТО, лишь подстёгивают напряжённость между государствами и провоцируют гонку вооружений в космическом пространстве. Уже сейчас абсолютно очевидно, что реализация намерений по выводу оружия в околоземное пространство будет иметь катастрофические последствия для международной безопасности и стратегической стабильности. Это чревато дальнейшей деградацией доверия между государствами, обострением напряжённости, возникновением новых угроз и вызовов, подрывом основополагающих договорённостей в области использования космического пространства, снижением предсказуемости и устойчивости космической деятельности.

Показательным по своему цинизму является то, что осуществляемые усилия по наращиванию военно-космического потенциала и указанные задачи ведения боевых действий в космосе, в т.ч. и в наступательных целях, позиционируются США и их союзниками как якобы соответствующие международному праву и Договору о космосе 1967 г., направленному на использование космического пространства в мирных целях. При этом любые переговоры по юридически обязывающему соглашению по ПГВК блокируются. Вместо переговоров по такому международно-правовому инструменту они предлагают сосредоточиться на разработке неких политически обязывающих, вольно трактуемых стандартов т.н. «ответственного поведения», заточенных сугубо под собственные интересы.

Нужны такие стандарты лишь для очередного разобщения мирового сообщества – политизированного разделения государств на «ответственных» и «безответственных». Параллельно достигалась бы и другая цель – легитимизировалась бы реализация упомянутых ранее доктринальных установок стран Запада по вепонизации космического пространства и проведению боевых операций в космосе под предлогом необходимости урезонивания «безответственных». Уже само начало работы над подобными нормами признавало бы возможность ведения боевых действий в космическом пространстве, а значит – размещения оружия и применения силы или угрозы силой в отношении космических объектов.

Налицо – очевидная попытка ревизии решений Первой спецсессии ГА ООН по разоружению 1978 г., перефокусирования усилий государств-членов ООН с целей ПГВК на разработку правил применения силы в космическом пространстве.

Россия вместе со своими единомышленниками стремится не допустить провоцируемой странами Запада гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве и превращения космоса в арену боевых действий. В последние годы мы выступили с целым рядом инициатив, направленных на решение задачи ПГВК. Ключевой является находящийся на рассмотрении Конференции по разоружению (КР) российско-китайский проект договора о предотвращении размещения оружия в космическом пространстве, применения силы или угрозы силой в отношении космических объектов. К сожалению, из-за нежелания ряда государств во главе с США проявить политическую волю и пойти на компромисс ради укрепления международной безопасности начать предметную работу на КР по данному документу до сих пор не удаётся.

К текущей сессии Первого комитета мы подготовили проект традиционной резолюции ГА ООН «Неразмещение первыми оружия в космосе». Эта резолюция уже оформилась на ооновской площадке в качестве традиционного документа, с 2014 г. ежегодно принимаемого Генассамблеей по инициативе трёх изначальных соавторов – Бразилии, КНР и России. Не подсекая национальных интересов государств, она призвана способствовать мобилизации международного сообщества в поддержку выдвинутой Россией ещё в 2004 г. многосторонней инициативы/политобязательства о НПОК. За последний год, даже несмотря на пандемию коронавируса, к ней присоединилось ещё одно государство – Бурунди. В процессе подписания находятся совместные заявления по НПОК с Мьянмой и Туркменистаном. Таким образом, в самое ближайшее время полноформатных участников станет 25.

Мы вносим также на рассмотрение ставший уже традиционным проект резолюции ГА ООН «Меры по обеспечению транспарентности и укреплению доверия в космической деятельности (МТДК)», который с 2013 г. принимался без голосования при соавторстве России, Китая и США. Однако времена изменились, и США не просто отказались в 2018 г. от коспонсорства, а без каких-либо на то причин кардинально пересмотрели свою позицию по данной резолюции, проголосовав «против». Особенно красноречиво это

выглядит на фоне заблокированной уже второй год, в т.ч. по причине невыдачи властями США американской въездной визы для главы делегации Российской Федерации, работы Комиссии ООН по разоружению, где одним из пунктов повестки дня является проблематика МТДК.

Мы также внесли на рассмотрение Первого комитета проект процедурного решения по дальнейшим практическим шагам по ПГВК.

Рассчитываем, что наши проекты резолюции и решений по космической тематике получат широкую поддержку и соавторство.

Спасибо за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Обычные вооружения»

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Уважаемые коллеги,

Россия, будучи одним из наиболее активных участников Конвенции о «негуманном» оружии (КНО), выступает за дальнейшее укрепление её режима, прежде всего, путём универсализации Конвенции и Протоколов к ней, а также добросовестного выполнения их положений.

Выражаем глубокое сожаление, что в этом году предусмотренные решениями Совещания государств-участников КНО мероприятия (сессии Группы правительственных экспертов государств-участников КНО по смертоносным автономным системам вооружений – ГПЭ по САС, а также совещания экспертов по Дополненному протоколу II и Протоколу V КНО) не состоялись. Причиной тому стала пандемия коронавируса и отсутствие консенсуса среди государств-участников в отношении скорректированных «гибридных» модальностей проведения данных встреч, ограничивающих право делегаций на задействование необходимого количества экспертов в заседаниях.

По-прежнему считаем, что рассмотрение новых тем в рамках КНО должно производиться самым осторожным образом при сбалансированном, взвешенном учёте как гуманитарных озабоченностей, так и законных оборонных интересов государств. Поддержание такого баланса особенно актуально и востребовано на фоне усиливающихся нелегитимных попыток отдельных стран и представителей гражданского общества использовать гуманитарные озабоченности в качестве абсолютного и единственного достаточного условия для введения ограничительно-запретительных режимов в отношении конкретных видов обычных вооружений.

Исходим из того, что нормы международного права, включая международное гуманитарное право, в полной мере применимы к новым технологиям в области САС и не нуждаются в адаптации с учётом специфики данных систем вооружений. В этой связи не видим необходимости в каком-либо юридически обязывающем инструменте по САС и введении запрета или моратория на разработку, применение таких систем и технологий их создания. Считаем преждевременными и дискуссии по «кодексу поведения» в отношении САС. Рассматриваем призывы ряда государств и НПО изменить мандат ГПЭ с исследовательского на переговорный как безосновательные и контрпродуктивные в контексте дальнейшей работы Группы.

В условиях когда отсутствуют действующие образцы таких систем, остаются неопределёнными базовые характеристики и понятийный аппарат САС, налицо значительный разброс в позициях участников обсуждений, поспешные шаги могут нанести ущерб научно-техническому прогрессу в сфере информационных технологий, искусственного интеллекта, мирной робототехники и т.п.

Выражаем готовность продолжить обсуждение данной темы в рамках профильной ГПЭ. Результаты работы Группы подтверждают, что КНО остаётся оптимальной площадкой для рассмотрения проблематики САС.

Внимательно следим и за развитием дискуссии по проблематике применения в густонаселённых районах боеприпасов взрывного действия (БВД). Необходимо с осторожностью подходить к выработке неких «политических деклараций» о запрете данного вида вооружений, которые впоследствии могут быть использованы для дискредитации любых военных операций с применением БВД, а также их классификации на «допустимые» и «недопустимые».

Исходим из того, что международное гуманитарное право (МГП) не нуждается в адаптации к специфике применения БВД. Решение связанных с применением БВД проблем лежит исключительно в плоскости добросовестного выполнения уже существующих норм МГП. Речь, прежде всего, идёт о Дополнительном протоколе I 1977 г. к Женевским конвенциям 1949 г.

Придаём важное значение урегулированию проблемы самодельных взрывных устройств (СВУ), представляющих на данном этапе главную гуманитарную угрозу. Выступаем за продолжение рассмотрения этого вопроса в рамках Дополненного протокола II КНО, в т.ч. путём координации усилий с другими международными инициативами и подходами в этой области, как того требуют профильные резолюции ГА ООН и СБ ООН. Осуществляемая в рамках КНО работа по СВУ должна соответствовать предмету и целям Конвенции.

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Самое серьёзное внимание уделяем проблематике незаконного оборота обычных вооружений. Выступаем за более эффективную реализацию Программы действий ООН по предотвращению и искоренению незаконной торговли лёгким и стрелковым оружием, призванную надёжно купировать переток оружия в нелегальный оборот. Безусловно, эта работа требует скоординированных усилий всего международного сообщества при сохранении центральной роли ООН.

Наряду с этим отмечаем значимость Регистра обычных вооружений ООН как одного из основных механизмов транспарентности и обеспечения международной безопасности посредством отслеживания и выявления дестабилизирующих накоплений оружия в тех или иных регионах мира. В то же время с настороженностью относимся к попыткам ряда стран расширить сферу охвата Регистра, принимая во внимание уже имевшие место прецеденты, когда этот механизм был использован в несвойственных его предназначению целях, в т.ч. при определении параметров оружейного эмбарго, вводимого по линии СБ ООН.

Не скрою, по-прежнему полагаем нецелесообразным присоединяться к Международному договору о торговле оружием в его нынешнем виде, участвовать в проводимых под его эгидой официальных мероприятиях даже в качестве наблюдателей. Установленные Договором стандарты существенно ниже российских. Кроме того, серьёзные вопросы вызывает применение Договора на практике. Недопустимо, когда его отдельные участники продолжают напрямую или опосредованно поставлять продукцию военного назначения в зоны внутренних вооружённых конфликтов.

Спасибо за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ

**Первого заместителя Постоянного представителя
Российской Федерации при ООН Д.А.Полянского
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе голосования по проектам резолюций в разделе
«Другие меры в области разоружения и международной безопасности»**

« » ноября 2020 года

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Сегодня крайне востребована созидательная, конструктивная повестка дня в области контроля над вооружениями, разоружения и нераспространения (КВРН).

Убеждены, что всеобщим интересам отвечает укрепление действующих и выработка на консенсусной основе новых договорных режимов в сфере КВРН. В этих целях вносим проект резолюции «Укрепление и развитие системы договоренностей по контролю над вооружениями, разоружению и

нераспространению». Это хорошо известная и популярная в Генассамблее инициатива, которая в прошлом году была принята практически консенсусом. Призываем поддержать ее и в этом году.

В 2018 г. международное сообщество сделало прорывной шаг к формированию под эгидой ООН первого универсального, инклюзивного, транспарентного и подлинно демократического переговорного механизма по обеспечению международной информационной безопасности (МИБ). Подавляющее большинство государств поддержало идею создания Рабочей группы ООН открытого состава (РГОС), закрепленную в резолюции Генеральной Ассамблеи ООН №73/27 «Достижения в сфере информатизации и телекоммуникаций в контексте международной безопасности».

За период своей работы в 2019-2020 гг. РГОС на практике подтвердила свою уникальность. Эта Группа наделила каждое государство беспрецедентной возможностью участвовать в глобальных переговорах по МИБ на равной основе, высказывать свое мнение в процессе принятия решений в этой сфере вне зависимости от уровня их экономического и технологического развития. Уникальным характеристикам Группы трудно что-либо противопоставить. Вполне закономерно большинство государств, включая даже те, которые голосовали против ее учреждения, уже высказалось за продолжение дискуссии именно в таком формате, который на текущем этапе является наиболее предпочтительным.

В соответствии с этими пожеланиями Российская Федерация внесла в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН обновленный проект резолюции «Достижения в сфере информатизации и телекоммуникаций в контексте международной безопасности». Благодарим государства, выступившие его соавторами. Наш документ выдержан в неконфронтационном ключе. Он объединяет международное сообщество вокруг ключевой идеи – обеспечить непрерывность глобального переговорного процесса по вопросам МИБ под эгидой ООН путем создания новой РГОС по безопасности в сфере использования информационно-коммуникационных технологий (ИКТ) и самих ИКТ 2021-2025.

В ходе переговорной работы по тексту проекта резолюции Россия демонстрировала гибкость и готовность учитывать конструктивные вклады и соображения всех без исключения государств. Скорректированный мандат новой РГОС, на наш взгляд, отвечает «духу времени» и запросу международного сообщества. Будущая группа будет уполномочена рассматривать любые национальные инициативы в области МИБ, ее работа будет носить более структурированный и динамичный характер.

Два года никто из оппонентов идеи РГОС не рисковал ее оспорить. К сожалению, в этом году ситуация кардинально изменилась. В ход идут любые методы, чтобы помешать принятию нашего проекта. Впервые формат РГОС открыто атакуют, стремясь выхолостить из российского проекта резолюции по МИБ его ключевые положения. ОР1 о создании новой РГОС 2021-2025 г. – «сердцевина» нашего проекта, ради которой он и вносится. Ссылаются, в частности на то, что Россия пытается предвосхитить итоги работы нынешней РГОС. Хотелось бы раз и навсегда прояснить, что, будучи автором инициативы о создании Группы в 2018 г., наша страна, вероятно, как никто другой заинтересована в том, чтобы она завершилась успешно. Приложим все усилия для достижения консенсуса по тексту итогового доклада с тем, чтобы представить его Генеральной Ассамблее ООН до завершения ее 75-й сессии. Новая РГОС 2021-2025 начнет свою субстантивную работу только после этого и с учетом рассмотрения итогов деятельности предыдущей группы.

Расцениваем постановку ОР1 на раздельное голосование как конфронтационный и контрпродуктивный шаг, который преследует единственную цель – вернуть международное сообщество в эпоху «клубных договоренностей» наиболее продвинутых в технологическом плане игроков, оставив «за бортом» все остальные страны. Принципиально важно гарантировать будущее переговорного процесса уже сейчас и закрепить апробированный, продемонстрировавший свою эффективность и приемлемый для всех переговорный формат. Учитывая масштабы и динамику нарастания вызовов и угроз в сфере использования ИКТ, мировое сообщество не может позволить себе отложить решение этого вопроса до 76-й сессии ГА ООН и на целый год лишиться универсального переговорного механизма по МИБ.

Сохранение РГОС отвечает интересам каждого государства, которое стремится иметь право голоса в профильной международной дискуссии. Убедительно просим все государства, заинтересованные сохранении открытого и демократичного формата Группы не поддаваться провокации и со всей ответственностью подойти к своей позиции в ходе голосования. Мы рассчитываем, что те страны, которые готовы голосовать за наш проект, то также в ходе голосования поддержат и ОР1. Хотелось бы верить, что государства-члены ООН не предадут идею, за которую сами же выступали в ходе заседаний нынешней Группы.

Не менее тревожны и попытки пересмотреть в преамбуле уже согласованные формулировки о важнейших принципах построения глобальной системы МИБ. Хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что поставленный на раздельное голосование РР 10 дословно взят из резолюции ГА ООН №73/27 от 5 декабря 2018 г., которую поддержали 119 стран. Он предусматривает необходимость предотвращения конфликтов в ИКТ-сфере и применения ИКТ исключительно в мирных целях ради построения сообщества общего будущего. По всей видимости, страна-инициатор, поставившая на голосование целый пассаж и не предложившая каких-либо альтернатив, подвергает сомнению эти важные основы для построения МИБ. Категорически не согласны с таким походом. Убеждены, что уже одобренные международным сообществом формулировки не должны подвергаться ревизии по субъективным причинам.

Неприемлемы также попытки поставить будущее переговоров по МИБ в ООН в зависимость от итогов действующих РГОС и Группы правительственных экспертов, содержащиеся в ОР 6 американского проекта. Выступаем категорически против такого подхода, подрывающего также суверенное право государств выступать с национальными инициативами по МИБ в ООН.

Спасибо за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Региональное разоружение и безопасность»

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Уважаемые коллеги,

Военно-политическая ситуация в мире продолжает ухудшаться. Нас особенно беспокоит то, что происходит в этом плане в Европе. Официальный антироссийский курс Североатлантического альянса «размывает» изначальный фундамент, на котором были построены и функционировали европейские режимы и инструменты безопасности.

Так, тысячи военнослужащих НАТО на так называемой «непрерывной ротационной основе» появляются там, где их никогда не было – вблизи российских границ. Логистическая инфраструктура европейских стран перестраивается под переброску ещё больших сил и средств. Возросли масштабы и интенсивность учений с явно провокационными сценариями, в том числе с участием стратегической авиации и предполагающими применение ядерного оружия. Продолжается экспансия блока на Балканах. Некогда стабильные в военном отношении регионы Северной Европы и Балтики все больше начинают напоминать прифронтовые зоны. Нарастает военная деятельность Североатлантического альянса в Черном море. Создаются все новые межвидовые контингенты, предназначенные для проецирования силы.

Считаем необходимым использовать все возможности для снижения напряжённости и активизации сотрудничества.

В условиях, когда Договор об обычных вооружениях в Европе изжил себя, значение мер доверия и безопасности не только сохраняется, но и становится крайне важным.

Осознаём особую значимость для европейской безопасности выполнения Венского документа (ВД-2011). В порядке доброй воли впредь намерены продолжать информировать государства-участники о проведении внезапных проверок боеготовности, учений, приглашать на них в качестве наблюдателей военных атташе иностранных государств.

Подтверждаем негативное отношение к идее модернизации ВД. В условиях конфронтации и курса НАТО на «сдерживание» России даже техническое переиздание этого документа не имеет смысла. Для укрепления безопасности нужно не сдерживание, а сдержанность.

По-прежнему считаем Договор по открытому небу (ДОН) важным элементом укрепления безопасности. С сожалением относимся к решению США выйти из ДОН под предлогом «нарушений» Договора Россией. Отмечаем, что действия Вашингтона вписываются в линию на разрушение всего комплекса договорённостей в области контроля над вооружениями и наносят ущерб системе европейской

безопасности. Свои дальнейшие шаги в отношении ДОН будем выстраивать в зависимости от действий партнёров.

В качестве важной меры доверия, направленной на деэскалацию военной напряжённости и уменьшение угрозы, рассматриваем «структурированный диалог» по вызовам безопасности в Европе. Встречи в этом формате, на наш взгляд, весьма полезны. Тематическая направленность дискуссий в целом затрагивает вопросы, которым необходимо уделять первостепенное внимание. Это, прежде всего, деэскалация, снижение военного противостояния, восстановление отношений по военной линии. Озвучены предложения, требующие дополнительного анализа. Продолжим своё участие в «структурированном диалоге».

Поддерживаем роль ОБСЕ в содействии урегулированию конфликтов. Со своей стороны продолжим способствовать их разрешению в Донбассе, Приднестровье и Нагорном Карабахе. Хотелось бы подчеркнуть, что Россия не является стороной никаких конфликтов на пространстве ОБСЕ и в мире.

В целом приходится констатировать, что при существующем дефиците доверия ожидать существенного продвижения в сфере контроля над обычными вооружениями в Европе не приходится.

Консолидация США, НАТО и ЕС на позициях противостояния с нашей страной и их возврат к политике «сдерживания», а по сути – «отбрасывания» России, беспрецедентное политическое и экономическое давление, разрыв сотрудничества по военной линии – всё это идёт вразрез с установками ОБСЕ по формированию общеевропейского пространства безопасности.

Переломить эту опасную тенденцию – общая задача всех заинтересованных государств.

Россия готова к конструктивной работе на этом направлении на основе принципов равноправия, взаимного уважения и учёта законных интересов безопасности друг друга.

Благодарю за внимание.

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
в ходе тематической дискуссии по разделу
«Разоруженческий механизм»

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Уважаемые коллеги,

В это непростое время, когда современный мир проходит через этап глубокой трансформации, усиливается турбулентность во всех областях общественной жизни, крайне опрометчиво подвергать ревизии и расшатывать выстраиваемую десятилетиями международную архитектуру контроля над вооружениями. Глубокий кризис продолжает распространяться на все компоненты разоруженческого механизма ООН. Повсюду – отход от предметного диалога и политизация дискуссий. Именно нам с вами под силу сплотиться и приложить максимум усилий по сохранению и усовершенствованию, в соответствии с требованиями современных реалий, системы договорённостей по контролю над вооружениями, разоружению и нераспространению (КВРН).

В связи с этим Российская Федерация вносит на рассмотрение 75-й юбилейной сессии ГА ООН проект резолюции «Укрепление и развитие системы договоров и соглашений по контролю над вооружениями, разоружению и нераспространению». Наш проект выдержан в духе объединительной, позитивной повестки дня и нацелен на консолидацию мирового сообщества вокруг необходимости сохранения и совершенствования существующей архитектуры КВРН. Мы обращаемся ко всем государствам-членам ООН с призывом полного и строгого выполнению, а также сохранения целостности действующих соглашений в этой области. Ещё раз хочу подчеркнуть важность повышения надёжности и эффективности системы КВРН, поддержания атмосферы доверия, без чего невозможно заключение новых профильных договорённостей.

Призываем государства-члены ООН поддержать данный проект и войти в число его соавторов.

Уважаемый господин Председатель,

Отводим ООН и её многостороннему разоруженческому механизму центральную роль в рассмотрении вопросов КВРН и международной безопасности, как это и задумывали отцы-основатели Организации 75 лет назад. Задачи укрепления действующих и разработка новых режимов в области контроля над вооружениями должны решаться в рамках разоруженческого механизма ООН на предназначенном для этого переговорном форуме – Конференции по разоружению (КР). Каждый из компонентов разоруженческой «триады» – Первый комитет ГА ООН, Комиссия ООН по разоружению (КОР), Конференция по разоружению – призван ответственно и эффективно выполнять возложенные на него функции.

В этом году деятельность разоруженческого механизма ООН подверглась серьёзному испытанию в связи с пандемией коронавируса. Введены серьёзные ограничения на деятельность делегаций в штаб-квартире ООН и Отделении ООН в Женеве, количество очных заседаний сокращено, большинство мероприятий переведено в виртуальный формат или перенесено на 2021 год. Всё это неизбежно будет сказываться на деятельности ооновской разоруженческой «триады». Несмотря на все сложности и издержки в этой связи, российская делегация подтверждает готовность к самому активному участию в работе ПК, КР и КОР.

Однако наблюдающиеся в рамках разоруженческого механизма ООН кризисные явления вызваны далеко не только ограничениями в связи с COVID-19. 74-я сессия ГА ООН продемонстрировала дальнейший рост политизации дискуссий по КВРН, отход от предметного диалога, а также попытки стран Запада во главе с США превратить площадку ООН в инструмент давления на «неудобных».

Впервые за многие годы США привнесли в работу ПК идеологическую составляющую, разделив государства-члены на «демократические», якобы укрепляющие систему КВРН, и «автократические», которые, мол, нацелены на её демонтаж. Считаем это крайне опасным шагом, направленным на разобщение мирового сообщества и отвлечение его внимания от реальных проблем международной безопасности, вызванных деструктивными действиями США.

Дополнительным деструктивным фактором в контексте работы ПК и Комиссии ООН по разоружению являются противоправные действия властей США по невыдаче виз ведущим экспертам российской делегации. Вашингтон грубо нарушает свои обязательства по Соглашению 1947 г. о штаб-квартире ООН и игнорирует ряд ключевых положений резолюции ГА ООН [74/195](#). Развязанный Вашингтоном «визовый беспредел» привёл к тому, что второй год подряд работа КОР остаётся заблокированной. Призываем американских коллег вернуться в нормальное русло уважительного межгосударственного диалога и взаимодействия в соответствии с Уставом ООН и соглашением о приёме на территории США штаб-квартиры ООН.

Постепенная деградация ситуации в области КВРН диктует необходимость совместных действий всех государств, осознающих свою ответственность за поддержание международного мира и безопасности. Со своей стороны, продолжим прилагать усилия по повышению эффективности и согласованности действий ПК, КОР и Конференции по разоружению. Для реализации этой цели необходимо возобновить обстоятельный диалог по наиболее важным профильным вопросам повестки дня и деполитизировать дискуссии.

В связи с этим хотелось бы ещё раз напомнить о нашей конструктивной инициативе, представленной в марте 2016 г. в целях преодоления двадцатилетнего застоя в переговорной работе на Конференции. Необходимо безотлагательно приступить к разработке международной конвенции по борьбе с актами химического и биологического терроризма. Таким образом был бы запущен переговорный процесс на КР в соответствии с имеющимся мандатом.

Работа Первого комитета ГА ООН, КР и КОР должна быть нацелена на результат и осуществляться в полном и безусловном соответствии с Уставом ООН, другими нормами международного права и определёнными для них полномочиями. От нас, как государств-членов ООН, требуется обеспечивать необходимые условия для полноценного функционирования разоруженческой «триады» ООН. Для этого необходимо строго следовать мандатам её площадок и избегать политизации в ущерб поиску консенсусных решений актуальных проблем КВРН. Только принцип консенсуса может обеспечить подлинную многосторонность в разоружении и учёт интересов безопасности всех вовлечённых сторон.

Необходимы незамедлительные совместные действия всех государств, осознающих свою ответственность за поддержание международного мира и безопасности. Именно сообща следует приложить дополнительные усилия по повышению эффективности и согласованности действий элементов разоруженческого механизма ООН. Всем нам важно проявить политическую волю в нахождении общеприемлемых развязок.

Благодарю за внимание.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Nuclear Weapons»

Distinguished Mr. Chairman,

Distinguished colleagues,

The promotion of international efforts aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons as soon as possible is one of priorities of Russian foreign policy. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), whose fiftieth anniversary since its entry into force we have celebrated this year, is fundamental for achieving this goal.

As a State Party to the NPT and one of its depositories, the Russian Federation strictly complies with all provisions of the Treaty. For decades, we have been consistently reducing our nuclear arsenal, as well as diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national defense policy. We provide assistance and share our extensive experience in the field of peaceful nuclear energy development with other States Parties. We contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system, which ensures reliable verification of States' compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

States Parties should make every effort to address problems related to non-compliance with certain provisions of the NPT.

We consider necessary to put the end to the practice of the so-called NATO "nuclear sharing", that is a violation of Article I and Article II of the NPT nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states members of the Alliance respectively.

We note that despite the urgency of nuclear disarmament issues, related discussions should not become a stumbling block in the collective efforts to strengthen the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in general. Nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, is integrated into the broader context of general and complete disarmament and can only be carried out on a step-by-step basis, while complying with the principle of indivisible security for all and taking into account all factors affecting strategic stability.

We stress the importance of implementing the decisions adopted during past NPT review cycles.

We are ready to cooperate actively with all partners in order to overcome remaining differences on key issues and challenges facing the international community that hinder further strengthening of the Treaty regime.

We attach particular importance to the progress in the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMD in the Middle East (MEWMDFZ). This topic is one of the most debated within the framework of the NPT. The first Conference on this issue which was held in November 2019 in New York became the first practical step towards the establishment of the MEWMDFZ in many years. Russia actively contributed to its convening and successful holding. An open and inclusive dialogue to break the stalemate around the MEWMDFZ issues has been launched. It is important that all key countries to this process are engaged in these efforts.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a crucial instrument of the NPT regime and constitutes an effective measure in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Unfortunately, the Treaty, which was opened for signature a quarter of a century ago, still has not entered into force since not all of the Annex 2 States have implemented ratification procedures. Recently, the official refusal of the United States to ratify the CTBT, whose participation is essential to the CTBT, has further complicated the already difficult situation around the CTBT.

Mr. Chairman,

In recent years, we have witnessed a rapidly deteriorating situation in international security environment. At the same time, the arms control system, which has traditionally served as a kind of “safety net” for global strategic stability, is now experiencing an unprecedented crisis.

Against this background, it is no surprise that we hear more and more concerns from members of the international community about the prospects for nuclear disarmament, which are becoming increasingly uncertain.

Russia, as before, is ready to continue making a significant practical contribution towards a world free from the threat posed by WMD, nuclear in the first place. We remain committed to the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and fully implement our obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

As a result of reductions carried out under bilateral treaties with the United States, the overall capacity of Russian strategic arms has been consistently reduced by 85 percent. Russia continues to fully comply with its obligations under the New START Treaty. By the Treaty’s control date, February 5, 2018, we had reduced our arsenal even below the established central limits.

The New START Treaty will expire in February 2021. We have repeatedly emphasized that we support its extension without preconditions. Our official proposal in this regard was submitted to the United States back in December last year and repeated recently. We are convinced that the extension would be a reasonable step that would allow preventing further deterioration of the situation in the area of strategic stability and would help avoid total collapse of control and limitation mechanisms in nuclear and missile sphere. We could gain time to discuss how arms control and control on military technology should be organized in new environment, and who could be a part of possible future arrangements.

The termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) as a result of the U.S. Side’s withdrawal is deeply regrettable. Moreover, this withdrawal was made against the background of a reckless propaganda campaign regarding alleged “Russian violations” of the Treaty, which is by no means true.

Two types of ground-based nuclear missiles have been eliminated under the INF Treaty. Now it turns out that in terms of the Treaties in the field of nuclear and missile disarmament the world rolls back 30 years. At the same time, there is a significant risk of a missile arms race in different regions. Russia shows the most responsible approach with regard to the INF Treaty collapse. In order to ensure predictability and restraint in this area, we unilaterally imposed a moratorium on the deployment of intermediate- and shorter-range ground-based missiles in those regions of the world until similar U.S.-manufactured weapons are deployed there.

We have invited NATO countries to declare a similar reciprocal step. There has been no constructive response to this Russian initiative. Nevertheless, the commitment made by Russia remains valid. We still consider the moratorium to be a promising idea that would allow us to avoid new “missile crises” while keeping opportunities for mutually acceptable solutions. We call on everyone to show readiness and political will for a dialogue on ensuring predictability and restraint in the missile sphere.

We affirm with all responsibility that Russia did not have and does not have intermediate- and shorter-range ground-based missiles. To claim otherwise means to create a deliberately false picture and cover the actions of those who bear the real blame for the current situation.

All Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, the number of which has been reduced by four times compared to the level the USSR had in 1991, have been turned into non-deployed category and remain located at centralized storage facilities within the national territory. Against this background, we cannot but be concerned about the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon states of Europe and the training of their use within NATO with involvement of non-nuclear-weapon states. We have repeatedly drawn attention to the fact that such actions constitute a direct violation of the NPT.

Mr. Chairman,

We believe it necessary to devote the utmost attention to building upon a discussion to consider in detail all significant issues related to maintaining an adequate level of international security and strategic stability based on the principle of equal and indivisible security for all. Without such a consideration it would be difficult to make progress on a nuclear disarmament path. This includes the already mentioned problems, as well as such issues as the unconstrained deployment of the U.S. global missile defense system, development of high-precision strategic offensive non-nuclear weapons, the prospective deployment of strike weapons in outer space, attempts to weaken

the defensive potential of other countries by illegitimate methods of economic pressure bypassing the UN Security Council.

Russia is open to any ideas with regard to multilateral negotiation formats to prevent an arms race and strengthen international security and stability. We believe that such ideas should be implemented on the basis of consensus, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all potential participants. We consider as counterproductive any attempts to “force” someone to participate in such discussions through blackmail and threats and, even worse, to create artificial obstacles for the development of dialogue and interaction on the most pressing issues of today.

We believe that attempts to demand that the nuclear-weapon states abandon their arsenals unconditionally, without taking into account current strategic reality and their legitimate interests in security area, are counterproductive. Such actions run counter to the principles of the maintenance of international stability, equal and indivisible security for all, and lead to growing divisions between members of the international community. We, therefore, consider development and promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons to be a mistake.

Mr. Chairman,

Under current circumstances, restraint and responsible behavior on behalf of nuclear-weapon states is more critical than ever. That is why we have consistently advocated the reaffirmation by Russia and the U.S., as well as by all P5 countries, of the fundamental formula that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. We believe that it is one of the key tasks to prevent a recurrence of the tragic events of 75 years ago, when the United States used nuclear bombing against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Thank you for your attention.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Other Weapons of Mass Destruction»

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) is now in its third decade as one of the most important elements within the international system of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It addresses two key issues: the elimination of an entire class of weapons of this kind and the establishment of firm barriers against the production, use, and proliferation of chemical weapons. The Russian Federation was at the origin of the CWC and has consistently supported its strengthening. Our country has faithfully fulfilled its obligations under this international treaty. Back in September 2017, we destroyed the world’s largest arsenal of chemical weapons – around 40,000 tonnes – ahead of schedule and under proper international control. This fact was certified by the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We encourage the United States to follow suit as it has all financial and technological capacities to eliminate its remaining stockpiles of toxic substances as soon as possible.

The current situation within the OPCW gives rise to serious concern. Continuing split within the Organization caused by the politicization of its activities and imposing on the Organization of matters outside the legal framework of the Convention, delusion of the OPCW mandate, departure from the practice of consensus, and adoption of illegitimate decisions by vote – all this presents the effective achievement of goals and objectives of the Convention and seriously damages the reputation of the Organization as an independent expert body on chemical weapons.

The adoption in June 2018 at the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties of the decision to vest the OPCW Technical Secretariat with attributive powers to identify those responsible for the use of chemical weapons is illegitimate. Activities of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) (“attribution team”) established as a follow-up to this decision are contrary to the CWC and are infringing on the exclusive prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council.

IIT investigation is based on reports by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) in Syria, whose methods of work raise many questions. In its activities, the FFM relies on evidence obtained remotely from groups opposed to the Syrian Government; investigations are conducted without following a clear chain of custody procedure specified

in the CWC, i.e., the collection of evidence only by Mission experts on site. We also have questions about the staffing of the FFM which mainly includes representatives of Western countries and their allies.

Conclusions of the Mission's Report on the investigation of the high-profile chemical incident in Douma on April 7, 2018, are a striking example. The document was written with an anti-Syrian attitude for subsequent submission for review by the "attribution mechanism". Opinions of some of FFM experts who believe that this provocation was staged and confirm the credibility of information in this regard provided by the Syrian Government and the Russian military, were ignored, and the document was based on the opinion of some outside "experts". Attempts to get things straight, restore the actual events are blocked.

The first IIT report on incidents in Ltamenah in March 2017, published on April 8, 2020, containing conclusions of the alleged involvement of Syrian military and political leadership in these events confirmed the fears that the work of the team is politicized. The document turned out to be highly biased, unconvincing, unprofessional, and technically unreliable. It replicates politically motivated working methods of the FFM and the former OPCW-UN Joint Investigative Mechanism.

It is highly probable that the United States and its allies will use the UN platform to introduce a draft punitive resolution on Syria based on the conclusions of the IIT report that was essentially fabricated. We believe that the introduction of sanctions against Damascus on international platforms based on unsubstantiated accusations of the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Armed Forces is absolutely unacceptable.

The United Nations Security Council and the OPCW receive recurring evidence of the preparation of new chemical attacks and provocations by Syrian militants. Terrorists have their own technological and production capacities to synthesize actual warfare agents, as well as extensive supply chains for their precursors. There is a risk of recurrent chemical terrorism outside Syria as well. Therefore, it is now crucial to abandon political ambitions and focus on countering the real threat of chemical terrorism.

We strongly reject ungrounded accusations by the United Kingdom of the involvement of Russian citizens in the incidents with toxic chemicals in Salisbury and Amesbury. Their only goal is to mislead the international community. One evidence of this is London's lack of legal cooperation with Russia on the Skripal case. The UK has yet to present any evidence.

We view the situation regarding Russian blogger Alexei Navalny similarly. All our requests to the German side to engage in cooperation, including between law enforcement authorities and medical institutions, have been ignored. Rather, Berlin decided to follow the path Great Britain has adopted in the Skripal case orchestrated against Russia, by making groundless accusations in "megaphone diplomacy" style. At the same time, they ignore CWC provisions that specify States Parties' obligations to cooperate in order to clarify concerns. All of the above only strengthens our conviction that the German side is not interested in clarifying the circumstances of the incident, and this whole story is used to strengthen the public perception of Russia as a violator of the CWC to justify sanctions planned against our country beforehand.

Mr. Chairman,

We are making all the efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons (BWC) which remains a reliable instrument to eliminate threats of biological agents used as weapons and promote international cooperation in the biological field for peaceful purposes.

The effectiveness of the Convention can be ensured only by the full implementation of its provisions by all States Parties. A legally binding protocol to the Convention with an effective verification mechanism will contribute to the achievement of this objective.

We call upon all the Parties to take full advantage of the BWC Meetings of Experts scheduled for December in order to explore specific proposals with a view to improve the implementation of the Convention and prepare for further consideration at the Ninth BWC Review Conference in 2021.

In this regard the Russian proposals that enjoy wide international support and are action-oriented and relevant. In particular, we can refer to our initiative to establish mobile biomedical units to provide assistance in case of an alleged use of biological weapons for the purpose of investigating such use, and assistance in coping with the infectious diseases of various origins. Our concept of mobile units, based on the positive experience of Russian specialized anti-epidemic teams, including their participation in dealing with the Ebola epidemic in West Africa, would contribute to the implementation of the provisions of the BWC article VII (assistance and protection

from biological weapons), article X (international co-operation in preventing and combating epidemics), and article VI (investigation of the alleged use of biological weapons).

We also propose to establish a scientific advisory committee under the Convention which mandate is to analyze the state of affairs related to biosecurity issues and make recommendations in that regard upon the request of States Parties. We are convinced that our proposal is timely and relevant.

We acknowledge that the BWC regime is currently being subjected to further challenges due to expanding military medico-biomedical activities of some States beyond their national borders. In this regard we have suggested refinements to a format of confidence-building measures under the Convention by inclusion in a reporting form data regarding biological military activities abroad in order to increase transparency and enhance confidence in compliance with the BWC. As a matter of principle we call upon Parties concerned to refrain from the militarization of public healthcare. We also count on the engagement of the consultation procedures established by the BWC to resolve all existing and potential issues related to the implementation of the BWC provisions.

While there is no visible progress in strengthening the BWC new ideas emerge aimed at shaping alternative arrangements and schemes that clearly undermine the Convention regime. We oppose so-called voluntary “peer reviews” of dual-use microbiology facilities designed to substitute BWC verification measures. Behind those manipulations one can see a wide window for subjective and speculative interpretations. We believe that all friends of the BWC should in every possible way support intersessional work carried out under the Convention in order to help converge positions of delegations and accelerate adoption and implementation of measures that could reduce the threat posed by biological weapons. There is no real alternative to this process in the framework of an international treaty with 183 States Parties. All decisions should be taken on the basis of the outcome of negotiations among States Parties.

Any attempts to impose on States schemes developed by some “unknown” in the absence of transparency and inclusiveness are absolutely unacceptable. Even more unacceptable is an attempt to rewrite BWC provisions in its key aspect related to investigations upon a complaint by a State with regard to an alleged violation of the Convention including possible use of biological weapons.

Therefore, we consider attempts to use the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons to the detriment of the BWC to be unacceptable. We would like to draw attention to the need to update principles and procedures of the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism. To that end we introduce to the UNGA 75th session a relevant draft resolution under the agenda item “General and Complete disarmament”.

We call upon all UN Member States to support and co-sponsor the draft.

Thank you for your attention.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)»

Mr Chairman,

Outer space is the common heritage of humankind. In this regard the objective for the world community is to ensure the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, for the benefit and in the interest of all countries. Guided by that very understanding as of back to 1978, the first UNGA Special session on disarmament determined the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and the launch of relevant negotiations in accordance with a spirit of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty as one of the key disarmament measures. The said objectives have been annually reaffirmed by the UNGA resolution on PAROS permanently supported and co-sponsored by the Russian Federation.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Conventional Weapons»

Mr. Chairman, Colleagues,

Being among of the most active Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) Russia stands for further strengthening of its regime, above all, via universalization of the Convention and its Protocols as well as full implementation of their provisions.

We deeply regret that the events preplanned by the decisions of the Meeting of the CCW High Contracting Parties – MHCP (session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems – GGE on LAWS, and meetings of experts under the Amended Protocol II and Protocol V) have not taken place. The reason is the COVID pandemic and the lack of consensus among the Parties regarding «hybrid» format of the meetings that restricted the right of delegations to be adequately represented in the meeting room by a number of experts needed.

We still call to exercise the utmost caution when introducing new topics in the framework of the CCW taking into account the balance between humanitarian concerns and the legitimate defense interests of States. The maintenance of such a balance is particularly relevant and required against the background of growing illegitimate attempts of certain countries and civil society activists to present humanitarian aspects as the only absolutely sufficient condition for imposing restrictions and prohibitions on specific types of conventional weapons.

We proceed from the fact that norms of international law including international humanitarian law fully apply to emerging technologies in the area of LAWS and there is no need to adapt those to specifications of weapon systems in question. In this regard, we see no grounds to elaborate a legally binding instrument on LAWS containing a ban or a moratorium on development and use of such systems and related technologies. Any discussions on a «code of conduct» with respect to LAWS we consider also to be premature. So, the calls by a number of States and NGOs to change the GGE's research mandate to a negotiation one are baseless and counterproductive for its further work.

While prototypes of such systems are non-existent and LAWS basic characteristics and conceptual frameworks remain uncertain and, moreover, there is a considerable divergence in positions among State Parties any precipitate steps may only damage scientific and technological progress in areas related to information technology, artificial intelligence, peaceful robotics, etc.

We are ready to continue the discussion on LAWS in the GGE. The results of the Group's work confirm that the CCW remains the best venue for further consideration of LAWS issues.

We follow closely evaluation of the discussion on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA). One has to be cautious when it comes to elaboration of some «political declarations» on the prohibition of the weapons in question that may be used in the future under this pretext in order to discredit any military operation that employ explosive weapons as well as to divide those weapons into categories of «acceptable» and «unacceptable».

In our view, there is nothing that can justify any adaptation of international humanitarian law to specifics of explosive weapons' use. Any related issues can be solved exclusively through faithful implementation of already existing norms of international humanitarian law, first of all, of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

We attach great importance to the solution of the problem of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which are currently a major imminent humanitarian threat. We advocate for further consideration of issue in the framework of CCW Amended Protocol II including coordination of efforts with other international initiatives and approaches in this sphere, as required by relevant UNGA and UNSC resolutions. The ongoing work on IEDs within the CCW should be consistent with the subject and purpose of the Convention.

Mr. Chairman,

We pay the greatest attention to the issue of trafficking in conventional weapons. We stand for a more efficient implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in

Small Arms and Light Weapons, which aims to reliably curb arms trafficking. Certainly, this work will require concerted efforts of the entire international community with the UN playing the central role.

In addition, we note the importance of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms as one of the chief mechanisms for ensuring transparency and international security through tracking and detection of destabilizing stockpiles of arms in certain regions of the world. At the same time, we are cautious about attempts of a number of States to expand the scope of the Register, taking into account the past precedents when this mechanism was applied for purposes it is not meant for, such as by establishing the parameters of the arms embargo imposed by the UN SC.

I have to admit, we still believe it is inadvisable to accede to the Arms Trade Treaty in its current form and participate, even as observers, in official events held under its auspices. The Treaty-established standards are way below the Russian ones. Besides, the application of the Treaty in practice raises serious questions. It is unacceptable for its individual Parties to keep on supplying military products directly or indirectly to the zones of internal armed conflicts.

Thank you.

However, we have to note the trend that is gaining strength towards revision of those goals leading to destabilization of the space security activities as well as the international security in general. In 2020 some states pursued policies aimed at using the outer space for combat operations and deployment of strike weapons systems. Those policies are already officially enshrined in relevant national doctrines.

The most far-reaching ones are contained in the US's renewed Defense Space Strategy and the Space Force Doctrine. The documents set out the objective of achieving military superiority to the extent of absolute supremacy in outer space which they regard only as a theater of a battlefield. The US Space Force' activities are focused on enhancing space combat capabilities for both deterrence and "enforcement" operations. The US identified as a primary goal the restriction of "adversaries'" access and freedom of actions in outer space and, where and as necessary, degrading the effectiveness of their military capabilities both on Earth and in cyberspace.

Furthermore, the US and their allies aim for conducting both defensive (including so called active defense) and offensive (including preventive measures) space military operations. To impose its will on others the US Space Force is instructed to use force (including "physical destruction of an adversary military capabilities"), or threat of use force in, from or with regard to outer space. There is also a possibility to use US space military assets to destroy ground targets at any location on Earth, i.e. against any state.

Simultaneously, the US and its allies continue to build up their capabilities including kinetic and non-kinetic means to be engaged against outer space objects. This refers, *inter alia*, to directed energy weapons, electronic warfare systems, and potential application of inspection and servicing satellites in their capacity of antisatellite weapons. NATO countries' determination to deploy a large constellation of small satellites in outer space in the next few years cannot be but a question. We are aware that these systems can be used as "space mines" to affect the damage to space objects of other countries including Russia.

The US's specific practical actions aimed at building a space-based BMD echelon (including interceptors) require particular attention. Relevant objectives are set out in the US Missile Defense Review of 17 January 2019.

Such US's guidelines and actions pursued with support from and in coordination with its NATO allies only aggravate tensions among relations of the states and provoke an arms race in outer space. It is already crystal-clear that the realization of the intention to place weapons in outer space will have disastrous consequences for international security and strategic stability. This will lead to further degradation of trust between states, exacerbation of tensions, emergence of new threats and challenges, disruption of fundamental agreements in the area regarding the use of outer space as well as much lowered predictability and long term sustainability of outer space activities.

The most vivid example of such a cynicism is the fact that actions to build military space capabilities and the related space warfare missions, including those intended for offensive operations, are presented by the US and its allies as no more than allegedly consistent with international law and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty that promotes only peaceful uses of outer space. Any negotiations on a legally binding PAROS agreement are being blocked. Instead of negotiations on this kind of an international legally binding instrument, our opponents (US) prefer to focus on developing some politically binding and freely interpreted rules of the so-called "responsible behavior" designed to serve their own interests.

Those considerations only seek to further divide the world community – through a politicized discrimination of states into “responsible and irresponsible”. At the same time such ones legitimize the above-mentioned doctrinal provisions of Western countries aimed at weaponizing outer space and space warfare under the pretext of confronting those qualified as “irresponsible”. By starting the work on such considerations we would admit the very possibility of warfare in outer space, and consequently the use of force or threat of the use of force against outer space objects.

We are facing a clear attempt to revise the decisions of the first UNGA Special session on disarmament in 1978, refocus efforts of the UN Member States from pursuing the PAROS objectives towards elaborating rules for the use of force in outer space.

Russia and like-minded nations work together to prevent the arms race in outer space provoked by Western countries as well as the transformation of outer space into a battlefield. Over the recent years we have proposed a number of initiatives aimed at implementing the PAROS goals. The key initiative is the Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects which is currently subject to consideration at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Regrettably, since a number of states led by the US are reluctant to show political will and agree to a compromise for the sake of enhancing international security, the CD so far can not commence the substantive work on the text of the treaty.

For the current First Committee session we have prepared the traditional UNGA draft resolution “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. Since 2014 this resolution has proved itself as an on-going practice within the UN platform and has been annually adopted by the UNGA, on the initiative of its three initial co-sponsors: Brazil, China and Russia. Far from affecting national interests of any state, the resolution seeks to mobilize the international community for support of the multilateral initiative/political commitment on PAROS proposed by Russia as far as in 2004. Over the past year, despite the coronavirus pandemic, another state – Burundi – has joined the initiative. Joint statements on PAROS with Myanmar and Turkmenistan are about to be signed. This will bring the number of full participants up to 25.

We also submit for consideration of the FC another traditional UNGA draft resolution “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBMs)” which had been adopted without a vote since 2013 and was initially co-sponsored by Russia, China, and the USA. Yet, times changed and in 2018 the US refused not only to co-sponsor the resolution, but for no reason at all radically revised its stance on the resolution by voting against it. This looks especially eloquent given the fact that the work of the UN Commission on Disarmament which has space TCBMs as one of the items on its agenda has been blocked for two years due to, among other things, the non-issuance of the entry visa by the US authorities to the head of the Russian delegation.

We hope for wide support and co-sponsorship of our draft resolutions on outer space.

Thank you.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Regional Disarmament and Security»

Mr. Chairman,

Colleagues,

The military and political situation in the world continues to deteriorate. We are particularly concerned by the developments in Europe. The official anti-Russian policy of the North Atlantic Alliance “erodes” the original foundation on which European security regimes and instruments were built and functioned.

Thousands of NATO military appear on a so-called “continuous rotational basis” where they have never been – near Russia’s borders. The logistics infrastructure of European countries is being redeveloped to accommodate even larger deployments. The scale and intensity of exercises with clearly provocative scenarios, including with strategic aviation and those involving the use of nuclear weapons, have grown. NATO’s expansion in the Balkans continues. Once militarily stable regions of Northern Europe and the Baltics increasingly resemble front-line zones. Military activity of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Black Sea region is expanded. New joint (multi-service) forces have been growing in number to project power.

We believe it is necessary to use all opportunities to reduce tension and enhance cooperation.

At a time when the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is obsolete, security- and confidence-building measures not only remain important but become critical.

We understand the significance of the implementation of the Vienna Document (VD 2011) for European security. Acting in good faith, we intend to further inform the participating States about unannounced operational readiness inspections, and exercises, and invite military attachés of foreign States to attend them as observers.

We reaffirm our negative attitude to the VD modernization. In circumstances of confrontation and NATO's policy of "containing" Russia, even technical re-issuing of the document has no sense. Security strengthening requires restraint rather than containment.

We still deem the Treaty on Open Skies (OST) an important element of security strengthening. We regret the US decision to withdraw from the OST under the pretext of Russia's "violations" of the Treaty. We note that Washington's actions feed into the policy aimed to destroy the entire regime of arms control agreements and undermine the European security system. Our further steps relating to the OST will depend on our partners' steps.

We believe that "structured dialogue" on security challenges in Europe is an important confidence-building measure to de-escalate military tensions and reduce threat. In our view, meetings in this format are rather useful. In general, themes of discussions cover issues that need to be prioritized: first of all, de-escalation, military disengagement, and re-establishment of military-to-military relations. Proposals voiced require further analysis. We will continue to participate in the "structured dialogue".

We support the OSCE's role in promoting conflict settlement. For our part, we will further facilitate resolution of conflicts in Donbas, Transdniestria and Nagorny Karabakh. We would like to underline that Russia is not a party to any conflict throughout the OSCE space or the world.

On the whole, it should be noted that, given the current deficit of trust, no significant progress can be expected in conventional arms control in Europe.

The consolidation of the US, NATO and the EU basing on their positions of confrontation with our country and their return to the policy of "containment", and in fact of "discarding", of Russia, an unprecedented political and economic pressure, and breakdown of military cooperation are all contrary to the OSCE policy to build a pan-European security space.

The common objective for all States concerned is to reverse this dangerous trend.

Russia is ready for a constructive work in this area basing on the principles of equality, mutual respect and consideration of each other's legitimate security interests.

Thank you.

STATEMENT
by the Representative of the Russian Federation
in the First Committee of the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly
at the Thematic Debate on «Disarmament Machinery»

Mr. Chairman,
 Colleagues,

At these uneasy times, when the modern world passes through deep transformations faces growing turbulences in every public sphere, it would be rather thoughtless to revise and degrade the international arms control architecture which has been constructed over decades. The deep crisis continues to affect all components of the UN disarmament machinery. There one witnesses the retreat from a substantive dialogue and politicization of discussions everywhere. It is for you and us together to stand up and join efforts in order to do utmost to preserve and improve the system of agreements on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in accordance with the needs of today's world.

To that end, the Russian Federation submits for consideration of the 75th anniversary UNGA session a draft resolution "Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties

and agreements”. Our resolution is made in a spirit for unifying a positive agenda and aimed at consolidating the world community for a need to preserve and improve the existing architecture of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We encourage all UN Member States to strictly and fully implement existing agreements in this area and maintain their integrity. Once again, I would like to stress once again the importance of enhancing the reliability and effectiveness of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation system and maintaining the atmosphere of trust which are essential for reaching new pertinent agreements.

We invite all UN Member States to support and co-sponsor this draft resolution.

Mr. Chairman,

In our view, the central role in considering issues of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation must be put to the UN and its multilateral disarmament machinery as the founding fathers of the Organization determined 75 years ago. The issues of strengthening of the existing and developing new arms control regimes should be decided within the framework of the UN disarmament machinery, particularly at a dedicated negotiation forum – Conference on Disarmament (CD). Each component of the disarmament “triad” – the UN GA First Committee, UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and Conference on Disarmament – is called upon to perform its mandated functions in a responsible and effective manner.

This year, the activity of the UN disarmament machinery has been challenged by the COVID-19 pandemic. Serious restrictions have been introduced in relation to the work of the delegations at the UN Headquarters and UN Office at Geneva. The number of in-person meetings was decreased with most events to be held online or rescheduled for 2021. All those measures will inevitably affect the activities of the UN disarmament “triad”. Despite all those difficulties and delays the Russian delegation confirms its readiness for the most active participation in the work of the First Committee, UNDC and CD.

However, crises within the UN disarmament machinery have not been caused only by the restrictions due to COVID-19. The 74th UNGA session demonstrated the further politicization of discussions on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, backtracking from the substantive dialogue and attempts of Western countries headed by the US to transform the major UN forum into a tool for pressuring those who are considered by some to be “undesirable”.

For the first time in many years, the US introduced an ideological factor into the First Committee dividing the UN Member States into “democratic”, allegedly strengthening the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation system, and “autocratic” which allegedly intend to dismantle it. We consider it to be an extremely dangerous step with a view to further disunite the world community and distract its attention from real international security problems caused by the US destructive actions.

An additional destructive factor in the context of the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission is the US Government’s unlawful denial of visas to the leading experts of the Russian delegation. Washington flagrantly violates its obligations under the 1947 Agreement on the UN Headquarters and ignores a number of key provisions of UNGA resolution [A/RES/74/195](#). The “visa havoc” unleashed by Washington led to the UNDC being blocked for the second consecutive year. We urge our American colleagues to get back to a normal mutually respectful inter-State dialogue and cooperation in accordance with the UN Charter and the Agreement regarding the UN Headquarters in the US.

Gradual deterioration of the situation in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation calls for joint actions of all States that are aware of their responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. For our part, we shall continue to make efforts for greater effectiveness and coherence of the First Committee, UNDC and Conference on Disarmament. To that end it is necessary to resume the substantive dialogue on the most important agenda issues and depoliticize discussions.

In this regard we would like once again to remind of our constructive initiative presented in March 2016 to overcome a 20-year-old deadlock in the negotiation work of the Conference. It is necessary to start without delay

the elaboration of an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism. Such a step would help re-launch the negotiation process at the CD in accordance with its existing mandate.

The work of the UNGA First Committee, UNDC and CD should be result-oriented and carried out in full and unconditional conformity with the UN Charter, other norms of international law and their mandates. As the UN Member States we all have to provide the desired conditions for a full-fledged functioning of the UN disarmament “triad”. To that end it is necessary to strictly adhere to the mandates of its fora and avoid politicization in a way for finding consensus solutions to ongoing problems of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Only the principle of consensus can ensure real multilateralism in disarmament with due regard to the security interests of all States involved.

There is a need for prompt actions of all States that realize their responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. We together should make further efforts to increase the effectiveness and coherence between actions the components of the UN disarmament machinery. It is important that we all show political will when seeking generally acceptable solutions.

Thank you all for the attention.

**Statement submitted by
The Permanent Mission of Saint Lucia to the United Nations
On behalf of
The Caribbean Community
(CARICOM)
On the thematic cluster
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
In the First Committee
75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly
New York
October 30, 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

It is my honour to deliver these remarks on behalf of the fourteen Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) on the cluster – Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Mr. Chairman,

The perilous times in which we are living has brought about multiple threats to our survival. The COVID-19 pandemic is indeed a catastrophe in and of itself. Notwithstanding this contemporary threat, we are also mindful of the effect that the pandemic places on international peace and security. That said, CARICOM continues to denounce the use of weapons which in a single occurrence will cause widespread loss of lives, as well as severe environmental damage. Such occurrences jeopardize our goal of achieving sustainable development and can also have severe humanitarian impacts.

In that regard, CARICOM reiterates its full support for the Chemical Weapons Convention and for the work undertaken by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We applaud the progress made in eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles since the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention 23 years ago and we are convinced that the Convention has made an important contribution towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

As we have stated before in other forums, the use of chemical weapons under any circumstance is unjustifiable. The use of such weapons results in dire human and environmental consequences and we must ensure that any use of chemical weapons is fully and impartially investigated, and that the perpetrators are held accountable. We are of the view that these investigations can contribute to the further strengthening of the norms against the use of chemical weapons. It is also an important step that can contribute to bringing redress to the victims of such heinous acts.

We view the Convention as an important instrument for the maintenance of peace and security. We encourage the remaining states that have neither signed nor ratified the Convention, to join the other State parties to the Convention, to attain universal adherence. Rest assured of the support of our delegations for full compliance with the provisions of the Convention.

Additionally, we welcome the ongoing efforts to strengthen cooperation between key stakeholders in compliance with the objectives set forth by the Chemical Weapons Convention. We also commend the OPCW for continuing its mandate, particularly on verification and capacity-building support, in spite of the new challenges as a result of the global pandemic.

Mr. Chairman,

Conflicts continue to be waged with a variety of other weapons of mass destruction. CARICOM also reaffirms our support for the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.

45 years after its entry into force, we consider that the constructive and consistent engagement on issues relating to the Biological Weapons Convention is very important at this juncture, given that the developments in science and technology are increasing the possibilities for the acquisition, access to and use of biological weapons, including by non-state actors.

We welcome the advances made in the implementation of the Convention. Notwithstanding, for the full and effective implementation of the Convention, it is incumbent that national level measures complement those that are taken at the regional and international levels. As we have stated in the past, we share the view that it is important to investigate any alleged use of biological weapons and to quickly detect any illegal acts as it can serve as a deterrent to these harmful uses.

Furthermore, we are of the view that multilateral cooperation will help us achieve the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and against the use or threat of use of such weapons, as well as minimizing the risk of humanitarian consequences from their use. In that vein, we welcome the convening of the Ninth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to be held in 2021.

Mr. Chairman,

Climate change remains the greatest challenge for our region. The socio-economic and health impacts of COVID-19 are additional challenges which we must confront. We are also mindful that our porous maritime and land borders can create added challenges to our peace and security. In that sense, we are concerned about the increasing challenges posed to international peace and security by terrorists and other non-state actors, particularly their possession of any type of weapon of mass destruction.

To this end, CARICOM has worked towards the elaboration of a CARICOM Counter Terrorism Strategy, which was undertaken in collaboration with the United Nations. We welcome such joint endeavors that will assist in maintaining peace and security.

Despite the challenges which we encounter, we are committed to fulfilling our obligations in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540.

Mr. Chairman,

We are at a critical juncture where we must save lives today, but also safeguard our peace and security. In conclusion, I take this opportunity to reiterate CARICOM's commitment once again to the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and for our common goal of maintaining international peace and security.

I thank you.

SINGAPORE

STATEMENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) FOR THE 75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DEBATE ON CLUSTER FIVE: OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

This statement is made on behalf of the ten Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.

2. The COVID-19 pandemic has amplified the importance of new technologies, as many aspects of our daily lives have moved online. Digital transformation presents tremendous benefits and opportunities for people everywhere. At the same time, this growing dependency on digital platforms has increased our exposure to cyber attacks. The pervasive and constantly evolving nature of cyber threats requires coordinated expertise from multiple stakeholders across different domains and across borders, to effectively mitigate threats, build trust, and realise the benefits of technology. No government can deal with the growing sophistication and transboundary nature of cyber threats alone. Regional collaboration is imperative. To this end, ASEAN has taken the following steps:

3. First, ASEAN established a Cybersecurity Coordinating Committee this year to promote cross-sectoral and cross-pillar cooperation to strengthen cybersecurity in the region. The Coordinating Committee will promote policy coherence across different sectors, and enhance the alignment of regional cybersecurity policy, while taking into account national operational considerations.

4. Second, ASEAN recognises the importance of continuing dialogue and cooperation, especially during this pandemic. The 5th ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC) was held virtually in October 2020, and noted the progress made in the development of a long-term regional action plan to ensure the effective and practical implementation of the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms recommended by the 2015 Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security (GGE). ASEAN Member States also highlighted the importance of taking practical steps to enhance the cybersecurity of our region, and the urgent need to protect national and cross-border Critical Information Infrastructure, especially in light of cybersecurity threats posed by the current COVID-19 pandemic.

5. Third, ASEAN believes that we should continue coordinating cyber capacity-building programmes. Our capacity-building programmes should be aimed at equipping us with the policy, operational, and technical capacities to implement the 2015 GGE norms, but also to level up the region's cyber capacities as a whole. This common goal drives the work of the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence in Singapore and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre in Thailand.

6. ASEAN reaffirms that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, underpins an open, secure, stable, accessible, interoperable, and peaceful Information and Communications Technology environment. ASEAN recognises the importance of implementing the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms recommended by the GGE and the need to further develop, on the basis of consensus, voluntary and non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. In this regard, ASEAN reaffirms that the UN must continue to play a central role in discussions on cybersecurity, and such discussions must remain open and inclusive, where the views of all are taken into account. ASEAN is committed to supporting the progress of both the Open-ended Working Group on the developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG) and the GGE. We look forward to meaningful and positive outcomes that will strengthen international cooperation on this vital issue.

7. Finally ASEAN will remain committed to working with all stakeholders towards a peaceful, secure, and resilient cyberspace that will serve as an enabler of economic progress, enhanced regional connectivity, and the betterment of living standards for all.

STATEMENT BY SINGAPORE AT THE 75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON CLUSTER ONE: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1 Singapore remains committed to our common goal of establishing a world free of nuclear weapons. 75 years after the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world is still faced with the ongoing threat of nuclear weapons. Despite the progress in reducing Cold War nuclear arsenals, the world's combined inventory of nuclear warheads remains at a very high level. The international community must renew its collective commitment to safeguard and strengthen the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture, and pledge to continue dialogue, implement confidence-building measures, reduce the size of nuclear arsenals, and exercise utmost restraint.

2 Singapore believes that there are several concrete steps that we can take to advance nuclear disarmament.

3 First, States must maintain and strengthen their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. With 2020 marking the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT, Singapore reiterates our commitment to the objectives and the three mutually enforcing pillars of the NPT. Even as it works towards the universalisation of the NPT, the international community must also find a way to involve nuclear weapon possessing states that fall outside the ambit of the NPT in disarmament discussions. The Tenth NPT Review Conference has been postponed to 2021 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. States should use this time to lay the groundwork to ensure a successful outcome of the Tenth Review Conference. This is particularly important as the third Preparatory Committee in 2019 was unable to adopt a set of recommendations for the Tenth Review Conference. States must redouble their efforts to overcome the divisiveness and mistrust between Nuclear Weapon States and non-Nuclear Weapon States, as part of our collective efforts to uphold the legitimacy and relevance of the NPT.

4 Second, the international community must continue to work towards the early entry into force of the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). A universal and effectively verifiable Treaty constitutes a fundamental instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Singapore urges all States to remain seized of this issue at the highest political level, and calls on all States that have already signed and ratified the CTBT to refrain from actions that go against the object and purpose of the Treaty, pending its entry into force.

5 Third, Singapore supports the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, as practical steps under Article VII of the NPT. We encourage efforts to achieve genuine and lasting peace in a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East through open and constructive dialogue involving all relevant parties. In the Southeast Asian region, Singapore reaffirms our commitment to the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. We look forward to the signing and ratification of the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty by the Nuclear Weapon States without reservations.

6 Fourth, Singapore supports the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology as provided for under the NPT. To this end, Singapore reaffirms the central role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in maintaining nuclear safety and security. The IAEA has done commendable work in safeguards verification, capacity building, and providing assistance to Member States. We call on Member States to continue to uphold and fulfil their commitments to the IAEA. Technical cooperation remains an integral part of the IAEA's work. Singapore will continue to play an active and constructive role, and looks forward to continuing our strong cooperation with the IAEA, including renewing our Third Country Training Programme with the Agency.

7 Finally, other useful initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), that can complement and contribute to efforts at achieving our goal of nuclear disarmament should be supported. Singapore has hosted three multi-national maritime interdiction exercises under the PSI. Our support for this initiative demonstrates our commitment to strengthen international cooperation to disrupt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their related material.

8 In conclusion, Singapore is committed to working with all Member States in building a culture of trust, collaboration and open dialogue, towards a safer, more secure and better future for all.

STATEMENT BY SINGAPORE AT THE 75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON CLUSTER FOUR: CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

1 Singapore fully supports international efforts to curb the illicit production, trafficking, and trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). A critical element is the full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in All Its Aspects (PoA) and its International Tracing Instrument. We regret that the 2018 Third Review Conference on the PoA could not achieve a consensus outcome. The Seventh Biennial Meeting of States of the PoA (BMS7) has also been postponed to 2021 due to COVID-19. We urge States to engage constructively and make genuine progress in the implementation of the PoA, and towards a successful outcome at the BMS7. All Member States must also strengthen our export control regimes, cross border controls, and relevant legislation. Singapore maintains a robust regime and legislation for export control. We will remain committed to fully implementing our international obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

2 Singapore will also continue contributing to global efforts to establish common international standards in the conventional arms trade. We strongly support transparency in international arms transfers, and have submitted annual national reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) since 1993, including on SALW, to fulfil the seven-plus-one formula. We were honoured to contribute to the discussions of the 2019 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on UNROCA on keeping the voluntary reporting instrument relevant and in step with technological developments. The UNROCA is an important confidence-building measure that will strengthen trust between Member States. Singapore signed the Arms Trade Treaty in December 2014, and we are currently undertaking the necessary domestic reviews to our national framework and legislation to ensure its full implementation.

3 Finally, Singapore is committed to supporting international initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions, and conventional weapons. We recognise the impact they can have on innocent civilians, and we have consistently supported relevant UN resolutions and international initiatives under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons, the Ottawa Convention, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Singapore has also imposed an indefinite moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.

4 All Member States must fulfil their international obligations to curb the illicit trade and the indiscriminate use of conventional weapons. The sovereign right of States to acquire weapons for the right of self-defence and for responsible law enforcement must also be respected. Singapore emphasises our commitment to working with the international community to prevent and regulate the diversion and illicit trade of conventional SALW to achieve a safer and more secure world for all.

STATEMENT BY SINGAPORE AT THE 75TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DISCUSSION ON CLUSTER FIVE: OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

1 Singapore is a small country, and we rely heavily on the global digital architecture to drive our social and economic activities. Any disruption would result in severe consequences. There has been no other event in recent history that has emphasised the importance of digital technology more than the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, the increasing dependency on ICT networks has been accompanied by increased risks and vulnerabilities. Malicious cyber activities remain a real threat. A successful attack on Critical Information Infrastructure would have far-reaching consequences. It is critical for the international community to engage in capacity-building programmes and constructive dialogues in order to bolster cybersecurity. Trust and cooperation remain pertinent.

2 First, we are only as strong as our weakest link. Every citizen in every Member State has to be part of this collective global effort. As a small but highly connected country, Singapore has taken steps to protect our networks and promote a secure ICT environment. In 2016, Singapore launched our national cybersecurity strategy. Building on one of the four key pillars of our 2016 strategy, we recently launched a Safer Cyberspace Masterplan to raise the general level of cybersecurity in Singapore for individuals, communities, enterprises, and organisations.

The Masterplan aims to secure core digital infrastructure, safeguard cyber activities through the early detection of threats, and empower our people to adopt good cyber hygiene practices.

3 Second, beyond national borders, regional and international cooperation remain critical to countering cyber threats. To build regional capacity and strengthen collaboration, ASEAN has an active series of mechanisms for cybersecurity cooperation, including the ASEAN Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy, the ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity, the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence in Singapore, and the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre in Thailand. Strong regional networks are pillars for strong international cooperation, where countries exchange best practices, coordinate capacity-building programmes, and advance confidence-building measures. In October 2020, Singapore convened the 5th Singapore International Cyber Week (SICW) virtually to ensure that despite the pandemic, substantive conversations among global policy makers, thought leaders, and industry experts would continue.

4 Third, our national and regional efforts must feed into a common, rules-based multilateral order in cyberspace. This is where the UN plays a central role in the development of international norms and rules in cyberspace. There is agreement that international law and the provisions of the UN Charter apply in cyberspace. Building on this foundation, Member States are undertaking important and constructive work through both the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace in the context of international security (GGE) and the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the context of international security (OEWG). As the issues and threats evolve, it is critical that we maintain an open, transparent, and inclusive format where the views of all Member States are taken into account. We also need to maintain channels for the views of other stakeholders such as operational specialists, industry, and non-profit organisations, to feed into the global dialogue.

5 Everyone has a stake in the global commons. We are all united in our common goal of an open, interoperable, secure, stable, accessible, and peaceful cyberspace. We can only realise the full benefits of a common and connected digital future by working together. We urge Member States to engage in good faith and focus on pragmatic ways to make progress, especially in the many areas where there is broad convergence. Singapore will remain committed to engaging with all stakeholders to achieve meaningful and concrete outcomes.

**STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA
DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

Chairperson,

South Africa associates itself with the statements delivered on behalf of the African Group, the Non-Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition.

Chairperson,

This year we convene for the First Committee Session against the backdrop of the 75th anniversary of the United Nations, we also mark the 75th anniversary of the tragic and horrible events which occurred 75 years ago in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Although these unwarranted events occurred 75 years ago they remain a constant reminder of the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapons whether they were to be detonated by mistake or intention. And as the late South African struggle icon and then President of the ANC, Oliver Reginald Tambo inscribed in the Guest Book at the Hiroshima memorial on 23 April 1987, *"History chose the city of Hiroshima to tell the world never again to go to war; never ever to abandon the struggle for peace. The tragic story of Hiroshima told in this painful museum is a guide to present and future generations if mankind and our planet is to be saved from complete obliteration."*

Seventy-five years after the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is not far from entry-into-force since adoption in 2017. This is testimony of the concerns of the international community with regard to nuclear weapons. It finally bans the only category of weapon of mass destruction not yet to be subject to a global prohibition, following the example of the existing conventions proscribing biological and chemical weapons, and it does so with a pronounced humanitarian approach. On this basis we once again congratulate the 84 countries that signed and the 46 that have ratified the Treaty, bringing it even closer to entry-into-force. We take this opportunity to encourage States that have not done so, to please sign and ratify the TPNW to ensure its early entry into force.

Chairperson,

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone for non-proliferation and disarmament and complimented by other numerous international and regional instruments, such as the CTBT and the TPNW. We, therefore, attach greater importance to the continued validity of the outcomes of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, as well as the extensive Action Plan aimed at accelerating the implementation of all Treaty provisions under the three Treaty pillars. However, urgent action is required to fully implement the commitments and undertakings entered into at these Review Conferences.

It is therefore important that we find ways and means to materialize the convening of the 2020 NPT Review Conference next year and trust that it will yield all the desirable outcomes for the sake of humanity. In this connection, we wish to recognize the 50th Anniversary milestone of the NPT this year.

Article VI of the NPT is continually undermined by the weapon modernisation programmes and in this regard more needs to be done particularly by nuclear weapon States in the area of nuclear disarmament. South Africa reiterates its belief that concrete progress on these solemn undertakings is essential to the success of the 2020 RevCon. We reiterate that the goals of the NPT can never be achieved if it is seen only as a means to protect the security concerns of a few countries at the expense of humanity at large. This merely encourages proliferation, contradicts nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments, and ultimately undermines the Treaty.

Chairperson,

It is equally important for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to remain a priority for the international community. Such a Treaty should serve both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament objectives and would need to be both credible and feasible. A ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would reinforce the ideals enshrined in the NPT and complement the CTBT, as well as the TPNW.

Finally Chairperson, we once again stress that, nuclear weapons are inhumane weapons, and it is inconceivable that their use, under any circumstance, could ever be consistent with international law, particularly international humanitarian law. Nuclear disarmament is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral and ethical imperative. It is with this in mind that my delegation has the honour to again table for consideration a resolution entitled “Ethical Imperatives for a world without nuclear weapons” which we hope will again receive wide support.

I thank you.

**STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA
DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

October 2020

Chairperson,

For my delegation, the total elimination of all weapons of mass destruction remains one of South Africa’s key foreign policy priorities.

South Africa reiterates her position to oppose the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances and is fully committed to its international obligations as a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. We call upon the States that are not yet part of the Convention to join as soon as possible, as we all have collective responsibility to ensure a safe world, free of chemical weapons and to uphold the international norm against the production, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons established under the CWC.

Chairperson,

Allow me to reiterate the support of my delegation for the work of the *Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons* (OPCW).

The OPCW is the only technically competent international authority in the field of chemical weapons and the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) must have full confidence in its work, including that there is no political interference. It is equally imperative that States are held accountable for any non-compliance with their obligations and that the relevant multilateral instruments governing chemical weapons are not politicised.

South Africa remains concerned about the continued polarisation in the Policy Making Organs of the OPCW, leading to the frequent adoption of decisions through a vote and not by consensus as it was the practice in the past. We therefore urge caution in preserving the integrity of the OPCW as an objective and impartial organisation.

My delegation takes stock of the progress achieved under the Fourth Phase of the Programme to Strengthen Cooperation with Africa and eagerly looks forward to attaining tangible and measurable actions under the Fifth Phase of the OPCW Programme for Africa that could lead to concrete outcomes in the continent. We commend the Secretariat for the establishment of the Steering Committee for this Programme which aims at enhancing its implementation.

South Africa also underlines the importance of the promotion of capacity-building and international cooperation for the benefit of States Parties through the transfer of technology, knowledge, material, and equipment for peaceful purposes. This year the COVID-19 pandemic has made it difficult to engage in meaningful technical exchanges but we remain committed to continue working with the OPCW to strengthen collaboration to foster better training opportunities for Africa in the future.

South Africa reiterates its resolve to have an OPCW Designated Laboratory that will be able to enhance international cooperation by performing off-site analysis of chemical samples collected by OPCW inspectors from chemical production facilities, storage depots and other installations, or from the site of an alleged use of chemical weapons.

Chairperson,

My delegation continues to call for a greater gender and geographical balance in the workforce of the OPCW Technical Secretariat. South Africa values improved gender representation in the organisation, in particular at the senior level, but also calls for intensified action in order to address the still outstanding geographical balance in the organisation, in particular from African states.

Chairperson,

This year marks the forty-fifth anniversary of the entry into force of the *Biological Weapons Convention*, the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. The COVID-19 pandemic has showed the world how vulnerable we all are to the devastating human and economic consequences of biological threats.

South Africa welcomes the work of the BWC and the build-up to the Convention's *Ninth Review Conference* in 2021. This Conference represents an opportunity to address the new biological threats facing the world today and to consider how to adapt this unique Convention to future challenges. South Africa has proactively contributed to this work through our chairing, on behalf of NAM, of the Meeting of Experts on Strengthening National Implementation and by reporting on its work to the Meeting of State Parties in 2019. South Africa will continue to work constructively towards an outcome in 2021 that will strengthen the Convention and its balanced implementation so that all countries are equipped to prevent and respond to the possible use of biological weapons.

Finally, my delegation would like to underscore that the universalisation of the BWC and the CWC is crucial for the effective eradication of all biological and chemical weapons. We call upon those countries not yet party to these Conventions to join without further delay.

I thank you.

STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON OUTER SPACE

October 2020

Chairperson,

The benefits of outer space and its exploration for peaceful purposes cover everything from agriculture to zoology. Space-based systems deliver information and services that protect lives and the environment, enhance prosperity and security, and stimulate scientific, industrial and economic development.

The African Union adopted its *African Space Policy and Strategy* with a view to ensuring space science and technology serve as a key driver for inclusive and sustainable development in Africa. As part of this strategy the AU concluded, amongst other, that critical spacial information derived from the use of space based products and services could have contributed to the Continent better achieving the Millennium Development Goals and that remains essential in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. As Africa seeks to grow a space programme that will harness the potential of space science to address the Continents socio-economic challenges and opportunities, co-operation amongst all Member States in respect to accessing the mutually beneficial and peaceful uses of outer space remains essential.

Chairperson,

In view of the vast benefits provided by the outer space environment, is our obligation as responsible space stakeholders to ensure that outer space and other celestial bodies remain an area for exclusively peaceful purposes. It is of the utmost importance for my delegation that space does not become yet another frontier for war and conflict. It is self-evident that the weaponisation by one actor would be followed by others, thereby creating an environment ripe for an arms race in outer space. Beyond the vast waste of resources that this would entail, the weaponisation of space would result in a proliferation of space debris, which remains an issue of concern to all of us. The weaponisation of space will also undoubtedly undermine international and national security.

South Africa therefore believes we should take preventative action now. It is on this basis that an integral component of our efforts to sustain outer space as an area for exclusively peaceful purposes is the need to adopt preventative measures to ensure that space does not become an arena for conflict. We believe that in order to achieve the widest possible adherence to such rules and norms, open and transparent multilateral processes are necessary to ensure that States can participate without discrimination and on the basis of equality.

Chairperson,

It is in this context, that South Africa reiterates its support for the draft Treaty presented by China and Russia in the *Conference on Disarmament* (CD) on the *Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects* (PPWT). This proposal could serve as a useful basis for further discussions in terms of the elements and scope of future legally-binding instruments.

We regret that the *Group of Governmental Experts* (GGE) to consider and make recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on PAROS was not able to produce recommendations which could have contributed to the earliest possible commencement of negotiations in the CoD on a legally-binding instrument or instruments on PAROS.

We likewise consider it important for the *United Nations Disarmament Commission* to be able take up substantive work, including on practical measures to implement transparency and confidence building measures in outer space, when it resumes its session.

I thank you.

STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA ON THE UNGA75 FIRST COMMITTEE THEMATIC DEBATE ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

Chairperson,

We have all witnessed and experienced the dramatic and tragic effects that the COVID-19 pandemic has had on the world this year. It has also had a profound impact on the work of the United Nations, including on our work in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

As with all deliberations across the disarmament spectrum, we have experienced similar challenges in the area of conventional weapons. This will see a number of the annual UNGA draft resolutions and decisions taking the form of roll-over texts, with minimal amendments. This is understandable, given the fact that few updates can be incorporated. However, this does not mean that we are resorting to inaction.

We should continue to promote the implementation and universalisation goals that we aspire to with the international conventional weapons instruments to which we subscribe and adhere to with our continued and combined commitment.

In this regard, South Africa continues to support the full implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and its Annexed Protocols, the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).

The recent Sixth Conference of States Parties to the ATT, though limited to being held in written format, was nonetheless important as we were able to note this major conventional arms control instrument's further global universalisation. It is South Africa's hope that with the accession of China to the ATT, other major conventional arms producers, possessors and traders will be encouraged to do the same.

It is disappointing that the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects has had to be postponed to July 2021. However, we are encouraged that this deferral may pave the way for a successful Review Conference in 2024 and reinvigour our efforts to eradicate the scourge of the illicit trade in these weapons.

The illicit proliferation of conventional arms, exacerbated by, amongst others, inadequate or weak national arms control systems contributes to crime, conflict and as a result, has huge destabilising effects across societies. Weak national arms control systems run a serious risk of being exploited and of the diversion of Government controlled arms into the illicit arms trade.

National implementation efforts also run the risk of further constraints by the lack of international cooperation and assistance. These measures on international cooperation and assistance are cornerstones of the Arms Trade Treaty, the UN Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument.

It is worth highlighting that the African Union's theme for the year 2020: "Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa's Development" is a fundamental precondition for achieving our Continental priorities of Agenda 2063. The year 2020 also fittingly marks the 20th anniversary of the Bamako Declaration on small arms and light weapons (SALW), the first ever African continental initiative to address the scourge of illicit SALW, adopted by the then-OAU on 1 December 2000.

The African Union Master Roadmap identifies a number of obstacles such as the persistence of illicit transfers and illegal arms transactions as constituting serious threats to the African peace and security agenda.

In conclusion, South Africa continues to encourage the empowerment of women, including through capacity-building efforts to participate in the design and implementation of efforts related to the field of international peace and security. It is our hope that others will join us in contributing to a better understanding of gender based violence and the inclusion of women in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

**STATEMENT BY SOUTH AFRICA
DURING THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON THE DISARMAMENT MACHINERY**

October 2020

Chairperson,

South Africa believes that each part of the disarmament machinery plays an essential part within their respective mandates to achieve the world which was envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. Against the backdrop of an increasingly complex international peace and security environment, and in the face of trans-national and trans-discipline challenges, it becomes even more essential for the disarmament machinery to be able to engage in substantive work.

Chairperson,

We share the frustration and concerns of many Member States about the inaction in the *Conference on Disarmament* (CD) in 2020 which did not meet expectations for an end to the protracted impasse, notwithstanding the challenges posed by the prevailing pandemic, Covid-19. South Africa remains committed to a functioning Conference on Disarmament mandated to negotiate multilateral disarmament instruments and it is regrettable that since 1996 when South Africa and 22 other countries were admitted as members of this body, 24 years ago, it has not discharged its basic mandate with the exception being the negotiations on the CTBT.

The inability of the CD to deliver on its responsibility as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" ranks high amongst the serious challenges facing international disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control efforts.

Chairperson,

We therefore urgently need to attend to the current state of the Conference on Disarmament. We can no longer engage in the repetitive past activities that have not brought the Conference closer to an agreement on a Programme of Work, but rather distracted the CD from the imperative of reaching consensus on a Programme of Work and starting negotiations, while creating the illusion that substantive work is being done. We have said many times

before that this continued impasse is not sustainable and will increasingly affect the relevance and stature of the CD.

Chairperson,

South Africa regrets that the *United Nations Disarmament Commission*, despite a promising start to the current 3-year cycle in 2018, was again not able to conduct substantive work 2020, this time partly due to the pandemic. The themes of this current cycle, namely nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as practical measures to implement transparency and confidence building measures in outer space, are important and topical. It is essential that the UNDC is able to resume substantive work once the pandemic abates. As the deliberative body in the disarmament machinery, the UNDC is uniquely placed to find much needed common ground.

Chairperson,

Despite these challenges, my delegation is encouraged by the work of the *United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research* (UNIDIR) which marks its fortieth anniversary this year and we would like to commend the institute for conducting high quality independent research and convening timely discussions on issues within the field of disarmament. The current geo-political environment requires such innovative perspectives and enhanced dialogues that can respond to our collective security concerns.

In this context, my delegation joins the call to ensure the equal engagement and meaningful participation of *women* across multiple disarmament fora. Prioritising a gender perspective into disarmament and international security discussions expands our knowledge and understanding of challenges, with a view to greater progress in disarmament.

Chairperson,

Common threats can only be effectively addressed through enhanced international co-operation and strong international institutions that can address collective security concerns. It is with this in mind that my delegation stands ready to actively contribute towards exploring options to unlock the potential of the disarmament machinery. We will remain actively and constructively engaged in all disarmament fora with a view to seeking solutions that would inevitably require compromise to strengthen the multilateral system and efforts towards the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons.

It remains our hope that our discussions and decisions during this session will steer away from acrimonious debates to those that will strengthen solidarity and trust among Member States and move toward more consensus based resolutions and common ground, despite us dealing with a number of sensitive and complex issues and our sometimes different viewpoints.

I thank you, Chairperson.

Written Statement
submitted by the Kingdom of Thailand
on behalf of the Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Thematic Discussion on Disarmament Machinery
October 2020
United Nations Headquarters, New York

1. ASEAN is of the firm view that global disarmament and non-proliferation issues can be best addressed through multilateralism, and all countries committed to their obligations and our collective resolve towards a more peaceful world. Indeed, based on its existing rules of procedure and methods of work, the United Nations disarmament machinery has produced important treaties and guidelines, and has promoted confidence and trust amongst States.
2. ASEAN expresses its concern about new challenges on disarmament and strategic weapons control, as well as the current stalemate in major multilateral disarmament negotiations. ASEAN therefore welcomes further coordination and cooperation between the General Assembly and the Security Council on the non-proliferation and disarmament of WMDs, illicit proliferation of conventional weapons and small arms and light weapons.
3. ASEAN recognizes the First Committee as the most inclusive platform for comprehensive discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation. Dialogues in this Committee must strive to be constructive, relevant and in good faith. We call on Member States to exercise flexibility and compromise for the success of the Committee's deliberations. ASEAN recognizes the important role of the Conference on Disarmament and reiterates its call on the Conference to agree, by consensus, on a balanced and comprehensive program of work without further delay.
4. ASEAN continues to stress the importance of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as a multilateral negotiating body on disarmament-related treaties. We reaffirm our support in reinvigorating the CD to fulfill its negotiating mandate, while taking into account the views of wider Member States. We also continue to advocate for the CD to enlarge its membership and increase interactions with relevant stakeholders to bring fresh perspectives to the body.
5. ASEAN remains engaged with the UN Disarmament Commission (DC) and looks forward to its substantive session. We encourage all Member States to work together constructively to resolve outstanding issues that hinder our collective efforts in this body. In the same spirit, we encourage all Member States to reflect on the outcome of the Open-ended Working Group on convening the Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (4th SSOD) and to continue discussions on convening the 4th SSOD without delay.
6. ASEAN acknowledges the necessity of utilizing a multistakeholder approach in our work, as it has proven to be an important catalyst in moving forward important discussions and actions on disarmament. It is in this context, we welcome enhanced engagement with civil society, academia, women and youth.
7. ASEAN commends the Secretary General's Disarmament Agenda, a milestone achievement that called on all Member States to demonstrate stronger political commitment to preserve multilateralism, the foundation upon which disarmament and non-proliferation rests. Efforts at conflict prevention should also fit into a comprehensive disarmament machinery.
8. ASEAN reiterates that Regional Centres for Disarmament are valuable contributors towards global disarmament. ASEAN therefore reaffirms its support for the Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) in promoting regional disarmament priorities, bridging needs and fostering cooperation in our region. We also encourage taking into account the analyses and recommendations of think tanks and research institutions, such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to enhance disarmament efforts at the local, regional, and global levels.
9. ASEAN emphasizes that we must ensure that the disarmament machinery will keep pace with the rapidly evolving security landscape and advancements in science and technology, including developments in cyber space.
10. ASEAN reaffirms its readiness to coordinate and cooperate with other Member States, regional and international organisations to promote international peace and security and search for solutions to regional and international issues, including those on non-proliferation, disarmament and weapons control, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. ASEAN stands ready to collaborate with all partners to strengthen the UN disarmament machinery and advance our common disarmament and non-proliferation vision within the larger objectives of the UN in achieving a peaceful and prosperous world.

Written Statement
submitted by the Kingdom of Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons
October 2020
United Nations Headquarters, New York

1. Thailand aligns itself with the written statement on nuclear weapons submitted by Myanmar on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Nuclear weapons threaten our right to life and jeopardizes our development gains. Thailand firmly believes that Human rights, development and peace are mutually reinforcing, and that people must lie at the centre of disarmament and non-proliferation. As such, we must collectively address the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.
3. Thailand continues to share the international community's concern over the situation on the Korean Peninsula. We hope that all Parties will remain committed to peaceful means to realize peace and stability on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.
4. Furthermore, we have been closely following the developments regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). We reaffirm that the JCPOA remains a key pillar of global non-proliferation. We therefore call on all Parties to do their utmost to uphold the agreement and to refrain from any action that could escalate the situation.
5. In the same light, Thailand remains concerned with the lack of dialogue between Nuclear Weapon States. We urge involved parties to commence negotiations towards further strategic nuclear arms reduction beyond the expiration of the New START Treaty in 2021.
6. As the Depositary State for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok Treaty), Thailand is committed to its full and effective implementation. The signing of the Protocol to the Treaty by the Nuclear Weapon States remains a priority, thus, we call on them to continue engaging in consultations with ASEAN. We also advocate the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in other areas, notably in the Middle East, and support exchanges among the nuclear weapon-free zones to complement regional and global nuclear non-proliferation.
7. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is an important achievement that brings us closer towards a world without nuclear weapons. We are very pleased that the Treaty has received the necessary 50 ratifications, and we look forward to the Treaty's entry into force on 22 January 2021. Even while the disarmament architecture within the multilateral framework continues to be a challenge, Thailand, as a member of the TPNW core group, sees the upcoming entry into force as a significant development that gives hope and momentum to the global efforts towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
8. We continue to stress that the TPNW complements and strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this regard, we also look forward to substantive, meaningful, comprehensive and actionable outcomes at the 10th NPT Review Conference next year.
9. Thailand continues to stress the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We urge the remaining States of Annex II of the CTBT to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible to expedite its long-overdue entry into force.
10. Furthermore, nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. The work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote nuclear science and technology and their peaceful applications are, and will continue to provide, valuable contributions to our efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Thailand once again reaffirms our support for the IAEA in its endeavors across the nuclear safety, security, safeguards and peaceful uses agendas.
11. Thailand believes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only pathway towards a nuclear-weapons-free world. It is our hope that all concerned parties will exert every possible effort to renew long overdue commitments and to rebuild and regain trust. On our part, Thailand will continue to play an active role and work with all parties to this end.

Written Statement
submitted by the Kingdom of Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
October 2020
United Nations Headquarters, New York

1. Thailand aligns itself with the statements submitted by the Lao People's Democratic Republic on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
2. Thailand recognizes the danger of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and is fully committed to upholding the norm against the use of these weapons under all circumstances. Universalisation and full implementation of the norms and Conventions related to WMD is of utmost importance in addressing the increased insecurity of the world today.
3. On biological weapons, collective efforts are required from all parties to strengthen implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), particularly its verification regime. At the same time, we recognize the benefit of peaceful use of bio-science and biotechnology which helps advance global development.
4. This year, the international community has been facing the health and biological challenge from the COVID-19 pandemic. It demonstrates that the international community must be more prepared to counter biological threats by committing to their obligations under international law. We therefore call for more robust and early sharing of knowledge and information on preventive measures, strengthening response capacities and reinforcing effective counter-measures.
5. Thailand also reaffirms our commitment to uphold the norms and obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We are worried that in recent years, there have been increasing reports of chemical weapons uses in different parts of the world. We should all work together to maintain robust verification and effective investigations to hold the perpetrators of such incidents accountable.
6. Thailand welcomes the progress on the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, especially the report by OPCW that currently more than 98% of world chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed. We remain hopeful that the world is coming closer to the total elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles which will help bring about a more secure and peaceful world.
7. National legislation to control dual-use items is also vital. Thailand urges Member States to pay particular attention to the control over dual-use items. On our part, Thailand has been updating our legislation to control dual-use items and transfer of technology, while enhancing interactions with the private sector, to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands.
8. Finally, Thailand wishes to reiterate that the total prohibition of the use of WMD is an obligation and all related parties must contribute to reinforcing related norms to ensure that the promise of global disarmament and non-proliferation is fulfilled.

Written Statement
submitted by the Kingdom of Thailand
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons
October 2020
United Nations Headquarters, New York

1. Thailand aligns itself with the statement submitted by Cambodia on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
 2. The development of advanced technology and the complexity of conflicts in the world today underscore the importance of conventional arms control and disarmament. We are all aware that the use of conventional weapons and their illicit trade have devastating impacts on human lives and well-being. Thailand therefore call upon all Member States to strengthen their efforts and cooperation in this regard.
 3. Thailand is a country still confronted with challenges from anti-personnel mines and unexploded remnants of war. Therefore, mine action is an urgent and important priority for the country. As a State Party to the Mine Ban Convention, Thailand is committed to uphold the spirit and humanitarian goal of the Convention, which is to prevent human suffering from landmines, as well as to raise the standard and quality of life of people in the communities.
 4. Thailand has put utmost efforts to mine clearance operations, and to date the progress has been satisfactory. Thailand has been able to clear and release more than 90 percent of its mine contaminated area. We are determined to achieve a mine-free Thailand by 2023.
 5. Meanwhile, the illicit trade, transfer and trafficking of conventional arms continue to pose a threat to the maintenance of peace and security. Thailand attaches great importance to international mechanisms and frameworks to control the illicit trade and transfer of conventional arms.
 6. Thailand values the importance of, and remains committed to, the UN Programme of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons. The PoA is a vital international framework which could potentially curb the threats posed by illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) as well as prevent their diversion to unauthorized end users. Therefore, we have been using the PoA to guide our national efforts in setting measures and practices to response to the illicit trade and diversion of SALWs. We also put great emphasis on stockpile management as it is a crucial element of arms control.
 7. Thailand recognizes the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as a significant multilateral instrument in combating illegal arms trade and transfer. Thailand is working towards Treaty's ratification and wishes to learn from our regional and international partners through experience sharing and exchanging of good practices. We believe that the ATT should not be looked in isolation. Multilateral frameworks are all complementary in nature, especially PoA and ATT, whose mutual goal is to control arms and to prevent them from falling into wrong hands.
 8. New technologies pose challenges in our efforts to control arms flows. We call upon the international community to cooperate more closely to ensure that our endeavour on arms control are keeping pace with emerging threats and new technologies.
 9. The core of disarmament is the goal of saving lives. One State alone cannot create international peace and security. We stress the importance of multilateralism and the need for more regional and international cooperation. Thailand stands ready to work with our partners in this regard.
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**Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine
at the UN GA First Committee Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons**

Mr.Chair,

Ukraine strongly supports full and effective implementation and strengthening of the legal and institutional multilateral mechanisms to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, related materials, equipment and technologies as essential for nuclear disarmament.

We also believe that against the backdrop of different positions on the means to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons, identifying and developing practical and effective measures of nuclear disarmament verification and monitoring will foster confidence and contribute to the efforts to attaining the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

Since Ukraine joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the non-nuclear state we have devotedly implemented our international obligations to destroy nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, ground-based launchers, other elements of nuclear infrastructure.

Regrettably, as it is seen from our experience, the credibility and efficiency of some of the key pillars of the NPT have been seriously undermined. The historic decision of Ukraine to renounce its nuclear weapons was largely based on the clear international security assurances provided in writing in 1994, in particular in the Budapest Memorandum signed by Ukraine, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation. There is no doubt that this Memorandum is valid and should be adhered to by all its state-signatories.

The State-signatories to the Memorandum “reaffirmed their commitment to Ukraine to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine”, as well as “reaffirmed their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.

However, brutal violation of international obligations, including under the Budapest Memorandum, by Russia – clearly demonstrated how a nuclear weapon state can neglect the security assurances it gave to Ukraine in 1994. Moreover, this brings us to a very simple conclusion – that security assurances under the existing international law are extremely ineffective to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

Mr.Chair,

Notwithstanding the existing challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, Ukraine considers the NPT as a key element of the mentioned system and the essential basis for promotion of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its Article VI.

We have to recognize that it was very much unfortunate that the 10th NPT Review Conference was postponed to 2021 due to the spread of COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, it gives us another opportunity to continue developing areas of convergence and discussing ideas on the strengthening of all three NPT’s pillars.

Ukraine believes that the successful outcome of the 10th NPT Review Conference would pave the way for effective promotion of the Treaty and strengthening of international peace and security.

Mr.Chair,

In addition to the NPT itself, there are still other crucial elements of multilateral disarmament framework worth our special attention.

Being a country that voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal in 1994 and made historic contribution to ensuring global strategic stability, Ukraine closely follows the ongoing dialogue between the United States and Russia on further limiting their nuclear arsenals.

Ukraine would welcome a positive outcome of negotiations on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start). In this regard, we also believe that China could make a significant contribution by joining US-Russia dialogue on nuclear disarmament, in a trilateral format, on limiting nuclear capabilities and expanding the New Start Treaty.

Reiterating its support of the multilateral approach in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation, Ukraine underlines the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty universalization, negotiating and concluding the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) within the Conference on Disarmament framework and establishment of nuclear weapon free zones, including such a zone in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr.Chair

NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty entering into force. The Treaty has helped make us safer and more prosperous: it has extended the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, provided a framework for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and led to significant levels of disarmament since the Cold War peak. The next Review Conference, which we hope will be held as soon as is practically possible in 2021, provides an important opportunity to celebrate its successes and come together to strengthen its future.

The UK remains deeply committed to the long term goal of a world without nuclear weapons, with undiminished security for all, in line with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT. Our nuclear posture, being the only Nuclear Weapon State to have reduced our deterrent capability to a single system, and maintaining our warhead numbers at the level needed to provide a minimum, credible nuclear deterrent, underscores this commitment.

The UK also plays a leading role on nuclear disarmament verification, an essential element in enabling a future nuclear weapon free world, through our national programme, our work with the United States, Sweden and Norway in the Quad Partnership, and through international initiatives such as the International Partnership on Nuclear Disarmament Verification. We look forward to participating actively in the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification established under resolution 74/50, which will commence its work in 2021. The UK also supports and actively engages in projects to depolarise the debate and improve understanding and empathy between States with and without nuclear weapons. This includes the US-led initiative on Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament, and work related to strategic risk reduction and nuclear responsibilities.

We continue to support efforts to strengthen the multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament. The UK champions the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and Organisation and the start and conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. We remain committed to all nuclear weapon free zones. We stand ready, with the P5, to engage further with the ASEAN States on the Protocol to the South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. We support the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free from nuclear weapons, all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in accordance with the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.

In 2019-2020, the UK had the honour of coordinating the 'P5 Process' of dialogue between the five Nuclear Weapon States recognized by the NPT, and of hosting the ninth P5 Conference in London in February 2020. A report of the Conference was given to the Conference on Disarmament by the UK Permanent Representative (CD/PV.1531). During the year, the P5 made important progress on several issues of relevance to the NPT Review Conference, including discussions on nuclear doctrines, strategic risk reduction, and transparency.

It is through such practical steps that the UK believes real progress can be made. The NPT is the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime, and provides the only credible framework in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. For that reason, the UK will not support, sign or ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which will not advance disarmament, and risks undermining the international consensus that the NPT has achieved. The UK would not accept any argument that this treaty can constitute a development of customary international law binding on the UK or on other non-parties.

While significant progress has been made in reducing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, we must acknowledge the challenges in the current security environment that make further progress more difficult. Russia and Iran's destabilising activity in their regions, Iran's systematic non-compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as confirmed by the IAEA, and the DPRK's nuclear programme, which poses a threat to regional and global security and the integrity of the NPT regime, all contribute to these challenges.

In this context, and notwithstanding our commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, the UK's independent nuclear deterrent remains essential to our security today, and for as long as the global security situation demands. Our programme to maintain and renew elements of our nuclear deterrent capability to ensure

its continued safety and reliability is a necessary aspect of our responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state and fully consistent with Article VI of the NPT.

In the face of these challenges, the NPT is more important than ever as a fundamental pillar of international security. As the Review Conference approaches, we remain determined to work with partners across the international community to strengthen the NPT that benefits us all.

OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom restates its position that the complete ban on the production and use of chemical and biological weapons remains a central pillar of arms control and disarmament. The 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) are cornerstones of our joint efforts to prevent the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction.

The global prohibition against chemical weapons is under threat. Upholding and strengthening the ban on chemical weapons is a pressing challenge. We must robustly defend the CWC and send a clear message that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances, is unacceptable.

Chemical weapons have been used in Syria and Malaysia, in Salisbury and Siberia. As recently as this summer, Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny was poisoned by a chemical weapon. The perpetrators of this weapons attack must be held to account. We encourage Russia to establish the facts of this case.

The UK strongly supports the independent, impartial and expert work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In 2018, the UK was instrumental in securing the agreement that mandated the OPCW Technical Secretariat to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In April 2020, the first report by the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for three chemical weapons attacks in Idlib in March 2017. In response, the OPCW's Executive Council laid out a clear and time-bound path for Syria to come into compliance with the CWC. We call on Syria to take the actions set out in the Executive Council decision.

Through our contributions to the organisation's capacity building programmes and to its new Chemistry Technology Centre, we will continue to support the OPCW.

Since 1975, the BTWC has been the foundation of the international ban on biological and toxin weapons. We encourage all States Parties to work together to achieve an effective outcome to the Ninth Review Conference, due to be held in 2021, that strengthens implementation of the Convention. We encourage all States Parties to continue to promote the full and effective national implementation of the Convention and urge all States that have not yet done so to accede to the Convention.

The UK remains deeply concerned about the possibility of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Iran's ballistic missile programme and continued activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231 pose a threat to global security as a potential delivery system for weapons of mass destruction. We remain concerned by Iran's development of advanced technologies of increasing complexity and capability, under the guise of Space Launch Vehicle research. These technologies have clear transferability to ballistic missiles. In April, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps launched a Qased Space Launch Vehicle, placing what it described as a 'military satellite' into orbit using a mobile launch pad, a platform typical of military ballistic missile systems which minimises pre-launch detection.

Iran also actively proliferates its missile technology throughout the region, including to non-state actors, in violation of UNSC resolutions 2216, 1701 and 1546. We call on Iran to abide by the provisions of these resolutions and urge all states to remain vigilant with regards to the implementation of these resolutions.

The UK also remains concerned by DPRK's illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes which violate UN Security Council Resolutions. In January the DPRK announced that it no longer considers itself bound by its moratorium on nuclear and long range missile tests and it has conducted four ballistic missile tests this year. Sanctions targeting the DPRK's illicit programmes must be strictly enforced by the international community.

UN Security Council Resolution 1540 plays a crucial role in preventing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery, and related materials, from falling into the hands of non-state actors, including terrorists. In 2021, the Security Council should reaffirm the principles of UNSCR 1540. We encourage States to use the Comprehensive Review to assess and to strengthen their own implementation of the measures set out in UNSCR 1540.

The Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and material of mass destruction was launched at the Kananaskis Summit in Canada in 2002. G7 Global Partnership programmes provide practical assistance to States to build capacity to meet international obligations set out in UNSCR 1540. Since then, the Global Partnership has grown to include over 30 States and representation from international organisations. The UK looks forward to chairing this group in 2021 and will continue to contribute to its valuable work.

OUTER SPACE THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

For fifty years, the international legal framework, including the Outer Space Treaty, has served us well in addressing the challenges of operating in space. As humanity's use of space continues to develop and evolve, we need to ensure that the international framework keeps up.

Our societies increasingly rely on space. We are seeing things that we did not previously think possible, such as in-orbit servicing and an improved ability to understand what is happening in space. But alongside these positive developments, challenges to our ability to operate safely and securely in space are proliferating. Jamming of positioning signals threaten navigation and, potentially, our economies. Capabilities have been developed to hold satellites at risk.

At last year's First Committee, in the thematic debate on outer space, the United Kingdom set out the increasing risks to security in outer space, and the consequent need to build trust in each other's actions, define acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and establish norms around the use of on-earth technologies that can affect satellites. This approach is based on the conviction that the prevention of an arms race in outer space must be broader than the narrow focus on the placement of weapons in space, and look not only at the capabilities but also the behaviours that could lead to escalation of tensions and conflict in space.

Since then, the UK has been exploring some of these ideas with a wide range of Member States and other stakeholders to see how we can make progress on reducing threats to space systems through responsible behaviours.

In January 2020 the UK organised a Wilton Park conference in Singapore on "Operating in space: current multilateral policy issues and challenges" involving the ten nations of ASEAN as well as China, India, Japan, Pakistan, and the Republic of Korea. While the Covid-19 pandemic prevented further physical meetings, we were able to arrange virtual events in June and July which brought together another 35 States from Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Americas. We also held several bilateral consultations in various capitals.

Building on those discussions, and in the spirit of offering a new way of breaking the deadlock on outer space security in multilateral institutions, the UK has introduced a new draft resolution at this year's General Assembly session, entitled 'Reducing Space Threats Through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours' (L.45). The text of this draft resolution has evolved through further discussions and open informal consultations in New York and Geneva. We also held an information session in Vienna, to explain our thinking to colleagues working on the peaceful uses of space.

The resolution encourages Member States to study threats and risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth; characterise what actions could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security; and share ideas for the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours in outer space.

We hope that our new approach will build a better understanding of existing threats in space and on Earth, and of how we can reduce threats to the space systems on which we all rely. This could contribute to further consideration of legally binding instruments in this area. Importantly, the substantive report that the resolution calls for should build awareness for all and enable us to discuss together how to tackle these threats to space systems.

The UK commends this draft resolution to the Committee, and looks forward to working with all Member States to develop this new approach, in the hope that it will contribute positively to our shared goal of maintaining space as a peaceful, safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment, for the benefit of all.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

2020 marks the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, a central arms control instrument. The UK welcomes the progress made by the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and looks forward to further meetings this year. We believe that the eleven guiding principles, affirmed at last year's Meeting of High Contracting Parties, represent important areas of international consensus. The UK looks forward to furthering the group's discussions on this complex subject and to contributing to recommendations on aspects of the normative and operational framework ahead of the CCW's Sixth Review Conference in 2021. Central to these future discussions is the need to better understand the concept of human control, and to work together to find the right balance between freedom and control of autonomous systems.

It is also the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which, over that decade, has delivered significant humanitarian impact. The UK looks forward to renewing its commitment, together with all States Parties to the Convention, at the Second Review Conference in Lausanne in November. The Conference will be a valuable opportunity to review the Convention's achievements and challenges, as well as to adopt an ambitious Action Plan for the next five years. The UK is honoured to assume the Presidency for the 10th Meeting of States Parties in 2021. During our period in office, we will focus on the implementation of the Lausanne Action Plan and on making further progress towards the universalisation of this important treaty.

The UK welcomes the adoption last year by the Fourth Review Conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention of the Oslo Declaration and Action Plan, which will further its fundamental humanitarian objectives to end suffering caused by anti-personnel mines. The UK will shortly complete the clearance of anti-personnel mines in the Falkland Islands, fulfilling its obligations under Article 5 of the Convention. We continue to encourage states not already party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban to accede without delay.

The UK remains strongly committed to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and its goal to create the highest common standards for regulating the international trade in conventional arms and prevent their illicit trade and diversion. Universal consolidation and full implementation of existing Treaty provisions and commitments are key to achieving these objectives. The UK welcomes the fact that the Sixth Conference of States Parties was able to arrive at some important decisions, despite the impossibility of an in-person meeting, due to the hard work of the President, Ambassador Villegas of Argentina, and the Secretariat.

We warmly welcome the accession of China, Afghanistan and Niue, and the ratifications of Namibia and São Tomé and Príncipe. While it grows stronger with each new State Party, we must acknowledge that the Treaty cannot fully achieve its object and purpose as long as major exporters remain outside the discussion. Their accession will have the greatest impact on the aims and objectives of the ATT and, as such, must be the priority

for future engagement. Industry, regional organisations, academia and civil society can bring unique perspectives in this context.

The UK has consistently been at the forefront of global efforts to counter the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition. This is a transnational problem. We will continue to work with individual states, regional organisations, industry and civil society to strengthen cooperation, and reduce the supply of, and demand for, illicit weapons.

The UK is proud to participate in the valuable discussions of the Group of Government Experts on the 'Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus'. We stand ready to cooperate with all stakeholders to deliver the outcomes and recommendations of that Group.

The rules based international system is crucial for tackling threats to life and security. It is in our collective interest that these instruments function. This is impossible without full funding, effective implementation, and involvement of all relevant stakeholders. We therefore call on all Participating States to pay their contributions; meet their obligations; and support active and meaningful participation of all relevant actors and stakeholders. In this way, we will uphold it and build a safer world.

OTHER DISARMAMENT MEASURES THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom is committed to a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, and to advancing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.

This year's First Committee session, like much of our daily life during the Covid-19 pandemic, relies on information and communication technologies (ICTs). This has brought the threats and opportunities inherent in the sphere of ICTs and international security into sharper focus.

Technology continues to develop at an unprecedented pace and in unparalleled complexity. Malicious or accidental exploitation of vulnerabilities can incur the most serious of consequences. Attacks can endanger lives, as was shown in the tragic case of a patient who died while a Dusseldorf hospital was affected by ransomware.

National efforts alone cannot mitigate the impact of large-scale, disruptive cyber-attacks, or reckless and indiscriminate behaviour.

We each have a responsibility to improve our cyber security and uphold the rules-based international system in all domains, including cyberspace. The UK underscores the need to maintain a clear focus on operationalising our shared framework for stability in cyberspace.

UN Member States have reaffirmed, in the General Assembly, that existing international law applies to cyberspace and have agreed a set of voluntary, non-binding norms. The UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly have also affirmed that human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in the relevant international instruments, must be respected and upheld equally online and offline.

These are important commitments underpinned by investment in confidence building measures, and supported by coordinated and targeted capacity building programmes.

The work of the Open-ended Working Group (OWEG) and Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) is making a reality of the General Assembly's call for all UN Member States "to be guided in their use of ICTs by the UNGGE's 2015 report".

The GGE brings continuity and expertise, where the OWEG offers broad participation. We strongly welcome the commitment to hearing from diverse voices in both these processes, including from Member States who bring different perspectives to the table and non-government stakeholders.

The UK hopes both groups will reach consensus. We must recognise the significant differences in views on some issues but continue our commitment to unlock these differences through dialogue, agreeing discrete areas on which we can make further progress together.

There are no quick wins. Member States must work together in good faith, giving ourselves time to find common ground and ensuring everyone has the opportunity to fully participate and be heard.

The challenges of 2020 have been significant. Pragmatism, commitment and consensus are crucial. These groups must be given the opportunity to complete their important mandates. We should wait for their recommendations on next steps and not pre-empt how best to continue these discussions at the UN.

When States act responsibly in cyberspace they respect and uphold the rules and values we all share. The need to develop and share practical support on implementing the crucial 2015 GGE report is central. We must assist and support other states to uphold these rules and values and be resolute in defending them and acting when we believe they have been challenged.

The UK remains one of the most active cyber donors in the world, investing over 44 million dollars in international cyber work with partners in more than 100 countries across six continents since 2012. Funding international capacity building is an urgent priority that deserves our collective attention. We would have grave concerns about any approach which does not address this fundamental need.

It is crucial that we are prepared to impose consequences and ensure States are held accountable for irresponsible and malicious cyber activity. Together with partners, the UK has taken steps to expose such malicious cyber activity. We can, and do, attribute malicious cyber acts to States and continue to counter those who conduct reckless cyber-attacks for their own malicious ends. This furthers our commitment to clarity and stability in cyberspace.

Working together, we can realise the potential of a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace.

REGIONAL DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

Regional stability based upon mutual understanding and respect between neighbours remains essential for global peace. The situation in several regions gives cause for concern.

The tension and instability in the Middle East continues to pose a threat to global peace and security. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is one of the key causes of this instability. In this context, the UK continues to support a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East. The UK attended the November 2019 Conference on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone as an observer, and voiced our reservations about the credibility of a process that does not include all States of the region. We were pleased that the majority of participants were constructive and that the importance of IAEA safeguards for non-proliferation was emphasised. However, our view remains that such a process can only succeed if based on consensus and arrangements freely arrived at between all regional States.

One of the most urgent questions to be addressed in this regard is the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In April, the OPCW's Investigation and Identification Team concluded that the Syrian regime was responsible for three chemical weapons attacks in March 2017. In response, the OPCW's Executive Council set a clear, time-bound pathway for Syria to comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention. We call on Syria to take the actions set out in the Executive Council decision.

The situation in the Middle East and beyond is also severely exacerbated by Iran's behaviour, through its development of ballistic missiles, its provision of military and financial support to a range of actors in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, and its systematic non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments. Iran must

engage seriously in the Dispute Resolution Mechanism process. We are in particular deeply concerned by the IAEA's confirmation that Iran continues to violate multiple JCPOA limits, installing new advanced centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and increasing its enriched uranium stockpile to ten times the JCPOA limit. Iran must reverse all measures inconsistent with the agreement and return to full compliance without delay.

The UK remains concerned by repeated launches of ballistic missiles by the DPRK and its announcement in January that it no longer considers itself bound by its moratorium on nuclear and long range missile tests. The DPRK's illegal nuclear and ballistic weapon programmes are a serious threat to global security and violate UN resolutions. We encourage the DPRK to commit to taking verifiable and irreversible steps towards denuclearisation. Until the DPRK does so, sanctions targeting the DPRK's illicit programmes must be strictly enforced by the international community.

The UK remains concerned about the potential for a nuclear crisis between India and Pakistan. We urge all parties to refrain from actions that could jeopardise regional stability and to engage in dialogue and transparency to reduce tensions and the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

In our own region, Europe, it is the Russian Federation which is undermining peace and security through its pattern of aggressive and destabilising behaviour against its neighbours. Its deployment of a missile system prohibited under the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty caused the demise of that treaty and made Europe and the world a more dangerous place. Russia must demonstrate their compliance to arms control and come into alignment with international norms.

The UK, along with our NATO allies, is committed to the preservation of effective international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. We will therefore continue our efforts with all parties to construct confidence-building measures, universalise the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and reinforce the rules-based international system that underpins global security.

DISARMAMENT MACHINERY THEMATIC DEBATE

STATEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM

2020 has been an exceptionally challenging year for the multilateral disarmament machinery. The restrictions necessitated by the Covid-19 pandemic disrupted the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which could not meet for over three months, and the UN Disarmament Commission, which was unable to meet at all. The restrictions caused the postponement of the tenth NPT Review Conference, the seventh Biennial Meeting of States on the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, the Meetings of Experts of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the sessions of the Group of Government Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The restrictions also forced the sixth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty to be held using a written procedure, and have complicated the preparations for the 18th Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the second Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The UK takes this opportunity to place on record its deep thanks and appreciation for the work of all office-holders, secretariat and implementation support unit staff, technicians, interpreters and others for their tireless work in these unprecedented circumstances to keep the necessary disruption to the minimum possible.

The pandemic has also adversely affected the finances of the disarmament machinery, already under pressure due to the accumulated arrears built up by several States over many years. Claims by States as to the value they place on multilateral disarmament instruments are worth nothing if they consistently fail to pay their contributions to keep those instruments functioning on time and in full. We urge those with arrears to settle them without delay. We commend the continued efforts of the office-holders of the various disarmament instruments and their secretariats to ensure their sustainable, transparent and effective financing.

The continued failure of the Conference on Disarmament to adopt a Programme of Work for 2020 cannot, however, be blamed on the pandemic. Despite the exceptional work of the six Presidencies of the 2020 session, and in particular of Algeria and Argentina, the first and second Presidencies respectively, who presented a series of practical and pragmatic proposals taking into account the priorities of all delegations, a tiny handful were once

again prepared to prevent the Conference from adopting a Programme of Work that would have allowed it to pick up its substantive work and live up to its unique role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Recalling that, under the Conference's Rules of Procedure, the only stipulation for the Programme of Work is that it include a schedule of activities for that session, the UK encourages the six Presidencies for 2021 to bring forward a proposal for a Programme of Work that can advance the substantive work of the Conference, and urges all delegations to support them by showing creativity and flexibility.

Despite this failure, the UK welcomes the extensive consultations undertaken by the Australian Presidency while the Conference was unable to meet, which resulted in an in-depth report of the views of delegations on the priorities and role of the Conference, and ways to break the deadlock and be more effective. These consultations can constitute a sound basis for the work of the Conference in 2021. The UK also commends the proposal by the Australian Presidency for rendering the Conference's Rules of Procedure gender-neutral, and urges its adoption by the Conference in its coming session.

As for the UN Disarmament Commission, the UK supports the efforts of Australia, and the most recent Chair, to get the Commission back to work following the disruption of 2019 and 2020, and deplores any attempts to undermine that work, or to hold the Commission's work hostage to extraneous issues.

The UK pays tribute to the important work of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, in its 40th anniversary year, in generating knowledge and promoting dialogue on disarmament and security issues. We have been proud to support its programmes on conventional arms and gender and disarmament in 2020. We warmly commend its outgoing Director, Dr Renata Dwan, for her exceptional leadership of UNIDIR's work since 2018.

We look forward to working with all delegations to improve transparency and build trust across the UN disarmament machinery over the coming year.

**Statement on behalf of the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership by the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States of
America**

In 2015, our four countries – Norway, Sweden, the United States, and the United Kingdom – established a unique nuclear verification partnership colloquially referred to as the Quad. This partnership between two non-nuclear weapon states and two nuclear weapon states seeks to solve some of the very real challenges associated with verifying that nuclear disarmament has occurred.

The Quad is built on a common understanding that a future comprehensive nuclear disarmament scenario will require robust and credible verification solutions. Nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike will need to have confidence that disarmament has taken place. The challenge is how to provide this confidence while upholding existing non-proliferation obligations, as well as safety and security requirements.

Since 2015, the Quad has been working to tackle this verification challenge, building on the work of the UK-Norway Initiative and previous UK-US arms control exercises. In October 2017 we conducted the first-ever multilateral nuclear disarmament verification exercise. The exercise, known as LETTERPRESS, explored the practical challenges associated with the monitoring and verification of nuclear weapon declarations. LETTERPRESS was held in strict conformity with all states' non-proliferation obligations and successfully examined the very challenging, real-life considerations related to the inclusion of non-nuclear weapon states in nuclear disarmament verification.

The lessons learned from the exercise have led the Quad to organize its continuing work towards 2025 in two separate workstreams: one focusing on verification strategies, the other focusing on verification technologies. The results will be integrated into a common, substantive deliverable, possibly including an exercise, within the next several years. We look forward to keeping the international community informed of our progress during future meetings of this body, as part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review cycle, and in other appropriate venues such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification, where we will continue to engage and share more detailed technical lessons learned.

Multilateral disarmament verification is a vital component of an incremental and pragmatic approach towards our goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The Quad Partnership shows how non-nuclear weapon states can play an important role in this process and provides a realistic testbed for evaluating verification technologies and procedures. It has demonstrated key concepts for how multilateral nuclear disarmament verification could be implemented in the real world. In this way, the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership helps to lay the groundwork for meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament and towards the fulfillment of Article VI of the NPT.

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons
UNFC October 2020

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

This year has truly been a battle for all of us. The Coronavirus pandemic has thrown the world into chaos, caused immeasurable suffering and hardship across the globe, and tragically has cost legions of people their lives. Still, our nations continue our collective fight against the pandemic. We must also continue the fight towards achieving global, verifiable nuclear disarmament.

On that front, the United States remains a leader in efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation and remains committed to the creation of an effective and modernized arms control architecture. We seek to achieve that goal by crafting an historic trilateral arms control treaty among the three powers with the largest nuclear stockpiles on the planet, the United States, Russia and China. China's rapidly accelerating nuclear weapons build-up and global aspirations have made it abundantly clear that agreements solely between the United States and Russia are no longer adequate – China must also come to the negotiating table. While China is the least transparent of the P5 nuclear powers, Chinese Communist Party organs are openly talking about narrowing its nuclear weapons gap with the United States over the next decade, with the suggested eventual goal of fielding over 1,000 deployed nuclear warheads. This is a threat that the world simply cannot afford to ignore. China must begin to behave like a responsible state and negotiate in good faith to preclude the world from being gripped by another arms race - one for which China will be directly responsible.

Russia can play a constructive role by bringing China into a new era of arms control and to the table for negotiation of a comprehensive trilateral nuclear arms control agreement. It would be in Russia's best interest to do so. The existing New START Treaty was drafted based on expectations for a future vastly different from the reality of today. But Russia continues to press the United States to extend New START and maintain the status quo on arms control. The reasons for this are stark and unambiguous. New START's limits apply to approximately 92% of U.S. nuclear weapons, while they constrain just 45% of Russia's and none of China's. New START does not apply to several of Russia's novel strategic nuclear weapons systems, and it does nothing to limit any of Russia's up to 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, nor their forecasted growth. It does not limit any of China's unconstrained and growing arsenal, since the treaty binds only the United States and Russia. In pursuit of a new nuclear arms control architecture that reflects the reality of today, the United States proposed to the Russian Federation a constructive and comprehensive framework, which would limit all nuclear warheads, enhance verification, and lay the groundwork for the next nuclear arms control treaty to include China. The United States has made every effort in this process, and it is prepared to verifiably implement Russia's recent agreement to a U.S. proposal to limit all nuclear warheads in exchange for an extension of the New START Treaty. The United States has made clear its willingness to meet with Russia as soon as possible to finalize the details of this verifiable agreement. This would be an historic deal, good for the U.S., Russia, and the world. A broader trilateral arms control agreement including China that would bolster the existing verification architecture and improve the international security environment by addressing all nuclear warheads would present a groundbreaking opportunity to advance the arms control and disarmament agenda. We have not and will not give up on the pursuit of this standard, and call on all UN member states to help turn this goal into reality and achieve a safer, more secure world.

An end to the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons – the principal objective of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) – is another U.S. goal and an essential step toward the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has long supported immediately commencing FMCT negotiations, provided negotiations are governed by consensus and all key states participate. The United States also remains committed to maintaining our unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, which has been in place since the early 1990s. We call on all states that have not yet done so to declare a moratorium on such production immediately. The United Kingdom, France, and Russia currently have similar moratoria in place. China, notably, does not. China and Pakistan, either together or individually, blocked FMCT negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1999, 2007, and 2009. Such a treaty would be a huge boon to arms control and the international nonproliferation regime.

At the same time, we have advanced the undertaking towards further, verifiable progress on nuclear disarmament. The “Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” (CEND) initiative, includes participants from over 40 countries, representing states with and without nuclear weapons across the globe. CEND explores ways of improving the international security environment so as to enable further progress on disarmament. Participants in the CEND initiative have held positive and productive virtual meetings across its three subgroups during this past summer, and will continue to do so in the lead-up to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and thereafter. Alongside fora like the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the UN Group of Government Experts addressing Nuclear Disarmament Verification (NDV GGE), these initiatives prove that there are outlets for open, constructive dialogue to address questions of arms control, future disarmament, and their related international security concerns. In this work, we aspire to find productive ways forward on issues that have remained gridlocked in other fora, such as the CD.

Turning to regional threats, we continue to work towards solutions to solve the problems currently presented by states like North Korea, Iran, and Syria. We remain committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and a brighter future for the Korean people. We are open to making progress through diplomacy toward these goals, while maintaining the implementation and enforcement of sanctions. We have repeatedly taken steps to keep the door open for diplomacy, but Pyongyang must decide it is ready to engage and appoint a representative empowered to negotiate on these issues. Dialogue alone is not enough, but it can lead to positive action. In the meantime, the DPRK continues to violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) through its continued weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs and sanction evasion activities. The DPRK must refrain from provocations and comply with its obligations under these UNSCRs.

Regarding Iran, its expanding nuclear program, development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, and purchases and transfers of destabilizing conventional weapons all pose a critical threat to regional and international security and a significant challenge to global nonproliferation efforts. The United States is committed to constraining Iran’s malign activities and we welcome allies and partners on board our campaign focused on maintaining international peace and security. Until Iran is willing to conclude a comprehensive deal that addresses the regime’s malign behavior, we will continue to exert maximum pressure and expand our sanctions. We remain open to negotiations without preconditions, but Iran must respond to diplomacy with diplomacy, not further violence.

Syria remains in violation of its obligations under the NPT and its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement for the undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance, as reported by the IAEA. Given these findings, the United States remains concerned about the possibility of undeclared nuclear material in Syria. Syria must provide the IAEA full cooperation without further delay to resolve outstanding issues and return to compliance with its obligations under the NPT.

Although we face a great many challenges today, we are confident that a new era of arms control, heralded by an unprecedented trilateral agreement, is on the horizon, and with international help, we can all move closer to the eventual goal of verifiable nuclear disarmament together.

Finally, the United States remains committed to improving the international security landscape while advancing the objectives of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. The United States was the first country in the world with comprehensive national legislation on Women, Peace and Security, formalizing our commitment to meaningful participation by and the full inclusion of women in foreign policy and national security.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNFC October 2020

Mr. Chairman, Colleagues,

This has been a difficult and challenging year for all of us as we continue to grapple with the ongoing effects and the tragic loss of life due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We express our sincerest sympathies to all nations impacted during these unprecedented times. In the midst of such overwhelming difficulties we have been forced to consider creative and innovative ways to operate while attempting to respond effectively to ongoing threats to international peace and security. Tragically, one of these threats continues to be the use of chemical weapons, with the poisoning of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny as the most recent example. The United States condemns the poisoning of Alexei Navalny and would like to highlight that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has released its Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) report summary confirming Alexei Navalny was exposed to a nerve agent of the Novichok group.

The United States has full confidence in the OPCW's findings, which independently confirm the chemical analysis of German, French and Swedish certified laboratories. The use of a chemical weapon in the poisoning of Alexei Navalny is an intolerable and reprehensible act –and one that the United States and all responsible nations have condemned in the strongest possible terms; we have reiterated that any use of chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable and contravenes the international norms and standards against such use. Toward that end, we call on the Russian Government to provide a full accounting for the poisoning of Alexei Navalny; and further explain how a Novichok nerve agent was used within its borders. Russia's contempt for the international norm against chemical weapons use must stop. The United States calls on Russia to join the responsible nations of the world and comply with its international obligations by fully declaring and eliminating its chemical weapons program, including its Novichok agents.

Similarly, we must hold the Syrian Arab Republic accountable for its blatant and continued flouting of its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and Security Council resolution 2118. In this regard, States Parties took decisive action in July -- in response to the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team's (IIT) first report which concluded that Syria used chemical weapons on three separate occasions in March 2017. States Parties sent a strong message to take steps to hold Syria accountable. The OPCW Executive Council (EC) adopted a decision ("Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,") on July 9th requesting Syria complete specific measures – which included declaring the facilities where chemical weapons used in the attacks in March 2017 were developed, produced, stockpiled, and operationally stored for delivery; declaring all of its chemical weapons – including chlorine that is not intended for purposes not prohibited under the CWC; declaring its CW production facilities and other related facilities; and finally resolving all of the outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration related to its chemical weapons program. Again – the OPCW Technical Secretariat offered their assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic to meet these obligations within the 90-day timeline.

Mr. Chairman, 90 days have come and gone – and on October 14, the OPCW Director General released his report to States Parties on Syria's implementation of this EC Decision – and the results should not be a surprise to anyone. The Syrian Arab Republic refused to cooperate with the OPCW and has failed to meet the measures outlined in the July EC Decision.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot turn a blind eye to these actions or acquiesce to non-compliance by States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). We must call out such concerns and address them accordingly. This is precisely why the work of – and support to -- the OPCW as such a critical forum on these issues remains a vital part of preserving the global norm against the use of chemical weapons. The United States reiterates its full support of the OPCW, a well-respected organization with a long history of impartiality, transparency, and professionalism that speaks for itself – and should be commended. There is no basis for attacking the OPCW's thorough evaluation and established investigatory techniques and analysis.

The OPCW also remains the ideal forum to address future threats and challenges. To that end, the United States and numerous co-sponsors support adopting an Executive Council decision recommending to the November 2020

OPCW Conference of the States Parties that it take a decision affirming States Parties' understanding that the use of aerosolized Central Nervous System (CNS)-acting chemicals is inconsistent with law enforcement as a "purpose not prohibited" by the Convention. By having the Conference of the States Parties memorialize their understanding on this application of the Convention, they make clear that countries cannot hide their work to advance an offensive capability regarding aerosolized CNS-acting chemicals under the guise of doing so for law enforcement as a "purpose not prohibited" under the Convention. It is imperative that we act on these chemicals without delay.

Mr. Chairman, the Chemical Weapons Convention is a remarkable achievement in the progress of humanity. We all must fight for it and, without exception, expose those who use chemical weapons and hold them accountable. As States Parties, we are entrusted with a solemn responsibility which demands that, in our words and in our actions, we defend and advance the shared vision of a world free of chemical weapons. Silence and inaction only further embolden those who seek to maintain an offensive chemical weapons program; and look to use such weapons to the detriment of all mankind. As responsible nations, we must be unwavering in our resolve on such matters; and have the courage of our convictions to collectively banish the scourge of chemical weapons forever.

Turning to matters regarding the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and preparations for the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC next year. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the globally disruptive power of all biological threats and the Convention is an essential means to responding to the impacts and reducing the threats from biological weapons. The United States strongly believes it is more important than ever that BTWC States Parties work together to strengthen this critical legal instrument. The question is whether States Parties can overcome their political differences and agree to strengthen the Convention in new and innovative ways, while refraining from reopening fruitless negotiations on a new legally binding mechanism.

The Review Conference, set to take place in November 2021, is the best opportunity States Parties will have in the foreseeable future to ensure that the BTWC remains capable of dealing with rapidly evolving biological threats by biological agents with pandemic potential. If the obstruction of progress by a small number of delegations can be overcome, States Parties are likely to be able to agree on guidelines for requests for assistance under Article VII of the BTWC, which would help to ensure that any Party, in the words of the BTWC, "exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention," can be provided requested assistance quickly and efficiently.

These are some of the more pressing matters confronting BTWC States Parties, but it is also important that we adopt measures to ensure the relevance and vitality of the Convention for the longer term. For this purpose, the United States believes that Parties should, at the upcoming Review Conference, agree on a new and more effective program of work. The BTWC intersessional program that ends this year has demonstrated that Meetings of Experts can enable Parties to engage meaningfully on the difficult and complex challenge of preventing the development, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, even while some block consensus on practical measures to address them. Based on discussions in recent BTWC meetings, the United States believes that Parties are also very interested in reaching consensus on a more formal process for reviewing developments in science and technology, and we urge them to do so at the Review Conference. Parties should agree on a new intersessional program that makes expert discussion of these issues even more useful in addressing this challenge.

To take advantage of the outcome of experts meetings, the United States believes it is critical, especially given the evolving threats we have mentioned, that Parties be able to take collective action more often than every five years at Review Conferences. Biological threats will not wait for BWC Parties to convene a Review Conference, so we should be able to take joint decisions whenever necessary to maintain the strength of the Convention, at least at the annual Meetings of States Parties. We look forward to working with other States Parties on these and other measures to strengthen the BTWC at the 2021 Review Conference.

Finally, the United States is strongly committed to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The United States understands that societies where women are empowered are more stable, peaceful, and prosperous both economically and politically.

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Outer Space
UNFC October 2020

Mr. President,

Today, the world is increasingly reliant on space assets for prosperity and security that bring tremendous benefits to all nations. The United States believes that there is a common interest in maintaining peace and security in outer space for the benefit of all. As such, we reaffirm the applicability of existing international law in this area, in particular the Outer Space Treaty and the UN Charter, which continue to serve as an essential framework to ensure that all nations benefit from outer space.

At the same time, we take note of the desire of all countries to maintain space as a peaceful, safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment, while reducing threats to space systems and space operations, and preventing conflict from occurring in outer space. In order to effectively address these threats, we need to move beyond a singular focus on the prevention of an arms race in space, towards an expanded approach that takes into account additional potential threats to international peace and security, including from ground-based systems that are increasing the contested nature of the outer space environment. This is not, in our view, an attempt to undermine SSOD-1, but instead a realization that the current environment in outer Space is much more complicated than it was in 1978. That is why President Trump reaffirmed the United States commitment to this approach, which included announcing the establishment of the US Space Force and reinvigorated efforts to meet and overcome challenges to America's vital interests in outer space.

Space conflict is not a hypothetical threat. For example, in 2018, Russia announced the deployment of a ground-based laser weapon called the Peresvet, which the Russian Ministry of Defense has stated is designed to "fight satellites." This year, Russia tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite missile capable of destroying satellites in low-Earth orbit. Subsequently, the commander of Russia's aerospace forces, Col.-Gen. Sergei Surovikin, disclosed that Russia's S-500 air defense missile system would have the capability to "destroy low-orbit satellites." Here we have the main proponent of the No First Placement (NFP) resolution actively proclaiming that their country has a capability to attack satellites in orbit, with no explanation of how this system is consistent with its advocacy for space arms control.

Then there is China – a co-sponsor of the NFP resolution – which in 2007 launched a ground-based missile that intentionally destroyed a Chinese satellite, creating 3,000 pieces of trackable orbital debris and much more debris we cannot track. Despite the fact that this debris remains in orbit today and will remain for over 300 years, China has moved forward with the deployment of this system capable of targeting on-orbit assets.

Finally, Russia has not limited its counterspace capabilities to political statements but has tested and deployed capabilities in outer space. In October 2017, the Russian Ministry of Defense conducted highly questionable space activities with COSMOS 2519 and 2521, which the United States described in 2018 at both the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly. The on-orbit behavior by the Russian satellites COSMOS 2521, which launched a high-speed projectile, was inconsistent with any sort of device on-orbit except for an anti-satellite weapon. This year Russia demonstrated potentially dangerous behavior with another similar set of satellites, COSMOS 2542 and COSMOS 2543, by maneuvering near a U.S. Government satellite during a period of time, then later moving away and firing a new object at high velocity in Low Earth Orbit. The firing action was inconsistent with COSMOS 2543's stated mission of inspection and also appeared to be an anti-satellite weapon. Although this test was non-destructive, the behavior was both potentially threatening and strikingly characteristic of a space-based counterspace system and nothing else. The activities of COSMOS 2543 in 2020 and COSMOS 2519 in 2017 are clear examples of Russia's hypocritical behavior when it comes to its No First Placement commitment and arms control advocacy.

So, the question for the international community continues to be what can we do to reduce these risks? The United States believes we can reduce these risks by cooperating in the development of voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible behavior that strengthen the stability and security of the outer space environment.

That is why we seek to advance multilateral measures that are transparent, build confidence and are consistent with the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts Report.

Instead of focusing on ill-defined and unverifiable proposals, our approach is anchored by the proposition that we should examine and develop ideas around observable behaviors to maintain outer space as a safe, stable, secure, and sustainable environment. We should recognize that satellites, even if they don't have weapons on them, are going to start interacting more in space than ever before. Some interactions will have benefits that make space more accessible to all nations. Other interactions could be viewed by one State as potentially threatening. The international community must work together to address these issues, rather than ignore them because they don't fit some states' definition of "preventing an arms race in outer space."

That is why the United States supports calls for a process to articulate threats to space systems, report on and develop possible solutions for responsible behaviors to manage perceived threats and risks to space systems, and infrastructure. We welcome approaches that call for the establishment of an inclusive, international process through the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee that can enhance the safety and security of outer space. That type of approach does not mean that we should cease engaging on and discussing space security issues at the Conference on Disarmament. However, we must recognize that threats and risks to satellites may not solely arise from the placement of weapons in outer space. Instead, it is the view of the United States that we can proceed with both of these approaches in parallel.

Beyond this, we believe that such "rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviors" generated in peacetime could form the foundation for habits of trust and co-operation between operators in the space environment, and reduce the risk of operating in space or the risk of conflict extending into outer space. We look forward to working cooperatively to identify those behaviors and develop and implement those voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible behavior over the coming years.

Finally, the United States is strongly committed to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Translating the WPS agenda into concerted action will take long-term commitment. The United States is resolute in its commitment and calls all governments to implement their commitments under 1325.

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons
UNFC October 2020

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Responsible State use of conventional weapons contributes to global and regional security and stability. However, in the wrong hands, these tools of security can be a source of global and regional destabilization. The international community must therefore cooperate to reduce risks posed by illicitly traded small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), including Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), and related ammunition. We look forward to the Seventh Biennial Meeting of States to consider the implementation of the Program of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects and the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on problems arising from the accumulation of ammunition stockpiles in surplus, both of which have been rescheduled for 2021, as opportunities to address issues raised by illicitly traded or unsecure SA/LW and ammunition stockpiles.

MANPADS in the wrong hands remain a significant threat to civil and military aviation, despite the absence of recent incidents against civilian aircraft. The United States continues to undertake focused work with partners to deter illicit trafficking and use of MANPADS, including through training programs for border security forces, destruction of excess State-held stocks, inclusion of MANPADS in Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD) programs, and assisting with the mitigation of MANPADS threats near critical civilian aviation sites.

States must act responsibly not only in their use of weapons, but also in their transfers of weapons. The UN Register of Conventional Arms is the cornerstone of international transparency and confidence-building efforts on conventional arms. Last year, SA/LW were added to the UN Register's existing seven categories of heavy weapons, ensuring that the UN Register provides transparency on the international transfer of the full spectrum of conventional weapons. We urge all States to report to the UN Register.

We welcome the decision of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons High Contracting Parties to endorse the GGE's affirmation of eleven guiding principles on lethal autonomous weapon systems and to continue the GGE on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons through 2021. Despite the logistical challenges due to COVID-19, the GGE held substantive discussions in September 2020, and we look forward to engaging further during the November session of the GGE. As States, we should work to build a better common understanding not only of the potential risks, but also the potential benefits that are presented by weapons with autonomous functions, including their potential to strengthen compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and to reduce the risk of civilian casualties. The U.S. military has robust programs and processes to implement our obligations under IHL, as well as a detailed policy on the use of autonomy in weapon systems. The use of advanced technologies has been shown in practice to be capable of improving the protection of civilians in armed conflict. Being willing to invest in such capabilities, along with the implementation of other good practices, can improve protections for civilians.

The United States has been participating in the Irish-led effort to develop a political declaration that relates to the protection of civilians in urban warfare. We believe this effort could be an excellent opportunity for States to commit to sharing good practices to mitigate harm to civilians in armed conflict and to strengthen compliance with IHL. As part of the process, we have proposed language in the political declaration that would encourage States to begin sharing their good practices on civilian protection immediately. Along with several other States, we have led by example by sharing with other participating States a technical compilation of practical measures that States can implement to strengthen the protection of civilians in military operations. In our view, any effort to ban or stigmatize the use of explosive weapons is impractical and counterproductive to strengthening protections for civilians because it could hamper efforts to protect civilians from bad actors like ISIS, and increase risks to civilians by incentivizing bad actors to hide in urban areas or use civilians as human shields. Coming to consensus on a commitment among participating States to share and promote good practices through non-political, military-to-military exchanges should be our common focus.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States is strongly committed to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Translating that agenda into concerted action will take long-term commitment. The United States is resolute in its commitment and calls on all governments to implement their commitments under this initiative.

Lastly, clearing explosive hazards contributes to stability and helps protect civilians. The United States is the single largest financial contributor to CWD efforts. Since 1993, we have provided more than \$3.7 billion in assistance to more than 100 countries to reduce excess arms and ammunition from state stockpiles, to improve stockpile security, and to remediate explosive hazards. Even amidst the global pandemic, we continue to provide support, particularly as humanitarian mine action plays an increasing role in our effort to deliver stabilization assistance in both post-conflict and conflict zones.

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Other Disarmament Measures
UNFC October 2020

Mr. Chairman,

My remarks today will address U.S. views relating to developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

Broad international consensus on a framework of responsible state behavior in cyberspace is the signature accomplishment of international cyber diplomacy discussions at the United Nations over the last decade. This framework consists of three elements: international law, peacetime norms, and confidence-building measures. The consensus reports of the 2010, 2013, and 2015 Group of Governmental Experts articulate the elements of this framework. The UN General Assembly, through its 2015, 2016, and 2018 resolutions, has repeatedly affirmed that all states should follow the reports' recommendations.

We believe the time is now to prioritize universalization and implementation of the Framework for Responsible State Behavior, because doing so is in all states' interests.

In 2018, the UN General Assembly began two new processes on Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security – the sixth round of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the first Open Ended Working Group (OEWG). Our goal for both venues is to universalize the recommendations made by consensus, and welcomed by the UN General Assembly, in the three successful GGE reports. The GGE is working on in-depth guidance on the recommendations contained in its three consensus reports.

The United States is also contributing constructively to the work of the OEWG. We believe the OEWG, which is open to all member states, serves as a useful and complementary venue to broaden awareness of the Framework of Responsible State Behavior and to discuss ways we can provide capacity building to help all States implement and uphold it.

This year, the United States has updated its draft resolution with minor revisions to note the productive ongoing work of both processes and affirm that the General Assembly will consider future work once the ongoing OEWG and GGE processes conclude. Given the negotiations underway in these two venues, including on the question of future institutional dialogue, we believe this is the correct approach for UNFC this year.

In contrast, in its draft resolution, Russia has proposed a five-year extension of the OEWG and has ignored the fact that the current mandate for the OEWG calls for a consensus report to be delivered to UNGA75. Frankly, this ignores the work of all UN member states who have contributed to and actively participated in the OEWG since 2018 as we work toward a consensus report. The intent of Russia's unhelpful proposal is clear: to pre-judge the results of consensus processes and pursue unending UN debates on controversial cyber issues via majority votes in UNGA. This plan will get us nowhere.

The United States aligns itself with member states who seek to return to a consensus-based process on cybersecurity within the UNGA First Committee. Our draft resolution aligns with that long-term objective.

Despite challenges like the Russian OEWG extension effort, we will continue to work with other member states toward meaningful, consensus outcomes that improve international stability in cyberspace, including in the area of future dialogue mechanisms on these issues in the UN. We also appreciate the efforts of the chairs of the GGE and OEWG, and their teams, to maintain momentum despite COVID-related scheduling obstacles.

Finally, in recognition of the 20th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the United States continues to lead on the implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Our ongoing commitment aims to ensure that women's voices are heard and taken into account in all major security, peace, and political decisions.

Statement by the United States
Thematic Discussion on Regional Disarmament and Security
UNFC October 2020

Mr. Chairman,

Regional approaches provide important avenues to further disarmament, security, and nonproliferation objectives. ASEAN's continued support for efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons and commitment to preserve the region as a nuclear weapon-free zone will be vital to address regional threats. China's expanding nuclear arsenal, estimated to more than double in the next decade, includes efforts to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed hypersonic missiles – all the while refusing to engage in substantive dialogue on nuclear arms control. China's refusal to engage is destabilizing and runs counter to its NPT Article VI commitment, especially for a country with global aspirations, but it will not delay U.S. efforts to begin shaping a new era of arms control with Russia. China's interests will not be served by coming late to the table.

Mr. Chairman,

Significant security challenges also persist in the Middle East region. Chief among these challenges are Iran's destabilizing activities, including its continued development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, expansion of uranium enrichment activities, and support for terrorism. In addition, Syria has repeatedly used chemical weapons against its own people in utter disregard for its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, and remains in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor with North Korean assistance. We urge all the regional states to refocus attention on addressing these significant real-world security issues.

The United States continues to support the goal of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems. We remain convinced that efforts to advance this goal must be pursued in an inclusive, cooperative, and consensus-based manner that takes into account the legitimate security concerns of all regional states. As it did not include participation by all the regional states and was convened despite lacking consensus regional support the United States declined to participate in the UN conference convened last November regarding establishing such a zone. We fear that such an approach will only set back prospects for inclusive regional dialogue toward our shared goals. We continue to believe the regional states should work cooperatively to identify practical steps that could build trust and promote an environment conducive to such a zone. The United States will support any initiatives in this regard that have consensus support among all the regional states and are based in direct and inclusive dialogue.

Mr. Chairman,

The United States is strongly committed to UNSCR 1325 and the implementation of the global Women, Peace, and Security agenda. The United States' long-standing belief that the meaningful participation of women is at the heart of efforts to promote security and advance peace. Our ongoing commitment aims to ensure that women's voices are heard and taken into account on major security, peace and political decisions.

In conclusion, none of us should be under the illusion that the long-term goal of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons can be achieved without doing the hard work necessary to address these security challenges. We encourage all states to join us in reinvigorating that work by engaging in a realistic dialogue about the world as it is and the steps we can take to reshape it into the world we would like it to be.

WRITTEN STATEMENT
submitted by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons
New York, October 2020

1. Viet Nam reaffirms its consistent policy of supporting common efforts of the international community on non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), with a view to the general and complete disarmament of these weapons. Viet Nam is a party to and fully complies with its obligations under all WMDs non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and related Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#).

2. We express our concern at the increasing global military expenditure, arms race trend and new challenges faced by disarmament and strategic weapons control in recent years. We note that according to a report in the 2019 the total expenditures for nuclear weapons reached 72.9 billion dollars, with an increase of 7.1 billions from 2018. At the same time, we are concerned about the continued impasse in multilateral efforts on nuclear disarmament including that at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over last 2 decades .

3. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continues to be the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the NPT's entry into force, we call upon all State Parties to dialogue and negotiate in good faith for the success of its upcoming 10th Review Conference in 2021.

It is importance to achieve the universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We continue to call upon the remaining States in CTBT's Annex 2 to sign and ratify the Treaty to enable its long-overdue entry into force.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a historic agreement. Viet Nam was proud to be the 10th country to ratify it. We welcome the fact that 50 states have ratified this Treaty. Viet Nam congratulates and thank all other 49 states for their efforts and commitments. We look forward to the entry into force and implementation of the Treaty. At the same time, we call on all other states to sign and ratify this important Treaty, thus contributing to the common efforts towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

4. Viet Nam continues to commit its joint efforts with all other Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Nuclear Weapons States to preserve the Southeast Asian region as a Nuclear Weapon- Free Zone and free of all other weapons of mass destruction. We support further efforts for strengthening other nuclear weapon-free regions and enhancing dialogue and negotiations for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

5. We welcome further coordination and cooperation, as well as the complementarity, between the General Assembly and the Security Council on nonproliferation and disarmament. Being a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the period of 2020-2021, we will continue to actively engage in and contribute to this endeavour for sustainable peace for all./.

WRITTEN STATEMENT
submitted by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
Thematic Discussion on Conventional Weapons
New York, October 2020

1. We are concerned about the negative impact, human casualty and suffering caused by the illicit proliferation and misuse of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons.

2. It is imperative that the implementation of all related international instruments should be in accordance with fundamental principles of international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, with States bearing primary role.

3. While emphasizing the principles of balance, consistency, nondiscrimination and non-politicisation when implementing those instruments, we reaffirm the sovereign rights of States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and retain conventional arms and relevant parts, components, and ammunition for their self-defense and security needs.

4. We continue to call for strengthening the multilateral disarmament machinery and instruments relating to conventional weapons by all states parties. We support the work of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA). We call for further regional and international cooperation, in accordance with respective contexts and needs, in addressing issues related to small arms and light weapons, including the illicit trades and misuse of these weapons.

5. Focus should further be given to humanitarian objectives of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. We support common efforts of the international community against the indiscriminate use of those weapons.

6. We welcome efforts of the international community to help affected countries to address the issue of mines and unexploded ordnance in aftermath of wars. We call for further enhancing the role and participation of women in mine action programmes, for supporting socio-economic development and the implementation of the Agenda 2030.

7. Viet Nam is currently implementing its National Mine Action Plan for the period 2010-2025. We have been making every efforts in addressing issues related to explosive remnants of war to ensure safe livelihoods and development for the people. In this regard, we thank all partners for their valuable contributions and assistance to mine action in Viet Nam, including demining and supporting affected victims. We are ready to share with other countries our experience of post-conflict reconstruction, victim assistance and socio-economic development in this field./.

Section III

Written submissions in explanation of vote

1. Armenia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. China
5. Colombia
6. Costa Rica
7. Cuba
8. Egypt (on behalf of the Arab Group)
9. Egypt
10. European Union
11. France (on behalf of P5 group)
12. France (on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States)
13. France
14. Germany (on behalf of the European Union)
15. Germany (on behalf of a group)
16. Germany and France
17. Germany
18. Guatemala
19. Guyana
20. India
21. Indonesia
22. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
23. Israel
24. Japan
25. Kazakhstan
26. Liechtenstein
27. Malaysia
28. Mexico
29. Netherlands (on behalf of a group)
30. Netherlands and Germany
31. New Zealand
32. Poland
33. Singapore
34. South Africa
35. Spain
36. Sweden
37. Switzerland
38. Turkey
39. United Kingdom (on behalf of France and the United Kingdom)
40. United States (on behalf of a group)
41. United States (on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and the United States)
42. United States (on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States)
43. United States
44. Uruguay

Explanation of Vote before the vote on:**Draft Resolution L.8/Rev.1 entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” and Draft Resolution L.4 entitled “Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security”**

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to present the position of the Delegation of Armenia on the Draft Resolutions L.8/Rev.1 “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” and L.4 “Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security”.

We recognize the critical role of Information and Communications Technologies in promoting peace and development, enabling realization of human rights, as well as in enhancing cooperation between nations.

Armenia attaches high priority to the protection of human rights and freedom of speech in the process of combating the use of ICT in malicious purposes. The denial of access to information and its underlying infrastructure violates human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, regardless of frontiers, as enshrined in the Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Armenia underscores great importance of open, free, stable and secure cyberspace, based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We would like to reiterate our long-standing position that the principles of international law in their entirety should become a basis for the responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. All purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, are applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment. Therefore, we don't support selective references to the principles of international law and UN Charter.

We believe that the OEWG, as an inclusive and transparent platform for discussions between Member States, should elaborate its own set of comprehensive rules, norms and procedures in the field of ICTs, which will come to fill the gaps of GGE Report.

It is with this understanding that the Delegation of Armenia will vote in favor of the resolutions L.8/Rev.1 and L.4.

I request that this position is duly reflected in the records of the Committee.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote before the vote on:**Draft Resolutions L.13, L.15, L.19, L.20, L.27, L.35 with regards to the reference to the 18-th NAM Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting and the 18th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the NAM**

Mr. Chairman,

I took the floor to explain the position of the Delegation of Armenia on Draft Resolutions contained in the documents L.13, L.15, L.19, L.20, L.27, L.35 with regard to references to the 18th Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, from 3 to 6 April 2018 and the 18th Summit of Heads of State or Government of the NAM on 25 and 26 October 2019 both held in Baku.

The paragraph 577 of the Final Document of the Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting and the paragraphs 662 and 663 of the Final Document of the Summit of Heads of State or Government of the NAM contain biased and one-sided formulations, distorting the root causes, essence and principles of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The provisions of the mentioned documents run counter to the long-established position of the international community on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as reflected in the statements of the OSCE Minsk

Group Co-Chairs, the only internationally agreed mediation format, dealing with the resolution of the conflict. The paragraphs of the Final Documents related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict also fall short of upholding the principles at the heart of the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly the right of people to self-determination.

Armenia rejects the above provisions of the NAM Final Documents and highly regrets that the Movement has appeared to condone the manipulative and abusive tactics of the current holder of its chairmanship.

Since assuming the chairmanship of the Movement, Azerbaijan has turned the NAM into a platform for advancing its distorted conflict narratives in violation of working methods of the Movement and undermining its principles and values.

In course of the ongoing military aggression of Azerbaijan against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) launched with direct military support of Turkey and involvement of foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries Azerbaijan has deliberately targeted civilian population and critical infrastructure of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has resulted in killing of dozens of civilians, including women and children, war crimes and atrocity crimes, destruction of religious sites, hospitals and schools.

Armenia deplores in strongest terms abuse of the chairmanship of the NAM by Azerbaijan and urges the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement to support the position of the international community, expressed in the statements of the United Nations Secretary-General and the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, condemning the use of force, calling to immediately cease the hostilities in line with commitments on humanitarian ceasefire and agree upon ceasefire verification mechanism.

In the face of the ongoing violence, war crimes, atrocities and deteriorating humanitarian situation the international community should stand united in condemning the party responsible for unleashing armed aggression, violating the ceasefire agreements, obstructing the establishment of a ceasefire verification mechanism and gross violations of the international human rights law and humanitarian law.

In light of the above the Delegation of Armenia would like to register its reservation and disassociation from paragraphs of those resolutions of the First Committee containing a reference to the Mid-Term Ministerial Meeting and Summit of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Baku.

I request that this position is duly reflected in the records of the Committee.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote before the vote

Draft Resolution L.53 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” and other ATT Related Resolutions

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to deliver an Explanation of Vote on Draft Resolution L.53 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

Armenia strongly advocates a robust and legally binding conventional arms control regime – be it at regional or international level, that would enable efficient regulation of trade in conventional arms, prevent and eradicate their diversion into illicit markets, or their use for illegitimate purposes, in particular serious violations of human rights.

Armenia reiterates its concerns regarding the “Preamble and Principles” section of the Arms Trade Treaty. We have continuously stressed the need of balanced and non-restrictive references to the principles of the international law, including the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with Article 1 of the UN Charter.

We reaffirm our position that the Treaty in its current shape may be interpreted as limiting the exercise of sovereign right to self-defense as well as hinder the legitimate access to relevant technologies.

The key objective of the Treaty – the encouragement and enforcement of regulation of the conventional arms trade through strong national control systems, could have been upheld more strongly.

Armenia will abstain on resolution L.53. Armenia's position concerning the ATT is applicable to all other resolutions of the First Committee containing a reference to the Treaty, therefore we disassociate from those paragraphs.

I request that this position is duly reflected in the records of the Committee.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote before the vote on:

Draft Resolution L.61 entitled “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” and draft resolution L.43 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me to present the position of the Delegation of Armenia on the draft resolutions L.61 “Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects” and L.43 “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Delegation of Armenia will join consensus on the resolution in L.61 in view of the importance to demonstrate unity and solidarity of international community in addressing the issue of impact of excessively injurious and indiscriminate weaponry on civilian population and environment during armed conflicts.

We are concerned by the use of such types of weaponry, in particular incendiary weapons, including in our region. As most of you are aware, it is more than a month, since Azerbaijan with direct involvement of Turkey and foreign terrorist fighters and mercenaries has unleashed a large-scale military aggression against the people of Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh). The hostilities are accompanied by indiscriminate targeting of civilian settlements and critical civilian infrastructure by Azerbaijan and its supporters, including by incendiary weapons.

Since 30 October the armed forces of Azerbaijan have been using munitions containing chemical elements of white phosphorus causing severe injuries to the civilian population and forest fires in the vicinity of the civilian settlements, which can potentially lead to environmental disaster. The use of such weapons, which do not distinguish between military and civilian targets, while also causing environmental disasters and possible human losses, constitute war crimes. This is yet another manifestation of Azerbaijan's policy aimed at making the life in Artsakh impossible by inflicting maximum damage not only to the critical civilian infrastructure, but also to the environment.

Mr. Chairman,

We condemn in strongest terms massive use of banned weapons, including cluster munitions by Azerbaijani armed forces against the civilian population and infrastructure in Nagorno-Karabakh. Targeted air bombardments and missile strikes on more than 120 settlements in Artsakh, including the capital Stepanakert and cities of Martakert, Martuni, Shushi, Hadrut have resulted in killing of 50 civilians, including women and children and other vulnerable persons, with 140 injured. Hundreds of unexploded cluster bomblets have contaminated vast areas of NK, which put more civilians, especially children, at risk.

The resolution sends an important message of deploring the recent cases of use of cluster munitions and related casualties. Bearing in mind the critical importance to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by cluster munitions Armenia will vote in favour of the resolution L.43.

I request that this position is duly reflected in the records of the Committee.

Thank you.

**General Statement by AUSTRIA
Cluster I –Nuclear Weapons
3 November 2020**

Mr. President,

I have the honour to formally introduce draft resolution L. 6 entitled “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, submitted by Brazil, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, South Africa, Thailand and my own country, Austria. The resolution is currently co-sponsored by 65 countries.

After being opened for signature on 20 September 2017, the TPNW’s now counts 84 signatories and reached the threshold of 50 States parties necessary for entry into force on 24 October 2020. We look forward to the Treaty’s entry into force on 22 January 2021.

With the adoption of the TPNW, a clear majority of states have decided that in light of the evidence of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and the risks that these weapons of mass destruction pose, the status quo is not acceptable.

As a legally binding norm to prohibit nuclear weapons, the TPNW is indispensable to reach and maintain a world free of nuclear weapons and to fulfil the obligations of Art. VI of the NPT.

There are no inconsistencies between the NPT and TPNW –in fact, the TPNW reaffirms that the NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the TPNW It strengthens the taboo against nuclear weapons, irrespective of who possesses them, and thus supports the implementation of Articles II and VI of the NPT.

Furthermore the TPNW requires a higher standard on safeguards than the NPT does and –unlike the NPT –also requires States Parties that possess nuclear weapons to directly negotiate, conclude, and maintain an adequate safeguards agreement.

To quote the Secretary General, the TPNW is a further pillar of the disarmament regime. As such, it enables States that so choose to subscribe to some of the highest available multilateral norms against nuclear weapons.

Resolution L. 12 has deliberately been drafted as a purely technical resolution, containing no PPs but merely the customary implementation provisions for treaties.

A revision to OP 3, which updates the number of ratifications of the Treaty and welcomes the Treaty’s entry into force will be introduced before taking action.

We would be grateful for your support.

Mr. President,

Allow me to also take this occasion to introduce resolution L. 5 titled “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”, presented by the same group of countries as L.6. The resolution is currently co-sponsored by 87 countries.

The resolution contains only technical updates compared to last year and as such remains entirely based on the Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons as delivered on behalf of 159 Countries at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

The sponsors of the two resolutions are fully and firmly committed to the NPT and the commitments taken in the NPT review process.

We therefore call on all states to sign and ratify the TPNW and to vote in favour of resolutions L.6 “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” and L.5 “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons”

Mr. President,

Allow me finally to make some remarks on other resolutions in this cluster. We remain concerned that at a time where progress on nuclear disarmament has slowed and even worse, is partially reversed through modernisation of arsenals and development of new nuclear warheads and delivery systems, we are seeing increased attempts to backtrack on parts of the NPT acquis.

This is highly dangerous and very worrying, also in view of the upcoming tenth NPT Review Conference. General Assembly Resolutions should not be used as trial runs for potential language to be used in the Review Conference, especially when such language strives to weaken existing obligations and commitments.

We need to reaffirm that the NPT and the outcome documents of previous Review Conferences remain fully valid until they have been fully implemented. The commitments and agreements agreed to by all NPT states parties are obligations and we need to see concrete progress on the implementation of these obligations and commitments.

Consequently, we cannot support any resolutions which seek to backtrack on or question existing Treaty obligations and their implementation.

I thank you.

Austria - Explanation of Vote after the Vote

L.71 “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”

Mr Chair,

I am taking the floor to explain Austria’s vote on resolution L.71 “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

Let me start at the outset by thanking Japan as the main sponsor for this resolution for their consultations and for their longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament. In our explanation of vote on the same resolution last year, we ended with an appeal that this year’s resolution regain balance and chart truly joint courses of action agreeable to all member states.

We are disappointed that these hopes were not fulfilled and regret that, in some parts, the resolution has been weakened further. Consequently, Austria again was not in a position to vote in favor of resolution L.71. On the paragraph votes, Austria followed her longstanding practice of voting on the merit of each paragraph. Allow me to explain our position on a few of the paragraphs:

We remain deeply worried about attempts to replace established consensus language with new formulations that backtrack on existing commitments agreed upon during past NPT Review Conferences or add new conditions to them. We are very concerned about the potential negative impact of this changed language on the integrity of the NPT and on the ongoing NPT Review Process. This is especially acute ahead of next year’s review conference in which we place great importance – we remain fully committed to achieving a successful outcome of the conference. Austria wishes to hereby place on record that the NPT and its adopted outcome documents of previous NPT review conferences remain integrally valid.

Elements of the text of draft resolution L.71 are unfortunately incompatible with the wording of existing commitments and decisions of previous NPT review conferences. Austria is a strong supporter of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which represents the cornerstone of the nuclear **disarmament** and non-proliferation architecture. PP 2 placed its main focus solely on non-proliferation and treated disarmament in a secondary manner, which is why we abstained on the vote on it.

In the NPT Review Process, important commitments were agreed upon to ensure the progress on implementation of the treaty and to support the delicate balance the treaty represents. While the importance of these agreements is mentioned in PP4 of the Resolution, it regrettably omitted the importance of implementing these agreements. We remain fully committed to past agreed steps, but are strongly concerned that a lack of their implementation undermines the Review Process. As we do not support the notion that implementation of agreements is not important, we had to vote against PP4.

The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons form the very underpinning of nuclear disarmament. We voted in favor of PP19 in order to have this fundamental issue reflected in the Text. However, we regret that the Resolution, in PP19, departed from the NPT acquis, which still stands as agreed language by the NPT’s State Parties. where the 2010 Review Conference adopted by consensus the following language – and I quote: *“The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result*

from the use of nuclear weapons”. Our vote on this paragraph cannot be construed as Austria accepting the language contained in this resolution in the upcoming NPT review conference.

Austria supports the implementation of measures to reduce the risk of nuclear detonations by miscalculation, misunderstanding or by willful use. In OP3b, we would have preferred clarification that such risk reduction measures cannot be a substitute for complete nuclear disarmament. Additionally, the paragraph introduced a selective list of risk reduction measures while leaving out more substantive measures such as de-alerting. Austria consequently had to abstain on this paragraph.

In OP 3d, we regret that the already weak language on the CTBT, against which Austria voted last year, has been compromised further. Standard agreed language on the CTBT regularly urges all states and in particular the Annex II states to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without waiting for any other state to do so. As strong supporters of the CTBT, its entry into force and as the host state to the CTBTO, we regret that this resolution dilutes this call, which we have heard by a large number of delegations during this year’s First committee, even further. We therefore voted against OP3d once more and also voted against PP9 which in similar fashion diverts the focus from signing and ratification of the CTBT and its early entry into force. We repeat our clear position that testing moratoria, though their significance as an interim measures is given, can be no substitution to a legally binding prohibition of nuclear tests.

Regarding the DPRK’s nuclear program, we are surprised to see that language calling for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles of all ranges and related nuclear and ballistic missile programs was removed from OP5, moved to PP 17 and replaced with less comprehensive language which is not consistent with relevant Security Council resolutions.

Overall, we regret that the draft resolution follows a narrative that the total elimination of nuclear weapons would only occur after confidence and trust have been rebuilt. This does not reflect the historic fact that major nuclear disarmament agreements were achieved precisely at the height of the cold war. On the contrary, Disarmament measures are particularly needed when tensions are high. This conviction guided our abstention on PP12 – while we recognize the importance of New START, we regret that the paragraph does not call for its extension and frames arms control dialogues as “preparing the way for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons”.

To conclude, let me once again express our esteem for the main sponsor, Japan, for its successful quest in the past to act as a uniting force. We hope that future iterations of this resolution will regain more balance and act as true bridge building blocks for joint courses of actions.

I thank you.

Belgique - Explication de vote – L.14 “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”

La Belgique vote en faveur de la résolution L.14 « **Effets de l’utilisation d’armes et de munitions contenant de l’uranium appauvri** ».

Le 11 mai 2007, la Belgique a approuvé une loi qui classe en tant qu’armes prohibées les munitions inertes et les blindages contenant de l’uranium appauvri ou tout autre type d’uranium industriel général. Cette loi est entrée en vigueur en 2009. La Belgique est ainsi le premier pays au monde à avoir décrété une interdiction de ce type d’armement en vertu des principes de précaution et de prudence.

En effet, l’adoption de la loi belge a été précédée d’auditions parlementaires durant lesquelles des experts scientifiques se sont exprimés. Des points de vue différents y ont été exposés quant à l’évaluation du danger causé à la santé et à l’environnement par l’utilisation d’armes contenant de l’uranium appauvri. La Belgique porte la plus grande attention à tout développement dans l’analyse scientifique des dangers liés à l’utilisation de systèmes d’armements à uranium appauvri, y compris aux études menées à ce sujet au niveau international.

La Belgique se tient à la disposition des Nations Unies et de ses Etats membres pour toute information concernant les définitions, les objectifs et les modalités de la loi du 11 mai 2007.

La Belgique espère que la résolution que nous adopterons en Première Commission pourra contribuer à une meilleure compréhension, au niveau international, des effets possibles induits par les munitions à uranium appauvri en vue de convenir, en temps utile, à une évaluation commune.

中国代表团关于生化领域决议草案的解释性发言

中国对L.29号决议草案投了反对票，愿借此机会阐述中方立场。

中方一贯坚决反对任何国家、任何组织、任何个人，在任何情况下、出于任何目的使用化学武器。对指称使用化武问题，中方主张严格按照公约规定，充分利用公约现有机制开展调查，得出经得起历史和事实检验的结论。

令人遗憾的是，对叙利亚化武问题的调查并未遵循上述原则，中方对此深感关切。禁化武组织“调查鉴定组”的成立和工作方式都不符合禁化武公约的规定，其提交的报告存在诸多疑点和漏洞。中方对禁化武组织成立“调查鉴定组”的决定，以及基于“调查鉴定组”报告采取进一步行动的决定都投了反对票。

在处理叙化武问题和其他指称使用化武事件的过程中，一些国家出于地缘政治目的进行政治操弄，无视各方不同意见和关切，动辄强行付诸表决。这不仅无助于解决问题，还进一步破坏了禁化武组织的团结，损害了禁化武公约的权威。中方对此坚决反对。

中方将继续本着负责任态度，致力于加强禁化武公约，维护国际和地区的和平与稳定。我们希望各方相向而行，通过对话协商弥合分歧、凝聚共识，妥善解决有关问题。

Explanation of Vote by the Chinese Delegation on Cluster 2 Resolutions at the 75th UNGA First Committee

China voted against the draft resolution L.29, and would like to take this opportunity to elaborate the Chinese position.

China stands firmly against the use of chemical weapons for any purpose and by any country, organization or individual under any circumstances. We stand for investigations into alleged use of chemical weapons through the existing Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) mechanisms and in strict accordance with the CWC in order to reach a conclusion that can stand the test of time and facts.

It is regrettable that the investigation of chemical-weapon issue in Syria has not followed the above principles. Many countries including China believe that the establishment of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) and its work are not in accordance with the provisions of the CWC. The IIT report contains many controversial conclusions and loopholes. China voted against the decisions respectively on establishing the IIT and taking further actions based on the IIT report at the OPCW.

When dealing with the chemical-weapon issue in Syria and other alleged use of chemical weapons, a small number of countries manipulated these issues for geo-political purposes, and even pushed for a vote at the OPCW by ignoring different views and concerns. Such a behavior does not help in finding a solution, but is detrimental to the unity of the OPCW and authority of the CWC. China is resolutely opposed to that behavior.

China is willing to make efforts to strengthen the CWC, and safeguard international and regional peace and stability in a responsible manner. We hope that all relevant parties meet each other halfway, resolve differences and forge consensus through dialogue and consultation, and find a proper solution to relevant issues.

DECLARACIÓN DE COLOMBIA

PRESENTACIÓN DEL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.44 “COMERCIO ILÍCITO DE ARMAS PEQUEÑAS Y LIGERAS EN TODOS SUS ASPECTOS”

PRIMERA COMISIÓN

75 PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE NACIONES UNIDAS

Nueva York, noviembre 2 2020

Señor Presidente:

Colombia, como uno de los patrocinadores de la Resolución sobre *“El Comercio Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en todos sus aspectos”*, agradece a Japón la presentación del Proyecto y lo apoya plenamente.

El comercio y manufactura ilícita de armas pequeñas y ligeras, junto con el de municiones y explosivos, continúa siendo una preocupación y una amenaza contra la paz, la seguridad, el desarrollo sostenible y la estabilidad mundial, en la medida en que grupos terroristas y de delincuencia organizada transnacional tienen acceso a estos elementos a un relativo “bajo” costo y “fácil” transporte.

Las dimensiones del problema demuestran que este es resultado de la conjugación de realidades nacionales con flujos y variables de nivel regional y global, por lo que es imprescindible continuar y fortalecer la articulación de acciones en estos diferentes niveles.

La cooperación y la asistencia internacional son esenciales, y complementarias a las medidas nacionales y regionales, para la ejecución plena y efectiva del Programa de Acción para Prevenir, Combatir y Eliminar el Tráfico Ilícito de Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras en Todos Sus Aspectos, y del Instrumento Internacional de Localización.

Por lo tanto, este proyecto de Resolución busca seguir fortaleciendo los esfuerzos colectivos en la lucha contra este delito, así como la cooperación internacional en la materia. Colombia invita a todas las Delegaciones a nuevamente adoptar la resolución sin votación.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE COLOMBIA RESOLUCIÓN “JOINT COURSES OF ACTION AND FUTURE-ORIENTED DIALOGUE TOWARDS A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS” (A/C.1/75/L.71)

CLUSTER ARMAS NUCLEARES PRIMERA COMISIÓN 75 PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE NACIONES UNIDAS

Nueva York, noviembre 2020

Gracias Señor Presidente:

Mi Delegación hace esta explicación de voto en relación con la Resolución contenida en el Documento L.71, *“Joint Courses of Action and Future-Oriented Dialogue towards a World without Nuclear Weapons”*.

Colombia tiene un firme compromiso con el desarme y no proliferación de las armas de destrucción masiva, y dentro de ellas de las armas nucleares.

Para Colombia, ninguna resolución de la Asamblea General tiene ni el estatus, ni la fuerza jurídica para cambiar las disposiciones de los instrumentos vinculantes. Por lo tanto, esta Resolución no puede ser interpretada o aplicada en detrimento de las obligaciones jurídicas establecidas en el Tratado sobre la No Proliferación de las Armas Nucleares, ni de los compromisos acordados en sus Conferencias de Examen, cuyo objetivo es “examinar el funcionamiento del Tratado para asegurarse que se están cumpliendo los fines del preámbulo y las disposiciones del Tratado”.

Colombia apoyó esta Resolución en el 2019 y lo hizo ahora nuevamente porque entiende que su motivación es el objetivo del desarme general y completo, al igual que la búsqueda de pasos inmediatos para avanzar hacia el logro de dicho objetivo.

Gracias Señor Presidente.

United Nations First Committee: Explanation on vote for draft resolutions L.45/Rev.1. and L.62
 Minister Counsellor José David Murillo, Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations.
 75th Session of the General Assembly, New York, Friday November 6th, 2020

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Estimado señor Presidente,

Me permito hacer uso de la palabra para razonar el voto de mi país a favor del proyecto de resolución L.62, “No ser el primero en emplazar armas en el espacio ultraterrestre”, y todos sus párrafos, ya que coincide en la necesidad de prevenir una carrera armamentista en el espacio.

Nuestro voto se fundamenta en el compromiso del desarme general y completo, pero esencialmente en la obligación de preservar este espacio para fines exclusivamente pacíficos; consideramos que como humanidad, debemos ir más allá, y reconocer el espacio como una zona de paz.

El hecho que un Estado o un grupo de ellos declaren que no serán los primeros en colocar allí armas, no equivale a la prohibición absoluta, clara y contundente de evitar del todo que armas de cualquier tipo sean colocadas en el espacio, como lo hubiéramos esperado.

United Nations First Committee: Explanation on vote for draft resolutions L.45/Rev.1. and L.62
 Minister Counsellor José David Murillo, Mission of Costa Rica to the United Nations.
 75th Session of the General Assembly, New York, Friday November 6th, 2020.

Señor Presidente, permítame también referirme al proyecto de resolución L.45/Rev.1. *Reducción de las amenazas relacionadas con el espacio mediante normas, reglas y principios de conductas responsables.*

En concordancia con el razonamiento anterior, Costa Rica debe insistir que todas las actividades en el espacio deben ser realizadas con fines exclusivamente pacíficos.

Con el aumento en los actores y los tipos de actividades que se llevan a cabo actualmente en el espacio, es importante que este foro sostenga conversaciones que nos ayuden a garantizar el uso exclusivamente pacífico y es por esta razón que mi país votó a favor de esta resolución y todos sus párrafos.

Sin embargo, dejamos constancia de que el ejercicio de identificación de amenazas que se plantea en la resolución no debe de ninguna manera constituir una base o precedente para justificar ningún tipo de agresión o carrera armamentista en Tierra o en el espacio.

Le agradezco.

Dear Mr. President,

I allow myself to take the floor to explain the vote of my country in favor of draft resolution L.62, “*No first placement of weapons in outer space*”, and all its paragraphs, since it agrees on the need to prevent an arms race in space.

Our vote is based on the commitment to general and complete disarmament, but essentially on the obligation to preserve the space for exclusively peaceful purposes; We believe that as humanity, we must go further, and recognize space as a zone of peace.

The fact that a State or a group of them declare that they will not be the first to place weapons in the outer space, does not equal to the absolute, clear and forceful prohibition of completely preventing weapons of any kind from being placed in space, as we would have expected.

Mr President, allow me also to refer to draft resolution L.45 /Rev.1. “*Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours*”.

In accordance with the foregoing rationale, Costa Rica must insist that all activities in space must be carried out for exclusively peaceful purposes.

With the increase in actors and types of activities currently taking place in space, it is important that this forum holds conversations that help us ensure exclusively peaceful uses in the space and it is for this reason that my country voted in favor of this resolution and all its paragraphs.

However, we want to place on record that the exercise of identification of threat proposed in the resolution should in no way constitute a basis or precedent to justify any type of aggression or arms race on Earth or in space.

I thank you.

DECLARACION GENERAL DE CUBA**GRUPO DE TEMAS NO. 1 “ARMAS NUCLEARES”
PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU**

Señor Presidente:

La delegación de Cuba toma la palabra para realizar una declaración general bajo el grupo de temas referido a las armas nucleares, específicamente sobre los proyectos de resolución siguientes, que copatrocinamos: **L.6, L.17, L.22, L.34, L.36, L.50 y L.55.**

El proyecto **L.6** “Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares”, que consideraremos, se presenta este año bajo circunstancias alentadoras. En el marco de 75 Aniversario de las Naciones Unidas, resulta un hito histórico haber alcanzado la ratificación número 50 que posibilitará la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares el próximo enero, quedando así legalmente prohibidas esta categoría de armas. Ese instrumento proscribire el uso, existencia y desarrollo de las armas nucleares, refrenda que son inhumanas, inmorales, y éticamente indefendibles, refuerza y complementa el TNP, en particular la aplicación de su Artículo VI.

Exhortamos a los Estados Miembros que aún no lo han hecho que firmen y ratifiquen el Tratado a la mayor brevedad. Reiteramos que la única manera efectiva de evitar el terrible impacto de esas armas, es su eliminación total, de forma verificable, transparente e irreversible.

En relación con el proyecto **L.17** “Seguimiento a la Reunión de Alto Nivel de la Asamblea General del 2013 sobre Desarme Nuclear”, deseamos resaltar que esta iniciativa del Movimiento de Países No Alineados posibilita que, cada 26 de septiembre celebremos, el Día Internacional para la Eliminación Total de las Armas Nucleares.

Una vez más, 120 países de la comunidad internacional, han expresado su preocupación por el perfeccionamiento de las armas nucleares existentes y el desarrollo de nuevos tipos de armas nucleares previstos en las doctrinas militares de algunos Estados poseedores, incluida la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear de los Estados Unidos de 2018, que violan las obligaciones jurídicas en materia de desarme nuclear, así como los compromisos contraídos de reducir el papel de las armas nucleares en sus políticas militares y de seguridad.

El proyecto de resolución **L.19** “Desarme Nuclear”, en nuestra opinión, sigue siendo uno de los textos que mejor aborda esta cuestión del desarme nuclear, la cual es y debe continuar siendo la máxima prioridad en la esfera del desarme.

En relación con el **L.55**: “Seguimiento de la opinión consultiva de la Corte Internacional de Justicia sobre la legalidad de la amenaza o el empleo de las armas nucleares”, el proyecto reafirma que la continua existencia de las armas nucleares representa una amenaza para la humanidad, así como la determinación de la comunidad internacional de alcanzar el objetivo de un mundo libre de armas nucleares. En ese sentido, instamos a los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares a que muestren voluntad política y rectifiquen sus posturas, en particular en el marco del 50 Aniversario de la firma del TNP.

Instamos a votar a favor de todos los proyectos de resolución antes mencionados y de cualquier párrafo específico al que se le solicite votación por separado.

Muchas Gracias

**DECLARACIÓN GENERAL REALIZADA POR LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA.
GRUPO TEMÁTICO 3 “ESPACIO ULTRATERRESTRE”.
PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA YORK.**

Señor Presidente:

La amenaza de una carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre y el continuo desarrollo y perfeccionamiento del armamento espacial, atentan contra la realización de las aspiraciones de los pueblos, en particular de los países más pequeños, de beneficiarse del potencial de las tecnologías espaciales para la implementación de Agenda 2030.

Cuba aboga por el legítimo derecho de todos los Estados a acceder al espacio ultraterrestre en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación.

Resulta muy preocupante la utilización de las tecnologías espaciales en detrimento de la seguridad de las naciones, incluida la nutrida red de satélites espías existente, que además de ser incompatible con la paz y el desarrollo, continúa saturando la órbita geoestacionaria con gran cantidad de desechos espaciales.

Asimismo, resulta alarmante la declaración de que “el espacio es un dominio de guerra” y la creación del Comando Espacial de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos. Debemos impedir a tiempo la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre.

Resulta necesario fortalecer el régimen jurídico existente para prevenir una carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre. Es por ello que Cuba apoya la adopción de un tratado legalmente vinculante para la prevención y prohibición del emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre, y lamenta que un Estado haya bloqueado el consenso en la adopción del informe final del Grupo de Expertos, establecido por la Asamblea General, para presentar recomendaciones sobre los elementos sustantivos de un instrumento legalmente vinculante para la prevención y prohibición de la carrera de armamentos en el espacio.

La delegación cubana copatrocina y apoya los proyectos de resolución: **L.3** “Prevención de la carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre”, el **L.63** “Otras medidas prácticas para la prevención de una carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre”; el **L.62** “No primer emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre” y **L.66** “Medidas de transparencia y fomento de la confianza en las actividades relativas al espacio ultraterrestre”.

Instamos a los Estados miembros a votar favor de los proyectos de resolución mencionados y de los párrafos a los que se les solicite votación por separado.

Muchas gracias.

Declaración General realizada por la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA sobre el proyecto de resolución L.8/Rev.1 “avances en la esfera de la información y las telecomunicaciones en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”. Primera Comisión. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana ha tomado la palabra para realizar una declaración general sobre el proyecto de resolución **L.8/Rev.1** “Avances en la esfera de la información y las telecomunicaciones en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”, que Cuba copatrocina y apoya tradicionalmente.

El Grupo de Trabajo de composición abierta de la Asamblea General sobre avances en la esfera de la información y las comunicaciones, es sin dudas, un proceso histórico; es el primer foro que brinda a todos los Estados Miembros la oportunidad de participar y expresar sus opiniones de manera transparente y en pie de igualdad.

En ese sentido, llamamos a los Estados miembros a apoyar el L.8/Rev.1 y los párrafos que se han sometido a votación por separado, como muestra del respaldo a la continuidad de los debates sobre las tecnologías de la

información y las comunicaciones, en un Grupo de Trabajo abierto, transparente e inclusivo, donde todos los Estados Miembros podemos continuar negociando en igualdad de condiciones, sin interferencia de ningún tipo.

Para Cuba la forma adecuada de atender las preocupaciones de la comunidad internacional en este tema y posibilitar soluciones, por consenso, multilateralmente negociadas, es a través de un Grupo de Trabajo de Composición Abierta de la AGNU.

El proyecto de resolución no prejuzga de modo alguno los resultados del proceso en curso; sino que nos ofrece un espacio para discutirlos.

Nos ofrece además, el marco multilateral e institucional adecuado donde podemos discutir propuestas nacionales; así como, seguir estudiando, con miras a promover la comprensión común, las amenazas actuales y potenciales en que se derivan del uso de las TICs.

Continuamos respaldando el inicio, sin más demora, de un proceso negociador en el marco de las Naciones Unidas, para adoptar un instrumento internacional jurídicamente vinculante, que permita dar respuesta efectiva a los significativos vacíos legales que hoy se aprecian en el contexto de la ciberseguridad y atender de manera efectiva y sobre la base de la cooperación multilateral, a los crecientes retos y amenazas que enfrentamos en esta materia.

Llamamos a votar a favor de la resolución en su conjunto y de los párrafos PP10 y OP1 que se votarán por separado.

Muchas Gracias

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE cuba, sobre el proyecto de resolución L.4 “Avances en el comportamiento responsable del Estado en el ciberespacio en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”. Primera Comisión. 75 AGNU

Señor Presidente:

Tomamos la palabra para explicar nuestro voto sobre el proyecto de resolución L.4 “Avances en el comportamiento responsable del Estado en el ciberespacio en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”.

Nuestra delegación no apoyará este texto y votará en contra porque consideramos que su autor principal debió haber mostrado flexibilidad y presentar un texto de conjunto con la Federación de Rusia permitiendo el restablecimiento del consenso en este tema, en vez de promover un enfoque que trata de poner fin a las discusiones sobre sobre el tema en un marco abierto, transparente e inclusivo.

No corresponde al patrocinador principal de este texto, determinar cuándo o cómo los Estados Miembros debemos continuar las discusiones en el tema, tratando de prejuzgar los futuros debates en un Grupo de Trabajo Abierto. Esta actitud nos ha conducido una vez más a la polarización en este tema.

Nos oponemos a la presentación de resoluciones paralelas, que compiten entre sí y que pretenden dividir a la comunidad internacional. Recordamos que fue la delegación patrocinadora de este proyecto de resolución quien rompió el consenso en el tema y promovió en el 2018 un texto alternativo al texto que tradicionalmente se consideraba en la Comisión.

El L.4 es desbalanceado en el tratamiento al Grupo de Trabajo de Composición Abierta que es, indiscutiblemente, el foro apropiado para abordar el tema de forma transparente, inclusiva, multilateral, democrática y abierta, con la plena participación de todos los Estados miembros, en igualdad de condiciones.

Reiteramos que los Grupos de Expertos sobre este tema han agotado las discusiones sobre la aplicabilidad del derecho internacional en el uso de las nuevas tecnologías de información y las comunicaciones, sin llegar a un consenso sobre las acciones urgentes que se necesitan para impedir el empleo encubierto e ilegal, por individuos, organizaciones y Estados, de los sistemas informáticos de otras naciones para agredir a terceros países.

El autor de este texto no tiene moral alguna para “promuever el comportamiento responsable de los Estados en el ciberespacio” al tiempo que desarrolla operaciones y capacidades ciberoofensivas y una doctrina militar que autoriza el uso de armas cibernéticas y la posibilidad de lanzar ataques cibernéticos preventivos para disuadir a sus adversarios. Rechazamos los intentos de convertir el ciberespacio en un teatro de operaciones militares y legitimar en ese contexto acciones unilaterales punitivas de fuerza.

Muchas Gracias

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.29 “IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA CONVENCIÓN SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL DESARROLLO, PRODUCCIÓN, ALMACENAMIENTO Y USO DE LAS ARMAS QUÍMICAS Y SU DESTRUCCIÓN”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana quisiera explicar su voto respecto al proyecto de resolución **L.29** “Implementación de la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Desarrollo, Producción, Almacenamiento y Uso de las Armas Químicas y su Destrucción”.

Reiteramos el pleno compromiso de Cuba con la plena, efectiva y no discriminatoria implementación de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas. Cuba no posee, ni tiene intención de poseer armas químicas. Rechazamos categóricamente el empleo de estas armas y abogamos por la destrucción completa, irreversible y de forma verificada de todas las categorías de armas químicas declaradas restantes.

Señor Presidente:

Aunque Cuba comparte el objetivo general de este proyecto de resolución y el pleno compromiso con la Convención, lamentablemente, tampoco podrá apoyarlo este año. Cuba se abstendrá nuevamente en la votación del proyecto **L.29** y votará en abstención en el párrafo preambular 6, y en contra, de los operativos 2, 3, 4, 5 y 17.

Recordamos este es el único texto con que contamos en la Comisión para considerar la implementación de la Convención para la Prohibición de las armas químicas, y en ese sentido, resulta necesario continuar trabajando para restaurar el tradicional equilibrio y balance del proyecto de resolución y retomar la práctica de su adopción por consenso.

Con relación a los párrafos operativos 2 y 3, consideramos que es inadmisibles singularizar a un Estado Parte de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas, de emplear estas armas, sin una investigación independiente, imparcial, completa y concluyente de la OPAQ, basada en pruebas fidedignas y en muestras tomadas en el terreno, en pleno cumplimiento de la Convención.

En el caso de los operativos 4, 5 y 17, consideramos que no debe trasladarse a los debates de la Comisión aquellos elementos que no gozan de consenso en la OPAQ, ni tuvieron respaldo en el Consejo de Seguridad. La Primera Comisión no está mandatada para refrendar ni tomar acción sobre los resultados de informes presentados al Consejo de Seguridad, que no se sustentan en una investigación exhaustiva en el terreno, de conformidad con las disposiciones de la Convención.

La decisión C-SS-4/DEC.3 adoptada en la Cuarta Sesión Especial de la Conferencia de Estados Parte de la Convención sobre las Armas Químicas, en 2018, no fue apoyada por todos los Estados Partes de la Convención. Esta decisión que va más allá de las prerrogativas otorgadas a la Secretaría Técnica de la OPAQ en la letra de la Convención e intenta modificar el mandato técnico de la Organización.

Rechazamos la creación de mecanismos precipitados y no consensuados, sin tener en cuenta las opiniones de los Estados Partes, y que establecen precedentes muy negativos contra un Estado Parte de la Convención.

El proyecto de resolución continúa ignorando la cooperación que brindó el gobierno sirio en la destrucción de todas sus armas químicas e instalaciones de producción, a pesar de la complejidad de la situación de seguridad. Las cuestiones técnicas pendientes sobre la Declaración siria, deben resolverse en el marco de la OPAQ, sin enfoques sesgados ni politizados, en correspondencia con los procedimientos allí establecidos.

Debemos superar la confrontación y la politización que afectan el espíritu de cooperación y el apoyo unánime a la Convención sobre las Armas Químicas.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.45 “REDUCIR LAS AMENAZAS ESPACIALES A TRAVÉS DE NORMAS, REGLAS Y PRINCIPIOS DE COMPORTAMIENTOS RESPONSABLES”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana quisiera explicar su voto respecto al proyecto de resolución **L.45** “Reducir las amenazas espaciales a través de normas, reglas y principios de comportamientos responsables”.

Cuba no apoyó este proyecto de resolución en tanto no fueron atendidas las preocupaciones de nuestra delegación, planteadas desde la primera consulta en esta sede.

En opinión de Cuba, el foro apropiado para abordar la cuestión de la seguridad de las operaciones espaciales, así como otras cuestiones abordadas en el texto, incluido las Directrices de sostenibilidad a largo plazo sobre las actividades en el espacio ultraterrestre, es la Cuarta Comisión.

En relación con las cuestiones sustantivas, Cuba considera que el proyecto intenta modificar deliberadamente el enfoque que ha prevalecido bajo este tema de la Agenda, al establecer que la principal amenaza en el espacio ultraterrestre proviene de acciones, actividades, sistemas, tecnologías y medios en tierra, lo que no ha sido estudiado, ni considerado con anterioridad por esta Comisión, ni tiene precedente.

El emplazamiento de armas y la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre con el continuo desarrollo y perfeccionamiento del armamento constituyen las principales amenaza que enfrentamos.

Las normas o reglas de comportamiento responsable con carácter voluntario que se proponen en el texto, no son suficientes para atender las amenazas en el espacio ultraterrestre. Diluyen el camino hacia la adopción de un instrumento internacional legalmente vinculante que complemente el régimen jurídico vigente, respaldado por la amplia mayoría de la comunidad internacional.

Consideramos que las dificultades para comprobar de forma efectiva las capacidades de los objetos espaciales y de desarrollar un régimen de verificación no pueden ser utilizadas como pretexto para impedir el avance de un instrumento legalmente vinculante.

El texto omite intencionadamente el proyecto de tratado para la prevención del emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre y la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza contra objetos situados en el espacio ultraterrestre, presentado por China y Rusia en la Conferencia de Desarme y las Declaraciones políticas de varios Estados sobre no primer emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre.

Señor Presidente:

El párrafo operativo 1 es ambiguo y no cierra la puerta a la posibilidad del uso y amenaza del uso de la fuerza en el espacio, lo cual es contrario a nuestro compromiso con el uso y exploración del espacio ultraterrestre con fines estrictamente pacíficos.

Si bien compartimos la preocupación del potencial uso de las tecnologías espaciales en detrimento de la seguridad de las naciones; en los párrafos preambulares 12 y 14, en lugar de rechazarse, se legitima que las tecnologías, medios y sistemas espaciales puedan ser utilizados con propósitos incompatibles con el objetivo de mantener la seguridad y la estabilidad internacionales.

En el texto no queda reflejada la importancia de la transferencia de conocimientos y tecnologías, y de la creación de capacidad para el uso pacífico del espacio ultraterrestre, desconociéndose las aspiraciones de los pueblos, en particular de los países en desarrollo, de beneficiarse del potencial de las tecnologías espaciales y sus aplicaciones para la implementación de la Agenda 2030.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCIÓN L.53 “TRATADO SOBRE EL COMERCIO DE ARMAS Y L.26 “CONVENCIÓN SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN O RESTRICCIÓN DEL USO DE CIERTAS ARMAS CONVENCIONALES QUE PUEDAN CONSIDERARSE EXCESIVAMENTE NOCIVAS O DE EFECTOS INDISCRIMINADOS”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

Como en años anteriores, la delegación cubana se abstendrá en la votación del proyecto de resolución **L.53** “Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas”.

Este Tratado, aprobado en una votación prematura, cuando aún no habían concluido las negociaciones sobre el mismo, no cuenta con consenso. Se caracteriza por significativas ambigüedades, inconsistencias, indefiniciones y vacíos legales, que atentan contra su efectividad y eficacia.

No puede ser efectivo un Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas que no prohíbe y que, por tanto, legitima las transferencias de armas a actores no estatales no autorizados, principal fuente del tráfico ilícito de armas.

Es un instrumento desbalanceado, a favor de los Estados exportadores de armas. Los parámetros establecidos para que dichos Estados evalúen la aprobación y denegación de las transferencias, son de naturaleza subjetiva y, por tanto, pueden ser fácilmente manipulados por razones políticas. Ello obstaculiza el derecho de los Estados a adquirir y poseer armas para su legítimo defensa, reconocido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

En relación con el párrafo operativo 9, reiteramos nuestra preocupación por las pretensiones de establecer estas sinergias entre el ATT y otros instrumentos que sí gozan de aceptación universal. Rechazamos el establecimiento de sinergias artificiales entre instrumentos de naturaleza jurídica, membresía, alcance y categoría de armamentos totalmente diferentes.

Nuestra delegación se desasocia de todos los párrafos referidos al ATT, contenidos en los diferentes proyectos de resolución sobre los que tomará acción la Primera Comisión.

Señor Presidente:

De igual forma, la delegación de Cuba se abstendrá en la votación del proyecto de resolución **L.26** “Aplicación de la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Uso, Almacenamiento, Producción, Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción”.

Compartimos plenamente las legítimas preocupaciones humanitarias asociadas al uso indiscriminado e irresponsable de las minas antipersonal. Nuestro país es Estado Parte de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales, incluyendo su Protocolo II original, y cumple estrictamente con las prohibiciones y restricciones respecto al empleo de minas que establece este último.

Cuba ha estado sometida durante más de seis décadas a una política de continua hostilidad y agresión por parte de Estados Unidos. En consecuencia, a nuestro país no puede renunciar al uso de las Minas Antipersonales para la preservación de su soberanía e integridad territorial, en correspondencia con el derecho de legítimo defensa reconocido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

Continuaremos apoyando todos aquellos esfuerzos que, manteniendo el necesario equilibrio entre las cuestiones humanitarias y de seguridad nacional, estén dirigidos a eliminar los terribles efectos que causa en la población civil y la economía de muchos países el uso indiscriminado e irresponsable de las minas antipersonal.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE cuba, sobre el proyecto de DECISIÓN L.59 “Cumplimiento de los acuerdos y compromisos de no proliferación, limitación de armamentos y desarme”. Primera Comisión.

Señor Presidente:

Tomamos la palabra para explicar nuestro voto sobre el proyecto de decisión L.59 “Cumplimiento de los acuerdos y compromisos de no proliferación, limitación de armamentos y desarme”.

Nuestra delegación se abstuvo, pues si bien en esta ocasión se trata de un proyecto de decisión que solo decide incluir el tema en la agenda del próximo período de sesiones, nuestra delegación considera que Estados Unidos, no cuenta con moral alguna para promover en esta Comisión, un texto sobre este tema, cuando desconoce y se retira de los acuerdos y compromisos internacionales en materia de desarme y limitación de armamentos.

Estados Unidos promueve una política guerrerrista. La Revisión de su Postura Nuclear y la publicación de la nueva doctrina nuclear, que incluyen la modernización y fabricación de nuevas armas nucleares, la reducción del umbral para la posibilidad de su uso y el fortalecimiento del papel de esas armas en sus doctrinas de seguridad; unido a la reiterada del INF y el Programa Nuclear con Irán, atentan contra la paz y la seguridad de todos, socaban la arquitectura del desarme y no proliferación nuclear y están iniciando una nueva carrera de armamentos global.

Estados Unidos, líder mundial en la realización de ensayos nucleares con 1 032 pruebas nada más que de 1945 a 1992, continúa violando todas sus obligaciones legales contraídas en virtud del Tratado de No Proliferación y los compromisos alcanzados en sus Conferencias de Examen.

En julio pasado, mientras el mundo continuaba inmerso en el enfrentamiento a la COVID-19; Estados Unidos, país más afectado por la pandemia por sus fallidas políticas neoliberales, pero con más armas nucleares desplegadas en el mundo, aprobó la Ley de Autorización de Defensa Nacional 2021, otorgando 740.5 mil millones de dólares para programas de defensa nacional.

Señor Presidente:

Sin duda alguna, el mayor peligro para la paz y la seguridad internacionales es la conducta irresponsable del gobierno de Estados Unidos. Promueve conflictos en todas las regiones del planeta y guerras no convencionales y comerciales, patrocina el derrocamiento por la fuerza de gobiernos soberanos, insta al terrorismo, promueve posiciones supremacistas y racistas e impone severas medidas coercitivas unilaterales, con irrespeto absoluto al Derecho Internacional.

Muchas Gracias

**GENERAL STATEMENT BY CUBA
THEMATIC CLUSTER NO. 1. "NUCLEAR WEAPONS".
FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA**

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation takes the floor to make a general statement under the thematic cluster related to nuclear weapons, specifically on the following draft resolutions, which we co-sponsor: **L.6, L.17, L.22, L.34, L.36, L.50 and L.55.**

Draft resolution **L.6** "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons", which we will consider, is presented this year under encouraging circumstances. Within the framework of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, it is a milestone to have reached the 50th ratification that will make possible the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons next January, thus legally banning this category of weapons. This instrument outlaws the use, existence and development of nuclear weapons, endorses that they are inhumane, immoral and ethically indefensible, and reinforces and complements the NPT, in particular the implementation of its Article VI.

We urge Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. We reiterate that the only effective way to avoid the horrendous impact of these weapons is their total elimination, in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner.

With regard to draft resolution **L.17** "Follow-up to the 2013 High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament", we wish to underscore that this initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement enables us to celebrate, every September 26, the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Once again, 120 countries in the international community have expressed their concern over the sophistication of the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the military doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States, including the United States Nuclear Posture Review of 2018, which violate the legal obligations regarding nuclear disarmament, as well as the commitments undertaken to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies.

Draft resolution **L.19** "Nuclear Disarmament", in our view, remains one of the texts that best addresses this issue of nuclear disarmament, which is and should continue to be the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

In connection with draft resolution **L.55**: "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons," the draft reaffirms that the continued existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to humanity, as well as to the determination of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we urge nuclear-weapon states to show political will and redress their positions, particularly in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the NPT.

We urge everyone to vote in favor of all of the above-mentioned draft resolutions and of any specific paragraph on which they are requested to vote separately.

Thank you very much.

**GENERAL STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA.
THEMATIC CLUSTER 3 ON "OUTER SPACE". FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK.**

Mr. Chairman,

The threat of an arms race in outer space and the ongoing development and sophistication of space weapons, stymies the realization of the aspirations of the peoples, particularly the smallest countries, to benefit from the potentialities of space technologies for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Cuba advocates the legitimate right of all States to have access to outer space on equal footing and without discrimination.

The use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations, including the existing large network of spy satellites, is of great concern, which, apart from being inconsistent with peace and development, continues to saturate the geostationary orbit with huge amounts of space debris.

Also disturbing is the declaration that “space is a war-fighting domain” and the creation of the U.S. Armed Forces Space Command. We must prevent on time the militarization of outer space.

It is necessary to strengthen the existing legal system to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is why Cuba supports the adoption of a legally binding treaty for the prevention and prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space, and regrets that one State has blocked consensus on the adoption of the final report of the Group of Experts, established by the General Assembly, to present recommendations on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument for the prevention and prohibition of an arms race in space.

The Cuban delegation co-sponsors and endorses draft resolutions: **L.3** “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”; **L.63** “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”; **L.62** “No-first placement of weapons in outer space” and **L.66** “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”.

We urge Member States to vote in favor of the above-mentioned draft resolutions and the paragraphs on which they are requested to vote separately.

Thank you very much.

**GENERAL STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT
RESOLUTION L.8/REV.1 “DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY”. FIRST
COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK. NOVEMBER 9, 2020.**

Mr. Chairman:

The Cuban delegation has taken the floor to make a general statement on draft resolution **L.8/Rev.1** “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, which Cuba traditionally co-sponsors and supports.

The Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications Technologies is, without a doubt, a historic process; it is the first forum that offers all Member States the opportunity to participate and express their views in a transparent manner and on an equal footing.

In this regard, we urge Member States to support L.8/Rev.1 and the paragraphs that have been put to a separate vote, as a token of support for the continuation of the discussions on information and communications technologies, in an open, transparent and inclusive Working Group, where all Member States can continue to negotiate on an equal footing, without interference of any kind.

For Cuba, the appropriate way to address the concerns of the international community on this issue and to search for possible solutions, by consensus, multilaterally negotiated, is through an Open-Ended Working Group of the UNGA.

The draft resolution does not in any way prejudice the results of the ongoing process; but it gives us a space to discuss them.

It also provides us with the appropriate multilateral and institutional framework where we can discuss national proposals and further studies, with a view to promoting common understanding, the current and potential threats arising from the use of ICTs.

We continue to support the commencement, without further delay, of a negotiating process within the framework of the United Nations to adopt a legally binding international instrument that will make it possible to effectively fill the significant legal gaps that are currently apparent in the context of cybersecurity and to address effectively, and on the basis of multilateral cooperation, the growing challenges and threats that we face in this area.

We call to vote in favor of the resolution as a whole and of paragraphs PP10 and OP1 that will be voted by separate.

Thank you very much.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT RESOLUTION L.4 “ADVANCING responsible state behavior in cyberspace in the conText of international security” FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

We take the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution L.4 “Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

Our delegation will not support this text and will vote against since we consider that its main author should have shown flexibility and submit a text together with the Russian Federation, allowing the re-establishment of consensus on this topic, instead of promoting an approach that seeks to put an end to discussions on the issue in an open, transparent and inclusive environment.

It is not up to the main sponsor of this text to determine when or how Member States should continue discussing this topic, trying to prejudge future debates in an Open-ended Working Group. This attitude has led us once more to polarization in this matter.

We oppose the presentation of parallel resolutions that compete with each other and try to divide the international community. We recall that it was the sponsor delegation of this draft resolution that broke consensus on this issue and promoted in 2018 an alternative text to the text that was traditionally considered in the Committee.

L.4 is unbalanced in the treatment of the Open-ended Working Group which is, indisputably, the appropriate forum to address the issue in a transparent, inclusive, multilateral, democratic and open manner, with the full participation of all Member States, on equal terms.

We reiterate that groups of experts on this topic have exhausted all discussions on the applicability of international law in the use of new information and communications technologies, without reaching consensus on the urgent actions required to prevent the covert and illegal use, by individuals, organizations and States, of computer systems of other nations to attack third countries.

The author of this text has no moral to “promote responsible State behavior in cyberspace” while it develops cyber-offensive operations and capacities and a military doctrine that authorizes the use of cyberwarfare and the possibility of launching preventive cyber-attacks to deter its enemies. We reject the attempts to turn cyberspace in a theater of military operations and legitimize punitive unilateral actions of force.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTION L.29 “IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION”. FIRST COMMITTEE. UNGA 75.

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation would like to speak in explanation of vote relating to draft resolution **L.29** “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”.

We reiterate the full commitment of Cuba to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to possess chemical weapons. We categorically reject the use of these weapons and advocate for the complete, irreversible and verifiable destruction of all the remaining declared categories of chemical weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Although Cuba shares the general objective of this draft resolution and the full commitment to the Convention, unfortunately, it will not be able to support it this year either. Cuba will once again abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.29** and will vote in abstention on preambular paragraph 6, and against operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 17.

We recall that this is the only text we have in the Committee to consider the implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition of chemical weapons, and in this regard, it is necessary to continue working to restore the traditional balance of the draft resolution and resume the practice of its adoption by consensus.

With regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 3, we consider that it is inadmissible to single out a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention for using these weapons, without an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation by the OPCW, based on credible evidence and samples taken in the field, in full compliance with the Convention.

In the case of operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 17, we consider that those elements that do not have consensus in the OPCW nor did they have support in the Security Council, should not be moved to the debates of the Committee. The First Committee is not mandated to endorse or take action on the results of reports submitted to the Security Council, which are not based on a thorough investigation in the field, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 adopted in the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2018, was not supported by all States Parties to the Convention. This decision goes beyond the prerogatives granted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat contained in the Convention and attempts modifying the technical mandate of the Organization.

We reject the creation of hasty and non-consensual mechanisms, without taking into account the views of States Parties, and which establish very negative precedents against a State Party to the Convention.

The draft resolution continues disregarding the cooperation the Syrian government provided in the destruction of all its chemical weapons and production facilities, despite the complexity of the security situation. The pending technical issues on the Syrian Declaration must be solved in the framework of the OPCW, without biased or politicized approaches, in line with the proceedings established there.

We must overcome confrontation and politicization that affect the cooperation spirit and the unanimous support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTION L.45 “REDUCING SPACE THREATS THROUGH NORMS, RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIORS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. UNGA 75. NEW YORK.

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation would like to speak in explanation of vote relating to draft resolution **L.45** “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”.

Cuba did not support this draft resolution since the concerns our delegation stated from the first consultation in this venue were not addressed.

Cuba is of the opinion that the appropriate forum to address the issue of security of space operations, as well as other matters in the text, including the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, is the Fourth Committee.

Regarding substantive issues, Cuba believes that the draft attempts to deliberately modify the approach that has prevailed on this agenda item, by establishing that the main threat in outer space comes from actions, activities, systems, technologies and means on Earth, which has not been previously studied or considered by this Committee, and has no precedent.

The placement of weapons and militarization of outer space with continuous arms development and improvement are the main threats we are facing.

The voluntary norms or rules of responsible behavior proposed in the text are not sufficient to address threats in outer space. They dissolve the path towards the adoption of a legally binding international instrument which complements the current legal regime supported by the vast majority of the international community.

We believe that difficulties to effectively verify the capacities of space objects and to develop a verification regime cannot be used as a pretext to impede the advancement of a legally binding instrument.

The text intentionally omits the draft treaty for the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space, submitted by China and Russia in the Disarmament Conference and the Political declarations of several States of no first placement of weapons in outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

Operative paragraph 1 is ambiguous and does not preclude the possibility of the use and threat to use force in space, which is contrary to our commitment to the use and exploration of outer space for strictly peaceful purposes.

Although we share the concern about the potential use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations; in preambular paragraphs 12 and 14, instead of being rejected, it is legitimized that space technologies, means and systems may be used for purposes incompatible with the objective of maintaining international security and stability.

The text does not reflect the importance of knowledge and technology transfer and building capacity for the peaceful use of outer space, disregarding the aspirations of peoples, in particular developing countries, to benefit from the potential of space technologies and their applications for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS L.53 “ARMS TRADE TREATY” AND L.26 “CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

As in previous years, the Cuban delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.53** “Arms Trade Treaty”.

This Treaty, adopted in an early voting, when negotiations on it have not yet concluded, has no consensus. It is characterized by significant ambiguity, inconsistency, lack of definitions and legal loopholes, which threaten its effectiveness and efficacy.

An Arms Trade Treaty that does not prohibit and therefore, legitimize the transfer of weapons to unauthorized non-State actors, the main source of illicit arms trafficking, cannot be effective.

It is an unbalanced instrument that favors arms exporting States. The established parameters for those States to assess the approval and denial of transfers, are subjective in nature, and therefore, can be easily manipulated for political purposes. This hinders the right of States to acquire and possess weapons for their self-defense, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Regarding operative paragraph 9, we reiterate our concern about the attempts to establish these synergies between the ATT and other instruments that do enjoy universal acceptance. We reject the establishment of artificial synergies between instruments of a totally different legal nature, membership, scope and category of weapons.

Our delegation disassociates itself from all the paragraphs referring to the ATT, contained in the different draft resolutions on which the First Committee will take action.

Mr. Chairman,

Likewise, the delegation of Cuba will abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.26** “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction”.

We fully share the legitimate humanitarian concerns related to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State Party to the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons, including its original Protocol II, and strictly complies with prohibitions and restrictions regarding the use of mines established by the latter.

Cuba has been subjected for over six decades to a policy of continuous hostility and aggression by the United States. Accordingly, our country cannot renounce the use of anti-personnel mines for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with the right of self-defense enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

We will continue to support all those efforts that, while maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security issues, are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines on the civil population and the economy of many countries.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT DECISION L.59 “COMPLIANCE WITH NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

We take the floor to explain our vote on draft decision L.59 “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments”.

Our delegation voted in abstention since, although this time it is a draft decision that only decides whether to include the topic on the next session agenda, our delegation believes that the United States has no moral to promote a text on this issue in this Committee, while it disregards and withdraws from disarmament and arms limitation international agreements and commitments.

The United States promotes a warmongering policy. Its Nuclear Posture Review and the publication of the new nuclear doctrine, which includes modernization and manufacture of new nuclear weapons, the lowering of the threshold for the possibility of their use and the strengthening of the role of those weapons in its security doctrines;

along with the withdrawal from the INF and the JCPOA with Iran, threaten the peace and security of all persons, undermine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and are starting a new global arms race.

The United States, the world leader in nuclear testing with 1,032 tests from 1945 to 1992 alone, continues to violate all its legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the commitments made in its Review Conferences.

Last July, while the world continued immersed in the fight against COVID-19; the United States, the country most affected by the pandemic due to its failed neoliberal policies, but with more nuclear weapons deployed in the world, passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, granting more than \$740.5 billion to national defense programs.

Mr. Chairman,

Undoubtedly, the greatest danger to international peace and security is the irresponsible behavior of the United States government. It stirs up conflicts all over the world and unconventional and commercial wars, sponsors the overthrow of sovereign governments by force, encourages terrorism, promotes supremacist and racist positions and imposes severe unilateral coercive measures, with absolute disrespect for international law.

Thank you.

**DECLARACION GENERAL DE CUBA
GRUPO DE TEMAS NO. 1 “ARMAS NUCLEARES”
PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU**

Señor Presidente:

La delegación de Cuba toma la palabra para realizar una declaración general bajo el grupo de temas referido a las armas nucleares, específicamente sobre los proyectos de resolución siguientes, que copatrocinamos: **L.6, L.17, L.22, L.34, L.36, L.50 y L.55.**

El proyecto **L.6** “Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares”, que consideraremos, se presenta este año bajo circunstancias alentadoras. En el marco de 75 Aniversario de las Naciones Unidas, resulta un hito histórico haber alcanzado la ratificación número 50 que posibilitará la entrada en vigor del Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares el próximo enero, quedando así legalmente prohibidas esta categoría de armas. Ese instrumento proscribire el uso, existencia y desarrollo de las armas nucleares, refrenda que son inhumanas, inmorales, y éticamente indefendibles, refuerza y complementa el TNP, en particular la aplicación de su Artículo VI.

Exhortamos a los Estados Miembros que aún no lo han hecho que firmen y ratifiquen el Tratado a la mayor brevedad. Reiteramos que la única manera efectiva de evitar el terrible impacto de esas armas, es su eliminación total, de forma verificable, transparente e irreversible.

En relación con el proyecto **L.17** “Seguimiento a la Reunión de Alto Nivel de la Asamblea General del 2013 sobre Desarme Nuclear”, deseamos resaltar que esta iniciativa del Movimiento de Países No Alineados posibilita que, cada 26 de septiembre celebremos, el Día Internacional para la Eliminación Total de las Armas Nucleares.

Una vez más, 120 países de la comunidad internacional, han expresado su preocupación por el perfeccionamiento de las armas nucleares existentes y el desarrollo de nuevos tipos de armas nucleares previstos en las doctrinas militares de algunos Estados poseedores, incluida la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear de los Estados Unidos de 2018, que violan las obligaciones jurídicas en materia de desarme nuclear, así como los compromisos contraídos de reducir el papel de las armas nucleares en sus políticas militares y de seguridad.

El proyecto de resolución **L.19** “Desarme Nuclear”, en nuestra opinión, sigue siendo uno de los textos que mejor aborda esta cuestión del desarme nuclear, la cual es y debe continuar siendo la máxima prioridad en la esfera del desarme.

En relación con el **L.55**: “Seguimiento de la opinión consultiva de la Corte Internacional de Justicia sobre la legalidad de la amenaza o el empleo de las armas nucleares”, el proyecto reafirma que la continua existencia de las armas nucleares representa una amenaza para la humanidad, así como la determinación de la comunidad internacional de alcanzar el objetivo de un mundo libre de armas nucleares. En ese sentido, instamos a los Estados poseedores de armas nucleares a que muestren voluntad política y rectifiquen sus posturas, en particular en el marco del 50 Aniversario de la firma del TNP.

Instamos a votar a favor de todos los proyectos de resolución antes mencionados y de cualquier párrafo específico al que se le solicite votación por separado.

Muchas Gracias

**DECLARACIÓN GENERAL REALIZADA POR LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA.
GRUPO TEMÁTICO 3 “ESPACIO ULTRATERRESTRE”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU. NUEVA
YORK.**

Señor Presidente:

La amenaza de una carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre y el continuo desarrollo y perfeccionamiento del armamento espacial, atentan contra la realización de las aspiraciones de los pueblos, en particular de los países más pequeños, de beneficiarse del potencial de las tecnologías espaciales para la implementación de Agenda 2030.

Cuba aboga por el legítimo derecho de todos los Estados a acceder al espacio ultraterrestre en condiciones de igualdad y sin discriminación.

Resulta muy preocupante la utilización de las tecnologías espaciales en detrimento de la seguridad de las naciones, incluida la nutrida red de satélites espías existente, que además de ser incompatible con la paz y el desarrollo, continúa saturando la órbita geostacionaria con gran cantidad de desechos espaciales.

Asimismo, resulta alarmante la declaración de que “el espacio es un dominio de guerra” y la creación del Comando Espacial de las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos. Debemos impedir a tiempo la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre.

Resulta necesario fortalecer el régimen jurídico existente para prevenir una carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre. Es por ello que Cuba apoya la adopción de un tratado legalmente vinculante para la prevención y prohibición del emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre, y lamenta que un Estado haya bloqueado el consenso en la adopción del informe final del Grupo de Expertos, establecido por la Asamblea General, para presentar recomendaciones sobre los elementos sustantivos de un instrumento legalmente vinculante para la prevención y prohibición de la carrera de armamentos en el espacio.

La delegación cubana copatrocina y apoya los proyectos de resolución: **L.3** “Prevención de la carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre”, el **L.63** “Otras medidas prácticas para la prevención de una carrera de armamentos en el espacio ultraterrestre”; el **L.62** “No primer emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre” y **L.66** “Medidas de transparencia y fomento de la confianza en las actividades relativas al espacio ultraterrestre”.

Instamos a los Estados miembros a votar favor de los proyectos de resolución mencionados y de los párrafos a los que se les solicite votación por separado.

Muchas gracias.

Declaración General realizada por la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE cuba sobre el proyecto de resolución L.8/Rev.1 “avances en la esfera de la información y las telecomunicaciones en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”. Primera Comisión. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana ha tomado la palabra para realizar una declaración general sobre el proyecto de resolución **L.8/Rev.1** “Avances en la esfera de la información y las telecomunicaciones en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”, que Cuba copatrocina y apoya tradicionalmente.

El Grupo de Trabajo de composición abierta de la Asamblea General sobre avances en la esfera de la información y las comunicaciones, es sin dudas, un proceso histórico; es el primer foro que brinda a todos los Estados Miembros la oportunidad de participar y expresar sus opiniones de manera transparente y en pie de igualdad.

En ese sentido, llamamos a los Estados miembros a apoyar el L.8/Rev.1 y los párrafos que se han sometido a votación por separado, como muestra del respaldo a la continuidad de los debates sobre las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones, en un Grupo de Trabajo abierto, transparente e inclusivo, donde todos los Estados Miembros podemos continuar negociando en igualdad de condiciones, sin interferencia de ningún tipo.

Para Cuba la forma adecuada de atender las preocupaciones de la comunidad internacional en este tema y posibilitar soluciones, por consenso, multilateralmente negociadas, es a través de un Grupo de Trabajo de Composición Abierta de la AGNU.

El proyecto de resolución no prejuzga de modo alguno los resultados del proceso en curso; sino que nos ofrece un espacio para discutirlos.

Nos ofrece además, el marco multilateral e institucional adecuado donde podemos discutir propuestas nacionales; así como, seguir estudiando, con miras a promover la comprensión común, las amenazas actuales y potenciales en que se derivan del uso de las TICs.

Continuamos respaldando el inicio, sin más demora, de un proceso negociador en el marco de las Naciones Unidas, para adoptar un instrumento internacional jurídicamente vinculante, que permita dar respuesta efectiva a los significativos vacíos legales que hoy se aprecian en el contexto de la ciberseguridad y atender de manera efectiva y sobre la base de la cooperación multilateral, a los crecientes retos y amenazas que enfrentamos en esta materia.

Llamamos a votar a favor de la resolución en su conjunto y de los párrafos PP10 y OP1 que se votarán por separado.

Muchas Gracias

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE cuba, sobre el proyecto de resolución L.4 “Avances en el comportamiento responsable del Estado en el ciberespacio en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”. Primera Comisión. 75 AGNU

Señor Presidente:

Tomamos la palabra para explicar nuestro voto sobre el proyecto de resolución L.4 “Avances en el comportamiento responsable del Estado en el ciberespacio en el contexto de la seguridad internacional”.

Nuestra delegación no apoyará este texto y votará en contra porque consideramos que su autor principal debió haber mostrado flexibilidad y presentar un texto de conjunto con la Federación de Rusia permitiendo el restablecimiento del consenso en este tema, en vez de promover un enfoque que trata de poner fin a las discusiones sobre sobre el tema en un marco abierto, transparente e inclusivo.

No corresponde al patrocinador principal de este texto, determinar cuándo o cómo los Estados Miembros debemos continuar las discusiones en el tema, tratando de prejuzgar los futuros debates en un Grupo de Trabajo Abierto. Esta actitud nos ha conducido una vez más a la polarización en este tema.

Nos oponemos a la presentación de resoluciones paralelas, que compiten entre sí y que pretenden dividir a la comunidad internacional. Recordamos que fue la delegación patrocinadora de este proyecto de resolución quien rompió el consenso en el tema y promovió en el 2018 un texto alternativo al texto que tradicionalmente se consideraba en la Comisión.

El L.4 es desbalanceado en el tratamiento al Grupo de Trabajo de Composición Abierta que es, indiscutiblemente, el foro apropiado para abordar el tema de forma transparente, inclusiva, multilateral, democrática y abierta, con la plena participación de todos los Estados miembros, en igualdad de condiciones.

Reiteramos que los Grupos de Expertos sobre este tema han agotado las discusiones sobre la aplicabilidad del derecho internacional en el uso de las nuevas tecnologías de información y las comunicaciones, sin llegar a un consenso sobre las acciones urgentes que se necesitan para impedir el empleo encubierto e ilegal, por individuos, organizaciones y Estados, de los sistemas informáticos de otras naciones para agredir a terceros países.

El autor de este texto no tiene moral alguna para “promuever el comportamiento responsable de los Estados en el ciberespacio” al tiempo que desarrolla operaciones y capacidades ciberoofensivas y una doctrina militar que autoriza el uso de armas cibernéticas y la posibilidad de lanzar ataques cibernéticos preventivos para disuadir a sus adversarios. Rechazamos los intentos de convertir el ciberespacio en un teatro de operaciones militares y legitimar en ese contexto acciones unilaterales punitivas de fuerza.

Muchas Gracias

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.29 “IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA CONVENCIÓN SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN DEL DESARROLLO, PRODUCCIÓN, ALMACENAMIENTO Y USO DE LAS ARMAS QUÍMICAS Y SU DESTRUCCIÓN”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana quisiera explicar su voto respecto al proyecto de resolución **L.29** “Implementación de la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Desarrollo, Producción, Almacenamiento y Uso de las Armas Químicas y su Destrucción”.

Reiteramos el pleno compromiso de Cuba con la plena, efectiva y no discriminatoria implementación de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas. Cuba no posee, ni tiene intención de poseer armas químicas. Rechazamos categóricamente el empleo de estas armas y abogamos por la destrucción completa, irreversible y de forma verificada de todas las categorías de armas químicas declaradas restantes.

Señor Presidente:

Aunque Cuba comparte el objetivo general de este proyecto de resolución y el pleno compromiso con la Convención, lamentablemente, tampoco podrá apoyarlo este año. Cuba se abstendrá nuevamente en la votación del proyecto **L.29** y votará en abstención en el párrafo preambular 6, y en contra, de los operativos 2, 3, 4, 5 y 17.

Recordamos este es el único texto con que contamos en la Comisión para considerar la implementación de la Convención para la Prohibición de las armas químicas, y en ese sentido, resulta necesario continuar trabajando para restaurar el tradicional equilibrio y balance del proyecto de resolución y retomar la práctica de su adopción por consenso.

Con relación a los párrafos operativos 2 y 3, consideramos que es inadmisibles singularizar a un Estado Parte de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas, de emplear estas armas, sin una investigación independiente, imparcial, completa y concluyente de la OPAQ, basada en pruebas fidedignas y en muestras tomadas en el terreno, en pleno cumplimiento de la Convención.

En el caso de los operativos 4, 5 y 17, consideramos que no debe trasladarse a los debates de la Comisión aquellos elementos que no gozan de consenso en la OPAQ, ni tuvieron respaldo en el Consejo de Seguridad. La Primera Comisión no está mandatada para refrendar ni tomar acción sobre los resultados de informes presentados al Consejo de Seguridad, que no se sustentan en una investigación exhaustiva en el terreno, de conformidad con las disposiciones de la Convención.

La decisión C-SS-4/DEC.3 adoptada en la Cuarta Sesión Especial de la Conferencia de Estados Parte de la Convención sobre las Armas Químicas, en 2018, no fue apoyada por todos los Estados Partes de la Convención. Esta decisión que va más allá de las prerrogativas otorgadas a la Secretaría Técnica de la OPAQ en la letra de la Convención e intenta modificar el mandato técnico de la Organización.

Rechazamos la creación de mecanismos precipitados y no consensuados, sin tener en cuenta las opiniones de los Estados Partes, y que establecen precedentes muy negativos contra un Estado Parte de la Convención.

El proyecto de resolución continúa ignorando la cooperación que brindó el gobierno sirio en la destrucción de todas sus armas químicas e instalaciones de producción, a pesar de la complejidad de la situación de seguridad. Las cuestiones técnicas pendientes sobre la Declaración siria, deben resolverse en el marco de la OPAQ, sin enfoques sesgados ni politizados, en correspondencia con los procedimientos allí establecidos.

Debemos superar la confrontación y la politización que afectan el espíritu de cooperación y el apoyo unánime a la Convención sobre las Armas Químicas.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.45 “REDUCIR LAS AMENAZAS ESPACIALES A TRAVÉS DE NORMAS, REGLAS Y PRINCIPIOS DE COMPORTAMIENTOS RESPONSABLES”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

La delegación cubana quisiera explicar su voto respecto al proyecto de resolución **L.45** “Reducir las amenazas espaciales a través de normas, reglas y principios de comportamientos responsables”.

Cuba no apoyó este proyecto de resolución en tanto no fueron atendidas las preocupaciones de nuestra delegación, planteadas desde la primera consulta en esta sede.

En opinión de Cuba, el foro apropiado para abordar la cuestión de la seguridad de las operaciones espaciales, así como otras cuestiones abordadas en el texto, incluido las Directrices de sostenibilidad a largo plazo sobre las actividades en el espacio ultraterrestre, es la Cuarta Comisión.

En relación con las cuestiones sustantivas, Cuba considera que el proyecto intenta modificar deliberadamente el enfoque que ha prevalecido bajo este tema de la Agenda, al establecer que la principal amenaza en el espacio ultraterrestre proviene de acciones, actividades, sistemas, tecnologías y medios en tierra, lo que no ha sido estudiado, ni considerado con anterioridad por esta Comisión, ni tiene precedente.

El emplazamiento de armas y la militarización del espacio ultraterrestre con el continuo desarrollo y perfeccionamiento del armamento constituyen las principales amenaza que enfrentamos.

Las normas o reglas de comportamiento responsable con carácter voluntario que se proponen en el texto, no son suficientes para atender las amenazas en el espacio ultraterrestre. Diluyen el camino hacia la adopción de un instrumento internacional legalmente vinculante que complemente el régimen jurídico vigente, respaldado por la amplia mayoría de la comunidad internacional.

Consideramos que las dificultades para comprobar de forma efectiva las capacidades de los objetos espaciales y de desarrollar un régimen de verificación no pueden ser utilizadas como pretexto para impedir el avance de un instrumento legalmente vinculante.

El texto omite intencionadamente el proyecto de tratado para la prevención del emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre y la amenaza o el uso de la fuerza contra objetos situados en el espacio ultraterrestre, presentado por China y Rusia en la Conferencia de Desarme y las Declaraciones políticas de varios Estados sobre no primer emplazamiento de armas en el espacio ultraterrestre.

Señor Presidente:

El párrafo operativo 1 es ambiguo y no cierra la puerta a la posibilidad del uso y amenaza del uso de la fuerza en el espacio, lo cual es contrario a nuestro compromiso con el uso y exploración del espacio ultraterrestre con fines estrictamente pacíficos.

Si bien compartimos la preocupación del potencial uso de las tecnologías espaciales en detrimento de la seguridad de las naciones; en los párrafos preambulares 12 y 14, en lugar de rechazarse, se legitima que las tecnologías, medios y sistemas espaciales puedan ser utilizados con propósitos incompatibles con el objetivo de mantener la seguridad y la estabilidad internacionales.

En el texto no queda reflejada la importancia de la transferencia de conocimientos y tecnologías, y de la creación de capacidad para el uso pacífico del espacio ultraterrestre, desconociéndose las aspiraciones de los pueblos, en particular de los países en desarrollo, de beneficiarse del potencial de las tecnologías espaciales y sus aplicaciones para la implementación de la Agenda 2030.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA. PROYECTOS DE RESOLUCIÓN L.53 “TRATADO SOBRE EL COMERCIO DE ARMAS Y L.26 “CONVENCIÓN SOBRE LA PROHIBICIÓN O RESTRICCIÓN DEL USO DE CIERTAS ARMAS CONVENCIONALES QUE PUEDAN CONSIDERARSE EXCESIVAMENTE NOCIVAS O DE EFECTOS INDISCRIMINADOS”. PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU.

Señor Presidente:

Como en años anteriores, la delegación cubana se abstendrá en la votación del proyecto de resolución L.53 “Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas”.

Este Tratado, aprobado en una votación prematura, cuando aún no habían concluido las negociaciones sobre el mismo, no cuenta con consenso. Se caracteriza por significativas ambigüedades, inconsistencias, indefiniciones y vacíos legales, que atentan contra su efectividad y eficacia.

No puede ser efectivo un Tratado sobre el Comercio de Armas que no prohíbe y que, por tanto, legitima las transferencias de armas a actores no estatales no autorizados, principal fuente del tráfico ilícito de armas.

Es un instrumento desbalanceado, a favor de los Estados exportadores de armas. Los parámetros establecidos para que dichos Estados evalúen la aprobación y denegación de las transferencias, son de naturaleza subjetiva y, por tanto, pueden ser fácilmente manipulados por razones políticas. Ello obstaculiza el derecho de los Estados a adquirir y poseer armas para su legítimo defensa, reconocido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

En relación con el párrafo operativo 9, reiteramos nuestra preocupación por las pretensiones de establecer estas sinergias entre el ATT y otros instrumentos que sí gozan de aceptación universal. Rechazamos el establecimiento de sinergias artificiales entre instrumentos de naturaleza jurídica, membresía, alcance y categoría de armamentos totalmente diferentes.

Nuestra delegación se desasocia de todos los párrafos referidos al ATT, contenidos en los diferentes proyectos de resolución sobre los que tomará acción la Primera Comisión.

Señor Presidente:

De igual forma, la delegación de Cuba se abstendrá en la votación del proyecto de resolución **L.26** “Aplicación de la Convención sobre la Prohibición del Uso, Almacenamiento, Producción, Transferencia de Minas Antipersonal y sobre su Destrucción”.

Compartimos plenamente las legítimas preocupaciones humanitarias asociadas al uso indiscriminado e irresponsable de las minas antipersonal. Nuestro país es Estado Parte de la Convención sobre Ciertas Armas Convencionales, incluyendo su Protocolo II original, y cumple estrictamente con las prohibiciones y restricciones respecto al empleo de minas que establece este último.

Cuba ha estado sometida durante más de seis décadas a una política de continua hostilidad y agresión por parte de Estados Unidos. En consecuencia, a nuestro país no puede renunciar al uso de las Minas Antipersonales para la preservación de su soberanía e integridad territorial, en correspondencia con el derecho de legítimo defensa reconocido en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas.

Continuaremos apoyando todos aquellos esfuerzos que, manteniendo el necesario equilibrio entre las cuestiones humanitarias y de seguridad nacional, estén dirigidos a eliminar los terribles efectos que causa en la población civil y la economía de muchos países el uso indiscriminado e irresponsable de las minas antipersonal.

Muchas gracias.

EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE la delegación de LA REPÚBLICA DE cuba, sobre el proyecto de DECISIÓN L.59 “Cumplimiento de los acuerdos y compromisos de no proliferación, limitación de armamentos y desarme”. Primera Comisión.

Señor Presidente:

Tomamos la palabra para explicar nuestro voto sobre el proyecto de decisión L.59 “Cumplimiento de los acuerdos y compromisos de no proliferación, limitación de armamentos y desarme”.

Nuestra delegación se abstuvo, pues si bien en esta ocasión se trata de un proyecto de decisión que solo decide incluir el tema en la agenda del próximo período de sesiones, nuestra delegación considera que Estados Unidos, no cuenta con moral alguna para promover en esta Comisión, un texto sobre este tema, cuando desconoce y se retira de los acuerdos y compromisos internacionales en materia de desarme y limitación de armamentos.

Estados Unidos promueve una política guerrerista. La Revisión de su Postura Nuclear y la publicación de la nueva doctrina nuclear, que incluyen la modernización y fabricación de nuevas armas nucleares, la reducción del umbral para la posibilidad de su uso y el fortalecimiento del papel de esas armas en sus doctrinas de seguridad; unido a la reiterada del INF y el Programa Nuclear con Irán, atentan contra la paz y la seguridad de todos, socaban la arquitectura del desarme y no proliferación nuclear y están iniciando una nueva carrera de armamentos global.

Estados Unidos, líder mundial en la realización de ensayos nucleares con 1 032 pruebas nada más que de 1945 a 1992, continúa violando todas sus obligaciones legales contraídas en virtud del Tratado de No Proliferación y los compromisos alcanzados en sus Conferencias de Examen.

En julio pasado, mientras el mundo continuaba inmerso en el enfrentamiento a la COVID-19; Estados Unidos, país más afectado por la pandemia por sus fallidas políticas neoliberales, pero con más armas nucleares desplegadas en el mundo, aprobó la Ley de Autorización de Defensa Nacional 2021, otorgando 740.5 mil millones de dólares para programas de defensa nacional.

Señor Presidente:

Sin duda alguna, el mayor peligro para la paz y la seguridad internacionales es la conducta irresponsable del gobierno de Estados Unidos. Promueve conflictos en todas las regiones del planeta y guerras no convencionales y comerciales, patrocina el derrocamiento por la fuerza de gobiernos soberanos, insta al terrorismo, promueve posiciones supremacistas y racistas e impone severas medidas coercitivas unilaterales, con irrespeto absoluto al Derecho Internacional.

Muchas Gracias

**GENERAL STATEMENT BY CUBA
THEMATIC CLUSTER NO. 1. “NUCLEAR WEAPONS”.
FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA**

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation takes the floor to make a general statement under the thematic cluster related to nuclear weapons, specifically on the following draft resolutions, which we co-sponsor: **L.6, L.17, L.22, L.34, L.36, L.50 and L.55.**

Draft resolution **L.6** “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, which we will consider, is presented this year under encouraging circumstances. Within the framework of the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, it is a milestone to have reached the 50th ratification that will make possible the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons next January, thus legally banning this category of weapons. This instrument outlaws the use, existence and development of nuclear weapons, endorses that they are inhumane, immoral and ethically indefensible, and reinforces and complements the NPT, in particular the implementation of its Article VI.

We urge Member States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty as soon as possible. We reiterate that the only effective way to avoid the horrendous impact of these weapons is their total elimination, in a verifiable, transparent and irreversible manner.

With regard to draft resolution **L.17** “Follow-up to the 2013 High-level Meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament”, we wish to underscore that this initiative of the Non-Aligned Movement enables us to celebrate, every September 26, the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Once again, 120 countries in the international community have expressed their concern over the sophistication of the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the military doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States, including the United States Nuclear Posture Review of 2018, which violate the legal obligations regarding nuclear disarmament, as well as the commitments undertaken to downplay the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security policies.

Draft resolution **L.19** “Nuclear Disarmament”, in our view, remains one of the texts that best addresses this issue of nuclear disarmament, which is and should continue to be the highest priority in the field of disarmament.

In connection with draft resolution **L.55**: “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons,” the draft reaffirms that the continued existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to humanity, as well as to the determination of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this regard, we urge nuclear-weapon states to show political will and redress their positions, particularly in the context of the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the NPT.

We urge everyone to vote in favor of all of the above-mentioned draft resolutions and of any specific paragraph on which they are requested to vote separately.

Thank you very much.

GENERAL STATEMENT DELIVERED BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. THEMATIC CLUSTER 3 ON “OUTER SPACE”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK.

Mr. Chairman,

The threat of an arms race in outer space and the ongoing development and sophistication of space weapons, stymies the realization of the aspirations of the peoples, particularly the smallest countries, to benefit from the potentialities of space technologies for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Cuba advocates the legitimate right of all States to have access to outer space on equal footing and without discrimination.

The use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations, including the existing large network of spy satellites, is of great concern, which, apart from being inconsistent with peace and development, continues to saturate the geostationary orbit with huge amounts of space debris.

Also disturbing is the declaration that “space is a war-fighting domain” and the creation of the U.S. Armed Forces Space Command. We must prevent on time the militarization of outer space.

It is necessary to strengthen the existing legal system to prevent an arms race in outer space. That is why Cuba supports the adoption of a legally binding treaty for the prevention and prohibition of the placement of weapons in outer space, and regrets that one State has blocked consensus on the adoption of the final report of the Group of Experts, established by the General Assembly, to present recommendations on the substantive elements of a legally binding instrument for the prevention and prohibition of an arms race in space.

The Cuban delegation co-sponsors and endorses draft resolutions: **L.3** “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”; **L.63** “Further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”; **L.62** “No-first placement of weapons in outer space” and **L.66** “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”.

We urge Member States to vote in favor of the above-mentioned draft resolutions and the paragraphs on which they are requested to vote separately.

Thank you very much.

GENERAL STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT RESOLUTION L.8/REV.1 “DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA. NEW YORK. NOVEMBER 9, 2020.

Mr. Chairman:

The Cuban delegation has taken the floor to make a general statement on draft resolution **L.8/Rev.1** “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, which Cuba traditionally co-sponsors and supports.

The Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on Developments in the Field of Information and Communications Technologies is, without a doubt, a historic process; it is the first forum that offers all Member States the opportunity to participate and express their views in a transparent manner and on an equal footing.

In this regard, we urge Member States to support L.8/Rev.1 and the paragraphs that have been put to a separate vote, as a token of support for the continuation of the discussions on information and communications technologies, in an open, transparent and inclusive Working Group, where all Member States can continue to negotiate on an equal footing, without interference of any kind.

For Cuba, the appropriate way to address the concerns of the international community on this issue and to search for possible solutions, by consensus, multilaterally negotiated, is through an Open-Ended Working Group of the UNGA.

The draft resolution does not in any way prejudice the results of the ongoing process; but it gives us a space to discuss them.

It also provides us with the appropriate multilateral and institutional framework where we can discuss national proposals and further studies, with a view to promoting common understanding, the current and potential threats arising from the use of ICTs.

We continue to support the commencement, without further delay, of a negotiating process within the framework of the United Nations to adopt a legally binding international instrument that will make it possible to effectively fill the significant legal gaps that are currently apparent in the context of cybersecurity and to address effectively, and on the basis of multilateral cooperation, the growing challenges and threats that we face in this area.

We call to vote in favor of the resolution as a whole and of paragraphs PP10 and OP1 that will be voted by separate.

Thank you very much.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT
RESOLUTION L.4 “ADVANCING responsible state behavior in cyberspace in the context of international
security” FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA**

Mr. Chairman,

We take the floor to explain our vote on draft resolution L.4 “Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

Our delegation will not support this text and will vote against since we consider that its main author should have shown flexibility and submit a text together with the Russian Federation, allowing the re-establishment of consensus on this topic, instead of promoting an approach that seeks to put an end to discussions on the issue in an open, transparent and inclusive environment.

It is not up to the main sponsor of this text to determine when or how Member States should continue discussing this topic, trying to prejudge future debates in an Open-ended Working Group. This attitude has led us once more to polarization in this matter.

We oppose the presentation of parallel resolutions that compete with each other and try to divide the international community. We recall that it was the sponsor delegation of this draft resolution that broke consensus on this issue and promoted in 2018 an alternative text to the text that was traditionally considered in the Committee.

L.4 is unbalanced in the treatment of the Open-ended Working Group which is, indisputably, the appropriate forum to address the issue in a transparent, inclusive, multilateral, democratic and open manner, with the full participation of all Member States, on equal terms.

We reiterate that groups of experts on this topic have exhausted all discussions on the applicability of international law in the use of new information and communications technologies, without reaching consensus on the urgent actions required to prevent the covert and illegal use, by individuals, organizations and States, of computer systems of other nations to attack third countries.

The author of this text has no moral to “promote responsible State behavior in cyberspace” while it develops cyber-offensive operations and capacities and a military doctrine that authorizes the use of cyberwarfare and the possibility of launching preventive cyber-attacks to deter its enemies. We reject the attempts to turn cyberspace in a theater of military operations and legitimize punitive unilateral actions of force.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTION L.29 “IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION”. FIRST COMMITTEE. UNGA 75.

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation would like to speak in explanation of vote relating to draft resolution **L.29** “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction”.

We reiterate the full commitment of Cuba to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Cuba does not possess, nor does it intend to possess chemical weapons. We categorically reject the use of these weapons and advocate for the complete, irreversible and verifiable destruction of all the remaining declared categories of chemical weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Although Cuba shares the general objective of this draft resolution and the full commitment to the Convention, unfortunately, it will not be able to support it this year either. Cuba will once again abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.29** and will vote in abstention on preambular paragraph 6, and against operative paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 17.

We recall that this is the only text we have in the Committee to consider the implementation of the Convention of the Prohibition of chemical weapons, and in this regard, it is necessary to continue working to restore the traditional balance of the draft resolution and resume the practice of its adoption by consensus.

With regard to operative paragraphs 2 and 3, we consider that it is inadmissible to single out a State Party to the Chemical Weapons Convention for using these weapons, without an independent, impartial, complete and conclusive investigation by the OPCW, based on credible evidence and samples taken in the field, in full compliance with the Convention.

In the case of operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 17, we consider that those elements that do not have consensus in the OPCW nor did they have support in the Security Council, should not be moved to the debates of the Committee. The First Committee is not mandated to endorse or take action on the results of reports submitted to the Security Council, which are not based on a thorough investigation in the field, in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 adopted in the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2018, was not supported by all States Parties to the Convention. This decision goes beyond the prerogatives granted to the OPCW Technical Secretariat contained in the Convention and attempts modifying the technical mandate of the Organization.

We reject the creation of hasty and non-consensual mechanisms, without taking into account the views of States Parties, and which establish very negative precedents against a State Party to the Convention.

The draft resolution continues disregarding the cooperation the Syrian government provided in the destruction of all its chemical weapons and production facilities, despite the complexity of the security situation. The pending technical issues on the Syrian Declaration must be solved in the framework of the OPCW, without biased or politicized approaches, in line with the proceedings established there.

We must overcome confrontation and politicization that affect the cooperation spirit and the unanimous support for the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTION L.45 “REDUCING SPACE THREATS THROUGH NORMS, RULES AND PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIORS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. UNGA 75. NEW YORK.

Mr. Chairman,

The Cuban delegation would like to speak in explanation of vote relating to draft resolution **L.45** “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”.

Cuba did not support this draft resolution since the concerns our delegation stated from the first consultation in this venue were not addressed.

Cuba is of the opinion that the appropriate forum to address the issue of security of space operations, as well as other matters in the text, including the Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, is the Fourth Committee.

Regarding substantive issues, Cuba believes that the draft attempts to deliberately modify the approach that has prevailed on this agenda item, by establishing that the main threat in outer space comes from actions, activities, systems, technologies and means on Earth, which has not been previously studied or considered by this Committee, and has no precedent.

The placement of weapons and militarization of outer space with continuous arms development and improvement are the main threats we are facing.

The voluntary norms or rules of responsible behavior proposed in the text are not sufficient to address threats in outer space. They dissolve the path towards the adoption of a legally binding international instrument which complements the current legal regime supported by the vast majority of the international community.

We believe that difficulties to effectively verify the capacities of space objects and to develop a verification regime cannot be used as a pretext to impede the advancement of a legally binding instrument.

The text intentionally omits the draft treaty for the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against objects in outer space, submitted by China and Russia in the Disarmament Conference and the Political declarations of several States of no first placement of weapons in outer space.

Mr. Chairman,

Operative paragraph 1 is ambiguous and does not preclude the possibility of the use and threat to use force in space, which is contrary to our commitment to the use and exploration of outer space for strictly peaceful purposes.

Although we share the concern about the potential use of space technologies to the detriment of the security of nations; in preambular paragraphs 12 and 14, instead of being rejected, it is legitimized that space technologies,

means and systems may be used for purposes incompatible with the objective of maintaining international security and stability.

The text does not reflect the importance of knowledge and technology transfer and building capacity for the peaceful use of outer space, disregarding the aspirations of peoples, in particular developing countries, to benefit from the potential of space technologies and their applications for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.

Thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA. DRAFT RESOLUTIONS L.53 “ARMS TRADE TREATY” AND L.26 “CONVENTION ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA

Mr. Chairman,

As in previous years, the Cuban delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.53** “Arms Trade Treaty”.

This Treaty, adopted in an early voting, when negotiations on it have not yet concluded, has no consensus. It is characterized by significant ambiguity, inconsistency, lack of definitions and legal loopholes, which threaten its effectiveness and efficacy.

An Arms Trade Treaty that does not prohibit and therefore, legitimize the transfer of weapons to unauthorized non-State actors, the main source of illicit arms trafficking, cannot be effective.

It is an unbalanced instrument that favors arms exporting States. The established parameters for those States to assess the approval and denial of transfers, are subjective in nature, and therefore, can be easily manipulated for political purposes. This hinders the right of States to acquire and possess weapons for their self-defense, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Regarding operative paragraph 9, we reiterate our concern about the attempts to establish these synergies between the ATT and other instruments that do enjoy universal acceptance. We reject the establishment of artificial synergies between instruments of a totally different legal nature, membership, scope and category of weapons.

Our delegation disassociates itself from all the paragraphs referring to the ATT, contained in the different draft resolutions on which the First Committee will take action.

Mr. Chairman,

Likewise, the delegation of Cuba will abstain from voting on draft resolution **L.26** “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and Their Destruction”.

We fully share the legitimate humanitarian concerns related to the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines. Our country is a State Party to the Convention of Certain Conventional Weapons, including its original Protocol II, and strictly complies with prohibitions and restrictions regarding the use of mines established by the latter.

Cuba has been subjected for over six decades to a policy of continuous hostility and aggression by the United States. Accordingly, our country cannot renounce the use of anti-personnel mines for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, in accordance with the right of self-defense enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

We will continue to support all those efforts that, while maintaining the necessary balance between humanitarian and national security issues, are aimed at eliminating the terrible effects of the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of anti-personnel mines on the civil population and the economy of many countries.

Thank you.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE BY THE DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA ON DRAFT
DECISION L.59 “COMPLIANCE WITH NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS LIMITATION AND
DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS AND COMMITMENTS”. FIRST COMMITTEE. 75 UNGA**

Mr. Chairman,

We take the floor to explain our vote on draft decision L.59 “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments”.

Our delegation voted in abstention since, although this time it is a draft decision that only decides whether to include the topic on the next session agenda, our delegation believes that the United States has no moral to promote a text on this issue in this Committee, while it disregards and withdraws from disarmament and arms limitation international agreements and commitments.

The United States promotes a warmongering policy. Its Nuclear Posture Review and the publication of the new nuclear doctrine, which includes modernization and manufacture of new nuclear weapons, the lowering of the threshold for the possibility of their use and the strengthening of the role of those weapons in its security doctrines; along with the withdrawal from the INF and the JCPOA with Iran, threaten the peace and security of all persons, undermine nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture and are starting a new global arms race.

The United States, the world leader in nuclear testing with 1,032 tests from 1945 to 1992 alone, continues to violate all its legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the commitments made in its Review Conferences.

Last July, while the world continued immersed in the fight against COVID-19; the United States, the country most affected by the pandemic due to its failed neoliberal policies, but with more nuclear weapons deployed in the world, passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, granting more than \$740.5 billion to national defense programs.

Mr. Chairman,

Undoubtedly, the greatest danger to international peace and security is the irresponsible behavior of the United States government. It stirs up conflicts all over the world and unconventional and commercial wars, sponsors the overthrow of sovereign governments by force, encourages terrorism, promotes supremacist and racist positions and imposes severe unilateral coercive measures, with absolute disrespect for international law.

Thank you.

Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group

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ي الفضاء الخاري ج من خلال قواعد
القرار المعنون "الحد من التهديدات ف ومبادئ
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Egypt on behalf of the Arab Group

بيان رشح التصويت
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EGYPT

Explanation of Vote

75th Session of the First Committee of the General Assembly General Statement before taking action on the resolutions under cluster 3 Cluster (the Prevention of an Arms Race Outer Space)

Mr. Chairman,

It is regrettable to see that all proposals under this cluster are being put for a vote, including a genuine balanced attempt, as contained in document L.3 which is tabled by Egypt and Sri Lanka and cosponsored by a large number of delegations and aims at bridging the gaps and addressing the threats that are fully recognized by all Member States.

This situation clearly indicates the intention of some States to turn outer space into another scene for possible military conflicts and an arena for an arms race in a manner that can have catastrophic consequences.

Given the fragility and volatility of the outer space environment, we believe that it is more necessary now than at any time before for the United Nations to clearly express its resolve to address the alarming security threats to such a strategic domain that has a direct impact on almost all aspects of life.

We sincerely hope that the spirit of consensus and cooperation would be restored and that multilateral efforts on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will regain the necessary momentum leading to the commencement of negotiations on legally binding instruments.

Thank you.

General Statement before taking action under cluster 5

Mr. Chairman,

Progress on addressing the international peace and security aspects of information and telecommunication technologies (ICTs) has been stalled and held hostage for decades. Discussions continue to be characterized by obvious polarization and subjectivity. The positions of many States are guided by competition rather than cooperation.

ICTs are becoming too important to be left without any clear international rules to regulate States' behavior in their use of these technologies and to prevent turning ICTs into weapons that could be used against civilian infrastructure or into a threat to international peace and security.

We welcome and value the progress made during the deliberations of the OEWG established by Resolution [73/27](#), which has proved the necessity of addressing this issue expeditiously in an inclusive format with the participation of all Member States and the engagement of multiple stakeholders.

It is disappointing, however, that none of the proposals tabled on this issue contain the type of actionable and tangible measures that the majority of Member States aspire to.

Progress means action on implementing the voluntary recommendations that have already been agreed, as well as commencing negotiations on further rules and norms to fill the obvious gaps in this domain in conformity with international law.

Egypt hopes that at the next session of the First Committee, there would be one proposal on this topic, with clear actions and tangible measures that take the UN efforts forward instead of going around in circles.

Mr. Chairman,

Turning to the issue of "the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament", on which we have joined consensus.

We stress that Science and Technology have been recognized as essential enablers for Sustainable Development and the achievement of the UN 2030 Agenda. It is each State's inalienable and inherent right to develop, utilize, and acquire technologies for socio-economic development.

Proliferation concerns should not become a pretext for denying dual-use technologies. Such denials are often based on political grounds.

It is necessary that the right to access technologies should be ensured on a non-discriminatory basis.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote on the proposal contained in document L.29 entitled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC)" on which we intend to abstain.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt actively participated in the negotiations leading to the CWC and has always strongly supported its objectives in line with our firm stance against all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Egypt also continues to actively support and contribute to the international efforts aiming at preventing the acquisition of WMDs by non-State actors including through the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.

In spite of the shortcomings of this resolution, my delegation voted in favor of its previous versions for several years. This was a reiteration of Egypt's principled position in support of the total elimination of all WMDs and its firm condemnation of any use of such weapons by any party under all circumstances.

However, Egypt once more, is not in a position to support this resolution at a time when many of its main proponents continue to refrain from supporting any effort towards nuclear disarmament, including the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other WMDs in the Middle East, arguing that the security conditions are not conducive.

States that themselves, directly or indirectly, rely on nuclear deterrence and strongly resist any genuine effort towards their elimination based on arguments related to the so-called "strategic stability" or "the international security environment", are simply not in a position to preach on the elimination of other WMDs.

We stress that human values and moral standards are indivisible and that the security of some States is not more important than the security of other States.

Moreover, while we continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms any use of chemical weapons by any party under all circumstances, my delegation is, once more, not in a position to take an informed decision in support of several paragraphs related to country specific incidents or to the work and investigations of the OPCW contained in the recent versions of this Resolution.

We reiterate that the continued politicization of this Resolution undermines its credibility, and we believe that the attribution of incidents involving the use of chemical weapons must be based on an independent, evidence-based, and transparent process at the relevant specialized multilateral fora.

Finally, we also wish to reiterate that serious efforts towards the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East could have saved the region and the world from the horrors of those incidents involving the actual use of chemical weapons in the region in recent years.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote before the vote on the draft proposal contained in document L.45 entitled "reducing space threats through norms, rules, and principles for responsible behaviours"

Egypt highly appreciates the constructive and professional manner in which the United Kingdom conducted the consultations on this proposal.

Egypt will vote in favor of this proposal on the understanding that it represents a step in the right direction towards the development of rules that could pave the way to the necessary legally-binding instruments needed to address threats to space systems from a comprehensive point of view that addresses terrestrial and space-based threats to space systems.

However, we intend to abstain on PP14 as a result of an amendment introduced to the revised version after the conclusion of the negotiations on the text. The revised text of this paragraph could be interpreted as an attempt to turn the issue of verification into an obstacle that prevents negotiations and progress.

We underscore that several significant capabilities and expertise do exist in the field of verifying and monitoring outer space activities and systems. And we believe that the use of the term “arms control” rather than “disarmament” in the revised version of this paragraph was not a successful choice.

We intend to closely assess the impact of the implementation of this Resolution and its complementarity with the previous and ongoing international efforts aiming at the prevention of an arms race in outer space. And we stress that we have no intention whatsoever to accept any weaponization of outer space or any notions that such weaponization can be conducted responsibly.

Mr. Chairman,

Egypt is a sponsor of three of the five resolutions under this cluster. We view these resolutions to be complementary rather than contradictory to each other, and it is regrettable to see all 5 proposals being put to a vote. We sincerely hope that the mutual polarization of the issue of PAROS would come to an end.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

EoV on the proposals under Cluster 4: Conventional Weapons The draft proposal contained in L.53 Entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on the proposal contained in documents L.53. entitled “**The Arms Trade Treaty**” and the references to this Treaty in other proposals presented to the Committee.

Egypt has always been and continues to be at the forefront of any genuine effort aiming at combating illicit trafficking in arms and eradicating any arms transfers to terrorists and illegal armed groups. We have also actively and constructively participated in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the ATT.

Nevertheless, motivations related to the desire of some States to manipulate and politicize legitimate arms trade led to several shortcomings and loopholes in this treaty, especially its deliberate lack of necessary definitions and criteria, making the implementation of the treaty selective and subjective and allowing the exporting states to abuse its provisions. The treaty also completely ignored the prohibition of intentional State-sponsored supply of weapons to unauthorized recipients including terrorists and illegal armed groups, which represents the real main threat in this domain.

Therefore, my delegation will continue to abstain on the draft resolution contained in document L.53 entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty” as well as on paragraphs which refer to this treaty in the draft resolutions contained in other proposals such as L.32 and L.21.

Regarding the draft resolution contained in document L.26 on the Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines,

Egypt will continue to abstain on this draft resolution. On several occasions, Egypt has expressed its reservations about the imbalanced nature of this instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations.

Mindful of the humanitarian considerations associated with landmines, Egypt has imposed a moratorium on its capacity to produce and export landmines since the 1980s, long before the conclusion of this convention. We believe that the Convention lacks the balance between the humanitarian concerns related to anti-personnel landmines and their possible legitimate military uses, especially in countries with long borders facing extraordinary security challenges.

Furthermore, the Convention does not establish any legal obligation on States to remove the anti-personnel mine they have placed in the territory of other States, making it almost impossible for many states to meet the demining requirements on their own. This is particularly the case of Egypt which is one of the most affected countries as it still has over 22 million landmines placed in its territory during World War II.

Regarding the draft resolution contained in document L.43 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions,

Egypt will continue to abstain on this draft resolution in light of the selective and imbalanced nature of this instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations, and which lacks an equitable and clear definition of cluster munitions in a manner that was deliberately designed to fit the specific production requirements of some States.

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's position on **the resolution contained in L.38 entitled "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices"**,

Egypt continued to join consensus on this resolution which attempts to address an important threat, especially that IEDs increasingly represent a preferred weapon of choice by terrorists and illegal armed groups.

Egypt is one of the countries that have suffered severe civilian and military casualties due to the increasing use of IEDs by terrorists and fully supports and international effort to address this threat.

However, in spite of our support for the resolution in its entirety and for its overall objectives, we would like to reiterate our strong reservation about PP14, which imposes language that largely undermines the value of this resolution and could be interpreted as justifying terrorism and the use of IEDs by terrorists.

We hope that the sponsors will take this into consideration in the future.

We also reiterate that the provisions of this resolution should not be interpreted in a manner that would affect the legitimate transfers of dual-use items or technologies, thereby exceeding the scope of the resolution which is the prevention of the acquisition by terrorists of IEDs and their components.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

Explanation of Vote on L.8.Rev1

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote after the vote on the proposal contained in document **L.8Rev1 entitled "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security"**.

Egypt voted in favor of this Resolution in line with its principled support for, and interest in, maintaining the central role of the United Nations in addressing the international peace and security aspects of ICTs in an inclusive and universal platform.

However, while appreciating the efforts of the Russian Federation in conducting intensive rounds of informal consultations on the text of this proposal, my delegation is obliged to place on record a number of observations and concerns that we have expressed during the consultations, some of which were not fully addressed.

First, Egypt was of the view that the creation of a new OEWG, or any other mechanism, on ICTs should be considered only after the existing OEWG concludes its deliberations and fulfills its mandate, in order not to preempt the outcome of the ongoing discussions and negotiations.

Second, there are several structural issues in relation to the proposed new OEWG. To name a few, the length of the proposed year period implies that Member States who aspire for tangible progress and action-oriented results have to wait at least until the year 2025 before any tangible progress or significant action takes place.

OEWGs and GGEs are by definition and design deliberative platforms or preparatory processes that should lead to further action oriented steps, such as the establishment of a PoA as has been proposed by 46 Member States including Egypt, or the convening of a conference to negotiate legally-binding instruments.

Third, the name of the new OEWG as indicated in OP1 is rather confusing and may create issues in interpreting its mandate. And the selective reference to specific issues such as data security or national initiatives may also create imbalances in addressing several other issues of interest that represent an increasing threat to international peace and security. Finally, we reiterate that we question the relevance and added value of the creation of thematic subgroups as indicated in OP4. We stress in advance that the creation of such subgroups must not be interpreted as an opening for creating exclusive subgroups that do not allow for the full and equal participation of all Member States. It also must not lead to convening parallel meetings that impose limitations on the capacity of the majority of New York-based Missions to participate in them.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote after the vote on the proposal contained in **document L.39 entitled "the Hague Code of Conduct against ballistic missiles proliferation" on which we abstained:**

We reiterate that HCoC was developed on the basis of the exclusive and discriminatory export control regime of MTCR, which imposes undue restrictions on equipment and technologies that are essential for several peaceful and legitimate applications. It was not negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations or in an inclusive format. Its provisions have disregarded the legitimate concerns and constructive proposals submitted by a number of Member States.

Moreover, this Code of Conduct ignores nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in a discriminatory manner. Its scope also excludes the category of cruise missiles. Such a selective approach, which undermines the principle of undiminished security for all, cannot represent a credible basis in the area of disarmament and arms control.

Furthermore, HCoC has far-reaching negative implications on the right of developing countries and emerging space-faring nations to the peaceful applications of outer space by establishing a de facto monopoly over the necessary technological requirements.

For an international regime on missiles to be credible and effective, it has to be comprehensive and nondiscriminatory. And it must be negotiated in an inclusive format under the auspices of the United Nations in order to reduce the threats to international peace and security emanating from the excessive development, stockpiling, and testing of new types of missiles and other delivery systems of nuclear weapons, as well as the alarming proliferation of missiles to terrorists and illegal armed groups.

Dialogue on topics such as definitions and scope, as well as possible confidence building measures at the international and regional levels, could represent a good starting point for a possible genuine effort on this issue.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote after the vote on the proposal contained in **document L.71 entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons"**:

We consider Japan to be one of our key international partners, especially in the area of disarmament. However, once again, Egypt had to abstain on the Resolution as a whole as well as many of its paragraphs.

The Resolution continues to further undermine nuclear disarmament obligations, the relevant previously agreed and unequivocal undertakings, as well as the special responsibility of Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) in this regard.

It links the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations to an ambiguous set of preconditions and aims to lower the level of expectations regarding the pace of implementing the relevant agreed commitments.

Several paragraphs continue to weaken the language of previously agreed undertakings under the NPT and its Review Conference and undermine the importance of implementing the relevant commitments, in a manner that reinforces an alarming trend, especially as we approach the 10th session of the NPT Review Conference.

With this alarming trend, we caution that under the pretext of pragmatism we might risk destroying the credibility of the NPT and its review process by going backwards on nuclear disarmament obligations instead of moving forward.

Egypt voted against PP4 in light of the alarming deletion of the reference to the "implementation" of previously agreed commitments, as well as against OP1 which imposes ambiguous conditionalities on the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations. We abstained on PP2 in line with our principled position regarding considering the NPT to be the cornerstone for the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime.

In subparagraph OP3(b), the term "States possessing nuclear weapons" does not observe the established categorization within the context of the NPT which only recognizes NWS and NNWS. We cannot accept reducing the calls on States that have not yet adhered to the NPT to vague risk reduction measures instead of calling upon them to accede to the NPT as NNWS without preconditions or further delay. We strongly caution against the consequences of using this terminology.

Last but not least, we deeply regret that this resolution continues to omit the previous references to the agreed objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant 1995 resolution, which is an integral element of the indefinite extension of the NPT. To this date, we have not received any convincing explanation from Japan regarding this unjustifiable and inexplicable amendment. Several delegations have highlighted their disappointment in this regard, especially that the resolution selectively addresses specific regional issues in Northeast Asia.

We have expressed these concerns to the delegation of Japan on numerous occasions. We look forward to cooperating with Japan on this resolution in future occasions and we sincerely hope that these concerns would be taken into consideration in the future iterations of this resolution in order to strive for truly united courses of action towards a world without nuclear weapons.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, my delegations does not consider the adoption of this Resolution with such a divisive vote to form a basis for future action on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation or for the consensual outcome that we aspire for in the forthcoming NPT Review Conference.

Thank you.

EU General Statement

before the vote on Cluster I (Nuclear Weapons) concerning the Middle East

Mr. Chair,

I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

The 2016 European Union Global Strategy for the Union's Foreign and Security Policy as well as the 2003 European Union Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are founded on the conviction that a multilateral approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international peace and security.

The Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean of 13 July 2008, establishing the Union for the Mediterranean, reaffirmed the common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security as set out in the Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of 27-28 November 1995, which, inter alia, promotes regional security through, inter alia, nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation, adherence to regional arrangements such as zones free of nuclear weapons, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith the commitments of the signatories to the Barcelona Declaration under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The Parties to the Union for the Mediterranean agreed to pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of WMD and their delivery systems and to consider practical steps, inter alia, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as the excessive accumulation of conventional arms.

The EU reiterates its full support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has laid the foundation for establishing nuclear-free zones around the world as well as the establishment of a Middle East Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction-Free Zone (ME WMDFZ).

It remains a strategic priority of the EU to support peace and stability in the entire Middle East. The EU remains committed to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The EU reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, as agreed by NPT States Parties. The path for action as set out in the 2010 Action Plan remains the most promising basis on which to proceed.

The EU is of the view that such Zones can only be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all States of the region concerned. The EU maintains the view that dialogue and building confidence among stakeholders is the only sustainable way to agree on arrangements for a meaningful conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by them. The process must be inclusive for it to be effective and proposals that force the issue risks failure.

The EU has consistently presented this position at the UN, as was also the case in recent UN discussions related to concrete proposals on how to take the process forward. The EU reiterates its support for the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament 'Securing our Common Future', presented on 24 May 2018, which pledges to work with UN Member States to strengthen and consolidate nuclear-weapon-free zones including by supporting the further establishment of such zones, including in the Middle East. The EU takes note of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, held on 18-22 November 2019 in New York. The EU calls on all Parties to

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

further their efforts to build an inclusive and consensus-based process, including all States of the region, taking into account the security concerns of all States and covering all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, in line with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 NPT Review Conference Outcome. The EU reconfirms its readiness to assist the process leading to the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, as it has done in the past by facilitating dialogue among States of the region. Specific legislative acts have been adopted at the EU to support UN works in this regard. Council Decision CSDP 2017/809 currently supports the implementation of the [United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540](#), where assistance requests from States to take additional, practical steps to implement the obligations of UNCSR [1540 \(2004\)](#) at national level, gives priority to States from, inter alia, the Gulf and Middle East region.

The EU promotes very concretely the process leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East and adopted a number of decisions in that regard.

Firstly, the Council Decision 2019/615 of 15 April 2019 in support of activities leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this framework, the EU delivered a specific statement on the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East at the Third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT taking place in New York from 27 April until 10 May 2019.

Secondly, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/938 of 6 June 2019 specifically in support of a process of confidence-building leading to the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It reinforces EU efforts to bring the process forward by organising seminars and meetings as was done in 2011 and in 2012 respectively. It aims to enhance confidence building through a number of seminars, work-shops and research projects, whose objective it is to reach a deeper collective understanding of the successes and failures related to previous efforts and which would eventually allow for ideas on new avenues and proposals leading to a WMD free zone in the Middle East. This project will last for 3 years.

Thirdly, the Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/538 of 1 April 2019 in support of key activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) including the universalisation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the implementation of the Decision of the 4th Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the CWC on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use (C-SS-4/DEC.3) adopted on 27 June 2018.

The EU also confirms its readiness to continue to assist the Middle East region, via “The European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centers of Excellence Initiative” (CBRN CoE), which was launched in response to the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of countries outside the European Union to mitigate CBRN risks. The Centers of Excellence established in Jordan, Algeria, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates all contribute to enhanced capacity building in the region and cooperation between these States. Examples thereof include training on radiological detection undertaken by the Middle East Centre of Excellence in Amman on 8-10 April 2019, within the framework of the EU CBRN CoE risk mitigation Initiative, as well as other countries in the region, such as training in risk mitigation in which the EU engaged with Iraqi CBRN authorities on 9-12 September 2019.

Finally, the EU continues to call on all States in the region, which have not yet done so, to accede to and abide by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol and, as applicable, a modified Small Quantities Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Also subscription to The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missiles Proliferation (HCoC) could contribute to regional confidence building, which is necessary for progress towards a Middle East WMD free zone.

**EU General Statement
before the vote on Cluster VI (Regional disarmament and security)
concerning the resolution on Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region
New York, November 2020**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honor to speak on behalf of the European Union. The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Serbia* and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

With regard to draft resolution L.31, Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region, the EU would like to state the following.

We take note of the operative paragraph 5, which has again been tabled, in order to maintain consensus on this important resolution. It calls upon all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so to adhere to all multilaterally negotiated legal instruments in force related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the conditions necessary for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region.

We would like to underline that the proposed reference to “legal instruments in force” does not imply a change to our long-standing position in support of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which regrettably has not yet entered into force. Promoting universalization and the early entry into force of the CTBT are among EU’s top priorities. All 27 EU Member States have ratified the Treaty, and remain strongly committed to pursuing the achievement of its objectives. The EU has also continued to provide significant financial support for the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities. Confirming the EU Member States’ continued active engagement, the EU has become a supporter of ten actions of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, among which, Action 4 “Bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force”. In this context, we will devote attention to promoting universalisation and the entry into force of the CTBT.

Mr. Chair,

The EU reiterates its call on all States who have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions or delay. In particular, we address this call to the remaining eight Annex II States whose ratification is essential for the Treaty’s entry into force. We welcome the latest ratification by Zimbabwe, increasing the number of ratifications to 168 States. Pending the entry into force, we call upon all States to maintain moratoria on nuclear weapon test explosions and other nuclear explosions and to refrain from any actions that would undermine the Treaty’s object and purpose. In this regard, we call upon the DPRK to maintain its declared suspension of nuclear weapons testing and to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay.

Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious threat to international peace and security, and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. It is important that all State Signatories adhere to the objectives of the Treaty. Nonetheless, the absence of the CTBT’s entry into force prevents the use of on-site inspections, an important verification tool. Only the entry into force of the Treaty will outlaw nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions in a verifiable way. We will therefore continue to use every opportunity to advocate the Treaty’s ratification and universalization also during this First Committee session.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

**Explanation of Vote by Germany
on behalf of European Union Member States
Resolution “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of
international security (L.8)”
New York, 27 October 2020**

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the EU Member States. The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

1. The EU and its Member States welcomed the resumption of UN discussions on cyber issues in 2019 and reaffirm our commitment to work both within the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) and the OEWG, in a complementary and coordinated fashion, to promote and further build on the cumulative achievements of the previous UN GGEs.

2. We support the important and the ongoing work in 2021 of the OEWG and UN GGE that includes discussions on future institutional dialogue. We should let the OEWG and the UN GGE conclude their work first to allow the discussion on cyber issues in the First Committee to return to one consensus track. This proposal by Russia pre-empts the outcome of the ongoing Open-ended Working Group (OEWG). It is perceived as going against the inclusive and open-spirit of the resolution [A/RES/73/27](#) and disregarding its mandate, as well as the engagement of the whole UN community to make progress on cyber issues. It is therefore with great regret that EU MS cannot support the resolution “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (L.8)”.

3. Furthermore, we recall that during the OEWG it was widely shared that we were not starting from scratch. We regret that the sponsor of the draft resolution L.8. has chosen to include language that has not enjoyed consensus in the past within the First Committee framework, as well as establishing a process of discussion pre-empting the outcome of the consensus based discussions of the OEWG and the GGE. We regret that despite the invitation by many States to go back to consensual language and to endorse a constructive approach that this effort has been denied. We reaffirmed on various occasions our readiness to discuss the draft resolution in order to find consensus. The draft risks postponing the possibility of the OEWG to recommend the establishment of a permanent and regular institutional dialogue. We therefore regret the current situation that does not allow us to support the resolution.

4. We acknowledge and welcome the broad desire for continued regular dialogue with universal participation, including multi-stakeholder participation, on the implementation of the GGE reports on responsible behaviour of States in cyberspace, endorsed by all UN Member States. Our proposal, jointly supported at this stage by (45 countries [TBC] or list of countries) to establish a Programme of Action to Advance Responsible States Behaviour in Cyberspace, submitted to the OEWG and UN GGE, constitutes the most promising proposal on the table which could allow for the return to a one-track process based on consensus. It offers the opportunity to work together towards an inclusive, more permanent and constructive environment with the whole UN Membership, without delay or interruption in our discussions. The PoA would allow our work to progress, including on the pertinent and pressing problem of increasing cyber incidents, through strengthening the normative framework, reiterating our commitment to preserve the *acquis* and facilitating cyber capacity building in a concrete and results-oriented manner.

5. We recall that the consensus achieved after the UN GGE in 2015 regarding the application of international law, including the UN Charter, as well as the developed norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, must be preserved. We welcome the work done so far in the framework of the OEWG, which offers a valuable platform to exchange positions and foster a stronger common understanding on how to face threats and promote responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. We also welcome the consultations of the UN GGE with the UN Membership, as well as with other stakeholders, notably through regional organizations such as the African Union, the European Union, the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. We are looking forward to continuing discussions within these two processes, following the interruptions of the meetings schedules because of the Covid-19 pandemic.

* *The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.*

6. The EU and its Member States had hoped to avoid a contentious First Committee discussion this year as we believe our efforts should be focusing on our ongoing substantive work. The EU still maintains such a goal, prioritising one coherent and consensual approach that reaffirms consensus views, whilst including the work of previous First Committee resolutions.

7. In conclusion, the EU and its Member States look forward to continuing its constructive engagement in UN GGE and OEWG discussions with a view to promoting an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace, where human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and international law are fully respected and upheld. The EU will work with all the UN Membership towards conclusions of the UN discussions that plot a path back to consensus in the First Committee process.

**Explanation of Vote by Germany
on behalf of European Union Member States
Decision “2021 session of the Disarmament Commission”
New York, November 2020**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the EU Member States

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this Explanation of Vote.

1. We are not in a position to support Decision L.48 on the ‘2021 session of the Disarmament Commission’.
2. The underlying issue prompting this decision does not belong to the First Committee, and is being discussed elsewhere.

More importantly, Australia given its status as outgoing chair is the only legitimate pen-holder with regards to the UNDC this year. Hence, we cannot support this decision being submitted by another country as it creates an unfortunate precedent.

**Explanation of Vote by Germany
on behalf of European Union Member States
Resolution “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
treaties and agreements”
New York, November 2020**

Mr. Chair,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union. The following countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Republic of North Macedonia and Norway align themselves with this statement.

After careful consideration, the EU Member States have decided to continue to vote in favour of/join the consensus on the draft Resolution L.64 “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements”. In this context, we would like to make the following remarks.

The EU is a staunch supporter of the rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the UN at its core. Upholding the integrity of this system is indispensable for maintaining international peace and security.

We are deeply concerned over the current tensions afflicting the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. We must endeavour to decrease tensions, restore dialogue and trust, explore further transparency and confidence-building measures, and move from confrontation to cooperation, if we are to solve global and regional security challenges. It is important that all parties, including the main sponsor of this resolution, the Russian Federation, contribute constructively to improving the strategic context and preserving and further advancing treaties and agreements for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation to enhance global security. In this regard, we reiterate our call on all States, including the main sponsor of this resolution, to join conventional

arms conventions and treaties without delay, such as the Arms Trade Treaty and the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.

We are gravely concerned about the continued non-compliance by some States with their international obligations in the areas of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The viability and effectiveness of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements require that they be fully complied with and enforced. The international community must ensure accountability and end impunity for violations and uphold global norms. This is why the EU has strongly supported the establishment of an international attribution mechanism to identify and hold accountable the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons. This is why autonomous EU sanctions have been adopted against the use of chemical weapons, but also against nuclear proliferation and other violations of international law, notably the use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of other States. We regret that these issues relating to compliance have not been included in the draft by the main sponsor of L.64. We also recall that Russia has violated its commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State.

When talking about issues of compliance, the INF Treaty is a case in point. Given the heightened tensions, we must be careful not to enter the path of a new arms race that would offset the significant reductions achieved after the end of the Cold War. We also stress the highest importance we attach to the New START Treaty. Given the expiration in early February 2021, we strongly call for the extension of the New START Treaty as well as negotiations of broader follow-on agreements. All European countries have benefited from the Conventional Arms control and Confidence and Security Building Measures within the auspices of the OSCE and in particular the commitments in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces, the Vienna document 2011 and the Treaty on Open Skies. We underline the importance of fully implementing these instruments as well as best practices contained in other OSCE documents.

We are dismayed by the repeated and continuing attempts by a few States to challenge the authority and integrity of international organisations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), including in the debates during this First Committee. There is no doubt that the Director-General and the Technical Secretariat are fulfilling their duties in the service of the international community in a professional, objective and impartial manner. We recall the use of the veto by Russia against the extension of the mandate of the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) in this regard. We also recall the cyber-attack targeted at the offices of the OPCW, carried out by a Russian military intelligence service, following the attack in Salisbury. Furthermore, we recall the report of the Investigation and Identification Team of the OPCW that identified the Syrian Air Force as responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2017. We also recall the report by the OPCW Technical Secretariat on the assassination attempt on Mr. Navalny, who was poisoned in Russia by a military chemical toxic nerve agent of the "Novichok" group, as has been confirmed by the OPCW on the basis of analysis conducted in two of its designated laboratories. Once again, we underline serious concerns about the violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention and continuous attempts to undermine the OPCW. We expect all States to reaffirm their strong political support to the work of this important organisation as well as other relevant treaties and conventions.

We express our utmost concern about the financial crisis facing a number of disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements. The continued failure of some States Parties to comply with their financial obligations puts the functioning of these vital instruments at risk and hampers further progress. We recall that assessed contributions constitute an integral part of States Parties' obligations under international treaties and agreements and once again urge those States which have not yet done so to pay their contributions in full and on time and to settle their outstanding arrears without further delay.

We emphasise that gender equality and the empowerment of women are an important cross-cutting priority for the EU, and that the Women, Peace and Security Agenda continues to feature prominently in EU external action. Women must be fully involved, through active and equal participation, including in leadership in non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. We are encouraged that relevant gender considerations have been included in an increasing number of First Committee resolutions this year, while regretting that the main sponsor of Resolution L.64 did not accept any such suggestions in this regard last year when the resolution was first submitted. The EU will continue to keep gender issues high on the UN agenda, also bearing in mind the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament and the upcoming 20th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325.

The EU will continue to provide significant political and financial support to multilateral institutions to uphold and strengthen key international treaties and agreements, promoting universal adherence thereto and helping to build capacities in partner countries for effective treaty implementation. Even if the rules-based international system is confronted with multiple challenges, the EU will remain a strong, consistent and reliable partner of the UN. We call on all UN Member States to demonstrate their support for multilateral cooperation in these critical times, not only in words, but through actions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

General Statement by France

**on behalf of People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the United States of America and France**

L.6 “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” New York, 4 November 2020

I am speaking on behalf of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States, and my own country, France, and would like to explain our vote against the draft resolution L.6 ‘Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’.

We reiterate our opposition to the TPNW. We firmly believe that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a gradual process that takes into account the international security environment. This proven approach to nuclear disarmament has produced tangible results, including deep reductions in the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

The TPNW fails to address the key issues that must be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament. It contradicts, and risks undermining, the NPT. It ignores the international security context and regional challenges, and does nothing to increase trust and transparency between States. It will not result in the elimination of a single weapon. It fails to meet the highest standards of non-proliferation. It is creating divisions across the international non-proliferation and disarmament machinery, which could make further progress on disarmament even more difficult.

We will not support, sign or ratify this Treaty. The TPNW, including after its entry into force, will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that support or are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously on its implications for international peace and security.

Je parle au nom de la Chine, de la Fédération de Russie, du Royaume-Uni, des États-Unis et de mon propre pays, la-France, et je voudrais expliquer notre vote contre le projet de résolution L.6 “Traité sur l’interdiction des armes nucléaires”.

Nous réitérons notre opposition au TIAN. Nous sommes fermement convaincus que la meilleure façon de parvenir à un monde sans armes nucléaires est de suivre un processus progressif qui tienne compte de l’environnement de sécurité international. Cette approche éprouvée du désarmement nucléaire a produit des résultats tangibles, notamment de profondes réductions des arsenaux nucléaires à l’échelle internationale.

Le TIAN n’aborde pas les problèmes clés qui doivent être surmontés pour parvenir à un désarmement nucléaire international durable. Il est en contradiction avec le TNP et risque de le compromettre. Il ignore le contexte de sécurité international et les défis régionaux, et ne fait rien pour accroître la confiance et la transparence entre les États. Il n’aboutira pas à l’élimination d’une seule arme nucléaire. Il ne répond pas aux normes les plus élevées en matière de non-prolifération. Il crée des divisions au sein de la machinerie internationale de non-prolifération et de désarmement, ce qui pourrait rendre encore plus difficile toute avancée en matière de désarmement.

Nous ne soutiendrons, ne signerons ni ne ratifierons ce traité. Le TIAN, y compris après son entrée en vigueur, ne sera pas juridiquement contraignant pour nos pays, et nous n’acceptons aucune affirmation selon laquelle il contribue au développement du droit international coutumier ; il ne fixe pas non plus de nouvelles normes ou standards. Nous appelons tous les pays qui soutiennent ou envisagent de soutenir le TIAN à réfléchir sérieusement à ses implications pour la paix et la sécurité internationales.

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

**General Statement
by France**

**on behalf of People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
the United States of America and France**

L.30 "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices"

New York, 4 November 2020

I have the honor to take the floor on behalf of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom the United States of America, and my own country, France, to deliver an explanation of vote on draft decision L.30 entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

As NPT nuclear-weapon States, our five countries continue to pursue a persistent gradual approach towards nuclear disarmament, in a way that considers the prevailing security environment, and based on the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. In this regard, we believe that the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons cannot be achieved without ending the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Our five countries reaffirm our support for, and readiness to negotiate, a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty – FMCT), on the basis of consensus and with the participation of all countries relevant to an FMCT. In this context, we remain convinced that the appropriate venue to negotiate such an instrument is the Conference on Disarmament. We strongly believe that negotiations on the basis of document [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein allow for the concerns of all the CD member States to be addressed in a framework acceptable to all CD member States.

We highly value the work achieved so far on an FMCT. We welcome the reports adopted by consensus by the Group of Governmental Experts in 2015, as well as by the High Level Expert Preparatory Group on FMCT in 2018, in both of which our five countries actively participated. We underline the importance of fostering a shared understanding of the multiple complex issues underpinning an FMCT and welcome in this respect the substantive in-depth technical discussions which took place in 2018 in the relevant subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the substantive work carried out so far in these various fora provide a solid basis for further work on the matter. In this context, our five countries intend to support draft decision L. 30.

J'ai l'honneur de prendre la parole au nom de la Chine, de la Fédération de Russie, du Royaume-Uni, des États-Unis d'Amérique, et de mon propre pays, la France, pour lire une explication de vote sur le projet de décision L.30 intitulé "Traité interdisant la production de matières fissiles pour la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ou d'autres engins explosifs nucléaires".

En tant qu'États parties au TNP dotés d'armes nucléaires, nos cinq pays continuent de suivre une approche progressive en matière de désarmement nucléaire, d'une manière qui tienne compte de l'environnement de sécurité actuel et qui soit fondée sur les principes du maintien de la stabilité stratégique mondiale et d'une sécurité non diminuée pour tous. À cet égard, nous pensons que l'objectif ultime d'un monde sans armes nucléaires ne peut être atteint sans mettre fin à la production de matières fissiles destinées à la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ou d'autres engins explosifs nucléaires.

Nos cinq pays réaffirment leur soutien à et leur volonté de négocier un traité non discriminatoire, multilatéral et internationalement et effectivement vérifiable interdisant la production de matières fissiles destinées à la fabrication d'armes nucléaires ou d'autres engins explosifs nucléaires (traité sur l'arrêt de la production de matières fissiles), sur la base du consensus et avec la participation de tous les pays concernés. Dans ce contexte, nous restons convaincus que le lieu approprié pour négocier un tel instrument est la Conférence du désarmement. Nous sommes fermement convaincus que des négociations sur la base du document [CD/1299](#) et du mandat qu'il contient permettent de répondre aux

préoccupations de tous les États membres de la Conférence du désarmement dans un cadre acceptable pour tous les États membres de la Conférence.

Nous attachons une grande importance aux travaux réalisés jusqu'à présent sur un traité FMCT. Nous nous félicitons des rapports adoptés par consensus par le Groupe d'experts gouvernementaux en 2015, ainsi que par le Groupe préparatoire d'experts de haut niveau sur le FMCT en 2018, auxquels nos cinq pays ont participé activement. Nous soulignons qu'il importe de favoriser une compréhension commune des multiples questions complexes qui sous-tendent un FMCT et nous nous félicitons à cet égard des discussions techniques approfondies qui ont eu lieu en 2018 au sein de l'organe subsidiaire compétent de la Conférence du désarmement. Nous estimons que les travaux de fond menés jusqu'à présent dans ces différentes enceintes constituent une base solide pour la poursuite des travaux sur la question.

Dans ce contexte, nos cinq pays ont l'intention de voter en faveur du projet de décision L. 30.

Segment VI – Désarmement régional et sécurité
Déclaration générale
de la France
avant les votes sur le segment VI

Monsieur le Président,

Je souhaite préciser que, cette année en 1^{ère} Commission de la 75^{ème} Assemblée générale des Nations unies, la France continuera de se prononcer dans le même esprit que les années précédentes sur un certain nombre de résolutions.

La France récuse néanmoins toute lecture de ces textes qui induirait un lien avec le Traité d'interdiction des armes nucléaires adopté le 7 juillet 2017 et qui devrait entrer en vigueur le 22 janvier 2021, en particulier s'agissant du projet des résolutions L.1 et L.31.

Je vous remercie./.

Courtesy translation

Mr. President,

I would like to make it clear for the record that this year, during the First Committee of the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly, France will continue to take action in the same spirit as previously on a number of resolutions.

France nevertheless rejects any reading of these texts which would create a link with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was adopted on 7 July 2017 and should enter into force on January 22th 2021. This applies, in particular, to draft resolutions L.1 and L.31.

Thank you, Mr. President.

Segment I – Armes nucléaires
(New York, 4 novembre 2020)

Explication de vote à titre national après le vote

Résolution L.71 : « Modes d'action conjoints et dialogue tourné vers l'avenir pour l'avènement d'un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires »

La France souhaite prononcer une explication de vote sur la résolution L71 intitulée « Modes d'action conjoints et dialogue tourné vers l'avenir pour l'avènement d'un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires », portée par le Japon.

Nous louons les efforts visant à créer des ponts dans le domaine du désarmement nucléaire, en particulier s'inscrivant dans le cadre de la préparation de l'échéance majeure que constitue la 10^{ème} conférence d'examen du TNP. Nous avons voté en faveur de la résolution « modes d'action conjoints » l'an passé, présentée pour la première fois lors de la 74^{ème} AGNU.

Cette année, nous nous sommes abstenus, pour les raisons suivantes :

L'entrée en vigueur du Traité d'interdiction des essais nucléaires est une priorité de longue date de la France et de l'Union européenne. Elle n'est pas optionnelle mais une étape indispensable vers l'interdiction définitive des essais nucléaires et à terme vers un monde sans armes nucléaires. Les PP9 et OP 3d) présentent la signature et la ratification du TICE comme une option parmi d'autres, atténuant par la même la nécessité incontournable d'assurer une entrée en vigueur sans délais du TICE. Nous appelons de nouveau tous les Etats qui ne l'ont pas encore fait, en particulier ceux de l'annexe II, à signer et ratifier le traité.

La France soutient l'appel à l'extension du traité New Start au PP12, mais ce paragraphe préambulaire présente également quelques éléments qui ne sont pas de nature à réunir un consensus large. La France attache une grande importance à la transparence dans le domaine du désarmement nucléaire. Son bilan à cet égard, en particulier la transparence sur son arsenal ou l'exposition régulière de sa doctrine, la fonde à exiger une transparence accrue de la part des Etats dotés. La France est également prête à participer à des discussions qui rassembleraient les cinq Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires au sens du TNP, sur les priorités du désarmement nucléaire, le renforcement de la confiance et de la transparence sur les arsenaux et les stratégies nucléaires de chacun.

Toutefois, les traités bilatéraux russo-américains correspondent à une histoire – celle de la Guerre froide - mais aussi à une réalité toujours actuelle, celle de la taille considérable des arsenaux nucléaires encore détenus par ces deux pays, sans commune mesure avec ceux des autres Etats dotés d'armes nucléaires. Le langage inclus au PP12 ignore cette réalité, raison pour laquelle nous nous sommes abstenus.

S'agissant du pp19, le langage relatif aux conséquences humanitaires catastrophiques résultant de l'emploi de l'arme nucléaire n'est pas nouveau. Il est connu de tous depuis longtemps. Il est regrettable que ce sujet ait servi de fondement à la campagne ayant conduit au traité d'interdiction des armes nucléaires, sur lequel la France a eu l'occasion de rappeler sa position, notamment aujourd'hui par la voix du P5. La France a donc voté contre ce PP.

S'agissant de l'OP 3c), nous souhaitons rappeler que toute négociation sur un FMCT devra être fondée sur le document [CD/1299](#) et le mandat qu'il contient. L'absence de la mention de ce document dans la partie opérationnelle de cette résolution explique l'abstention de mon pays sur ce paragraphe précis relatif au FMCT, priorité fondamentale pour mon pays.

Enfin, nous déplorons la dégradation du langage agréé par la communauté internationale sur le démantèlement complet, vérifiable et irréversible des armes nucléaires et missiles balistiques de la RPDC aux PP17 et à l'OP5, qui fonde notre vote d'abstention. La persistance des programmes nucléaire et balistique nord-coréens appelle à maintenir la pression et une position forte sur ce sujet.

Pour l'ensemble de ces raisons, la France considère que la résolution L.71 s'éloigne de l'objectif louable et ambitieux qu'elle souhaitait incarner : rapprocher les points de vue sur le désarmement nucléaire et construire un consensus autour d'un langage équilibré qui puisse ouvrir la voie à un terrain d'entente lors de la Conférence d'examen. En conséquence, la France s'est abstenue cette année mais reste intéressée de poursuivre l'étroite coopération avec le Japon sur les versions ultérieures de cette résolution importante de la première commission de l'AGNU.

Je vous remercie./.

Courtesy translation

France would like to make an explanation of vote after the vote on resolution L71 entitled “Joint Courses of Action and Future-oriented Dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”, carried by Japan.

We commend the efforts to build bridges in the field of nuclear disarmament, particularly in preparation for the major deadline of the 10th NPT Review Conference. We voted in favor of the resolution “Joint Courses of Action” last year, first introduced at the 74th UNGA.

This year, we abstained on the resolution for the following reasons:

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is a long-standing priority for France and the European Union. It is not optional but an indispensable step towards a definitive ban of nuclear tests and ultimately towards a world without nuclear weapons. PP9 and OP 3d) present the signature and ratification of the CTBT as one option among others, thereby mitigating the indispensable need to ensure the CTBT's entry into force without delay. We reiterate our call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular Annex II States, to sign and ratify the Treaty.

France supports the call for the extension of the New Start treaty in PP12, but this preambular paragraph also presents some elements that are not likely to meet with a broad consensus. France attaches great importance to transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament. Its record in this regard, in particular the transparency of its arsenal and the regular exposure of its doctrine, is the basis for its demand for greater transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. France is also ready to take part in discussions that would bring together the five nuclear-weapon States as defined by

the NPT, on the priorities of nuclear disarmament, confidence-building and transparency on the arsenals and nuclear strategies of each.

However, the Russian-American bilateral treaties reflect a history - the history of the Cold War - but also a reality that is still relevant today, namely the considerable size of the nuclear arsenals still held by both countries, which

is out of all proportion to those of the other nuclear-weapon states. The language included in PP12 ignores this reality and is the reason why we abstained.

With regard to PP19, the language relating to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences resulting from the use of nuclear weapons is not new. It has been known to all for a long time. It is regrettable that this subject served as the basis for the campaign leading to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, on which France had the opportunity to reiterate its position, notably today through the voice of the P5. France therefore voted against this PP.

With regards to OP 3c), we wish to recall that any negotiation on a FMCT will have to be based on document [CD/1299](#) and the mandate it contains. The absence of mention of this document in the operational part of this resolution justifies my country's abstention on this specific paragraph relating to the FMCT, which is a fundamental priority for my country.

Finally, we deplore the degradation of the language agreed by the international community on the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of the DPRK's nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in PP17 and OP5 on which we abstained. The persistence of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs calls for continued pressure and a strong position on this issue.

For all of these reasons, France considers that resolution L.71 moves away from the laudable and ambitious objective that it wished to embody: to build bridges on nuclear disarmament and build consensus around a balanced language that could pave the way for common ground at the Review Conference. Consequently, France abstained this year but remains interested in pursuing close cooperation with Japan on future versions of this important UNGA First Committee resolution.

Thank you.

**Explanation of Vote delivered by Germany on behalf of European Union Member States
“No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”
New York, 6 November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries Turkey, the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Albania*, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the proposal contained in document A/C.1/75/L. 62 regarding “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space”.

We are not in a position to support draft resolution [A/C.1/75/L.62](#).

Mr. Chairman,

The European Union and its Member States have long advocated the preservation of a safe and secure space environment and peaceful uses of outer space on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis. Strengthening the safety, security, and long-term sustainability of activities in outer space is a key priority for us and in our common interest.

We believe it is important to develop initiatives that will increase confidence and mutual trust between current and future space actors. In this regard, we would like to highlight the importance of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures that can make a contribution to the security, safety and sustainability of activities in outer space. This is the reason why the EU proposed some years ago an international Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. We encourage further international cooperation to elaborate principles of responsible behaviour in outer space and underline the need to advocate responsible behavior in outer space notably in the UN framework.

The EU and its Member States remain committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore, all EU Member States voted in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution 75/L3 regarding the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).

With regard to draft Resolution L.62 on “No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (NFP), we are concerned that this initiative does not adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence between States. In particular, the NFP initiative does not address the difficult issue of defining what a weapon in outer space is, which renders this resolution ineffective.

Furthermore, with space being increasingly contested, we remain concerned of the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including ground based systems. We underline the importance of addressing such developments promptly, comprehensively and as part of international efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space, something that this resolution does not do sufficiently.

Mr. Chairman,

Rather than introducing a NFP pledge, the EU and its Member States believe it would be more useful to address the behaviour in, and use of, outer space in order to advance meaningful discussions and initiatives on how to prevent space from becoming an arena for conflict and to ensure the long-term sustainability, safety and security of the space environment.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

**Explanation of Vote by Germany on behalf of European Union Member States
L.65 “United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism
for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”
New York
November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Member States of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the Republic of North Macedonia*, Montenegro* and Albania*, and the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

I am taking the floor to explain our vote on the proposal contained in document A/C.1/75/L. 65 entitled “United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

We are not in a position to support draft resolution [A/C.1/75/L.65](#).

The EU Member States fully support the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), as key pillars of the international rules-based system, as well as the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism (SGM), as a key component of the non-proliferation and disarmament architecture. In the same vein, the EU stands fully behind the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

We took note with concern of the Russian Federation’s proposal for a resolution calling for a review of the SGM Guidelines and Procedures.

It is well known that the Russian Federation has demarched the EU as well as a number of EU Member States and other countries, opposing the work done by UNODA with the help of several UN Member States to strengthen the SGM. At the Meeting of States Parties of the BTWC in December 2019, the Russian Federation strongly criticized any further development and strengthening of the SGM, claiming it was an attempt to create a poor substitute for a legally binding verification protocol within the BTWC. Against this background, it seems unlikely that the motive behind this resolution is to strengthen the SGM.

It must be emphasized that the SGM is an independent instrument separate from the BTWC, with a different mandate and different membership. The Secretary-General decides, as per agreed Guidelines and Procedures, whether to launch an investigation, and a separate approval from the UNSC is not needed. This independence of the SGM instrument is a crucial guarantee to UN Member States that if they request for an investigation into alleged use of chemical or biological weapons, the launch of the investigation cannot be blocked by another Member State due to political motives. This independence should not be called into question, not even indirectly.

The SGM is based on the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the UN General Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council. Yet, OP3 and OP4 of the resolution constitute a very clear and specific threat to the independence of the SGM. When read together, OP3 and OP4 change fundamentally the way in which the SGM functions by subordinating it to the UNSC. It is not acceptable to require that any report of alleged use of biological weapons brought to the attention of the Secretary-General by any States Party to the BTWC must be exclusively considered and addressed in the framework of the BTWC, in other words submitted to the UNSC that will if it deems necessary, request the Secretary-General to launch an investigation.

The SGM currently stands as the only independent international instrument for investigating alleged use of biological weapons and it constitutes an invaluable instrument assisting the OPCW in investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons, as was the case in Syria in 2013, where the Guidelines and Procedures worked fine. The resolution notes this fact in PP11. It is not immediately clear why there would be an urgency to review the Guidelines and Principles again.

* The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

The EU believes that discussions on possible verification measures under the BTWC (preambular paragraph 8) do not belong to this draft resolution that deals primarily with the Secretary General's Mechanism. Such discussions should be conducted within the BTWC.

The EU considers this resolution politically motivated and counterproductive. We cannot support a draft resolution that seeks to undermine the independence of the Secretary-General's Mechanism by weakening the mandate given to the UNSG by the General Assembly (resolution [42/37](#) C of 30 November 1987) and endorsed by UNSC resolution [620 \(1988\)](#).

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

2020 UN General Assembly First Committee
Explanation of Vote: L.62
“No first placement of weapons in outer space”

I am taking the floor on behalf of the following group of countries, **Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Montenegro, the Netherlands, the Republic of North Macedonia, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden including my own country Germany**, to explain the reasons pertaining to our shift in voting from “Abstention” to “No” on the proposal in document L.62 regarding “No first placement of weapons in outer space”.

Our group of countries continues to promote the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space. We remain strongly committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We do not believe that the Russian approach “No first placement of weapons in outer space” does adequately respond to the objective of strengthening trust and confidence between States and increasing security in and around outer space for the following reasons:

Firstly, our group of countries is concerned about the increasing development and ongoing testing of various counter space capabilities, in particular by the initiator/main sponsor of the resolution. Russia has failed to meaningfully address the concerns of others regarding the rationale of this RES. Moreover, Russia has also failed to reconcile its approach with the fact that it already possesses and continues to develop capabilities that can be regarded as weapons. This includes ground-based counter-space capabilities, which constitute significant and serious threats to space systems and the space environment but are not explicitly included in the scope of the RES.

We are particularly concerned about the threatening behavior with regard to the Russian satellites COSMOS 2519/2521/2523 and more recently COSMOS 2543. The satellite COSMOS 2543, which by releasing a new object at high velocity in Low Earth Orbit, has the characteristics of an on-orbit counter-space capability. How can Russia bring the development, placement in space and testing of such capabilities in line with its “No First Placement” initiative?

Secondly, the PAROS GGE discussions in 2018/2019 illustrated that the international community is facing a broad spectrum of space-related threats, namely space-to-space attacks, space-to-ground attacks and ground-to-space attacks. These aspects are not sufficiently reflected by the NFP initiative nor by the Russian and Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space which only touches upon the threat or use of force against outer space objects –and even that only in a generic manner. We miss a serious engagement by Russia and China to amend their approach and constructively respond to the concerns regarding all threats and risks perceived by the international community.

Furthermore, the NFP initiative continues to ignore the challenge of sufficiently defining weapons or illegitimate objects in outer space, in particular with a view to certain dual-use technologies as repeatedly asked for by this group. Ambiguities regarding the capabilities of certain objects and regarding intentions of their use could lead to misinterpretations, misunderstandings and miscalculations and could consequently increase the risk of conflict in space.

Taking into account these insufficiencies and notwithstanding the goal that we share of a comprehensive and legally binding framework which complements the Outer Space Treaty and the UN Charter, we believe it would be more useful to follow an approach that addresses already existing security threats and risks in and around outer space, that increases transparency and confidence-building measures and that promotes consensus-building regarding responsible behavior with regard to space activities.

Thirdly, despite these insufficiencies, when voting on the NFP resolution last year, we abstained with the aim to facilitate a relaunch of arms control efforts with regard to all relevant threats to space systems arising from irresponsible behavior in outer space. We deeply regret that Russia has not taken any step towards this direction and that it is actively opposing initiatives that aim to do so. We remain committed to engage constructively with the international community in order to build trust and confidence among states and to promote the preservation of a safe, secure and sustainable space environment and the peaceful use of outer space to the benefit of all states.

Cluster VII – Machinerie du désarmement
Déclaration générale
 de la France
de la part de l'Allemagne et de la France
L.37 « 40ème anniversaire de l'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement »
 New York, 10 novembre 2020

Je souhaiterais prononcer une déclaration générale au nom de l'Allemagne et de la France, pour introduire le projet de résolution L.37 « 40ème anniversaire de l'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement », que nos deux pays portent conjointement en cette 75ème Assemblée générale.

La France, eu égard à son rôle historique dans la création de l'UNIDIR, et Allemagne, en tant que principal donateur de l'UNIDIR, entretiennent une relation spéciale avec l'Institut. La résolution quinquennale relative à l'UNIDIR vise à réaffirmer le soutien de la communauté internationale à son travail et ses activités. La France et l'Allemagne ont été et continueront à être de fervents partisans de l'UNIDIR, tant en ce qui concerne l'utilisation de ses excellents travaux que le financement des événements et activités de recherche de l'Institut. Cette année est particulièrement importante alors qu'elle marque le 40ème anniversaire de l'UNIDIR. C'est un moment pour réfléchir aux succès passés de l'UNIDIR, et doter l'institut d'une base financière viable lui permettant de continuer de remplir pleinement son mandat.

En effet, la subvention sur le budget régulier des Nations Unies allouée à l'UNIDIR n'a pas augmenté depuis 2000. Dans le même temps, l'UNIDIR, pour répondre aux besoins exprimés par la communauté internationale et aux défis liés à la diversification des enjeux de sécurité et de désarmement, a augmenté ses activités et publications, induisant une augmentation de ses dépenses. Certaines dépenses non prévues ont apparues, comme cette année du fait de l'imposition d'un loyer par l'ONUG et de la crise sanitaire liée au COVID-19. Les rapports successifs du Secrétaire général, du Conseil d'administration de l'UNIDIR, ainsi que le rapport de l'audit externe mené en 2018, concluent tous à la nécessité d'accroître la subvention sur le budget régulier des Nations unies. Une telle réévaluation est indispensable pour renforcer l'impartialité, l'indépendance et la viabilité de l'institut sur le long terme et pour soutenir le cœur de son mandat.

La résolution L.37 propose de prendre ces mesures qui s'imposent. Nous regrettons que cette année, la résolution ait été appelée au vote. Il s'agit d'une rupture historique du consensus sur cette résolution relative à une composante clé de la machinerie du désarmement. Nous comptons néanmoins sur le soutien le plus large possible des Etats parties.

Je vous remercie.

Courtesy translation

I would like to make a general statement on behalf of Germany and France to introduce draft resolution L.37 "40th anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research", which our two countries are jointly running on the occasion of the 75th General Assembly.

France, in view of its historic role in the establishment of UNIDIR, and Germany, as major donor, have a special relationship with the Institute. The quinquennial resolution aims to reaffirm the support of the international community for UNIDIR's work and activities. France and Germany have been and will continue to be staunch supporters of UNIDIR, both, in terms of drawing on its excellent products as well as in terms of financing events and research of the Institute. This year is particularly significant as it marks UNIDIR's 40th anniversary. It is a time to reflect on UNIDIR's past successes, and to provide the Institute with a viable financial base to enable it to continue to fully carry out its mandate.

Indeed, the grant from the regular UN budget allocated to UNIDIR has not increased since 2000. At the same time, in response to the needs expressed by the international community and to the challenges posed by the diversification of security and disarmament issues, UNIDIR has increased its activities and publications, leading to an increase in its expenditures. Some unplanned expenses have arisen, such as this year due to the imposition of rent by UNOG and to the COVID health crisis. Successive reports by the Secretary-General, the UNIDIR Board of Trustees, and the report of the Independent Third Party assessment conducted in 2018 all conclude that there is a need to increase the subvention from the regular UN budget. Such a re-evaluation is essential to strengthen the impartiality, independence and long-term viability of the Institute and to support its core functions.

Resolution L.37 proposes to take these necessary steps. We regret that this year the resolution has been put to a vote. This is an historic break in the consensus that this resolution related to a key component of the disarmament machinery has always enjoyed. Nevertheless, we count on the widest possible support of the States Parties.

I thank you.

EXPLANATION OF VOTE
DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA

Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security

Thank you, Mr. President.

The delegation of Guatemala would like to exercise its right of explanation of vote on the resolution [A/C.1/75/L.8/Rev.1](#) on Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

My delegation abstain to the abovementioned resolution taking into account that the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security has not finished its mandate, Guatemala is of the view that the timing of creating a new Group is not yet adequate. By establishing a new Group when the current one is still on sessions, we may be indirectly prejudging its outcomes. In that order of ideas, Guatemala's abstention vote is not against the continuation of discussions on the matter and should be interpreted as a desire to finalize the current OEWG, publish its outcomes and have the opportunity to analyze them and plan the subsequent steps on the best format to continue our discussions.

Regarding the best format to continue these discussions, to establish a new OEWG with a five-year mandate is a significant change from the current one. We would prefer to continue on a two-year mandate as the topics to be discussed are not only of international significance but also demonstrate a constant and rapid change as it has been shown by the pandemic of COVID-19.

Thank you,

EXPLANATION OF VOTE
DELEGATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GUATEMALA

Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Thank you, Mr. President.

The delegation of Guatemala would like to exercise its right of explanation of vote against the resolution [A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1](#) on the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

Guatemala extends its support to the Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons and believes that any Member State can bring to the attention of the Secretary General reports of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law.

Furthermore, Guatemala extends its support to the BWC, CWC and supports the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and all its bodies.

In that sense, Guatemala's against vote on the draft resolution [A/C.1/75/L.65/Rev.1](#) is on the basis of a disagreement regarding the language as it was presented, as well as the modalities in which the mechanism wants to be reformed.

Guatemala reaffirms its position against the use or threat of use of any weapon of mass destruction regardless of who, where and how it is carried out.

Thank you,

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE COOPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
Explanation of vote on First Committee drafts L.8 and L.48 at the 75th session of the United Nations General Assembly

Mr. Chair,

The delegation of Guyana wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution L.8 titled *Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security* and draft Decision L.48 titled *2021 session of the Disarmament Commission*.

Regarding the draft resolution, L.8, the delegation of Guyana abstained on the draft in light of the fact that there is an existing Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security which was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution [73/27](#) of 5 December 2018. Guyana is of the view that since this OEWG has not yet completed its work, it would be somewhat duplicative and premature to proceed with the establishment of a second OEWG with a near identical mandate. It would be prudent for the existing OEWG to complete its work and produce its report for the consideration of Member States. Thereafter, Member States would be in a better position to pronounce on the need for another OEWG, or alternatively, the need to extend the life of the existing OEWG.

Guyana takes this opportunity to reiterate its support for inclusiveness in the work of the United Nations on all matters on the organization's agenda. My delegation remains supportive of the fact that the OEWG was meant to give all Member States the opportunity to deliberate on the critical issue of ICTs in the context of international security. Guyana therefore affirms this initiative and will look favourably on initiatives to continue work on this issue in the future, as appropriate.

Mr. Chair,

With respect to the draft L.48, at the outset Guyana underscores its full commitment to the disarmament agenda of the United Nations and for the work undertaken by the disarmament machinery. On this note, Guyana views the work of the Disarmament Commission as critical in making recommendations for treating with various problems in the field of disarmament. We were therefore disappointed that the UNDC has been unable to have substantive sessions since 2018 and are hopeful that the relevant concerns can be addressed clearing the way for a substantive session in 2021.

Our abstention on L.48, **Mr. Chair**, was premised on our studied conclusion that issues of entry and access for participation in meetings are outside the purview of the First Committee and would be better addressed by the organs tasked with this mandate. On this note, we affirm the right of every Member State to participate fully in the work of the United Nations.

I thank you.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolutions under “Nuclear Weapons” Cluster**

3 November 2020

L.6: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

I would like to state that India did not participate in the negotiations on the TPNW, therefore, will not become a party to the Treaty, and shall not be bound by any of the obligations that may arise from it. India believes that this Treaty does not constitute or contribute to the development of any customary international law.

India reiterates its commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon free world. India believes that this goal can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework, as outlined in our Working Paper titled “Nuclear Disarmament”, submitted to the UNGA in 2006. In this regard, India supports the commencement of negotiations on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention in the CD.

L.50: Nuclear Disarmament

We share the main objective of the draft resolution L.50, which is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time. Let me reiterate that India attaches a high priority to nuclear disarmament.

However, we have abstained because of certain references to the NPT as well as the TPNW, on which India’s position is well known.

We support other provisions of the resolution, which we believe are consistent with India’s positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We compliment Myanmar for retaining vital principled paragraphs in this resolution which are supported by a vast majority of member States.

L.54: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments

We have voted against L.54 as well as its OP15 since India cannot accept the call to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. In urging India to accede to NPT “promptly and without conditions,” the draft resolution negates the rules of customary international law, as enshrined in the Vienna Law of Treaties, which provides that a State’s acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty is based on the principle of free consent. India is a responsible Nuclear Weapon State and therefore, there is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

L.71: Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons

We acknowledge that Japan, the lead sponsor, is the only country to have suffered a nuclear weapons attack. We share the resolution’s aspiration on nuclear disarmament, but in substantive terms, the text has fallen short on this objective.

India supports the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the CD on the basis of [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein. So, the question of a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons does not arise and hence our abstention on OP3(c).

India remains committed to a nuclear weapon free world and to maintaining a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Our views on the CTBT are well known and in view of these, we have voted against OP 3(d).

L.5: Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons

India has voted in favour of resolution L.5 consistent with its participation in the three meetings in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Our participation in these meetings was premised on the shared concern on the serious threat to the survival of humankind that could be posed by the use of nuclear weapons.

L.2: The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East

India believes that the focus of this resolution should be limited to the region that it intends to address.

The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, provides that States are bound by a treaty based on the principle of free consent. The call to those States remaining outside the NPT to accede to it and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear facilities is at variance with this principle. India is not a Party to the NPT and is not bound by its outcome documents. This applies also to certain operative paragraphs contained in L.2.

L.73: Ethical Imperatives for a Nuclear Weapon Free World

On L.73, India agrees with several provisions of this resolution, in particular its acknowledgment that nuclear disarmament is a global public good of the highest order. We support the ICJ Advisory Opinion, that there exists a legal obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this regard, India has supported the NAM proposal for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention.

The global elimination of nuclear weapons will require progressive steps aimed at reduction in their military utility, reduction in their role in security policies and a universal commitment, with a global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament. Until that goal is accomplished, reflected in specific international legal instruments, questions relating to the immorality of nuclear weapons have to be examined in the framework of the sovereign responsibility of states to protect their security in a nuclearized global order put together on the pillars of nuclear deterrence. India's nuclear doctrine of credible minimum deterrence, with the posture of no-first use and non-use against non-nuclear weapons States achieves this very balance.

Explanation of Vote of India on Draft Resolutions under "Other WMD" Cluster

4 November 2020

L.29 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

India has been supporting the draft resolution L.29 on "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction" given the high importance that India attaches to the CWC and all its provisions to address concerns regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons.

India has always maintained that any use of chemical weapons is in complete disregard of humanity, is reprehensible and contrary to the provisions of the CWC as well as accepted international norms. India is against the use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anybody, and under any circumstances. The perpetrators of such abhorrent acts must be held accountable.

India attaches great importance to upholding the integrity of the CWC and for avoiding politicization of the issues. With regard to any allegations of use and consequent measures in this regard, we believe that the provisions and procedures laid down in the Convention should be strictly adhered to by the OPCW and the concerns should be addressed on the basis of cooperation among all parties concerned.

This resolution traditionally has received consensus support. However, it is a matter of regret that the consensus nature has been negatively affected due to inclusion of some contentious issues in its operative part. We hope that this will change for the better in the future.

L.65 United Nations Secretary General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons

We recognize the efforts of the Russian Federation for tabling L.65. India is State Party to and attaches highest importance to the CWC, BWC, and 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare and all their provisions. India has maintained that alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be dealt with as per the provisions of CWC and BWC.

The CWC has a comprehensive verification regime and detailed provisions to deal with any alleged use of chemical weapons. As to the BWC, India has called for negotiation of a comprehensive and legally binding Protocol, providing for an effective, universal and non-discriminatory verification mechanism.

India has always supported upholding the integrity of these Conventions and dealing with specific instances as per the provisions of these Conventions. We have underlined that any amendments to the provisions of the Convention must be carried out through the due processes as laid out in the Conventions.

India has been constrained to abstain on the resolution, as India believes that matters relating to the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons should be addressed within the framework of respective Conventions, for which CWC already has provisions. India would like to reiterate its call for negotiating a verification protocol for the BWC, which in our view, is the only way to strengthen the norm and verification process against the use of biological weapons.

L.52 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on their destruction

India attaches high importance to the BWC as the first global and non-discriminatory disarmament Convention, prohibiting an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

India has underlined that financial stability of the Convention is essential for its full and effective implementation. India urges all State Parties to make their annual assessed contributions in full and in time. As to the Working Capital Fund, India has maintained that such a Working Capital Fund must be established through assessed contributions by States Parties and not through voluntary contributions. A similar Working Capital Fund has been established in the OPCW through assessed contributions. Furthermore, India maintains that the budget of BWC must be supported through contributions by States Parties and not by non-State entities. India looks forward to the review of the decision on the establishment of the Working Capital Fund by the Ninth Review Conference of BWC scheduled to take place next year.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolutions under "Outer Space" Cluster**

6 November 2020

L.45: Reducing Space Threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviours

As a major spacefaring nation, India has vital developmental and security interests in space. India remains opposed to the weaponisation of outer space. India has not, and will not, resort to any arms race in outer space. India has been a consistent advocate of preserving the outer space as a common heritage of humankind. We remain committed to maintaining outer space as an ever-expanding frontier for cooperative endeavours of all space faring nations.

India continues to support substantive consideration of the prevention of an arms race in outer space within the multilateral framework of the UN. We remain committed to negotiation of a legally-binding instrument on PAROS to be negotiated in

the CD. While not a substitute for legally binding instruments, TCBMs can play a useful and complementary role to legally-binding instruments. India has been an active participant in the GGE on PAROS, which concluded its session in March 2019.

India has been voting in favour of all resolutions submitted under the Outer Space cluster. However, we were constrained to abstain on L.45. While we share with the United Kingdom and other sponsors, the objective of reducing space threats, we believe that the resolution does not address the key issue of preventing arms race in outer space through a universally acceptable and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument on PAROS.

Furthermore, the resolution introduces a number of subjective elements, including responsible and irresponsible behavior, characterisation and interpretation of behavior as well as perception of threats, which further complicates our task at hand. We believe that this resolution deflects and takes us further away from the objective of preventing an arms race in outer space, which continues to be a priority for the international community. We have abstained on some preambular and operative paragraphs for the same reason.

L.62: No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space

India has voted in favour of L.62 on the No First Placement of Weapons in Outer Space. The resolution states that the legal regime applicable to outer space needs to be consolidated and reinforced. India supports this objective as well as strengthening of the international legal regime to protect and preserve access to space for all and to prevent, without exceptions, the weaponization of outer space. We support the substantive consideration of PAROS in the CD. We see No First Placement of weapons in outer space as a useful initiative and not a substitute for substantive legal measures to ensure the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We have voted against PP5 of this resolution due to the inclusion of the phrase “a community of shared future for humankind”. This phrase is part of a political ideology and a resolution of the UNGA is not the appropriate place to reflect ideologies of countries.

Explanation of Vote of India on Draft Resolutions under “Conventional Weapons” Cluster

6 November 2020

L.53: The Arms Trade Treaty

India has established strong and effective national export controls with respect to export of defence items. India subscribes to the objective of the ATT and our export control system meets those objectives. As part of our commitment to international transparency measures, India submits an annual report under the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms for the same categories of conventional arms that are regulated under the ATT. Our commitment is also reflected in India’s participation in Wassenaar Arrangement.

India continues to keep the ATT under review from the perspective of our defence, security and foreign policy interests. We have therefore abstained on the resolution L.53.

L.26: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

India has abstained on L.26. India supports the vision of a world free of anti-personnel landmines and is committed to their eventual elimination. The availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.

India is a High Contracting Party to AP-II of the CCW which enshrines the approach of taking into account the legitimate defence requirements of States, especially those with long borders. India has fulfilled its obligations under AP-II including *inter alia* stopping the production of non-detectable mines as well as rendering all our anti-personnel mines detectable. India is observing a moratorium on the export and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.

We have taken a number of measures to address humanitarian concerns arising from the use of anti-personnel landmines in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. India remains committed to increased international cooperation and assistance for mine clearance as well as rehabilitation of mine-victims and has been contributing technical assistance and expertise to this end.

India also regularly participates as an Observer at the Meetings of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolutions under
“Other Disarmament Measures and International Security” Cluster**

9 November 2020

L.21 Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control

India has voted in favor of L.21 as we fully support the objectives it seeks to promote.

We were however constrained to abstain on preambular paragraph 13 which contains a reference to the Arms Trade Treaty. As explained with regard to L.53 on ATT, India is conducting an internal review on its position and pending its conclusion has abstained on L.53. Therefore we believe that any reference in this resolution to the ATT applies only to the States Parties to the Treaty.

L.42 United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education

On L.42, India attaches high importance to promoting disarmament and non-proliferation education. India believes in the positive and important contribution that the younger generation can make to international peace and security. In this regard, we are happy to note that India's Annual Disarmament and International Security Affairs Fellowship, launched in 2019 has been well received by various Member States and is aimed at the same goal as sought by the resolution L.42.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolutions under “Regional Disarmament and Security” Cluster**

10 November 2020

L.24: Conventional arms control at the regional and sub regional levels

India has voted against L.24 on “Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels” as well as its OP2 which requests the Conference on Disarmament to consider the formulation of principles that can serve as a framework for regional agreements on conventional arms control.

The Conference, as the world's single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, has a vocation of negotiating disarmament instruments of global application. In 1993, the UNDC had, by consensus, adopted guidelines and recommendations on regional disarmament. There is no need, therefore, for the Conference on Disarmament to engage itself in formulating principles on the same subject at a time when it has several other priority issues on its agenda.

Further, we believe that the security concerns of States extend beyond narrowly defined regions. Consequently, the notion of preservation of a balance in defence capabilities in the regional or sub-regional context, is both unrealistic and unacceptable. We are, therefore, not convinced that conventional arms control, which is a global issue, needs to be pursued primarily in the regional and sub-regional contexts.

Due to this reason, India has voted against PP7.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolutions under “Disarmament Machinery” Cluster**

10 November 2020

L.48 on 2021 Session of the Disarmament Commission

India accords high importance to the UN Disarmament Commission, as part of the triad of the disarmament machinery and as a universal deliberative forum for disarmament issues. Therefore, the functioning of the UNDC in an effective, efficient, objective and inclusive manner is of paramount importance to my delegation. The inability of the UNDC to hold its substantive sessions for two successive years, in 2019 and 2020, are certainly an opportunity lost for deliberations among Member States on crucial issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

It is regrettable that the issues pertaining to denial of visas to delegates of some Member States have not yet been resolved for the second year in a row. India believes firmly that actions that prevent a country from participating in UN meetings are very serious as it affects the country's contribution to and participation at the UN. The effectiveness of the UN Disarmament machinery is dependent on full and effective participation of all countries, which is severely handicapped by the lack of grant of visas to delegates of some Member States. We sincerely hope that a solution will be found soon. At the same time, it is incumbent on all Member States to ensure the continued effective functioning of the UN disarmament machinery including the UNDC, especially at a time when it is already under strain.

In view of the importance of unhindered functioning of UNDC, India has voted in favour of the resolution for its provisions calling for timely convening of the UNDC and making substantive progress on the issues on its agenda.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolution L.10
under “Nuclear Cluster”**

3 November 2020

L.10: African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty

India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear weapon states to establish nuclear-weapon-free-zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. This principle is consistent with the provisions of SSOD-I and the UNDC Guidelines.

India enjoys friendly and mutually beneficial relations with countries of the African continent. India shares and supports their aspirations for enhancing the region's well-being and security. We respect the sovereign choice of States Parties to the Pelindaba Treaty and welcome the successful entry into force of the Treaty. As a Nuclear Weapon State, India conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect the status of the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolution L.13
under “Nuclear Cluster”**

3 November 2020

L.13 Mongolia’s international security and nuclear-weapon-free-status

As a country that maintains close friendly ties with Mongolia, India welcomes the resolution contained in document L.13 on Mongolia’s international security and nuclear weapon-free status, which is adopted without a vote every year. We note the many steps that Mongolia has taken to reinforce such a status. Mongolia has received support and security assurances for such a status from Member States, particularly those States that possess nuclear weapons. India fully respects the choice made by Mongolia and conveys its unambiguous assurance that it will respect Mongolia’s nuclear weapon-free status.

**Explanation of Vote of India
on Draft Resolution L.55
under “Nuclear Cluster”**

3 November 2020

**L.55: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons**

India has been the only State possessing nuclear weapons to have traditionally co-sponsored this resolution in the past. We were disappointed that substantive changes were made to the traditional text of the resolution in 2017. In particular, we were disappointed that references to the early conclusion of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, based on the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention co-submitted by the lead sponsors themselves, had been dropped. Further, the objective of this resolution, as reflected in OP2, is ambiguous. Therefore, my delegation had to withdraw its co-sponsorship and had to abstain on the resolution.

Explanation of Vote by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster One: Nuclear Weapons
New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia would like to take this opportunity to explain its position on the draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.71/Rev.1, entitled “Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons”.
2. Indonesia appreciates Japan for its continuous efforts to develop this important draft resolution with the aim of contributing to the realization of a world without nuclear weapons, as a common goal for the international community.
3. We have lent our support to this endeavor in previous years with a view to paving the way for substantial progress and concrete actions towards the implementation of the commitments agreed in the 1995, 2000 and 2010 review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), especially those under Article VI.
4. This year, we are unable to provide our support on the draft resolution, as a whole, and have to vote in abstention on PP4, PP9, PP12, OP1, OP3d, OP3e, and OP5. The draft contains reinterpretation of the already agreed commitments, including on the CTBT, which not only takes us farther from achieving progress, but also entails setbacks, as we approach the tenth NPT Review Conference next year.
5. For Indonesia, implementing the agreed commitments, is an obligation, and not an option. We cannot accept any conditionalities or any more hindrances placed upon our disarmament endeavors.
6. We reaffirm that the elimination of nuclear weapons will contribute to the easing of international tensions and foster trust among nations.
7. Furthermore, the draft should also address some key developments and elements that are important to achieving the common goal, such as: acknowledgment of the process to establish a Middle East zone free from Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction, negative security assurances, and concrete action on the universalization of the NPT.
8. Indonesia stands ready to continue discussing those concerns with Japan and all other member states in future deliberation of this important resolution.
9. On the draft resolution L.39, entitled “The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, Indonesia views positively the spirit of the Hague Code of Conduct as a step towards strengthening cooperation to minimize the risk of misuse of ballistic missiles for the purpose of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
10. Indonesia is fully committed to the same objective as exemplified in our compliance to various multilaterally negotiated treaties, including: NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT, and SEANWFZ. Furthermore, Indonesia has also ratified the Outer Space Treaty, Space Liability Convention, and the Convention on Registration of Object Launched into Outer Space.
11. Indonesia maintains that every state has the legitimate right to develop its self defence capability, including ballistic missiles, as long as it is not explicitly prohibited by the United Nations. We are of the view that norms on this matter should be established through an inclusive multilateral platform, particularly the United Nations.
12. Therefore, Indonesia voted in abstention of the draft L.39.

Thank you.

**Explanation of Vote by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Three: Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects)
New York, November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

1. Our delegation takes the floor to explain its position on the draft resolution A/C.1/75/L.45/Rev.1, entitled “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behavior”.
2. Indonesia’s supports for this resolution is in line with our principled position to maintain outer space as a peaceful, safe, stable, secure and sustainable environment.
3. We underscore that the exploration and use of outer space and other celestial bodies shall be for peaceful purposes only and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development.
4. Thus, all space assets with exclusive peaceful purposes should be guaranteed free from all forms of threats, from space or terrestrial systems.
5. At the same time, we remain concerned at any policy of placing weapons in the outer space or making space as a new battle domain, which runs counter to our objective of Preventing Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS).
6. Therefore, Indonesia maintains that threats to space systems should be addressed in a comprehensive manner. Our effort should aim at both preventing the militarization and weaponization of outer space, as well as use of space and earth based capabilities against peaceful use of outer space.
7. We consider the elaboration of rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour, as a step in the right direction toward the potential formulation of a legally binding instrument on PAROS.
8. Our delegation stands ready to constructively engage all member states in the implementation and development of this resolution, with a view to ensuring that its alignment with our principles, and complementarity with existing initiatives on PAROS.

Thank you.

**Explanation of Vote
by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Four: Conventional Weapons
New York, .. November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia would like to take this opportunity to explain its position on the draft resolution [A/C.1/75/L.32](#) entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and collecting them” as well as [A/C.1/75/L.53](#) entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.
2. Indonesia completely shares the view with fellow Member States on the urgency of reducing human suffering caused by the misuse of weapons, particularly due to illicit trade in arms and ammunition. We, therefore, fully support various international efforts to address this menace.
3. In general, Indonesia views the Arms Trade Treaty as a positive step towards strengthening cooperation, transparency, and responsible action by and among states on this issue. In fact, Indonesia was among the initiators and supporters to have a treaty at the UN General Assembly.
4. However, the current form of the Treaty is in contradiction to our national law on Defense Industry that does not allow for conditionality to be implemented on sales by exporting states.

5. Indonesia also believes that the ATT does not reflect the reality on the ground in the case of intra-state conflict, where sovereign states have rights and responsibilities to protect civilians as well as defend their national unity and integrity against non-state actors.

6. In view of the above, Indonesia will follow further developments on the Treaty and continue to strengthen international cooperation to address this important matter. Therefore, Indonesia has voted in abstention on the draft L.53 as well as the reference to the Treaty in draft resolution L.32.

Thank you.

**Explanation of Vote by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Five: Other Disarmament Measures
and International Security
New York, November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

1. Indonesia wishes to deliver an explanation of vote regarding its position on document L.8/Rev.1, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”.

2. At the outset, Indonesia commends the Russian delegation, as the penholder of this draft resolution, for their initiative and active engagement including through various informal consultations.

3. We took note with appreciation that the draft resolution has been considerably revised following discussions with Member States.

4. We still have concerns over modalities of the proposed new Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), contained in the first operational paragraph of the draft.

5. First, we remain convinced that the mandate of a follow-up OEWG process needs to consider and address the outcome of the current one. Secondly, to keep pace with the rapid advancement in the ICT and maintain the relevance of OEWG discussion, we need to update the mandates in every two years. Thirdly, we welcome the inclusion of national initiatives in the proposed mandate and are of the view that particular initiatives should be decided by the OEWG, instead of in this draft.

6. For these reasons, we voted to abstain on OP1 of this draft resolution.

7. Indonesia continues to support the draft resolution, as a whole which reflects our principle support for this multilateral and inclusive institutional process with a view to increasing stability and security of the ICT environment.

8. During the current OEWG process, we submitted several inputs and proposals, both in national capacity as well as among group of states. Our active contribution is a testament to our delegation’s commitment on realizing meaningful and successful outcomes in the OEWG.

9. Finally, Indonesia reiterates its support for a multilateral, inclusive and consensual process that belongs to and is driven by all UN Member States. We look forward to continued constructive engagement on the future discourse on ICT in the context of international security.

10. Indonesia also wish to express our reservation to PP13 and PP16 of document [A/C.1/75/L.21](#) on Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. There are few references in the aforementioned paragraphs that are not in line with our national legislation and culture. We joined with the consensus, however, this does not imply an acceptance towards the paragraphs to become references as agreed language for future outcome documents in the UN General Assembly.

Thank you.

Explanation of Vote by the Republic of Indonesia
Cluster Seven: Disarmament Machinery
New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

1. I take the floor to explain Indonesia's vote on draft proposals under the cluster 7.
2. As an important part of the UN disarmament machinery – the Disarmament Commission (UNDC), provides member states with a level playing field to present their ideas, test their traction and build international acceptance on concept and ideas to advance the disarmament cause.
3. Unfortunately for a couple of years, we have not been successful to hold UNDC substantial session to address important global problems related to disarmament.
4. Acknowledging that member delegations of some states have not had access to their relevant UN meetings due to measures applied by the host country, we underscore the need to ensure full, equal and meaningful participation of all states in the disarmament machinery. In this regard, we urge the full compliance to the host country agreement.
5. Indonesia is fully sympathetic to the concerned delegations. Indonesia has voiced out its concern over this matter and will continue to do so, in the relevant platforms of this august organization.
6. At the same time, the disarmament work significantly contributes to the Article 1 of the UN Charter, an agreement that we all agree upon. We owe our work here to, the people, our people, that this organization is established to serve. We need to pay this standing due.
7. Indonesia therefore urges all delegations to place disarmament issues in the driving seat of our deliberation, steer away from politicization, and work within our respective limitations.
8. In conclusion, our vote here should be construed as our impartial and full compliance to the UN Charter, with a view to delivering substantial disarmament work through the functioning of UN disarmament machinery.

Thank you.

Concluding Statement by the Republic of Indonesia
New York, November 2020

Mr. Chair,

Our delegation takes this opportunity to first express our appreciation to you and the bureau members. You have navigated the work of this committee through the difficult and uncharted waters of pandemic in our lifetime.

Indonesia also commends the work of UNODA, the DGACM, interpreters, and all other support staffs.

Mr Chair,

We listened carefully about your explanation and figures regarding our deliberation, which should warrant special attention about the direction in which the First Committee is heading.

It is concerning that even during this difficult time that should unite us, the pattern of our actions and interactions has shown otherwise.

A significant portion of our energy, including political leverage, has been spent on competing proposals, procedural matters, or issues that are not directly related or not of high priority to our disarmament efforts – the very mandate of this committee.

Before going further, let me underscore that we do not intend to play the blame game to any country or group of countries.

Instead, we call for all of us to focus on the substance over the style of our deliberation; functions over the forms of our work, and messages over the messengers.

We must resist the growing divisive dichotomization of our states of affairs. In a wide array of disarmament spectrum, we all belong to different interest groups and have complex relationship. For example, there are nuclear weapon states, umbrella states, and non-nuclear weapon states; space-faring nations and non-space faring nations; major producing, exporters or net importers of conventional weapons.

Thus, the richness of the 193 members' positions cannot be simply captured by the three voting colors, or even absence. We should instead be more ambitious in our work: to strive and reach for consensus so that we can capture the gradation.

While, consensus should not be misused as a virtual veto, voting should be the last not the first resort to solve our differences. It should not be our basic instinct or dominant way of decision making. Voting is useful to understand about the level of support on certain issues.

Before concluding, we reiterate our call at the beginning of this session's first committee "to work together better with a greater sense of collective responsibility, and desire to achieve greater good, that could emanate from the work of this committee".

Indonesia is ready to work with all delegates to forge consensus in future iteration of the First Committee. We hope that we can use the time between now and the next session to find a way to reach this ambition, to deliver to we the people, substantial work on international security and disarmament.

Thank you.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.1 and L.2 respectively on:
“Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” and
“The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”
New York, 3 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

Iran will vote in favor of L.1. The resolution in PP3 emphasizes respect for the nuclear non-proliferation principle and, in PPs 10 and 11, recognizes the importance of the establishment of a mutually verifiable nuclear-weapon-free zone as well as the essential role of the United Nations in this regard. OP 7 urges the nuclear-weapon States to cooperate in the establishment of the zone and, at the same time, refrain from any action that runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the resolution.

The substance of the resolution has not changed for many years due to the desire to maintain consensus on this resolution. Now, the situation has changed, and some have chosen to break the consensus that has spanned three decades on this resolution. Therefore, there is no more justification to refrain from updating the substance of the resolution. We reiterate our urge to the sponsor of the resolution to delete PP9 and OP 4 regarding peace negotiations in the Middle East since no such peace negotiations exist. All we have and see in that the Middle East is relentless Israeli aggression, brutal occupation, and refusal to participate in the Conference on establishing a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction with the backing of the US.

The resolution should include an expression of regret regarding the continued refusal of Israel and the USA to participate in the said Conference and acknowledge the lack of progress in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as the refusal of Israel to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facility under IAEA safeguards.

It is no surprise that Israel, the only impediment to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, votes against L.1.

The U.S., the most irresponsible nuclear-weapon State, also votes against L.1 while it has a clear international commitment and responsibility to undertake all necessary measures for prompt implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It proves, once again, that the U.S. is not a reliable party in international or bilateral agreements.

Iran will vote in favor of L.2. It reflects the concern of the solid majority of States that the Israeli regime, as the only non-party to the NPT in the Middle East, is the source of the nuclear proliferation in this region. L.2 recognizes the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as an important measure to enhance peace and security in the region. Peace and stability cannot be achieved in this volatile region as long as Israeli nuclear weapons exist. Since its inception over the course of its short history, the Israeli regime has waged 17 wars, committed acts of aggression against all of its neighbors, used force against numerous countries in the region, and continued to illegally occupy the territories of several neighboring countries. On 29 August 2018 while speaking at Dimona, Israel's nuclear weapons development center, Netanyahu brazenly threatened Iran with nuclear annihilation. There should be no doubt that the risk of nuclear proliferation and threat of use of such weapons in the Middle East continue to exist as long as certain western countries continue to appease the illicit nuclear weapons program of Israel.

We fully support OPs 5 and 6 of the L.2 that call on Israel to accede to the NPT without further delay, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, and to place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA's full-scope safeguards.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to seek and support any meaningful steps aimed at making progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in appropriate international forums, including

the Tenth NPT Review Conference as well as the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the second session of which is to be convened by the UN Secretary-General in 2021.

Thank You!

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
on the Draft Resolution L.6**

Entitled: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

New York, 3 November 2020

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Iran will vote in favor of draft resolution L.6 entitled “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, which is consistent with its principled position on nuclear disarmament. The adoption of this treaty was a right step in the right direction. As such, we continue to support its overall objective. The TPNW complements the NPT. However, the TPNW should also be complemented by the urgent commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons, leading to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Submission of the 50th instrument of ratification of the Treaty, as required for its entry into force, is considered a successful achievement for the global movement towards nuclear disarmament and a defeat of against the bullying and anti-disarmament policies of the USA.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.54**

Entitled: “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”

New York, 3 November 2020

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chair,

We voted in favor of draft Resolution L.54 entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. It recognizes the grave danger to humanity posed by nuclear weapons and calls upon the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons with the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in their receipt of unequivocal and legally-binding negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States pending the total elimination of these weapons.

Based on our constructive approach, we have shared our observations on some paragraphs with the co-sponsors of the draft resolution, and we hope that they will be duly reflected in the next revision of the draft resolution to continue our supportive approach towards that.

Thank you, Mr. Chair!

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.58
Entitled: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
New York, 3 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Madam Chair,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation after the vote regarding draft resolution L.58 on the CTBT.

On L.58, as a Treaty's signatory, Iran will vote in favor of this draft resolution.

The principal objective of the Treaty is to terminate the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of new advanced types of nuclear weapons. Twenty-four years after the Treaty's adoption, achieving this objective has become ever more elusive.

Unfortunately, almost all nuclear-weapon States, in particular the U.S., are modernizing and qualitatively upgrading their nuclear weapon systems by using new technologies, including through sub-critical testing and simulations. While this undermines the CTBT's object and purpose, it is a source of serious regret that there is no call made in this draft resolution for the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from such measures.

There are also other certain aspects in this draft on which my delegation expresses its serious reservations:

Firstly, pending the Treaty's entry into force, all of the activities of the Preparatory Commission are for the purpose of carrying out the necessary preparations for the Treaty's effective implementation and for preparing for the first session of the Conference of the States Parties. Therefore, all of the works with regard to the verification regime, at any stage of development, should be considered, as the necessary preparations for an independent and reliable means to ensure compliance with the Treaty once it enters into force.

Secondly, while we acknowledge the potential "civil and scientific benefits, which might be available to States Signatories, by the CTBT global monitoring system" as reflected in the draft resolution, we stress that such benefits shall neither distract our attentions from the fundamental objectives of the Treaty nor be used as a pretext for its de facto operationalization. Such benefits are not within the inherent mandate of the Treaty. Therefore, the Preparatory Commission should decide on the relevant requests on a case by case basis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.39
Entitled: The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation
New York, 3 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chair,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution L.39, entitled "The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation".

Since 2004 when this draft was tabled for the first time, Iran has maintained a consistent position regarding the HCoC. In line with our established position, once again, we voted against L.39 for the following reasons:

The HCoC is an offshoot of an exclusive and discriminatory export control regime, known as the MTCR, that imposes restrictions on many of the goods, equipment, technologies, and know-how that have peaceful applications.

The HCoC is not and cannot be considered an internationally negotiated text. It was drafted and adopted outside of the United Nations by some MTCR participants in a selective, non-transparent and unbalanced manner. Even when other countries were invited to participate in the final segment of this process, almost none of their views were taken into account. Therefore, the result of this flawed procedure was crystal clear: it is an utterly flawed Code of Conduct with serious substantive shortcomings.

While the existence and development of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles are the main threat to regional and global security, the HCoC is completely silent about that threat and has failed to call for an end to the development of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles by the possessor States. Accordingly, while the HCoC practically acknowledges the possession of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles by a few MTCR participants, it aims at discouraging others from possessing conventionally-armed ballistic missiles in the exercise of their inherent right to security and self-defense.

The message that the HCoC sends is clear: certain States have the right to develop and are able to possess as well as use ballistic missiles of any type while other States, including those targeted by such missiles, must be prevented by all possible means from developing any type of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles despite the fact there is no internationally accepted legal norm against the development and acquisition of ballistic missiles.

Another major shortcoming of the HCoC is that it deliberately fails to distinguish the difference between the SLVs program and ballistic missiles program. As a result, the right of emerging space-faring nations to peaceful applications of outer space, including having access to necessary technology for Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs), has been ignored in its text by including restrictions and arbitrary conditions for assistance and cooperation in the area of SLVs for non-MTCR participants. Again, the message is clear: certain States have such technologies, and other States, at best, have the right not to be excluded from the peaceful uses of outer space and to exercise this right, they have no choice but to be dependent on those who have such technologies!

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, by stressing that the issues related to missiles, including ballistic missiles, have to be addressed comprehensively and, in the overall context of general and complete disarmament, within which nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons remain the highest priority. The process started through the UNGA resolution on missiles can be the best foundation for the progressive consideration of this highly complicated and multidimensional issue.

Thank You!

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Decision L.30**

Entitled: Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

New York, 3 November 2020

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft decision L.30 entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

We will abstain on L.30 because it does not advocate an instrument capable of addressing all of the conditions required for a total disarmament instrument and instead advocates the commencement of negotiations on such a Treaty based on a limited mandate contained in an old document which is no longer relevant to today's realities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
on the Draft Resolution L.71
Entitled: Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue
towards a world without nuclear weapons
New York, 3 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Iran abstained in voting on draft resolution L.71 entitled "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons". We also abstained on separate voting regarding preamble paragraphs 8, 16 and 18 and operational paragraphs 1, 3 c, 3d, 3e, and OP 5 for the following reasons:

First, the phrasing used in PP5 and OP 5 is contrary to the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

Second, the draft has failed to strike an acceptable balance between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. There is no reference to the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to fully and effectively implement their nuclear disarmament obligations.

Third, PP 18 must use the agreed language of the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference; it has failed thus far to do so.

Fourth, we believe negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament should commence within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced program of work that also includes the commencement of negotiation of a comprehensive convention on nuclear disarmament. This view is not reflected in the draft.

Iran voted in favor of PPs 2, 4, and 19, as well as OP 3(f) for these paragraphs, affirming the importance of universality of the NPT with the continued validity of the steps agreed upon in the final documents of the NPT Review Conferences and the need for awareness-raising on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in 1945.

In conclusion, I would like to highlight that my delegation sees the goodwill of the sponsor of the draft resolution to introduce an intermediary resolution. However, the past 50 years of experience have proven that these reconciliatory and intermediary solutions on the implementation of nuclear disarmament have been assisting only the outlaw nuclear-weapon states like the US who does not comply with their explicit nuclear disarmament obligations.

Thank you, Mr Chair.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L. 29
Entitled: Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
New York, 4 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution L.29 on the CWC.

Iran reaffirms its strong support for, and commitment to, the CWC as a unique multilateral agreement that has not only codified and reinforced international norms against chemical weapons but also made remarkable progress in their elimination as well as provided a framework for international cooperation and exchange in scientific and technical information in the field of chemical activities among States parties for peaceful purposes.

On L. 29, It is essential to preserve the CWC's effectiveness and its implementing institution, the OPCW. In fact, this draft resolution is expected to serve this purpose.

However, unfortunately, it is being used for political ends rather than contributing to the CWC's implementation. It is being used to highlight controversial issues and deepen divisions among the States Parties rather than moving the States Parties toward consensus.

The draft contributes to further confrontation and polarization among the States Parties rather than uniting them around the main objectives of the CWC. It advocates a particular point of view on issues where opinions differ substantially among the Member States rather than providing a balanced and professional detachment from such positions. It has been drafted in a manner to align with specific political views held only by a group of States Parties, thus polarizing the OPCW and attempting to shape the Technical Secretariat into a political organ rather than a technical implementation body.

The Islamic Republic of Iran condemns the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances. However, condemnation of a State party to the Convention that has extended unprecedented cooperation with the OPCW in destroying its chemical stockpiles in the shortest possible time is not acceptable because the basis of such condemnation lies within unproved assumptions and unsubstantiated claims.

Strict observance of the principles of impartiality and independence, as well as preserving the integrity of the chain of custody, are of the utmost importance in conducting investigations regarding the alleged use of chemical weapons and drawing a reliable professional conclusion. Some of these principles were not observed in preparing related reports. Instead of relying on "authorized information", conclusions have been based on speculations, assumptions, remote assessments, interviews held with certain people and the receipt of information from open sources and terrorist groups. This seriously undermines the reliability and credibility of the reports and their conclusions.

My delegation will vote against this draft resolution as a number of its paragraphs are highly politicized. We hope that the politicization of this draft resolution as well as the work of the OPCW will be put to an end, thus enabling the Committee to adopt a consensual resolution on the CWC's implementation in its future session. To revive the consensual resolution, as in the past, Iran and a group of countries offered their constructive proposals based on the language agreed by the CWC and OPCW, but unfortunately, in repetition of previous years, none of them have been reflected in the draft resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.65/ Rev.1
Entitled: “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons”
New York, 4 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

We support and voted in favor of the draft Resolution L.65/Rev.1 entitled “Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons”.

The draft resolution contains particularly positive paragraphs including, inter alia, condemning any use of toxic chemicals, biological agents or toxins as weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time, and to hold accountable those responsible for any such use; urging all States parties to the BTWC and CWC as a priority to fully comply with all of their obligations undertaken pursuant to those Conventions; calling upon States parties to the BTWC for continued efforts to strengthen that agreement, including by resuming multilateral negotiations to conclude a non-discriminatory legally binding protocol to the Convention dealing with all articles of the Convention in a balanced and comprehensive manner, inter alia, through effective verification measures; and last but not the least, encouraging Member States to assess the effectiveness of the SG Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons and the implementation of the guidelines and procedures thereof, while taking into account relevant provisions of those Conventions.

In the meantime, the world has consistently witnessed the abuses of the Security Council and the Secretariat by the US and western countries. We abstained regarding the OP3 because, from our point of view, involving the Security Council in the Secretary-General’s reports concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological or toxin weapons can jeopardize the required independence and or impartiality of the SG mechanism. Furthermore, when the mechanism is very much dependent on the financial contributions of some western countries, and while the US has been assertive in its influence of the Secretariat’s functions and makes any attempt to instrumentally utilize the Security Council as well as the Secretariat realize its destructive policies, it will be hard to believe that the SG mechanism can remain independent and impartial. It is our conviction that the BTWC envisaged the Member States to decide on handling any Convention-related issues, therefore the SG mechanism will not be appropriate to utilize.

Thank You, Mr. Chair!

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation
of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.68
Entitled: Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources
New York, 4 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation fully supports the main objective of draft resolution L.68 entitled “preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources”. However, in order to preserve global consensus on this issue, it is necessary to avoid overloading the text of the resolution with unrelated matters. We encourage the sponsors to refrain from bringing issues into the resolution that are of a technical nature and should be exclusively considered within the IAEA.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Explanation of Vote

**of the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.45/Rev.1
Entitled: “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution L.45/Rev.1 entitled “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”.

In fact, some years back, the possibility of an arms race in outer space was just a potential risk. Now, it has become a real and serious threat. To cope with the threat of militarization of outer space, discussions and the development of a legally binding instrument specifically related to PAROS are especially necessary. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty is not enough to make outer space a safer place simply because it does not mention or address other types of weapons and military activities.

It is our principled position that, on one hand, outer space is a human’s common heritage that should be protected against any attempt to weaponize or witness an arms race in this area. On the other hand, setting certain and tangible measures to promote and facilitate international cooperation through the transfer of technical knowledge, technology and the required equipment is imperative. Besides transparency and confidence-building measures which are complementary to each other, the monopoly of a few countries or imposing any restriction on the transfer of space-related science, expertise, technology, and services to developing countries should be rejected.

Having said that, Iran will vote against draft resolution L.45/Rev.1 and calls upon the delegations from the developing countries to accompany us in voting against this draft resolution. From our point of view, not only does it fail to reflect the above said principles but also tries to set preconditions in enjoying outer space and satellite technology for peaceful purposes. Any pretext to prevent developing countries from entering spacefaring nations is rejected. We are of the view that the adoption of such a draft could lead us to a divisive situation where UN member states would be forced to split into the so-called ‘responsible’ versus ‘irresponsible’ states. This situation is completely unacceptable. Furthermore, the draft overlaps with the COPUS and the Fourth Committee Agenda, which should be avoided. Last, but not least, if there is a genuine intention to contribute to a safe and secure outer space, we should start from the negotiation of a legally binding instrument.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.62 and L.66 respectively on:
“No first placement of weapons in outer space”
and
“Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position and vote of my delegation regarding two draft resolutions, namely: “No first placement of weapons in outer space” and “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” as contained in documents L.51 and L.68.rev.1, respectively.

While my delegation will vote in favor of L.62 and L.66, I wish to put on record that our previously announced position on them, remains valid.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L. 26
Entitled: “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the vote of my delegation regarding the draft resolution L.26 on “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction”.

Anti-personnel mines have been used irresponsibly during the civil wars in certain regions of the world and consequently have claimed a great number of innocent lives, particularly among women and children. We welcome every effort to stop this trend.

However, the Anti-personnel Mines Convention focuses mainly on humanitarian concerns and does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for the responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territories.

Because of the difficulties related to monitoring extensive sensitive areas by established and permanent guarding posts or effective warning systems, unfortunately, anti-personnel mines continue to be the effective means for those countries to ensure the minimum-security requirements of their borders.

While these defensive devices should be used under strictly established rules to protect civilians, more national and international efforts should also be made to explore new alternatives to such mines.

My delegation appreciates the objectives of L.26. However, due to our particular concerns and considerations, we abstained in the voting on this draft resolution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L. 43
Entitled: “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the vote of my delegation regarding the draft resolution L.43 on the “Implementation of Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

My delegation abstained in voting on resolution.43 due to the following:

First, my delegation did not participate in its negotiations and is neither a signatory nor a party thereto;

Second, we cannot support an instrument negotiated outside of the UN that is in disregard of the security concerns and interests of many States.

As a general principle, we believe that negotiations on disarmament subjects, due to their nature which addresses vital issues such as the security concerns and interests of States, requires not only a balanced and comprehensive approach but also a progressive, transparent and all-inclusive process that incorporates consensual decision-making procedures. This is essential “to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage” as stressed in the SSOD-I Final Document.

We continue to share the view of many delegations that the Cluster Munitions Convention was negotiated and concluded in an exclusive process outside of the United Nations disarmament machinery, disregarding the interests of many States. Therefore, circumventing the United Nations disarmament machinery should not be allowed, and such a process should not be encouraged or promoted by the UNGA.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolution L.53
Entitled: “The Arms Trade Treaty”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to explain the position of my delegation regarding draft resolution L.53 on the ATT. My delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution L.53 on ATT for the following reasons:

First, in the ATT, the political and commercial interests of certain arms exporting countries have a higher priority than the observance of the fundamentals of international law. The international prohibition on the use of force by one state against another state(s) is the most fundamental principle of modern international law. However, the ATT has failed to uphold this principle and to prohibit the transfer of arms to countries that commit acts of aggression, including foreign occupation. This is a significant loophole and major legal deficiency in the ATT.

Second, the draft resolution L.53 calls upon non-parties to accede to the Treaty. Such a call for the universalization of the ATT is unacceptable because this Treaty was not adopted by consensus due to its substantive flaws as well as disregard for the concerns and interests of some States participating in the negotiation process. Further, some of its States parties are committing major violations of its provisions as well. Exporting billions of dollars of arms to Israel and certain countries in the Persian Gulf while they are being used for death and destruction by occupiers in Palestine and aggressors in Yemen are only two examples of such violations.

Finally, I would like to put on record that our position on the ATT applies to all paragraphs in the draft resolutions and decisions that are adopted or will be adopted by the Committee this year and, therefore, my delegation disassociates itself from all such references.

I should also mention that although we join the consensus on the draft resolution L.32 entitled Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them, our position on the ATT, here or in any other draft resolution, is the same as explained about L.53.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.38
Entitled: “Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices”
New York, 6 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation regarding the draft resolution on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices” as contained in document L.38.

Iran supports the measures to counter the threat posed by the use of IEDs by illegal armed groups and terrorists. For this reason, my delegation joined the consensus in adopting resolution.38.

In our view, preventing and combating the use of IEDs by terrorists and illegal armed groups is the exclusive purpose of this resolution. Therefore, any interpretation of the provisions of this draft resolution should be consistent with this purpose.

Moreover, since it is almost impossible to define the scope of the items used for manufacturing IEDs, and many of those items have civilian applications, any interpretation beyond the exclusive purpose of this draft resolution that could restrict the free access to, and trade in, such equipment and goods for civilian uses is unacceptable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Decision L.59
Entitled: “Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and
commitments”
New York, 9 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

We will vote against draft decision L.59 as it is another proof of hypocritical policies materialized by the USA, and we believe that this document deserves nothing but a NO. Furthermore, it is redundant and unnecessary when we bear in mind the sophisticated compliance mechanisms in place based on various international instruments on arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. Ironically, the US itself has not complied with them due to the ill intention of the US Administration in abusing these mechanisms that have been proven time and again. It is a matter of regret that US agencies are generating annual reports on the so-called non-compliance of the rival countries, and they use such excuses to exert political pressure on those countries.

This approach and these actions are not acceptable at all, especially when we are witnesses to the facts pertaining to US performance with regard to its obligations. The US’ nuclear-weapon strategy and its rigid intention to produce and deploy more sophisticated nuclear weapons are absolutely against its explicit obligations towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, while many countries strongly call for the extension of the New START Treaty and hope to see that the bilateral nuclear disarmament process between the U.S. and Russia can be maintained, continued, and developed, the US refused Russia’s offer to extend the treaty for another five years. The US has not affirmed the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and rather it has increased the military budget to realize the nuclear arsenal modernization program. The current US President has reportedly informed military advisers that he intends to increase the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to its Cold War peak of 30,000 warheads. He also signed a defense authorization bill that violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and withdrew from it consequently.

Following a more aggressive nuclear strategy using other countries as an excuse to break free from the constraints of international treaties proves that the US wishes to develop and deploy nuclear armament, lower the threshold of using nuclear weapons, vigorously enhance the global missile defense system and follow this strategy for outer space supremacy. During the deliberation of the First Committee, most countries candidly expressed their strong regret and concerns about the termination of INF, the U.S. withdrawal from JCPOA and its offensive nuclear policy.

The US has failed to comply with its obligations under the CWC, and yet it holds a remarkable part of its chemical weapon arsenal. There are numerous reports about its clandestine activities contrary to the Biological Weapons Convention. We should bear in mind the destabilizing and destructive effects of its military sales to foreign invaders and violators of international human rights and international humanitarian law.

Living with a continuous Cold War mentality, the U.S. has been creating and escalating tensions around the world, and we strongly believe that it doesn't have a moral or legal stand to lead compliance issues.

**Explanation of Vote by the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
on Draft Resolutions L.4
“Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security”
9 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution L.4 entitled “Advancing responsible State behavior in cyberspace in the context of international security”.

1. From 1998 onward, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to be part of the consensus that existed in the first committee over the process addressing the developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security. This was against the fact that we had serious reservations over the way the GGEs were established and conducted. In 2018 and following 5 rounds of GGEs, Resolution [73/27](#) established the OEWG, the first-ever inclusive multilateral intergovernmental process within the UN in order to continue to address the issue having on board the whole UN membership.
2. The OEWG started to face an opposing force from its inception when the US tabled resolution [73/266](#) in the same UNGA session giving effect to a new GGE with the same mandate. This was both a clear deviation from the spirit of collective work through OEWG as envisaged in the resolution [73/27](#) and a burden-creating move against the UN and its membership. Ever since we have persistently requested for putting an end to the ongoing parallelism in terms of two groups (OEWG and GGE) and two resolutions. In our view, the OEWG as the most inclusive existing mechanism should continue to fulfill its mandate until and unless a new inclusive multilateral institutional dialogue mechanism is established within the UN. And if needed, OEWG in its work may commission some technical parts of its mandate to relevant UN bodies or some sub-groups.
3. The Draft Resolution L.4 surprisingly ignores the two-year UN-wide discussions within the OEWG as if nothing has happened since 2015 when the last report of the GGE was presented. The OEWG in its several meetings has received a range of views and positions by many UN members and groups which had been overlooked by GGE, given its least-inclusive and non-democratic nature.

Mr. Chairman,

4. The United States, the main sponsor of draft Resolution L.4 on advancing responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, personifies a notorious prototype of irresponsible behaviour and malicious acts in, and through, cyberspace. The US government and its close state- and non-state allies have been behind a range

of malicious acts in cyberspace, including the so-called Stuxnet malware against Iran's critical infrastructures in 2010. This irresponsible behaviour has ever since been increasing.

Against these backdrops, and with all due respect to those who vote otherwise, the Islamic Republic of Iran will vote against L.4.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.64**

Entitled: "Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements"

New York, 9 November 2020

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution L.64 entitled "Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements".

Iran supported and voted in favor of draft resolution L.64 for the following reasons:

1. While a specific Nuclear-Weapon-State continuously violates the provisions of the treaties on disarmament and arms control thus weakening them one by one, the disarmament and arms control machinery suffers immensely as well due to such irresponsible behavior. By highlighting the views of peace-loving nations who comply with international law and their commitments thereof, adoption of this draft resolution sends a strong message to that Country;
1. The draft resolution recognizes the importance of disarmament and arms control within the context of international security and emphasizes the importance of the full and effective implementation of related treaties. Given its non-compliance, the US regime has brought about a complicated situation that undermines the trust in the efficiency of these treaties in de-escalating international crises. A clear example in this regard is the noncompliance with the implementation of the explicit obligation for nuclear disarmament based on Article VI of the NPT as well as the recommendations of its Review Conferences;
1. While the draft resolution underlines the importance of firm compliance with the obligations enshrined in the related treaties, it correctly underscores the necessary strengthening of those treaties. In fact, without strengthening, some treaties can lose their effectiveness over time. Such is the case, especially with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention wherein, so far, the USA, has been opposing strengthening of the BWC through negotiations as well as the adoption of a legally binding protocol and implementation of all of its provisions, including, inter alia, a verification mechanism.

We believe that while the draft resolution contains a number of constructive elements, it can be further strengthened and promoted. For instance, universalization of the disarmament and arms control treaties has not been taken into account in this draft. The Israeli regime is not a member of any of the treaties on WMDs, and it has been threatening the security of regional member states of those treaties in the Middle East.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of the Delegation of
the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.21
Entitled: “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”
New York, 9 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation joined the consensus in adopting draft resolution L.21 entitled “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control”. However, we would like to put on record that this draft resolution is acceptable to my delegation in as much as it is in line with our constitution, laws, and regulations as well as administrative procedures. Our position on the subjects of the PP5 and PP9 announced in other occasions remains valid. We abstained regarding PP16 as we believe that referring to a factor like the COVID-19 pandemic in the context of disarmament of arms control is not relevant.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Explanation of Vote of
the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On Draft Resolutions L.31
Entitled: “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the
Mediterranean region”
New York, 10 November 2020**

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

I have taken the floor to explain the position of my delegation on draft resolution L.31 entitled “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”.

On L.31, Iran voted in favor of operative paragraph 2 of this draft resolution, which calls for the elimination of all causes of tension in the region along with the promotion of just and lasting solutions to its persistent problems. More importantly, our support for this paragraph is based on its call to ensure the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation while respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all countries of the region as well as the right of peoples to self-determination, including full adherence to the principles of non-use or threat of use of force and the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force. These are the basic principles of international law and enjoy our strong support.

My delegation also voted in favor of operative paragraph 5 of this draft resolution as it calls for adherence to all of the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments on disarmament and non-proliferation. Israel is the only case in point. Therefore, this is in line with the repeated calls by successive NPT Review Conferences on Israel to accede, without any delay and precondition as a non-nuclear-weapon party, to the NPT.

However, my delegation did not participate in the action on this draft resolution as a whole as this draft resolution has not factually reflected the realities in the region and the situation in the occupied territories, including the continued killing of innocent Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories of Palestine and the imposition by the Israeli regime of the most severe blockade on the Gaza Strip.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.1: Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right to explanation of vote on resolution L.1 “Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East”:

Mr. Chairperson,

It took a long time and considerable international efforts to reach past consensus on L.1 resolution on the “Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East”.

Even though Israel had its own deep reservations on the language and modalities of this resolution, which have been voiced every year in our EOP, Israel supported this resolution for the sake of the consensus, as Israel’s consistent approach was always constructive and consensus oriented.

It is very unfortunate that this long standing practice was broken by the Arab group. By imposing a new unilateral and destructive resolution in 2018 entitled “Convening a Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction”, the Arab group has altered the status quo and forced Israel to dissociate itself with the subject resolution.

We regret that we do not see the same enthusiasm by the advocates of this resolution to solve the real threats and challenges of the Middle East, especially the growing threats from Iran and its allies, who are making use of this initiative to divert international attention from their noncompliance.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.2: “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right for explanation of vote on resolution L.2 “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the middle east”:

Mr. Chairperson,

Resolution L.2 titled “The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”, which Israel voted against it, has been submitted once again by the Arab Group. This is an unfortunate attempt to divert the First Committee’s attention away from the real proliferation challenges facing the Middle East. This approach serves neither the interests of regional states nor those of the international community.

Not only does this resolution distort the truth, it also fails to genuinely confront the real WMD risks in the region. This should worry all of us, as this resolution undermines any attempt to address regional threats effectively, as well as curtails chances for a real and constructive dialogue between states of the region.

Mr. Chairperson,

The “Risk” resolution is detached from reality and from what the peoples of the Middle East have been experiencing; unrest and growing instability, unrelenting violence, large scale displacement of populations and territories ceded or abandoned to terrorists. Against this backdrop, the threat of proliferation of WMDs cannot be ignored or misrepresented as the text of this resolution purports to do.

Mr. Chairperson,

The sponsors of this resolution neglect to mention that four countries of the region namely: Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya - some of which are sponsors of this resolution - violated their NPT obligations and promoted a clandestine military nuclear programs in contravention of their international obligations. They also overlooked Iran's continued aspirations for nuclear weapons, although vast and alarming information on their clandestine nuclear program was already revealed.

In this vein, it is important to recall that since the Implementation Day of the JCPOA, Iran tested more than 20 ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. These were of various ranges, among them a missile with a range of 2,500 km which also can reach well beyond the Middle East, a missile with an inscription stating Israel should be wiped off the face of the earth and a missile fired toward a Star of David drawn on the ground. The Secretary General's reports under UNSCR 2231, called Iran to refrain from conducting these missile tests, warning that they have the potential to increase tensions in the region. He also clearly stipulated that Iran's missile tests are not consistent with the spirit of the JCPOA.

In light of Iran's subversive activity in the region, as well as its support for terrorist organizations in the region, which includes supplying weapons, financial support and military training, it is clear that the sponsors of this resolution have misdirected their efforts. Iran and its allies are the real risks of the Middle East, not Israel.

Mr. Chairperson,

In addition, this resolution deviates attention away from the atrocities conducted in Syria, in particular the use of Chemical Weapons. The use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime has become a pattern, as we have seen in the past years. This is especially significant in light of remaining discrepancies, inconsistencies and gaps in the Syrian declarations to the OPCW and the growing concerns about residual chemical weapons capabilities, including R&D, which would allow Syria to rehabilitate its chemical weapons program.

Mr. Chairperson,

We reject this resolution in its entirety. Attempts to side-track, detour or shortcut by submitting one-sided and biased resolutions in the multilateral fora will not succeed or contribute to the positive atmosphere required to build peace and security in the region.

Thank You.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.6 “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”:

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right to explanation of vote on resolution L.6 “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”:

Mr. Chairperson,

Israel voted again against this resolution. Israel did not participate in the negotiations on the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, and voted against resolutions of the First Committee and UNGA pertaining to this process over the last years.

Israel's deep reservations regarding this initiative were based on substantive as well as procedural considerations. On the substantive side, Israel is concerned by arms control and disarmament processes which fail to give due regard to the security and stability context when drafting disarmament measures. Such endeavors may result in arrangements and agreements, which hinder rather than reinforce disarmament processes as well as global and regional security. On the procedural aspect, Israel firmly believes that such negotiations should be undertaken in

the appropriate forums, under the appropriate rules of procedure, which would not undermine the inclusiveness of any processes.

It should be emphasized that the “Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” does not create, contribute to the development of, nor indicate the existence of customary international law related to the subject of or the content of the treaty. Moreover, the treaty does not reflect legal norms that apply to states that are not party to the Treaty, and it does not alter in any way existing rights or obligations upon states that have not joined this Treaty. The treaty’s entry into force is relevant only to those countries who signed or ratified it, hence Israel is not obliged by it in any way.

Thank you.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.29 Chemical Weapon Convention

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right to explanation of vote on resolution L.29 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”:

Mr. Chairperson,

The prevalent use of chemical weapons by Syria, which has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention and avowed to forgo its entire chemical weapons program, has been clearly stipulated inter alia in the 2016 Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) report.

The last Fact Finding Mission (FFM) report is joined by numerous reports and statements made by the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Director General regarding gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Syrian declaration. This is a source of concern that must be addressed clearly and firmly by the international community to prevent the further erosion of the absolute norm against the use of chemical weapons. We hope the new mechanism - the Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) - will succeed in carrying out the task of attributing the chemical attacks to their actual perpetrators, and welcome its work thus far.

The use of chemical weapons is a deeply concerning development especially in light of the ambitions of State Actors and Non State Actors to acquire and use these capabilities in the future. These cases continue to demonstrate the erosion of the chemical taboo and that terrorists are motivated to follow suit. It is vital that the international community step up its efforts to deal with this challenge effectively and curtail any chance for future use of chemical weapons by State and Non State Actors.

In this point in time, it is also evident that the residual chemical capabilities of Syria, including R&D must be fully dismantled. Any other course of action will allow Syria to continue its shameful pattern and to eventually rehabilitate its chemical weapons program.

Finally, Mr. Chairperson

Israel for its part voted in favor of L.29 due to our long-standing support of this resolution and the goals and purposes of the CWC, which we signed in 1993. Israel maintains a close dialogue with the OPCW and is party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

I Thank you Mr. Chairperson.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.30: Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right for explanation of vote on resolution L.30 “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”:

Mr. Chairperson,

The ability of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to address current proliferation challenges, including non-compliance by states with their international obligations in the nuclear domain, is questionable.

This holds especially true for the Middle East where several states have an exceptionally poor record of compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

It has been Israel's long standing position that the notion of an FMCT should be part of a new consensual WMDFZ Middle East regional security architecture, the essential prerequisites for which are far from being fulfilled.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.31 – Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region 2020

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right to explanation of vote on resolution L.31 “Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region”, paragraphs OP2 and OP5, as they do not reflect truly the reality in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairperson,

On OP2 – Peace in the Mediterranean is the ultimate goal of the State of Israel, but this one-dimensional paragraph is misleading. There is no mentioning of the ongoing use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime; there is no mentioning of the ongoing missile proliferation by the Iranian regime; there is no mentioning of the unleashed terror by the Iranian Regime; there is no mentioning of the radical Islamic groups and Non State Actors that terrorizing the whole region, including the Mediterranean. This resolution legitimizes the atrocities that are perpetuated in our region, as well as dangerous proliferation.

On OP5 – Israel believes that joining arms control treaties is not an aim or a goal by itself, because they are useless if countries do not obey by them or if they do not actually solve regional issues. Israel believes that the most important element is for the right conditions to be established, creating trust and confidence, security and mutual recognition. Without these conditions, it is a falsified illusion that dooms for failure.

Israel believes that it is time to face the reality for what it is.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.53, L.44 – ATT/SALW

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right to explanation of vote on resolution L.53 “Arms Trade Treaty” paragraph OP.9, and resolution L.44 “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects” paragraphs PP.7:

Mr. Chairperson,

Israel stated in the 3rd RevCon of the UNPoA on SALW that we do not consider the UNPoA on SALW as the right venue for the issue of Ammunition, since another venue was already chosen for it, the GGE in 2020, and voted against the relevant paragraphs in the outcome document.

Therefore, we cannot support all the outcome document of the 3rd RevCon.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.58 – Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty –

Thank you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right for explanation of vote on resolution L.58 “Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty”:

Mr. Chairperson,

Israel voted in favor of this resolution in light of its longstanding support of the Organization and Treaty, which we signed in 1996.

Since the establishment of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT, Israel has actively participated in the development of all elements of the Treaty’s verification regime. Israel transmits data from its certified seismic stations to the International Data Center, and actively participates in various relevant activities. Israel’s significant support and involvement in the substantive work of the CTBTO PrepCom is consonant with the importance it attributes to this Treaty, and a recognition of its contribution to the enhancement of international peace and security. In that vein, Israel co-sponsored UNSC 2310 adopted on 2016.

Mr. Chairperson,

Notwithstanding Israel’s favorable attitude towards the Treaty, as outlined earlier, we were unable to support the language contained in L.58 in its entirety, in particular preamble paragraph 7 and operative paragraphs 1 and 6.

Preamble paragraph 7 inserts into a resolution dealing with the CTBT, references from the NPT and its review conference. While both treaties are in the nuclear domain, they are different in their subject matter, scope, obligations and membership. In accordance with international law, decisions and resolutions taken in the context of one forum cannot be injected into the work of the other without the latter’s explicit consent.

With regards to OP1 and OP6, it should be noted that the completion of the verification regime is a prerequisite for entry into force (EIF) of the Treaty, in accordance with the Treaty. It also constitutes a major consideration for ratification for Israel. While significant progress has been made in the development of the CTBT verification regime, further efforts are still required, especially in the Middle East region.

Mr. Chairperson,

The regional security situation in the Middle East, including adherence to and compliance with the Treaty by states in the region, is another major consideration for ratification for Israel.

Another significant consideration for ratification is Israel’s equal status in the policy making organs of the Treaty’s Organization. The fact that the MESA regional group, defined in Annex 1 of the Treaty, has been paralyzed for nearly 20 years due to a few extreme members holding hostage the MESA group, is an inexcusable situation that must be resolved.

I thank you.

Israel/FC 2020/EOV – L.70: “General and Complete disarmament: Missiles” - 2020

Thanks you Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to exercise my right for explanation of vote on resolution L.70 “General and Complete disarmament: Missiles”:

Mr. Chairperson,

Year after year we are confronted with the same baffling situation whereby one member state, name the Islamic Republic of Iran, is the proponent sponsor of a decision pertaining to missiles, and on top of all in the nuclear cluster.

Iran is a violator of the NPT, who has not answered questions on its clandestine nuclear program until today, and continues to hide relevant information and sites from the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran is also violating several United

Nations Security Council Resolutions and Arms Control instruments on missile proliferation as well, due to heavy involvement in the proliferation of missiles and rockets to numerous terrorist organizations in the Middle East and its active R&D program, also to carry WMD warheads.

Mr. Chairperson,

In our perspective, it is inconceivable that Iran is sponsoring this decision on missiles, and without any response by members of this body. Therefore, Israel asked for a vote, to stop this hypocrisy, and voted against this decision.

Thank you Mr. Chairperson.

EOV JAPAN

I would like to explain Japan's votes on L.5 (Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons) and L.6 (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons).

We voted for L.5 (Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons)

As the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings during war, Japan fully shares the goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons, and precisely recognizes the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons based on our first hand experience. We have made various efforts in sharing our experiences to raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

We voted against L.6 (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons)

It is essential that all states, both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, join forces to realize our shared goal based on a clear understanding of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons as well as an objective assessment of the severe and unstable security environment.

Although there are various approaches, including a legal framework, in achieving total elimination of nuclear weapons, Japan strongly believes that we should focus on concrete and practical measures.

Japan will spare no effort in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons, through creating a common ground where both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states can work together with a view to achieve substantive advancement of nuclear disarmament.

EOV JAPAN

I would like to explain Japan's votes on L.37 (Fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research).

We voted in favor of L.37 (Fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) and abstained in the voting on the OP8.

We appreciate the significant work done by UNIDIR, which marks its 40th anniversary this year. UNIDIR has engaged in the research on disarmament and related issues for long time. We take note with appreciation that UNIDIR deals with various areas from traditional disarmament agendas such as an FMCT, to rather new issues such as relationship between security, including nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament, and the influence of cutting-edge technology on security and nuclear disarmament.

Until now, Japan and UNIDIR have collaborated in a lot of projects such as those on the transparency, nuclear risk reduction and also seminar on the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (ME WMDFZ). Besides, we invited the Director of UNIDIR for our "The Track 1.5 Meeting for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament" held in March this year in Tokyo. We appreciate UNIDIR's kind corporation and are ready for further collaboration.

Against this backdrop, Japan voted in favor of the resolution as whole. Nevertheless, Japan abstained for OP8, as the paragraph endorses an increase of the subvention to the Institute without holding substantial discussions on its mandates and programme. Prior to inviting the Secretary-General to propose an increase in the subvention, discussion on the mandates and programme of the Institute at the Committee for Planning and Coordination (CPC) is needed. Japan reiterates its appreciation of the important role of the Institute and is ready to discuss ways to finance the Institution appropriately under its current funding structure.

Explanation of Vote

Japan would like to explain its vote on L.62 (No first placement of weapons in outer space) to elaborate on the reasons for changing our vote to opposing to it as a whole this year instead of abstaining.

As we have made clear in the past EoV on this resolution, there are several issues pertaining to the approach of “No first placement of weapons in outer space.” We regret the lack of concrete progress in this area over the past years. Firstly, it is important to ensure confidence and mutual trust between space actors, in particular through transparency and confidence-building. This resolution, however, does not adequately deal with the question of what constitute a “weapon in outer space”. Given the dual use nature of space objects, this initiative could lead to increased mistrust or misunderstanding with regard to the activities and intentions of other states and thus decrease transparency and trust in outer space.

Secondly, we do not believe that a No First Placement pledge would be effectively verifiable.

Thirdly, the resolution focuses solely on space-based weapons and thus does not adequately deal with risks regarding outer space activities. Japan is seriously concerned about the actual, not abstract, development and deployment of counter-space capabilities, including those terrestrially based, which are not addressed in this resolution.

Furthermore, risks against sustainable and stable use of outer space are becoming serious, as our society is becoming increasingly reliant on space systems. Against this backdrop, Japan expresses its concern over outer space activities that lack transparency, and notes that such activities seem to have become increasingly active and could lead to misunderstandings, or even pose threats. Reducing risks in outer space is a pressing issue, hence the necessity of a practical and holistic approach to prevent an arms race in outer space. From this viewpoint, Japan will continue to exchange views in a transparent manner with countries with various positions, and to promote international rule-making in outer space with a view to reflecting a wide range of opinions.

Lastly, we opposed PP5 since it contains the language which does not enjoy consensus in the GA.

Japan reiterates the need to build mutual trust through transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), and will continue contributing to discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) in order to achieve the widely shared goal of the peaceful and stable use of outer space.

EOV JAPAN

I would like to explain Japan’s votes on L.66 (Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities)

Japan supports and has worked tirelessly to ensure the long-term safety, sustainability, security, and stability of outer space. In this regard, it is important to develop initiatives to ensure confidence and mutual trust between space actors, in particular through transparency and confidence-building.

We voted in favor of the resolution entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities” (A/C.1/75-66) as a whole but abstained on PP9, because our position is that the procedural matters of UNDC should not be included in this resolution.

We hope discussions on TCBMs will make further progress based on this resolution.

**The Explanation of Vote
by the Delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan
at the Cluster 1 of the First Committee of the
(4 November 2020)**

Mr. Chairman,

The Delegation of Kazakhstan decided to vote in favor of the Resolution L.71 called “Joint Courses of Action and Future-oriented Dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons” tabled by Japan, notwithstanding the fact that several of our proposals have not been reflected in the resolution.

It has already been acknowledged that the substance of the resolution lacks concrete measures towards nuclear disarmament.

This resolution refers to the NPT. However, my delegation is of the view that there has not been adequate focus on the specific implications of Article 6 of the Treaty, which calls for nuclear disarmament. Hence, the resolution would carry more weight and impact if nuclear disarmament features more prominently indicated in it. Furthermore, we are of the deep conviction that nuclear weapons have two equally vital dimensions - their actual use and that of testing. The latter, i.e. nuclear testing, can have equally or even more devastating consequences over a period prolonged period of time, and world history proves that there has been testing in many regions of the Globe.

My delegation thus strongly believes that there should be a call in the resolution also for greater efforts to be made to raise awareness of the realities and impact of nuclear weapons testing. Hence, if we have to achieve this end, it is critical that those, who suffered as victims of nuclear weapons testing not only transmit their experiences to future generations but are on forefront to ban nuclear testing.

My delegation would like to reiterate that these views have been voiced several times in Geneva, New York and our capital. And so, it is somewhat disappointed that they have not been taken into consideration.

We hope that Japan will take into account these and other related proposals next year, and that we collectively achieve the full mandate of the NPT.

Thank you.

PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
NEW YORK, 4 NOVEMBER 2020
**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE ON [A/C.1/75/L.8/REV.1](#) AS ADOPTED
STATEMENT BY GEORG SPARBER, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE**

Chairperson,

I am taking the floor to explain Liechtenstein's vote on the resolution contained in L.8/Rev.1 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security" as adopted. Last year, Liechtenstein has supported this resolution as a contribution to establishing a regular open-ended dialogue on cybersecurity – a priority topic for all States and an area where the United Nations must show leadership. Liechtenstein has been an active participant in the deliberations of the Open-Ended Working Group, expertly chaired by Switzerland, and saw value and, at times progress, in the substantive discussions in that framework. Liechtenstein supported this resolution last year despite concerns with the mandate of the Open-Ended Working Group, its restrictive modalities for civil society and private sector engagement and its strict consensus basis among others.

Broad support and ownership of discussions on cybersecurity at the United Nations is essential for their legitimacy and high levels of participation in the Open-Ended Working Group have been a welcome development in this respect. The present iteration of the resolution, however, constitutes a risk and a step back in this regard. It preempts discussions currently taking place in the Open-Ended Working Group and undermines the potential for concrete results, both now and in the future. Liechtenstein is of the view that the membership has a legitimate expectation that ongoing parallel UN processes in the area of cybersecurity should maintain normative coherence and aim at eventual convergence. Unfortunately, we perceive growing polarization and a risk for further fragmentation, including as a result of the present resolution. Liechtenstein has therefore voted against the resolution.

The international community can unite behind the objective of an open, free, stable and secure cyberspace. The United Nations should lead efforts to strengthen the rule of law online, based on the principle that international law applies in cyberspace, including the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is unfortunate that the institutional set up of United Nations is prone to incoherence and inefficiency and risks preventing the membership from having a targeted discussion on the specific aspects of how to strengthen the application of the law in cyberspace. Liechtenstein expresses its hope for a more unifying approach to this important topic in the future.

Thank you.

NEW YORK, 3 NOVEMBER 2020
**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE ON [A/C.1/75/L.71](#) AS ADOPTED
STATEMENT BY GEORG SPARBER, DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE**

Chairperson,

I am taking the floor to explain Liechtenstein's vote on the resolution contained in L.71 "Joint courses of action and future-oriented dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons" as adopted. Liechtenstein acknowledges the continuous efforts of the main sponsor Japan in presenting this resolution to the First Committee and its commitment to bridge-building. Unfortunately, that commitment has not translated in a more acceptable text for the Liechtenstein delegation. Liechtenstein continues not to be in a position to support this resolution and has again abstained. It is unfortunate that our main concerns, as expressed in our modest calls not to undermine existing obligations and commitments, have not been addressed.

The overall concerning developments in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation call for the unequivocal support of our common acquis of past agreements, in particular in the framework of the NPT and its review conferences. The formulation in OP1 is therefore unacceptable as it introduces a qualification to the clear obligations for nuclear weapon States under article VI of the NPT and undermines the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals as previously agreed. Nor is it acceptable to take us further away from implementing those obligations and commitments as suggested in PP4. Ahead of the NPT review conference Liechtenstein considers such attempts at weakening what should actually unite us misguided and places on record that it

will not accept this or any other elements of the resolution either as basis or as guidance towards an outcome of the 2020 NPT review conference.

As last year, Liechtenstein is also dissatisfied with the approach of the resolution towards the urgent entry into force of the CTBT. In light of increasing attempts to weaken or undermine the nuclear test moratorium the resolutions should issue a clear and strong call on all missing states and in particular the Annex II states to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without waiting for any other state to do so. Unfortunately, the resolution falls again short of doing that. The fact that CTBT has still not entered into force adds to the already significant insecurity non-nuclear weapon States experience as a consequence of the receding rule of law in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Liechtenstein therefore clearly distances itself from any message to the effect that the international community is reducing efforts towards entry into force of the CTBT.

Thank you.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 1
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75TH SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 3 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Malaysia lauds Japan for the engagement and extensive outreach in tabling its resolution L71 entitled “**Joint Courses of Action and Future-Oriented Dialogue towards a World without Nuclear Weapons.**”
2. The resolution encompasses many important issues pertaining to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The efforts by Japan in trying to forge common ground among UN Member States on such critical topics must be commended.
3. Malaysia’s principled position on this matter is very clear. That the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they will never be produced again, is the only absolute guarantee against the catastrophic humanitarian consequences arising from their use.
4. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has been the cornerstone of the global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. This universal understanding needs to be better reflected in **PP2** of the resolution.
5. We are deeply concerned with the deletion of the term “implementing” from **PP4**. This is a major departure from the agreed language that honors past commitments reached at previous NPT Review Conferences, namely in 1995, 2000 and 2010. The notion of merely reaffirming the importance of agreed steps without actual implementation suggests that we are simply satisfied with the status quo.
6. It is unfortunate that **PP9 and OP3 (d)** of the resolution shy away from explicitly calling the Annex 2 states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive-Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) without further delay. In our view, these two (2) paragraphs do not place appropriate emphasis on the imperative of bringing the CTBT into force.
7. **OP1** of the resolution suggests that the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons is predicated on the easing of international tensions and the strengthening of trust between States. This misconception goes against the letter and spirit of the NPT.
8. Article 6 of the NPT, which entered into force five (5) decades ago, clearly stipulates for its States Parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, as well as on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.
9. As such, if we are to consider the argument that international tension must first be eased before pursuing nuclear disarmament, then chances are the world and humanity will never be saved from the existential threats posed by nuclear weapons.
10. On **OP3 (b)**, we believe that there are only two categories of states recognized by the NPT, namely Nuclear-Weapon-States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon-States. And states not parties to the NPT are urged to urgently join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states. As such, for the resolution to use the NPT context and gradually recognize another category of states namely nuclear-possessor-states is quite concerning.
11. For the reasons already highlighted, Malaysia had abstained on **PP2, PP4, PP9, OP1, OP3 (b) and OP3 (d)** of the resolution.
12. However, the divergent views among Member States should not discourage us from continuing to engage in dialogues to better understand one another and develop areas of convergence.
13. On this note, we wish to extend our appreciation to Japan once again for undertaking the challenging task of facilitating dialogues around this resolution.

14. It is our hope that Japan will continue to facilitate the discussion with all UN Member States on this matter by taking into consideration the points raised with respect to this resolution.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 2
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75th SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 4 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr Chair,

1. Malaysia voted in favour of resolution L29 as a whole while abstaining on **OP3, OP5 and OP17** of the text.
2. Malaysia condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances.
3. The use of such weapons is abhorrent and a flagrant violation of international law, especially the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Those responsible for the deployment of such weapons must be held accountable.
4. Malaysia is committed to the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of the CWC. The compliance and verification provisions of the CWC are significant achievements of multilateral negotiations for disarmament and provide lasting confidence among States Parties in the effectiveness of the Convention.
5. Malaysia supports the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as the sole organization mandated to undertake investigations on chemical weapons use. Malaysia is of the view that all parties concerned should cooperate with the OPCW to ensure an impartial and thorough investigation of any incidents.
6. Malaysia takes note of Decision S-SS-4/DEC.3 adopted during the Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties on 27 June 2018 which empowers the OPCW with an attribution mandate.
7. However, it is imperative that every decision and action taken within the OPCW be done within the parameters laid out by the CWC and in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the Convention.
8. Malaysia, therefore, reiterates the need to protect the OPCW, a respected technical organization, from extraneous influences in the conduct of its work.
9. On this basis, Malaysia has once again abstained from voting on **OP3, OP5 and OP17** of the resolution.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 3
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75th SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 5 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Malaysia voted in favour of all resolutions presented under Cluster 3 on Outer Space (Disarmament Aspects).
2. Malaysia recognizes the significance of protecting outer space for our common interest as well as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The outer space should exclusively be committed for peaceful purposes.
3. In our efforts to strengthen the peaceful uses of outer space, Malaysia continues to seek for opportunities to work and collaborate with other Member States and the international community within the international legal framework.

4. Our shared goal and interest are in preserving the peaceful nature of outer space.

5. While we take note of the comments and interventions made in the context of this Cluster today, it is our hope that the constructive approach and engagement under this cluster, namely Cluster 3 on outer space, will be preserved moving forward and that the proposals submitted under this Cluster are considered as complementary and not against one another.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 5
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75TH SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 9 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Malaysia has been supportive of both the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and the Open-Ended-Working-Group (OEWG) on ICT in the context of international security.

2. The GGE has contributed to our substantive discourse because of its unique nature that allows for targeted discussions and in-depth deliberations on specific topics.

3. The OEWG, on the other hand, is an inclusive platform that allows all UN Member States to openly engage on various pertinent issues including norms-setting, principles, rules as well as legally-binding commitments in cyberspace.

4. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, the realm of cyber is now presented with opportunities and vulnerabilities. The international community must be prepared to confront the risks with a robust cyber security response, especially in protecting national security interest.

5. In this context, what we need the most at this juncture is regular institutional dialogue, involving States and other important stakeholders.

6. Here in the First Committee, we had been presented with 2 draft resolutions, namely L.4 and L.8/Rev.1. Ideally, we would have preferred for there to be one unifying resolution that commands consensual support of all UN Member States.

7. Let us remind ourselves that the work of the GGE should benefit all UN Member States while the OEWG belongs to all UN Member States.

8. Both platforms should rightly be preserved and protected, and should be considered in clear detachment from the respective main sponsors of the 2 resolutions.

9. We should be clear in forming our position on this matter, based first and foremost on the substantive consideration regardless of the main sponsors of the 2 resolutions. At the end of the day, what is at stake concerns us all. We need to preserve regional institutional dialogue that could contribute to safeguarding our collective interests in cyberspace.

10. For the reasons stated above, Malaysia voted in favour of resolutions **L.4** as well as **L.8/Rev.1** while abstaining on its **OP1**.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 6
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75th SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Malaysia joined consensus and voted in favour of all resolutions and their separate paragraphs under Cluster 6 of Regional Disarmament and Security.
2. Malaysia views the nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) as vitally important in enhancing global and regional peace. They strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.
3. As a founding member of the Southeast Asia Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), Malaysia reaffirms the significance of such zones and treaties in the pursuit of a nuclear weapon-free world.
4. Malaysia underscores the importance of realizing the overarching objectives of the SEANWFZ Treaty and its Protocol, in accordance with the “ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together”, adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in 2015. The accession of the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) to the SEANWFZ Protocol remains imperative.
5. Malaysia welcomes consultation and continuous dialogue between ASEAN and the NWS in resolving protracted issues to allow for the signing and ratification of the Protocol by the latter at the earliest. We also reaffirm our commitment to continue working with ASEAN Member States to actively pursue this goal, as well as to maintain the international profile of SEANWFZ by submitting the biennial SEANWFZ Resolution to the First Committee at the 76th session of the UN General Assembly in 2021, following the last substantive submission in 2015.
6. Guided by these principled positions on regional disarmament and security, Malaysia joined consensus and voted in favour of all resolutions and their separate paragraphs under Cluster 6 of Regional Disarmament and Security.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLANATION OF VOTE AFTER THE VOTE
ON CLUSTER 7
BY REPRESENTATIVE OF MALAYSIA
FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE 75th SESSION OF
NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 2020**

Mr. Chair,

1. Malaysia abstained on the draft decision L.48 while voting in favour of the draft decision L.49.
2. With regard to the visa issuance matter, Malaysia has on many occasions expressed its sympathy and solidarity with all delegations that have been affected.
3. Full and effective participation of delegations in this Committee is vital, which must be ensured.
4. We fully respect the sovereign right of all countries to effective representation at the United Nations.
5. As such, it is important for the matter to be rightfully addressed through the mandated platform within the UN in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, the 1947 Headquarters Agreement and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

Mr. Chair,

6. As fellow delegations would recall, on the last day of the First Committee meeting last year in November 2019, Malaysia called for all parties to strive towards the strengthening of the First Committee and the effectiveness of its work.

7. This is especially pertinent today given the pressing and uncertain global geopolitical dynamics.

8. As we will soon conclude the work of the First Committee this year, let us set a goal for ourselves.

9. That we will convene in one year's time, next year, hoping that situation would improve and return to normal, while we would be ready to continue fruitful engagement and constructive dialogue.

10. And for that to happen, we all need collective efforts, readiness and willingness to preserve, protect and defend the disarmament machinery including the First Committee and the UNDC that belong to all of us, because the world cannot afford anything less.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO A FAVOR DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE
EL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.8/REV.1 “AVANCES EN LA ESFERA DE LA
INFORMACIÓN Y LAS TELECOMUNICACIONES EN EL CONTEXTO DE LA
SEGURIDAD INTERNACIONAL”, PRESENTADO POR LA FEDERACIÓN DE
RUSIA.**

Nueva York, a 9 de noviembre de 2020.

México vota a favor de esta resolución como muestra de compromiso con la centralidad de la ONU y del grupo de trabajo de composición abierta como el formato incluyente para avanzar los temas de ciberseguridad y para garantizar los usos pacíficos del ciberespacio. México lo hace como muestra de la importancia de ejercer flexibilidad para continuar colaborando en asuntos de seguridad internacional para alcanzar resultados sustantivos.

No obstante, México considera que la iniciativa de creación de este nuevo grupo de trabajo inicia de manera prematura, cuando aún es necesario seguir generando acuerdos para culminar el mandato e importante trabajo de los procesos todavía en curso. Para México la temporalidad de 5 años es arbitraria y no responde a la intención de institucionalizar la actual discusión, ni parece indicar que pudiera transitarse a ello en un lapso establecido de manera artificial.

Es imperativo que el nuevo grupo parta de la base actual y refleje continuidad de los trabajos previos del grupo de trabajo (OEGW) y del grupo de expertos gubernamentales (GGE). Deberá dar cabida íntegra a los intereses de todos los países y considerar las múltiples iniciativas que se han puesto en la mesa, sin dar preminencia a temas o iniciativas nacionales de diversa índole que no gozan de un respaldo mayoritario y no consensuadas.

La aplicación del derecho internacional y la generación de confianza, paz y estabilidad en el ciberespacio deberán seguir siendo la prioridad, y México trabajará desde este momento de adopción para ello.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE EL
PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.44 “EL COMERCIO ILÍCITO DE ARMAS
PEQUEÑAS Y ARMAS LIGERAS EN TODOS SUS ASPECTOS”, PRESENTADA
POR JAPÓN, COLOMBIA Y SUDÁFRICA.**

Nueva York, a 6 de noviembre de 2020.

México agradece a Japón, Colombia y Sudáfrica por haber realizado cambios mínimos a esta resolución, en reconocimiento de que no hay cambios sustantivos en el proceso de las Naciones Unidas sobre el combate al comercio ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras que ameriten un pronunciamiento distinto por parte de la Asamblea General.

Por lo que concierne a México, la aprobación de esta resolución no implica un cambio en el endoso de la Asamblea General del documento final de la Tercera Conferencia de Examen del Programa de Acción (UNPoA). De igual manera, el lenguaje contenido en ella no puede ser considerado como sustitución del acordado en la Conferencia de Examen y las obligaciones y compromisos multilaterales en materia de combate al comercio ilícito de armas pequeñas y ligeras.

México espera que esta resolución se mantenga como el vehículo para avanzar sobre la base de los resultados ya alcanzados en el pasado, especialmente hacia la séptima reunión bienal a celebrarse en 2021.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO A FAVOR DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE
EL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.45/REV.1 “REDUCCIÓN DE LAS
AMENAZAS EN EL ESPACIO A TRAVÉS DE NORMAS, REGLAS Y PRINCIPIOS
Y COMPORTAMIENTO RESPONSABLE”. PRESENTADO POR REINO UNIDO.**

Nueva York, a 6 de noviembre de 2020.

Agradecemos a la delegación del Reino Unido por sus esfuerzos en torno a la presentación de esta resolución y su disposición para escuchar las preocupaciones de las delegaciones en las consultas del texto.

México promueve la conservación del espacio ultraterrestre para fines exclusivamente pacíficos, de conformidad con los tratados existentes, así como el fortalecimiento de medidas de seguridad y sostenibilidad de las actividades espaciales.

Rechazamos el emplazamiento de cualquier tipo de armamento en el espacio y pugnamos por continuar el avance normativo para dichos fines, incluyendo la negociación de un tratado jurídicamente vinculante en la materia.

Hacemos votos porque la discusión sobre la reducción de las amenazas en el espacio, cuyas bases sienta esta resolución, y el informe que preparará el Secretario General en consecuencia, complementen las discusiones en COPUOS, en especial el trabajo del Grupo sobre la sostenibilidad de las actividades espaciales, así como las de prevención de una carrera armamentista en el espacio ultraterrestre.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE EL
PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.48 “SESIÓN DE 2021 DE LA COMISIÓN DE
DESARME”, PRESENTADO POR LA FEDERACIÓN DE RUSIA.**

Nueva York, a 10 de noviembre de 2020.

Reiteramos nuestra solidaridad con la preocupación de las delegaciones que han tenido algún tipo de problema para que sus delegados obtengan visas para que participen en reuniones en Nueva York. No obstante, tal como expresamos en la 74 AGONU, no estimamos correcto que asuntos relacionados con el cumplimiento del acuerdo de sede sean considerados en la Primera Comisión. Mucho menos, que esta discusión sea utilizada como condición para el inicio de trabajos.

Del mismo modo, las resoluciones de la Primera Comisión no deberían ser escenario para solucionar temas que no se resolvieron en la Comisión.

Por otra parte, debemos aceptar la crisis institucional de toda la maquinaria de desarme establecida en el documento final de la SSOD-I. Mientras podemos revisarla, y con suerte, revitalizarla, lo mínimo que podría hacer la Asamblea General es expresar preocupación por la falta de avances sustantivos en los foros de desarme, y sentar las bases procedimentales para el trabajo de los foros. No creemos que seguir manteniendo lenguaje para simular que todo está marchando bien en los textos de las resoluciones de la Asamblea General, beneficie a la comunidad internacional en general.

Es necesario hacer una evaluación real de la situación y establecer las bases mínimas para recuperar la institucionalidad multilateral requerida avanzar en el desarme nuclear, asignatura pendiente de las Naciones Unidas.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO A FAVOR DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE
EL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.62 “COMPROMISO DE NO SER EL
PRIMERO EN EMPLAZAR ARMAS EN EL ESPACIO ULTRATERRESTRE”.
PRESENTADO POR LA FEDERACIÓN DE RUSIA.**

Nueva York, a 6 de noviembre de 2020.

México agradece a la Federación de Rusia por la presentación de la resolución sobre el “Compromiso de no ser el primero en emplazar armas en el espacio ultraterrestre”, que apoyamos, puesto que coincidimos con la importancia y urgencia de prevenir una carrera armamentista en el espacio exterior, en apego a su compromiso con la conservación del espacio ultraterrestre para fines exclusivamente pacíficos.

No obstante, deseamos reiterar que nuestro apoyo no debe entenderse, en ningún momento, como un endoso tácito o aceptación de un supuesto derecho a colocar armas en el espacio, o lanzarlas desde la Tierra si otro Estado es el primero en hacerlo, o en respuesta a un ataque.

México continuará pugnando porque ningún actor, bajo ninguna circunstancia, emplace armas en el espacio exterior. Asimismo, México reitera que, de manera particular, todas las armas nucleares deben ser prohibidas y eliminadas, independientemente de su clase o ubicación, de conformidad con el Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO SOBRE EL
PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.64 “FORTALECIMIENTO Y DESARROLLO
DEL SISTEMA DE TRATADOS Y ACUERDOS SOBRE EL CONTROL DE
ARMAMENTOS, EL DESARME Y LA NO PROLIFERACIÓN”.**

Nueva York, a 9 de noviembre de 2020.

México agradece a la Federación de Rusia por la presentación del proyecto L.64. Apoyamos el llamado central de esta resolución a que se cumplan los diferentes tratados y acuerdos de manera cabal y sin condicionamientos.

No obstante, la aseveración de que los instrumentos multilaterales de desarme, no proliferación y control de armas estén basados en el consenso no es factual.

Por el contrario, cada tratado y foro tiene su propia dinámica y reglamento, y el consenso no es el denominador común. Como ya ha expresado mi delegación en el pasado, el consenso siempre es una aspiración deseable, pero no debe ser utilizado como veto o justificación para la parálisis de los foros.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO EN ABSTENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO
SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.65/Rev.1 “MECANISMO DEL
SECRETARIO GENERAL PARA LA INVESTIGACIÓN DE EL EMPLEO DE
ARMAS QUÍMICAS Y BIOLÓGICAS”, PRESENTADO POR LA FEDERACIÓN
DE RUSIA.**

Nueva York, a 4 de noviembre de 2020.

Agradecemos a la Federación de Rusia por las múltiples consultas sobre el proyecto de resolución “Mecanismo del Secretario General para la Investigación del Empleo de Armas Químicas y Biológicas”, así como su disposición para modificar el proyecto varias veces.

No obstante, lamentamos que no haya quedado completamente claro el alcance o las posibles implicaciones de esta resolución para distintos foros y procesos, como la Organización para la Prohibición de las Armas Químicas en La Haya, la Convención sobre las Armas Bacteriológicas (Biológicas), Toxínicas y su Destrucción, en Ginebra, así como en la

relación entre la Asamblea General, el Consejo de Seguridad y la Secretaría General, en caso de investigación sobre el empleo de estas armas inhumanas.

México desea reiterar que condenamos en los términos más estrictos el empleo de armas químicas y de armas biológicas, por cualquier actor y bajo cualquier circunstancia. Continuamos comprometidos con la instrumentación y universalización de las convenciones respectivas sobre armas químicas y biológicas, especialmente con el fortalecimiento de ésta última mediante un Protocolo de Verificación, así como con el trabajo de la OPAQ, y la independencia y eficacia del Mecanismo del Secretario General.

Muchas gracias.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE VOTO EN ABSTENCIÓN DE LA DELEGACIÓN DE MÉXICO
SOBRE EL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L.71 “ACCIONES CONJUNTAS Y
DIÁLOGO ORIENTADO AL FUTURO EN ARAS DE UN MUNDO SIN ARMAS
NUCLEARES”, PRESENTADA POR JAPÓN.**

Nueva York, a 3 de noviembre de 2020.

México comprende y comparte la motivación de Japón para presentar el proyecto L.71. Estamos convencidos de la importancia buscar la unidad y acciones conjuntas para lograr un mundo libre de armas nucleares y mantener la paz, a través del multilateralismo efectivo, y la preeminencia del derecho internacional, especialmente, en los preparativos de la X Conferencia de Examen del TNP.

Es imperioso impulsar el fortalecimiento del régimen establecido por el TNP, mediante la implementación de todos las obligaciones y compromisos consignados en el Tratado, sin condicionamiento. Asimismo, la creación de puentes entre los Estados Poseedores de Armas Nucleares y los No Poseedores, está sentada en los acuerdos forjados en el marco del TNP. La evaluación de la eficacia de dichos acuerdos, así como la negociación de nuevos entendimientos corresponde a las partes del TNP, no a la Primera Comisión de la Asamblea General.

México reitera su preocupación porque el lenguaje en varios párrafos de esta resolución reinterpreta, debilita o, en algunos casos, ignora, acuerdos previos, contraídos por las partes del TNP, especialmente las obligaciones y provisiones contenidas en el artículo VI de dicho tratado y aquellas acciones en las que los Estados Poseedores de Armas Nucleares tienen una responsabilidad especial.

Preocupa asimismo a México que la resolución contenga referencias al CTBT que no corresponden al lenguaje acordado en otras resoluciones, y documentos, entre otros, la resolución sobre este tema de la que México es coautor.

Finalmente, reiteramos que la aprobación de esta resolución no representa ningún precedente, ni implica un cambio en obligaciones y compromisos multilaterales en materia de desarme nuclear. En tal sentido, México se reserva el derecho de presentar su propia posición en la X Conferencia de Examen del TNP.

Expresamos nuestra disposición para continuar dialogando con los autores de esta resolución sobre esta temática. México y Japón tenemos una muy estrecha colaboración en temas de no proliferación y desarme nuclear y la continuaremos teniendo.

Muchas gracias.

Netherlands on behalf of a group

Explanation of Vote (after the vote) on L.17 “Follow-up to the 2013 High Level Meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”

4 November 2020

Chairperson,

I would like to make this Explanation of Vote on behalf of the following countries: Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, and my own country, the Netherlands.

We would like to explain our vote **against** the resolution L.17 “Follow-up to the 2013 High-Level Meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”.

All of us share the long-term goal of this resolution: achieving and maintaining a world free of nuclear weapons. We all supported holding the High-Level Meeting on Nuclear Disarmament in 2013. And we all participated constructively in that meeting, discussing how to best achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

At the 2013 meeting, we made various proposals on how to reach this shared goal. We therefore regret that these were not captured in the resolutions on the High-Level Meeting of the past years. Unfortunately, the draft that was submitted this year does not address our concerns either.

This leaves us with no choice but to voice our continuing concerns with this resolution once more.

The NPT is the foundation of the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime. It is the international legal instrument that sets the framework for achieving and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, resolution L.17 fails to acknowledge the central role of the NPT and its review cycle.

NPT States parties have confirmed by consensus that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That is why we welcome the call in the resolution to negotiate effective disarmament measures. However, since the proposals we made at the 2013 HLM, and the concerns we have raised subsequently, have not been acknowledged in the resolution, we do not believe the UN high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament, to be convened on a date to be decided later, sets the right mandate for such negotiations.

Thank you.

Netherlands and Germany

Explanation of Vote (before the vote) of the Netherlands on L.48 ‘2021 session of the Disarmament Commission’

d.d. 10 November 2020

Chairperson,

In addition to the EoV delivered by Germany on behalf of the EU, the Netherlands and Germany would like to add the following in their national capacity.

The Netherlands will vote against decision L.48 on ‘2021 session of the Disarmament Commission’ as a whole for the following reasons.

First, and foremost, we are deeply concerned that L. 48, if adopted, sets an unwanted procedural precedent. The Russian Federation – the sponsor of this resolution – has, by submitting this text, not followed the long-standing practice that former or current chairs of disarmament bodies submit draft decisions or resolutions pertaining to

the work of such body. This is certainly the case for the UNDC resolution or decision, as well for the annual resolution on the Conference on Disarmament. Hence, Australia – the sponsor of decision L.49 on the Disarmament Commission – should have the primacy to submit this decision as the most recent chair of the UNDC.

While the Russian Federation was aware that Australia would submit a technical decision on this issue, it took the chance to side step this practice for reasons to benefit its own position. What the Russian Federation could have done, and what we consider normal practice, is to – at an early stage in a cooperative spirit – propose suggestions to improve the draft. If such suggestions were acceptable, they could have been included. Now, the First Committee is confronted with two competing decisions on the same subject, risking the adoption of both decisions and thereby creating a serious implementation challenge and risk to the continuity of the UNDC. We call on UN Member States to therefore make a clear choice between the Russian initiative and the Australian decision. Voting ‘yes’ for both is not a responsible, viable or functional option.

Secondly, a number of proposals in L.48 relating to host country issues pre-empt the course of action in another Committee, namely the Sixth Committee, which is mandated to deal with these issues.

Thirdly, the issuance of visas to representatives of Member States in accordance with the 1947 Headquarters Agreement is not an issue that falls within the specific mandate of the First Committee, which deals with issues concerning disarmament and international security. This should therefore be addressed in the appropriate Committee, which is the Committee on Relations with the Host Country.

Being UN host countries ourselves, the Germany and the Netherlands do not wish to make a judgement on the issues related to entry visa issuance in this forum.

As to the Russian amendment [A/C.1/75/L.79](#), the Germany and Netherlands will vote against it. We cannot support the procedure that was followed by the Russian Federation leading to the submission of this amendment, but also our other arguments mentioned count. This ‘No’ vote does not necessarily indicate our substantive position on the paragraphs in the amendment.

Thank you, Chairperson.

**Statement by David Lynch
First Secretary, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations**

Explanation of Vote on L.8

9 November 2020

New Zealand will vote against resolution L.8 entitled Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

New Zealand acknowledges the importance of discussions among the UN membership on the critical topic of responsible state behaviour online. To this end, we have been an active contributor to the Open Ended Working Group concerned with these issues. We recognise the value of the conversations we have had in this forum – we think it has acted as a Confidence Building Measure in and of itself. And we will work to support the Group in delivering a report that delivers meaningful progress on implementation of the framework of responsible state behaviour online.

We acknowledge that there is an appetite among states to continue the conversation that the OEWG has started. And as part of the ongoing OEWG process, we are required to consider the question of “Regular Institutional Dialogue” which is aimed at addressing this very issue.

We think this is worth in-depth discussion amongst all member states. There are a range of different ways we may wish to take forward the work the OEWG has started – and we think we should give the membership the ability to talk this through in detail, at expert level.

This is the primary reason we will vote against this resolution today. We believe the resolution pre-empts OEWG discussions on future dialogue, and it does so in ways that undermine the inclusive, transparent and democratic mandate the Group is supposed to have. We will vote against OP1 of this resolution for the same reason.

We look forward to working with the full membership of the UN to continue our discussions on responsible state behaviour online in order to deliver practical, meaningful outcomes for security and stability online.

ENDS

**Statement by David Lynch
First Secretary, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations**

Explanation of Vote on L.37

10 November 2020

New Zealand has been pleased to vote in favour of this resolution, and to join in celebrating forty years of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Since its establishment in 1980, UNIDIR’s work has been able to keep States, and the global community more generally, well-informed on the disarmament and security challenges of today and, indeed, those which will confront us tomorrow. It has spear-headed high-quality research and promoted creative thinking and dialogue.

The level of support for this resolution demonstrates the global breadth of UNIDIR’s supporters and the strong contribution it has made for 40 years now to the work of this Committee. New Zealand welcomes the continuation of UNIDIR’s high quality independent research and the virtual events and other activities which it has convened this year, notwithstanding the global pandemic.

We recognize that UNIDIR is an autonomous entity within the UN and is funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. For our part, New Zealand has continued to make financial contributions to UNIDIR in order to support a range of its projects and we certainly encourage all States in a position to do so to do the same. We welcome the resolution’s call for accommodation to be provided to UNIDIR at the Palais des Nations in Geneva at a reduced rate. We also strongly support the proposal for an increase in the subvention to the Institute – something, in our view, which is well overdue - and we have accordingly voted ‘yes’ on the separate vote on OP 8.

We trust that this improved level of support will position UNIDIR well in being able to continue its important work. We also take this opportunity to extend our thanks and best wishes to UNIDIR's departing Director, Dr Renata Dwan. She has made a formidable contribution both to the organisation and work of the Institute and will be sorely missed.

New Zealand looks forward to welcoming her successor – and to seeing what the next 40 years will bring for the Institute.

ENDS

Statement by David Lynch
First Secretary, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Explanation of Vote on L.48
10 November 2020

I take the floor to explain New Zealand's position on Decision L.48 entitled "2021 Session of the Disarmament Commission" and Decision L.49 on the "Disarmament Commission".

My Delegation is well able to understand the frustrations underlying aspects of this first text – L.48 - notably with respect to the non-issuance of entry visas, bearing on the UNDC. Aware, however, of the obligations pertaining to all Member States under the UN Headquarters Agreement, it would be our continued hope that these issues could be satisfactorily resolved in an expeditious manner, including as necessary in the Committee on Relations with the Host Country, and without any impact on the UNDC itself or any requirement for this Committee to consider competing resolutions with regard to the convening of the UNDC.

New Zealand views the request to the Secretary-General, contained in paragraph (e), to "deal with problems ... including with issuance of entry visas of representatives of Member States" as particularly inappropriate.

In contrast, the other Decision on this topic – L.49, tabled by the most recently-elected Chair of the UN Disarmament Commission, is - as it should be - purely technical in nature. We hope that it will be able to provide a clear path forward for the Commission to resume its substantive meetings in 2021.

For these reasons, Mr Chair, New Zealand has voted against L.48 and each of its separate paragraph votes. Instead, we will vote in favour of L.49.

ENDS

Statement by David Lynch
First Secretary, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Explanation of Vote on L.65
4 November 2020

It is with regret that New Zealand is obliged to vote against Resolution L.65 "United Nations Secretary General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons" and also on the separate paragraph votes.

New Zealand remains a strong supporter of the UN Secretary-General's investigative mechanism and the essential complement it provides to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in particular to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Our negative vote on this resolution does not reflect any shift in our position on the mechanism, but rather our concern that it is being politicized as part of an effort to undermine the existing international framework governing chemical weapons. Nor does our negative vote, including on pp8, signal any shift in New Zealand's ongoing support for the addition of verification measures to the BWC.

The UNSG's mechanism predates the CWC – a treaty which now enjoys near universal membership with only four States remaining outside it. For all but these four States, it is the CWC – and its implementing body the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – which provides the mechanism through which to address allegations of the use of chemical weapons. As the UN Secretary General has himself stated, as the CWC approaches universality it should become the single standing body with responsibility to carry out investigations as to whether or not chemical weapons have been used. The resolution's failure to acknowledge this, and its suggestion that States must instead study the intersection of the UNSG's mechanism with the CWC, raises concerns for us about the overarching objective of L.65.

We regret that the resolution seeks to suggest that nothing has moved forward since the UNSG was first given this mandate by the UN General Assembly in 1987 and fails entirely to take account, inter alia, of the updated technical appendices to the guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of UN Document [A/44/561](#), the maintenance of a list of qualified experts, and the holding of relevant training courses. Equally, New Zealand cannot support a resolution that misrepresents the important developments that have taken place to ensure that the mechanism remains fit for purpose, as it proved, for example, in its use in 2013 in Syria.

We recognize that investigations into allegations of use of biological and toxin weapons are not analogous to those relating to chemical weapons, given the absence of an investigating or verification body within the BWC. It is in this area that the effective operation of the Secretary-General's mechanism is particularly important. We do not feel that any of the operative paragraphs bearing on the mechanism are useful in this regard.

New Zealand is also concerned that the resolution puts undue emphasis on the role of the UN Security Council in responding to allegations of the potential use of biological and toxin weapons. It is unclear to us why, in a resolution purportedly focused on the UN Secretary-General's mechanism, the text focuses instead on the standing invitation issued to the UN Security Council by States Parties to the BWC.

The UN Secretary-General's investigative mechanism must remain a tool able to be utilized by any Member State of the UN General Assembly. New Zealand opposes any suggestion that this important means of investigating a possible breach of international law could become only a tool of the UN Security Council or caught up in efforts to politicize it.

ENDS

Statement by David Lynch
First Secretary, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations

Explanation of Vote on L.71/Rev 1
4 November 2020

Mr Chair,

New Zealand will again this year abstained on the vote on the resolution to be put forward by Japan entitled “Joint Courses of Action and Future-oriented Dialogue Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons” – L71/Rev 1.

We very much regret that L71 maintains the divisive approach toward nuclear disarmament which has been evident in this text in recent years and continues seriously to devalue both the legally-binding commitments in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the standing of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Such an approach, combined with the generally low-level of ambition evident in this text, is unlikely to assist the international community in moving “towards a world without nuclear weapons”.

We will vote ‘no’ on PP 4 of L 71 as a reflection of our disquiet with the removal of its reference to the importance of implementing previously “agreed steps” under the NPT. Such steps or undertakings are never ends in themselves: their value lies in the legitimate expectation on the part of the international community that they will be implemented.

As a strong and unwavering supporter of the NPT, New Zealand will express its opposition to the attempt to rewrite fundamental aspects of this cornerstone Treaty, including with regard to the nuclear disarmament obligation in Article VI, by voting ‘no’ on OP 1 of L71.

We will vote ‘no’ also on OP 3 (d) of L 71 as a reflection of our grave concern at the dilution of the focus in this paragraph on the CTBT (and on the importance of the CTBT’s entry-into-force), and also on account of its unacceptably weak language relating to the maintenance of the existing moratorium on nuclear testing (and which even, seemingly, appears to contemplate a return to nuclear testing).

In addition, New Zealand will abstain on a number of paragraph votes.

We will abstain on OP 3 (b) which deals with the risks entailed by the existence of nuclear weapons. This subparagraph fails to take account of the significant history of accidents with respect to nuclear weapons and includes only a very limited set of the options potentially available to lower nuclear weapon-related risks. These options do not include a number of important and widely supported risk reduction measures, such as the removal of nuclear weapons from high alert operational status.

We will also abstain on OP 3 (e). New Zealand is not at all opposed to efforts to advance nuclear disarmament verification. Indeed, such efforts are very welcome and they can usefully amplify the important framework for nuclear disarmament provided by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. But, reflecting our genuine commitment to advancing verification, we oppose any effort to constrain the avenues in which progress can be made.

Notwithstanding the best of intentions, this resolution has not, regrettably, managed to identify common ground nor possible “joint courses of action” towards nuclear disarmament under the NPT.

It remains New Zealand’s hope that with continued work on the part of all States Parties in the lead up to, and during, the Tenth Review Conference of the NPT we will be able to agree there on an outcome document that builds on previous commitments made under this very important Treaty and serves to sustain its position as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime.

Thank you.

STATEMENT BY

H.E. JOANNA WRONECKA**PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS****NEW YORK, 4TH NOVEMBER 2020***Mr. Chair,**Distinguished Delegates,*

I take the floor to introduce a draft Resolution on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention that Poland – as a sole sponsor – has presented again this year as we did in the past to this Distinguished Committee.

Since its first adoption the resolution has greatly contributed to international peace and security, enhancing chemical non-proliferation regime based upon the Convention and its implementing body – OPCW. Despite complex issues the resolution deals with, for years it received unanimous international support. Regrettably, in recent years its consensual character has been undermined due to polarization of positions over key matters regarding the implementation of the CWC.

This year, the context of our work is more demanding than ever. With the continuous, confirmed use of chemical weapons around the world, even in recent months, the CWC bedrock – complete prohibition of chemical weapons – is again fundamentally challenged, questioning the integrity of the CWC and the credibility of the OPCW. As we are reminded that the threat of re-emergence of chemical weapons is real, we need to defend the Convention and reinforce again our key message to all perpetrators of chemical weapons use: there is no tolerance of international community for such unacceptable acts, those responsible will be held to account.

Poland strongly believes that especially in the current situation, when the implementation of the Convention is facing fundamental challenges, the international community absolutely needs to convey a strong and unambiguous message of support for the comprehensive implementation of the CWC under all its pillars. We need to be loud and clear about it and offer our full support for the efforts of the OPCW Director General and the Technical Secretariat.

Mr. Chair,

The resolution refers to such critical issues as: universality, progress in destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles, national implementation, verification, risk posed by the threat of use of chemical weapons by non-state actors, including terrorists, and last but not least – international cooperation. Retaining the structure and balance of the text, we have been successful this year to enhance some provisions in this regard.

Furthermore, recognizing that the CWC integrity and the OPCW credibility are at stake, the resolution must not be silent on the key challenge to the Convention – the use of chemical weapons around the world. Accordingly, it has to comment upon the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon against Alexei Navalny with reference to the OPCW technical report on this case. It has also to refer to the implementation of the 2018 CWC Conference of States Parties decision, addressing comprehensively the threat from chemical weapons use, including the worrisome conclusions of the first report of the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team, and follow up actions taken in this regard by the OPCW Executive Council in July.

Building common understanding on these issues proved to be extremely challenging. Poland has done its utmost to address the current situation with the implementation of the CWC in a balanced and adequate manner, taking into account the ongoing works at the OPCW, and various, sometimes very divergent, comments made during the consultations. The end product before you is the result of an open, inclusive and transparent process. I would like to express our gratitude to all the Distinguished Delegations in New York (but also in Geneva and The Hague), for contribution over the last few weeks to the draft, in these unique, challenging circumstances caused by COVID-19 pandemic.

Mr. Chair,

Let me conclude with a strong call on all of the Member States in this room to take a positive stance towards the presented draft.

Thank you.

SINGAPORE'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON "TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AT THE 75TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE, NOVEMBER 2020

1 Singapore reiterates our full commitment to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, and will continue to support resolutions and initiatives that contribute to concrete and meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament.

2 Singapore's position on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has been clearly expressed and remains unchanged. Our abstention on this resolution and our position on all other resolutions and paragraphs in the First Committee that refer to the TPNW should be viewed through the same lens.

3 Singapore participated actively in the TPNW negotiations. We regret that our concerns were not fully taken into account when the TPNW was adopted. Singapore reiterates our view that the TPNW should not in any way affect the rights and obligations of States Parties under other treaties and agreements, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

4 Singapore firmly believes that there are multiple pathways to a nuclear weapon-free world. To achieve meaningful progress in nuclear disarmament, all relevant parties need to be involved in a collective global effort. The international community should work towards finding a realistic and complementary role for the TPNW within the existing global disarmament architecture, of which the NPT remains the cornerstone.

SINGAPORE'S EXPLANATION OF VOTE ON "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION" AND ON "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS" AT THE 75TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST COMMITTEE, 6 NOVEMBER 2020

1 Singapore had voted in favour of the draft resolutions L.26, "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction", and L.43, "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions", both of which were adopted on 6 November 2020.

2 Singapore's position has been clear and consistent. We have traditionally voted in favour of the resolution "*Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*", and support all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. In May 1996, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralising mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, and extended this moratorium indefinitely.

3 Singapore also voted in favour of the resolution "*Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions*", as we support initiatives against the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, especially when directed at innocent civilians. It was for this reason that Singapore declared an indefinite moratorium in November 2008 on the export of cluster munitions.

4 At the same time, as a small state, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines may therefore be counter-productive.

5 Singapore supports international efforts to resolve humanitarian concerns over anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. We will continue to work with members of the international community towards a durable, and truly global solution.

**Explanation of vote by South Africa During the Meeting of the UN General Assembly 1st Committee on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the context of international security
9 November 2020**

Chairperson,

In 2018 South Africa voted for the resolution that established two processes to discuss the issue of security in the use of ICTs, namely the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) for the period 2019-2021 and 2019-2020 respectively.

My delegation joined other Member States in extending the mandate of the OEWG to enable a final session to be held in a face-to-face format.

South Africa abstained on Resolution L.8 and voted against OP.1 as we are of the view that establishing a new mechanism, namely the Open Ended Working Group on Security in the Use of ICTs 2021-2025, is premature and Member States should rather focus their attention on completing the work of the current OEWG.

South Africa has previously shared its support for the extension of the OEWG by a further two years, to provide Member States sufficient time to achieve its current mandate, with a focus on implementation of existing norms rather than the development of new ones.

I thank you.

**Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations During the Meeting of the UN General Assembly 1st Committee on Joint Courses of Action and Future-orientated Dialogue Towards a World Without Nuclear Weapons
3 November 2020**

Chairperson,

South Africa is of the view that the draft resolution The Joint Course of action and future-orientated dialogue towards a world without nuclear weapons has the potential to negatively impact on the previously agreed consensus commitments of the NPT Review Conferences as well as the efforts towards the early-entry-into force of the CTBT. In particular the wording: 'unequivocal undertaking' is missing in the resolution. South Africa has always maintained that NPT Revcon outcomes of 1995, 2000, and 2010 should not be re-interpreted in a manner that is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the NPT.

Furthermore, we have consistently encouraged the establishment of further nuclear-free-weapons zones in all the areas where they do not exist. The inclusion of some phrases is opening the way to exclude some areas. Nuclear Disarmament implies that the whole world should ultimately become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The resolution by and large introduces preconditions for the implementation of already agreed decisions.

For these reasons South Africa will abstain (has abstained) on resolution.

I thank you.

**Explanation of Vote by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations During the Meeting of the UN General Assembly 1st Committee on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)
3 November 2020**

Chairperson

South Africa has voted in favour of this resolution. We particularly welcome the fact the 50th ratification threshold was reached on the 24th October 2020 and which paves the way for the TPNW to enter into force after 90 days.

The 50th ratification of the Treaty on the eve of United Nations Day, 25 October 2020, is a watershed moment in humanity's efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The conclusion and the immanent entry into force of this history Treaty is testimony of the concerns of the international community with regard to nuclear weapons. The Treaty finally bans the only category of weapon of mass destruction not yet to be subject to a global prohibition, following the example of the existing conventions proscribing biological and chemical weapons, and it does so with a pronounced humanitarian approach. It reminds us also that nuclear energy should be solely used for peaceful purposes and not as a weapon of mass destruction.

The Treaty complements other international instruments by contributing towards fulfilling the nuclear disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the various nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties, such as the Pelindaba Treaty that already banned nuclear weapons in Africa.

I thank you

**Statement by Ambassador Xolisa Mabhongo, Deputy Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations During the Meeting of the UN General Assembly 1st Committee on Ethical Imperatives for a World Without Nuclear Weapons
3 November 2020**

Chairperson,

As we celebrate the 75th anniversary of the United Nations and the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it is an anomaly that more than 14,000 nuclear weapons remain in existence. For as long as nuclear weapons exist, humankind will continue to face the threat of catastrophe.

It is impossible to imagine that there could be any acceptable justification within established international norms for the continued existence of nuclear weapons, much less for their use. Nuclear disarmament is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral and ethical imperative.

As the only country that has voluntarily abandoned nuclear weapons, South Africa remains deeply concerned that the nuclear disarmament obligations remain unfulfilled.

Like other Member States, South Africa is concerned about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, as aptly outlined in the ground-breaking Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons signed in 2017. We hope that this Treaty will serve as a catalyst for progress on nuclear disarmament which is essential for achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

It is with this in mind, my delegation has the honour to again table for consideration a resolution entitled "Ethical Imperatives for a world without nuclear weapons" which we hope will again receive wide support.

I thank you.

**EXPLICACIÓN DE POSICIÓN TRAS LA ADOPCIÓN POR CONSENSO
DEL PROYECTO DE RESOLUCIÓN L10 SOBRE
“EL TRATADO DE UNA ZONA DESNUCLEARIZADA EN AFRICA”**

Sr. Presidente,

España desea realizar una Explicación de Voto en relación con el proyecto de resolución L10, titulado *“Tratado de una Zona Desnuclearizada en África”*.

La entrada en vigor del Tratado de Pelindaba para la creación de una Zona Libre de Armas Nucleares en África en 2009 supuso una importante contribución al fortalecimiento de la paz y seguridad internacionales, de especial trascendencia para todos los países africanos.

Por ello, España ha manifestado siempre de forma inequívoca su apoyo a los objetivos del Tratado de Pelindaba y se ha felicitado de su entrada en vigor.

España mantiene estrechas relaciones con los países de África y viene dedicando esfuerzos considerables, mediante la acción del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Unión Europea y Cooperación, para promover un desarrollo sostenible de todos los países africanos. España también está dispuesta a hacer los esfuerzos necesarios para que los Estados parte del Tratado de Pelindaba adquieran las capacidades necesarias para su eficaz cumplimiento en sus respectivos territorios.

Sr. Presidente,

Tras haber estudiado muy detenidamente la invitación que se extiende a España a formar parte del Protocolo III del Tratado de Pelindaba, mi Gobierno, en consulta con el Parlamento y tomando en consideración las directrices adoptadas por consenso en la Comisión de Desarme de las Naciones Unidas en su sesión sustantiva de 1999 sobre la “Creación de Zonas Libres de Armas Nucleares conforme a arreglos libremente concertados entre los países de la región de la que se trate”, decidió no proceder a su firma, lo que se comunicó en su momento al depositario del Tratado.

Quisiera a este respecto destacar únicamente dos cuestiones:

- En primer lugar, el Tratado de Pelindaba no contiene ninguna disposición, obligación, garantía o salvaguardia en el ámbito del desarme y la no proliferación nucleares que España no haya adoptado ya para la totalidad de su territorio nacional. En virtud de su pertenencia a diversos organismos internacionales, España ha contraído una serie de obligaciones y salvaguardias, en el marco del EURATOM y del Acuerdo de Salvaguardias complementado por el Protocolo Adicional que ha suscrito con el OIEA, que van más allá de las contenidas en el Tratado de Pelindaba, y a las que da cumplimiento.
- En segundo lugar, todo el territorio español está desnuclearizado militarmente desde 1976. Esta prohibición de introducción, instalación o almacenamiento de armas nucleares en todo el territorio español fue reiterada por el Parlamento cuando tuvo lugar el ingreso de España en la OTAN en 1981 y fue aprobada en referéndum consultivo celebrado en marzo de 1986.

En consecuencia, España ya ha tomado todas las medidas necesarias para que el contenido del Tratado de Pelindaba se aplique en todo su territorio nacional.

Sr. Presidente,

España viene sumándose al consenso en torno a esta resolución de la Primera Comisión desde su presentación por vez primera en 1997. Sin embargo, la delegación española no se considera asociada al mencionado consenso en lo que se refiere al párrafo dispositivo 5. Por ello, ha venido trabajando con otras delegaciones para encontrar una redacción más equilibrada que resulte aceptable para todas las

partes, y confía que las conversaciones sobre esta resolución puedan ofrecer resultados satisfactorios con vistas a próximos periodos de sesiones.

Muchas gracias, Sr. Presidente.

**Explanation of Vote by Sweden
on L.6 “Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”**

Mr Chair,

Sweden abstained on the resolution Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. This was done for the following reasons:

In 2017 Sweden took active part in the negotiations that led to the adoption of the TPNW. During the negotiations, Sweden actively sought to rectify certain key shortcomings in the draft, without success. While voting in favour of the adoption of the TPNW at the conclusion of the negotiations, Sweden made clear in its explanation of vote that several concerns remained, and that the question of possible Swedish accession was going to be subject of further national evaluation.

In July 2019, the Swedish Government announced its decision not to sign or ratify the TPNW in its current form. This decision was preceded by careful consideration, including an independent inquiry, and extensive consultations with relevant governmental authorities, civil society organizations, business and academic institutions.

When the TPNW enters into force in January 2021, Sweden will seek to become an observer state.

I thank you.

Item 103 (ii)
L.38 entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”

New York, 6 November 2020

Explanation of Vote

Mr. Chair,

I take the floor to explain the position of Switzerland on resolution L.38 titled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”.

Switzerland is deeply concerned by the growing humanitarian challenges of improvised explosive devices. The prevention of the unlawful use of IEDs is essential. While we joined consensus on this resolution, my delegation wishes to express the following considerations.

- **First**, concerns over humanitarian consequences or the unlawful use of IEDs are not dependent on the status of the actor or its labelling, that is to say, whether a “legal” or “illegal” armed group or even a state actor used an IED in an unlawful manner.
- **Second**, when preventing or combating the use of IEDs or their proliferation, any measure taken must comply with international law, as noted in the present resolution. Switzerland would reiterate that the fact that an actor is labelled as “terrorist”, “criminal” or “illegal” in a given situation cannot prejudge or affect the application, fulfilment and respect of international law, especially human rights law and, in armed conflicts, international humanitarian law.

We hope that these concerns will be addressed in next year’s resolution.

I thank you Mr. Chair.

Other WMD
Explanation of vote after the vote by Turkey
4 November 2020

Mr. Chair,

I am delivering an explanation of vote on draft resolution L.29 entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

My delegation has voted in favor of this resolution, including its related paragraphs, based on Turkey’s principled position on and firm support for the CWC, which plays an essential role in international disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Turkey reiterates that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere and under any circumstances is a crime against humanity. We condemn in the strongest terms the use of chemical weapons that has re-emerged in various parts of the world. The case of Syria remains particularly worrisome in this regard.

The updates in the current resolution capture well the latest evidence of non-compliance by the Syrian regime with its obligations under the CWC. The reference to the IIT report of 8 April 2020 is particularly important as the report was the latest in a sequence of scientific studies which established Syrian regime’s culpability in chemical weapons use against its own population in Ltamenah, in March 2017.

Similarly, we also welcome the reference in the resolution to the important decision of the OPCW Executive Council of 9 July 2020, entitled “Addressing the Possession and Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”. This decision was a crucial step forward in addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. In this context, we express our grave concern for non-implementation of this decision by the Syrian regime, as also indicated by the report of the OPCW Director-General dated 14 October 2020. Turkey looks forward to further measures, particularly during the next session of the Conference of States Parties to address the failure of the Syrian regime to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities in a fully verifiable manner.

Nevertheless, we would have wished to see a stronger wording in this resolution, specifically condemning those who have used chemical weapons, particularly the Syrian regime. The regime is responsible for repeatedly using chemical weapons against its own people, as has been well documented to date.

Similarly, the resolution could have been better equipped if it referred to the ongoing cooperation between the OPCW Secretariat and the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM). This could have been a significant encouragement for the ongoing efforts to combat impunity for the chemical weapons use in Syria.

Finally, the resolution could have also urged the Syrian regime to cooperate with the OPCW bodies, especially the Investigation and Identification Team.

Taking this opportunity, we commend the OPCW Technical Secretariat for its impartial and objective stance as well its professionalism in investigating chemical weapons attacks in Syria and in other places. Their endeavors are invaluable to ensure accountability and combat impunity. In this context, we are deeply concerned with the ongoing efforts to discredit the OPCW and its staff based on political motives.

Turkey will continue to support all the steps taken by the international community, first and foremost the UN and OPCW, to ensure full accountability in Syria.

Thank you.

Cluster V– Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Written explanation of position**on behalf of the United Kingdom and France****L.15 “Relationship between disarmament and development”**

New York, November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

The United Kingdom and France would like to explain their position on draft resolution L.15: “Relationship between disarmament and development”.

France and the United Kingdom have joined consensus on this resolution. We support the effective, practical linkages between disarmament issues and development policy, particularly in the field of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

That said, we feel it necessary to make our position clear on other aspects of this text. The notion of a “symbiotic relationship” between disarmament and development appears questionable to us as the conditions conducive to effective arms control and disarmament are not necessarily dependent on development only, as seen with the growing military expenditure of some developing countries. There is no automatic link between the two but rather a complex relationship that this notion does not accurately capture. Moreover, the idea according to which military expenditure directly diverts funding from development requirements would need to be nuanced, as defence investments are also necessary to deliver the peace and security that facilitates development, including through legitimate military operations, peacekeeping, and an improved response to natural disasters (airborne and maritime equipment).

Cluster V– Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Written explanation of position**on behalf of the United Kingdom and France****L.27 “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control”**

New York, November 2020

The United Kingdom and France would like to explain their position on the resolution L.27, entitled “Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Control”, on which they joined consensus. We wish to make clear that France and the United Kingdom operate under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.

Climate change is among the most serious challenges facing our world. It poses a threat to the environment, to global security and economic prosperity. In this respect, the United Kingdom and France are strongly committed to the fight against climate change. The 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change constitute our common road maps to transform our economies and our energy models. We reaffirm our attachment to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, as well as our determination to intensify our efforts to live up to our ambitions and responsibilities towards future generations.

Other WMD

Explanation of vote

after the vote

By Stephen B. Knight

Senior Advisor of the United States to the United Nations

on behalf of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Denmark, Slovenia, Croatia, Australia, Greece, Canada, Finland, Ukraine, Georgia, Portugal, Malta, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Montenegro and North Macedonia

L.29 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”

New York, 3 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

I am delivering an explanation of vote on behalf of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Lithuania, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Luxembourg, Sweden, Czech Republic, Italy, Latvia, Slovakia, Denmark, Slovenia, Croatia, Australia, Greece, Canada, Finland, Ukraine, Georgia, Portugal, Malta, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Montenegro and North Macedonia; and my own country on draft resolution L.29 “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.”

Mr. Chairman, our respective countries voted in favor of this resolution, as we believe it reflects the objectives and goals of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); and particularly reinforces the aim found in its preamble which is to “Exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons.” Despite the continued use of chemical weapons by some in contravention of international norms; it is the many, who have associated their countries with this statement that remain steadfast in defending and preserving the Convention; and holding those accountable who defy it. This resolution highlights the extraordinary work done by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW); rather than tearing it down or undermining it.

The OPCW is a well-respected Organization with a long history of impartiality, transparency, and professionalism that speaks for itself. There is no basis for deliberate attacks on the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat; using false arguments to seek to reduce the efficacy and credibility of their efforts to effectively implement the CWC. While others sow disinformation about the Organization’s mandate and maneuver to weaken its framework, we remain fully confident in the OPCW’s well-established investigatory expertise, techniques and analysis; and we express our deepest appreciation to the brave women and men of the OPCW for their dedication and professionalism in investigating chemical weapons attacks in Syria; and their efforts to assist other States Parties when called upon to do so.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution rightfully highlights the grave concerns of chemical weapons use seen in Syria, Malaysia, Iraq, and United Kingdom; and most recently with the poisoning of Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny in Russia. Nearly every country in the world is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the vast majority of these nations comply with their obligations. Yet the Assad regime continues to flout its international obligations and disregard the standards of basic humanity by using chemical weapons against its own people. Earlier this year, in its first report, the OPCW Investigation and Identification Team (IIT) concluded that the Syrian Arab Republic used chemical weapons on three occasions in March 2017. In response, the OPCW Executive Council adopted a decision on July 9 setting out clear measures for the Syrian regime to take, including declaring the chemical weapons it currently possesses as well as chemical weapons production facilities and other related facilities; and resolving the remaining outstanding issues regarding its initial declaration of its chemical weapons program. However, Syria has failed to complete these measures; and refuses to cooperate with the OPCW.

Mr. Chairman, in the simplest terms, the Assad regime must cease the use of chemical weapons, provide a complete and accurate declaration of all of its CW holdings, materials and equipment; and verifiably eliminate

the entirety of its CW program in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and resolution 2118. Similarly, we call on the Russian Government to change its behavior and provide a full accounting for the poisoning of Mr. Navalny with a Novichok agent on Russian territory; cooperate fully with the OPCW in a transparent manner without obfuscation or deflection; and comply with its international obligations by fully declaring and eliminating its chemical weapons program, including its Novichok agents. Such use is abhorrent, and this resolution rightly condemns and recognizes our collective view that such actions are reprehensible and must end; and the perpetrators involved must be held to account.

Mr. Chairman, continued flouting of international obligations without consequence breeds malign behavior. Such disrespect for international norms and agreements undermines global objectives toward international security, arms control, and nonproliferation and disarmament. We are entrusted with a solemn responsibility which demands that, in our words and in our actions, we defend and advance the shared vision of a world free of chemical weapons. If we simply stay silent and do nothing, we only further embolden those who seek to maintain an offensive chemical weapons program; and look to use such weapons to the detriment of all mankind.

Any effort to ignore these serious issues or claim they are too controversial even to include in this resolution is irresponsible and undermines the work we have advanced to date. We must continue to condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of chemical weapons collectively by any State or non-State actor, and to hold all those who would use such weapons accountable. Toward that end, we commend the commitments made by participating States of the International Partnership Against Impunity for the use of chemical weapons and invite others to join.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

Written Explanation of Vote

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf of the France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

***L.5 “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons”
L.73 “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world”***

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit this explanation of vote on behalf of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States on the draft resolutions L.5, “Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons,” and L.73, “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world.”

The concerns resulting from the use of nuclear weapons are not new: they were written into the preamble of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, and captured in the outcome document of the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

The question is what conclusions we draw from these concerns. Some of those who continue to promote the humanitarian consequences narrative contend that nuclear disarmament can be achieved by prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons now without an effective verification regime or even if those states in possession of the weapons do not sign up to, and are not bound by, the prohibition. We find this approach to be deeply flawed.

The TPNW fails to account for the security considerations required for nuclear disarmament and sets back the cause of implementing and strengthening the NPT regime in all its aspects by deepening the divide among NPT states parties.

We are committed to pursuing the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We believe that an approach that addresses the challenges to the international security environment that make nuclear deterrence necessary is

the only way to combine the imperatives of general and complete disarmament, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, and of maintaining global stability. It is only by working together, that we can create the environment in which nuclear weapons would no longer be needed.

Cluster 5 – Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Written Explanation of Vote

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

L.14 “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium”

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit this explanation of vote on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to explain our negative vote on draft resolution L.14 “Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium.”

This is not a new issue.

The environmental and long-term health effects of the use of depleted uranium munitions have been thoroughly investigated by the World Health Organization, the United Nations Environmental Program, the International Atomic Energy Agency, NATO, the Centres for Disease Control, the European Commission, and others.

None of these inquiries has documented long-term environmental or health effects attributable to use of these munitions. It is therefore regrettable that the conclusions of these studies are thus ignored, and that the authors are calling for further studies without taking into account the existing research.

Given the lack of tangible evidence to the contrary, we do not recognise the presupposed potential risk to health and the environment and therefore do not support UN resolutions that presuppose depleted uranium is harmful.

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

Written Explanation of Vote

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

L.17 “Follow-up to the 2013 high-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit an explanation of vote on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on draft resolution L.17: “Follow up to the 2013 High Level meeting of the General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament.” We cannot support the resolution for the following reasons.

We believe that nuclear proliferation and non-compliance by a few States with their respective non-proliferation obligations, as well as nuclear terrorism and the deterioration of the international security environment constitute serious threats to international peace and security. Unfortunately, the resolution calling for the establishment of the High-level International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament does not address these threats. Halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and addressing the deterioration in the overall international security environment are crucial to creating conditions conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament.

The only reference to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in this resolution is to Article VI; this is insufficient, incidental and unbalanced. The NPT as a whole constitutes the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential basis for nuclear disarmament efforts. Convening another conference to discuss nuclear disarmament without consideration of the NPT as a whole will lead to another futile outcome. The upcoming NPT Review Conference is a far more appropriate venue to deliberate the threats that this resolution purports to address.

Furthermore, the resolution takes note of the adoption of the text of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We strongly oppose this Treaty, for all the reasons we have long outlined. Progress on the nuclear disarmament agenda will only be possible through an incremental, inclusive, consensus-based multilateral process that takes into account the prevailing international security environment.

Cluster 5 – Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Written Explanation of Position

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

L.33 “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit this Explanation of Position on behalf of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States on the resolution entitled “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament”.

We support this text because we believe that this resolution is useful to highlight the benefits and challenges of the development of science and technology in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. The resolution rightfully highlights the need to remain closely informed about the latest scientific and technological developments and to regulate the transfer of sensitive technologies for peaceful uses in order to address the risk of proliferation by States or non-State actors.

This issue is regularly discussed in many fora, inter alia the CCW, the CWC, the BWC, or the Conference on Disarmament.

We want to underscore that the rights referred to in PP5 of this resolution are those noted in specific provisions of a limited number of treaties: the CWC, the BWC, and the NPT. As PP5 makes clear, States must exercise those rights in accordance with their international obligations, including their obligations under those three treaties. As States Parties to those treaties, the UK, the United States, and France will comply with their respective international obligations and expect all other States Parties to do the same. It should be added that none of the three treaties recognizes a “right to technologies” or a “right to sensitive materials.”

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

Written Explanation of Vote

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America

L.54 “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit an explanation of vote on behalf of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States on draft resolution L.54, entitled “Toward a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments.

This resolution continues to welcome the adoption on of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which we strongly oppose. We have expressed serious concerns that this Treaty will take us further away from a common approach to nuclear disarmament. A balanced and pragmatic approach that takes into account the prevailing international security environment remains the only realistic way to make substantial progress on nuclear disarmament while enhancing international peace and stability. Deterrence remains critical to international security, as long as nuclear weapons continue to exist. The TPNW ignores this reality.

We have made tremendous progress in reducing our nuclear arsenals. However, addressing further prospects for nuclear disarmament requires taking into account all factors, including those that affect international peace and stability and make nuclear deterrence necessary, which an approach merely focused on the humanitarian dimension fails to achieve. The disregard of the TPNW for security considerations, the permissiveness of its non-proliferation provisions as well as the absence of any verification regime prevent it from being qualified as an effective measure of nuclear disarmament under strict effective international control, as called for by the NPT. The TPNW also fails to meet the highest standard of non-proliferation, namely the IAEA Additional Protocol. The TPNW will not be binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; nor does it set any new standards or norms.

Cluster III - OUTER SPACE (DISARMAMENT ASPECTS)

Explanation of Vote

before the vote

Delivered by Mr. Stephen Knight
United States of America

**on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
France, and the United States of America,**

L.62, “No first placement of weapons in outer space”

6 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

I would like to deliver an explanation of vote on behalf of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, on draft resolution L.62, “No first placement of weapons in outer space (“NFP”). We will vote no and strongly encourage all delegations to do likewise.

The United States, France and the United Kingdom look forward to continuing to engage constructively and pragmatically with other UN Member States in order to strengthen the safety, stability, security, and sustainability of outer space activities. The safety and security of the outer space environment is under threat and all nations must make progress on the development of effective transparency and confidence building measures. Our national experts actively participated in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. We also encourage all countries to take advantage of fora like the UN Disarmament Commission to make real progress on transparency and confidence-building measures.

However, we believe that Russia's NFP initiative contains a number of significant problems and the continued development of all anti-satellite weapons and capabilities, including earth-based, that does not match the diplomatic rhetoric. Some countries are currently developing new systems capable of carrying out aggressive action against those of their potential adversaries. Unfriendly activities or demonstrations of power such as ASAT launches, proximity operations and the jamming of location systems have been observed.

The NFP initiative does not adequately define what constitutes a "weapon in outer space." In space, any object with maneuvering capabilities can in theory be used for offensive purposes. Without a common understanding of what we mean by a space weapon, this resolution would increase mistrust or misunderstanding with regard to the activities and intentions of States.

Second, there are limits to a State's ability to understand the purpose of a satellite once it has been launched and the NFP initiative contains no features that would make it possible to effectively confirm a State's political commitment "not to be the first to place weapons in outer space."

Third, we cannot support the reference to "common effort towards a community of shared future for mankind" in preambular paragraph 5. We urge countries to look closely at this language. While it sounds innocuous, this phrase has been promoted by China to insert its own view of multilateralism and world geopolitics on the international system. It is not a phrase with any meaning or relation to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, the Outer Space Treaty, or multilateral arms control and disarmament. Instead, this phrase is code for China's views of its role in the world and none of us should support incorporating language targeting a domestic political audience into multilateral documents.

Finally, systems in space can also be damaged from earth; this resolution fails to address the near term threat from other types of anti-satellite weapons, for example, lasers or ground-launched systems. These weapons pose a serious threat to the space environment, including by creating multiple long-lived debris in valuable orbits for hundreds of years – as in the case of, for example, just one single ASAT test in 2007.

All nations must take concrete steps to strengthen the safety, stability, and sustainability of space. The NFP resolution is not the right mechanism for achieving these goals. Rather, we should look to reduce the risks to operations in space in order to create the conditions for a safe, secure, stable, and operationally sustainable space environment. Our nations support the development of non-legally binding transparency and confidence building measures that consider how we can communicate better, explain our intentions and demonstrate good behavior. These measures should be clear, practical and confirmable. Therefore, clarifying acceptable and unacceptable behavior would be important, as well as considering space and earth-based threats to our space operations. There are real threats to the outer space environment, but the NFP resolution is not the answer.

Cluster I – Nuclear Weapons

Written Explanation of Vote

Submitted by the United States of America on behalf the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, and the United States of America

L.72 “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”

10 November 2020

The United States of America has the honor to submit this explanation of vote on behalf of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with regard to L.72, “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems.”

We continue to disagree with the premise that the Nuclear Weapon States’ current level of readiness of nuclear weapons automatically increases the risk of unintentional or accidental use and that lowered alert levels will in all cases lead to heightened international security. In fact, lowered readiness levels may contribute to miscalculation and accelerate instabilities in a crisis.

Our operational readiness has been adapted to the changing international security environment. The current status of our respective nuclear weapons systems are maintained at levels consonant with our national security requirements and our obligations to our allies. These readiness levels are highly stable and our nuclear weapons systems are not on “hair-trigger” alert. Highlighting that, and as we have stated before, our respective nuclear weapons systems are no longer targeted against any state.

We would also like to reiterate that our nuclear weapons systems are subject to the most rigorous command, control and communication systems denying the possibility of accidental or unintentional use.

Cluster 5 – Other Disarmament Measures and International Security

Explanation of Vote
after the vote

by Stephen Knight
United States of America

on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

L.64 “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties/agreements”

New York, 9 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom and my own country, the United States of America. I would like to explain our vote on resolution L.64, “Strengthening and developing the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties/agreements.”

We voted “yes” because of our deep commitment to the principles contained in the resolution. Yet we cannot leave unsaid the fact that Russia’s sponsorship of this resolution stands in sharp contrast to its history of violating these principles in spirit and deed.

Meaningful arms control decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation by helping manage strategic competition among States. But we should be mindful that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners. The value of any agreement is derived from treaty partners who comply with their obligations, and avoid actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation.

In the arms control and disarmament sphere, Moscow continues to violate its obligations, undermining trust that States can place in Russia as a treaty partner, including with respect to treaties that have served global security interests for years.

The use of a chemical weapon in the poisoning of Alexey Navalny – which comes only two years after a similar shocking use of a chemical weapon in the UK – is an intolerable and reprehensible act – and one that the United States, United Kingdom, and all responsible nations have condemned in the strongest possible terms. We reiterate that any use of chemical weapons, anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable and contravenes the international norms and standards against such use. Russia also continues to undertake destabilizing cyber operations like the one against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in an attempt to undermine the institution established to uphold the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Despite sustained efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons, today's deteriorated international security environment is impeding nuclear disarmament efforts.

Many of Russia's actions to build-up its nuclear arsenal are unconstrained by the current arms control architecture, and have deepened the deficit of trust between Russia and the international community. Russia is upgrading and diversifying its nuclear weapons capabilities, and its total nuclear stockpile is likely to grow over the next decade, fed by the massive increase in mid-range theater systems, and novel strategic nuclear delivery systems. These novel systems, which include an intercontinental-range, nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable underwater drone and an intercontinental-range, nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile are threats to regional and global security. These systems are doomsday devices antithetical to the principles of the resolution Russia sponsored.

The value of any agreement is derived from treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation. Unfortunately, Russia's repeated failures to uphold its obligations across numerous treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the treaty on Open Skies have undermined the integrity of arms control.

Done correctly, arms control can help manage and stabilize strategic relationships and promote greater transparency and predictability. We invite the Russians to live up to the principles contained in L.64 and practice what they preach.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Cluster 5 – Regional disarmament and security

The United States of America – Explanation of Position

Written submission

L.15, “Relationship between disarmament and development.”

L.27, “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms.”

New York, November 10, 2020

The United States of America submits this Explanation of Position on two resolutions in Cluster 5 – L.15, “Relationship between disarmament and development” and L.27, “Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms.”

The United States did not participate in the Committee’s action on either draft resolution.

The United States believes that disarmament and development are two distinct issues. Accordingly, we do not consider ourselves bound by the Final Document of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development that was adopted in September of 1987.

Similarly, the United States sees no direct connection, as stated in L.27, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control and does not consider this matter germane to the First Committee. The United States operates under stringent domestic environmental impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

**The United States of America
Explanation of Vote**

L.1, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”

**Submitted in Writing
10 November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

The United States continues to support the overarching objective of this resolution, namely the long-term goal of creating a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems alongside a comprehensive and durable regional peace. We also continue to endorse a number of key elements of the resolution, including its recognition of the practical need to build confidence and consensus among the regional states, its acknowledgment of the relevance of regional security concerns to any serious arms control efforts, and its emphasis on the need for direct dialogue to resolve contentious issues.

Unfortunately, however, my delegation cannot support this resolution while turning a blind eye to separate efforts by its sponsors, in cooperation with other regional states, to advance initiatives that run contrary to the cooperative, consensus-based principles that this resolution claims to endorse. We fear that such efforts will continue to set back prospects for inclusive dialogue among all the regional states, which is necessary to achieve progress toward the goal that we all share of a safer and more secure region. We urge the states concerned to abandon such efforts and reengage their regional neighbors in good faith to identify mutually acceptable paths forward that take into account the legitimate security concerns of all parties.

While my delegation will vote “no” on this resolution, we hope to return to consensus once the resolution’s sponsors have adopted a more cooperative, constructive approach to this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**The United States of America
Explanation of Vote**

L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”

**Submitted in Writing
10 November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

As in the past, my delegation will vote “no” on draft resolution L.2, “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” because it inappropriately seeks to single out one regional state, while ignoring the serious nuclear proliferation and regional security challenges currently facing the region today.

Make no mistake, the United States is deeply concerned by the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. As we speak, Iran continues to expand its uranium enrichment activities, even as the IAEA investigates serious safeguards concerns in Iran, including the possible presence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. In Syria, the Assad regime remains in noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for constructing a clandestine plutonium production reactor with North Korean assistance, and continues to obstruct the IAEA’s investigation. In addition, several regional states are pursuing nuclear power programs yet continue to resist international transparency measures and refuse to bring into force an IAEA Additional Protocol.

These are all serious concerns that would merit attention in such a resolution. However, rather than seeking to address actual nuclear proliferation concerns in the region, the sponsors of this longstanding resolution instead continue to criticize one regional state that is in full compliance with its nonproliferation obligations, including under its IAEA safeguards agreement. Such an approach only serves to drive the regional states further apart and to undermine prospects for meaningful dialogue toward our shared goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The unwillingness of certain states to abandon such politically motivated resolutions should prompt us all to question the seriousness and purported inclusivity of regional arms control initiatives trumpeted by the same states.

We urge all of the regional states concerned to refocus their efforts toward direct dialogue and practical steps with their regional neighbors to address nuclear proliferation risks, rather than continuing to pursue anachronistic resolutions that have long been detached from regional security and political realities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States of America

Explanation of Votes in the First Committee on

**Resolutions L.3: “Prevention of an arms race in outer space” and
L.66: “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”**

**Submitted in Writing
10 November 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

Although the U.S. delegation voted against these resolutions, our votes in no way detract from our longstanding support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities.

The U.S. National Space Strategy seeks to foster conducive international environments through bilateral and multilateral engagements. As part of these efforts to strengthen stability in outer space, the United States will continue to pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space.

We have repeatedly noted in this and other fora that clear, practicable and confirmable TCBMs, implemented on a voluntary basis, have the potential to strengthen the safety, stability, and sustainability of outer space activities for all nations.

In particular, the United States continues to note the importance of the consensus report of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities ([A/68/189](#)). We encourage all nations to continue to review and implement, to the greatest extent practicable, the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the 2013 GGE report, through the relevant national mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with their national interests.

However, our support for voluntary guidelines for the safe and responsible use of space and other transparency and confidence building measures ends when such efforts are tied to proposals for legally binding space arms control constraints and limitations.

The United States voted “no” on these two resolutions because it believes they make an unacceptable linkage between proposals for voluntary, pragmatic TCBMs and the commencement of futile negotiations a fundamentally flawed arms control proposals. In particular, we note the resolutions’ references to Russia’s and China’s draft treaty proposal introduced in 2014 at the Conference on Disarmament, which the United States opposes. Our most recent critique of their space arms control treaty is in [CD/2129](#) of August 2018.

Mr. Chairman, the United States would prefer that the space domain remain free of conflict. But as the United States has repeatedly noted, both China and Russia have been aggressively developing and deploying technologies that have transformed space into a warfighting domain. Therefore, hollow and hypocritical efforts such as PPWT that cannot be confirmed or verified by the international community are not the answer.

Despite this disappointment, the United States will seek to continue to support practical implementation of space TCBMs by Member States and the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system. We also will continue to take a leading role in substantive discussions on space TCBMs at the Conference on Disarmament, UN Disarmament Commission and other appropriate fora.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cluster 7 – Disarmament Machinery

United States

Explanation of Vote In writing

L.7, “Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons: Report of the Conference on Disarmament”

New York, 10 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

I take the floor to explain the vote of the United States on L.7, “Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons: Report of the Conference on Disarmament.”

The United States believes the international community should focus on the very real problem of the proliferation of *known* weapons of mass destruction, both by states that willfully violate their obligations under treaties and by non-state actors. In the 66 years since the 1948 definition of WMDs was written, no new types of WMD have

appeared. The notion of new types of WMDs beyond chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear remains entirely hypothetical.

No useful purpose is served by diverting the attention of the international community away from existing threats, so the United States has voted against L.7.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The United States of America
Explanation of Vote

L.8 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security
(agenda item 98)
9 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation intends to vote “no” on draft resolution L.8 “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” because we believe this is a needlessly divisive proposal at a time when most member states are working in good faith to make progress in a consensus manner via the ongoing OEWG and GGE processes.

This attempt by Russia, the resolution’s drafter, to make irrelevant the ongoing OEWG they themselves proposed two years ago is an affront to all UN member states who are actively participating in that group, which was mandated to develop consensus recommendations on future institutional dialogue on cybersecurity, among other issues. The drafter of this resolution held no open consultations on this text, nor did it consult with all UN regional groups. The drafter wants to be seen as a leader on these issues and it pays lip service to inclusive consensus processes. But its true objective is to pursue at all costs an affirmation of its authoritarian model for cyberspace and, in the process, destroy two decades’ worth of consensus-driven work that was welcomed by the international community in order. The drafter is attempting to turn the OEWG mechanism, and the UNGA First Committee resolutions on cybersecurity, into a Trojan horse for its own parochial interests.

The United States has been an active participant in the OEWG and GGE processes. Until this year’s First Committee negotiations, we were hopeful that these processes would reach consensus on useful recommendations, and enable us to reorient back to a consensus approach. If this resolution passes, it is hard to envision the United Nations operating on a consensus basis to achieve any meaningful new results on these issues for years to come, which is fundamentally detrimental to the achievement of international cyber stability.

The United States aligns itself with the many member states who seek to return to a consensus-based process on cybersecurity within UNGA 1C, and we reflected that objective in our cyber resolution this year. In contrast, if this resolution is passed, it will cement for five years the division and controversy on cyber issues about which so many member states have expressed frustration.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**2020 UN First Committee
U.S. Explanation of Vote (Delivered in Writing)**

L. 26 Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (agenda item 103 (1))

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation abstained on draft resolution, L.26, “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.” We consider this resolution applicable only to States Parties to this Convention, in particular, we are referring to the part of the resolution stressing the importance of the Convention’s full and effective implementation.

The United States is not a Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction nor does it intend to become one. Landmines, including anti-personnel landmines (APL), remain a vital tool in conventional warfare that the U.S. military cannot responsibly forgo, particularly when faced with the risk of being overwhelmed by enemy forces in the early stages of combat.

On January 31, 2020, the United States announced a new U.S. landmine policy that will be overseen by the Department of Defense. This new policy allows planning for and use of landmines, including APL, in future potential conflicts, including outside the Korean Peninsula, while continuing the Department’s commitment not to employ “persistent” landmines (that is, landmines that do not incorporate self-destruction mechanisms and self-deactivation features). Under this policy, U.S. Combatant Commanders may authorize the use of non-persistent landmines when necessary for mission success in major contingencies or other exceptional circumstances. Moreover, if combatant commanders authorize the use of landmines in such situations, such use will include self-destruction and self-deactivation safeguards that will prevent landmines from posing a risk to civilians, including after a conflict ends.

The United States remains committed to working to minimize risks to civilians posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war. The United States also remains fully committed to complying with its treaty obligations regarding landmines and explosive remnants of war, as contained in Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, annexed to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. In addition, the United States will continue to lead in international humanitarian demining and clearance efforts that locate and remove landmines and explosive remnants of war that pose persistent risks to civilians living in current and former conflict areas around the world.

**The United States of America
Explanation of Vote**

L.37 - “Fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research”

Submitted in Writing
10 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

The United States wishes to explain its decision to vote “no” on OP8 in this resolution and abstain on the document as a whole.

As indicated during the consultations process, the United States is unable to support an “invitation” from the General Assembly to the UN Secretary General to submit a proposal for an increase in the budget subvention to UNIDIR. Let us be clear – this is not an anti-UNIDIR vote. Instead, it reflects broader U.S. policy regarding UN budget issues. The United States supports UNIDIR in its role as an autonomous institution that, through its research, analysis, and activities, contributes to progress in disarmament and ultimately to a safer world. For example, the United States has contributed to UNIDIR’s efforts in organizing discussions and conferences on

space and cyber security. We also commend Director Renata Dwan's efforts to revitalize and reform UNIDIR and support efforts aimed at establishing a reformed funding structure and operating model for the Institute.

The United States, however, continues to firmly believe that the UN regular budget should not be the fallback option for entities that are having difficulty attracting funding from other sources. We are committed to containing costs at the United Nations – not increasing them. UNIDIR's budget should continue to be based on voluntary contributions, which were the original conditions under which UNIDIR was established. Further, an increase in the Institute's subvention from the regular budget would do little, if anything, to ensure the Institute maintains its independence, relevance, and influence into the future. That can only be achieved through the delivery of credible and relevant research that is valued by member states and potential donors.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

2020 UN First Committee

U.S. Explanation of Vote (Delivered in Writing)

L. 43 Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (agenda item 103.11)

Mr. Chairman,

My delegation abstained on draft resolution, L.43, "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions." The United States is not a Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, nor does it intend to become one. The United States also does not accept that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm or prohibition in customary international law on the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict.

Mr. Chairman, it remains the strong U.S. view that when used in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL), cluster munitions provide an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including massed formations of enemy forces, and, the use of cluster munitions, in certain circumstances, can result in less collateral damage than the use of other weapons, including high-explosive, unitary weapons. Trying to minimize collateral damage during military operations is an integral part of implementing IHL, and having the right mix of weapons and tactics for the situation is a very practical and important matter for professional militaries that must decide how best to accomplish the mission at hand while respecting international obligations. Thus, cluster munitions remain an integral part of U.S. defense capabilities.

The United States is committed to reducing the risks posed to civilians and civilian objects from the use of all weapons, including cluster munitions. The U.S. Department of Defense's cluster munitions policy is a central part of U.S. efforts to achieve these important objectives.

Thank you.

2020 UN First Committee

L. 44 – The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects

Explanation of Vote – *After the Vote*

Delivered by Stephen Knight

United States of America

Mr. Chairman,

The United States has repeated continuously at every meeting related to the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) for the last 19 years that the issue of ammunition is outside the scope of the PoA. In fact, the inclusion of ammunition did not achieve consensus in 2001, and the United States voted against the inclusion of ammunition in the Outcome Document of Third Review Conference in June 2018.

We strongly and unequivocally opposed the inclusion of ammunition language in the final Outcome Document of the Third Review Conference. As such, we cannot accept language in PP7 of this resolution that characterizes the outcome of the Review Conference as an unqualified success, when consensus on two Outcome Document paragraphs on a highly controversial issue clearly was not achieved. We proposed compromise language that would have allowed us to join consensus on this important resolution, but that language was ultimately not accepted.

Thank you.

**U.S. EXPLANATIONS OF VOTE
BEFORE THE VOTES**

ON:

L.48, “2021 session of the Disarmament Commission,” sponsored by Russia

AND:

L.79, Russian Hostile Amendments to L.49, “Disarmament Commission,” sponsored by Australia

Mr. Chairman,

The United States will vote “no” on L.48, titled “2021 session of the Disarmament Commission. Likewise, my delegation will vote “no” on all paragraph votes called on this typical process foul maneuver by the Russian Federation. It is entirely inappropriate for Russia to be raising visa issues in the First Committee. Russia knows well that the proper place to discuss this issue is the Host Country Committee. We will also vote “no” on Russia’s hostile amendments, contained in L.79, to Australia’s legitimate UNDC draft procedural decision contained in L.49. We urge all other delegations to vote “no” on L.48, and L.79 as well.

Just recently, Russia joined consensus on recommendations adopted by the Host Country Committee addressing visa issues. Thus, this matter is already being addressed in the Committee with jurisdiction. It does not belong here, and the First Committee should not adopt any resolution or decision on visas.

The Host Committee is the competent authority to deal with visas. The First Committee, as a Main Committee of the General Assembly, has a completely different mandate. Namely, to address disarmament and international security. Similarly, the UN Disarmament Commission has nothing to do with visas. As its name implies, it is the DISARMAMENT Commission, not the VISAS commission.

Injecting this non-germane matter into the work of the First Committee and Disarmament Commission unhelpfully distracts from and dilutes the disarmament discourse in both of these bodies, where we need more focus and more time to address the disarmament challenges before us.

This is especially true for the Disarmament Commission, the work of which has been particularly impeded for reasons completely unrelated to its consensus-based agenda, to include, this year, because of COVID-19.

As a result, the UNDC, unfortunately, is ailing. Russia’s draft procedural decision, L.48, preys upon this important body even further, and won’t make it any healthier moving forward. By contrast, Australia, the last duly elected Chair of the Commission, has rightfully introduced draft procedural decision L.49. Unlike Russia’s L.48, Australia’s L.49 shepherds the UNDC forward in a clear and straightforward way. It tries to give the Commission a chance, next year, to get back to work, unburdened with baggage it has neither the remit nor the remedy to resolve. To make matters even worse, Russia now has decided, in the 11th hour, to attack and undermine the regular order even further, by introducing L.79, its hostile amendments to Australia’s L.49. Like L.48, L.79’s goal is to grind a political ax and hold the UNDC hostage in the process. Neither measure has anything to do with disarmament, about which Russia cares not at all, as its nuclear build-up and non-compliance record demonstrates.

Mr. Chairman, to be clear, the visa issue is important, which is why it is being appropriately addressed elsewhere. Let’s support Australia’s L.49 instead of Russia’s L.48. Let’s reject L.79 as well, Russia’s hostile amendments to L.49. Australia’s L.49 represents the reasonable, responsible way forward for all Member States who continue to value the integrity of the UN’s existing multilateral disarmament machinery. By contrast, L.48 and L.79 do not. We urge all delegations to vote “no” as a whole on both of these drafts, and any associated paragraph votes.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cluster 1 – Nuclear Weapons

L.58, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Explanation of Vote, *After the Vote***By Stephen Knight**
The United States of America

New York, October 27, 2020

Mr. Chairman, I take the floor to explain the U.S. decision to vote “NO” on L.58, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The principles behind the CTBT are sound and reflect the broad consensus of the international community on nonproliferation and disarmament. However, the United States cannot support a resolution calling for entry into force of this treaty in its current form. Even if this treaty were in force, it would constrain the actions of responsible states like the United States, United Kingdom, and France. At the same time, malign actors like Russia and China – both serial violators of other treaties related to weapons of mass destruction – could potentially violate the CTBT without detection by secretly conducting nuclear explosive tests. Such clandestine nuclear testing activity could help Russia improve its nuclear weapons designs and capabilities and provide support to China’s secretive effort to at least double its nuclear weapons arsenal over the next few years.

As set forth in the United States’ annual compliance report, Russia has conducted nuclear weapons experiments that have created nuclear yield. Moreover, as the international community reacted with horror in August 2019 to the disaster related to the destabilizing and environmentally calamitous “Skyfall” nuclear-powered cruise missile, Russia abandoned principles of transparency in the wake of that disaster when its nearby International Monitoring System stations stopped transmitting data to the International Data Center. Additionally, China’s conduct also raises concerns regarding its adherence to the “zero yield” standard adhered to by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in their respective nuclear weapons testing moratoria. Unfortunately, this resolution fails to call out the non-transparent and irresponsible nuclear testing activities of Russia and China, and we would encourage others to seek clarification from Russia and China on what these activities entail and precisely how each country defines the scope of its nuclear explosive testing moratorium – specifically, whether each country’s moratorium prohibits all supercritical nuclear tests or experiments.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) highlights that, although the United States will not become a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, it will continue to support the CTBTO Preparatory Commission as well as the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre. In addition, the NPR reaffirms that the United States will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to ensure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear testing. I will note that the United States continues to abide by the “zero yield” nuclear testing moratorium it has observed since conducting its last nuclear explosive test in 1992.

Thank you Mr. Chairman

The United States of America
Explanation of Vote in the First Committee onL.63: “Further Practical Measures for the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space,” Agenda item 101 (c)
10 November 2020

In the view of the United States, while this decision only proposes to keep this item on the Agenda for the 76th Session of the General Assembly in 2021, the associated resolution has a long history of making unacceptable references to the fundamentally-flawed and hypocritical draft “Treaty on the Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT). We have long opposed negotiating a legally-binding agreement based on this Russian and Chinese draft at the Conference on Disarmament because of our fundamental concerns with the PPWT.

The draft PPWT would not effectively prohibit the development of the threats to outer space systems today, including terrestrially-based and orbital anti-satellite weapons. As the U.S. delegation has noted to this Committee, the drafters of PPWT are developing capabilities that are designed to attack satellites in space – the very thing that they claim to seek to prohibit.

The draft PPWT also fails to resolve definitional problems of what constitutes a “weapon in outer space,” given the dual-use nature of many space technologies. Furthermore, the draft PPWT fails to address the challenge of creating an effective verification regime.

The United States would prefer that the space domain remain free of conflict. To that end, the United States participated constructively in the PAROS GGE to guide discussions on space security towards more practicable and productive approaches. We will continue to work with other UN Member States in order to strengthen the safety, stability, security, and sustainability of outer space activities.

However, as Vice President Mike Pence has noted, “both China and Russia have been aggressively developing and deploying technologies that have transformed space into a warfighting domain.” Therefore, such a hollow and hypocritical effort as the draft PPWT, which cannot be confirmed or verified by the international community, is not a practical measure and is not the answer.

The United States of America Explanation of Vote

L.65 – United Nations Secretary General’s Mechanism (UNSGM) for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (agenda item 103)

10 November 2020

Mr. Chairman,

Like most every member state represented in this room, the United States places great value on preserving the integrity and independence of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism (UNSGM) for investigating the alleged use of chemical, biological, or toxin weapons.

Created by the UN General Assembly in 1987 in response to the horrors of chemical weapons use in the Middle East, the importance of preserving a strong, independent international capability to investigate alleged use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) attacks has been reinforced more recently by a deeply troubling series of chemical weapons (CW) attacks in Iraq, Syria, Malaysia, the United Kingdom, and Russia. It is also worth noting the efforts by some countries to obstruct international investigations of these attacks. That is why my government can only view as deeply regrettable Russia’s efforts to pursue this draft resolution.

From the beginning, it has been clear that Russia’s intention has not been to strengthen the UNSGM, but to undermine it, and by extension the work of the OPCW. Whether it is trying to place the UNSGM under the authority of the UN Security Council, where Moscow could veto any investigation, or by casting doubt on the integrity of the mechanism’s guidelines and procedures by pushing an unneeded, wasteful review process that would seize responsibilities long assigned to the Secretary-General and place them in an overtly political framework designed to end in gridlock and politicization.

Fortunately, delegations from all regions refused to accept Russia’s blatant attack on this vital tool for enhancing international peace and security. They have pushed back, persistently raising questions and concerns. And in the process, many – though not all – of the damaging elements in this resolution were removed or rendered ineffective.

Nevertheless, this resolution remains deeply flawed. It scarcely resembles what a proper resolution seeking to enhance the UNSGM would actually look like.

Most significantly, through the arbitrary cherry picking of language from certain UNSC decisions and BWC reports, the draft Russian resolution continues to send a confusing, muddled message about the proposed role of the UNSC, particularly as it relates to addressing the possible use of biological and toxic weapons.

Just last week, the Russian delegation chose to make things worse, adding deeply troubling language into the operative section (**OP4**) that clearly implies that any BWC States Party that wishes to report possible BW use to the UN Secretary-General must go through the Security Council, where – again – Russia can veto any investigation. This, of course, would be contrary to the very purpose of the UNSGM to enable any UN Member State to seek an investigation. There has never been a requirement for the Security Council to approve a UNSGM investigation, and there never ought to be.

This language threatens both the fundamental independence and the universal nature of the UNSGM. And if left unaddressed, we should expect those who oppose a viable and independent UNSGM to leverage that language, using distorted, self-serving interpretations to throw up roadblocks for possible investigations into alleged BW use.

Then there is Russia's decision to add, very late in the consultation process, deliberately divisive language calling for the resumption of negotiations on a BWC verification protocol (**PP8**). The United States understands and respects that governments hold different views about the merits and viability of a BWC verification protocol, but this language has no place in this resolution.

It is clear that including the language, which is not relevant to the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism, is deliberately provocative. Russia incorporated this text knowing that it would make consensus on the resolution impossible. Coming after repeatedly denying proposed additions by many delegations of far greater relevance to this resolution, based on the argument they were too "political" or "divisive," Russia's inclusion of this text on a highly contentious BWC matter is breathtaking in its hypocrisy. Having been forced to retreat on so many fronts in this resolution, Moscow decided to plant a booby trap to perpetuate the politicized mess we now find ourselves in.

Furthermore, it is the prerogative of BWC States Parties, not the General Assembly, to act on the Convention. Indeed, the language ignores many other constructive ideas and proposals put forward by BWC States Parties that have far greater chance of achieving consensus.

For these reasons, the United States will vote "no" on this resolution and those elements we view as the most problematic, especially PP8 and OP4.

We strongly encourage other delegations that value maintaining a strong, independent UNSGM, along with preserving the integrity of the UNFC resolution process, to join us in this regard.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Explanation of Vote – L.70, "Missiles"
Explanation of Vote Before the Vote
Delivered by Stephen Knight
On behalf of the United States of America
 October 27, 2020

Mr. Chairman,

The United States has traditionally not participated in action on this decision. However we can no longer remain silent. For Iran to attempt to assert leadership regarding the issue of preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles is the height of hypocrisy. Given Iran's longstanding and deeply troubling record of ballistic missile development and proliferation, in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, it is disappointing that

any countries would make common cause with Tehran on L.70. The United States takes note of those who have decided to do so.

For this reason, my delegation will vote “no” on draft decision L.70. We urge all responsible states to join the United States in voting against this hypocritical decision.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

URUGUAY**Cluster 5: Other Disarmament Measures and International Security****Written explanation of vote after de Vote
on behalf of Uruguay
November 9th, 2020.**

Mr. Chairman,

Regarding the draft resolutions voted in the First Committee, proposed by the United States of America (L.4) and the Russian Federation (L.8/Rev.1) on Cybersecurity and referred to the continuation of the work of the GGE and the OEWG, the delegation of Uruguay has voted affirmatively for both, since it is understood that they contain valuable elements that bet on the continuation of the work.

Uruguay also understands that it is essential to take, as a starting point, the degree of progress in the work and conclusions that both groups can reach. The GGE on Responsible behavior of States in cyberspace, of which Uruguay is part of, has worked on previous GGE reports on the matter since 2010, and has issued a final draft report in which an additional interpretation is consigned to the non-binding rules that should guide the behavior of States in cyberspace.

The report also refers to the importance of regional organizations and sub regional organizations in the development of specific concepts and mechanisms for each region.

It also underlines the importance of involving other actors in the debates, in particular the private sector and academia.

In this sense, it is understood that a future Action Program could be based on these non-binding rules already approved and examined by the GGE, that can develop within the framework of a possible new open-ended working group to function between 2021 and 2025, as the one proposed by Russia which is focused on materializing the action program, in case of being agreed by the States.

Uruguay also records and becomes aware of a work dynamic proposed by France as well as an important group of Member States during the last stage of the OEWG who try to combine and consolidate elements of the GGE and the current OEWG.

The new group would have the OEWG format, which gives more flexibility and offers the advantage of giving equal opportunities for participation to all Member States, although this time they are taking into account the contributions of state and non-state sectors specialized in the thematic.

We believe that all proposals are interesting and compatible.

We continue to vote on draft resolutions that propose divergent paths instead of convergent. We trusted that the pandemic we have been experiencing for months, would encourage us to work in a spirit of greater collaboration, but unfortunately, we see that it is not so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Section IV

Written submissions in exercise of the right of reply

1. Argentina
2. Azerbaijan
3. Bangladesh
4. Cuba
5. Democratic People's Republic of Korea
6. Germany (on behalf of the United Kingdom and Germany)
7. Iran (Islamic Republic of)
8. Japan
9. Russian Federation
10. Turkey
11. United Kingdom
12. United States
13. Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

**ARGENTINA'S WRITTEN STATEMENT IN EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF REPLY TO THE WRITTEN
STATEMENT PRESENTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN
IRELAND UNDER THE
"CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS" CLUSTER**

NEW YORK, 6 NOVEMBER 2020

La Argentina desea reiterar la situación particular en la que se encuentra el territorio argentino de las Islas Malvinas, conforme al contenido de la declaración interpretativa que la República Argentina formuló en el momento de la ratificación de la "Convención de Ottawa" el 14 de septiembre de 1999, que hasta el presente no se ha visto modificada y que constituye el fundamento principal de la prórroga otorgada a Argentina para el cumplimiento de lo dispuesto en el artículo 5.

La única parte del territorio argentino que se encuentra afectada por minas antipersonal son las Islas Malvinas. Pero la Argentina se ve impedida de acceder a dichas minas a fin de dar cumplimiento a las obligaciones asumidas en virtud de la Convención, ya que dicho territorio, junto con las Islas Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos circundantes, se hallan ilegalmente ocupadas por el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte y son objeto de una disputa de soberanía. En efecto, la Asamblea General ha reconocido la existencia de tal disputa de soberanía, y ha exhortado a ambos Gobiernos a reanudar negociaciones a fin de encontrarle lo antes posible una solución pacífica y definitiva.

En igual sentido se ha manifestado el Comité Especial de Descolonización, que adopta anualmente una resolución que expresa que se debe poner fin a esta situación colonial especial y particular de forma pacífica y negociada, y solicita a ambos Gobiernos que reanuden las negociaciones a tal fin.

Sin embargo, a pesar de los reiterados pronunciamientos de las Naciones Unidas y otro foros regionales e internacionales, el Reino Unido continua desconociendo los llamamientos de la comunidad internacional sobre la reanudación de las negociaciones bilaterales destinadas a encontrar una solución pacífica y definitiva a la disputa de soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sandwich del Sur, y los espacios marítimos circundantes.

En ocasión de su solicitud de prórroga, el 1° de octubre de 2009 la Argentina presentó un plan esquemático para implementar el artículo 5 de la Convención en las áreas en disputa durante los 10 años de la prórroga, para el caso de que las negociaciones de soberanía entre la República Argentina y el Reino Unido se reanudaran y, en ese marco, alcanzaran un acuerdo sobre la limpieza de minas anti-personales, incluyendo municiones sin explotar.

En marzo de 2019, la Argentina solicitó una extensión de dicha prórroga por el período comprendido entre el 1 de marzo de 2020 (fecha en la que se cumple el plazo máximo para la República Argentina en virtud del Artículo 5 de la Convención), y el 1 de marzo de 2023. En ese contexto, se propuso al Reino Unido realizar en forma conjunta, bajo fórmula de soberanía, y con fines estrictamente humanitarios, el desminado de las Islas Malvinas.

La República Argentina reafirma sus derechos de soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur, Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos circundantes, que son parte integrante de su territorio nacional.

Argentina wishes to reiterate the unique situation of the Argentine territory of the Malvinas Islands, in accordance with the content of the interpretative declaration issued by the Argentine Republic during its ratification of the Ottawa Convention, on 14 September 1999. To date, that declaration has not been modified and constitutes the basic foundation of the extension granted to my country to fulfill the provisions of article 5 of the Convention.

The only parts of Argentine territory affected by anti-personnel mines are the Malvinas Islands. However, Argentina is prevented from accessing those mines in order to comply with its obligations assumed under the Convention, as that territory, together with the South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, are illegally occupied by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and are the subject of a sovereignty dispute. Indeed, the General Assembly has recognized the existence of that sovereignty dispute and has urged both Governments to resume negotiations to find a peaceful and definitive solution as soon as possible.

In that same vein, the Special Committee on Decolonization annually adopts a draft resolution stating that this special and particular colonial situation must end in a peaceful and negotiated manner, and requests both Governments to resume negotiations to that end.

However, despite the reiterated declarations of the United Nations and other regional and international forums, the United Kingdom continues to ignore the calls of the international community to resume bilateral negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful and definitive solution to the sovereignty dispute over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas.

Following its request for an extension on 1 October 2009, Argentina presented an outline plan to implement article 5 of the Ottawa Convention in the disputed areas over 10 years, on the basis that sovereignty negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic resume and that, in that framework, both parties reach an agreement on clearing anti-personnel mines, including unexploded ordnance.

In March 2019, Argentina requested for an additional extension for the period between 1st March 2020 when the extension granted to Argentina in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention ends) and 1st May 2023. In this context, it was proposed to the United Kingdom to undertake joint demining activities in the Malvinas Islands, under sovereignty safeguard and with strictly humanitarian purposes.

The Argentine Republic reaffirms its sovereign right over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which are an integral part of its national territory

**ARGENTINA'S WRITTEN STATEMENT IN EXERCISE OF THE SECOND RIGHT OF REPLY TO
THE WRITTEN STATEMENT PRESENTED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND UNDER THE
"CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS" CLUSTER**

NEW YORK, 10 NOVEMBER 2020

La Argentina desea formular las siguientes consideraciones en ejercicio de su derecho a réplica a la respuesta escrita del Reino Unido sobre el conjunto de temas 4 (Armas Pequeñas) en relación con la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas.

La Delegación argentina reitera en todos los términos el discurso del Presidente de la República Argentina ante la Asamblea General del 22 de septiembre de 2020.

El Gobierno argentino recuerda que las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos circundantes son parte integrante del territorio nacional argentino y que, estando ilegalmente ocupadas por el Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte, son objeto de una disputa de soberanía entre ambos países, la cual es reconocida por diversas organizaciones internacionales.

La ocupación ilegal que ejerce el Reino Unido llevó a la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas a adoptar las resoluciones [2065 \(XX\)](#), [3160 \(XXVIII\)](#), [31/49](#), [37/9](#), [38/12](#), [39/6](#), [40/21](#), [41/40](#), [42/19](#) y [43/25](#), las cuales reconocen la existencia de la disputa de soberanía a que hace referencia la 'Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas' e instan a los gobiernos de la República Argentina y del Reino Unido a reanudar las negociaciones a fin de encontrar a la mayor brevedad posible una solución pacífica y duradera de la disputa. Por su parte, el Comité Especial de Descolonización se ha pronunciado reiteradamente en igual sentido, más recientemente a través de la resolución contenida en el informe correspondiente al presente año ([A/75/23](#)). Asimismo, la Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos adoptó, el 21 de octubre de 2020, un nuevo pronunciamiento sobre la cuestión en términos similares.

La Argentina reitera que el principio de la libre determinación de los pueblos –elemento en que el Reino Unido funda su negativa a reanudar las negociaciones de soberanía – resulta inaplicable a la controversia entre los dos países sobre la soberanía de las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur, y los espacios marítimos circundantes, de conformidad con las resoluciones de la Asamblea General y del Comité Especial de Descolonización.

La República Argentina, en coincidencia con lo señalado, entre otros, por los países de nuestra región, representados por diversos grupos, reitera que la votación que tuvo lugar en las Islas Malvinas es un simple acto unilateral británico, sin ningún tipo de valor jurídico, por lo que en nada altera la naturaleza de la Cuestión Malvinas, no pone fin a la disputa de soberanía, ni afecta los legítimos derechos argentinos.

En efecto, en su reciente Opinión Consultiva sobre las consecuencias jurídicas de la separación del archipiélago de Chagos de Mauricio en 1965, la Corte Internacional de Justicia indicó que es potestad de la Asamblea General pronunciarse respecto de las modalidades de la expresión libre y auténtica de un TNA, allí donde correspondiera, incluyendo la formulación de preguntas sometidas a consulta. En consecuencia, la realización de un “referéndum” que no cuente con su aprobación carece de valor jurídico.

Prueba de ello es que dicha votación no modificó el desarrollo de las sesiones del Comité Especial de Descolonización celebradas desde aquella fecha, en las que continuaron aprobándose por consenso resoluciones sobre la Cuestión de las Islas Malvinas, en los términos habituales.

La solución a la disputa de soberanía no depende del resultado de una votación en el que ciudadanos británicos se manifiesten sobre su deseo de seguir siendo británicos. Permitir que los ciudadanos británicos de las islas se constituyan en árbitro de una disputa de la que su propio país es parte, distorsiona el derecho a la libre determinación de los pueblos, ya que no existe en la Cuestión Malvinas un “pueblo”, en el sentido del derecho internacional.

La Argentina recuerda que los intereses de los habitantes de las Islas Malvinas y su modo de vida están adecuadamente tutelados por las resoluciones pertinentes de la Asamblea General así como también por la Constitución de la República Argentina.

La República Argentina reafirma sus legítimos derechos de soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur y los espacios marítimos circundantes, que son parte integrante del territorio nacional argentino.”

Non- official translation

The Argentine Delegation would like to submit the following considerations in exercise of the right to reply to the written response of the the United Kingdom on cluster items 4 (Conventional Weapons) with regards to the question of the Malvinas Islands.

The Argentine Delegation reiterates in all its terms the statements made by the President of Argentina before this General Assembly on 22 September 2020.

The Argentine government recalls that the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas are an integral part of the Argentine national territory that, being illegally occupied by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are subject to a sovereignty dispute between both countries which is recognized by several international organizations.

The illegal occupation exercised by the United Kingdom led the United Nations General Assembly to adopt resolutions [2065 \(XX\)](#), [3160 \(XXVIII\)](#), [31/49](#), [37/9](#), [38/12](#), [39/6](#), [40/21](#), [41/40](#), [42/19](#) & [43/25](#), all of which recognize the existence of the sovereignty dispute referred to as the “question of the Malvinas Islands” and call upon the government of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom to resume negotiations in order to find a peaceful and lasting solution to the dispute as soon as possible. Moreover, the Special Committee on Decolonization has expressed in the same sense on repeated occasions, most recently through the resolution included in the report of its work of the current year ([A/75/23](#)). In addition, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States adopted a new pronouncement on the question in similar terms on 21 October 2020.

Argentina reiterates that the principle of self-determination of peoples – element alleged by the United Kingdom to refuse resuming sovereignty negotiations – is not applicable to the controversy between the two countries over the sovereignty of the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on Decolonization.

As it has also been expressed, among others, by countries of our region represented by different groups, the Argentine Republic reiterates that the vote which took place in the Malvinas Islands is a simple British unilateral act, without legal value, which doesn’t alter in any way the nature of the question of the Malvinas Islands, does not put an end to the sovereignty dispute and does not affect the Argentine legitimate rights.

In fact, in its recent Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, the International Court of Justice pointed out that it is under the power of the General Assembly to determine the modalities for a free and authentic expression of a Non-Self-Governing-Territory, where appropriate, including the formulation of the questions subject to a consultation of the population. In consequence, conducting a “referendum” without the approval of the General Assembly lacks any legal value.

Evidence of this is that the vote has not altered the development of the meetings of the Special Committee held since then, during which resolutions on the question of the Malvinas Islands has been approved by consensus in the usual terms.

The settlement to the sovereignty dispute doesn’t depend on the outcome of a vote in which British citizens express on their wish to continue being British. Allowing that the British citizens of the Islands become the arbitrator of a dispute to which their own country is a party, distorts the right to self-determination of peoples, because in the question of the Malvinas Islands there is no people in the terms of international law.

Argentina recalls that the interest of the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands and its lifestyle are adequately protected by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and by the Argentine Constitution.

The Argentine Republic reaffirms its legitimate sovereignty rights over the Malvinas, South Georgias and South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas, which are an integral part of the Argentine national territory.

**Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, the Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
New York, 12 October 2020**

right of reply

Mr. Chair,

My Delegation would like to exercise its right of reply in connection with the issue on outbreak of the hostilities in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan since 27 September, raised earlier today. While comprehensive statement on the matter in reference will be delivered by the Delegation of Azerbaijan in the course of current general debate, we would like to offer following remarks in response to the intervention by the Delegation of Armenia.

The groundless and fabricated arguments presented by the delegation of Armenia in this august body is no longer come as surprise. All attempts of this country to deny the facts that points to its policy of aggression, hatred and falsification are nothing but vain endeavour, especially in light of the current hostilities committed by Armenia against Azerbaijan and its civilian population.

It has been unanimously recognized by the international community through the UN Security Council resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of 1993 that acts committed by Armenia against Azerbaijan constitutes unlawful use of force and occupation. These documents confirm that Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan, condemn the use of force against Azerbaijan and demand the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forces of Armenia from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.

The occupying state in effective control of these territories for years concealed its military potential from relevant regional arms control and verification mechanisms, engaged in massive military build-up, transferred and diverted weapons and ammunitions, as well as combat units and conducted military exercises, attended by the president, minister of defence and other high-ranking officials of Armenia.

Accompanied by the deliberate policy of Armenia to derail the peace process, its inflammatory and warmongering statements and consistent provocations on the ground, including the deliberate attacks in April 2016 and July 2020, the incursion of the sabotage-reconnaissance group into the territory of Azerbaijan this August and purposeful actions aimed at changing the demographic, cultural and physical character of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, leaves no doubt that the ultimate goal of Armenia was to consolidate the occupation and achieve the annexation of the territories of Azerbaijan under the cover of cease-fire and peace process. Thus, Armenia's statement on its support for and adherence to the appeal of the United Nations Secretary-General for global ceasefire is nothing other than utter falsehood.

On 27 September 2020, after repeated provocations, the armed forces of Armenia subjected the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the entire frontline and the adjacent populated areas in my country to intensive fire, with the use of large-caliber weapons, artillery and mortars. These attacks have resulted in numerous deaths and injuries among civilians and military.

In response, Azerbaijan has undertaken successful counter-offensive measures, neutralizing Armenian fire and battle positions and liberating the territories of Azerbaijan from the occupation, in the exercise of the right to self-defence. **Azerbaijan acts on its sovereign soil**, and takes adequate and proportionate measures to repulse the imminent threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity and security of its population. Our military objectives are to protect and to prevent further loss of life of innocent Azerbaijani civilians by neutralizing presence of the Armenian armed forces in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and to achieve a sustainable and durable peace in our country and region.

As of 9 October, 16 command posts, 196 tanks, 38 BM-21, 1 "Hurricane", 10 self-propelled artillery units (8 actions, 2 carnations), 36 infantry fighting vehicles, 24 artillery batteries, 2 REM or air defense devices, 2 S-300 launchers, 25 OSA anti-aircraft missile systems, 2 KUB anti-aircraft missile systems, 4 "Repeland" radio equipment obstacle vehicle, 136 cannons, 56 mortars, 1 TOS-1 A firearm, 2 radar stations, 1 "Kalchuga" antenna belonging to the armed forces of Armenia were destroyed. 18 tanks, 4 artillery pieces, 22 infantry fighting vehicles, 12 mortars, 4 UAZ cars, 1 excavator, 27 Igla complexes, 1 Zil and 9 GAZ cars were requisited as a trophy of war.

The very fact of deliberate targeting of civilians and the illegal deployment of such a large number of troops and armaments in the sovereign territory of Azerbaijan indicates that Armenia is the aggressor and that all public pronouncements of Armenia about its alleged adherence to ceasefire and peaceful settlement are nothing other than a hollow rhetoric and smokescreen to camouflage the clear-cut annexationist objectives.

We resolutely reject all baseless allegation by Armenia related to involvement of external parties into the conflict. The armed forces of Azerbaijan are well-equipped, self-sufficient and fully capable of repulsing on their own the ongoing aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan. These allegations of Armenia are a futile and desperate attempt to deviate the attention from heavy losses suffered by the Armenian army and to draw in third parties, including mercenaries and terrorist groups, in order to enlarge the scope of hostilities and reverse the situation on the ground. According to international media reports, thousands of ethnic Armenians from different countries, have already arrived in the conflict zone or in the process of deployment.

The main destabilizing factor in the region is the presence of the Armed Forces of Armenia and military occupation of the territory of Azerbaijan. The sooner Armenia withdraws its armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the earlier the conflict will be resolved and both countries and their people will benefit from the prospects of cooperation and economic development.

Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, the Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
New York, 3 November 2020

right of reply

Mr. Chair,

I thank you, Mr. Chair.

We would like to exercise the right of reply to the statement of the Delegation of Armenia, which is nothing but yet another futile and desperate attempt to divert the attention of the international community of what is happening in the course of the ongoing aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan, as well as from crimes and policy of terror committed against my country and civilian population.

Armenia, as a country with very dire record of compliance with norms and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law and little respect to human life, resorts to shelling residential areas situated far away from the battle zone, resorts to using prohibited cluster munitions and targeting sleeping children with ballistic missiles. The use by Armenia of prohibited cluster munitions has already been recognized by the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch organizations.

Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is a responsible member of the international community and approaches its obligations as the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement in a fair and responsible manner.

The position of the Non-Aligned Movement with regards to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is fully in line with the Bandung principles, founding principles of the Movement, the Charter of the United Nations and relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The UN SC resolutions in reference unanimously recognize that the acts committed by Armenia against Azerbaijan constitutes unlawful use of force and occupation. These documents confirm that the Nagorno-Karabakh is an integral part of Azerbaijan, condemn the use of force against Azerbaijan and demand the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the armed forces of Armenia from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. This principled and strong position of the Movement has been consistent since 2012 Midterm Ministerial meeting in Sharm El-Sheik. In Baku Head of State and Government of 120 Member States of the Movement reconfirmed its position.

Therefore, we strongly reject allegations presented by Armenia against the Movement as groundless and fabricated.

On mercenaries, it has been mentioned on numerous occasions, that the armed forces of Azerbaijan are the only force on the ground and they are well-equipped, self-sufficient and fully capable of repulsing on their own

the ongoing aggression by Armenia against Azerbaijan. Furthermore, unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan has joined the 1989 Convention against the Recruitment, use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries in 1997.

It is Armenia that having exhausted its manpower on the battle field, not only resorts to the use of mercenaries and foreign terrorist fighters, but has recently started to employ children in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan which constitutes yet another act of brutal violation of the norms and principles of international law.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

**Statement by the Delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan
First Committee, the Seventy-Fifth Session of the General Assembly
New York, 6 November 2020**

right of reply

Mr. Chair,

I thank you for giving me the floor to exercise the right of reply in connection with the statement of Armenia, which is the height of hypocrisy.

Since the beginning of the counter-offensive, Azerbaijan has repeatedly stated that Azerbaijan exercises its right to self-defense and acts in full compliance with the international law, including the international humanitarian law. Azerbaijani armed forces neutralize only legitimate military objects in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and do not target civilian population and civilian infrastructure, adhering to the principle of distinction.

Therefore, Azerbaijan fully rejects the groundless accusations of Armenia that fails to provide any evidence proofing to the wrongdoing on the part of Azerbaijan, except for utterly unprofessionally made fake photos and videos.

The sole purpose of the statement of the delegate of Armenia is to misuse this platform and to present distorted reality that no one else believes in. Armenia is tirelessly trying to divert the attention from and to cover up its own crimes and policy of terror against civilians of Azerbaijan.

While there is not enough time to go through all crimes committed by Armenia within the recent act of aggression that started on 27 September, I will specify just few.

On 4 October, 11 October and 17 October 2020 Ganja, the second largest city of Azerbaijan was hit with Smerch multiple-launched rocker system and Scud type ballistic missiles. On 28 November 2020, the city center of Barda was hit with Smerch multiple-launched rocket system containing prohibited cluster munition. The strike on Barda has become the second deliberate attack on this city with cluster munition within the 20 hours.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has emphasized with regards to a rocket attack on the Azerbaijani city of Barda that “[t]he rockets, allegedly fired by Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh, reportedly carried cluster munitions”.

As of 2 November 2020, ANAMA found 1173 bomblets from 9N235 cluster monitions. The use by Armenia of the prohibited weapons has been recently confirmed by reputable international non-governmental organizations.

Amnesty International has stated the following:

“Amnesty International has verified the use of banned cluster bombs by Armenia for the first time in the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, following the attack on the city of Barda in Azerbaijan.”

Human Rights Watch has stated the following:

“Armenian forces either fired or supplied internationally banned cluster munitions and at least one other type of long-range rocket used in an attack on Barda city.”

Armenia has also used prohibited white phosphorus projectiles in Fuzuli and Tartar districts and in the Shusha forests. Some of the unexploded ordnances containing such projectiles were neutralized by ANAMA. The territories where white phosphorus was used belong to Azerbaijan and once, they are fully liberated, forcibly expelled Azerbaijani population will return there. Thus, Azerbaijan is not interested in creating environmental disaster in those territories.

The political and military leadership of Armenia and the agents of the puppet racist regime it has set up in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan bear responsibility for these heinous acts and must be brought to account. The Republic of Azerbaijan calls on international community to strongly condemn the atrocity methods of warfare employed by Armenia, which constitute war crimes under international law and demand justice and accountability.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Right of Reply of Bangladesh on 19 October 2020

Mr. Chair

Bangladesh is taking the floor in exercise of its right of reply in respect to the statement made by Myanmar.

Bangladesh strongly rejects the allegations of Myanmar regarding presence of their terrorist elements inside the territory of Bangladesh. Such claims are totally baseless, false and fabricated, intended solely to divert attention from Myanmar's own failures to fulfill its obligations as a State.

Bangladesh reiterates its policy of zero tolerance against terrorism. We do not allow our territory to be used by any terrorist entity - whatsoever.

Mr. Chair

The truth is, Myanmar, has driven away over a million people from their homes by a terrifying campaign and failed to assure them of minimum safety and security on their return.

Despite Bangladesh's repeated efforts to send forcibly displaced Rohingyas to their homes under the bilateral arrangement of return, not a single one of them volunteered. The Rohingyas continue to carry the trauma caused by the atrocities Myanmar unleashed on them and their families.

It is indeed shameful to see that Myanmar once again claimed that 350 Rohingyas have returned to Myanmar on their own volition. 350 out of 1.1 million in 3 years – which nobody knows about. This dismal figure tells it all.

Mr. Chair,

On the issue of using landmines, we express our utmost dismay at Myanmar's continuous denial of the evidential facts. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission in its report presented to the Third Committee documented use of landmines by both State and non-State actors in Myanmar's Kachin, Shan and Rakhine States since 2011, often with fatal consequences.

In its report the FFM concluded that landmines were planted by the Tatmadaw, both in the border regions as well as within northern Rakhine State, as part of the "clearance operations" with the intended or foreseeable effect of injuring or killing Rohingya civilians fleeing to Bangladesh. Further, new anti-personnel mines were placed in border areas as part of a deliberate and planned strategy of dissuading Rohingya refugees from attempting to return to Myanmar.

Mr. Chair,

A number of international organizations including Amnesty International reported on Myanmar military's use of antipersonnel landmines in areas of Kachin and northern Shan states. The annual '**Landmine Monitor report**' confirmed the presence of landmines in Myanmar's townships stretching almost the entire length of the country, from north to south, as well as in the Rakhine state.

The President of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention had requested the government of Myanmar to consider an independent fact-finding mission with international participation in this matter.

Can Myanmar inform this committee about any engagement on its part with the President of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty?

In a survey conducted by the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Cox's bazar on the causes of deaths of Rohingyas in the course of clearance operation by Tatmadaw, it was found that 2% of the deaths were due to landmine blasts.

After findings from such authoritative and diverse sources, should there be any of doubt?

Mr. Chair

We believe, a plain acknowledgment of the fact by the State Myanmar would be an important first step to demonstrate their genuine for working towards a just and comprehensive solution of the crisis. As a responsible neighbor, we reiterate our call to the Myanmar to take urgent necessary steps to ensure mine clearance, declare a moratorium on the production of landmines, and end civilian casualties.

To conclude Mr. Chair, Bangladesh would like highlight that it is Bangladesh that continues to suffer the consequences of Myanmar's internal acts. We are currently hosting 1.1 million forcibly displaced Rohingyas who fled atrocities in Myanmar. Due to lack of right conditions they are not being able to return.

We reiterate that the Rohingya problem has originated in Myanmar and its solution lies in Myanmar. Myanmar needs to address the root causes of the problem and ensure safe and sustainable return of the Rohingyas without any delay.

I thank you.

**RÉPLICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CUBA.
PRIMERA COMISIÓN. 75 AGNU**

La República de Cuba hace uso de su derecho de réplica en respuesta a la réplica de la delegación de los Estados Unidos. Cuba reafirma las consideraciones que expresó durante los debates de la Primera Comisión. La delegación de los Estados Unidos debería mostrar mayor respeto por este importante foro y dejar de mentir sobre sus falsos compromisos en temas de gran relevancia internacional, como los que discute la Primera Comisión.

Las únicas declaraciones engañosas realizadas durante la Primera Comisión fueron hechas por la delegación de Estados Unidos, quien en vano se esfuerza por ocultar, detrás de críticas infundadas a otras delegaciones, su falta de compromiso e incumplimiento de los acuerdos internacionales en materia de desarme, no proliferación y control de armamentos.

Estados Unidos, único país que ha usado el arma nuclear en dos ocasiones, es el mayor responsable de la erosión del multilateralismo y la arquitectura de desarme y no proliferación. Es el líder mundial en la realización de ensayos nucleares, ha violado sistemáticamente el TNP y los documentos finales de sus Conferencias de Examen. Es responsable del 38 % del gasto militar global, militariza el ciberespacio y el espacio ultraterrestre y moderniza sus arsenales nucleares.

Reiteramos que la decisión del gobierno estadounidense de retirarse del Acuerdo Nuclear con Irán y del Tratado sobre Misiles de Alcance Corto e Intermedio es una muestra fehaciente del incumplimiento de este país de sus compromisos internacionales. Lo instamos a renovar el Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas.

Recordamos a la delegación de los Estados Unidos que no solo Cuba, sino 120 Estados Miembros que son a su vez, Miembros del Movimiento de Países No Alineados plantearon su preocupación con la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear de EE.UU. que reduce el umbral para la utilización de armas nucleares, incluso en respuesta a las llamadas amenazas estratégicas no nucleares.

Estados Unidos, país que se considera con derecho para calumniar y singularizar a Estados soberanos, es el único Estado Parte de la Convención para la Prohibición de las Armas Química que aun no ha finalizado la destrucción de los arsenales declarados, en flagrante violación de la letra y espíritu de la Convención. Es este mismo país quien imposibilitó la adopción en 2001 de un Protocolo jurídicamente vinculante que fortalezca la Convención sobre Armas Biológicas, e impide la aplicación plena, efectiva y no discriminatoria de su Artículo X referido a la cooperación internacional con fines pacíficos, y del Artículo XI de la Convención sobre Armas Químicas sobre desarrollo económico y tecnológico de los Estados.

Cuba reafirma que, sin duda alguna, el mayor peligro para la paz y la seguridad internacionales es la conducta irresponsable del gobierno de Estados Unidos.

The Republic of Cuba uses its right to reply in response to the reply of the delegation of the United States. Cuba reaffirms the considerations it stated during the debates of the First Committee. The United States delegation should show more respect for this forum and stop lying about its false commitments to issues of high international relevance, as those discussed by the First Committee.

The only deceitful statements during the First Committee were made the delegation of the United States, which tries in vain to hide behind groundless critics to other delegations, its lack of commitment and non-compliance with international agreements in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

The United States, the only country that has used nuclear weapons twice, is the most responsible for the erosion of multilateralism and disarmament and non-proliferation architecture. It is the world leader in nuclear testing, have systematically violated the NPT and the final documents of its Conference Reviews. It is responsible for 38 percent of global military expenditure, militarizes cyberspace and outer space and modernizes their nuclear arsenals.

We reiterate that the decision of the US government to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear Deal and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is a convincing evidence of the non-compliance of international commitments by this country. We urge it to renew the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

We remind the United States delegation that not only Cuba, but 120 Member States, which at the same time are members of the Non-Aligned Movement, stated their concern about the US Nuclear Posture Review, which lowers the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and even in response to non-nuclear strategic threats.

The United States, a country that thinks it is entitled to slander and single out sovereign States, is the only State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons that has not yet completed the destruction of declared arsenals, in flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Convention. This is the same country that made impossible the adoption of a legally binding Protocol that strengthens the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001 and prevents the full, effective and non-discriminatory implementation of its Article X referred to international cooperation for peaceful purposes, and Article XI of the Chemical Weapons Convention on economic and technological development of States.

Cuba reaffirms that, undoubtedly, the biggest danger to international peace and security is the irresponsible behavior of the government of the United States.

Written Right of Reply by the Delegation of the DPRK

My delegation would like to exercise its right of reply in relation to the written statements on the thematic clusters made by the delegations of the United States, France, United Kingdom, Japan and other European countries.

My delegation reiterates that DPRK has never acknowledged or bound itself by the resolutions of the UN Security Council as they totally deny the sovereignty and the right to development of a sovereign nation.

No one can dispute that it is the legitimate right of a sovereign state to build up national capabilities for self-defense.

DPRK is a peace-loving nation and in historical terms, it has never pitched a single pebble onto the other's soil. Moreover, our self-defensive deterrent force can never pose a threat to European countries which are far apart from across the globe.

As clearly stated scores of times, the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula was born out of the decades-old external nuclear threats and blackmail against the DPRK.

This year alone, in the southern part of the Korean peninsula, there have continued undisguised acts of hostility in breach of peace such as provocative joint military exercises and ceaseless introduction of sophisticated military hardware from the outside even in the midst of the "COVID-19" pandemic.

Given the fact that nuclear threats against the DPRK continue unabated along with all sorts of hostile acts taking place before our very eyes, it doesn't make sense to call for abandoning the efforts at self-defensive capabilities.

As it stands, our self-defensive national capabilities serve as a deterrent force for reliably guaranteeing the security and future of the State and people in response to ever-growing external nuclear threats and blackmail.

If European countries are truly concerned about peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region, why don't you call for a complete and irreversible withdrawal of hostility against the DPRK?

Apart from crying wolf over whosever nuclear threats or COVID, European countries are well-advised to take an unbiased and impartial approach with a correct insight into the nature of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Arguably, the previous theme of the DPRK-US negotiations should be changed from "denuclearization measures versus lifting of sanctions" to the formula of "abandonment of hostility versus resumption of DPRK-US negotiations".

DPRK-US dialogue is deemed unnecessary in future as long as there is no significant shift in the US position.

DPRK remains committed to developing war deterrent force, not for targeting others but for defending itself.

Our self-defensive deterrent force will pose no threat whatsoever if armed provocations encroaching upon our sovereignty and the right to existence are not perpetrated, and anti-DPRK forces refrain from intimidation and blackmail in pursuit of a hostile policy against the DPRK.

Japan is devoid of qualification and moral justification for talking about whosever denuclearization.

As is widely known, an astronomical expenditure in armaments is made every year in Japan under the signboard of "defense".

Continued increase in military expenditure, development of preemptive strike capabilities beyond the principle of "exclusive defense" and expansion of overseas deployment of the SDF in offensive formation are clearly aimed at launching overseas aggression.

Worse still, Japan is a country which turned the Asian continent into a sea of blood and committed unprecedented inhumane crimes against the peoples in Korea and the rest of the world in the last century. Japan's moves to repeat the past history of aggression should never be tolerated.

Japan must bear in mind that it has a historical responsibility for making a sincere apology and compensating for its past class-A crimes against humanity. It must move to liquidate the past soonest possible.

It also must abandon, without delay, its plan for aggressive arms build-up and attempts at overseas expansion which undermine peace and security in the region.

It is the consistent goal of the DPRK to build a peaceful world free of war.

It is an undeniable fact that thanks to our reliable and effective war deterrent, peace and security are firmly defended on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of the region.

We will continue to strengthen the war deterrent as a justified leverage of self-defense, so as to contain and control all dangerous attempts and intimidating actions by the hostile forces, including their sustained and ever-growing nuclear threats.

So in the past, as in the future, we will make every possible effort as a peace-loving nation to safeguard peace and security in the Korean peninsula and the region in a responsible manner.

Cluster 2 – Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

**Written right of reply
on behalf of Germany and the United Kingdom**

New York, 10 November 2020

The United Kingdom and Germany reject the false claims by the Russian Federation about the chemical weapons attacks against Sergei Skripal and others in Salisbury and Amesbury, and against Alexey Navalny.

Independent and impartial investigations using the expertise of the OPCW have shown that these attacks used Novichok nerve agents, which are banned chemical weapons.

There is no plausible explanation other than Russian involvement and responsibility.

The Russian Federation has a case to answer. The United Kingdom and Germany call on the Russian Federation to account for these uses of chemical weapons.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against the USA

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran would like to exercise its right of reply against a number of baseless allegations written by the US delegation concerning Iran. In this regard, we categorically reject such allegations.

Following World War II, the United States' foreign policy oftentimes failed to accomplish its objectives and largely behaved counterproductively. Force replaced diplomacy. Military solutions trampled negotiations. Counter-insurgency produced insurgents. Since 2001, that the US initiated the war on terrorism, this war never recedes and it grows and grows and becomes connected to another war.

As it stands, the world is grossly exasperated by the US' overseas interventions for decades now. The U.S. President has been taking an unprecedented approach to a chaotic foreign policy and made abrasive decision-making, the main feature of which is a sanctions-obsessed approach, problematic for the whole world. Regrettably, the fault lines of American foreign policy are being redrawn under the Trump Administration which has made it clear that it believes assassinating foreign officials is a legitimate tool of foreign policy and that war criminals should be lionized. Our assassinated hero, Martyr General Soleimani, was the champion of the fight against violent extremism in the Middle East and ardently fought to protect all citizens of this region—religious or secular, Muslim or Christian, Shia or Sunni—against any and all medieval reactionaries.

The damage that the USA has caused around the world will have long-term consequences and will reverberate for generations to come. Fewer nations will aspire to work with it or willingly trust its word.

The US should be reminded that they are trapped in their own made illusion of the American empire. This has destroyed the US foreign policy as a result.

In the Middle East, Trump has praised some of the world's most brutal autocrats—and, what's more, they have figured out how to flatter and effectively take advantage of him. He has allowed local client states, wealthy donors, and hawkish advisors to drag him back into a pointless confrontation with Iran.

With its across-the-board military escalations, a blank check to impulsive U.S. partners, hostility to Iran and disinterest in peacemaking, the US continues to make the Middle East less stable thus increasing the risks of conflict.

The US' isolation at the multilateral level, and especially the UNSC, has proven that its policy on Iran, which is projected as a maximum pressure policy, is brain dead and that such strategic myopia goes well beyond the Middle East.

The US' nuclear weapon strategy and its rigid intention to produce and deploy more sophisticated nuclear weapons are absolutely against its explicit obligations towards nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, while many countries strongly call for the extension of the New START Treaty and hope to see the bilateral nuclear disarmament process between the U.S. and Russia as maintained, continued, and developed, Trump refused President Putin's offer to extend the Treaty due to its expiry in February 2021. He has not affirmed the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, rather he increased the military budget to realize the nuclear arsenal modernization program. In fact, he reportedly told military advisers that he intends to increase the size of the U.S.' nuclear arsenal to its Cold War peak of 30,000 warheads. He also signed a defense authorization bill that violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and withdrew from it consequently.

Living with a continuous Cold War mentality, the U.S. has been creating and escalating tensions around the world. Following a more aggressive nuclear strategy, using other countries as an excuse to break free from the constraints of international treaties, doing as it wishes to develop and deploy nuclear armament, lowering the threshold for use of nuclear weapons, vigorously enhancing the global missile defense system and following the strategy for outer space supremacy are all acts forming an exhibition of behavior that has gravely undermined global strategic stability. During the deliberation of the First Committee, most countries candidly express strong regret and concerns about the termination of INF, the U.S.' withdrawal from JCPOA and its offensive nuclear policy.

That is why when independent observers are asked to describe U.S. foreign policy over the last couple of decades as “disastrous”, they say. “Arrogant” and “murderous” also seem appropriate, they add.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The I. R. of Iran against the USA – Thematic

In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful

The delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran would like to exercise its right of reply against a number of baseless and unfounded allegations written by the US delegation concerning Iran. We categorically reject such allegations.

While we have explained in our statements, the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the US illegal and illegitimate activities and intentions based on the international law, the delegation of Iran herewith adds and highlights that during the last 40 years, we have become completely familiar with the pattern of US foreign policy and the way that they want to enforce it.

The pattern can be traced and proved by a common feature of their policy and this feature is lying and lying and lying by the US officials. The world has not forgotten that just in 2003 the US initiated a war against Iraq using WMDs as a pretext. A lie that never was verified; but it led to a destructive war with hundreds of thousands of victims and sever regional security implications.

A glance at the regional developments either in the second half of the 20th century or their activities from the beginning of the 21st-century is confirming this belief about the US foreign policy.

The world is witnessing the US bullying which shall come to end soon.

Right of Reply submitted by Japan
November 10, 2020

Japan exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the “Written right of reply by the delegation of the DPRK” and their EOJ regarding the draft resolution on L.71.

First, on the issue of Japan’s defense capability, under the Constitution, Japan has adhered to the basic precept of maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented policy, not becoming a military power that poses a threat to other countries, and observed the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. Under these precepts, Japan will never change the course it has taken as a peace-loving nation. Our defense capability will be for Japan’s defense towards the future, and we ensure transparency of our defense-related expenditure’s substance through adhering to the strict civilian control of the military.

Second, on the issue of plutonium, as the IAEA has concluded that all nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, remained in peaceful activities under stringent IAEA safeguards, there are no issues in relation to non-proliferation. Japan continues to take appropriate measures in order to maintain adherence to the principle of “not possessing plutonium without specific purposes”. Based on this principle, Japan announced a policy of reducing the size of its plutonium stockpile. Moreover, as our own voluntary measures to secure transparency of nuclear materials, Japan has been publishing information on its plutonium management which is more detailed than one required by the international guidelines.

Third, the claims and figures that North Korea mentioned on Japan are not based on facts and are groundless. Japan would like to emphasize that, for over 70 years since the end of World War II, Japan regards the facts of history in a spirit of humility and has consistently respected democracy and human rights, and contributed to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the international community.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile development is in clear violation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions that urge North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. It is our greatest hope that on-going diplomatic efforts will lead to the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges by North Korea, which is a common goal that we all share under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

(END)

Проект

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в порядке права на ответ в ходе тематической дискуссии
по разделу «Ядерные вооружения»

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Хотели бы отреагировать на ряд необоснованных обвинений в адрес Российской Федерации, сделанных делегацией Украины в опубликованном на интернет-портале «e-delegate» заявлении.

Судя по выступлению украинского представителя, в Киеве продолжают попытки ввести международное сообщество в заблуждение насчет того, что Россия якобы нарушила Меморандум о гарантиях безопасности в связи с присоединением Украины к ДНЯО. Ещё раз поясним, что положения Меморандума со всей очевидностью не распространяются и не могут распространяться на обстоятельства, ставшие следствием действий внутривнутриполитических или социально-экономических факторов. Напомним, что пришедшее к власти в Киеве в результате антиконституционного переворота в 2014 г. правительство своей политикой само взорвало единство Украины. Так что утрата нашим соседом территориальной целостности стала результатом внутренних процессов, к которым Россия и ее обязательства по Будапештскому меморандуму отношения не имеют. Упорные попытки взваливать ответственность за свои внутренние проблемы на других не делают чести украинскому политическому руководству.

Отметим также, что в Киеве, судя по всему, не вполне понимают, о чём идёт речь в рамках российско-американского стратегического диалога. Обращаем внимание на то, что Россия и США обсуждают широкий спектр тем, имеющих отношение к укреплению и совершенствованию механизмов обеспечения стратегической стабильности и режимов контроля над вооружениями. Это включает в себя продление ДСНВ, а также все вопросы, связанные с выработкой возможной новой договорённости или договорённостей о контроле над наступательными и оборонительными вооружениями как в ядерном, так и неядерном оснащении, способными решать стратегические задачи.

Хотели бы подчеркнуть нашу готовность к контактам со всеми членами международного сообщества для детального разъяснения истинного положения дел и перспектив российско-американского стратегического диалога.

Проект

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в порядке права на ответ в ходе тематической дискуссии
по разделу «Космос (разоруженческие аспекты)»

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Хотели бы отреагировать на ряд голословных обвинений в адрес Российской Федерации относительно разработки и испытания противоспутникового оружия наземного и космического базирования, сделанных делегацией США в опубликованном на интернет-портале «e-delegate» 30 октября с.г. заявлении.

Рассматриваем этот антироссийский выпад как часть инициированной Вашингтоном пропагандистской кампании по дискредитации российской космической деятельности и наших инициатив по предотвращению гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве. Американские коллеги вновь пытаются представить ситуацию в искажённом виде с тем, чтобы отвлечь внимание международной общественности от реальных угроз в космосе, оправдать предпринимаемые ими шаги по размещению оружия в космическом пространстве и добиться выделения дополнительного финансирования под эти цели.

В очередной раз хотели бы подчеркнуть, что действия России в космосе не имеют конфронтационной направленности, не создают помех или трудностей для функционирования иностранных космических аппаратов и осуществляются в строгом соответствии с международным правом, включая базовый Договор по космосу 1967 года. Отдаём приоритет недискриминационному использованию и

исследованию космического пространства исключительно в мирных целях. Подтверждением тому служат продвигаемые Россией при широкой поддержке государств-единомышленников инициативы в данной области.

Благодарим за внимание.

Проект

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в порядке права на ответ в ходе тематической дискуссии
по разделу «Другие виды ОМУ»

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Обратили внимание на прозвучавшие в заявлениях ряда западных государств обвинения о якобы причастности властей России к «отравлению» А.Навального.

Хотели бы отметить, что в первую очередь речь идет о произошедшем на российской территории с российским гражданином инциденте. Именно в России было сделано все возможное, чтобы спасти жизнь А.Навальному. Благодаря своевременным действиям экипажа российского рейсового самолета на маршруте Томск - Москва, осуществившего экстренную посадку в г.Омск для спасения одного из пассажиров (несмотря на поступившие с расположенного в ФРГ сервера сообщения о минировании аэропорта этого города), а также персонала скорой помощи, которому удалось в кратчайшие сроки доставить пациента в городскую больницу №1, жизнь блогера оказалась вне опасности. В течение почти двух суток к пациенту применялась интенсивная терапия, в результате чего оказалась возможной его транспортировка в Германию для продолжения лечения. В связи с обращением членов семьи А.Навального соответствующее разрешение было дано, несмотря на то, что в отношении блогера заведено уголовное дело (с запретом на выезд за пределы страны). После нескольких часов интенсивных консультаций российских и немецких медиков, подготовки самолета и отдыха экипажа спецрейса 22 августа с.г. А.Навальный был доставлен в Германию.

Таким образом о заинтересованности российского государства в «отравлении» А.Навального речи быть не может. Абсурд состоит и в том, что отравив якобы своего гражданина крайне опасным и столь специфическим способом, российские власти фактически добровольно передали его в руки химиков из Бундесвера.

Хотели бы напомнить, что Российская Федерация в ситуации с А.Навальным изначально заняла максимально транспарентную позицию. После выдачи разрешения на отправку блогера в Германию наши врачи передали немецким коллегам все данные о состоянии здоровья пациента и были готовы продолжить совместную работу в интересах его скорейшего выздоровления. В ответ мы получили категорический отказ правительства ФРГ от сотрудничества с нами в установлении истины в отношении произошедшего с А.Навальным. Фактически с первого дня Берлин перешел к «мегафонной» дипломатии, развязав широкую кампанию по обвинению российских властей в «отравлении» собственного гражданина. Активное участие в ней приняли евроатлантические союзники, а также штаб-квартиры НАТО и Евросоюза, требовавшие проведения некоего «независимого международного расследования» под эгидой Организации по запрещению химического оружия (ОЗХО).

Весьма показательным является отказ Германии и от сотрудничества с нами по линии правоохранительных органов. Генеральная прокуратура Российской Федерации в общей сложности направила четыре запроса в Берлин об оказании правовой помощи в связи с ситуацией с А.Навальным. При этом неоднократно указывалось, что запрашиваемые сведения необходимы для принятия решения об открытии в России соответствующего уголовного дела. Ни одного вразумительного ответа мы так и не получили, в связи с чем в Берлин был направлен пятый запрос. Таким образом Германия фактически препятствует проведению в России официального расследования возможного уголовного преступления. Аналогичным образом поступают Париж и Стокгольм, также отказывающиеся под надуманными предлогами от сотрудничества с российскими правоохранительными органами в рамках действующих договоренностей по оказанию правовой помощи. Вот такое вот соблюдение международного права по европейски.

В этой связи были вынуждены обратиться к Техсекретарату ОЗХО с просьбой направить своих экспертов в Россию для оказания технического содействия с целью прояснения обстоятельств

произошедшего с А.Навальным. Завершаем согласование деталей организации такого визита. Рассчитываем, что по итогам совместной работы нам все же удастся разобраться в сложившейся ситуации.

Неоднократно указывали, что обвинения властей Сирии в применении химического оружия против собственных граждан основываются на сфабрикованных данных. Наиболее ярким примером таких манипуляций стал доклад спецмиссии ОЗХО по установлению фактов применения химического оружия в Сирии (МУФС) по итогам расследования инцидента с применением хлора в сирийском г. Дума 8 апреля 2018 г. Не только российские специалисты, но и целый ряд международных независимых экспертов, а также некоторые сотрудники самой Организации обращали внимание на многочисленные нестыковки и расхождения в итоговом докладе по Думе. Весьма показательно, что все эти свидетельства были проигнорированы руководством ОЗХО.

Аналогичным по своему содержанию получился и опубликованный 8 апреля с.г. первый доклад Группы ОЗХО по расследованию и идентификации (ГРИ) по трем химинцидентам в Аль-Латамне в марте 2017 года. Документ вышел крайне предвзятым, необщественным, непрофессиональным и технически недостоверным. ГРИ воспроизводит политически мотивированные методы работы МУФС, а также бывшего Совместного ОЗХО-ООН механизма по расследованиям в Сирии.

Продавленное США на 94-й сессии Исполнительного совета ОЗХО антисирийское решение представляет собой заведомо невыполнимый ультиматум Дамаску – объявить будто бы сокрытые объекты по хранению и производству химического оружия. При этом единственным основанием подобных требований являются выводы по сути сфабрикованного доклада ГРИ. Сирийский химический арсенал и объекты по его производству были уничтожены под строгим международным контролем, что неоднократно подтверждалось Гендиректором Техсекретариата ОЗХО.

Исходим из того, что принятие на международных площадках санкционных мер в отношении Дамаска, базирующихся на бездоказательных обвинениях в использовании химического оружия вооруженными силами Сирии, категорически неприемлемо. Призываем США и их евраатлантических союзников отказаться от политизации деятельности ОЗХО в собственных геополитических интересах.

Проект

ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ
представителя Российской Федерации
в порядке права на ответ
в Первом комитете 75-й сессии ГА ООН
(10 ноября 2020 г.)

Уважаемый г-н Председатель,

Хотели бы отреагировать на ряд голословных обвинений в адрес Российской Федерации, сделанных делегацией США (в т.ч. от имени Великобритании) в рамках выступления по мотивам голосования по российскому проекту резолюции «Укрепление и развитие системы договоров/соглашений в области контроля над вооружениями (КВРН)» в ходе заседания 9 ноября.

Американские коллеги в попытке переложить ответственность на Россию за предпринимаемые самим Вашингтоном шаги по демонтажу всей международно-правовой архитектуры КВРН в очередной раз использовали ставшую для них уже традиционной тактику передёргивания и фальсификации фактов. Однако всем хорошо известно, что именно США в одностороннем порядке вышли из Договора по ПРО, Договора о РСМД и СВПД, выходят из Договора по открытому небу, отказались от ратификации ДВЗЯИ и адаптированного ДОВСЕ, а также от работы по созданию ЗСОМУ на Ближнем Востоке. Вашингтон до сих пор не выполнил свои обязательства по КЗХО, блокирует переговоры по юридически обязывающему Протоколу к КБТО, в нарушение ДНЯО продолжает практику «совместных ядерных миссий» со своими союзниками по НАТО. Администрацией США заявлено о намерении разместить оружие в космосе и использовать космическое пространство как арену для боевых операций, что идёт вразрез с задачами предотвращения гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве.

У США нет никакого права оценивать выполнение другими государствами соглашений по контролю над вооружениями. Каждая международная договорённость в этой области обладает собственными, тщательно

проработанными механизмами проверки и контроля за соблюдением договорных обязательств. В отдельных случаях для этого созданы специализированные международные организации.

Стремление Вашингтона в явочном порядке присвоить функцию «судьи» исключительно себе не имеет под собой никаких международно-правовых оснований и не может использоваться в качестве аргумента для любых выводов и заключений (тем более обвинений) в адрес суверенных государств, обладающих в международных организациях теми же правами, что и США. На контрасте, возведённая в ранг государственной политики практика американских властей по невыдаче виз ведущим российским экспертам в области КВРН для участия в профильных мероприятиях на территории США (в т.ч. по линии ООН) лишь подтверждает лицемерность курса Вашингтона, молчаливо поддерживаемого странами Запада.

Благодарим за внимание.

**Right of Reply by Turkey
3 November 2020**

Mr. Chair,

I am taking the floor to exercise my delegation's right of reply in relation to the references made to my country by the representative of Armenia.

I refute these allegations in their entirety.

This disinformation campaign aims to portray Armenia as the victim, while it continues its illegal occupation of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territories as well as its indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

We would like to urge Armenia to uphold the relevant Security Council Resolutions without delay, calling for the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of their occupying forces in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Thank you.

**Right of Reply by Turkey
4 November 2020**

Mr. Chair,

I am taking the floor to exercise my delegation's right of reply in relation to the baseless allegations against my country made by the representative of Syrian regime.

Turkey rejects Syrian regime representative's delusional statement in its entirety. It's unacceptable that the Syrian regime which lost its legitimacy long ago continues to misuse UN General Assembly First Committee to distort the facts.

This is a desperate attempt to divert attention from the enormous destruction and human suffering the regime caused in Syria. Syrian regime is responsible for death, mutilation, abduction, starvation and enforced disappearance of millions of Syrians.

Its crimes against humanity, violations of international humanitarian law and the war crimes have been documented in countless UN reports.

This is a regime that brazenly uses chemical weapons and tortures its own people repeatedly, in blatant breach of its obligations emanating from international agreements and conventions to which it is party.

Therefore the regime is not in a position to lecture anybody on counterterrorism or compliance with international law.

Turkey has been at the forefront in efforts to fight DAESH and other terrorist organizations.

Thank you.

Cluster 4 – Conventional Weapons
Written right of reply
The United Kingdom
New York, 10 November 2020

The United Kingdom wishes to exercise its right of reply to the statement submitted by Argentina in response to the thematic statement by the United Kingdom on conventional weapons.

The United Kingdom has no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas of both territories, nor about the principle and the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination as enshrined in the UN Charter and in article one of the two UN Covenants on human rights, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

This means there can be no dialogue on sovereignty unless the Falkland Islanders so wish. The 2013 referendum - in which 99.8% of those who voted wanted to maintain their current status as a territory of the United Kingdom - sent a clear message that the people of the Islands do not want dialogue on sovereignty. Argentina should respect those wishes.

The United Kingdom's relationship with the Falkland Islands, and all of its Overseas Territories, is a modern one based on partnership, shared values, and the right of the people of each territory to determine their own future.

Cluster 4 – Conventional Weapons
Second written right of reply
The United Kingdom
New York, 12 November 2020

The United Kingdom wishes to exercise its second right of reply, in response to that of Argentina on the thematic statement by the United Kingdom on conventional weapons.

The United Kingdom reiterates that it has no doubt about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas of both territories, nor about the principle and the right of the Falkland Islanders to self-determination as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in Article One of the two United Nations Covenants on human rights, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

The United Kingdom rejects the continued attempts of the Republic of Argentina to extend the geographical area over which it seeks to raise a dispute in the United Nations to include South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and its surrounding maritime zone. Equally, the United Kingdom rejects the assertion that General Assembly Resolution 2065 (XX), or related General Assembly resolutions, or resolutions by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, cover South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and its surrounding maritime zone. The United Kingdom draws the attention of the Argentine delegation to the fact that the UN has never issued any resolutions referencing a sovereignty dispute over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

The United Kingdom rejects the argument of Republic of Argentina that the 2013 referendum has no legal value. There have been no statements from the United Nations disputing the Falklands referendum. The international observer mission, comprising observers from Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Uruguay, Chile and Brazil, commented after the vote that the referendum was "...free and fair, reflecting the democratic will of the voters of the Falkland Islands".

The United Kingdom's position in respect to our continued sovereignty over the British Indian Ocean Territory following the ICJ's Advisory Opinion is set out in more detail in the United Kingdom's submission to the report of the United Nations Secretary-General ([A/74/834](#)) dated 18 May 2020.

Written Right of Reply

Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, October 26, 2020

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to misleading statements made by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Contrary to the false narrative Iran wishes to spread, the United States has been the leader in arms control and disarmament efforts, resulting in the cessation of the Cold War nuclear arms race and an 88 percent reduction in the total U.S. nuclear stockpile.

Committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT, we are engaged in new diplomatic initiatives with NPT partners on how to create a global security environment under which progress toward disarmament might be possible. As long as nuclear weapons exist, however, we will maintain a nuclear deterrent that is appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure our allies that rely on “extended deterrence” for their own security.

While the United States is living up to its commitments, Iran and others are not. We will not stand by while others continually violate existing international treaties and commitments. Russia’s production, flight-testing, and then fielding of multiple battalions of an intermediaterange missile system in violation of its INF Treaty obligations directly led to the termination of the treaty. Meanwhile, China continually refuses to engage in meaningful nuclear arms control talks, even as it pursues a rapid military buildup of its nuclear and missile arsenal. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to effective arms control and made clear our interest in both Russia and China joining the United States in negotiations on a nuclear arms control agreement that goes beyond past such agreements.

As we have made clear, the United States remains committed to supporting efforts to achieve a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone, but this longstanding effort can only succeed with the participation and assent of all countries in the region. Despite Iran’s stated support for such a zone, it continues to actively undermine the confidence necessary to make any progress with its regional neighbors.

On matters related to chemical weapons, particularly our CW destruction efforts, let us set the record straight. The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the CWC and the relevant decisions taken by the policy making bodies of the OPCW. We continue to demonstrate extraordinary transparency about the pace of the destruction of our declared chemical weapons stockpile, to include visits to our destruction facilities, and continued efforts to review all opportunities to accelerate our planned completion date of September 2023. Iran likes to claim the United States is the “sole possessor” of chemical weapons while Tehran obfuscates the fact that they maintain an undeclared chemical weapons program. The United States is committed to the destruction of all chemical weapons around the world, having expended billions of dollars not only to accelerate and destroy our own declared stockpile but to assist other countries in destroying their declared programs.

The fact remains that Iran is the greatest threat to peace and security in the Middle East. Its violent efforts to spread revolution and support armed militants and proxies throughout the region have killed thousands and upended the lives of millions of innocent people. Iran’s proliferation-sensitive activities, including its expanding nuclear program, development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, and purchases and sales of destabilizing conventional weapons, all pose a critical threat to regional and international security and a significant challenge to global nonproliferation efforts. Iran has sought to extort the international community with its nuclear program, as the International Atomic Energy Agency continues to investigate possible undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

Even now, as Iran levels false accusations against its neighbors and the United States, it unabashedly carries out illicit activities that destabilize regional and international security. This is evidenced by Iran’s continued military support and reported arms transfers that fuel ongoing conflict in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Committed to confronting these threats to international peace and stability, the United States sought strong action in the Security Council to extend the arms embargo on Iran, but unfortunately, China and Russia once again turned a blind eye to Iran’s continued destabilizing behavior. Subsequently, and in response to Iran’s significant non-performance of JCPOA commitments, the United States triggered the “snapback” of previous UN resolutions under UNSCR 2231, including the arms embargo. We call on all UN Member States to uphold the integrity of the UN sanctions regime and fully implement these restored sanctions.

Our goal remains to leverage maximum pressure on Iran to achieve a new deal that comprehensively addresses the full range of threats posed by Iran, including its destabilizing regional activities, its development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, and its nuclear program.

The international community should not accept an Iranian regime emboldened to escalate its regional destabilization. The United States is committed to constraining Iran's malign activities, and we welcome allies and partners on board our campaign focused on maintaining international peace and security. We ask every nation that can no longer tolerate Iran's destructive behavior to join us.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, October 26, 2020**

It is regrettable, yet unsurprising, that the illegitimate Maduro regime's delegation used its First Committee address to spread misleading narratives about the United States.

Consistent with longstanding U.S. nuclear policy, the United States would only consider employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners.

The United States is in full compliance with its treaty obligations and continues to implement New START. The United States has made every effort to initiate a new era of arms control that will address those aspects of national security that are absent from the bilateral treaties of the past. Specifically, an agreement covering all nuclear weapons of Russia, China, and the United States, which has never been done before.

The United States will continue to seek opportunities to pursue arms control efforts that strengthen U.S., allied, and partner security, that are verifiable and enforceable, and include the participation of compliant partners. We emphasize that arms control negotiations require willing partners, and that the deteriorating security environment has made progress on disarmament more difficult. This is why we launched a new diplomatic initiative, Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament, in order to create a global security environment that would facilitate progress toward disarmament.

We will continue imposing maximum pressure on the Iranian regime until it ceases its destabilizing activities and negotiates a comprehensive deal. The United States expects all UN Member States to fully comply with their obligations regarding re-imposed UN restrictions on Iran, as the UN Charter requires all Member States to do.

The devastating crisis in Venezuela is a direct result of the illegitimate Maduro regime's policies. The Independent Fact Finding Mission on Venezuela's 2020 report concluded there are reasonable grounds to believe that Maduro and his key ministers are likely guilty of crimes against humanity. Per 2020 reports from UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet, a political solution that includes free and fair elections is the only way to restore human rights in Venezuela.

The parliamentary elections the regime announced for December 6 will not meet the necessary requirements for a free and fair election. Acceptable democratic standards, notably absent in the regime's elections plan, include: the independence of all political parties; an end to the prosecution and disqualification of political leaders and full restoration of their and other candidates' rights to equal political participation; a comprehensive update of the voter register to include young voters and Venezuelans abroad; an independent and balanced National Electoral Council; and independent and impartial election observation; and equal participation and unrestricted access to all media.

The illegitimate Maduro regime allegations are simply not accurate. Necessitating this response is an unfortunate distraction from the essential work of the Committee. The United States continues to stand with the people of Venezuela in their righteous struggle for freedom.

Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons
United States
Written Right-of-Reply
November 10, 2020

Mr. Chairman,

China's campaign of misinformation and misdirection on nuclear weapons has no limits. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review offers a clear and detailed statement of our policy regarding nuclear weapons, something China has consistently refused to provide. Instead, China is engaged in a rapid, non-transparent nuclear build-up completely unconstrained by any arms control limits. China is set to at least double its nuclear arsenal over the next decade, with no declared endpoint, creating more dangerous consequences for the world than the COVID-19 plague that the Chinese Communist Party unleashed onto the world. The United States will not stand idly by while the threat posed to ourselves, our allies, and our partners by the Chinese Communist Party's nuclear arsenal grows constantly day by day. For far too long, China has pretended to be a hero of multilateralism, supposedly deserving a "free pass" in the First Committee from international scrutiny of its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear arms build-up. Yet it refuses even to engage in dialogue with the United States or any other state on reducing nuclear risks.

Mr. Chairman, those days must come to an end.

China often raises the "P5 process" mechanism as a forum for concrete discussions on nuclear risk reduction, but China's own behavior in the P5 contradicts its claims of good faith. In the P5, China has been reluctant to discuss key issues to any meaningful degree or to allow the participation of subject matter officials and experts. The P5 is useful to raise the importance of arms control and risk reduction, but it is not a substitute for robust bilateral channels that enable more open and intensive engagement between policy experts on sensitive issues such as flashpoints, postures, and policies. These are the discussions that will improve stability and security for us all. They are also exactly the discussions that Beijing has refused to engage in. China's refusal even to talk to the United States sends a message in and of itself about its intentions and is supremely destabilizing. This is why many countries across the world have joined the growing chorus calling on China to engage in meaningful arms control.

The United States has for some time called for a new era of arms control. Why a new era? The reason is clear: The bilateral Cold-War approach to arms control that only constrains the Russian Federation and the United States, while important, is no longer sufficient to address current geopolitical security challenges. A new era must involve cooperation among the three largest nuclear powers, to produce a future treaty that addresses all nuclear weapons and is rigorously verifiable. Such a treaty is essential to that goal we all seek; that of a world without nuclear weapons. Without such a treaty, our generation is facing the menacing prospect of a new nuclear arms race among the three largest nuclear powers in the present era, triggered by the continuing, secretive, and aggressive actions of China.

With Beijing's overall number of nuclear warheads in its current stockpile, its ever-larger and more sophisticated delivery systems, and its plans to more than double the number of warheads it possesses in this decade, China has indeed emerged, along with the United States and the Russian Federation, as the third largest nuclear power on earth, completely unconstrained by any nuclear arms control agreement whatsoever. And China is not satisfied with third place. In stark contrast, the United States has focused on maintaining its current deterrent by investing in life extension programs and other sustainment activities.

Preventing a trilateral nuclear arms race among the three largest nuclear powers represents a central issue of war or peace in our time. Should such a race begin, its scale and intensity could very likely dwarf the previous bilateral arms race of the Cold War - with potentially dangerous consequences for the peace and security of the entire world. Fortunately, such a trilateral arms race is entirely avoidable.

Mr. Chairman, every UN Member State, every member of this Committee, has a right, a responsibility, and an existential interest to be heard on this issue. Every nation on earth should call on China to engage the United States and enter into trilateral arms control to lead the way for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. The United States, the Russian Federation, and China need only to embrace a responsible course and take nuclear arms control to the next level, without further delay.

For its part, the United States stands ready. We must prevent a new arms race and avoid conflict, which is in the interests of all nations. An historic negotiating table is waiting, and it has three chairs around it. It is time for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to sit down with one another, engage in good faith, and reduce nuclear risks rather than heighten them. If China continues to frustrate this noble effort, then the United States must act in its own defense and is prepared to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by The United States of America
City of New York, November 6, 2020**

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to misleading statements made by the People's Republic of China.

Contrary to the false narrative the People's Republic of China wishes to spread, in 2016 China established the Strategic Support Force as a command-level organization to centralize the PLA's strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The SSF Space Systems Department is responsible for nearly all PLA space operations, including: space launch and support; space surveillance; space information support; space telemetry, tracking, and control; and space warfare. The PRC officially designated space as a new domain of warfare in its 2015 defense white paper and expects space to play an important role in future conflicts. The PRC's 2019 defense white paper described the SSF's modernization goals as "seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force."

The PLA continues to acquire and develop a range of counterspace capabilities and related technologies, including kinetic-kill missiles, ground-based lasers, and orbiting space robots, as well as expanding space surveillance capabilities, which can monitor objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions. Although the PRC has not publicly acknowledged the existence of any new programs since it confirmed it used an ASAT missile to destroy a weather satellite in 2007 – which intentionally created 3,000 pieces of trackable orbital debris and much more debris we cannot track – PLA defense academics often publish on counterspace threat technologies. These papers stress the necessity of "destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance...and communications satellites," suggesting that such systems, as well as navigation and early warning satellites, could be among the targets of attacks designed to "blind and deafen the enemy."

Instead of trying to blame the United States and focusing on ill-defined and unverifiable proposals, we urge China to support the approach taken in the Resolution on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior that call for the establishment of an inclusive, international process through the United Nations General Assembly's First Committee that can enhance the safety and security of outer space. That type of approach does not mean that we should cease engaging on and discussing space security issues at the Conference on Disarmament. However, we must recognize that threats and risks to satellites may not solely arise from the placement of weapons in outer space, such as the ground-based weapons China has tested and deployed.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020**

Mr. Chairman,

It is regrettable, yet unsurprising, that China's delegation used its statement on conventional weapons to spread misleading narratives about the United States. For far too long, China has pretended to be a hero of multilateralism. We took the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at its word that it would abide by its international commitments. The anticipated results have not materialized. It is now clear to us and the broader international community that the People's Republic of China (PRC) government under Xi Jinping seeks to reshape the international rules-based order around the interests and preferences of the CCP. These actions fit a pattern. Where the PRC goes, it can increasingly be expected to flout the rules, make up its own facts, and break its promises.

The U.S. security presence and alliance system underpins the peace and stability that has enabled China and the Indo-Pacific region to develop and prosper for over seven decades. China's rapid and disruptive military expansion, violations of international norms, and attempts to coerce and intimidate its neighbors threaten the peace and stability of the region. We will vigorously defend our interests and those of our friends and allies when they are threatened. We ask the international community to join us in defending international norms and organizations.

The United States export control and conventional arms transfer system has been the "gold standard" for decades. The United States continues to set an example of responsible behavior for other nations to follow. The United States has been and will continue to be a responsible actor in the sale and transfer of arms. We will continue to call out any state that engages in such trade irresponsibly.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020**

It is regrettable, yet unsurprising, that the Chinese delegation used its Thematic Debate statement to recycle Russian talking points about biological laboratories constructed with U.S. financial support in foreign countries. Such facilities are constructed in close cooperation with the foreign partners who ultimately own and operate them. The world continues to struggle with the COVID19 virus that originated in China in late 2019, and many of these laboratories are critical to the COVID19 response. Giving credence to such baseless, politically motivated allegations not only insults the countries working to improve their laboratory capacity—it threatens the global response to debilitating outbreaks like the COVID19 pandemic.

The Chinese delegation also seeks to perpetuate the myth that—if not for the United States—negotiations on a BWC Protocol would rapidly resume and quickly bear fruit. In truth, these negotiations were mired in disagreement. The fact is that a handful of countries have deliberately obstructed meaningful progress on any issue within the BWC for many years using this fiction. To date, the United States has seen no indication—either in the form of practical proposal on this topic or of increased PRC transparency—that would suggest sincere motivations. Such transparency is very much needed; as described in the annual U.S. Compliance Report,¹ significant questions remain about the fate of an assessed historical PRC program. The United States request China to respond to these questions. Rather than using the BWC Protocol excuse as a blanket refusal to make real progress in the BWC, the United States urges a more constructive course.

With respect to the CWC, and matters related to our CW destruction efforts, let us set the record straight. The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the CWC; and the relevant decisions taken by the

¹ https://www.state.gov/2020-adherence-to-and-compliance-with-arms-control-nonproliferation-and-disarmament-agreements-and-commitments-compliance-report-2/#_Toc43298168

policy-making bodies of the OPCW. We continue to demonstrate extraordinary transparency about U.S. destruction efforts underway regarding our chemical weapons stockpile, to include visits to our two remaining destruction facilities; and continued efforts to review all opportunities to accelerate our planned completion date of September 2023. The United States has been nothing but transparent about the destruction timelines while other have remained evasive about activities and research in the area of CBW; and choose to undermine; and call into question the role and work of the OPCW – rather than stand behind and support its effort to preserve the international norm against the use of chemical weapons for the sake of all mankind.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020**

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to misleading statements made by Cuba.

In its various thematic debate statements, Cuba has made a number of inaccurate and disparaging remarks. The United States wishes to address some of the main points in these various statements.

On nuclear weapons issues, and despite Cuba's expressed views, the United States has been the leader in arms control and disarmament efforts, resulting in the cessation of the Cold War nuclear arms race and an 88 percent reduction in the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. We have sought to initiate discussions between the Russian Federation and China regarding a future arms control treaty that would include nuclear weapons systems not currently covered under the New START Treaty.

The United States remains committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are engaged in new diplomatic initiatives to create a global security environment under which progress towards nuclear disarmament can be made, such as the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) in which both non-nuclear weapons states and all but one of the states that possess nuclear weapons are participating. We have continued our support for the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), which includes participants from over thirty states. However, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we will maintain a nuclear deterrent that is appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure our allies that rely on extended deterrence for their own security.

Regarding the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the United States has been clear that we will not seek its ratification. However, we have continued support for the International Monitoring System and the International Data Center. We have maintained our moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and called on all other nuclear weapons possessing states to also maintain a moratorium on testing. We have maintained our commitment to the "zero yield" standard for nuclear explosive testing while others have not. We believe that Russia has conducted tests that do not meet the "zero yield" standard and that China's activities call into question whether they may also have conducted tests that do not meet the "zero yield" standard.

While the United States is living up to its commitments, others are not, something that Cuba failed to mention in its statements. The Russian Federation is a serial violator of arms control agreements. We will not stand by while others continually violate existing international treaties and commitments. Russia's production, flight-testing, and then fielding of multiple battalions of an intermediate-range missile system in violation of its Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty obligations directly led to the termination of the treaty. Meanwhile, China continually refuses to engage in meaningful nuclear arms control talks, even as it pursues a rapid military buildup of its nuclear and missile arsenal.

The U.S. supports Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and is a signatory to the protocols for most of them. We ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and completed a revised Small Quantities Protocol. As we have made clear, the United States remains committed to supporting efforts to achieve a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone, but this longstanding effort can only succeed with the participation and assent of all countries in the region.

On matters related to chemical weapons, particularly our chemical weapon destruction efforts, let us set the record straight. The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the relevant decisions taken by the policy-making bodies of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). We continue to demonstrate extraordinary transparency about the pace of the destruction of our declared chemical weapons stockpile, to include visits to our destruction facilities, and continued efforts to review all opportunities to accelerate our planned completion date of September 2023. The United States is committed to the destruction of all chemical weapons around the world, having expended billions of dollars not only to accelerate and destroy our own declared stockpile but to assist other countries in destroying their declared programs – to include Russia. Cuba failed to mention Russian and Syrian use of chemical weapons, in particular, Russia’s most recent use of chemical weapons against Russian opposition leader Alexi Navalny.

Regarding outer space, the United States continues to support non-legally binding norms of responsible behavior in outer space as well as transparency and confidence building measures. The United States strongly supported the UK resolution on Reducing Space Threats Through Responsible Behaviors, which received overwhelming international support.

In summary, many of Cuba’s charges focus solely on the United States and not the actions of others. More importantly, they are simply not accurate, thus necessitating this response.

**Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020**

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to a myriad of falsehoods made by the Islamic Republic of Iran across its thematic statements.

Contrary to Iran’s assertions, the United States is committed to fulfilling its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is engaged in new diplomatic initiatives with NPT partners on how to create a global security environment under which progress toward disarmament might be possible. Iran, however, is directly undermining that goal by continuing to expand its uranium enrichment activities and by failing to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The matters reported by the IAEA Director General since November 2019 are deeply troubling, and concern potential undeclared nuclear material or activities that go to the heart of Iran’s IAEA safeguards obligations. The world’s top sponsor of terrorism can never be allowed to enrich uranium at any level. Iran will only deepen its political and economic isolation if it takes further steps that escalate international concern with its nuclear program.

Related to outer space, unlike Iran, the United States is transparent about our activities and our intentions. The United States seeks real, meaningful progress on a stable and safe outer space environment for all countries, which is why we co-sponsored and endorse the UK’s resolution on reducing space threats through the development of rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior. On the other hand, in January 2019 and in February 2020, Iran fired off space launch vehicles in a rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Despite the failure of the missions and Iran’s obfuscation of their intent, this activity presents a threat to international security. Iran’s space launch vehicles possess technology virtually identical and interchangeable to intercontinental ballistic missiles and the launches could further Tehran’s ability to eventually build such a weapon.

Regarding cyber, while the United States is working with the international community to improve international stability in cyberspace, Iran is using cyber espionage, propaganda, and attacks to influence events, shape foreign perceptions, and illegally obtain intellectual property. Iran’s cyber activity undermines international norms and threatens access for its citizens to an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet. It also seeks to influence and manipulate beyond its borders. In a 2012 attack that was widely attributed to the Iranian regime, tens of thousands of computers were compromised and deemed inoperable at Saudi Aramco and Qatar’s RasGas, resulting in millions of dollars in damages. In May 2020, Facebook dismantled another network of over 500 accounts spreading disinformation that were connected to the state-owned Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting.

Finally, the United States soundly rejects Iran’s outrageous accusation that the United States is destabilizing its region. On the contrary, it is Iran who is funding regional proxies and sowing instability throughout the Middle East. In recent

months, the Iranian regime has engaged in an escalating series of threatening actions and statements. Iran attacked six commercial vessels, hijacked multiple foreign vessels, downed a U.S. aircraft in international waters, and launched a brazen attack on Saudi oil facilities. Its violent efforts to spread revolution and support armed militants and proxies throughout the region have killed thousands and upended the lives of millions of innocent people. The United States continues to call on Iran to end its support to Middle East terrorist groups, including Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas, and to halt its indefensible support of terror operations in countries around the world.

Iran's attempts to deflect attention away from its own malign behavior by verbally attacking the United States and others are transparent and ineffective. The world is not fooled by these feckless efforts. The United States stands with the Iranian people and will continue to expose the regime's corruption, malign activities, crooked self-dealings, and outright oppression.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the Russian Federation's Thematic Debate Statement on Nuclear Weapons.

The United States remains committed to NATO and our Allies, including our ironclad commitment to NATO's Article 5 collective defense clause. U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are under U.S. control and are not transferred. NATO arrangements with respect to U.S. weapons in Europe are fully consistent with the NPT. This issue was thoroughly discussed during the NPT negotiations, and the treaty itself reflects the U.S. position. The Treaty's language on nuclear weapons deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is permitted. It does not deal with, and therefore does not prohibit, transfer of delivery vehicles or delivery systems, or control over them to any recipient, so long as such transfer does not involve nuclear bombs and warheads. It does not deal with allied consultations and planning on defense so long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them results.

The United States is committed to fulfilling its obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We are engaged in new diplomatic initiatives with NPT partners on how to create a global security environment under which progress toward disarmament might be possible. As long as nuclear weapons exist, however, we will maintain a nuclear deterrent that is modern, robust, flexible, resilient, ready and appropriately tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure our allies. The U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the global security and nonproliferation benefits it provides, depend on modern facilities, infrastructure, equipment, and a highly trained workforce. The United States is reinvesting in all four areas to ensure the viability of the stockpile so long as other states continue to rely on nuclear weapons and so long as our partners and allies rely on "extended deterrence" for their own security. Transforming U.S. nuclear infrastructure will replace and appropriately scale facilities that are nearing the end of or have already exceeded their original planned lifespans, enhancing the safety of the workforce.

The United States continues to strongly support the long-term goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems alongside a comprehensive and durable regional peace. We remain convinced that efforts to advance a WMD-free zone in the Middle East must be pursued voluntarily, based on arrangements mutually agreed upon by all the regional states. The United States will support any initiatives in this regard that have consensus support among all the regional states and are based in direct and inclusive dialogue. We believe the ongoing UN MEWMDFZ conference is not a productive mechanism for advancing this shared goal, as it does not allow for the participation of all the regional states on the basis of terms and modalities agreed by consensus. Rather than providing opportunities for inclusive dialogue, we fear that this type of endeavor will only further undermine trust among the regional states and set back prospects for meaningful dialogue and regional cooperation to address the multitude of security and proliferation challenges in the region.

We urge the regional states to abandon this misguided initiative and to engage their neighbors directly to identify a mutually acceptable path forward, working cooperatively to identify practical steps that build trust and promote an environment conducive to such a zone. We provided U.S. ideas in this regard in a working paper at the 2018 NPT PrepCom and we remain committed to working with the regional states to advance this important, shared goal. Advocates

of the UN conference consistently maintain that holding this conference will alleviate pressure on this issue in the NPT review cycle. All NPT Parties should hold advocates of the conference to their word on this point.

The United States will not seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but will continue to support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission (CTBTO PrepCom) and its development and operation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and its supporting systems. The President's budget continues to fully fund our assessment to the PrepCom, and the U.S. assessed contribution far outweighs the contributions of other State Signatories, many of which are chronically in arrears. In addition, our IMS stations function reliably, with continuous data provided to the IDC, and we are one of two states that pay for our own IMS stations. The reality is that U.S. ratification is not the main impediment to the entry into force of the CTBT. Nuclear explosive testing by North Korea, coupled with the lack of ratification – and in some cases even signature – by the other seven so-called Annex 2 states, presents a far greater hurdle to overcome.

Furthermore, as Deputy Assistant Secretary and Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Thomas DiNanno stated at the 2019 UN General Assembly First Committee in October: Russia also has much to answer for regarding the August 8th “Skyfall” incident. The United States has determined that the explosion near Nenoksa, Russia, was the result of a nuclear reaction that occurred during the recovery of a Russian nuclear-powered cruise missile. The missile had remained on the bed of the White Sea since its failed test in 2018, in close proximity to a major population center. In the aftermath of the Skyfall incident, two Russian-based IMS particulate samplers stopped transmitting. In total, Russia would go on to turn off two additional IMS stations in an attempt to obfuscate the event and cover up Russia's role in it. Russian denial of this data to the international community hinders the ability of neighboring countries to assess potential hazards from radiation exposure.

Russia's proposal for a deployment moratorium on INF-range missiles rings hollow given that Russia has already fielded multiple battalions of the SSC-8/9M729 missile that pose a direct threat to U.S. allies and forces in Europe and elsewhere. Russia is trying to “lock in” its possession of INF-range missiles at the expense of the United States and its allies. The United States withdrew from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019 because Russia developed, flight-tested, and then fielded multiple battalions of an intermediate-range missile system in violation of its obligations. Russia bears sole responsibility for the termination of the treaty and its termination does not mean the United States is dismantling or walking away from arms control. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to effective arms control and made clear our interest in both Russia and China joining the United States in negotiations on an agreement that goes beyond past arms control agreements.

The United States is not in a position to immediately field a ground-launched, INF-range system because we complied with our treaty obligations. We did not produce or flight-test any INF-range missiles while the treaty was in force. However, we are taking steps to address the threat posed by ever larger missile forces deployed by our strategic competitors, China and Russia. Unlike our competitors, U.S. research and development programs on intermediate-range missiles are solely focused on conventional-armed missiles. The United States is at the beginning stages of developmental testing of an intermediate-range system and has not approached any allies or partners regarding hosting or basing new missile systems. The United States will continue to work with allies and partners to defend against threats to our shared security interests, and we will consult closely with our allies and partners regarding our defense posture and capabilities.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by
The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the Russian Federation's Thematic Statement on Other Weapons of Mass Destruction.

The OPCW is a well-respected organization with a long history of impartiality, transparency, and professionalism that speaks for itself. However, Russia continues to use false arguments and propaganda to seek to reduce the effectiveness and credibility of the Organization and its efforts to effectively implement the CWC. The Russian strategy is obvious and quite simple: to sow confusion, propagate misinformation and distract from the truth. There is absolutely no basis for Russia

and its ally, the Assad regime, to question the validity of the OPCW's work. Such desperate attempts like this only serve to shield the Assad regime from ongoing actions to hold it accountable for its use of chemical weapons attacks by the international community.

More generally, Russia has failed in its responsibility as guarantor for ensuring that Syria cease all use of chemical weapons, fully disclose and declare the entirety of its chemical weapons stockpile, and destroy it under international oversight. Contrary to the facts, Russia would have us believe that the Assad regime has complied with all of its obligations. Maybe in a different reality – but in the real world, since the adoption of resolution 2118, the Assad regime has used chemical weapons repeatedly in violation of its obligations and to instill fear and force Syrians eager for reform and change to their knees.

What we are seeing from Russia is another failed attempt to attack the professional work of the OPCW and obfuscate the facts. We have seen this performance before: it is getting old, and it will not work. As we have stated previously, the United States expresses its unequivocal condemnation of the use of chemical weapons, in Syria or anywhere else. We also call on Russia to stop enabling and defending the Assad regime, a serial violator of international obligations and human rights – and address its own failure to adhere to its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

We are deeply troubled and condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of a Novichok agent in the poisoning of Mr. Alexei Navalny. The recent findings released by the OPCW in its Technical Assistance Visit (TAV) report; and earlier analysis by German, French and Swedish laboratories have made clear that a chemical weapon was used. Any use of chemical weapons, anywhere, anytime, by anybody, under any circumstances whatsoever, is unacceptable and contravenes the international norms prohibiting the use of such weapons. As we all know, Russia used a chemical nerve agent from the “Novichok” group in a previous attack. Mr. Navalny, and the Russian people have a right to express their views without fear of retribution of any kind, and certainly not be subjected to chemical agents. We call on Russia to be fully transparent and cooperate fully with the OPCW, regarding the assistance recently requested; and urge Russia to not attempt to deflect or obfuscate the facts. Those responsible – both those who committed this attack and those who ordered it – must be held accountable.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the Russian Federation's Thematic Debate Statement on Disarmament Machinery.

It is entirely inappropriate for Russia to be raising visa issues in the First Committee. Russia knows well that the proper place to discuss this issue is the Host Country Committee. Just recently, Russia joined consensus on recommendations adopted by the Host Country Committee addressing visa issues. Thus, this matter is already being addressed in the Committee with jurisdiction. The Host Committee is the competent authority to deal with visas. The First Committee, as a Main Committee of the General Assembly, has a completely different mandate. Namely, to address disarmament and international security. Similarly, the UN Disarmament Commission has nothing to do with visas. As its name implies, it is the DISARMAMENT Commission, not the VISAS commission. Injecting this non-germane matter into the work of the First Committee and Disarmament Commission unhelpfully distracts from and dilutes the disarmament discourse in both of these bodies, where we need more focus and more time to address the disarmament challenges before us. This is especially true for the Disarmament Commission, the work of which has been particularly impeded for reasons completely unrelated to its consensus-based agenda, to include, this year, because of COVID-19.

Written Right of Reply
Submitted by The United States of America
City of New York, November 10, 2020

The United States exercises its right of reply with this written statement in response to the Russian Federation's Thematic Debate Statement on Regional Disarmament and Security.

On May 22, 2020 the United States submitted notice of its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. Article XV, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on Open Skies (OST), provides that a State Party intending to withdraw “shall provide notice to its decision to withdraw to either Depository at least six months in advance of the date of its intended withdrawal and to all other States Parties.” As per Secretary of State Pompeo’s May 21, 2020 Press Statement: “We may, however, reconsider our withdrawal should Russia return into full compliance with the Treaty.” U.S. withdrawal from the OST will take effect on November 22, 2020 unless that occurs.

Russia continues to violate its obligations under the Treaty, despite U.S. and Allied efforts over the past several years to encourage Russia to return to full compliance. Russia’s most recent violations consist of:

- Limiting the flight distance for Open Skies observation missions over the Kaliningrad Oblast to 500 kilometers (although they have permitted one flight of 503 km);
- Refusing to permit Open Skies flights to approach within 10 km of certain portions of the Georgian-Russian border; and

Denying a segment of a planned observation flight over a major Russian military exercise in September 2019.

**Derecho de Réplica escrita de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela
contra los Estados Unidos de América**
Nueva York, 26 de octubre de 2020.

Rechazamos categóricamente las declaraciones injerencistas y ofensivas de los Estados Unidos de América en contra del Gobierno de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, pretendiendo politizar las labores de esta Comisión, al exhibir su afán por forzar un cambio de gobierno en mi país.

Sea propicia la ocasión para recordar que es el gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América quien verdaderamente representa una amenaza a la paz y seguridad internacionales, quien lleva un proceso de creciente militarización de la región latinoamericana y caribeña, y quien ha amenazado militarmente a Venezuela en reiteradas ocasiones durante los últimos cuatro años.

Destaca el protagonismo de este país en el uso deliberado y excesivo de la fuerza militar, sin autorización del Consejo de Seguridad ni amparo en el derecho internacional, a nivel mundial.

Vale destacar, que los Estados Unidos de América ha sido el único país del mundo que ha detonado bombas nucleares contra población civil inocente, causando casi 500 mil muertes de impacto directo, y generando consecuencias humanitarias que aún persisten el día de hoy. Un terrible crimen de lesa humanidad que no ha sido y no podrá ser nunca reparado. Gracias a los Estados Unidos de América el mundo conoce el horror de lo que significa la existencia de las armas nucleares, pero también, el horror de lo que significa que algunos miembros de la comunidad internacional exhiban su irresponsabilidad, inhumanidad e inconsciencia de una forma tan deliberada.

Hoy, por la política belicista de los Estados Unidos de América, los mismos riesgos de repetir ese espectáculo horroroso persisten. Es ampliamente conocido por la comunidad internacional que este país está modernizando sus arsenales nucleares, y que es el que más pruebas nucleares ha realizado, muchas de ellas fuera de su territorio.

El 19 de septiembre de 2017, el presidente de los Estados Unidos de América profanó la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas, amenazando con la destrucción total de Corea del Norte, pudiendo desencadenar una guerra nuclear. En su discurso, el presidente Trump afirmó que, si los Estados Unidos “se ven obligados a defenderse a sí mismos o a sus aliados, no tendremos más remedio que **destruir totalmente** a Corea del Norte”, en clara violación de lo establecido en la Carta, que prohíbe la amenaza del uso de la fuerza.

Este país ha enfilado todo su accionar internacional en el socavamiento del marco jurídico internacional vigente para el control de armas, desarme y no proliferación. Recientemente hemos podido ver cómo ha instado por escrito a diferentes países a retirar su instrumento de adhesión y ratificación el Tratado de Prohibición de las Armas Nucleares para evitar que este entre en vigor¹, muy a pesar del derecho soberano de cada Estado de adherirse a los convenios y tratados que se correspondan con sus intereses y con el noble objetivo de lograr la eliminación de las armas nucleares.

En el año 2018, en la revisión de su Postura Nuclear², los Estados Unidos de América condicionan el desarme nuclear apelando a conceptos extremadamente subjetivos y ratifican la tenencia de armas nucleares como un elemento disuasivo.

¹ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-urges-countries-to-withdraw-from-un-nuke-bantreaty/2020/10/21/21918918-13ce-11eb-a258-614acf2b906d_story.html

² <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTUREREVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>

Los Estados Unidos de América viola el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear (TNP), de diversas formas:

1. No cumple con las disposiciones del Artículo VI en cuanto a la reducción de arsenales nucleares,
2. No cumple con los artículos I y III de TNP, debido a su asistencia a Israel para el desarrollo de armas nucleares.
3. No cumple con las disposiciones del artículo IV del TNP que establece el derecho de los Estados a desarrollar la energía nuclear con fines pacíficos para la atención de sus necesidades de desarrollo; imponiendo sanciones nucleares a países como Irán, aunque este desarrolla su programa nuclear de conformidad a lo establecido a resolución 2231 del Consejo de Seguridad.

Sin embargo, este no es el único ámbito en el cual los Estados Unidos de América transgrede el Derecho Internacional. Los Estados Unidos de América posee la mayor reserva de armas químicas del mundo, las cuales han sido utilizadas ampliamente al transcurso de todas sus guerras. Un ejemplo de ello, ha sido el programa del gobierno estadounidense denominado con el código “*Operation Ranch Hand*”, el cual roció más de 20 millones de galones de **productos químicos tóxicos sobre** Vietnam, Camboya y Laos desde 1961 hasta 1971.

Asimismo, los Estados Unidos de América se encuentra entre los pocos países que han desarrollado un programa ofensivo de armas biológicas y, según los informes, usaron tales armas biológicas en la Guerra de Corea de 1950-1953. Estos no solo son hechos del pasado, recientemente, el pasado 29 de septiembre, la comisión especial del Congreso de EEUU ‘*Future of Defense Task Force*’,³ que genera recomendaciones al Pentágono, sugirió el desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial y las armas cibernéticas y biológicas como ejes centrales de su estrategia defensiva, señalando la biotecnología como un nuevo dominio de guerra.

Los Estados Unidos de América, se ha retirado del Tratado de Cielos Abiertos, del Tratado de Fuerzas Nucleares de Rango Intermedio, del Plan de Acción Integral Conjunto con Irán (PAIC), y han afirmado que no renovarían el Tratado de Reducción de Armas Estratégicas, en el marco de un progresivo desmantelamiento del marco regulatorio que ha garantizado la estabilidad y seguridad internacionales durante los últimos 75 años; y avanzar de forma libre en su carrera armamentista.

3 <https://armedservices.house.gov/2020/9/future-of-defense-task-force-releases-final-report>

En el caso específico de Irán, el día 09 de octubre de 2020, el presidente Donald Trump declaró: “Si te metes con nosotros, si nos haces algo malo, te haremos cosas que nunca te han hecho antes”. El presidente de los Estados Unidos tiene por práctica recurrente amenazar con la destrucción total a naciones enteras que son Estados miembros de esta organización. Esta es la verdadera amenaza para la paz y seguridad internacional.

Los Estados Unidos de América desarrollan una política de amenaza progresiva a los Estados que no se pliegan a sus intereses geopolíticos, para ello, viola el Derecho Internacional de forma impune a través de la imposición de medidas coercitivas unilaterales, las cuales no solo coartan el derecho al desarrollo de las naciones, sino su derecho a mantener el apresto operacional de los sistemas defensivos de estos países. La supremacía económica, política y militar de los Estados Unidos de América, está sustentada en el empobrecimiento y el robo de los activos del resto de los países, de la mano de la violación sistemática de la Ley internacional.

Recientemente, los Estados Unidos de América⁴ desarrollan una operación de propaganda y desinformación en contra de mi país al tratar de reinventar una nueva “crisis de los misiles” alegando falsamente la existencia de misiles iraníes de largo alcance en Venezuela para justificar una operación militar de falsa bandera en contra de mi país, así como para obstruir el desarrollo del proceso electoral que tenemos previsto para el 06 de diciembre. Rechazamos categóricamente estas difamaciones a la vez que alertamos a los dignos Estados miembros de esta Organización, que ejercen un rol responsable para la paz y seguridad internacionales, expresado en importantes esfuerzos en pro del desarme y la no proliferación, de las verdaderas intenciones del gobierno estadounidense de pretender crear un nuevo frente de conflicto en una región que históricamente ha sido declarada como zona de paz, en la primera región densamente poblada del planeta en ser declarada como zona libre de armas nucleares, América Latina y el Caribe.

Hacemos llamado a los pueblos del mundo, y a los miembros responsables de la comunidad internacional, a no apoyar esta agresión en contra de mi país, a denunciar este comportamiento irresponsable y guerrillista; y a hacer un llamado a los Estados Unidos de América para que asuma su responsabilidad histórica en lo relativo al cumplimiento y la preservación marco jurídico internacional vigente para el control de armas, el desarme y la no proliferación.

4 www.foxnews.com/politics/us-threatens-to-destroy-iranian-missiles-shipped-to-venezuela.amp

Y para con cluir, qué desafortunado resulta que los Estados Unidos de América utilice su derecho a réplica en el marco de esta Comisión para promover ataques sin sentido contra mi país en el marco de su política de cambio de régimen. Esto no solo demuestra un infinito desprecio contra la importancia de estas deliberaciones, sino también, contra los principios y propósitos de las Naciones Unidas que reconocen la cualidad de autodeterminación de los pueblos. El modelo político o ideológico de una nación de ninguna manera puede constituir un impedimento para el cumplimiento de los compromisos internacionales en materia de desarme y no proliferación.

Muchas gracias.