



General Assembly

Seventy-third session

First Committee

29th meeting

Tuesday, 6 November 2018, 10 a.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Jinga (Romania)

*In the absence of the Chair, Mr. Diarra (Mali),
Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Agenda items 93 to 108 (continued)

Action on draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): Today the Committee will continue to take action on all draft resolutions and draft decisions submitted under agenda items 93 to 108. We will be guided by the ground rules of procedure.

We will first hear from the remaining delegations that requested the floor to explain their votes after the voting on the proposals under cluster 3, “Outer space (disarmament aspects)”.

Ms. Wood (Australia): Australia did not support draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.51, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”. While Australia is committed to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, we do not support either this draft resolution or the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects, introduced by China and the Russian Federation, which the draft resolution promotes. Both would provide limited comfort and could have counterproductive consequences, by allowing the unfettered development of terrestrial and dual-use counterspace systems. Moreover, we have already seen

space objects destroyed by anti-satellite missiles, and the ongoing development of anti-satellite capabilities, including by some sponsors of the draft resolution.

Furthermore, Australia shares the concerns of others about the unusual manoeuvres by a Russian satellite in October 2017. There is no way to verify the satellite’s true purpose or its consistency with the spirit of the no first placement draft resolution. It is such problems with verification and dual-use capability that make credible arms control in outer space so challenging. Ostensibly, civilian satellites can disguise malign purposes. For those reasons, the no first placement draft resolution offers little reassurance about space security, and Australia voted against it.

Australia will continue to engage actively in the Group of Governmental Experts tasked with considering and making recommendations on substantial elements of an international legally binding instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, including, inter alia, on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. We will strive to reach a consensus outcome that we hope will assist in preventing an arms race in outer space.

A crucial step towards that goal is to reinforce processes that will enhance trust and transparency sooner rather than later. That is why Australia supports efforts to strengthen transparency and confidence-building measures, which offer a rapid pathway to improving space security. The 2013 report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (see A/68/189) was agreed by consensus and provides a framework for space

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of speeches delivered in other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506 (verbatimrecords@un.org). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official Document System of the United Nations (<http://documents.un.org>).

18-36238 (E)



Accessible document

Please recycle



safety, security and sustainability, which can be used immediately on a voluntary basis. In contrast, the treaty that China and Russia proposed would seek to regulate specific assets — actual objects in space — and therein lies a minefield of definitional scope and verification issues.

Australia shares the desire to see the benefits of space shared by all and to preserve space as a peaceful domain. As one of only 16 countries to be a State party to all five outer space treaties, Australia has maintained a constructive approach, in good faith, that seeks to secure the safety, security and sustainability of space for all nations. But we cannot support measures we consider to be unbalanced and unworkable, especially when we have legitimate concerns about terrestrial and dual-use threats.

Mr. Nakai (Japan): Japan supports and has worked tirelessly to preserve the long-term safety, sustainability, security and stability of outer space. In that regard, it is important to develop initiatives to ensure confidence and mutual trust among space actors, in particular through transparency and confidence-building. We therefore voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.3, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space”, and A/C.1/73/L.68/Rev.1, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”. We abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.51, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”.

We take this opportunity to express our concerns regarding reported ongoing activities in outer space, with no or little transparency. Transparency is of the utmost importance in promoting space activities. But draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.51 not only fails to address the problem of the lack of transparency, it could also cause further mistrust and misunderstanding for the following reasons.

First, it is our view that the draft resolution does not adequately deal with the question of what constitutes a weapon in outer space. Given the dual-use nature of space objects, it is very difficult to clearly delineate what is and what is not a weapon in outer space. Given the conceptual ambiguity, it is all the more important that countries ensure transparency with regard to their activities and intentions, in order not to fuel mistrust or misunderstanding and undermine trust in outer space.

Secondly, for the same reasons of difficulty in clearly delineating weapons and non-weapons in outer space, we do not believe that the no first placement pledge would be verifiable.

Thirdly, the draft resolution focuses solely on space-based weapons. Japan is seriously concerned about the actual, not abstract, development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons capabilities, including those that are terrestrially based and not addressed in the draft resolution.

Japan reiterates the need to implement the principles of responsible behaviour for outer space activities, which will promote confidence-building. That could also be an important step for international rule-making. In that vein, we encourage all Member States to refrain from any action that increases mistrust or misunderstanding about outer space activities, as well as any that directly or indirectly brings about the damage or destruction of space objects. We encourage all Member States to enhance transparency in their activities in outer space.

Although we abstained in the voting on draft decision A/C.1/73/L.50, entitled “Prevention of an arms race in outer space: further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space”, which is linked to the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, we believe that there are a number of issues that needed to be carefully examined. However, Japan welcomes the discussion in Subsidiary Body 3 of the Conference on Disarmament. Japan has also been constructively engaged in the discussion in the Group of Governmental Experts and will continue that engagement during its next meeting.

Ms. Plath (United States of America): Although the delegation of the United States voted against the draft resolutions, our votes in no way detract from our long-standing support for voluntary transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for outer space activities. The United States national space strategy seeks to foster conducive international environments through bilateral and multilateral agreements. As part of efforts to strengthen stability in outer space, the United States will continue to pursue bilateral and multilateral transparency and confidence-building measures to encourage responsible actions in, and the peaceful use of, outer space. We have repeatedly noted in the First Committee and other forums that clear, practical and confirmable TCBMs, implemented on a voluntary basis, have the potential to strengthen the safety, stability and sustainability of outer space activities for all nations. In particular, the United States continues to note the importance of the 2013 consensus report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities

(see A/68/189). We encourage all nations to continue to review and implement, to the greatest extent practical, the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures contained in that report, through the relevant national mechanisms, on a voluntary basis and in a manner consistent with their national interests.

The United States also encourages Member States to take advantage of forums such as the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to make real progress on transparency and confidence-building measures. In particular, we call for all space-faring nations to begin the practical implementation of the 21 guidelines on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, endorsed by the Committee in June. However, our support for voluntary guidelines for the safe and responsible use of space and other transparency and confidence-building measures ends when such efforts are tied to proposals for legally binding space arms control constraints and limitations. The United States voted no on those two draft resolutions because it believes they make an unacceptable linkage between proposals for voluntary pragmatic TCBMs and the commencement of futile negotiations on fundamentally flawed arms control proposals. In particular, we note the references in draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.51 to the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China, introduced in 2014 at the Conference on Disarmament, which the United States opposes. Our most recent critique of their space arms control treaty is contained in document CD/2129, of August 2018.

The United States would prefer that the space domain remain free of conflict. But, as Vice President Mike Pence recently noted,

“Both China and Russia have been aggressively developing and deploying technologies that have transformed space into a war-fighting domain”.

Therefore, hollow and hypocritical efforts such as the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects — which cannot be confirmed or verified by the international community — are not the answer. Despite that disappointment, the United States will seek to continue to support the practical implementation of space TCBMs by Member States and the relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system. We will also continue to take a leading role in substantive discussions

on space TCBMs at the Conference on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and COPUOS.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to reaffirm that Iran’s explanations of vote after the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.51, entitled “No first placement of weapons in outer space”, and A/C.1/73/L.68, entitled “Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities”, as expressed last year, remain valid.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote after the voting on the proposals under cluster 3.

Turning to informal paper No. 2/Rev.4, the Committee will now consider proposals under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”. Before we begin, I should like to inform delegations that the main sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.53/Rev.1 has requested that action on it be postponed. The same applies to draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, A/C.1/73/L.37 and A/C.1/73/L.41/Rev.1. Specific information on the voting on those draft resolutions will be provided at a later date. Members may consult other draft resolutions for which votes have been requested at the back of the room, along the southern wall. Once the Committee has concluded with informal paper No. 2/Rev.4, we will move on to informal paper No. 3.

I shall now give the floor to speakers who wish to make general statements or to introduce draft resolutions under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”.

I give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39.

Mr. Rodrigo (Sri Lanka): At the outset, my delegation would like to extend our deepest condolences and best wishes to the Chair of the Committee, Ambassador Jinga, and his family at this time.

Under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, under sub-item (II) of agenda item 101, entitled “General and complete disarmament”.

It is well established that cluster munitions pose severe humanitarian threats and social and development consequences. The method of deployment of such explosives, whether launched from the ground or dropped from the air, means that they are indiscriminate and unable to distinguish between military targets and

civilians. There have been more than 21,614 cluster munitions casualties documented globally since 1960, with civilians accounting for a large majority of them.

Sri Lanka acknowledges the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which complements the international legal framework on disarmament, as an important step towards ending the use of such destructive and inhumane weapons. The Convention embodies the concept of humanitarian disarmament and accords the highest priority to the protection of civilians. The increasing number of States that have acceded to the Convention is an acknowledgement that the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions greatly outweighs any perceived military or other benefits. We urge States to see the benefits of the Convention's provisions and help work towards achieving a world free of cluster munitions by acceding to and ratifying the Convention.

Sri Lanka is pleased to have assumed the presidency of the ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and, as is the practice, is sponsoring this year's draft resolution. I would like to acknowledge and thank the many States that participated in the informal discussions and worked on finalizing the draft text that is now before the Committee. Many have subsequently joined in sponsoring the draft resolution.

The draft resolution this year reflects the language and format of those of previous years, with a few technical updates, such as references to the tenth anniversary of the Convention, reports of the Secretary-General on disarmament, revisions to finances and updates on the ratification of the Convention. There have also been new additions with respect to gender. We are pleased to note that the number of sponsors has been increasing daily and stands at 42 as of today. We hope to receive the Committee's support for this important draft resolution.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Mali to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32.

Mr. Coulibaly (Mali) (*spoke in French*): The delegation of Mali has the honour to introduce the annual draft resolution entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them", as contained in document A/C.1/73/L.32, on behalf of the 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) — Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and my own country, Mali.

With respect to form, apart from the necessary technical updates, the draft resolution includes exactly the same terms as the resolution adopted by consensus last year (resolution 72/40). ECOWAS member States very much hope that the tradition of consensus will prevail again this year in the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32.

With regard to substance, the text aims to consolidate stability in the West Africa region by improving regional security and strengthening regional initiatives and efforts aimed at reducing the proliferation of, and illicit trade in, small arms and light weapons. Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32 invites the international community to support the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and Related Materials, which entered into force on 29 September 2009. The draft resolution also invites the international community to provide technical and financial assistance to build capacity in civil society organizations for the purpose of combating the illicit trade in, and collection of, small arms and light weapons. Beyond the Sahel and West Africa region, the draft resolution also expresses the determination of many countries worldwide to combat the illicit trafficking in, and collection of, small arms and light weapons, which have the poor reputation of being some of the world's most feared weapons.

On behalf of the members of ECOWAS, I take this opportunity to thank all countries that have co-sponsored the draft resolution, which my country has the honour of introducing. I would also like to encourage those that have not yet done so to support the draft resolution.

In conclusion, the delegation of Mali reiterates its gratitude to all ECOWAS member States as well as to our technical and financial partners for their support in implementing the draft resolution.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Latvia to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1.

Ms. Vilde (Latvia): In our capacity as the presiding country of the fifth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty, and on behalf of 96 sponsors, I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty".

As we know, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) entered into force in 2014, after 50 States had ratified it. Since then, the number of States parties has continued to grow

and now stands at 99. We expect that number to reach 100 very soon. During this First Committee session, the Latvian delegation conducted one round of open-ended consultations with all interested delegations and tried to accommodate proposals that were made during those consultations to the extent possible. The high number of sponsors of the draft resolution indicates the commitment of States to the object and purpose of the Treaty, namely, contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability, reducing human suffering and promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action.

The Arms Trade Treaty draft resolution is an annual. The proposed text is largely based on last year's resolution 72/44 but incorporates technical changes, where necessary, and reflects on developments in ATT processes. For instance, it includes new language on preventing the diversion of conventional arms for unauthorized end use or to end users, which was the thematic focus of Japan's presidency during the fourth Conference of States Parties to the ATT and was reflected in the outcome document of the Tokyo meeting. It also includes a one-time reference to the outcome of the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, which took place in June. New language on gender dimensions is included in a few paragraphs, which reflects Latvia's priority during its presidency. While underlining the desire to strengthen the ATT in all its aspects, emphasis is also placed on urging all States parties to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.

We would like to express our appreciation to all 96 sponsors for their variable support to the draft resolution. We invite all delegations to support the proposed text.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We will now move onto the second stage and hear from delegations that wish to make statements in explanations of vote before the voting on the proposals under cluster 4.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position on a number of draft resolutions under cluster 4, namely, the proposals contained in documents A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1 and A/C.1/73/L.39.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty" (ATT), and references to the Treaty in other proposals presented to the First Committee, Egypt remains at the forefront of any genuine effort aimed at combating the illicit trafficking in arms and eradicating arms transfers to terrorists and

illegal armed groups. We also actively and constructively participated in the negotiations leading to the adoption of the ATT. Nevertheless, motivations related to the desire of some States to manipulate and politicize the legitimate arms trade led to several shortcomings and loopholes in the Treaty, especially its deliberate lack of several necessary definitions and clear criteria, making the implementation of the Treaty selective and subjective and allowing exporting States to abuse its provisions.

The Treaty also completely ignored the prohibition of the intentional State-sponsored supply of weapons to unauthorized end users, including terrorists and illegal armed groups, which represent the real main threat in that domain. Therefore, my delegation will continue to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, as well as on the paragraphs that refer to the Treaty in the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/73/L.21 and A/C.1/73/L.55.

With regard to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions", Egypt will continue to abstain in the voting on it, in the light of the selective and imbalanced nature of the instrument, which was developed and concluded outside the framework of the United Nations. It lacks an equitable and clear definition of cluster munitions and was deliberately designed to fit the specific production requirements of some States.

Mr. Bourgel (Israel): I would like to deliver a statement in explanation of vote before the voting on operative paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1 and on the seventh preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63.

At the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Israel stated that it did not consider the Programme of Action to be the right venue for considering the issue of ammunition, since another venue had already been chosen for it — the Group of Governmental Experts in 2020 — and voted against the relevant paragraphs in the outcome document. Therefore, we cannot support language that welcomes the outcome document of the third Review Conference.

Mr. Sarukhanyan (Armenia): I would like to deliver a statement in explanation of vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty".

Armenia has consistently supported efforts towards a negotiated comprehensive international instrument that would regulate trade in conventional arms and prevent and eradicate their diversion into illicit markets or their use for illegitimate purposes. We strongly believe that, in order to become an effective, inclusive and viable international instrument, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) should have been adopted by consensus and be inclusive and effective. Armenia has expressed significant concerns about the preamble and principal section of the Treaty. Armenia has been advocating the need for balanced and non-restrictive references to the principles of international law, and in particular for the inclusion of equal rights and the self-determination of peoples in accordance with Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The key objective of the Treaty, which is to encourage and enforce the regulation of the conventional arms trade through strong national control systems, should have been more firmly upheld. We share concerns about the fact that, in its current form, the Treaty might lead to political speculation related to the exercise of the sovereign right to self-defence and hinder legitimate access to relevant technologies.

While remaining a staunch advocate of a robust and legally binding conventional arms control regime, be it at the regional or international level, Armenia maintains its reservations with regard to the Treaty and will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1. Armenia's position concerning the ATT is applicable to all other First Committee draft resolutions that contain a reference to the Treaty. Therefore, Armenia disassociates itself from those paragraphs.

Mr. Robotjazi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position with regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty". We will abstain in the voting on the draft resolution. Iran supports preventing the illicit trade in arms in a non-discriminatory manner. However, my delegation continues to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) for the following reasons.

First, the draft resolution is about an instrument in which the political and commercial interests of certain arms exporting countries have higher priority than the observance of the fundamentals of international law. While the international prohibition on the use of force by one State against another State is the most fundamental

principle of modern international law, the ATT fails to uphold that principle by refraining from prohibiting arms transfers to countries that commit acts of aggression, including foreign occupation. That is a significant loophole and major legal deficiency in the ATT.

Secondly, paragraph 4 of the draft resolution calls upon non-parties to accede to Treaty. Such a call for the universalization of the ATT is unacceptable because the Treaty was not adopted by consensus, due to its substantive flaws and disregard for the concerns and interests of some Member States. Furthermore, some of its States parties are in major violation of its provisions. They export billions of dollars' worth of arms to Israel and countries in the Persian Gulf, where those weapons are used to sow death and destruction by occupiers in Palestine and Yemen — just two examples of such violations.

With regard to operative paragraph 9, while we do not have a problem with the reference to the final outcome document of the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, we cannot accept acknowledging synergies between the Programme of Action and the ATT. For that reason, we will abstain in the voting on that specific paragraph.

Lastly, I stress that our position on the ATT applies to all paragraphs in the draft resolutions and draft decisions that have been or will be adopted by the Committee this year. My delegation therefore disassociates itself from all such references.

Ms. Castro Loredo (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): As in previous years, the Cuban delegation will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty". As we all know, the Treaty, which was adopted prematurely, even before negotiations on it had been concluded, lacks consensus. Regrettably, the Arms Trade Treaty is characterized by significant ambiguities, inconsistencies, imprecisions and legal loopholes, which undermine its effectiveness and efficiency. The Arms Trade Treaty cannot be effective if it does not prohibit, and therefore legitimizes, arms transfers to unauthorized non-State actors, who are the main sources of illicit weapons trafficking. The Treaty is an unbalanced instrument, designed to work in favour of arms-producing States. Established parameters that ensure that those States assess transfer approvals and denials are, by their very nature, subjective, and could

therefore be easily manipulated for political purposes. That hampers the ability of States to acquire and possess weapons for the purposes of legitimate self-defence, as stipulated in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Cuban delegation will also abstain in the voting on operative paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1. We are concerned about the attempts to create artificial synergies between the Arms Trade Treaty and other instruments that are in fact universally accepted. As a result of the deep divisions among Member States, there was no consensus on establishing synergies between the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the Arms Trade Treaty in the final outcome document of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action. Cuba rejects the creation of artificial synergies among legal instruments of varying membership, scope and reference to completely different categories of weapons. Creating such synergies undermines the Programme of Action and its implementation. Our delegation also wishes to place on record that it disassociates itself from paragraphs with references to the Arms Trade Treaty that appear in various draft resolutions on which the First Committee will take action under this cluster.

Cuba also wishes to explain its position on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55, entitled “Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities”. Cuba supports efforts to prevent and combat illicit brokering activities, with full respect for the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international instruments. We believe that draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55 can make a positive contribution to such efforts. We therefore support its adoption. However, as we look towards the future, it is important that the draft resolution not focus on one specific category of weapons, such as small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, it should include additional references to weapons of mass destruction and sophisticated conventional weapons. The reference to the Arms Trade Treaty should be deleted from the ninth preambular paragraph, as the Treaty does not enjoy consensus among all States. I reiterate that the Treaty does not prohibit, and therefore ends up legitimizing, arms transfers to unauthorized non-State actors, who are the main sources of illicit brokering activities.

With regard to the tenth preambular paragraph, we deplore the fact that it takes note of Security Council resolutions that do not even enjoy consensus in this

body, as they did not take into account the urgent need to ban the transfers of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized non-State actors. We welcome the changes made to the fifteenth preambular paragraph, which now recognizes the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security.

Mr. Méndez Graterol (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, including its ninth preambular paragraph. Our country is not party to the Arms Trade Treaty, for we believe that the reasons underlying our initial decision remain valid. Venezuela believes that the drafting of the Arms Trade Treaty lacked balance, both in nature and scope. The Treaty is susceptible to political manipulation and includes inconsistencies that affect its universalization. Furthermore, the Treaty includes criteria that could be used by conventional-weapon exporters to restrict the sovereign right of States to acquire weapons for legitimate self-defence needs, by using arbitrary and subjective arguments. In addition, this legal instrument does not address the serious issues of the overproduction and stockpiling of conventional weapons on the part of major arms manufacturers and exporters. It does not recognize the right of all States to acquire, manufacture, export, import and possess conventional weapons for purposes of legitimate defence and security and disregards the threat posed by arms transfers to unauthorized non-State actors.

Our delegation would like to reiterate that Venezuela is fully committed to preventing, combating and eliminating the illicit trade in weapons and has always believed that the best way to achieve that goal is through international cooperation and the adoption of national, regional and international measures.

Lastly, we disassociate ourselves from references to the Arms Trade Treaty that appear in other draft resolutions under this cluster.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolutions under cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”.

We will first take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

I now give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8 was submitted by the

representative of Latvia on 5 October. Subsequently, a revised draft resolution, A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, was submitted on 29 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Chad, Guinea-Bissau and Liberia have also become sponsors.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): A separate vote has been requested on the eighth preambular paragraph and on operative paragraphs 4 and 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1. I shall therefore put those paragraphs to the vote first, one by one.

I first put to the vote the eighth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia,

Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Yemen, Zimbabwe

The eighth preambular paragraph was retained by 153 votes to none, with 18 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 4.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia,

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cambodia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, United States of America, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zimbabwe

Operative paragraph 4 was retained by 138 votes to none, with 35 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 9.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives,

Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia

Against:

Israel, United States of America

Abstaining:

Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Brazil, Cambodia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zimbabwe

Operative paragraph 9 was retained by 136 votes to 2, with 35 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Uganda, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zimbabwe

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, as a whole, was adopted by 151 votes to none, with 30 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.29, entitled "Information

on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons".

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.29 was submitted by the representative of Argentina on 15 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.29. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Belize, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Montenegro and Panama have also become sponsors.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.29 was adopted.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32, entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them".

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32 was submitted on 15 October by the representative of Mali on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the Economic Community of West African States. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.32. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. The Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Panama have also become sponsors.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.32 was adopted.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions".

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39 was submitted by the representative of Sri Lanka on 16 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.39. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Equatorial Guinea has also become a sponsor.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): A separate recorded vote has been requested on the fourteenth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo,

Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Oman, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe

The fourteenth preambular paragraph was retained by 152 votes to none, with 17 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint

Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia

Against:

Zimbabwe

Abstaining:

Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, Georgia, Greece, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Kuwait, Latvia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, as a whole, was adopted by 139 votes to 1, with 39 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55, entitled "Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities".

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55 was submitted by the representatives of Australia and the Republic of Korea on 17 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.55. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): A separate recorded vote has been requested on the ninth preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin,

Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia

Against

None

Abstaining:

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zimbabwe

The ninth preambular paragraph was retained by 149 votes to none, with 20 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55, as a whole.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay,

Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstaining:

Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of)

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55, as a whole, was adopted by 177 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices". I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60 was submitted by the representative of Afghanistan on 18 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.60. The main sponsors have informed of the following oral revision to the text: the deletion of the twelfth preambular paragraph, which states:

"Noting also the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, Securing our Common Future — An Agenda for Disarmament, and its call for United Nations entities to promote a strengthened and coherent United Nations inter-agency coordination on improvised explosive devices".

I will now read out an oral statement by the Secretariat in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices". The present oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 28 and 31 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, the General Assembly would encourage States in a position to do so to support the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, in consultation with the relevant bodies of the United Nations system, in developing a voluntary self-assessment tool to assist States in identifying gaps and challenges in their national regulation and preparedness regarding improvised explosive devices; and encourage States to continue to hold open, informal consultations, where appropriate, focused on matters of raising awareness, prevention and coordination within the United Nations system and beyond, with information provided by States, international and regional organizations, as

well as experts from non-governmental organizations, including relevant private-sector stakeholders, on efforts to prevent, counter and mitigate the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, which could assist the Assembly in maintaining a comprehensive overview of relevant global activities.

Pursuant to paragraph 28, the development of a voluntary self-assessment tool by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research would be carried out utilizing available extra-budgetary resources.

With regard to the request in paragraph 31, the Office for Disarmament Affairs will continue to support open, informal consultations, where appropriate. It is envisaged that no additional requirements would arise for the implementation of that activity.

Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, no additional requirements would arise under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019, or under the proposed programme budget for 2020.

The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. Armenia, Chad and Turkmenistan have also become sponsors.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60 was adopted.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63 was submitted by the representative of South Africa on 18 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/73/L.63. The additional sponsors are listed in the e-deleGATE portal of the First Committee. The Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Panama, Sao Tome and Principe and Turkmenistan have also become sponsors.

I will now read out an oral statement by the Secretariat in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63,

entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”. The present oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 7, 8 and 24 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63, the General Assembly would decide, pursuant to the schedule of meetings for the period from 2018 to 2024 agreed at the third Review Conference, to convene a one-week biennial meeting of States in 2020 to consider key challenges and opportunities relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument at the national, regional and global levels, for the purposes of preventing and combating the diversion and illicit international transfer of small arms and light weapons to unauthorized recipients, as well as a one-week biennial meeting of States in 2022. The Assembly would also decide to convene the fourth United Nations conference to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2024, preceded by a Preparatory Committee meeting in early 2024 of not more than five days. The Assembly would also decide to request the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its seventy-fourth session on the implementation of the present draft resolution and to take into account, within that report, among other issues, the views of Member States with regard to the recent developments in small arms and light weapons manufacturing, technology and design, particularly polymer and modular weapons, including on their associated opportunities and challenges, as well as their impact on the effective implementation of the International Tracing Instrument, and make recommendations on ways to of addressing them.

Pursuant to the request in paragraph 7, it is envisaged that the one-week biennial meeting of States in 2020 would comprise 10 meetings, over five days, to be held in New York, with interpretation in all six official languages, and constitute an addition to the meetings workload for the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management in 2020. That would entail additional resource requirements in the amount of \$84,000 for meeting services in 2020.

Furthermore, the request for documentation in paragraph 7 would constitute an addition to the documentation workload for the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, namely, five pre-session documents, totalling 21,500 words; two

in-session documents, totalling 13,000 words; and three post-session documents, totalling 16,000, to be issued in all six official languages in 2020. That would entail additional resource requirements in the amount of \$156,700 for documentation services in 2020.

With regard to the one-week biennial meeting of States in 2022 in paragraph 7, as well as the fourth United Nations conference in 2024 and the Preparatory Committee meetings in early 2024, of not more than five days, referred to in paragraph 8, it is understood that all issues related to the meetings, including the date, format, organization and scope, are yet to be determined. Accordingly, in the absence of the modalities for the meeting, it is not possible at the present time to estimate the potential cost implications of the requirements for the meetings and documentation. Upon the decision on the modalities, format and organization of the meeting, the Secretary-General would submit the relevant costs of such requirements, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the dates of meeting will have to be determined in consultations with the Department for General Assembly and Conference Management.

With regard to the information requested in paragraph 24, it is understood that it will be included in the recurrent report of the Secretary-General to General Assembly, at its seventy-fourth session, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects".

Accordingly, the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63 would not give rise to any budgetary implications under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019. The adoption of the draft resolution would result in additional resource requirements in the amount of \$240,700, under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council Affairs and Conference Management, to be included in the proposed programme budget for 2020.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): A separate recorded vote has been requested on the seventh preambular paragraph and on operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63.

I shall first put to the vote the seventh preambular paragraph.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria,

Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Israel, United States of America

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

The seventh preambular paragraph was retained by 173 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I shall now put to the vote operative paragraph 6.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan,

Vanuatu, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Israel, United States of America

Abstaining:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Operative paragraph 6 was retained by 174 votes to 2, with 1 abstention.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63, as a whole, was adopted.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The Committee will now proceed to take action on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects".

I give the floor to the Deputy Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Lomaia (Deputy Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67 was submitted by the representative of the United Kingdom on 18 October. The sponsor of the draft resolution is listed in document A/C.1/73/L.67.

I will now read out an oral statement by the Secretariat in connection with draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67, entitled "Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects". The present oral statement is made in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

Under the terms of paragraphs 15 and 16 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67, the General Assembly would request the Secretary-General to render the assistance necessary and to provide such services as may be required for the annual conferences and experts meetings of the high contracting parties to the Convention and of the high contracting parties to amend Protocol II and Protocol V, as well as for any continuation of the work after the meetings. The Assembly would also request the

Secretary-General, in his capacity as the depositary of the Convention and its Protocols, to continue to inform the General Assembly periodically, by electronic means, of ratifications and acceptances of, and accessions to, the Convention, its amended article 1 and the Protocols.

The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of Member States to the fact that the cost of the annual conferences and experts meetings of the high contracting parties to the Convention and of the high contracting parties to amended Protocol II and Protocol V, under the current financial regime, would be borne by the high contracting parties, as well as by States not parties to the Convention participating in the meetings, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments, adjusted appropriately. Following the established practice, the Secretariat will prepare cost estimates for any continuation of the work after the conferences, for the approval of the high contracting parties.

It is recalled that all activities related to international conventions or treaties that, under their respective legal arrangements, ought to be financed outside the regular budget of the United Nations may be undertaken by the Secretariat only when sufficient funding is received in advance from the States parties to the Convention.

Accordingly, should the General Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67, no additional requirements would arise under the programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): The sponsors of the draft resolution have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt it without a vote. If I hear no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.67 was adopted.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): I will now give the floor to speakers who wish to speak in explanation of vote or position on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mr. Soemirat (Indonesia): Our delegation would like to explain its position with regard to the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55 and to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”, as the two texts are practically connected.

Our delegation abstained in the voting on the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55 and on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, as a whole. While sharing the spirit and goal of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which is to regulate the international trade in

conventional weapons for the purpose of contributing to international and regional peace, our delegation considers that there are still many elements contained in the Treaty that need to be further clarified. For our delegation, it is a matter of principle that the Arms Trade Treaty should always be considered as a confidence-building-measure mechanism and not a sanctions mechanism. There are various elements in the Treaty that might be considered to be impediments for a sovereign country to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity, including for procuring arms through legitimate means.

We are of the view that the Treaty should not hinder or generate potential restrictions, especially for developing countries in the development of their own capabilities. We continue to examine the potential of the ATT to positively contribute to international peace and security. We are therefore ready to continue dialogue with other countries, especially the proponents of the Treaty, as well as the proponents of the draft resolutions in the First Committee, with a view to engaging in more intensive dialogue in future.

Mr. Favre (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): We take the floor to explain our delegation’s position on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”.

Switzerland is seriously concerned about the increasing number of humanitarian challenges posed by improvised explosive devices. Preventing the illicit use of such devices is therefore vital. Although we joined the consensus on the draft resolution, my delegation would like to voice the following concerns.

First, concerns about the humanitarian consequences of improvised explosive devices or their use do not depend upon the status of actors or on their designation, such as whether an armed group is legal or illegal or if a State actor has used an improvised explosive device in an illicit manner.

Secondly, all measures adopted to prevent or combat the use of improvised explosive devices must be in line with international law, as highlighted in the draft resolution. Once again, Switzerland would like to underscore that designating actors as terrorists, criminal or illegal, in any given situation, should not threaten or affect the application and implementation of, and respect for, international law, in particular human rights law and international humanitarian law, in all armed conflicts.

We hope that such concerns will be taken into consideration when the draft resolution is next submitted.

Mr. Hassan (Egypt): I take the floor to explain my delegation's position regarding draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices".

Egypt continues to join the consensus on the draft resolution, which attempts to address an important threat, especially since improvised explosive devices (IEDs) increasingly represent a preferred weapon of choice for terrorists and illegal armed groups. However, despite our support for the draft resolution in its entirety and its overall objectives, we would like to reiterate our strong reservations on the fifteenth preambular paragraph, which imposes language that largely undermines its value and could be interpreted as justifying terrorism and the use of IEDs. We hope that the sponsors of the draft resolution will take that into consideration in future.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): In order to be efficient and work within the time frame set, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that we need an hour to conduct our work on cluster 5. I therefore encourage delegations to be as brief as possible, without prejudice to their right to take the floor.

Ms. Mac Loughlin (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): Argentina abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39. The Republic of Argentina does not possess the prohibited munitions and continues to fight for the total prohibition of such weapons, without exception, or for a considerable reduction in their number, without discrimination.

As everyone is aware, to date the Republic of Argentina has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Argentina participated actively in the entire negotiating process, with a view to adopting an international instrument to achieve the total prohibition of such weapons and that would respond to high humanitarian standards. However, for our country, the text adopted was not sufficiently ambitious. In particular, article 2 and article 21 are considered to be at odds with the goal of the total prohibition of cluster munitions and the principle of non-discrimination.

The situation I have just described has remained unchanged. Nonetheless, considering that Argentina's vision is to promote the total prohibition of such weapons, in line with its national policy on the issue, my

country attends all meetings of the States parties to the Convention as an observer.

Mr. Lim (Singapore): I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions".

Our position on cluster munitions has been clear and open. Singapore voted in favour of the draft resolution. We support initiatives against the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions, especially when directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. With that in mind, in November 2008, Singapore declared an indefinite moratorium on the export of cluster munitions. We also support the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions by regularly attending the meetings of the States parties to the Convention.

Like several other countries, Singapore firmly believes that the legitimate security concerns and the right of self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions might therefore run counter to that notion. Singapore supports international efforts to resolve humanitarian concerns about cluster munitions. We will continue to work with the members of the international community towards a durable and truly global solution.

Mr. Medeiros Leopoldino (Brazil): My delegation asked for the floor to explain its vote on two draft resolutions, namely, A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty", and A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions".

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, Brazil is a long-time supporter of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and is one of its newest States parties. Therefore, Brazil voted in favour of the draft resolution. However, we abstained in the voting on operative paragraph 4, due to the reference made therein to synergies between the ATT and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We believe that the use of the term is inadequate, in the light of, among other factors, the differences between the two instruments in relation to the illegal nature and scope. In that sense, during the informal consultations, we suggested that the term be replaced by "complementarities", which would be consistent with the reference to other conventional weapons instruments in operative paragraph 7 of the draft resolution. We hope that we can align those two paragraphs at the next session, which would, *inter alia*,

contribute to a more constructive dialogue with States that are not parties to the ATT.

Turning now to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, I would like to explain Brazil's abstention in the voting on the text. Brazil has supported efforts at the United Nations to address cluster munitions, in particular discussions related to the adoption of a protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on the issue. We actively participated in the negotiations in the framework of the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention, whose objective was the adoption of a legally binding instrument that would lead to the gradual banning of cluster munitions.

Brazil did not participate in the Oslo process. In our view, the establishment of a parallel negotiating process to the CCW was neither consistent with the objective of strengthening the Convention nor with the goal of promoting the adoption of universal, balanced, effective and non-discriminatory arms-control instruments. We consider that there are serious loopholes in the Oslo Convention. For instance, it allows the use of cluster munitions equipped with technologically sophisticated mechanisms for an indefinite period of time. Such mechanisms are present only in those munitions manufactured in a very small number of countries with more advanced defence industries. The effectiveness of the Convention is also undermined by article 21, which is known as the interoperability clause. Brazil is a party to all CCW protocols, including its Protocol V, on explosive remnants of war. Brazil has never used cluster munitions. Not having joined the Oslo Convention does not imply that Brazil is not bound by regulations applicable to the possible use of cluster munitions, which would, in any case, be subject to international humanitarian law.

Mr. Kawalowski (Poland): I take the floor on behalf of Estonia, Finland, Greece, Romania and, my own country, Poland, to explain our abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions", as a whole.

We will continue to support international efforts aimed at addressing the humanitarian, socioeconomic and security impact of conventional weapons, including cluster munitions, and halting their indiscriminate use, especially when they are directed at innocent and defenceless civilians. We are convinced that respect for relevant international law is crucial to ensuring the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. In that context,

we support the humanitarian goal of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

At the same time, we believe that humanitarian concerns must be balanced with the legitimate security concerns of States, as well as their military and defence needs. We believe that the most competent and effective framework for addressing the issue of cluster munitions is the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), since it includes the main producers, possessors and users, as well as non-users. As high contracting parties to the CCW and all its five additional protocols. We remain firmly committed to fulfilling all our obligations under the CCW umbrella.

Bearing in mind the reasons I mentioned, we abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

Ms. Bhandari (India): I asked for the floor to explain India's vote on two draft resolutions under cluster 4.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled "The Arms Trade Treaty", India has strong and effective national export controls with respect to the export of defence items. India fully subscribes to the objectives of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and our export-control system is broadly aligned to its requirements. As part of its commitment to international transparency measures, India submits an annual report under the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for the same categories of conventional weapons that are regulated under the ATT. India continues to keep the ATT under review from the perspective of a defence, security and foreign policy interest. We therefore abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1.

India voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.55, entitled "Preventing and combating illicit brokering activities", as we support the objectives that the text seeks to promote. However, we were forced to abstain in the voting on the ninth preambular paragraph, which contains a reference to the ATT, to which India is not a party.

Mr. Lee Jang-geun (Republic of Korea): My delegation would like to explain our position on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled "Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions".

The Government of the Republic of Korea fully shares the concerns of the international community about the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions and supports its efforts to address the humanitarian problems arising from their use. However, due to the

unique security situation on the Korean peninsula, my Government is currently not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which bans the use of all cluster munitions. Therefore, my Government abstained in the voting on the draft resolution.

My delegation would like to share with Member States that the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Korea adopted a directive on cluster munitions in 2008. According to the directive, only cluster munitions that are equipped with self-deactivation devices and that would not result in more than a 1 per cent failure rate can be included in acquisition plans. The directive also recommends the development of alternative weapons systems that could replace cluster munitions over the long term. The Republic of Korea will continue its efforts to mitigate the humanitarian problems associated with the use of cluster munitions in a constructive manner.

Furthermore, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to the Pyongyang joint declaration, which was agreed at the latest inter-Korean summit, held in September. The declaration notes that the two Koreas will pursue a substantial removal of the danger of war across the entire Korean peninsula and the fundamental resolution of the hostile relations. A number of concrete actions are already under way, including the removal of mines from a couple of select areas. I hope that such efforts will eventually spill over to other areas of conventional weapons.

Mr. Jadoon (Pakistan): My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

Pakistan participated in the 2015 Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) as a non-signatory observer State. As a matter of principle, Pakistan does not support the conclusion of important international treaties, especially those related to arms control and disarmament, such as the CCM, outside the United Nations framework. Pakistan considers the multilateral framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) as the most appropriate forum for addressing the issue of cluster munitions. The strength of the CCW lies in its legal framework, which strikes a delicate balance between the need to minimize human suffering without sacrificing the legitimate security interests of States.

Although Pakistan has never used cluster munitions in any military conflict or internal operations, we consider cluster munitions as legitimate weapons with recognized

military utility. We support international efforts to address the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of cluster munitions and, as such, welcome efforts to mitigate the negative consequences. Strict adherence to international humanitarian law would help address the humanitarian concerns arising from the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions. Pakistan also supports efforts for improving the reliability of cluster munitions so that the issue of explosive remnants of war is adequately addressed.

We also joined the consensus on the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”. We share the concerns about the indiscriminate effects arising from the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by illegal armed groups and terrorists. Numerous Pakistani civilians and security personnel have suffered gravely on that account. Several issues that the draft resolution seeks to address can be best addressed through existing frameworks. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, in particular its amended Protocol II, provides the most appropriate forum for considering the issue of IEDs. The CCW forum has the right expertise and technical focus to deal with it in the most effective manner. It also provides pathways for international assistance and cooperation, which are critical for addressing the challenges associated with IEDs.

Ms. Pachoumi (Cyprus): I take the floor in explanation of our abstention in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, entitled “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”.

Cyprus attaches great importance to the application of restrictions and prohibitions of weapons deemed excessively injurious or which might have indiscriminate effects. In that regard, Cyprus is a State party to all protocols to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Furthermore, our national policy and legislation are in full compliance with European Union standards and regulations.

Cyprus signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2009, and the relevant legislation for its ratification was forwarded to Parliament in 2011. However, the ratification process is still ongoing due to considerations related to the abnormal security situation on the island. We remain hopeful that those issues will be resolved, which would then enable us to ratify the Convention and vote in favour of the draft resolution in future.

Ms. Plath (United States of America): This explanation of vote applies to draft resolutions

A/C.1/73/L.63, entitled “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”, and A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, entitled “The Arms Trade Treaty”.

The United States has repeated continuously at every meeting related to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects for the past 17 years that the issue of ammunition is outside the scope of the Programme of Action. In fact, the inclusion of ammunition did not achieve consensus in 2001. The United States voted against the inclusion of ammunition in the outcome document of the third Review Conference in June. We strongly and unequivocally oppose the inclusion of ammunition language in the final outcome document of the third Review Conference. As such, we cannot accept language in this venue that characterizes the outcome of the Review Conference as a success, when consensus on two paragraphs on a highly controversial issue was clearly not achieved.

My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39. The United States notes that the draft resolution includes references to “the principles of humanity” and “the dictates of public conscience”. Those are phrases also used in the Martens clause, various forms of which are reflected in several law of war treaties. Although the United States believes the principles of humanity and the dictates of public conscience can be part of a relevant and important paradigm for discussing ethical or policy issues related to warfare, the Martens clause is not a rule of international law that prohibits any particular weapon, including cluster munitions. In general, the lawfulness of the use of a type of weapon under international law does not depend on an absence of authorization, but instead on whether or not the weapon is prohibited. The United States does not accept that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm or prohibition in customary international law on the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict.

It strongly remains the view of the United States that, when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions provide an effective and necessary capability to engage area targets, including mass enemy formations, and can produce less collateral damage than highly explosive unitary weapons alone. Although cluster munitions remain an integral part of United States force capabilities, the United States is committed to reducing the potential for unintended harm to civilians and civilian objects caused by either the misuse of cluster munitions

or the use of cluster munitions that generate an inordinate amount of unexploded ordnance.

Under the United States Defense Department’s 2017 cluster munitions policy, the Department will procure only cluster munitions containing sub-munitions that either do not result in more than 1 per cent unexploded ordnance or that possess advanced safety features to minimize the risk posed by unexploded sub-munitions. It may also procure munitions not prohibited by the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Additionally, under United States law, the United States does not transfer cluster munitions to other countries, except those with sub-munitions that do not result in more than 1 per cent unexploded ordnance after arming.

Mr. Ghaniei (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation’s vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.39, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions”, and A/C.1/73/L.60, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39, as a general principle we believe that negotiations on disarmament subjects, due to the fact that they address important issues such as States’ security concerns and interests, require a balanced and comprehensive approach, a progressive, transparent and inclusive process and a consensus-based decision-making procedure. That is essential, as is stressed in the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to

“ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage” (*resolution S-10/2, para. 29*).

We continue to share the view of many delegations that the Convention on Cluster Munitions was negotiated and concluded in an exclusive process outside the United Nations disarmament machinery that disregarded the interests of many States. Such efforts to circumvent the United Nations disarmament machinery should not be allowed and should not be encouraged or promoted by the General Assembly. My delegation abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.39 because, first, Iran did not participate in its negotiations and is neither a signatory nor a party to the Convention. Secondly, Iran is unwilling to legitimize instruments negotiated outside the United Nations that disregard the main security concerns and interests of many States.

With regard to draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, Iran supports measures to counter the threat posed by illegal armed groups and terrorists' use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). We therefore joined the consensus in adopting the draft resolution. We believe that the draft resolution's sole purpose is preventing and combating the use of IEDs by terrorists and illegal armed groups, and therefore that any interpretation of its provisions should be consistent with that purpose. Also, since it is almost impossible to define the items that can be used to manufacture IEDs, and because many of those items have civilian applications and interpretations beyond the exclusive purpose of the draft resolution, restricting free access to or trade in such equipment and goods for civilian uses is unacceptable.

Mr. Hwang (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects". The draft resolution was adopted by consensus, in spite of the request — itself in spite of the highly commendable and tireless efforts of its three sponsors, Colombia, Japan and South Africa — that two paragraphs on the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects be put to the vote.

As the Committee knows, in June my country presided over the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. We are all aware of the high priority that France assigned to it, so I will not reiterate it. However, I want to emphasize that above and beyond substance in this area, our methodology is just as important. The methodology of multilateralism is consensus, which unites us all. It means holding one's ground, sometimes with difficulty, but also being ready to accept reasonable compromises that enable us to move forward while protecting everyone's interests.

The report of the third Review Conference (A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3), only three paragraphs of which received negative votes, reflects the overall position of every State. It therefore made no sense to vote against the two paragraphs in draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63 for which a separate vote was requested today. I would like to underscore that the results of the voting on the draft resolution were overwhelming. It made even less sense if we all recall that the outcome document itself was adopted unanimously. Every State represented here

today voted in favour of it. Once again, there were no votes against it, and the same should have obtained today.

Ms. Castro Loreda (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): The Cuban delegation joined the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled "Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices", because we share the concerns about the humanitarian consequences of the indiscriminate use of improvised explosive devices on civilians. However, our support for the draft resolution as a whole does not mean that we agree with all its content. It is important to ensure that the scope of the draft resolution remains clearly limited to the use of such devices by terrorists, illegal armed groups and other unauthorized actors, and that the inherent right of States to their legitimate self-defence be underscored, in line with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. That approach is what makes the draft resolution acceptable to my delegation.

We want to reiterate our reservations about the fifteenth preambular paragraph. We are concerned about the restrictive view of transfers of dual-use components of improvised explosive devices, which does not recognize the legitimate right of States to have access to this type of commercial material. We do not agree with that approach or with the language in operative paragraph 19, which could legitimize the diversion of commercial explosives and detonators for use in illegal trade and transfers to illegal armed groups, terrorists and other unauthorized recipients. We believe that sharing information related to countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, which is requested of States in operative paragraph 20, should be voluntary. We are also concerned about the proliferation of initiatives on improvised explosive devices proposed in operative paragraphs 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, which were developed without the endorsement of or consultation with all member States. Cuba believes that many of them should be thoroughly addressed within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which is the right forum for such discussions.

With regard to the content of the twenty-second preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 24 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, concerning mines, we believe that this is not the place for determining mine classifications and definitions. That issue should be addressed through the relevant instruments and should achieve the necessary consensus among all States. Instead of creating new forums for discussion and reports, which would require additional human resources and financial

contributions from States, it would be better to attempt to make the most effective use of existing forums. We want to ensure that the measures being adopted, and the means being used, to implement this draft resolution comply with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I would like to explain our vote on some draft resolutions, including draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63, “The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects”.

My country, Syria, attaches great importance to the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects and the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. From the start of the third Review Conference, my delegation stressed that there the Conference had no mandate to amend the 2001 Programme of Action. However, some subjects were inserted into the outcome document adopted by a vote at the end of the Conference (A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3), harmonizing and creating links between the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. There are 169 targets in the 2030 Agenda. Only one of them relates to arms, and it is very general. Another issue was that some delegations, on false pretexts, insisted on rejecting references in the document to illicit armed groups. References to preventing the transfer or trafficking of such arms were included only in the political declaration. We request that such language be included when referring to the prevention of the transfer of small arms and light weapons to terrorists and unauthorized recipients.

The Review Conference was an opportunity to address challenges and shortcomings in the implementation of the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument in a complete, balanced and effective manner. My delegation had eagerly awaited the outcome document, expecting it to address challenges such as the transfer and smuggling of small arms and light weapons to terrorist groups and unauthorized recipients by some States that continue to insist that they are committed to implementing the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument. Despite that, we voted in favour of the two paragraphs of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.63 that were put to a separate vote. We also voted in favour of the third Review Conference outcome document, because we believe in the importance

of shielding peoples from the scourge of wars imposed on them, as has been the case with the terrorist war imposed on Syria. We hope it will help to ensure the aspirations of peoples in Africa and the Caribbean. Despite all of that, while we still have some reservations on the outcome document, Syria will implement it, in line with our Constitution and national laws.

We once again abstained in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.8/Rev.1, “The Arms Trade Treaty”. We worked with other delegations at the two conferences reviewing and adopting the Treaty with the aim of adopting a good arms trade treaty, not just any treaty that would be used to put pressure on other countries, as has been the case with some other instruments. We would never have been against the Treaty if it been adopted the right way, by consensus. Regrettably, the Arms Trade Treaty merely protects the interests of certain arms-producing countries that are parties to it, at the expense of the concerns and security of a large group of other countries. The most dangerous part of the Treaty is that some of the States that repeatedly urged for its adoption are providing arms, material and ammunition to groups that are on the Security Council’s list of terrorist groups. That raises a question about what the States parties to the Treaty are doing to address the grave violations perpetrated by some of its States parties. Are they not providing non-State parties and terrorist groups with arms, material and ammunition? We would like to place on record our reservations about all the paragraphs that were or will be adopted with references to the Arms Trade Treaty.

Lastly, we have some reservations about draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”. We expect its sponsors to take countries’ concerns into account, particularly because the main aim of the text is to prevent terrorists from possessing or using improvised explosive devices or acquiring their components, and from gaining experience that would help them assemble and manufacture such devices.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote or position on cluster 4, “Conventional weapons”.

The Committee will now turn to cluster 5, “Other disarmament measures and international security”. In the interests of managing our time sensibly, I would like to remind delegations to keep their statements brief so that we can complete the voting process.

Before we take action on cluster 5, I have some additional information on draft resolutions A/C.1/73/L.15 and A/C.1/73/L.49. We have been informed that the request that operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.15 be put to the vote has been withdrawn, but that the draft resolution as a whole will still be put to the vote. With regard to A/C.1/73/L.49, operative paragraph 3 will be put to a vote, but the request for a recorded vote on the draft resolution as a whole has been withdrawn.

We will now take action on cluster 5. I will first give the floor to delegations wishing to speak in explanation of vote before the voting.

Mr. Willemaers (Belgium) (*spoke in French*): I am taking the floor to explain my delegation's vote before the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.12, "Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium".

Belgium will vote in favour of the draft resolution. On 11 May 2007, Belgium enacted a law classifying as prohibited weapons inert munitions and armour containing depleted uranium or any other kind of general industrial uranium, which entered into force in 2009. Belgium is therefore the first country in the world to ban such weapons, based on the principles of precaution and prudence. The law was preceded by parliamentary hearings at which scientists spoke. Various opinions were put forward with regard to assessing the threat posed to health and the environment by the use of weapons containing depleted uranium. Belgium pays very close attention to all developments in the scientific analysis of the dangers linked to the use of weapon systems containing depleted uranium, including international research on the issue. Belgium is happy to assist the United Nations and its Member States with information regarding the definitions, objectives and modalities of the law of 11 May 2007.

We hope that the draft resolution to be adopted in the First Committee can contribute to a better understanding at the international level of the possible effects of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium, so that we can reach agreement on the issue.

Mr. Cleobury (United Kingdom): I would like to make three explanations of position before the voting, the first of them on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.65/Rev.1, entitled "Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament", on which I have the honour to speak on behalf of France, the United States and my own country, the United Kingdom.

We support the draft text because we believe that it is useful for highlighting the benefits and challenges of the development of science and technology in the fields of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. It rightly emphasizes the importance of remaining closely informed about the most recent scientific and technological developments and regulating the transfer of sensitive technologies for peaceful uses in order to address the risk of proliferation by State or non-State actors. The issue is regularly discussed in many forums, including the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Conference on Disarmament. We want to underscore that the rights referred to in the fifth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution are those noted in the specific provisions of a limited number of treaties — the CCW, the BWC and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As the paragraph makes clear, States must exercise those rights in accordance with their international obligations, including their obligations under those three treaties. As States parties to those treaties, the United Kingdom, the United States and France will comply with their respective international obligations and expect all other parties to do the same. It should be added that none of the three treaties recognizes a right to technologies or sensitive materials.

I would now like to make two additional explanations of position on behalf of the United Kingdom and France. The first is on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.11, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development". France and the United Kingdom will join the consensus on this draft resolution. We support the effective practical linkages between disarmament issues and development policy, particularly in the areas of conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

That said, we feel it necessary to make our position clear on other aspects of the text. The notion of a symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development appears questionable to us, because the conditions conducive to effective arms control and disarmament are not necessarily dependent on development alone, as can be seen from some developing countries' growing military expenditures. There is no automatic link between the two but rather a complex relationship that this notion does not adequately capture. Moreover, the idea according to which military expenditure directly diverts funding from development requirements requires a nuanced

approach, as defence investments are also necessary for delivering the peace and security that facilitate development, including through legitimate military operations, peacekeeping and an improved response to natural disasters. Lastly, we consider that the report (A/59/119) of the Group of Governmental Experts on the relationship between disarmament and development, referred to in the draft resolution, did not give sufficient credit to unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions in disarmament and non-proliferation.

Finally, I would like to deliver the following explanation of position on behalf of France and the United Kingdom, which will join the consensus on draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.13, "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control". We want to make it clear that France and the United Kingdom operate under stringent domestic environmental-impact regulations for many activities, including the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. We see no direct connection, as stated in the draft resolution, between general environmental standards and multilateral arms control.

Climate change is one of the most serious challenges facing our world. It poses a threat to the environment, global security and economic prosperity. In that respect, France and the United Kingdom are strongly committed to the fight against climate change. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change constitute our common road maps for transforming our economies and our energy models in that regard. We reaffirm our attachment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement, as well as our determination to intensify our efforts to live up to our ambitions and our responsibilities to future generations.

Mr. Bourgel (Israel): I would like to explain our vote before the voting on the ninth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.35, "Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures".

At the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, Israel stated that we do not consider the Programme of Action to be the right forum for the issue of ammunition, since another platform, a 2020 group of governmental experts on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in

surplus, has already been chosen for it, and we voted against the relevant paragraphs in the outcome document (A/CONF.192/2018/RC/3). We therefore cannot support language that welcomes the outcome document of the third Review Conference.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We have heard the last speaker in explanations of vote before the voting on cluster 5. Given the time we have left, it will no longer be possible to conduct the voting on the draft resolutions under cluster 5 this morning. With the Committee's permission, we will postpone the voting until later and hear from delegations wishing to speak in exercise of the right of reply on cluster 4.

The representative of the United States of America has asked to speak on a point of order.

Ms. Plath (United States of America): I am a bit confused as to why we are not proceeding with the voting right now when we have more than 30 minutes left and most of the draft resolutions before us will be adopted by consensus, with a few votes on separate paragraphs. It seems that we have plenty of time to conclude a voting block and make some progress here today.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We have requests for the floor in exercise of the right of reply on cluster 4, whose voting we have concluded. It would therefore be difficult to grant those requests and conclude the voting process on cluster 5 in the time we have left.

I now give the floor to delegations wishing to speak in exercise of the right of reply on cluster 4.

Mr. Ji Haojun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The representative of the United States asked why we could not proceed with the voting on cluster 5. The answer lies in the question itself. At the start of the meeting this morning, the representative of the United States made unfounded accusations about the Chinese and Russian proposal for a treaty preventing the placement of weapons in outer space. China would like to respond as follows.

First, with regard to the accusation by the United States that China is turning outer space into a fighting domain, we must point out that this accusation is entirely baseless. China has always advocated for the prevention of the weaponization of, and an arms race in, outer space. All Chinese activities in outer space have been conducted solely for peaceful uses. However, the activities of the United States are aimed at the exact opposite. Starting with the so-called Star Wars plan, the actions of the United States in the weaponization of outer

space, and those activities are well known. Many United States policy papers agitate for space wars. In a speech on 13 March 2018, President Trump stated:

(spoke in English)

“We have the Air Force. We will have the space force ... We are finally going to lead again. We are going to lead the way in space”.

He recognizes that space is a fighting domain. Please note that President Trump said “recognizes that space is a ‘war-fighting domain’”. It is not that some country turns space into a war-fighting domain. To continue with President Trump’s remarks, he said, “[J]ust like the land, air and sea, we may even have a space force”. And in a speech on 18 June, he said, “It is not enough to merely have an American presence in space. We must have American dominance in space”.

(spoke in Chinese)

It is self-evident which country wants to turn outer space into a war-fighting domain and is doing so. In that regard, I would like to share two Chinese sayings with the Committee. The first is that it is the thief who cries “Stop thief!” The second is that when stealing a bell, one covers one’s ears.

Secondly, with regard to the verification of a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the implementation of international treaties should be based on good faith on the part of all countries first and foremost. Verification is not a *sine qua non*. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was concluded decades ago, yet in the absence of verification, its implementation has largely been very satisfactory. So far no countries have seriously violated the Convention. Speaking of the verification of the BWC, the international community will recall that at the suggestion of the United States, we negotiated a very informative and detailed protocol. However, just as the protocol was about to be concluded, the United States suddenly changed its mind, claiming that it no longer wanted the protocol. The international community’s efforts over the years were therefore wasted. In other words, for some countries, verification is not an issue of feasibility but rather of whether they want it or not. With respect to the verification of outer-space activities, from a technological perspective, the issue is not whether it is feasible or viable but whether or not its costs can be justified. Provided that sufficient resources are invested and with the development of outer-

space technology, it will certainly be feasible to conduct verification activities.

Thirdly, with regard to the relationship between transparency and confidence-building measures and legal instruments, China believes that such measures can either be independent security and arms-control measures or a component of international arms-control treaties. In certain circumstances, transparency and confidence-building measures can also be a component of the machinery for verifying compliance. Such measures and legal instruments are therefore mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive. That is an inherent link, not one established by a certain country. We often hear United States representatives discussing transparency and confidence-building measures in relation to various regimes for various treaties. Can that be viewed as establishing a link? If the United States does not like that link, I hope that in the future, within the framework of legal instruments such as the BWC and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, representatives of the United States will no longer discuss transparency and confidence-building measures.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) *(spoke in Russian)*: The Russian delegation fully shares the opinions just expressed by our Chinese colleague. The delegation of the United States has once again allowed itself to make unfounded accusations about Russia and China regarding the issue of the militarization of outer space. Such actions from a nuclear-weapon State and a permanent member of the Security Council are totally unacceptable. We will exercise our right of reply to draw the Committee’s attention to the flood of deception that we have all had the opportunity to hear today from various Western countries in their attempts to justify why, on Washington’s orders, they have decided not only to disregard their own priorities on preventing an arms race in outer space but to begin undermining the efforts of the entire international community in this important arena.

For many years now we have all been urging the United States to refrain from placing weapons in outer space. We have all proposed that we agree that weapons will never be placed in outer space. We have all proposed that we agree never to use force in outer space against objects in outer space, against outer-space objects from Earth or from outer space against objects on Earth. We are all trying to develop universal terms for weapons in outer space. What has the response been? The United States, and now its Western allies as well, pretend they have

heard none of it and continue to affirm their pathetic and entirely unsubstantiated reasons for why they apparently cannot support the efforts of the entire international community to prevent an arms race in outer space. Our Western partners continue to dissemble, being unwilling to answer for all of us a simple and quite understandable question. Will there be weapons in outer space tomorrow or not?

Without an answer to that question, at least on a political level, it will be impossible to reach an agreement on security in outer-space activities. Needless to say, we can all see that in its current circumstances, the United States, a nuclear-weapon State and permanent member of the Security Council, terrifying us all with its carelessness, has been repudiating almost all its obligations, even those that are legally binding and even those affirmed by the Security Council. Regrettably, that is the reality of our world today, whether we like it or not. We have no other United States of America, and we must therefore live and work with what we have. It is clear that the negative reaction of the United States to every proposal for preventing an arms race in outer space is certainly not because they are ineffective, but rather the reverse. The major efforts that the United States, and now its allies, are proposing in order to discredit any initiative on the part of the international community to prevent an arms race in outer space clearly show how important, necessary and timely such initiatives are. Our Western partners do not want to respond to the key question, which is whether they will place weapons in outer space tomorrow or not.

The Russian initiative on the no first placement of weapons in outer space has now become a reliably international one reflecting the greatest possible degree of transparency, confidence, trust and responsibility in inter-State relations. It is simple and clear. States are taking on the political obligation not to be the first to place weapons in outer space at the highest level. If we can ensure that all States honour that commitment, we will have put a reliable political obstacle in the way of the placement of weapons in outer space. And then we can launch full-fledged negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive, legally binding treaty on preventing the placement of weapons in outer space and preventing the use of force against outer-space objects, both from Earth and from outer space itself. That means that all the concerns that our Western partners are talking about could be resolved at the Conference on Disarmament through full-fledged negotiations.

The very fact that the initiative on the no first placement of weapons in outer space has become an important political factor that Washington cannot ignore is a source of annoyance to it. The reasons for the negative reaction of the United States to the Russian-Chinese draft agreement on the placement of weapons in outer space are similar. What we are proposing is very clear and simple. We should all sit down at the negotiation table and discuss all the issues. But the United States does not like that idea. The fact is that Washington does not want to talk or agree with anyone about anything. Washington still believes that it can dominate everyone, everywhere, but clearly that is not the case. Neither Russia nor any other genuinely sovereign State will ever agree to that. Unfortunately, the United States in no way wants to recognize that objective reality of today's world.

Washington is very concerned about the fact that the efforts of the international community to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space undermine its desire to achieve full, uncontrolled domination of the rest of the world in outer space. That is discussed in its military space doctrine, which openly states that the United States will make every possible effort to ensure that it can dominate every other State in outer space. Let us compare that with the defence doctrine of the Russian Federation, which clearly states that its priority is to promote equal access for all to outer-space activities for peaceful purposes and to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Look at the difference between the doctrinal approach of Russia and the United States. Apparently what Washington needs is an excuse for imposing yet another arms race, this time in outer space. Regrettably, no politicians in the United States are willing to see how catastrophic that would be, no less catastrophic than the nuclear arms race that the United States began back in the day, after bombing Nagasaki and Hiroshima with atomic weapons.

Ms. Plath (United States of America): You were right, Mr. Chair, we did need the extra time. I am glad we will be able to hear my right of reply.

When my Assistant Secretary for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance sat in this chair no more than two weeks ago (see A/C.1/73/PV.15), I think she very clearly outlined for member States here the aggressive action that China has been taking with regard to its space activities. We should not forget its very aggressive act in 2007 involving its anti-satellite-testing ballistic missile,

which created more than 3,400 pieces of space debris that the space station must make critical strategic manoeuvres to avoid to this day. On the subject of aggressive activity in space, more than 11 years after that test we are still experiencing the results of China's activities in space, and I do not think that anyone could say the same about the United States. In 2013, China also fired a ballistic missile more than 32,000 kilometres into space, just short of geostationary orbit, where critical United States satellites are positioned. That is an aggressive move by any definition. Let us be clear. My Chinese colleague likes to cite colloquialisms. We have a saying in America too — let us call a spade a spade.

The proposed treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space is nothing more than an obvious tool that China and Russia are using in order to continue their aggressive space activities and their military posturing in space, while the rest of us, including the United States, abide by international treaties and obligations. It is merely a smokescreen for providing legitimate cover for their covert space activities. We have no intention of being the only member State that abides by a treaty while China continues to increase its activities in space. I thank my Chinese colleague for quoting my President and Vice President. As he might also have noted, my President and Vice President also said that the United States will defend itself, whether on land, sea, in the air or in space, and we have made that clear.

Mr. Yermakov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): I would like to thank our American colleague for raising the very important subject of compliance with international treaties. We heard an expression from the American delegation that its Department of State always includes in its yearly report, which is that the United States is fully committed to its international obligations. We now have a very interesting situation. Let us consider whether there is even one international arms-control obligation that the United States has not violated. Let us look back to where it all began.

It started in 2001, when the United States withdrew from the foundational Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Even then it did serious damage to the entire system of strategic stability and international security, essentially paving the way for an unrestrained strategic arms race. Since this century began the United States has been speeding up its preparations for placing strike missiles in Earth orbit, both for missile defence and probably some other kinds of purposes as well. That is not something recent. The United States has been preparing for all of

this since the end of the 1990s, and we have had intensive talks with it on the subject. That is not a fabrication but a fact that the Americans cannot deny.

To that end, the United States is now in its second decade of blocking the consideration of any proposals on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Moreover, Washington has even contrived to oblige its European colleagues to repudiate notions that were once priorities for them, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Against that backdrop of preparations by the United States for the extraordinarily dangerous venture of introducing weapons into space, the countries of the West have begun to spread absurd accusations against Russia and China, which all of us here have unfortunately had to witness. They are trying to tell us that it is not they who have been preparing for a major arms race in outer space for what is now almost 20 years but rather Russia and China that have been doing something in that regard. But that is not so, and I do not think they will be able to deceive the international community that way any longer.

Let us consider the other treaties that the United States has continued to violate so treacherously. To take the example of what has been going on with respect to what we can assume is a vital agreement for the prohibition of biological weapons, the United States blocked the work on a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. Every other State was ready to strengthen it, but with one stroke the United States decided to end our joint efforts. Does the United States position benefit that agreement? I am very sorry to have to say that the list of these examples of the so-called adherence of the United States to such agreements is a long one. But we have other forums and times for discussing that.

Mr. Ji Haojun (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I feel obliged to respond to the accusations made just now by the representative of the United States about China's 2007 testing, which was done for the peaceful purpose of disposing of a satellite that was about to fall out of orbit. We should point out that the United States was the first country to carry out anti-satellite missile testing and has conducted most such tests. I want to highlight a few very simple examples of those numerous tests. In 1959, a B-52 bomber launched an anti-satellite missile aimed at destroying the Explorer VI satellite. That test failed. On 13 October of the same year, the United States carried out a similar test, which was successful. In 1960, the United States used nuclear warheads to conduct tests for destroying nuclear missiles. In October of that year, the United States Air Force conducted a test over the

Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean in which it fired a medium-range missile into near-Earth space carrying the equivalent of a 1-megaton nuclear warhead. The explosion was capable of destroying satellites within a range of 1,000 kilometres. That insane plan had an insane result. The nuclear warhead not only blew the target satellite apart, it also destroyed a nearby British satellite. There are a number of examples of this, which I will not cite one by one, but if the delegation of the United States is willing, we can continue this another time.

Ms. Plath (United States of America): I thank my Chinese colleague so much for the Wikipedia lesson. All I can say is that if that test was China's effort at "peaceful purposes", I have to fundamentally question his definition of aggressive behaviour and the benign intentions he touts in continuing to advance a very deeply flawed and unverifiable "peaceful" draft treaty.

The Acting Chair (*spoke in French*): We have heard the last speaker in exercise of the right of reply.

Before we adjourn, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to two points. It is important that we all understand that we are slightly behind in our programme of work, due mainly to the interest that delegations have shown in making statements. The Committee will recall that there are no official meetings tomorrow, Wednesday, and that therefore we have only Thursday left. In consultation with the Bureau and the Secretariat, we are working to provide an extra meeting to enable us to make up the delay. We may therefore have one meeting next week. Nothing has been decided yet, and we are still working on it, but it is important to ensure that the Committee is aware of the situation. We hope that detailed information will be available at the next meeting. We are counting on the cooperation of all delegations, and in that spirit, we urge Committee members to make their statements more concise.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.