



# General Assembly

Seventy-third session

## First Committee

**22**<sup>nd</sup> meeting

Tuesday, 30 October 2018, 10 a.m.  
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Jinga. . . . . (Romania)

*In the absence of the Chair, Mr. Diarra (Mali),  
Vice-Chair, took the Chair.*

*The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.*

### Agenda items 93 to 108 (continued)

#### **Thematic discussions on specific subjects and the introduction and consideration of draft resolutions and decisions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items**

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): The Committee will first hear from the remaining speakers on the list on the cluster “Conventional weapons” and then begin its consideration of the cluster “Other disarmament measures and international security”.

**Mr. Dieng** (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): Senegal associates itself with the statements delivered by the representatives of Indonesia, Morocco and Mali on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.16), the Group of African States (see A/C.1/73/PV.18) and the Economic Community of West African States (see A/C.1/73/PV.21), respectively, on the issue of conventional weapons.

Our work this year is taking place in quite a unique context, given the many hotbeds of tension throughout the world. Their continued existence demonstrates once again that the maintenance of international peace and security is an ideal that we remain very far from having achieved.

That is precisely the case in West Africa and the Sahel, a region facing multifaceted threats fuelled and

exacerbated by the proliferation and illicit trafficking of conventional weapons, as well as the activism of terrorist groups. To tackle those challenges, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has taken a number of initiatives to foster synergy in action and to harmonize legislation to combat the illegal circulation of small arms and light weapons. In 2010, it adopted a convention to combat the proliferation of such weapons.

It is also on behalf of the States members of ECOWAS that this year Mali will once again present a draft resolution entitled “Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons and collecting them” (A/C.1/73/L.32), in order to reiterate the special importance that our subregional organization attaches to that issue.

Fortunately, the issue of small arms and light weapons is taken up in the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first international legal instrument to regulate the illegal trade in conventional weapons and combat their illegal circulation in order to put an end to their disastrous humanitarian consequences. For its part, Senegal renews its firm commitment to the Treaty and calls on the States that produce such weapons to stop making them available to non-State actors.

We should call and commend the fact that the ATT entered into force on 24 December 2014, now has 130 signatory Member States and has been ratified by 97 countries, 21 of which are in Africa. Senegal will continue to do its part to promote the universalization of the ATT. Senegal, which signed the ATT on 3 June 2013 and ratified it on 25 September 2014, decided

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to incorporate its relevant provisions into its national legislation through the creation of a comprehensive draft bill.

A professional training course for civilian and military officials from francophone African countries that have signed the ATT was held from 26 to 30 September 2016 in Dakar, in partnership with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Following that, a professional training workshop on the ATT was held in December 2017 in the Senegalese capital, with the support of the Voluntary Trust Fund, for the benefit of 50 francophone African countries actively involved in the implementation of the ATT. The workshop reviewed the relevant provisions of the ATT through exercises, simulations, case studies and the sharing of good practices.

The proliferation, illicit transfer, accumulation and diversion of small arms and light weapons continue to pose a threat to international stability and have adverse effects on populations in conflict and post-conflict situations, with civilians being the primary victims. It is essential to ensure the effective implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, whose third Review Conference was held from 18 to 29 June in New York.

To that end, Governments are expected to show greater willingness and commitment to implementing the recommendations of the mechanism that is key to the Programme of Action — the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons. Its implementation should certainly take into account a major concern raised at the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action with regard to the emergence of polymer and modular weapons, whose design could jeopardize the effective and sustainable tracing of small arms and light weapons.

With regard to the fight against anti-personnel mines, Senegal is convinced that the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction must remain a priority if we are to rid the world of those devices, which indiscriminately sow death. In addition, my country welcomes the holding of the conference organized by Handicap International last November in Maputo, with the aim of raising awareness among African countries

on the use of explosive weapons and their devastating humanitarian consequences for civilians. In the context of the technical and financial assistance provided to the affected countries, we are of the view that particular attention should also be paid to the socioeconomic rehabilitation of victims.

The entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2010 was a significant step forward in protecting civilians and strengthening international humanitarian law. My delegation therefore calls for the effective implementation of its provisions.

**Mr. Grebenshchikov** (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The issue of conventional weapons is of particular importance to Russia. In our view, one important multilateral instrument in that area is the convention on inhumane weapons — the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The CCW is unique because it provides a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and the legitimate defence interests of States. For our part, we are making a significant contribution to strengthening that key instrument of international humanitarian law, in particular its Amended Protocol II, on mines, and Protocol V, on Explosive Remnants of War. For example, the Russian Engineer Troops conducted four humanitarian demining operations on Syrian territory — two in Palmyra and one each in Aleppo and Deir ez-Zor.

It is our view that developing any new arrangements under the Convention is possible only through meticulous, balanced work conducted by experts, and provided that such work would not undermine the time-tested core provisions of the CCW. We continue to take a cautious position with regard to discussions on the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems. Despite the establishment of a specialized Group of Governmental Experts and the agreement on a substantive consensus report of the outcome of its work in 2018, we continue to consider the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems to be extremely undeveloped and speculative.

We oppose the resumption on the CCW platform of any independent expert work on the issue of mines other than anti-personnel mines. We believe that existing humanitarian concerns related to such mines could be resolved within existing norms of international humanitarian law, in particular Amended Protocol II of the Convention.

We share the goal and objectives of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty. We do not exclude the possibility of acceding to that instrument in the future. Russia continues its work on addressing a number of technical, organizational and financial aspects related to the implementation of the Ottawa Convention.

Our view of the Convention on Cluster Munitions remains unchanged. It is a politicized instrument that tailors the very definition of cluster munitions to fit the interests of individual States seeking to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantage. The Convention only proclaims a ban on cluster munitions, but it does not, in fact, contain such a ban.

We see no point in acceding to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). We are compelled to note that the standards set by that instrument are considerably lower than those of the Russian Federation. First of all, we cannot accept the ATT's lack of direct prohibition of the unlicensed production of arms and the transfer of arms to non-State actors, nor of any provisions that would regulate the re-export of products for military use. Because of those shortcomings, the ATT framework retains considerable risks of arms being transferred into the hands of criminals and terrorists and of causing the further deterioration of the situation in various hotspots around the world.

We attach great importance to the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. To date, it remains the only specialized global instrument to combat the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons. At the same time, we are convinced that the Programme's potential is far from having been exhausted and that much more remains to be done to increase its practical effectiveness. We note with satisfaction that almost all of our ideas were duly reflected in the outcome document of the third Review Conference on the implementation of the Programme of Action. We intend to continue to consistently promote all of Russia's priorities during the work of the Programme of Action's review mechanism.

**Mr. Ki** (Burkina Faso) (*spoke in French*): My delegation aligns itself with the statements made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.16) and the representative of Morocco on behalf of the Group of African States (see A/C.1/73/PV.18) and would like to make a few remarks in its national capacity.

Small arms and light weapons are weapons of mass destruction because of the many victims they claim and the hundreds of thousands of families that are plunged into grief every year in all regions of the world. That is why Burkina Faso remains concerned about the illicit trafficking of such weapons, which are a threat to peace, security and stability in various regions of the world, including the Sahel-Saharan region. Such weapons fuel several conflicts, as well as the activities of criminal organizations and terrorist groups, resulting in untold suffering and human tragedy. They are a genuine threat to the stability of States and hinder many of them from achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

It is in that context that the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted in 2013, is relevant because it allows for an appropriate collective response by regulating and insuring the legitimacy of international transfers of conventional weapons. In addition, my delegation welcomes the holding last August in Tokyo of the fourth Conference of States Parties to that instrument and calls for its full implementation through the transparency, cooperation and universalization mechanisms. My delegation also welcomes the holding in June in New York of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and is very pleased by the inclusion of references to the Sustainable Development Goals and to ammunition in the outcome document.

The West African subregion, in particular the Sahel, is affected by the disastrous consequences of small arms and light weapons. My delegation remains convinced that the ATT, as well as the Programme of Action, the International Tracing Instrument and the United Nations register for small arms and light weapons, are tools that can be used to bring about greater efficiency and effectiveness in already existing instruments, in particular the Convention on Small Arms of the Economic Community of West African States, adopted in June 2014.

It is certain that no country on its own can combat the trafficking of small arms and light weapons. That is why my country's National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms organized, in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), conducted a national baseline assessment on the management of weapons and ammunition, from 31 July to 31 August. I would like to thank the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Disarmament

Commission and UNIDIR for working in partnership with my country within the framework to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The use of anti-personnel mines has many diverse consequences. Like many other delegations, my country calls for the universalization of the Ottawa Convention and asks that all States, as well as all institutions concerned, work together to provide assistance to countries affected by these devices, which cause death and destroy the lives of thousands, including children.

Cluster munitions such as anti-personnel mines, continue to prevent access to and the exploitation of vast usable areas in several regions of the world, thereby delaying the achievement of the SDGs relating to food security, education and the empowerment of women, to name just a few. In that connection, my country calls for the universalization of the Oslo Convention.

Improvised explosive devices affect several countries, including my own country. That is why my country attaches importance to addressing the issue within the framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

**Mr. Ahmed** (Sudan) (*spoke in Arabic*): My delegation aligns itself with the statements made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.16), the Group of African States (see A/C.1/73/PV.18) and the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/73/PV.17).

I will make some remarks on behalf of my country.

Like many countries in the world, the Sudan is adversely affected by the phenomenon of the illicit trade in conventional weapons. It has increased the number of armed conflicts, which have claimed thousands of lives. As the Committee knows, the smuggling and trade of such weapons often have economic implications and exacerbate natural phenomena such as climate change, drought and desertification. Intense competition for water and pasture resources, along with other variables, has made the acquisition of firearms an inherent trait of the life of local communities and a manifestation of their power.

My country believes in the need for synergies in combating such illicit weapons and has made substantial efforts with significant effects on curbing the proliferation of such weapons and addressing their consequences. I shall cite a few examples.

The first is a border-control initiative with neighbouring countries in order to prevent the smuggling of arms. That has made a significant contribution to curbing and monitoring human trafficking and drug smuggling through oversight and the establishment of a quasi-regional initiative for controlling arms, including in neighbouring countries to the west of the Sudan. It has had implications at the regional and international levels. The positive impact of that initiative has resulted in multiple seizures of smuggled weapons. The Sudan has also deployed its Rapid Support Forces to control human and weapons trafficking.

Secondly, the Sudan has acceded to and supported the initiative by the Federal Republic of Germany, the chairman of the Group of Seven, to control the proliferation and abuse of small arms and light weapons in the Sahel-Saharan region. The Sudan has supported the African initiative of Silencing the Guns by 2020.

Thirdly, the national campaign to collect weapons from civilians has led to the collection of more than 300,000 weapons from civilians who owned them illegally. That initiative has improved security and stability at the national and regional levels, through results that have been attained in reining in criminal gangs that are active in drug and human trafficking. It has also enabled civilians who had been forcibly displaced by armed violence to return to their homes.

It has become very clear that national, regional and international synergy and solidarity are very important in advancing the efforts of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. I take this opportunity to call on the international community to sponsor and support national and regional initiatives to eradicate a phenomenon that has led to much bloodshed in many countries.

The Sudan constantly works to combat landmines and unexploded ordnance in areas that have been battlefields. The Government of the Sudan has been implementing plans to remove landmines in all their forms in cooperation with the United Nations Mine Action Service in the Sudan.

**Mr. Ornai** (Timor-Leste): My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73.PV.19).

Our collective security strategy and commitment to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear and chemical weapons should also include the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. To that end, my delegation acknowledges and supports the adoption of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action, which has provided a global framework agreement, including for the identification of individuals and groups involved in such illegal activities as the illicit manufacture of small arms and their import, export and transfer on the black market to non-State actors, terrorists and civilians. Collective measures to prevent, combat, control and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects are needed to improve coordination and cooperation at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.

My delegation encourages the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament to continue organizing seminars and workshops to create partnership networks to stop the threat and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons so as to contribute to peace, security, stability and sustainable development at the local, national, regional and international levels. To achieve that, we believe that it is necessary to strengthen regional and national capacities to share information and address collective border control regarding the use of illegal arms and ammunition.

My delegation believes that international law does not permit State or non-State actors that support terrorist activities to hold firearms and small arms. My delegation therefore reaffirms that the illegal use of arms and weapons is a crime against human rights at the national, regional and international levels, and international peace and security.

At the national level, Timor-Leste has put in place domestic legislation regulating the use of arms, permitting such use only by police and military institutions and prohibiting civilians from owning or holding firearms, as well as prohibiting the use of melee weapons or so-called *armas brancas* at the national level.

In conclusion, my delegation reiterates that all parties must work together through collective strategic measures to combat all illegal activities that threaten human lives.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): I call on the representative of Afghanistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60.

**Mr. Musaddeq** (Afghanistan): Afghanistan has the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.60, entitled “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”, for adoption by the First Committee.

This year’s draft resolution is part of the continuing efforts to support the international response to effectively address the dangerous threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in all its aspects. In that regard, the draft resolution also recognizes the increasing negative impact of IEDs on civilian populations, including their use in attacks carried out by terrorist and extremist groups in various parts of the world. More broadly, the draft resolution once again underscores the need for enhanced cooperation by multiple actors — States, the United Nations and civil society, among the other stakeholders — to achieve our common goal.

Afghanistan is honoured to serve as the main sponsor of this draft resolution, alongside the delegations of Australia and France as the main co-sponsors. We thank all delegations for their participation and contributions during the course of negotiations. We are pleased that IEDs have become an important standing agenda item in the First Committee. We are grateful for Member States’ support for this resolution over the past four years. We submit this draft resolution to the Committee for adoption by consensus once again.

**Ms. Sein** (Myanmar): Myanmar aligns itself with the statements delivered by the representatives of Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.19) and of Viet Nam on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see A/C.1/73/PV.17), respectively.

Despite the fact that we are constantly threatened by weapons of mass destruction, we must not underestimate the threat posed by conventional weapons, which are equally threatening to humankind. Today we are witnessing the increased widespread availability of armaments — everything from small arms, light weapons and automatic weapons to heavy artillery — and their ammunition. According to the Small Arms Survey, small arms kill around 535,000 people every year. The number of casualties continues to increase even though the incidence of armed conflicts has declined.

In that connection, Myanmar shares the concerns regarding the challenges posed by the illicit transfer of conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, to terrorists and non-State actors. We are of the view that the widespread sale and supply of small arms and light weapons are an immediate security challenge to individuals, societies and States all over the world. It is an enormous obstacle for many countries to achieve the common goal of sustainable peace and security and development.

The continuing upward trend in global military expenditure and international arms transfers is not a positive signal for the maintenance of international peace and security.

At this important juncture of global efforts to save human lives, the launch of the Secretary-General's disarmament agenda, entitled "Securing Our Common Future", is a timely and welcome step. We share the Secretary-General's view that conventional disarmament and arms control help to end conflicts, secure peace and prevent the easy resumption of hostilities. We must therefore pay greater attention to disarmament that saves lives, working together through the existing multilateral disarmament and arms-control forums with strong political will.

Although Myanmar has not become a party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) due to our capacity constraints, we have been participating in the meetings of the Group of Governmental Experts. We look forward to the successful outcome of the forthcoming Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, to be held from 21 to 23 November in Geneva.

It is imperative to ensure the realization of the goal of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in order better to control the availability of and access to such weapons. We also welcome the adoption of the outcome document of the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, held in New York in June.

Myanmar supports the initiatives taken under the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions to avert the indiscriminate use of landmines and cluster munitions, which can lead to adverse humanitarian impacts. Therefore, Myanmar has established the Mine Risk Education

Inter-Agency Working Group, comprising members from relevant ministries, to raise awareness of those dangers in collaboration with United Nations agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.

We share the concerns regarding the difficulties facing the CCW due to funding shortfalls. Sufficient funding is also important for the successful implementation of the Convention. We believe that, with strong commitment and political will, our collective efforts to realize the objectives of the CCW will bear fruitful results.

I wish to draw the attention of this meeting to the fact that a representative made reference to our country in his statement yesterday. That reference had nothing to do with the work of that meeting but was made purely in his country's narrow political interests. Due to his complete lack of objectivity, relevance and sincerity, we believe that this representative does not even deserve to take the floor in exercise of the right of reply. I would like to suggest that delegations should refrain from exploiting this venue for their own political agendas.

The security forces of Myanmar and the neighbouring countries have conducted coordinated joint patrols, at least weekly, along the western border of Myanmar. No incidents of landmine casualties have been reported. Such politicized accusations without concrete evidence will not help strengthen relations between the two countries.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the observer of the Holy See.

**Archbishop Auza** (Holy See): The Holy See welcomes the statement delivered by the representative of Ireland on behalf of some 50 countries concerning explosive weapons in populated areas (see A/C.1/73/PV.18) and urges all States to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law.

Addressing the problem of the excessive accumulation of and illicit trade in conventional arms, the Secretary-General has highlighted that on average every 15 minutes the use of a firearm results in a violent death somewhere around the world. The widespread availability of small arms and light weapons and their ammunition is a key enabler of armed violence and conflict. High levels of arms and ammunition in circulation contribute to insecurity, cause harm to civilians, facilitate human rights violations and impede

humanitarian access. Yet, according to the Secretary-General, efforts by the United Nations to address the problems posed by illicit small arms have been fragmented and limited.

The Holy See strongly supports multilateral efforts to curb the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, in particular those efforts to provide assistance to States plagued by armed violence that strive to stop the illegal movement weapons and to ensure the collection and destruction of those already in circulation. My delegation therefore welcomes the unanimous vote in the third Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, and believes that the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons is a very significant tool in that regard. Curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, as the Programme of Action states, enhances respect for life and the dignity of the human person through the promotion of a culture of peace.

As several delegations pointed out at the third Review Conference, greater international cooperation and assistance are needed to restrict severely and to eradicate, as far as possible, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. As the Secretary-General has stated, the current paradigm of short-term and compartmentalized projects to address small-arms control is not keeping up with the seriousness and magnitude of the problem. There is therefore a clear need for the United Nations to pursue a new model for sustained and coherent funding for international assistance for the control of small arms and light weapons.

A secure world is essential for development and thus for the fight against extreme poverty. Pope Paul VI said in 1967 that development was the new name for peace, an affirmation echoed in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development when it underlines that there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.

An important component of the overall efforts to achieve peace and development is, as Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 states, to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030. Three years ago, Pope Francis asked the United States Congress why deadly weapons were being sold to those who planned

to inflict untold suffering on individuals and society. He said that, sadly, it was simply for money—money drenched in blood, often innocent blood. His words apply with particular force to those who profit from the sale of illicit weapons to entities and individuals involved in such horrendous activities as terrorism, large-scale theft, oppression of the poor and defenceless, and organized crime, such as the trade in narcotics, trafficking in persons and the illegal wildlife trade.

It is our duty to confront the problem of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons. We welcome to progress that has been made so far and are committed to helping carry it forward.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): We have heard from the last speaker on the cluster “Conventional weapons”.

The Committee will now resume its consideration of the cluster “Other disarmament measures and international security”. Once again, I urge all speakers kindly to observe the established time limit, since we have no countdown timer here.

**Mrs. Dallafior** (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): In the interests of time, I will deliver an abridged version of my statement. The full version will be available on PaperSmart.

Scientific and technological developments continue to transform our world, bringing with them unprecedented benefits. While they hold great potential for humankind, these developments could also have a significant impact on peace and security. Those two elements mean that science and technology form a new priority area for the United Nations system.

We welcome the significant focus in the Secretary-General’s agenda for disarmament on encouraging responsible innovation and protecting future generations from new weapons technologies that may pose a risk to the maintenance of peace and security or respect for international law. Switzerland stands ready to play a driving role in the implementation of a number of actions set out in the agenda’s implementation plan.

Switzerland welcomes the report of the Secretary-General, submitted pursuant to resolution 72/28, on the latest scientific and technological developments and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts (A/73/177). In the light of the significant opportunities and challenges in the area of science and technology, we must remain vigilant and

respond appropriately to ensure respect for existing norms and standards. We must also be prepared to consider the development of additional norms and standards where necessary. Given those objectives, we have a shared interest in being able to rely on responsive international institutions and treaties able to keep pace with the rapid developments occurring today.

Cyberspace is not a new realm of activity, completely void of norms and rules. Switzerland is actively engaged in further developing the existing framework for international stability. That framework is based on the application of international law and voluntary norms, rules and principles for responsible State behaviour, confidence-building measures and capacity-building. Promoting the peaceful use of and cooperation and stability in cyberspace, it is essential for ensuring that cyberspace is open, free and accessible to all.

In the light of the unprecedented challenges that State and non-State actors alike must face in the current cybersecurity environment, it is crucial to underscore the important role that the United Nations plays in contributing to international peace and security in cyberspace. The United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) has significantly contributed to strengthening the international framework for cyberstability through its three reports adopted by consensus in 2010, 2013 and 2015 (see A/65/201, A/68/98 and A/70/174, respectively).

The cumulative progress of United Nations efforts in this area must be maintained and built upon. In this context, Switzerland encourages Member States to work towards consensus so that the United Nations can continue to make progress in efforts relating to the challenges and threats relating to the use of information and communication technologies. To achieve that goal, further expert-level discussion is required to clarify the implications of cyberrisks for international peace and security. Moreover, Switzerland, together with Mexico and Germany, advocates that the GGE follow a more inclusive and representative process than it has to date by organizing informal consultative meetings with all States Members of the United Nations and other stakeholders.

**Mr. Wood** (United States of America): My remarks today will address the views of the United

States relating to developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security.

In September, the United States released its National Cyber Strategy, outlining the steps that the United States Government will take to renew its commitment to advancing and defending the United States national interests across cyberspace. Moreover, the Strategy calls for the reduction and prevention of destabilizing and malicious cyberactivities directed against the interests of the United States and its partners and highlights that activity that is contrary to responsible behaviour in cyberspace must be deterred through the imposition of costs through cyber and non-cyber means.

As the Strategy also notes, the United States will promote a framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace built on international law, adherence to voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behaviour that apply during peacetime, and the consideration of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from malicious cyberactivity. Those principles should form the basis for cooperative responses to counter irresponsible State actions inconsistent with that framework.

That framework is consistent with and supportive of the work on international cyberstability that has taken place over many years in the United Nations system. For example, the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) has served as a productive and groundbreaking expert-level venue to advance international stability in cyberspace. The consensus recommendations of the GGE reports have included affirmation of the applicability of existing international law to States' activities in cyberspace, support for certain voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in peace time and the implementation of practical confidence-building measures. In addition, its reports have demonstrated the value of consensus-driven expert-level negotiation on this topic within the United Nations.

The failure to reach consensus during the most recent round of GGE discussions demonstrates that challenging issues remain. However, that lack of consensus does not make the existing GGE recommendations in its previous reports any less valid or important.

We continue to view the GGE as the most productive and useful platform to discuss the international security dimensions of cyberissues in the United Nations system because it is consensus-based, time-limited and expert-driven. For that reason, we and many other Member States were extremely concerned when the Russian delegation introduced on 12 October a problematic draft GGE resolution that diverged significantly from many past consensus resolutions. That Russian draft seeks to prejudge the outcome of multilateral cyber discussions by imposing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's code of conduct on all States Members of the United Nations. The code is a document that has not gained traction within the broader international community since it was first shared at the United Nations in 2011, as it seeks to expand Government control over content on the Internet and to undermine free speech.

In addition, we understand that Russia has now abruptly shifted the focus of its draft resolution to put forward a process that is not a GGE. We were so concerned by the shift away from consensus by the Russian delegation last week that we chose to take the step of introducing a draft cyber resolution on 15 October. This United States' draft is in fact the Russian consensus draft of the past, and it mirrors recent years' consensus resolutions on this topic while seeking to make progress.

We have seen significant support for our draft resolution from a wide range of countries seeking to build on the consensus-based efforts of the past, and we continue to welcome additional sponsors. Sponsorship in no way prejudices a possible future consensus resolution if Russia moves towards compromise. Indeed, our hope remains that we can achieve a single consensus resolution this year that continues the progress we have made on these issues in the First Committee and the GGEs.

**Mr. Carrillo Gómez** (Paraguay) (*spoke in Spanish*): It is my great honour to deliver this statement on behalf of the delegation of the Republic of Paraguay and to underscore the importance of promoting the active participation of women, in conditions of equality with men, in disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control. In this regard, and in compliance with the resolutions on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control that we co-sponsor, the Paraguayan Government recently incorporated femicide into its criminal legislation and promotes and implements public policies with a gender perspective through the

Ministry of Women, mainly through the National Plan for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men 2018-2023.

Paraguay favours further research to enhance our understanding of the effects of the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons on women and girls, and calls on Member State delegations to step up cooperation to improve the collection of data required to inform public policy to address these issues.

At the same time, the delegation of Paraguay emphasizes that scientific and technological developments, access to information and communications and their use should be pursued with fullest respect for human rights and fundamental liberties; help maintain international stability and security; contribute to cooperation and friendly relations among States, with respect for national sovereignty; and be safeguarded from criminal or terrorist uses.

Early this year, the Paraguayan Government joined the 2001 Convention on Cybercrime, adopted by the Council of Europe, and its Additional Protocol of 2003, concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems. More recently, we established the Ministry of Information and Communication Technologies, thereby raising the profile of such technologies in the hierarchical State institutional architecture, and established the principles to be promoted in that sphere: public policy-based planning, transparency and citizen participation, the promotion of information and communication technologies, and user protection.

With a view to achieving sustainable development, Paraguay guarantees the free adoption of technologies and underscores once again the need to link international disarmament, non-proliferation, international peace and security to efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

**Mr. Mueller** (Canada) (*spoke in French*): Advancing international peace and security depends on our collective ability to recognize and take into account the gendered dimensions of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Integrating gender perspectives into such work requires systematic and sustained efforts. Canada prioritizes such efforts in line with feminist foreign policy. We believe that promoting gender equality, including in the area of disarmament, is the most effective way to build a world that is more peaceful, inclusive and prosperous.

We are deeply committed to the women and peace and security agenda. Our second national action plan includes specific targets for incorporating disarmament and gender in all our international efforts. Our leadership included organizing discussions on disarmament within the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security in New York and Geneva last spring, as well as continued discussions and capacity-building on specific gender issues within the areas of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament in Geneva this year.

Employing a feminist perspective in the area of disarmament provides vital opinions on the way in which Governments can prevent and respond to violence and conflict and better support the victims of violence. Effectively addressing such challenges requires the development and implementation of multilateral and national gender-specific policies based on factual data. That requires the use of data and research based on gender and age in order to thoroughly assess the gender-specific ramifications of armed violence, as well as consultations with civil-society organizations, those who monitor armed violence and gender experts.

*(spoke in English)*

Those policies must then inform our practices. For example, understanding how small arms are used to perpetrate violence against women and girls is critical. Canada is sensitive to how illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons can fuel the differential gender impact of armed violence. We work to take into account the risk of gender-based violence in our export-control assessments and to systematically consider that risk in our broader policies.

To overcome entrenched discrimination and achieve genuine progress, it is essential to empower women to engage meaningfully as full partners in policy-making, programming and field work in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. This year, Canada has included language in our fissile material cut-off treaty draft resolution (A/C.1/73/L.58) that underscores the importance of ensuring the meaningful inclusion of women in the negotiation of a future treaty.

Canada believes that the international community has a responsibility to continue to advance gender and disarmament considerations in all of its work. We are pleased to have been involved in such efforts in Geneva this year, including in training, and in the concerted effort by a group of States to advocate for gender analyses in more First Committee resolutions.

Finally, we welcome the establishment in Geneva of a disarmament impact group to promote dialogue and greater gender responsive action within disarmament processes.

**Mr. Hassan** (Egypt): My delegation associates itself with the statements made by the representatives of Indonesia, on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.19), and of Egypt, on behalf of the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/73/PV.19), respectively, and wishes to make the following remarks.

Egypt reiterates that non-discriminatory multilateral arrangements are the most effective instruments for achieving sustainable progress in the fields of disarmament and international security. We stress that the continued commitment by all States to previously agreed undertakings and to the rule of law at the international level, in conformity with the letter and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, is a necessary condition for maintaining international peace and security and avoiding chaos. Taking into consideration the rapid technological developments, there are several domains with a direct impact on international security from the arms-control point of view that are left without any internationally agreed rules and norms to prevent turning those domains into scenes of arms races and conflicts.

Cybersecurity and outer space security are two prominent examples. The lack of progress in such domains is clearly not due to the lack of knowledge and expertise on the part of the international community but, rather, is due to the continued insistence by a few States on maintaining absolute dominance in strategic domains and thereby resisting any efforts towards the development of equitable rules-based international regimes.

The era of maintaining absolute dominance is evidently over. Acting with a bipolar, zero-sum mentality in a multipolar world where the relevant technologies are available and accessible to many State and non-State actors can only lead to an arms race that no one can win, while international security continues to severely deteriorate.

Cybertechnologies, outer-space technologies and even nuclear technologies are no longer monopolized by a few States but are being developed and utilized by a growing number of States in the developed and developing worlds alike. In the area of cybersecurity and the possible malicious use of cybertechnologies as

a means of warfare, achieving meaningful progress in establishing a reliable regime, based on agreed rules and norms, has been stalled for more than a decade. Groups of governmental experts have been established since the year 2004 and have already put forward valuable recommendations. Yet efforts towards the codification of such recommendations or towards utilizing them as a basis for binding rules continue to be strongly resisted.

That is why Egypt strongly supports any proposal aimed at making real progress within the United Nations framework. Taking stock of what we have already achieved in the previous groups of governmental experts and other relevant multilateral venues, we believe that it is time to move forward in the most inclusive and action-oriented manner, instead of going in circles when we already know where the real challenges and threats lie.

Finally, we would like to commend the Secretary-General's agenda for disarmament and its clear elaboration of the security threats associated with the military applications of certain emerging technologies and the importance of achieving progress on disarmament for future generations. We also welcome the valuable report on the current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts (A/73/177).

**Mr. Sánchez Kiesslich** (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): Information, telecommunication and cyberspace technologies are the preferred avenues for circulating and sharing information and promoting development, business and the free expression of ideas. However, their increasing use has also given rise to criminal organizations that plan and commit illicit acts that could threaten international peace and security. A global challenge of such magnitude demands global responses.

Today more than ever we support multilateralism as the most effective formula to counter growing cyberchallenges. In that regard, the United Nations is called upon to play a central role in defining measures to guarantee a free, open, reliable, secure, stable, resilient cyberspace that fosters the development of people, in accordance with international law and ensuring the cross-cutting nature of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. At the same time, we must discourage and prevent the malicious use of such technologies.

For Mexico, during deliberations of the General Assembly, we must prioritize international cooperation, the sharing of experiences and good practices, confidence-building and the creation of synergies among all relevant actors. In recent months, we have seen an increasing number of international and regional initiatives and forums that propose, discuss, develop and promote norms, principles or standards for achieving stability in cyberspace. Mexico is of the view that we must take advantage of the value-added of such initiatives in order to reiterate the importance of using them for peaceful purposes and of preventing conflicts in cyberspace.

Mexico has expressed interest in ensuring that the agreements and the work of international organizations and forums on cybersecurity and cyberspace governance promote balance in at least three areas: first, ensuring access to and the peaceful uses of cyberspace as a driver of development; secondly, ensuring the free circulation of ideas and the exercise and protection of human rights on the Internet and, lastly, ensuring that cyberspace is a safe, stable and reliable environment for users, private companies and Governments.

We welcome the initiatives taken by some Member States to submit draft resolutions with the same objective: to ensure that the United Nations plays an active, effective and legitimate role in its deliberations.

Our citizens have many pressing expectations. That is why we call for moving past the discussions about formats or procedures in order to better focus on substantive discussions that are pluralist and transparent in nature and on a robust, action-oriented mandate.

The recommendations and reports of the Groups of Governmental Experts on that matter are quite valuable, so we must reaffirm and implement them. At the same time, we should build, on the basis of their findings, new agreements on how to implement international law and non-binding norms and principles on the responsible behaviour of States. In the same vein, confidence-building measures and capacity-building and technical assistance programmes should be taken up again as pillars for future work. Similarly, the enriching contributions of experts from academia, civil society organizations and the private sector should be taken up again.

We cannot ignore the ongoing work of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the

Secretary-General's own statements, including his ideas on the disarmament agenda implementation plan. For Mexico, that the General Assembly should agree on the way forward is not a possibility but an obligation.

We invite all Governments to debate with openness and a sense of commitment, rather than competing for support.

**Ms. Castro Loredo** (Cuba) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

The most industrialized countries, which are the main producers of weapons, must show the necessary political will to achieve the shared objective of general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, the highest priority in the disarmament sphere. The international community must be firm in its call for the implementation of disarmament and international security measures. The \$1.74 trillion and the scientific-technological progress that is today used for military purposes must be reoriented towards activities that generate socioeconomic development.

We must reduce the level and size of military expenditures, which are currently at the highest levels since the end of the Cold War. It is also urgent to promote legally binding initiatives to prohibit the militarization of outer space, cyberspace and autonomous lethal weapons and to regulate military attack drones. We must immediately lift the selective and discriminatory restrictions on access to equipment, materials and technology required by the least developed countries, which are to be used for peaceful purposes. Cuba reiterates its call for the establishment of a United Nations international fund, into which half of current annual military expenditures would be allocated, to support the implementation of 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The United States, one of the main polluting countries, not only maintains the extreme defence of its nuclear weapons having catastrophic consequences for humankind, but has also rejected the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, thus threatening the fragile environmental balance of our planet. Cuba reiterates that it is imperative that the forums and negotiations of international treaties and agreements on disarmament and the limitation of arms take full account of

the relevant environmental norms and that, in the implementation of those instruments, international standards on climate change be respected.

The defence of the role of the United Nations and multilateralism is crucial if we are to find agreed solutions to both real and potential threats. In that context, Cuba reiterates the validity of multilateralism as a basic principle in disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations. We support the draft resolution submitted by Russia on progress in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security (A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1) and the initiative to create an open-ended working group of the General Assembly.

We reiterate that the hostile use of telecommunications for the declared or concealed purpose of subverting the legal and political order of States is a violation of internationally agreed norms on that subject and constitutes illegal and irresponsible use of those means.

In violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including the provisions of the International Telecommunication Union, and the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, Cuban radio space is being systematically attacked from the outside through illegal radio and television transmissions that promote the subversion of the constitutional order freely established by the Cuban people. On average, between January and July 2018, Cuba received between 211 and 216 hours of illegal transmissions per day, for a total of 1,635 hours per week, via 20 frequencies from United States territory. Cuba urges once again that an end be put to such harmful and aggressive attacks on its sovereignty, which are also incompatible with peace, security, development and cooperation among States.

We demand the lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade, which for almost 60 years has severely affected the Cuban people, including the use and enjoyment of information technologies and telecommunications.

**Mr. Hwang** (France) (*spoke in French*): France endorses the statement made by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/73/PV.19) and would like to make additional remarks in its national capacity.

In a rapidly changing world, the civilian and military uses of cyberspace are increasing and represent important factors for development, but they also pose new security challenges. The attacks are increasingly frequent, complex and costly, reminding us of the extent to which cybersecurity is a legitimate priority for Governments. States must therefore show their determination to respond to those challenges through cooperation and through the law.

For that reason, France reiterates that international law, and notably the Charter of the United Nations in its entirety, applies to cyberspace. Every State must respect the obligation to resolve international disputes through peaceful means, without that affecting its right to take counter-measures in response to internationally illegal acts aimed against it, with the sole objective of putting an end to them, in accordance with its obligations under international law. Such counter-measures must be strictly peaceful, necessary and proportionate to the desired outcome.

In addition, France recalls that international humanitarian law also applies to cyberspace. The main principles of that law are necessity, proportionality, distinction and humanity. In that spirit, France encourages each State to publicly present its interpretation of the application of international law to cyberspace, as we did recently in our strategic cyberdefence review.

As the Committee knows, France has actively participated in the various Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) on that subject. That format made it possible to reach agreements, notably in 2013 and 2015, on the applicability of international law to cyberspace and on the development of important norms and recommendations for responsible State behaviour. Each State now has a responsibility to implement those recommendations and respect those standards.

Furthermore, we cannot allow different national approaches to take precedence over making real progress to build trust, security and stability in cyberspace. France therefore calls for the revival of multilateral negotiations on those topics within the framework of the United Nations, through the creation of a new group of governmental experts.

We consider it essential for such a Group to be given a specific mandate taking as a starting point the reports adopted by consensus by previous GGEs. Obviously, that process cannot have as a starting

point and negotiating mandate a draft code of conduct submitted in advance in a non-consensual resolution. The Group must also be capable of holding extensive consultations with all those concerned. We must also come up with original ideas on ways to involve the thinking of the private sector, the world of research and non-governmental organizations. Today, those actors have their own responsibilities and a novel yet crucial role in helping States improve the security and stability of cyberspace.

We must work to enhance cooperation among all those concerned for the stability of cyberspace. France is playing its part, which is why, from 11 to and 14 November, we will host the Paris Digital Week, including the Paris Peace Forum and the Internet Governance Forum. On that occasion, we will present an initiative to name several basic principles and enable everybody to take the necessary commitments so as to enhance our cooperation and our capacity to prevent the most destabilizing attacks.

That high-level political commitment will allow all stakeholders who will support the initiative, regardless of whether they are States, businesses or civil-society organizations, to confirm their support for those principles. It will be a political platform to accelerate the work under way in various forums. That initiative will mark our desire to make joint progress on this issue, which is crucial for the stability and prosperity of our societies. We hope that as many States as possible will support that declaration in order for the international community to send a resolute message at a time when cyberthreats are so strong.

The obstacles encountered last year during the normative work must not mark the end of our efforts. On the contrary, we must continue working together to develop original modalities for making progress on these topics. It is our responsibility, and in our interest, to defend the frameworks for action and the rule of law that have been collectively established by committing to strengthening the role of the United Nations system in that governance system, while including other digital stakeholders to develop new forms of global governance.

**Ms. Tiirmaa-Klaar** (Estonia): Estonia aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of European Union, and with that by the representative of Canada on behalf of a group of States (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

As one of the most advanced digital societies, Estonia urges the States Members of the United Nations to continue discussions on the norms of responsible State behaviour, confidence-building measures and the application of existing international law in cyberspace. The modern fabric of our societies is digital technology. Essential services, transport, banking, energy and telecommunications services depend on the cyberresilience of the digital domain. We are all dependent and intrinsically interlinked by information and communication technologies, which support our societies and economies. Estimates link a large portion of global gross domestic product growth to the smooth functioning of the digital ecosystem.

However, that same technology has the potential to be misused and exploited for malicious purposes. It is well known that more than 10 years ago Estonia experienced the first cybersiege in history, which we effectively mitigated. In recent years, the world has witnessed several global ransomware attacks that affected entire industrial sectors and cost \$800 million to \$900 million in lost revenue globally. We have also seen highly targeted cyberoperations that tried to weaken international institutions. Those attacks have been attributed to State actors, which confirms the relevance of the United Nations debate today.

Nation States bear a special responsibility to use information and telecommunications technology to support international stability and security and to refrain from malicious activities in cyberspace. This autumn the First Committee will have the task of deciding how to proceed with the cybernorms discussion at the United Nations level. It is important to remind ourselves that our future work should be based on the already solid achievements made by the previous Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2010, 2013 and 2015. Those GGEs have achieved consensus and listed a number of norms, rules and principles that should form a basis for further discussions in the First Committee.

The draft resolution put forward by the United States (A/C.1/73/L.37) envisages a realistic continuation for the United Nations discussion on cybernorms and calls for a new GGE. It has the potential to bring results and move the issue forward. In addition to following the previous consensus reports, the future United Nations process should also foresee an effective consultative mechanism for the wider United Nations membership, as well as other stakeholders. The draft resolution

also contains a solution for how countries can express their views on the application of international law in cyberspace, which is one of the most important issues to stress here.

Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to the fact that there is a need to raise awareness and understanding of both digital and cybersecurity issues among the larger United Nations community. There is a growing demand for capacity-building when it comes to e-governance and cybersecurity. Estonia has already been supporting developing countries and emerging economies in advancing their digitalization and cybersecurity. Work has been started by many stakeholders to raise the capacities of countries that require assistance to fight cyberthreats and address cybercrime.

I am glad to note the growing interest in our Group of Friends of e-Governance and Cybersecurity within the United Nations, which Estonia launched together with Singapore. Estonia will soon release its third cybersecurity strategy, in which capacity-building of global partners will have an important role in strengthening digital infrastructure and providing skills and training for e-governance and cybersecurity.

I would like to conclude my remarks by stressing that it is imperative that we continue the First Committee discussions on the norms of responsible State behaviour, international law and confidence-building in a fruitful, consensus-based and forward-looking manner.

**Mr. Ahmed** (Pakistan): My delegation aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries under this cluster (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

The relentless pace of emerging weapons technologies, driven by scientific innovations, carries serious implications. The rapid development of new weapon systems in the conventional domain poses a threat to peace, security and stability at the regional and global levels. Governing and regulating the development and use of such weapons systems under international law is, however, proving to be a major challenge.

The development of lethal autonomous weapon systems has emerged as a major cause for concern for the international community. Any weapon system that delegates life-and-death decisions to machines is by nature unethical and cannot fully comply with international law, including international humanitarian

law and human rights law. Lethal autonomous weapon systems gravely threaten international and regional peace and security, as they lower the threshold for war. They would also negatively affect progress on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. Their likely proliferation to non-State actors and terrorists adds another dangerous dimension to their existence.

Developments in the field of artificial intelligence need to be appropriately tackled and regulated. They should not outpace the evolution of the regulations governing them. Pakistan strongly feels that an international legally binding framework should be evolved to regulate different aspects of lethal autonomous weapon systems. States currently developing such weapons should place an immediate moratorium on their production and meaningfully engage with the international community in addressing its concerns.

Pakistan presided over the fifth Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held in Geneva in December 2016, which provided a useful opportunity to take stock of the Convention and resulted in a forward-looking outcome document.

Pakistan supported the establishment of an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) related to emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems in the context of the objectives and purposes of the Convention and looks forward to the development of concrete policy options by the GGE. At the same time, we remain open to addressing that issue in other relevant multilateral forums, including the Conference on Disarmament.

In our view, the unauthorized transborder use of armed drones outside of international armed conflict, especially against civilians, constitutes a violation of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Their use also contravenes State sovereignty and United Nations Charter restrictions on the legitimate use of force for self-defence purpose only. The Human Rights Council, jurists and human rights groups have all opposed the use of armed drones to target civilians through signature strikes and termed their use as tantamount to extrajudicial killings. Moreover, the threat of non-State actors and terrorists acquiring armed drones cannot be ruled out. All of those factors necessitate the development of appropriate international regulations on the employment of armed drones.

Cyberwarfare poses serious challenges to international peace and security. We are witnessing how the misuse and unregulated use of information and communications technology could have serious implications for international peace and security in the event of a cyberattack launched on critical infrastructure. The hostile use of cyber technologies is fast approaching the stage where it can be characterized as a weapon of mass destruction, and not just of disruption.

As a member, Pakistan remained positively and constructively engaged in the work of the Group of Governmental Experts mandated by resolution 68/243 and welcomed the 2015 report of the GGE (see A/70/174). We were disappointed that the latest GGE could not agree on a consensus report. Perhaps it is time to move the issue to a universal multilateral setting, including at the Conference on Disarmament, to develop an international consensus on addressing the security- and arms-control-related dimensions of this vital issue.

**Mr. Nugroho** (Indonesia): Indonesia associates itself with the statements made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and by the representative of Singapore on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see A/C.1/73/PV.19), and would like to emphasize the following items in its national capacity.

First, we fully support all measures that enable developing countries to harness new information and communication technologies for their socioeconomic benefit. Indonesia's national policy on information technology is already geared towards unlocking economic and business opportunities for its people, as well as for others in South-East Asia and beyond. Indonesia's digital denizens are among the world's most active, and we have a vibrant start-up ecosystem, supported by concrete State policy. We encourage further partnerships and investments in that promising sector.

Secondly, we agree that there is a risk that information and communications technologies might be used for illegal and negative purposes that affect international peace and security. In clear cases, there is a need to address those situations. Indonesia supports the development of a legal framework to do so. It should be pursued at the United Nations with the active and equal participation of all States.

Thirdly, Indonesia underlines the observance of environmental norms in the preparation and implementation of disarmament and arms-limitation agreements. In particular, the international community has inescapable responsibilities with regard to the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The international disarmament forums should fully take into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation. And it goes without saying that everyone should help ensure compliance through clear action.

**Mr. Bunk** (Netherlands): Netherlands aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (EU) and with that delivered by the representative of Canada on behalf of a group of countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.19). We would like to make the following remarks in our national capacity.

The digital domain underpins virtually every aspect of our daily lives, our economies and our societies. That international interdependence will grow exponentially as a consequence of the fourth industrial revolution. Unfortunately, malicious cyberactivities, whether carried out by States or non-State actors, threaten us all and undermine international security and stability.

As recently as April, the offices of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague were targeted by a hostile cyberoperation carried out by the Russian military intelligence service. I would like to refer to the 4 October joint EU statement of the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in which serious concern was expressed about the attempt to undermine the integrity of the OPCW, a respected international organization hosted by the Netherlands. The statement also stated that that aggressive act demonstrated contempt for the solemn purpose of the OPCW, which works to eradicate chemical weapons worldwide, notably under a United Nations mandate; that such actions undermine international law and international institutions; and that the EU will continue to strengthen its resilience in the digital domain.

The Netherlands is committed to strengthening the international rules-based order and to keeping cyberspace free, open and secure for all. Multilateral cooperation is therefore essential for all of us to counter

the growing cyberinsecurity. We therefore recognize the role of the United Nations in maintaining a free, open and secure cyberspace. The suspension of the United Nations process created a vacuum that might give the impression of impunity to those who wish to do wrong.

We believe that it is high time to resume discussions at the United Nations level, and we prioritize one way forward. The Netherlands supports the establishment of a new Group of Governmental Experts on Developments (GGE), based on the previous mandates and outcomes.

Previous GGEs on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security articulated a consensual set of recommendations and views on norms for confidence-building measures, capacity-building and the application of international law. The General Assembly explicitly requested States to take guidance from them. We should not selectively refer to those consensual GGE recommendations, and neither should we predetermine the outcome of the next discussions. Rather, the recommendations should be a starting point for subsequent discussions.

The Netherlands strongly believes that existing international law, and in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable to cyberspace and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting a free, open and secure cyberspace, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in cyberspace.

We recognize the complex nature of cyberspace and the need for all States to be involved in the discussion. We therefore consider consulting the wider United Nations membership, as well as other stakeholders, as an important element of a future GGE mandate. The GGE should hold repeated intersessional consultations with the wider United Nations membership and other stakeholders. In that regard, recommendations by multi-stakeholder bodies such as the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace could also be taken into account.

We furthermore believe that capacity-building should be an important part of the basis for further work and that we should begin by focusing on the implementation of the existing GGE reports. Capacity-building helps to develop a shared understanding, and therefore supports the international framework for cyberspace.

Building a global understanding is fundamental to maintaining long-term stability and security and reducing the risk of conflict in cyberspace. We believe that this is a shared interest for all States. The Netherlands therefore urges all States to be constructive in moving the discussion forward.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of Trinidad and Tobago to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/PV.21.

**Ms. Roopnarine** (Trinidad and Tobago): Trinidad and Tobago aligns itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Antigua and Barbuda on behalf of the Caribbean Community under this thematic cluster (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

I take the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.21, entitled: “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.” This draft resolution was first introduced in the First Committee in 2010 (see A/C.1/65/PV.15), and since then the delegation of Trinidad and Tobago and the other sponsors of the draft resolution have invited the First Committee to recognize, in a comprehensive manner, the role of women, including in decision-making processes related to disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

On each occasion since then, the First Committee adopted the following resolutions on this subject: resolutions 65/69 in 2010, 67/48 in 2012, 68/33 in 2013, 69/61 in 2014 and 71/56 in 2016. It should be noted that those resolutions transcend the notion of women as victims of armed violence and armed conflict and go further in recognizing and supporting women’s participation and their actual and potential contribution to the process of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

The current draft resolution builds upon its predecessors and reflects recent progress made in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and related matters. The draft resolution builds on language with respect to the Sustainable Development Goals, while acknowledging that the success of efforts to achieve sustainable development and disarmament depends on the full and effective inclusion of women in all aspects of those efforts. The language is in line with that on Sustainable Development Goals contained in the outcome document of the third Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

The draft resolution has kept language relating to women’s participation in preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, bearing in mind the significant work being done to curb the illicit trade in this category of conventional weapons. With that in mind, for the first time, the draft resolution recognizes the important role played by civil society organizations in promoting the role of women in this area.

Additionally, the draft resolution has preserved language on the Arms Trade Treaty, as its relevance to the draft resolution is twofold: it is the only international legally binding instrument to regulate the trade in conventional weapons, of which small arms and light weapons is a category, and it is the first global instrument to recognize the connection between arms transfers and violence against women and children.

If one may use the number of sponsors as an indicator of the interest shown in the potential of this draft resolution, then it is noteworthy that there has been a progressive increase in the number of sponsors of this resolution since 2010.

Trinidad and Tobago therefore takes this opportunity to thank all Member States for their contributions, which have enriched the draft text. Considering the importance of this matter to the international community, we are once again requesting the support of all Member States for this draft resolution, as with previous resolutions on this matter.

**Mr. Horne** (Australia): Australia endorses the group statement delivered by the representative of Canada on Friday (see A/C.1/73/PV.19), and wishes to add its comments and remarks in its national capacity.

Like many countries, Australia is concerned about the increasing scope and the severity of international cyberincidents perpetrated by State actors and their proxies. As more States seek to exert power through cyberspace, there is increasing potential for activities in this domain to lead to misperception, miscalculation, escalation and, in the most extreme cases, conflict.

Australia is clear that the international rules-based order applies both online and offline. Having established a firm foundation of international law and norms, the international community must now ensure that there are effective and proportionate consequences for those who act contrary to that consensus. That is why Australia recently joined a large group of countries to call out cyberincidents that contravene international

law and norms. By calling out those activities, the international community is sending a clear message that that type of behaviour will not be accepted.

Australia does not make these attributions lightly, but cyberspace is not an ungoverned space, nor is it the Wild West. Australia and its allies will not stand idly by as States engage in malicious behaviour online that destabilizes democracies, undermines institutions critical to international peace and security, interferes with proper legal processes and investigations or disrupts critical infrastructure.

This is not, however, about singling out any one individual country. In this digital age, we all depend on a peaceful and stable online environment. It is therefore in all of our interests to ensure that all countries follow the agreed rules online. Therefore, Australia calls on all countries to be responsible members of the international community.

Australia promotes an international cyberstability framework based on the application of existing international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour, and confidence-building measures, supported by coordinated capacity-building. We will continue to work with international partners to reinforce the rules-based order in cyberspace and to deter and respond to malicious cyberactivity.

As we outlined in our inaugural international cyberengagement strategy, Australia's goal is an open, free and secure cyberspace that drives economic growth, protects national security and promotes international stability.

Australia attaches great importance to the cumulative work of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE). Past GGEs have made tangible progress in setting clear expectations of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, and Australia remains committed to and will continue to promote the agreements articulated in the Group's reports. The GGEs have significantly deepened common understanding of international law, norms of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, confidence-building measures and capacity-building. While we regret that the 2016-2017 GGE was unable to agree on a substantive consensus report, we remind those present that the Group nonetheless made considerable progress, particularly in relation to best-practice implementation of norms.

In conclusion, Australia strongly supports the continuation of expert discussions in the United Nations on international cyberissues through the establishment of an inclusive sixth Group of Governmental Experts, which will be critical to advancing discussions among all members. Recent events have highlighted the needs for all countries to work constructively to promote and protect a peaceful and stable online environment, on which we all ultimately depend.

**Mr. Yu Peng** (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The rapid advancement of information and communication technologies is not only bringing about revolutionary changes to people's way of life and modes of production, but is also having an increasingly deeper influence on politics, economics, culture and other aspects.

The international community is facing challenges of an unprecedented gravity and complexity. Internet surveillance, cyberattacks and cyberterrorism are rampant. The risk of conflict in cyberspace remains unabated, and the digital divide is as wide as ever. Establishing fair rules and a just order in cyberspace remains an arduous task for us all.

In cyberspace we are all interconnected. A peaceful cyberspace serves the common interests of the whole international community, and it is crucial to uphold the new security concept and seek common security. The international community should enhance cooperation and expand common ground with a heightened sense of urgency, collaborating on building a community with a shared future for humankind in cyberspace.

First, we should stay committed to peace and stability in cyberspace. All parties should faithfully observe the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, such as sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and refrain from conducting any cyberactivities that endanger other countries. Countries should discuss the application of international law in the spirit of maintaining peace and security in cyberspace, avoid introducing force into cyberspace, prevent an arms race in cyberspace and reduce the risk of confrontation and conflict.

All parties should put aside their differences and seek common ground, especially on issues such as the international code of conduct in cyberspace, protecting critical information and infrastructure and combating cyberterrorism and crime. All parties should have a full and in-depth discussion on those issues and strive for feasible results.

Secondly, we must uphold multilateralism. Since cyberspace is an issue of global concern, global cyberspace governance requires broad participation and joint decision-making by all parties. As the most representative and authoritative international organization, the United Nations is best positioned to lead that effort. The discussions at the most recent sessions of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) reflect the differences with regard to the concept, approach and pathway for global cyberspace governance. That highlights the urgency of continuing the GGE process and building consensus through in-depth discussion.

In the long-term, it is vital for the international community to establish a more open, inclusive and institutionalized process that allows more countries to participate. Draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, sponsored by the Russian Federation and entitled “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, is of positive significance. China supports that draft resolution.

Thirdly, we need to uphold negotiations and women’s cooperation. Cyberspace is highly virtual, with diverse actors, which makes tracking difficult. Therefore, facts and proof are crucial when it comes to investigating and defining cyberissues. Such issues should be resolved through negotiations. Threatening, applying pressure or attempting long-arm jurisdiction will not contribute to the settlement of issues. Instead, they will only aggravate conflicts and add complexity to international relations.

Fourthly, we must put equal emphasis on development and security. The development of information and communications technologies is still uneven worldwide. Much remains to be done to bridge the digital divide. On the one hand, we should promote security through development, continue our endeavour to bridge the digital divide and make more efforts to build the capacity of developing countries, through which we can bolster the weak links in cyberspace. On the other hand, development should be secured. A favourable environment is vital for the sound and robust development of the digital economy. We should neither pursue absolute security at the expense of the vitality of development nor circumvent the necessary

security and supervision under the pretext of market and trade liberalization.

China attaches great importance to cybersecurity and to the development of information and communication technologies applications. China is vigorously implementing its national strategy for cyberpower and big data, as well as its Internet Plus action plan. China is also promoting Digital China and the building of a digital economy.

China advocates dialogue and cooperation by constructively participating in the GGE and other multilateral cybersecurity processes in the United Nations, promoting digital economy cooperation in the Group of 20, as well as the development of the Digital Silk Road and the China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Information Harbour, deepening cooperation within the framework of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. With the expansion of the circles of friends, China is constantly contributing to building a community of shared future for humankind in cyberspace.

China remains ready to continue its efforts, guided by notion of building a community of shared future for humankind in cyberspace. Together with the rest of the world, we strive for a peaceful, secure, open, cooperative and orderly cyberspace.

**Mr. Liddle** (United Kingdom): The United Kingdom aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union and the joint statement made by the representative of Canada (see A/C.1/73/PV.19). I would now like to make some remarks in a national capacity.

We all stand to benefit from a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace. We have a shared responsibility to improve our collective cybersecurity.

The United Kingdom recognizes that our economic prosperity and social well-being increasingly depend on the openness and security of networks that extend beyond our own borders. We are committed to promoting international stability frameworks for cyberspace based on the application of existing international law, agreed voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour, and confidence-building measures supported by coordinated and targeted capacity-building programmes.

The United Nations has a central role in that work. We support a sixth United Nations Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE) to address responsible State behaviour in cyberspace that maintains the mandate of previous Groups and preserves the conclusions of all past GGE reports, notably those of 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174). The Group should be tasked with ensuring better implementation of norms of State behaviour. It should encourage all States, in particular future GGE members, to state their national positions on how international law applies in cyberspace, and it should include a broad intersessional consultative mechanism to ensure all States Members of the United Nations engage in the process.

The foundation for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace is mutual commitment to existing international law, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the application of international humanitarian law to cyberoperations in armed conflict. We believe further work to clarify how international law applies will build understanding and foster greater transparency. We therefore call on all States to set out their understanding of international law in this domain.

This year the Attorney General set out the United Kingdom's position. He emphasized that cyberspace is not — and must never be — a lawless world. States and individuals in cyberspace are governed by law, just as they are in any other domain. It is the responsibility of all States, as the authors and subjects of international law, to be clear how that law extends to cyberspace.

The United Kingdom will promote the application of those rules through the implementation of agreed norms of responsible State behaviour and the development of positive practical measures we can all adopt. We will continue to support efforts at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other regional forums to implement confidence-building measures that contribute to transparency and trust among States in cyberspace. We welcome in particular the work of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to recognize and subscribe to the norms of State behaviour outlined in the 2015 GGE report.

The United Kingdom will continue to work with partners across all continents to deliver tailored capacity-building to help States increase their own cybersecurity. We believe it is vital that capacity-building and confidence-building be linked, and we strongly advocate wider engagement across the international community and greater interregional cooperation.

We must be prepared to take collective action against those States that choose not to follow the rules. We need to be prepared to identify and respond to unacceptable State behaviour, within existing international law. Together with partners, we have taken steps to expose such malicious cyberactivity and will continue to do so. We endorse the framework for joint European Union diplomatic responses to malicious cyberactivities — the cyberdiplomacy toolbox — which sets out various options, including restrictive measures.

Responsible State behaviour in cyberspace is about each State respecting and upholding our shared rules and values. Each one of us must be clear what those rules and values are. We must assist and support other States in applying those rules and values and be resolute in defending them and taking action when we believe they have been broken. In that way, we can realize the potential for development offered by a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace, while mitigating the threats from those who seek to abuse it.

**Mr. Lee Jang-keun** (Republic of Korea): My delegation aligns itself with the statement on cybersecurity delivered last week by the representative of Canada on behalf of a group of States (see A/C.1/73/PV.19) and would like to make some additional remarks.

The advances in information and communication technologies (ICTs) have presented us a new domain of boundless opportunities, thereby creating unprecedented economic and social benefits. At the same time, they have also brought about unprecedented challenges. The entire world today is facing mounting threats in cyberspace, with malicious actors endlessly plotting offensive activities using ICTs, targeting not only individuals and businesses, but also national critical infrastructure. As a result, cybersecurity has now emerged as a key issue on the international security agenda. In addressing those challenges, my delegation believes that it is important to give priority to the following three aspects.

First, it is crucial to step up our efforts to deepen our commitment to applying international law in cyberspace and implementing norms of responsible State behaviour. In this vein, we stress the value of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGE) established by this very Committee. It served as a unique and valuable global-level platform to seek common

international principles and guidelines to be applied in the cyberdomain.

In its consensus reports of 2013 (see A/68/98) and 2015 (see A/70/174), the GGE reaffirmed that international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, is applicable and essential to maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment. Furthermore, the 2015 GGE report offered valuable recommendations for 11 voluntary non-binding norms, rules or principles of responsible State behaviour. My delegation firmly believes that continuing the GGE process would greatly contribute to the concerted efforts aimed at achieving an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful environment in cyberspace. We hope that the First Committee will agree on re-establishing the GGE, while building upon its previous work and achievements.

Secondly, it is essential to develop and implement practical confidence-building measures to enhance transparency and reduce the risk of conflict flowing from misunderstanding and miscalculation. In that regard, my delegation recognizes the importance of interregional cooperation and dialogue in developing confidence-building measures. We therefore support and welcome the efforts made in regional forums, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization of American States. It was in that context that my Government organized the Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security, in April 2017, in cooperation with the OSCE. It offered a valuable venue for the sharing of views and experiences in building regional cyberrelated confidence-building measures. We consider that that interregional approach could be a good starting point for exploring the way of cooperation by sharing information and best practices. We plan to hold the second Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security next year.

Thirdly, it is essential to bridge the gap in cybersecurity capacity among countries. When my Government hosted the 2013 Seoul Conference on Cyberspace we sought to facilitate international cooperation in capacity-building by incorporating it into the agenda of the conference. Building upon that initiative, we launched, in 2015, the Global Cybersecurity Centre for Development as part of our efforts to share expertise and experience.

Considering the cross-border nature and ripple effects of cyberthreats, no single country is immune to this looming danger, and no single country can tackle this concern single-handedly. Having participated in four rounds of the GGE, my delegation would like to reaffirm our commitment to continuing to play a constructive role in developing cooperative measures to address existing and potential threats in cyberspace.

**Ms. Paasilinna** (Finland): Finland fully aligns itself with the statement made by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

The issues we are discussing under this cluster could not be more topical. Responsible State behaviour in the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in particular needs to be increased in the interests of maintaining peace and stability and promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.

Finland expressed its grave concerns about the recent attacks against the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, attributed to the Russian authorities, and underlines the need to uphold international law in cyberspace.

The United Nations has played an important role in promoting the dialogue on different aspects of the use of information and communication technologies. The successive Groups of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (GGEs) have agreed that generally applicable rules of international law also apply to State conduct in cyberspace. Certain questions related to the application of existing legal rules in cyberspace remain open and could benefit from clarification. However, it would be counterproductive to redefine unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of other States, specifically in cyberspace.

Furthermore, as a procedural point, the code of conduct — referred to as the “set of international rules, norms and principles of responsible behaviour of States”, referred to in paragraph 1 of the Russian draft resolution (A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1) — risks creating a confused mandate for future discussions. In our view, the normative work should be left to the bodies specifically designated for this purpose, which also have the necessary expertise. The purpose of the draft resolution to be adopted here (A/C.1/73/L.37) is to

define the modalities of future work, not to anticipate its results.

The recommendations of the 2015 GGE on responsible State behaviour have been welcomed by the General Assembly, which called upon States to be guided in their use of information and communication technologies by the 2015 GGE report. Those recommendations still deserve our attention. They outline standards as to what States should do at the national level and how they should cooperate with each other — for instance, to protect the critical infrastructure, ensure the integrity of the supply chain, prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and share information.

It goes without saying that such recommendations are without prejudice to the rights and obligations of States under international law. At the same time, they can be seen as a practical contribution to clarify what ICT-specific steps States should take in order to comply with their obligation not to knowingly allow their territories to be used for activities that may cause significant harm to other States.

The GGEs have very usefully also discussed confidence-building measures and capacity-building. That work should continue. Finland supports the continuation of the process in the form of a new GGE, complemented, as appropriate, by a mechanism for consulting the United Nations membership and other interested stakeholders. The work should build on the achievements of the earlier GGEs.

The authority of the work in the United Nations in this field has been based on consensual support. There is much value in trying to achieve consensus also this year on the modalities of future work. Finland is willing to participate in efforts to that end.

**Mr. Abbani** (Algeria) (*spoke in Arabic*): First, I would like to express the support of my country's delegation for the statements made on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.16), the Group of African States (see A/C.1/73/PV.18) and the Group of Arab States (see A/C.1/73/PV.17) on the cluster "Other disarmament measures and international security".

Modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) provide many opportunities for countries to achieve social and economic development, given the importance and growing use of such

technologies in civilian and military applications. Cyberspace has become an indispensable means in many areas, as well as in the widespread use of these technologies by defence and security systems. However, the use of those technologies for non-peaceful purposes, especially by criminal and terrorist groups, has become a real danger that threatens international peace and security. Therefore, it is imperative to secure cyberspace and promote international cooperation in order to prevent any attempts to use those technologies for criminal purposes.

In that context, my delegation would like to stress that fears of the dual use of such modern technologies should not be a pretext to curb the transfer of modern technologies to the countries that need them, especially developing countries, while taking into account their legitimate defence needs.

My delegation welcomes the conclusions and recommendations contained in the Secretary-General's report (A/73/177) on the current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts. They could contribute significantly to highlighting many important issues, such as averting the use of those technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes and promoting international cooperation, confidence-building measures and transparency to limit the risk of the outbreak of conflict.

Algeria expresses its concerns about the increase in significant challenges to cybersecurity, especially given the increase in worrisome cybersecurity threats that have recently targeted many countries and harmed their security, stability and infrastructure. Algeria has adopted a comprehensive approach that combines public security and cybersecurity to combat cross-border electronic crimes, by implementing various practical mechanisms that aim to enhance international and regional cooperation in order to address those challenges.

In that vein, my country has established an agency to prevent information crimes, whose task is to protect national security by revitalizing and coordinating preventive measures and fighting crimes relating to such technologies, especially terrorist crimes that threaten national peace and security. Algeria also ratified Arab and African conventions to combat information crimes with the aim to strengthen coordination among those countries in the context of fighting this kind of illicit

activity. In that context, my delegation stresses the need to establish real cooperation among States in order to develop a unified strategy to fight cross-border digital crimes and highlight the importance of achieving an international agreement to combat digital crimes that affect persons, institutions and States alike.

Artificial intelligence applications hold great potential for the welfare and progress of humankind in many spheres, but the use of such applications to develop lethal autonomous weapon systems would cause ethical, humanitarian and legal challenges. The international community must therefore develop clear legal constraints to curb the risks of using such systems and their catastrophic consequences. I would particularly mention the legal and security concerns of using drones against people and property. Their use requires increased transparency, monitoring and accountability within governmental laws to ensure that they do not compromise international humanitarian law.

My delegation would like to commend the study conducted by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in 2017, as well as its project to follow up on this important issue starting this year.

**Mr. Robotjazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): My delegation associates itself with the statement delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

Along with the rapid advances in information and communication technologies (ICTs), as well as the growing dependence of critical infrastructure on them, new and sophisticated cyber risks and cyber threats continue to increase. A number of States with subversive aims attempt to overtly, or covertly, use cyberspace to intervene in the political, economic and social affairs and systems of other States. Certain States have acquired cyberwarfare capabilities and techniques; malware and cyberweapons have also been used by some States. As a result, there is a great deal of potential for the eruption of cyberconflicts between States in the not too distant future.

Some national measures are being taken to respond to those relevant concerns and challenges. However, there is a dire need for a multilateral instrument to prevent such cyberconflict and address the security problems in cyberspace. Additionally, there is a need for an inclusive multilateral intergovernmental mechanism within the United Nations for sustained consideration,

cooperation and coordination on cybersecurity-related issues.

Accordingly, a serious substantive discussion is required to explore the ways and means of developing international norms, rules and principles for addressing cybersecurity issues. We should recall that the development of existing international law preceded the advent of cyberspace and cyberwarfare. Many questions on how to apply existing international law on cyberactivities must therefore be clarified. That has to be done in an inclusive process with the participation of all States.

As a victim of cyberweapons, Iran rejects the status quo in cyberspace and strongly supports the establishment of international legal norms and rules concerning the prevention of the use of ICT in cyberspace for malicious purposes. Those who have an explicit policy of seeking dominance and superiority in cyberspace aspire to maintain the status quo. They reject any step forward towards developing international legal norms, as it would limit their freedom in the application of their offensive cybercapabilities against other States.

The very State that, in collaboration with Israel, used Stuxnet against Iran's critical infrastructure in 2010 has now put forward a draft resolution regarding responsible State behaviour in cyberspace. That is a hypocritical move. That country wants to preserve the status quo and impede any inclusive, serious process within the United Nations to develop legal norms regarding the use of ICT. The sponsor of that draft resolution considers cyberspace a war-fighting domain. It is also actively engaged in making cyberweapons and interfering in the political, social and economic systems of other States through cyberspace. Given such track records, why should developing countries trust its intention and the rationale behind that draft resolution?

After several years spent examining that vital issue within the context of the Group of Governmental Experts with limited members, it is time to conduct such discussions in an inclusive forum within the United Nations. That would allow all States to participate in the process of international norm-setting and rule-making, with respect to the security aspects of the use of ICT. To that end, Iran welcomes and supports the proposal of the Russian Federation as contained in draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev.1, on establishing an open-ended working group within the United Nations on cybersecurity and the use of ICT. Indeed,

that is a step forward, as an open-ended working group is an inclusive forum open to the participation of all countries. The adamant opposition to the establishment of an open-ended working group on cybersecurity is not comprehensible. It appears that they favour a closed and discriminatory process. Why, then, should developing countries be deprived of participation in the norm-setting process on cybersecurity, which affects their long-term interests?

In consideration of the cybersecurity issues, the Islamic Republic of Iran underlines that the following elements, among others, should be taken into account. The right of all States to ICT research and development, as well as to manufacturing, utilizing and transferring ICT products and services for peaceful purposes, should be fully respected. In their use of ICT, States should uphold their commitment to observe the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including respect for sovereign equality, the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, the prohibition of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. There is a need to remove the major impediments that developing countries face in accessing ICT and its related know-how, technologies and services. Specific mechanisms and measures for international cooperation and coordination must be established.

Securing a conducive environment for the broadest possible use of ICT by all nations and preventing its use for illegal purposes is indeed an indispensable collective responsibility. Iran stands ready to contribute to the fulfilment of that noble objective.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): I now give the floor to the representative of India to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.65/Rev.1.

**Ms. Bhandari** (India): On behalf of my delegation, under this cluster I have the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/73/L.65/Rev.1, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament.

We were very pleased that, during the First Committee meetings last year, this draft resolution was adopted by consensus and attracted sponsors from across regions. The draft resolution mandated the Secretary-General to submit a report on the current developments in science and technology and

their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts. We welcome the Secretary-General's report (A/73/177), which highlights those recent developments, including in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, biology and chemistry, advanced missile and missile-defence technologies, space-based technologies, electromagnetic technologies and materials technologies.

The report provides an overview of recent developments of relevance to the means and methods of warfare; draws attention to the possible security implications of those developments, both individually and in convergence; documents multilateral efforts to address those issues; and makes recommendations on how to enhance those efforts, all of which, in our view, merit the consideration of Member States. We also welcome the submissions by Member States expressing their views on that issue, which are contained in the report.

We take note of the discussions on developments in science and technology across various forums over the past year, including in the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters during its sixty-ninth and seventieth sessions, in the Meeting of Experts of the Biological Weapons Convention on science and technology, in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and in the Conference on Disarmament under its subsidiary body 5.

Given the fast pace at which developments in science and technology are taking place, the draft resolution submitted this year requests that the Secretary-General submit to the General Assembly an updated report on recent developments. That would give Member States an opportunity to provide their views on the matter, including those that could not do so last year. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters is encouraged to continue its discussions on this important subject. The draft resolution also requests that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research organize a one-day focused seminar in Geneva in 2019 in order to facilitate dialogue among relevant stakeholders on the subject.

In our view, challenges related to the military applications of advances in science and technology should be tackled, first and foremost, with a nuanced understanding of those developments and how they interface with existing mechanisms and instruments

on international security and disarmament. While acknowledging that there is no need to duplicate the work being carried out in existing forums, this draft resolution responds to the call for better coordination among the various efforts under way across the United Nations to address developments in science and technology in order to ensure that the international community's efforts in that regard are both coherent and comprehensive.

The delegation of India believes that the important topic of science and technology should bring us all together. We look forward to the continued support of all delegations on this cross-cutting issue of immense significance, and we hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus again this year. We also encourage Member States to consider co-sponsoring the draft resolution as a demonstration of their support to this important issue.

**Mr. Nakai** (Japan): Under this agenda item, allow me to address the issue of cybersecurity and disarmament education.

With regard to cybersecurity, Japan fully associates itself with the joint statement delivered by the representative of Canada (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

Japan recognizes that cyberspace is an artificial domain for the free exchange of ideas without being constrained by national borders. It is an intangible frontier of definite values generated by intellectual creations and innovations inspired by globally exchanged ideas. Cyberspace is now an essential foundation of the socioeconomic activities of every country. For the purpose of the protection of the freedom of expression, the promotion of innovation and the improvement of socioeconomic vitality, cyberspace should be a space in which freedom is assured without unnecessary restrictions and all actors who wish to access it are neither discriminated against nor excluded without a legitimate reason.

However, the threat of cyberattacks is growing. The malicious use of cyberspace not only by State but also by non-State actors, including terrorists, has increased, and we are in a situation in which the means of cyberattacks can easily proliferate. It is necessary to ensure a secure cyberspace through each actor's cooperative and self-motivated activities. At the same time, we should not take arbitrary measures, even for the sake of countering such threats. Japan will make its utmost effort to create and develop a free, fair and secure

cyberspace. Japan's efforts consist of the following three pillars: promoting the rule of law in cyberspace, confidence-building measures and capacity-building.

With regard to the rule of law, Japan is actively contributing to the international discussion on the promotion of a common understanding that the existing international laws are applicable in cyberspace, and on the development of non-binding and voluntary norms of responsible State behaviour.

As for confidence-building measures, Japan is engaged in the promotion of information-sharing and confidence-building through bilateral dialogues and multilateral frameworks, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Since we believe that capacity-building is also important in enhancing the international response to cyberthreats, Japan is actively engaged in human-resource development assistance and technical cooperation focusing on the region of ASEAN.

Japan highly appreciates the past activities of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and welcomes the further discussion of cyberissues on the basis of the previous GGE reports.

Japan believes that all States can enjoy the benefits enabled by cyberspace through our efforts and cooperation to strengthen the deterrence of cyberattacks and the malicious use of cyberspace.

Next, I wish to touch upon the issue of education for disarmament and non-proliferation. Disarmament and non-proliferation education has significant potential to bridge differences among us with regard to disarmament. We recognize that critical thinking empowers people to use reason when considering important issues. Sound judgment, through critical thinking, can pave the way for people to take appropriate actions.

The final document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons highlighted education as a useful and effective means to achieve nuclear disarmament. It also encouraged all States to implement the 34 recommendations contained in the 2002 report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124). Japan reaffirms the significance of those recommendations and encourages all States Members of the United Nations to put them into practice. We furthermore believe that the 2002 report should be

upgraded to better suit today's situation. We are of the view that it is high time to start discussing the matter.

We believe that disarmament and non-proliferation education has significant potential to help to eventually achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Japan will continue to take the lead in that area and calls on all Member States to join our effort.

**Mr. Beerwerth** (Germany): Germany aligns itself with the statement delivered by the observer of the European Union (see A/C.1/73/PV. 19). Please allow me to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.

When the Committee discussed, almost exactly one year ago, the oral report of the Chairperson of the 2016-2017 Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), two messages concerning the GGE were loud and clear.

The large majority of States were convinced that despite last year's setback, the General Assembly was not left empty-handed. They insisted that the GGE had — especially in its 2013 report (see A/68/98) and 2015 report (see A/70/174) — collated a wealth of important insights and valuable recommendations on the international law of cyberspace, on the responsible behaviour of States, on confidence-building measures and on the importance of capacity-building. In the debate, many speakers, including my own delegation, issued passionate appeals to preserve what we already had and not to delegitimize it.

The second message, supported by a large majority of delegations, was that, despite widespread disappointment about last year's lack of consensus, the General Assembly must not stop its work and that a GGE process should again take up the 2013 and 2015 reports and continue its search for agreement — on the precondition, however, that a new GGE should work in a way that would allow more States and others with expertise on these issues to contribute their views and input to the work of the Group.

Why do we have an interest in continuing what proved to be so difficult last year? It is because we are concerned about securing peace, sovereign equality, the protection of human rights online and friendly relations among all States in the digital age. We want clarity about the norms, rules and laws that should guide all States in our digital age. We want a predictable and reliable framework for responsible State behaviour that prohibits and deters internationally wrongful cyberacts.

We insist on having rules that protect us against manipulation, interference, economic espionage and the theft of business secrets and intellectual property. We want to be protected against the threat of use of force against our political independence via cyberoperations carried out by State agents or non-State actors of all kinds acting on behalf of, or encouraged by, States.

We worry about the dangers of the escalation of minor cyberincidents into a real political crisis and look for measures to build trust and confidence in their relations with neighbours, regional organizations and beyond. We wonder about mechanisms or procedures for cooperating in the investigation of information technology incidents and addressing issues States may have with other States. We want capacity-building so as to make the Internet safe and secure everywhere, because that is part of the very definition of a net whose knots are equally strong and well-tied everywhere and that does not have glaring holes.

I am pleased to note that we actually have a draft resolution before us that provides for a new GGE following, in the most suitable way, the model of the previous GGE draft resolutions adopted in the Committee by consensus. It also provides for a very practical and pragmatic mechanism to guarantee that all States whose experts ultimately will not sit on the GGE and others whose cooperation we need will have a say and can make their voices heard in the work of the GGE.

That is the approach my delegation supports. There is still a great deal we can build on. That is why I would like to appeal, through the Chair, to all fellow representatives in the room to continue working together. It is up to us to keep our digital world free, open and secure, and it is certainly up to us to agree on how we do it.

**Mr. Sivamohan** (Malaysia): Malaysia associates itself with the statements delivered by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and by the representative of Singapore on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (see A/C.1/73/PV.19).

The advent of new technologies in cyberspace has brought about both tremendous opportunities and complex challenges. The articulation of norms and principles governing the conduct of States and other actors is of vital importance. Malaysia reaffirms the

need for multilateral cooperation in charting the way forward.

Malaysia has always taken a keen interest in this field. We are presently co-Chair of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, together with Singapore and Japan. The inaugural meeting was held in Kuala Lumpur on 25 and 26 April. Malaysia is confident that, in the years to come, that body will make valuable contributions to the regional discourse on cybersecurity, including through the development of confidence-building measures.

Malaysia reaffirms that the United Nations must continue to demonstrate leadership in the field of cybersecurity, which today influences the work of Governments, the private sector and ordinary individuals to an unprecedented degree. Notwithstanding the divergence of views on particular issues, we call on all parties to find common ground in addressing an area of great concern to the international community as a whole.

**The Acting Chair** (*spoke in French*): We have heard the last speaker in the debate for this meeting.

I shall now give the floor to members who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

I give the floor to the representative of Bangladesh.

**Mr. Kazi** (Bangladesh): My delegation exercises its right of reply in reference to the statement by the representative of the delegation of Myanmar under cluster 4, "Conventional weapons".

The statement of the delegation of Myanmar is emblematic of its systematic denial of all evidence-based information on the violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law by their security forces, especially the Tatmadaw. The delegation of Myanmar obliquely referred to the statement by our delegation under the same thematic cluster and stated that we had raised the reported use of, and casualties caused by, landmines planted by Myanmar authorities along our border areas last year from our so-called narrow political agenda.

The issue of the use of landmines by Myanmar to cause harm to the forcibly displaced Rohingya was raised by our Prime Minister in her statement at the seventy-second session of the General Assembly (see A/72/PV.14), and with full responsibility. The reported use of landmines in Myanmar's Kachin, Shan and Rakhine states was mentioned by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Myanmar, even in her latest report to the Assembly (see A/73/332).

The issue has now been further elaborated with first-hand accounts in the report of the United Nations independent international fact-finding mission on Myanmar (A/HRC/39/64), which has been broadly acknowledged as an authoritative account of the gravest crimes under international law committed by the Myanmar security forces. The report has categorically mentioned that the landmines excavated along the border were in some cases found to be PMN-1 — a type that Myanmar is reported to produce and procure for their use by the Tatmadaw, among others.

As a State party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty, Bangladesh has every responsibility to raise its concerns about the evidence-based use of such weapons in the relevant disarmament forums. Myanmar has continued to make various commitments against the production and use of landmines, but the continued reports of fatalities and casualties across its territory attest to facts otherwise. According to the fact-finding mission, in one particular instance along the border, two nationals of Bangladesh were reported to be casualties. Our border management forces continue to take up the matter with their Myanmar counterparts, but that does not redeem our concerns about the continued use in our neighbouring territory of a weapon that violates international humanitarian law.

We continue to urge Myanmar to accede to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty and take the necessary measures in compliance. Bangladesh has no particular political motivation in raising the issue at the United Nations, and we can only hope that Myanmar will stop creating one.

*The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.*