



General Assembly

Sixty-seventh session

First Committee

9th meeting

Wednesday, 17 October 2012, 3 p.m.
New York

Official Records

Chair: Mr. Percaya (Indonesia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 86 to 102 (continued)

General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chair: This afternoon the Committee will conclude its general debate with an exchange with the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs on the follow-up of resolutions and decisions adopted by the First Committee at its past session/presentation of reports. As members may recall, this exchange was postponed until today because we ran out of time yesterday.

In keeping with the working methods of the Committee regarding the consideration of this item, I will now suspend the meeting to enable us continue our discussion in an informal setting.

The meeting was suspended at 3.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.45 p.m.

The Chair: The Committee has now come to the end of the general debate phase of its work. In the course of the debate, which involved seven meetings, we listened to more than 100 statements, including 88 by national representatives, nine by the representatives of regional groups and coalitions of States, and two from international organizations. We also heard 13 statements in exercise of the right of reply.

Collectively, those statements highlighted the main concerns and priorities of member States in the field of disarmament and international security, and the

high number of speakers clearly illustrates the level of importance that member States continue to attach to matters of disarmament and international security. The Committee has thus concluded the first phase of its work.

Agenda items 86 to 102 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

The Chair: As I noted during the organizational session on 5 October, this segment will run from 17 to 30 October, for a total of 10 meetings. It will focus on a structured thematic discussion of specific issues grouped under the seven agreed clusters: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction; outer space (disarmament aspects); conventional weapons; regional disarmament and security; other disarmament measures and international security; and, lastly, disarmament machinery. The revised indicative timetable for this segment of our work, contained in document A/C.1/67/CRP.2/Rev.1, has been circulated to all delegations and posted on the First Committee web portal QuickFirst.

Before I open the floor for statements, I should like to remind delegations that we will continue with the electronic submission of draft resolutions, and, in that regard, I ask that members please keep in mind that the deadline for the submission of all draft resolutions and decisions is tomorrow, Thursday, 18 October, at noon.

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-506. Corrections will be issued after the end of the session in a consolidated corrigendum.

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As I also noted during our organizational meeting on 5 October, this submission deadline is necessary in order to allow sufficient time to delegations for consultations and to the Secretariat to process the draft resolutions in all official languages. Delegations are encouraged to submit their draft resolutions even before the stipulated deadline, if possible, in order to allow enough time for consultation with their respective capitals where necessary so that the texts finally adopted will reflect the highest possible degree of agreement. It is especially important that delegations submit as early as possible all draft resolutions that might entail programme budget implications in order to enable the Secretariat to prepare in a timely manner the necessary statements reflecting those implications.

Furthermore, I should emphasize that the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the Fifth Committee require some lead time to review the programme budget implications of any draft resolution before it can be acted upon by the General Assembly. In this connection, I should like to remind delegations once again of the guidance of the General Committee, contained in its report to the General Assembly, as outlined in document A/67/250. In paragraphs 43 and 44 of that report, the General Committee reaffirms that the Fifth Committee is the appropriate Main Committee of the General Assembly entrusted with the responsibility for administrative and budgetary matters.

The General Committee further draws the attention of the General Assembly to the views expressed by the ACABQ regarding the use of the phrase “within available resources”, as set out in document A/54/7. Accordingly, I would kindly request delegations to avoid the use of the phrase “within existing resources” in draft resolutions or decisions of the First Committee.

With those remarks, I shall open the floor for our thematic discussion and the introduction of draft resolutions under the nuclear-weapons cluster. As is customary, we have a rolling list of speakers for all the clusters, and I urge all delegations taking the floor to kindly keep their interventions within reasonable time limits. Let me also remind all delegations that a rolling list implies that they should be prepared to intervene at any time, possibly sooner or later than they had originally planned to speak. Delegations that are not able to speak by the time we adjourn on any given day will have the opportunity to speak first on the following day.

I now call on the representative of Indonesia to introduce the draft resolution entitled “High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”.

Mr. Cassidy (Indonesia): I am privileged to speak on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In the view of NAM member States and as clearly stated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to humankind and to the survival of civilization, and therefore effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority.

In this connection, NAM stresses that while the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war through the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, NAM reaffirms the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control. The Movement therefore emphasizes the necessity to start negotiations without further delay on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, including a nuclear weapons convention, within a specified time frame.

In this context, the Movement expresses concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, and in this regard the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals in fulfilment of their relevant multilateral legal obligations and their unequivocal undertakings in 2000 and 2010.

NAM strongly calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with their legal obligations and undertakings to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons without further delay, and in a transparent, irreversible and internationally verifiable manner. In this regard, the Movement also calls on the nuclear-weapon States immediately to cease all their plans to further modernize, upgrade, refurbish, or extend the lives of their nuclear weapons and related facilities.

NAM reaffirms the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and international verifiability by nuclear-weapon States in all measures related to the fulfilment of their nuclear disarmament obligations.

The Movement remains deeply concerned by the strategic defence doctrines of the nuclear-weapon States and the NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, adopted at its Summit in May 2012, which set out the rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. NAM strongly calls for the complete exclusion of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military doctrines.

NAM reaffirms that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons, and reaffirms further that all non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, NAM reaffirms the need for the conclusion of a universal, legally binding instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States as a matter of high priority.

NAM emphasizes that progress in nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects is essential to strengthening international peace and security. In this regard, the Movement underlines that the fulfilment of nuclear disarmament obligations should not be made conditional on confidence-building measures or other disarmament efforts.

While welcoming the successful conclusion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), NAM States parties to the Treaty call for the full implementation of the action plan adopted in 2010 on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. NAM States parties to the NPT, while noting with concern the lack of agreement on a number of their key priorities, including the launch of negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention and a universal legally binding instrument on unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States, express their determination to continue collective efforts in pursuing the realization

of those priorities during the 2015 review process of the Treaty.

NAM States parties to the NPT emphasize that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals. Any such assumption is incompatible with the objective, purpose and integrity of the Treaty, as well as with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

NAM considers the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be an important measure towards achieving global nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. In this regard, NAM urges the conclusion of agreements, freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, taking into account the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission principles and guidelines. At the same time, NAM stresses that the establishment of such zones is not a substitute for the legal obligation of the nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

NAM States parties to the NPT urge the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to exert the utmost effort to ensure the success of the Conference to be convened in 2012, and to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. They stress the importance of the full implementation of all aspects of the agreed plan of action and the active and constructive engagement of all parties concerned to allow for the success of the Conference in launching a regional negotiation process aimed at fully realizing the objectives of the 1995 resolution and the establishment of the zone.

In conclusion, NAM member States stand ready to contribute effectively to any genuine international effort aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In this context, NAM reiterates its firm commitment to working for the convening of a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date, with the objective of reaching an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified time frame, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing,

stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.

In this context, NAM will introduce a draft resolution entitled “High-level meeting of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament”. The objective of this draft resolution is to contribute to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. The support of all delegations for the draft resolution will be much appreciated.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/67/L.1, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”, and A/C.1/67/L.2, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”.

Mr. Abdelkhalek (Egypt) (*spoke in Arabic*): On behalf of the Group of Arab States, I should like to reiterate our confidence in you, Sir, as Chair of the First Committee and pledge our full support for the success and positive outcome of the Committee’s work. We align ourselves with the Non-Aligned Movement statement on nuclear weapons delivered by our colleague from Indonesia.

This session is the right time to assess what has been done and to determine what challenges and work lie ahead because the world is closely following the international efforts to free the world of nuclear weapons and is hoping to see even greater efforts to realize our objectives, especially with regard to the action plan adopted by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We need to focus on transforming this into reality. Another very important and indivisible goal is to reinforce multilateral nuclear disarmament mechanisms.

We must seek to universalize the NPT and act efficiently on nuclear stockpiles in the three States that have not yet joined the Treaty and therefore cannot be considered to be non-nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the Treaty. Nuclear weapons must be declared so that they can be destroyed irreversibly and verifiably. Attaining that objective would open the door to the Treaty’s universal ratification and enable the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to reconsider its role and mandate to negotiate towards nuclear disarmament and to draft a treaty on nuclear weapons, as has always been called for by the non-aligned countries.

The arms race in outer space and the proliferation of fissile materials must be stopped. The comprehensive overview and the desire for a universal NPT, the implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and negotiations on fissile materials all respond to global and non-selective objectives for the sake of world security. The five nuclear States should redouble their efforts and go beyond convening mere periodic meetings. They must implement their commitments to disarmament under the action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) with more serious objectives that go beyond periodic and formal reviews.

Since the preparatory work for the 2015 NPT Review Conference is under way, a progress review regarding the implementation of commitments under the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT Review Conference is becoming increasingly urgent. The fourth action plan of the Final Document on the Middle East (see NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), which is our top priority, reflects the universal consensus on declaring the Middle East a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

Arab States participated actively in the consultations held by Ambassador Laajava, the facilitator of the conference, and presented written submissions in this respect. We have been in tireless communication with the Secretariat and the three depositary States of the Treaty as conveners of the Conference. The Cairo meeting of 7 October 2011 reflected our resolve to draft a mandate for the 2012 conference in order to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to ensure efficient participation in all preparatory work for the next Review Conference.

The Arab States have also taken a number of measures to promote an environment conducive to the success of the conference through initiatives related to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and are undertaking intensive efforts to implement the action plan. The Arab States are in contact with the Secretary-General and the three depositary States, and affirm the importance of sending invitations to the regions as soon as possible. We call for the broadest possible participation.

(*spoke in English*)

I have the pleasure to formally introduce the draft resolution entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”, contained in document A/C.1/67/L.2.

The draft resolution uses the same substantive elements and the text of resolution 66/61, with the necessary technical updates. The draft resolution is being presented by Egypt on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States: Algeria, Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, the Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Egypt.

The preamble to the draft resolution notes with satisfaction that the action plans of the 2010 NPT Review Conference emphasized the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and decided, *inter alia*, that the Secretary-General and the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, would convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

The operative section of the draft resolution reaffirms the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

Last year, resolution 66/61 enjoyed the overwhelming support of 167 States in the General Assembly. We look forward to a continued increase in international support and invite all States that did not support it to reconsider their position and to join the overwhelming majority of the international community in supporting this year's draft resolution.

Allow me to deliver the following remarks in my national capacity. In line with the aforementioned Arab Group position, I have the honour to formally introduce another draft resolution of paramount importance to the peace and security of the Middle East region and globally. The draft resolution bears the symbol A/C.1/67/L.1 and is entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

The draft resolution reiterates the exact substantive content of resolution 66/25, adopted by consensus under the same agenda item, with only the necessary technical updates. It reflects one of the most important regional aspirations supported by the General Assembly since 1974 for the future of the Middle East, where nuclear

weapons should have no place. The text has enjoyed the consensus support of the General Assembly since its thirty-fifth session.

The operative part of the draft resolution urges all parties to consider taking practical and urgent steps for the implementation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the NPT, and calls upon all countries of the region that have not yet done so to place their nuclear activities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

The draft resolution is scheduled for adoption on 30 October. Egypt is confident of the continued consensus on the draft resolution entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

Mr. Román-Morey (Peru) (*spoke in Spanish*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). First and foremost, UNASUR States wish to reiterate their commitment to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. This must remain a high priority for the international community. So long as nuclear weapons exist, there will be a real risk of their use and proliferation. The existence of nuclear weapons diminishes the security of all States, including those that possess them. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will fulfil their commitments and enter in good faith into a general, transparent, irreversible and verifiable process, under a well-defined schedule, with a view to achieving nuclear disarmament.

UNASUR States underscore the importance of positive developments in the nuclear field, such as the implementation of the New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation in 2010; the announcements made by some nuclear-weapon States concerning the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines; the statements made by some nuclear-weapon States regarding measures to strengthen their negative security assurances; and the announcements made by some States listed in annex 2 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) that they will continue and complete the process of ratification of the Treaty.

Our hope, however, needs to be rekindled by specific actions on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. However positive they are, all these events and initiatives are still not enough to move us towards the

ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. While recognizing the positive atmosphere generated by the decisions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the aspiration of UNASUR States for the present NPT review cycle is no less than the adoption of additional concrete steps towards nuclear disarmament at the Review Conference to be held in 2015.

UNASUR States consider that, while welcome, the meetings of nuclear-weapon States to discuss the implementation of steps contained in the 2010 action plan are not in themselves an achievement. We expect concrete progress. The interventions made by the nuclear-weapon States during the first session of the Preparatory Committee, held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May, lacked ambition. The result of the 2015 Review Conference should include the adoption of a binding time frame for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. UNASUR States remain committed to this objective.

UNASUR States express their disappointment with the current impasse prevailing in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The CD concluded its work in 2012 without adopting a programme of work that would enable it to begin substantive negotiations. We welcome the discussions to revitalize the work of the CD and take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, but stress that we have to address this question comprehensively. The reform of the CD should be discussed in the context of an overall undertaking to review the machinery as a whole, which could be done through a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Our countries will continue to lend their full support to a consensus formula that enables the adoption of a programme of work by the CD, and hence the negotiation of new disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. Besides stressing their readiness to initiate, without delay, negotiations on a treaty on fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices that promote the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, UNASUR members also express their interest in addressing the other key issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament: nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of those weapons. We hope that discussions on these four issues will lead

to the conclusion of legal instruments that would be part, in a mutually reinforcing manner, of a larger legal framework, such as a nuclear-weapons convention.

It is vital and urgent that all States that have not yet ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially all nuclear-weapon States and those that are listed in annex 2 of the CTBT, do so as soon as possible. We welcome the recent ratifications of Guatemala and Indonesia.

Pending the Treaty's entry into force, UNASUR States reiterate the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear tests. In this regard, it is crucial that all States be committed not to promoting or carrying out nuclear tests or any other form of nuclear explosions, or any other action that would contradict CTBT provisions and obligations.

As members of the first densely populated nuclear-weapon-free zone, UNASUR States are celebrating the forty-fifth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Once again, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to withdraw all interpretative declarations to the protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would help to eliminate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons against countries of the region. We highlight the contribution of nuclear-weapon-free zones to the promotion of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and underline the importance of increasing coordination and cooperation among these zones. We note with satisfaction that the first preparatory meeting for the Third Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones and Mongolia, was held in Vienna last April. We welcome the offer by Indonesia to host the Conference in 2015.

UNASUR States also welcome the decision taken by the Eighth NPT Review Conference to encourage the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements freely arrived at among the States in each region. We equally welcome the call encouraging nuclear-weapon States to withdraw the reservations presented to the protocols of these treaties, which include negative security assurances, as agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is also important to highlight the decision to hold a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We call upon all States of the region to take part in that conference, which should be regarded as the first step of a timely confidence-building process in the Middle East.

In the light of the commitment to the promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones, UNASUR States support the draft resolution entitled “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas” (A/C.1/67/L.45).

UNASUR States also underline the important contribution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to common efforts to establish a safer world. In this regard, we recognize the importance of the IAEA safeguards system as an essential tool to ensure that nuclear materials are used for exclusively peaceful purposes, in accordance with the NPT and those treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. UNASUR States also highlight the valuable contribution that the IAEA can make to disarmament actions through independent verification. In this regard, UNASUR States welcome the fact that one of its members, Uruguay, presided over the fifty-sixth session of the IAEA General Conference.

On this particular point, we highlight the importance of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, the only binational safeguards organization in the world, which celebrated its twentieth anniversary last year.

UNASUR States would like to conclude by expressing their support for some of the ideas put forward by the Secretary-General in his recent article entitled “The World is Over-Armed and Peace is Under-Funded”. As noted by Mr. Ban Ki-moon, massive military spending and new investments in modernizing nuclear weapons continue to reflect paradigms that are hard to explain 20 years after the end of the Cold War. In this regard, we join his call on nuclear-weapon States to cut spending on nuclear weapons and to invest instead in social and economic development.

The Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Kazakhstan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/67/L.4/Rev.1.

Mrs. Aitimova (Kazakhstan) (*spoke in Russian*): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the delegations of the five States of Central Asia — the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan — as the coordinator of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. The Treaty’s entry into force on 21 March 2009 was an important step, signifying the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. As a result, the Central Asian countries have made a solid contribution

to strengthening regional and global security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia was possible thanks to the joint, constructive efforts of all five Central Asian States in their desire to ensure security, stability and peace in the region and to create the necessary conditions for development and the prosperity of their peoples.

With the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan spoke out at various levels. The necessary impetus was given at the time of the Summit of Central Asian States in Almaty on 28 February 1997, where we adopted the Almaty Declaration calling for support for the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. In September 1997 in Tashkent, we held the international conference under the theme “Central Asia: a nuclear-weapon-free zone”, with the symbolic signing of the Treaty on the zone at the Semipalatinsk test site in 1991 by decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nursultan Nazarbayev. Based on the will of the people of Kazakhstan, we forever closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test centre. The depositary of the Treaty is the Kyrgyz Republic. The first consultative meeting on the Treaty was held in Turkmenistan on 15 October 2009. On 15 March 2011 in Tashkent, we held the second consultative meeting of the States parties to the Treaty.

The Central Asian zone has a number of unique characteristics. It is the first zone that is entirely located in the northern hemisphere and landlocked. It is the only zone on whose territory nuclear weapons were deployed in the past. The States parties to the Treaty have undertaken obligations to ban the production, acquisition and deployment on their territory of nuclear weapons and their components or other nuclear explosive devices, and are strictly adhering to them.

The establishment of firm guarantees of peace and security in and around our region are the core conditions for stable development, cooperation and the progress of States and their civilized integration into the global community. Each of our States has its own individuality and unique characteristics, which have been the basis for their choice of path for development and integration into contemporary civilization. But we also have a common history and share values similar to those of all peoples of our planet — peace, security, mutual respect and cooperation. No doubt, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which

is at the very heart of a vast Eurasian continent, has substantially strengthened security and stability over a huge geopolitical space. We hope that the security space around our zone will also grow so that our planet will eventually become one continuous nuclear-weapon-free zone.

An important component of the Treaty is the Protocol on guarantees opened for signature by nuclear-weapon States — the United Kingdom, China, Russia, the United States of America and France. In signing the Protocol containing negative security assurances, each nuclear Power undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons on States parties to the Treaty. Even Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon joined in the appeal for prompt recognition of Central Asia as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We welcome the recent progress in recognizing previously established nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the ratification by the nuclear Powers, especially Russia and the United States, of the protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba and Bangkok.

We welcome the beginning of the consultative process with nuclear States members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on conditions for negative security assurances, and we hope for a prompt and positive conclusion that would assist our common goal of advancing to a safer world free of nuclear weapons. We believe that the voluntary desire of States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones must be not only welcomed but in every way encouraged.

In resolutions 61/88, of 6 December 2006, 63/63, of 2 December 2009, and 65/49, of 8 December 2010, the General Assembly welcomed the signing of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, and emphasized that the establishment of the zone was an important step towards strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, encouraging cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the environmental rehabilitation of territories affected by radioactive contamination, and strengthening regional and international peace and security, and was an effective contribution to combating international terrorism and to preventing nuclear materials and technologies falling into the hands of non-State actors, first and foremost terrorists.

At the third consultative meeting of States parties to the Treaty in Astana on 12 June, the countries took a look at the regional plan of action to strengthen nuclear

security, prevent the spread of nuclear materials, and combat nuclear terrorism in the Central Asian region. The Central Asian zone has thereby demonstrated its willingness to make an important contribution to combating international terrorism and preventing nuclear materials and technologies from falling into the hands of terrorists. We think that the plan could be a model for adoption in other regions of the world.

The countries of Central Asia earnestly call on States and international organizations with experience and knowledge in the area of rehabilitating radioactively contaminated sites and territories to provide assistance to them in eliminating the environmental implications caused by mining uranium ore and work involved with nuclear-weapon testing.

In this session's draft resolution on the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (A/AC.1/67/L.4/Rev.1), the text has generally remained unchanged, with the exception of a technical update and the addition of the following clause to paragraph 4:

“as well as the adoption of an action plan of the States parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia to strengthen nuclear security, prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials and counter nuclear terrorism in Central Asia”.

It is necessary to emphasize that this stage in the process of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not complete. In this regard, as States that have signed this Treaty in Central Asia we call on other States and regions of the world to follow this example. We hope that all parties directly affected will undertake the practical measures necessary for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and we sincerely hope for the success of the Helsinki conference scheduled for December this year.

The Chair: I call on the representative of Switzerland to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons”.

Mr. Laggner (Switzerland): I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland on the issue of decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems.

For several years now, our countries have called for practical steps to address the significant number

of nuclear weapons that remain today at high levels of alert. We remain deeply concerned at the maintenance on high alert of weapons that have the destructive capacity to kill billions of people and pose a threat to the survival of humankind. We find it anachronistic that while the tensions that marked the international security climate during the Cold War have eased significantly, corresponding decreases in the alert levels of the arsenals of the largest nuclear-weapon States have not been forthcoming. The fact that doctrinal aspects from that era — such as high levels of readiness — are perpetuated today is a deep and constant concern.

It is no mistake that lowering the operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems has been recognized as being a key part of the nuclear disarmament process. It remains our strong view that action in this regard would result in a significant nuclear disarmament dividend through a reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear doctrines, and hence security policies overall.

We acknowledge and welcome the progress that has been made to date. The level of operational readiness of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been considerably lowered, and decisions to stand down strategic bombers have also been taken. These steps highlight the fact that de-alerting is possible and that technical and political challenges can be met. However, more can and more needs to be done to address the disproportionately high levels of alert of many nuclear weapons today. We are encouraged by the numerous calls made by former high-ranking officers from nuclear-weapon States supporting the necessity and feasibility of reducing the level of operational readiness of nuclear weapons.

It is against this background that the group on whose behalf I am taking the floor today will introduce once again a draft resolution entitled “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems”. The main objective of the draft resolution remains unchanged in calling for further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.

The draft resolution is closely tied to the action plan agreed at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), particularly the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to promptly engage with a view to, *inter alia*, considering the legitimate interest

of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear-weapons systems. The draft resolution welcomes the opportunities provided by the NPT review process to address the further reduction of the operational status of nuclear-weapons systems. It acknowledges the dialogue under way among the nuclear-weapon States on this and other issues related to nuclear disarmament, and also looks forward to the report in 2014 by nuclear-weapon States on their work in this area.

Our countries have been pleased at the steady increase in support, from non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States alike, that the text has garnered since it was first submitted in 2007. The strong support that the text attracts is a demonstration of our collective commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and our recognition that reducing alert levels is an important interim step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. We look forward to continued strong backing for the draft resolution this year, and invite all States to support it.

The Chair: I now call on the observer of the European Union.

Mr. Kos (European Union): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union (EU). The acceding country Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilization and Association Process and potential candidates Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; as well as Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, align themselves with this statement.

We warmly welcome the progress that has been made in the field of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, particularly the momentum created by major events such as the entry into force last year of the New START agreement, the successful 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and this year’s first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. At the same time, we continue to be deeply concerned at the persistent impasse for more than a decade in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), thereby preventing it from fulfilling its mandate, and in particular its failure to start negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the risk that non-State actors may gain access to such weapons

continue to be a major threat to international peace and security that call for a global approach.

The EU is fully committed to upholding, implementing and strengthening the treaties and agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation, while recognizing that progress is needed in this field, in line with the existing relevant instruments and through the negotiation of new treaties. The European Union is actively contributing to global efforts to seek a safer world for all and to the achievement of the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the NPT.

The European Union emphasizes the great importance of Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), the New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation, the Nuclear Security Summit process, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and looks forward to further progress in achieving the highest level of nuclear security worldwide.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation system, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its article VI, and an important element in the further development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In view of current proliferation risks, we are convinced that the NPT is today more important than ever. We must preserve and strengthen its authority and integrity.

In that context, the EU welcomed the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 and the consensus established on the action plan, which is our common road map to the 2015 Review Conference, and the other measures contained in its Final Document (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). The NPT States parties thereby confirmed their shared commitment to preserving the integrity of the Treaty and reaffirmed its importance. At the same time, they adopted measures to reinforce the implementation of the NPT regime. The EU emphasizes the importance of universalizing the NPT and calls on States that have not yet signed or ratified it to join the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

We call on NPT States parties to actively pursue, without delay and in a balanced manner, the forward-looking action plan set out in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which is designed to strengthen the three pillars of the Treaty. In this

regard, we welcome the nuclear-weapon States' follow-up meetings to the NPT Review Conference in Paris in 2011 and Washington, D.C., in 2012, as well as such initiatives of the non-nuclear-weapon States as the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which promotes the implementation of the 2010 Final Document. The first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, which met in Vienna in May this year, paved the way for a smooth start to the new NPT review cycle.

The EU welcomed the reaffirmation by the 2010 NPT Review Conference of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East and the endorsement of practical steps leading to the full implementation of that resolution. In this respect, the EU is pleased to announce that a follow-up event to the successful seminar held in Brussels in July 2011 will take place again in Brussels between 5 and 6 November 2012. We hope that it will allow for an open exchange of views among the participants from the concerned region and beyond on all aspects related to the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The European Union welcomed the appointment of Under-Secretary of State Jaakko Laajava of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland as facilitator and the designation of Finland as the host Government for the 2012 Conference. The EU has been in close contact with the facilitator and welcomed his report during the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. In the run-up to the 2012 Conference and beyond, we look forward to continue working with the facilitator and all concerned and interested parties to make progress in the process for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The European Union remains committed to ensuring the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions for countries wishing to develop in a responsible way their capacities in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We stress the key role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard, and reaffirm our willingness to promote as a universally accepted international verification standard, the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement together with the additional protocol. The EU also contributes to enhancing the IAEA's capability of safeguards analytical services in financing the Nuclear Material Laboratory. We join

the international call for elevating the safety of nuclear power plants to the highest level and strengthening nuclear safety measures worldwide. The EU also notes the importance of the work undertaken concerning multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, and is providing financial support to the future IAEA low-enriched uranium reserve.

The international community continues to be faced with major proliferation challenges that must be addressed in a resolute way. Iran's nuclear and missile programme defying many Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's testing of a nuclear explosive device and delivery mechanisms, are most worrying examples in this regard. The same can be said regarding Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and continued non-cooperation with the IAEA, which remains to be addressed by the Security Council. Even in the present situation, the Syrian authorities remain responsible for urgently remedying their non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement and for cooperating urgently and transparently with the Agency to clarify matters with regard to Dair Alzour and other sites and for bringing into force an additional protocol as soon as possible.

International concerns about the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme prevail and resulted in the adoption of the most recent IAEA Board of Governors resolution on Iran on 13 September. It urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with all its obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, thereby deciding that Iran's cooperation on all outstanding issues, including those pointing to possible military dimensions, is essential and urgent to restore international confidence.

The EU's objective remains to achieve a comprehensive, negotiated, long-term settlement. The E3+3—China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States—led by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign and Security Policy, remain firm, clear and united in seeking a swift diplomatic resolution of the international community's concern on the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme, based on the NPT, and the full implementation of Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions. Clear and credible proposals have been laid out in recent months for an initial confidence-building step that will

address the immediate key concerns, focusing on Iran's 20 per cent enrichment activities in a comprehensive manner, as well as reciprocal steps that would benefit Iran. We urge Iran once again to engage seriously and urgently to take the necessary steps that will allow confidence to be restored.

We strongly condemn the North Korean attempted launch conducted on 13 April, which constitutes a serious violation of Security Council resolutions 1695 (2006), 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). We strongly urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including uranium-enrichment activities, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, and to refrain from further provocative actions. We call on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations, and to provide the IAEA with the requested access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities.

The EU is very concerned about the risks caused by the proliferation of missiles that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including ballistic missiles of increasingly great range and sophisticated technologies. A number of tests of medium- and intermediate-range missiles conducted over recent years outside the existing transparency and prenotification schemes and in violation of Security Council resolutions, especially by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran, deepen our concern.

Credible assurances that States are honouring their non-proliferation obligations are indispensable components of the non-proliferation regime. We emphasize the essential role of the IAEA in this respect. We call on all States that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol with the IAEA, and to bring them into force as soon as possible.

The European Union emphasizes the IAEA's work in the prevention of nuclear and radiological terrorism, particularly through the Nuclear Security Fund, to which the EU makes significant contributions. We also welcome the outcome of the high-level meeting on countering nuclear terrorism, organized during the ministerial week on 28 September by the Secretary-General and the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

The EU supports all measures designed to prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, related materials, delivery systems and radiological material. In this context, we stress the need for compliance with obligations under Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1887 (2009) and 1977 (2011), and call for improved security of radioactive sources. By supporting the creation of regional chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear centres of excellence, the EU is helping to build capacities for the mitigation of risks related to such materials.

We reaffirm our support for the Group of Eight Global Partnership, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summits, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and the Financial Action Task Force.

The European Union calls on members of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to continue to share their experience in export control so that all States can draw on their work and its implementation. The European Union recalls the importance of strengthening the NSG's guidelines, as agreed at the 2011 plenary meeting, and emphasizes that it is important that having an additional protocol in force is a condition for nuclear supply within the NSG. The EU also welcomes the ongoing review of the NSG control lists.

The European Union attaches the greatest importance to the entry into force as soon as possible of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the completion of its verification regime. In expressing its support for the provisions in the joint ministerial statement of the CTBT ministerial meeting on the early entry into force of the Treaty, held on 27 September, the EU welcomes continuing efforts to bring about the entry into force of the CTBT and has engaged diplomatically in this respect with countries that need to sign or ratify the Treaty. We welcome the latest ratifications by the Central African Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia as an annex 2 State.

We reiterate our appeal to all States that have not done so, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to sign and ratify the CTBT swiftly and unconditionally. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, the European Union calls on all States to uphold a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear

explosion, and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT.

The EU recognizes the fundamental value of the CTBT verification regime as an instrument encouraging international cooperation and the development of trust. In order to reinforce these verification capacities, the EU has been supporting the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) through specific EU funding directed at a number of projects that are being carried out to strengthen the CTBTO verification capabilities and to facilitate the participation of developing countries in the verification regime.

The EU attaches great importance to the negotiation, in line with agreed documents in the Conference on Disarmament, of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions, as a means of enhancing disarmament and non-proliferation. In the interim, the EU calls on the States concerned that have not yet done so to declare and apply an immediate moratorium on the production of such materials, and to dismantle or convert for non-explosive use only the facilities dedicated to the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. In this context, we welcome the actions taken by certain nuclear-weapon States, and in particular States members of the European Union, that have declared a moratorium and dismantled installations of this kind.

The European Union stresses the importance of overcoming the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament. We call on all delegations to be flexible and begin negotiations immediately on an FMCT and to engage in substantive discussions on all the core issues on the CD agenda. We welcome initiatives of CD member States, including EU member States, to advance the issue of an FMCT. During the wider General Assembly debate from 27 to 29 July 2011, the European Union presented a number of concrete proposals. We are ready during this session to engage with you, Sir, and with all States Members of the United Nations to explore also other concrete and operational options in order to take multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament negotiations forward.

The EU continues to stress the necessity of general disarmament and progress in all fields of disarmament. Positive and negative security assurances play an important role in the non-proliferation and disarmament

regime. The EU is committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances and welcomes the respective adjustments in the United Kingdom and United States nuclear postures.

The European Union continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as provided for in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in 1999. We hope that outstanding issues concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones can be resolved through in-depth consultations, in accordance with the UNDC guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved. In this respect, we welcome the recent progress of the negotiations between States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the five permanent members of the Security Council on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The EU regards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery, as a means of enhancing security and stability in the region.

We are committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT and welcome the considerable reduction in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the Cold War, as well as the significant steps taken by two EU member States in this connection. We stress the need to continue the overall reduction of the global stockpiles of nuclear weapons, especially by those States with the largest arsenals.

In this context we recognize the application, reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control as a contribution to establishing and upholding international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. We shall continue our efforts to promote greater transparency in support of fresh progress with disarmament. The EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon States, in particular the EU member States, on the nuclear weapons they possess and calls on others to do likewise.

We welcome the entry into force of the 2010 New START agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation. In that respect, the EU recalls

the continued existence of significant deployed and stockpiled arsenals that are not covered by formal arms control agreements. We encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to continue negotiations in order to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic weapons. We call on them and on all States possessing non-strategic nuclear weapons to include them in their general arms-control and disarmament processes with a view to their reduction and elimination, while agreeing to the importance of further transparency and confidence-building measures in order to advance the nuclear disarmament process.

Serious challenges remain in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and we must face them with resolve. We note with satisfaction the growing momentum for progress towards achieving the goals enshrined in the NPT. The EU calls on all States to seize this opportunity and work together to make the world a safer place.

The Chair: I should like to draw the attention of delegations to two things. I do understand the importance and merit of having consultations to seek support for draft resolutions, but I encourage members kindly to reduce the level of noise so as not to disturb speakers. Secondly, I would also encourage speakers to speak within a reasonable period of time.

I now call on the representative of Sweden to introduce the draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

Mr. Lindell (Sweden): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC): Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and my own country, Sweden. The Coalition will once again introduce its draft resolution entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”. The text of the draft resolution has been circulated to all delegations, and I take this opportunity to speak to its key elements.

As we noted in our statement in the general debate (see A/C.1/67/PV.2), the New Agenda Coalition remains committed to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. We continue to work for the full implementation of the nuclear-disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and subsequent commitments agreed to at its Review Conferences in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

The draft resolution thus addresses a number of nuclear-disarmament issues on which progress is essential for the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Through the draft resolution, we reiterate the need for the nuclear-weapon States to take concrete, transparent, verifiable and irreversible steps to eliminate all types of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution also highlights important elements such as the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the value of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

While calling for full compliance with all decisions, resolutions and commitments made at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences, the draft resolution draws attention in particular to the elements contained in action 5 of the 2010 action plan. It calls on the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to implement these in a timely manner and to report on their efforts. It underscores the importance of transparency activities and encourages agreement on a standard reporting format.

The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in the current NPT review cycle, held under the very able leadership of Ambassador Woolcott of Australia in Vienna in May, laid the foundation for the work towards the realization of the 2010 commitments.

The draft resolution reiterates our call on the nuclear-weapon States to diminish further the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. It also speaks to the importance of ensuring the irreversible removal of all fissile material no longer needed for weapons purposes, and notes the need to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities and arrangements. The latter topic was the subject of a working paper presented by NAC at the 2012 meeting of the Preparatory Committee. In underlining the importance of multilateralism, the draft resolution urges the implementation of the three recommendations of the NPT action plan pertaining to the Conference on Disarmament.

The draft resolution welcomes the positive bilateral and regional developments that have taken place. In this context, it recalls the encouragement of the 2010 Review Conference to the United States and the Russian Federation to continue discussions on follow-

on measures to the New START agreement in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals, and encourages the broadening of this process to also involve other nuclear-weapon States.

The draft resolution emphasizes the need fully to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and urges continued efforts to ensure a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

NAC calls on the nuclear-weapon States to submit comprehensive, substantive reports about their undertakings under action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan to the Preparatory Committee in 2014 in order to enable the 2015 Review Conference to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI of the Treaty towards the realization of the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

NAC further continues to call upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place their facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We also urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the NPT and to verifiably terminate its nuclear weapons programme.

NAC reaffirms its opposition to any nuclear-weapons test. We stress the importance of the ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is of fundamental importance to efforts towards nuclear disarmament. We warmly welcome all recent ratifications of the CTBT and view positively the expressions of some States of their intention to pursue and complete the ratification process.

We encourage all member States to support the draft resolution and we hope that the growth in support for our resolution, which has been seen in recent years, will continue this year. We are confident that delegations will want to join us in signalling a strong wish to see the full implementation of the disarmament elements of the NPT action plan and to make progress towards the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Woolcott (Australia): May I join others in noting how pleased I am to see you, Sir, in the Chair and leading the important work of this Committee. I take the floor in my capacity as Chair of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015

Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was held in Vienna from 30 April to 11 May. I am pleased to report to the Committee that the first NPT Preparatory Committee session proceeded smoothly and in a businesslike manner. All of the necessary procedural decisions to initiate the new NPT review cycle were taken expeditiously on the morning of 30 April, thereby allowing the Preparatory Committee to undertake its substantive deliberations.

Mr. Špokauskas (Lithuania), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

From my initial consultations, it was apparent that States parties were looking for a constructive discussion on the important work of the implementation of the NPT, notably through the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties. Indeed, from my perspective the most important outcome of the first Preparatory Committee session was that States parties focused on the action plan. In this way they showed their continuing commitment to the action plan and effectively consolidated it as the basis of moving forward on the NPT's implementation. Given the breadth, detail and ambition of the action plan, this was not guaranteed. This was an important outcome and, of course, the credit for it belongs to States parties themselves.

The factual summary that I prepared and submitted to the Preparatory Committee as a working paper sought to encapsulate the depth and breadth of those discussions. I hope that this summary will assist States parties in their preparations for the second Preparatory Committee session in Geneva in April and May 2013.

In my opening and closing remarks at the Preparatory Committee meeting, I challenged the States parties with the question: "Are we collectively moving in the right direction?" At the time, I did not ask for an answer. There was no expectation at the meeting that States parties would be making collective judgements at that early stage in the review cycle about whether we were on track in implementation of a 2010 action plan.

At this time, however, I would answer that question in the affirmative but with some pronounced qualifications, given the extent of the implementation challenges that confront the NPT membership as we move closer to 2015. It was clear from the deliberations at the meeting but not surprising that the state of action plan implementation remains uneven. Even taking into

account the difficulty of measuring the implementation of many actions, the implementation of pillar 3, "Peaceful uses", is clearly ahead of pillar 2, "Non-proliferation", and then pillar 1, "Disarmament". The implementation of the 2010 decision on a conference in 2012 on the Middle East is on the path of continuing consultations of the facilitator and the co-conveners. Of course, that remains an important work in progress.

The nuclear-weapon States delivered a very detailed statement to the Preparatory Committee, but they need to show even more leadership and especially to report more. There is a high level of expectation of the nuclear-weapon States in this review cycle — notably the reporting by nuclear-weapon States on their action 5 disarmament commitments at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in 2014. There is a genuine interest in and hunger for information about what they are doing to meet their commitments. It may be a challenge, but the nuclear-weapon States need to feed that interest for information. Active transparency is in their interest.

At the same time, active transparency is in the interests of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States. Coming from a country that submitted a detailed national action plan implementation report to the Preparatory Committee, I would encourage non-nuclear-weapon States to report as comprehensively as their capacities allow. This builds pressure on others to be more transparent.

We will maintain our momentum only if the NPT membership continues to view the action plan as something we own collectively. All States parties come to action plan implementation with different weights of responsibility across the pillars of the NPT and different capacities, but we all own it. This collective ownership was apparent at the first session of the Preparatory Committee and needs to be maintained. We also need to focus on the future with genuinely creative ideas. We saw some in Vienna. We will need more as the review cycle proceeds and to get a better sense of the state of implementation.

Let me conclude by saying that States parties came to the Preparatory Committee with a strong sense of realism, a strong sense of where we were in the new review cycle, and recognition that the 2010 Review Conference outcome was a genuine achievement worth consolidating. Vienna provided us with an opportunity to take stock of what we had achieved over the previous two years and to understand better the extent of the

implementation challenges that confront us as we move into the second half of the review cycle. The fact that the 2012 session of the Preparatory Committee provided us with a solid base upon which to move forward does not — and I repeat, does not — foreshadow a successful Review Conference in 2015. That will be determined by our effort and our political will. I look forward to the second session of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva in six months and to assisting the Chair from the Eastern European Group to maintain the necessary momentum.

Mr. Simon-Michel (France) (*spoke in French*): I associate myself fully with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Positive advances have been made in the nuclear field this year. Nevertheless, the increase in nuclear proliferation and the persistent malfunctioning of multilateralism continue to be major sources of concern. I should like to talk further about how France sees these various elements.

I wish first to commend the overall progress made by the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Thanks to the talent and professionalism of our colleague Ambassador Peter Woolcott, who just spoke, and to the resolve of all NPT parties to preserve the consensus achieved at the 2010 Review Conference, we were able to launch this new cycle with the swift adoption of rules of procedure and in-depth discussions on the implementation of the action plan, which represents our shared road map, with strong objectives for all three pillars. We also managed to discuss the key subjects of NPT withdrawal and compliance with non-proliferation commitments.

I would also like to commend Mr. Jaakko Laajava for the work he has done since his appointment just one year ago. We have given him our full support and will continue to do so in the lead-up to the Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, scheduled for the end of this year.

On the subject of disarmament efforts, my country has wasted no time in getting to work to meet the objectives set in the 2010 action plan. I would first like to recall some of our past actions, certain of which are irreversible and unique among the nuclear-weapon States. These include the unilateral and irreversible dismantling of plutonium and uranium production facilities for nuclear weapons; halving the number of

nuclear warheads; the complete dismantling of our surface-to-surface component; a 30 per cent reduction in our airborne and sea-based components; and the complete dismantling of our nuclear test sites. Together with the United Kingdom, we were the first nuclear-weapon States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

France does not intend to take part in any arms race. We abide by the principle of strict sufficiency. In other words, we maintain our arsenal at the lowest possible level compatible with the strategic environment. Designed only for extreme circumstances of legitimate defence, the French nuclear deterrent is in no way contrary to international law, as recalled by the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of 8 July 1996.

We obviously need to pursue our work towards a safer world for all. With our fellow permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), we have swiftly developed unprecedented cooperation in implementing the action plan adopted in 2010. Following on from the first NPT follow-up Conference in Paris in 2011, the Washington, D.C., P-5 conference in June this year was a success. In this regard, we are working on building the mutual trust and transparency vital to future disarmament efforts and on how best to actually report on the progress and action taken to implement the action plan. A group of experts tasked to develop a glossary of common definitions of nuclear terms has just been launched under the auspices of China to facilitate our discussions and build mutual trust. The P-5 remain fully committed to promoting the entry into force of the CTBT and to supporting the immediate launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament.

My country has long supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The regional approach is indeed an important course of action for the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation. In this regard, we stand ready, together with the other nuclear-weapon States, to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok as soon as possible. On 17 September, we also signed two parallel declarations with Mongolia on that country's nuclear-weapon-free status.

The nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility with regard to disarmament, which my country will not shirk as it strives to comply with the 2010 road map. However, I must stress just how much the implementation of the NPT action plan is also the

responsibility of us all. I have already emphasized the particular importance of the recent ratification of the CTBT by Indonesia, while the ratification by Guinea and Guatemala since the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly is also to be commended.

Disarmament depends above all else on mutual trust between States and on the general perception of security. It cannot be undertaken without regard for the strategic environment in which we live and the evolution of threats. Proliferation remains the most serious threat to international peace and security. It hinders the development of civil nuclear cooperation by undermining confidence. It is a hindrance to progress in nuclear disarmament. My country will make every effort to increase action against proliferation.

Iran continues to violate its safeguards agreement, the resolutions of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors. The latest IAEA report, dated 30 August, finds that Iran has not changed its attitude. It pursues its enrichment activities, especially at the Fordow site, where uranium-enrichment capacity has doubled. Its stocks of 3.5 per cent and 20 per cent enriched uranium continue to grow without any credible civil purpose. It has offered no cooperation over the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme, and engages in concealment activities at the Parchin military site, where the Agency suspects Iran of having conducted tests for the development of a military device. In view of this situation, we welcome the Board of Governors' adoption of a new resolution on Iran on 13 September this year.

As stressed by the President of the French Republic early in this session of the General Assembly,

“France will not accept such actions, which threaten not only security in the region but peace throughout the world... [W]e are prepared to adopt new sanctions, not to punish the great people of Iran, but to tell their leaders that enough is enough and that negotiations must be resumed before it is too late.” (*A/67/PV.6, p. 44*)

France is determined, with its E3+3 partners, to find a long-term diplomatic solution to this crisis, based on the enforcement of the resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. We hope that Iran will respond constructively to our proposals and that it will negotiate seriously. If it does not, we will continue, with our close partners, to step up the

diplomatic pressure on Iran, in particular with new sanctions.

North Korea is also pursuing its nuclear and ballistic missile programme in violation of Security Council resolutions. The complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling of the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programme is also a priority for the international community, which firmly condemned the rocket launch conducted by North Korea on 13 April. North Korea must comply with all its international obligations and refrain from any further act that might undermine regional and international security. Last but not least, light remains to be shed on Syria's nuclear activities.

Regarding non-proliferation, we should first and foremost support the work of the IAEA to ensure that its safeguards system remains fully effective. In particular, we call on all States parties to the NPT that have not yet done so to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement in order to fulfil their obligations under article III of the NPT. Moreover, France considers that the combined implementation of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol must form the verification standard for meeting the objectives of article III.1 of the NPT. Progress towards universalization of the additional protocol is real but insufficient.

Let us now turn to the multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations. The international community has been trying to find the best way to resume these talks for years. The situation has generated growing frustration, which we share. The time for more discussions on the order of priorities is past. Action 15 of the NPT action plan calls upon us to immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material at the Conference on Disarmament. This priority is echoed by Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) and, every year, by a General Assembly resolution.

The Conference on Disarmament urgently needs finally to adopt a programme of work based on document CD/1864, approved by consensus in 2009 following years of discussions. The launch of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty is the next logical step in nuclear disarmament after the NPT and the CTBT, since fissile material is the raw material for weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament is the only multilateral body tasked with negotiating universal

treaties on disarmament and a large number of countries, including mine, value it highly. It has many successes to its credit, including the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the CTBT, to name but the most recent. The current situation, created by opposition from one country, is understandably frustrating, first and foremost for my own country. Many and varied ideas have been put forward on how to overcome this deadlock, but the Conference on Disarmament's expertise and characteristics, especially the consensus rule and the participation of all States with key capabilities in the nuclear field, also guarantee that the agreements it negotiates will be truly universal and make a genuine contribution to international security. We need to take this into account if we are to avoid finding ourselves on the wrong track.

Now is the time for concrete and realistic action, with the emphasis on a step-by-step approach to disarmament. It is in the light of these criteria that we will consider draft resolutions concerning a resumption of negotiations.

Given that the subject of this debate is "nuclear weapons", I should like to say one last word about nuclear terrorism. France welcomes the substantial progress made in this area, as presented at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. It is in this context that France has decided, with Germany, to present again this year its draft resolution on preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive sources. Our aim is to preserve international momentum against this latent threat, in view of the serious potential radioactive repercussions of any malicious use of certain radioactive sources for the purposes of terrorism. The Chair can rest assured that he can count on our full support throughout this First Committee.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to the representative of Japan to introduce the draft resolution entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons".

Mr. Amano (Japan): Japan strongly believes that the tragic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons must never be repeated. As the only country to have suffered from atomic bombings, Japan has been engaged in practical and progressive efforts for a world without nuclear weapons.

As one of these ongoing efforts, Japan is again introducing to the Committee a draft resolution on nuclear disarmament entitled "United action towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons". Like similar resolutions of previous years, the draft resolution places emphasis on concrete and practical measures to be taken by the international community to advance nuclear disarmament. We hope that all States Members of the United Nations will support it.

Japan welcomes the unilateral and bilateral measures taken over the past few years by the nuclear-weapon States of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to cut the size of their nuclear arsenals. We encourage them not to stop there but to make further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons. In addition to such efforts, it is indispensable for the nuclear-weapon States to pursue disarmament on a multilateral basis in order to bring us closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Indeed, action 5 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to promptly undertake a number of concrete disarmament measures.

In that regard, Japan welcomes the meetings of the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), the most recent of which was held in Washington, D.C., in June, to build confidence among the five nuclear-weapon States. We hope that this P-5 process will produce tangible outcomes in the future that will lead to global disarmament on a multilateral basis.

When implementing nuclear-disarmament measures, the principle of transparency is crucial. The Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) highlights the importance of enhancing mutual confidence through increased transparency. It is for that reason that the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) places its focus on this issue. As noted in the joint statement at its fifth ministerial meeting held last month in New York, the NPDI developed a draft reporting form guided by action 21 of the NPT action plan, and shared it with the nuclear-weapon States. We also submitted the reporting form to the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference held this year in Vienna, as an annex to our working paper on transparency. Japan hopes that the NPDI's input will contribute to agreement by the

nuclear-weapon States on a standard reporting form and to appropriate reporting intervals.

At the same time, as the nuclear-weapon States carry out their activities, the non-States parties to the NPT should not remain inactive. Japan urges these States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions.

Japan is convinced that a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is the next logical step towards nuclear disarmament. It is therefore deeply regrettable that there are no emerging prospects in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of negotiations commencing on such a treaty. Therefore, while continuing our efforts to start negotiations within the CD, Japan believes that it is worth considering another solution that will lead to negotiations. As a member of the NPDI, Japan strongly supports the Canadian efforts this year to break through the current situation by presenting once more a draft resolution on an FMCT to the General Assembly. In the meantime, until the conclusion and entry into force of an FMCT, Japan calls upon all the States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes.

Along with an FMCT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also needs to be brought into force as soon as possible. Consequently, Japan welcomes the ratification of the CTBT by Indonesia and Guatemala in 2012. We have seized every occasion to urge all non-States parties, particularly the remaining eight annex 2 States, to promptly sign and ratify the CTBT, and we intend to continue these activities.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the 1999 United Nations Disarmament Commission guidelines contributes to global and regional peace and security. In this context, Japan supports the convening of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, which was agreed to at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. We commend the facilitator for his efforts to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to prepare the ground for a successful conference. We call upon all parties in the Middle East to participate in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation. Meanwhile, we hope that the nuclear-weapon States will sign and ratify the Protocol of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone at an early date.

In parallel with nuclear disarmament, it is important to strengthen and maintain nuclear non-proliferation in order to enhance peace and security. Accordingly, the full implementation of nuclear non-proliferation obligations by every State is vital. The nuclear issues related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran pose a serious challenge to the peace and stability of their regions, as well as to the entire international community. Japan strongly urges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, including uranium-enrichment activities, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must immediately comply fully with its obligations and commitments under relevant Security Council resolutions and the 2005 joint statement of the Six-Party Talks.

With regard to Iran's nuclear issue, Japan urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as the requirements of the resolutions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors, and to fully cooperate with the IAEA in order to resolve all outstanding issues, including those related to the possible military dimensions of its nuclear programme.

By way of conclusion, allow me to reiterate that Japan is fully committed to achieving a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons. We intend to continue steadily to promote effective measures for global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in close cooperation with other States Members of the United Nations.

Mr. Apakan (Turkey): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI): Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. At its meeting in New York on 26 September, the NPDI reiterated its resolve to support the implementation of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) through practical steps, and to pursue the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Many NPT States are making important efforts towards achieving these objectives, but much more needs to be done.

We recall that action 5 of the 2010 action plan calls on the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to implement their commitments in a timely manner and to report

on their efforts. In this regard, a key priority of the NPDI is to continue pushing for greater transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. A culture of greater transparency is vital to building confidence and ultimately achieving our collective goal of a world without nuclear weapons. The NPDI continues to engage the nuclear-weapon States on the draft reporting form that we first shared in June 2011, guided by action 21 of the 2010 NPT action plan, as a contribution to the discussions between the nuclear-weapon States on transparency and reporting with regard to all types of nuclear weapons.

The NPDI would welcome progress in the dialogue between the United States and Russia on all categories of nuclear weapons, including sub-strategic nuclear weapons. With respect to nuclear arsenals in general, the NPDI would like to see further quantitative reductions and parallel steps towards reducing the significance of nuclear weapons in security strategies and military doctrines.

On regional issues, we reiterate our support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and our support for efforts to implement the 2010 NPT Review Conference decision to convene a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, to be attended by all States of the region on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. We acknowledge and support fully the efforts of the facilitator to consult broadly with all relevant stakeholders to prepare for a successful conference, and call upon all parties in the Middle East to participate and engage in a spirit of genuine and constructive cooperation.

We endorse the joint ministerial statement of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), issued on 27 September and sponsored by 101 States, and we urge the remaining eight annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible and thereby end nuclear test explosions for all time. We welcome Indonesia's ratification of the CTBT, which has been a crucial mark of progress towards the entry into force of this instrument. We welcome the ratification of the Treaty by Guatemala and are encouraged by advice from Iraq and Thailand on the steps they are taking towards ratification of the Treaty.

We remain deeply concerned by the lack of substantive work in the Conference of Disarmament across the four core issues on its agenda. We urge

the adoption and implementation of a comprehensive programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We also strongly support Canada's efforts at this session of the First Committee to propose ways forward for substantive work on this essential step towards a world without nuclear weapons, and call upon all States to support this initiative.

We continue to support key legal instruments that safeguard and govern peaceful nuclear activities, and are promoting at the highest political level wider adherence to the additional protocol.

There is much more to do, and we look forward to taking proposals and ideas to the 2013 session of the NPT Preparatory Committee in order to address the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, the entry into force of the CTBT, export controls, nuclear-weapon-free zones and the wider application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States.

The Acting Chair: As Ambassador Apakan will be leaving New York in a few days, on behalf of the Committee and the Bureau I should like to thank him for his very important contribution to the Organization and to the work of this Committee.

Ms. Kennedy (United States of America): The United States is actively undertaking progressive, mutually reinforcing steps to move us closer to our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. This goal is at the heart of President Obama's nuclear agenda, presented in Prague three years ago. Only a balanced approach to maintaining international security will move us closer to a world without nuclear weapons. This requires strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime while working towards nuclear disarmament.

A year ago the United States initiated consultations among the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5) and other countries to unblock fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to prepare our own countries for what we expect to be technically challenging negotiations. These countries have met several times over the past year to discuss the way ahead. Bringing these countries to the table is our

best means to move an FMCT forward and unblock negotiations in the CD.

There are calls for alternate, wholesale approaches to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. While we share this goal, we do not share this approach at a fundamental level. Disarmament, as we all know, is hard work. There are no shortcuts and no practical alternatives to the step-by-step approach. Trying to accomplish everything at once will distract us from more realistic efforts. It is for that reason that we do not support proposals to set up new United Nations mechanisms to address nuclear disarmament. Such mechanisms would fare no better than existing bodies.

The five nuclear-weapon States signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) are engaging intensively on a wide range of topics related to all three pillars of the NPT action plan: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. Washington, D.C., hosted the latest in a series of P-5 conferences this past June to review and plan P-5 progress in fulfilling the NPT action plan. This followed the 2009 conference in London and the 2011 conference in Paris.

As my good colleague Ambassador Wu reported last week, we are working on a common glossary of nuclear terms. We are also focusing on transparency, reporting, confidence-building and verification. We are working towards the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the commencement of FMCT negotiations, and engaging on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the NPT withdrawal issue. Let me commend to members' attention copies of the P-5 statement from that Conference, which are available at the back of the room.

We also recognize our responsibility, along with Russia, as the two countries holding the largest nuclear arsenals. The United States and Russia are successfully implementing the New START agreement, which is the most comprehensive nuclear-disarmament agreement in 20 years. When Treaty reductions are completed, we will have cut American and Russian deployed nuclear weapons to their lowest levels since the 1950s. On-site inspections, data exchanges, notifications and consultations are providing a very detailed picture of United States and Russian strategic forces, enabling each side to confirm the accuracy of each other's nuclear-disarmament activities. Its verification regime is in some ways the most intrusive nuclear disarmament

verification regime yet, and it is setting an important precedent for future negotiations.

The United States is committed to step-by-step reductions, including the pursuit of further reductions with Russia in all categories of nuclear weapons — strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. We have begun a bilateral dialogue on strategic stability that can lay the groundwork for future negotiations.

As we make deep reductions and pursue additional ones, I should like to underscore that United States policy prohibits the development of new nuclear warheads. The United States is neither developing new nuclear weapons nor pursuing any new nuclear missions. The expenditures we are making in infrastructure and necessary safety improvements should not be conflated or confused with nuclear-weapons development.

Another area where we have seen significant progress this past year is in the advancement of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. The United States has worked actively to extend legally binding negative security assurances under these treaties. We have submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratify the relevant protocols to the Treaties of Pelindaba and Rarotonga. We are working for a P-5 signature to the Protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok as soon as possible. After some preliminary discussions, we expect that the pace of consultations with the parties to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia will accelerate. We are also very pleased to report that the P-5 and Mongolia recently made parallel declarations regarding Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status. This is the capstone of many years of effort by Mongolia, the P-5 and the United Nations, and will be included in a First Committee draft resolution that we sincerely hope will be adopted by consensus.

More broadly, the United States has in place a declaratory policy that it will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. In that spirit, we continue our work to implement the action plan contained in the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) and strengthen all three pillars of the NPT.

In addition to our disarmament activities, we are working with the States members of the IAEA to resolve all cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation

obligations and to strengthen safeguards, including by ensuring that the IAEA has the support necessary to fulfil its essential verification mission, and we are continuing our efforts to make the additional protocol universal.

Like many States represented here, we continue to have grave concerns about the non-compliance of Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Syria with their non-proliferation and Security Council obligations. As noted by my Acting Under-Secretary in our opening statement (see A/C.1/67/PV.4), these cases undermine confidence in the non-proliferation regime and stand in the way of our shared disarmament goals. They also threaten international security. The international community must insist on a return to compliance, in keeping with the NPT action plan.

We are enhancing support for the NPT's vital third pillar — the peaceful use of nuclear energy — not only to strengthen the regime but to contribute to economic development. In addition to our long-standing support for the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund, we have pledged \$50 million to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative between 2010 and 2015, and we have already provided approximately \$21 million under that new programme. Funded projects are benefiting more than 120 countries. We welcome the partnership of the 12 other countries that have joined us by contributing to this important IAEA Initiative.

We believe that the entry into force of the CTBT will play a central role in leading the world towards a diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, reduced nuclear competition and eventual nuclear disarmament. The CTBT will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, as well as the development of advanced types of nuclear weapons. We are fully committed to pursuing the ratification of the Treaty and its eventual entry into force.

The United States is actively working to reduce its holdings of fissile material stocks that could be used in nuclear weapons. Under the United States-Russia Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, each side will verifiably dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium — enough in total for 17,000 nuclear weapons. The Agreement entered into force in 2011, and our two countries are working towards an agreement on verification provisions with the IAEA. Once disposed of, this plutonium will be in a form that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. It is irreversible.

A verifiable treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons is necessary if we are to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. An FMCT is an absolutely essential step for global nuclear disarmament and the next logical step in halting the increase in nuclear arsenals.

As a practical matter, the CD, which includes every major nuclear-capable State, operates by consensus and allows members to ensure their national security concerns are met. It remains the optimal place to negotiate a multilateral FMCT. However, when it comes to what is in the best interests of international security, the venue for FMCT negotiations is less important than achieving a credible treaty, and if a treaty is to be credible the States most directly affected by an FMCT should be involved in its negotiation.

I have just detailed for the Committee how the path that the United States is on has produced tangible results. We think that it has a proven track record — the NPT action plan is being implemented — and that this path will lead us to our final destination of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Acting Chair: I now give the floor to those delegations that wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. Ibrahim (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): It would seem that the observer of the European Union sees things with one eye. He makes unfounded allegations and claims, and points his finger at my country, but he deliberately ignores Israel's unique nuclear arsenal in the region, which is aimed at us. Some members of the European Union also participated in building that arsenal, which proves once again the undeclared alliance of these countries with Israel.

We had hoped that the observer of the European Union would have indirectly cited Israel as a nuclear State and asked it to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Israel reaffirmed its position in September 2007 by attacking our territory and destroying a military building that had nothing to do with nuclear activity. The destruction of that building was in blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and the national sovereignty of Syria. It was an act of aggression that should have elicited unabashed condemnation from the European Union at the time, especially because the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) believed that the destruction of that site was a unilateral action

that weakened the Agency's ability to verify the nature of the building. We would like to remind the European Union of Israel's aggression against a State Member of the United Nations if it is as interested in international law as it claims to be.

I should like to touch on the following points. In 1968, my country was one of the first countries to join the NPT, well before many of the European Union members did so. My country has also long advocated the establishment of a non-nuclear-weapon zone in the Middle East. We presented a draft resolution in 2003 to the Security Council calling for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The draft text was opposed by an influential nuclear country and has been mothballed ever since. More than 40 years after the NPT was created, Israel has yet to join. The European Union knows this better than anyone. Some European Union members have helped Israel's nuclear and military programme, which is a threat to security and safety of the entire Middle East and its people.

Finally, I should like to refresh the memory of the representative of the French regime. Last week in our right of reply, we shed light on the nuclear testing carried out by his country, which has led to human and environmental disasters.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to exercise its right of reply in response to the very provocative and misleading statements and distorting of the truth by the Japanese representative about the reality on the Korean peninsula and the region.

Concerning the nuclear activities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, our nuclear deterrence is in response to the hostile policy and nuclear threats of the United States. If nuclear weapons were not deployed by the United States in South Korea, the question of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula would never have been raised. It is because of the original deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula by the United States, and because of United States blackmail and threats against the sovereignty and survival of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its people, that the nuclear issue has been raised. We have been compelled to possess a nuclear deterrent for self-defence and to safeguard the security of the country.

Secondly, the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has totally rejected the relevant Security Council resolution. The Security Council has never addressed the issue of the threat posed by the nuclear weapons of the United States. The mandate of the Security Council is to address the peace and security of the world, but it has never, ever addressed the blackmail and threats being made by the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A typical example is the listing of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the United States as part of an axis of evil, together with Iran and Iraq. The United States also listed the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, among the seven target countries, as a pre-emptive nuclear target. This pre-emptive strike strategy is continuing without being suspended and stopped. The Security Council should address that first as a priority issue for world peace and security.

Japan, before touching on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue, should first address and talk about the blackmail and nuclear threats of the United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The uranium enrichment mentioned by the Japanese representative is of a peaceful nature and perfectly legitimate under international law, which stipulates the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As far as the Japanese position on the nuclear issue is concerned, Japan is already nuclear-capable, possessing more than 40 tons of plutonium and all the related technology, and it is ready at short notice to manufacture nuclear weapons. Talking about the three non-nuclear principles is only a political cover-up. It has never been enacted into law, but is just political propaganda.

As far as the status of Japan is concerned, it is hell-bent on becoming a military Power in the Asia-Pacific region, fully armed with all types of highly sophisticated weapons of an offensive nature. It is moving towards militarism, creating and raising territorial disputes with neighbouring countries without apologizing for its unprecedented crimes against humanity.

Mr. Amano (Japan): I should like to exercise the right of reply to the groundless allegations made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on three points.

First, the Government of Japan's adherence to the three non-nuclear principles of not possessing,

manufacturing or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the territory of Japan remains unchanged, and Japan's determination to ensure the total elimination of nuclear weapons, with a view to achieving a world without nuclear weapons, is unshakeable.

Secondly, Japan maintains an exclusively defence-oriented policy and therefore exercises conducted by the Japanese Self-Defense Force do not target any particular country or area. Moreover, the ballistic missile defence system that Japan has decided to introduce is purely defensive and does not threaten any country or area surrounding Japan.

Finally, Japan is in strict compliance with its safeguards obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as an NPT State party, and Japan's peaceful use of nuclear energy has been confirmed by the IAEA in its annual conclusion that all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. Moreover, beyond the legal obligations, as an international transparency measure, Japan has regularly reported the amount of plutonium holdings in accordance with the guidelines for the management of plutonium, most recently on 17 September.

Mr. Ri Tong Il (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The Democratic People's Republic of Korea once again totally rejects the remarks of the Japanese representative as misleading and distorting the truth. As for the Japanese case, as everybody knows Japan is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States. It has been under the nuclear umbrella while, as the representative indicated in his earlier statement, it was the first country to be attacked by nuclear weapons. But

that is still very contradictory. It is using the nuclear umbrella of the very same country that dropped nuclear weapons. That is very contradictory.

Secondly, the Japanese Government itself has admitted that it concluded a nuclear deal with the United States in 1960. Under that nuclear deal, which is very confidential, the Japanese Government is allowing nuclear-armed military warships of the United States into the territorial waters of Japan. That is known by everybody; it is a known fact. The Japanese representative cannot reject that fact.

Thirdly, as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea indicated in its first right of reply, Japan is hell-bent on jointly developing a missile defence system, and intends to be capable of a first pre-emptive strike against neighbouring countries as a military Power.

Mr. Amano (Japan): At this late hour, I should like to limit my right of reply to one specific point, which is the alleged introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. As my delegation has repeatedly made clear, there is no evidence that the Japanese Government has ever allowed the introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States into Japanese territory. Based on the United States nuclear policy expressed to date, such as the announcement made in 1991, it is the judgement of the Government of Japan that there is currently no introduction of nuclear weapons by the United States, including vessels and/or aircraft to call at ports in, land on, or transit Japanese territories. I reiterate that Japan maintains the policy of adhering to the three non-nuclear principles.

The meeting rose at 6.15 p.m.