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Official Records

Chair: Mr. Koterec (Slovakia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

Agenda items 88 to 104 (continued)

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and related international security agenda items

Mrs. Chaimongkol (Thailand): At the outset, let me join other delegations in congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. My congratulations also go to every member of the Bureau. Thailand associates itself with the statement made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

We are all aware of the catastrophic impact and long-term effects of nuclear weapons. For decades, the international community has worked towards their total elimination. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has emerged as the cornerstone of those efforts and a vital tool for achieving our ultimate goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Yet, 40 years after the entry into force of the NPT, nuclear weapons still exist, their proliferation remaining a threat to international security. The task before us, therefore, is to continue to promote universal adherence to the NPT and compliance with NPT obligations among the States parties.

Several positive developments have occurred this year with regard to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Thailand welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the United States and the Russian

Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) on 8 April 2010. The entry into force of the New START treaty will further contribute to the disarmament process and increase confidence among NPT States parties. The United States 2010 Nuclear Posture Review also represents a decisive move towards reducing the likelihood of nuclear weapons use and a major step towards genuine disarmament.

At the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT in May, the international community saw the renewed political commitment of the NPT States parties to realizing the objectives of the Treaty, as reflected in the Review Conference Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), adopted by consensus for the first time in 10 years. Thailand welcomes the 64-point action plan for the three pillars of the Treaty, as well as the recommended practical steps towards implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. We hope that those follow-on actions and recommendations will be duly and effectively translated into action.

Thailand also welcomes the Joint Ministerial Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of the fifth Ministerial Meeting in support of the CTBT, held on 23 September. Although Thailand is not among the annex 2 countries, we reaffirm our strong commitment to accelerating the ratification process of the CTBT in order to contribute to promoting the entry into force of the Treaty. In the meantime, we have closely cooperated with the

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Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization and lent our support to CTBT-related activities.

To further enhance international efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, the issues of negative security assurances and fissile material should also be addressed. In that regard, Thailand underscores the necessity for the Conference on Disarmament to resume its substantive work as soon as possible. It needs to ensure the early commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Substantive discussions are also needed on all aspects of negative security assurances.

Regional mechanisms have always played an important role in efforts to attain a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), or Bangkok Treaty, has played a significant role in our region. In his address to the General Assembly, the Thai Foreign Minister said that major Powers and regional entities must do their fair share in global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (see A/65/PV.23). Thailand and the other States members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations look forward to resuming direct consultations with the five nuclear-weapon States to resolve outstanding issues so that the latter may accede to the Protocol to the SEANWFZ Treaty.

It is also important to strengthen cooperation among the nuclear-weapon-free zones, as well as between such zones and nuclear-weapon States, as emphasized at the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia in April this year.

Where they do not exist, nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established. We reaffirm our support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Efforts should be undertaken to facilitate the convening of a conference in 2012 on the establishment of such a zone and to ensure the participation of all States in the region.

The threat of nuclear terrorism compels us to strive for a strengthened nuclear security regime. The Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., this year is a positive step towards that objective. Thailand looks forward to participating in the 2012 summit in the Republic of Korea, and in the upcoming

sherpas meeting in Buenos Aires early next month. Thailand is pleased to have joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism this year.

Given the growing demand for energy, there has been increasing interest in nuclear power development. The NPT recognizes the inalienable right of the States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, peaceful uses of nuclear energy may fall short of its full potential amid international concern about nuclear proliferation, safety and security. In this regard, we commend the International Atomic Energy Agency for effectively executing its responsibilities regarding its three pillars of work: nuclear safety and security, safeguards and verification, and science and technology.

In conclusion, I would like once again to reiterate Thailand's firm commitment to contributing towards the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. We remain hopeful that, despite many pressing challenges, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States will continue to work together to achieve our common goals.

Ms. Ries (United States of America): The United States delegation is especially pleased today to join with the Russian delegation in presenting to the First Committee for its consideration a joint draft resolution regarding the New START treaty (A/C.1/65/L.28).

In April 2010, the United States and the Russian Federation signed the New START treaty, which will further reduce and limit the number of strategic arms for both sides, and which renews United States-Russian leadership on nuclear issues.

Let me say a little bit about its content. The draft resolution that we are proposing notes the continuing development of a new strategic relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation, expresses support for the commitment shown by the United States and the Russian Federation to the further reduction of strategic offensive arms, and recognizes the importance of the contributions made by the Russian Federation and the United States to nuclear disarmament as part of their commitment under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The draft resolution expresses the hope that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) will enter into force at an early date, recalls that both the

Russian Federation and the United States have stopped the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons, and supports the early commencement of negotiations for the conclusion of a verifiable treaty to end the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

In this context, the draft resolution also expresses appreciation for the implementation by the United States and the Russian Federation of their 1993 Agreement concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons as an expression of a commitment to their NPT article VI responsibilities, and welcomes their commitment to the implementation of the 2000 Agreement concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes and Related Cooperation.

Finally, the draft resolution invites the Russian Federation and the United States to continue to notify other Member States of their nuclear arms reduction activities, notes the growing expectations of the international community that progress will continue to be made on nuclear disarmament, and calls for Member States to make an active contribution to the disarmament process.

When President Obama spoke in Prague in April 2009 about his vision of a world without nuclear weapons, he recognized the need to create the conditions to bring about such a world. The New START treaty is an important step in achieving reductions in nuclear weapons, and this draft resolution recognizes that achievement.

However, the United States and the Russian Federation alone cannot create all the conditions necessary. Others must play their part as well. In that regard, we note that the Conference on Disarmament continues to be deadlocked over a programme of work that would launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), as well as substantive discussions on other disarmament topics. If we are serious about realizing a world without nuclear weapons, we must start now by initiating work on a treaty to end the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

It remains our strong preference to negotiate an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. However, the patience of the international community is swiftly running out. If efforts to start negotiations in the

Conference on Disarmament continue to stall, then interested States may have to consider other options for moving this process forward.

The entry into force of the CTBT represents another essential step on the path towards a world without nuclear weapons. The United States has reaffirmed its commitment to this Treaty and has increased its level of participation in all of the activities of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization in preparing for the entry into force of the CTBT. We believe that the United States and all States will be safer when the test ban enters into force, and we are preparing actively for the reconsideration of the Treaty by the United States Senate.

Our delegation hopes that our colleagues will join in supporting the draft resolution on the New START treaty, proposed jointly today by the United States and the Russian Federation, as a means of recognizing the singular achievement of the New START treaty, and that other Governments will join the United States and Russia in creating the conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament. Our delegation looks forward to collaborating successfully with other delegations on this draft resolution and on the remaining work of the Committee at this session.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): The full text of my statement will be circulated among the delegations. I will limit myself to making a few observations.

Recognizing its special responsibility as a nuclear Power for fulfilling its obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Russian Federation is pursuing in a spirit of goodwill the in-depth, irreversible and verifiable reductions in its nuclear-weapon capacities.

An important step in this direction is the New START treaty, which replaces one of the most historically significant disarmament agreements, namely, the original Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 31 July 1993, which has already expired. We note the important contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the conclusion of the Treaty.

The provisions of the New START treaty stipulate that each party shall reduce and limit its

strategic offensive arms in such a way that, seven years after its entry into force and thereafter, the aggregate numbers do not exceed 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles with 1,550 for warheads on them and 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This limit brings deployed and non-deployed launchers, as well as heavy bombers, under the legal scope of the Treaty. This will restrict the upload potential of the parties, that is, the potential for a sharp increase in the number of deployed warheads in crisis situations. It also creates an additional impetus for the elimination or conversion of these strategic offensive arms subject to reductions.

In so doing, Russia and the United States have clearly demonstrated once again their commitment to substantial reductions in strategic offensive arms. The parties have agreed to cut by one third the aggregate number of warheads and by more than half the aggregate limit of strategic delivery vehicles.

While negotiating the New START treaty, we worked on the basis that nuclear disarmament was impossible without taking into account developments in the field of strategic defensive arms, and that at that point there were no existing limits on the deployment of strategic missile defence systems. Defensive systems, in particular missile defence, can play both stabilizing and destabilizing roles. Setting up blocks of such systems will lead to the emergence of new strategic dividing borders and increase tension in relations between States.

With the entry into force of New START, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty between the United States and Russia of 24 May 2002 will no longer be in effect. The New START treaty has been submitted for ratification. In Russia, all the necessary ratification procedures will be implemented in due course, and we expect that consideration of the treaty by Russian and American legislators will take place simultaneously.

The Committee just heard the United States representative introduce the joint draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.28, entitled "Bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations". We are counting on broad support for the draft resolution and its adoption by consensus.

The deep reductions in strategic offensive arms undertaken by Russia and the United States will lead to

a qualitative change in the nuclear disarmament situation. The narrowing numeric gap between our stockpiles and those of the other five nuclear-weapon States raises the issue of whether other States possessing nuclear weapons should gradually join the Russian and American disarmament efforts. We also believe that it would not be justifiable to limit the issue of nuclear disarmament to the efforts of the States parties to the NPT. At a certain stage, further progress in disarmament will simply not be possible without the involvement of other States.

The signing of New START has brought us to a point at which the considerable reduction in nuclear capabilities makes deeper cuts unthinkable without taking into account all the other processes under way in the area of international security. Future steps towards nuclear disarmament will have to be considered and implemented in strict observance of the principle of equal and indivisible security, and taking into account every factor capable of affecting strategic stability. Such factors include the development of regional missile defence systems without considering the security of neighbouring States; the possibility of the appearance of weapons in space; the development of strategic delivery vehicles in non-nuclear configurations; the unilateral build-up of strategic missile defence capabilities; a growing imbalance in strength in the area of conventional arms; the deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear States, and many others.

The relationship between strategic offensive and defensive weapons and its growing potential for the strategic offensive arms reduction process has major significance for the strengthening of strategic stability. That is why we are launching a broad international dialogue on missile defence issues.

One defining issue in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament has been the successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The emphasis at the Conference was on the most important fact that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the international security system. All recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime can and must be addressed first on the basis of the NPT. We consider it extremely important that, for the first time in 10 years, the States parties to the Treaty sent a strong political signal of their united stance in support of the NPT norms and their readiness to take practical steps to strengthen all three of its

fundamental pillars on the basis of the balanced action plan approved by the Conference.

Now as never before it is imperative that nuclear disarmament initiatives not remain on paper but be translated into practical arrangements. An important phase in the nuclear disarmament process should be the earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). All the conditions for this are in place. We send to issue a firm call on all States, and especially those whose accession to the CTBT is necessary to its entry into force, to sign and ratify it as soon as possible. Observing the voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, though significant as a measure, cannot substitute for the legal obligations in this area. That is why we have joined the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.48 on the CTBT.

We would also like to recall our proposal to universalize the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. We consider it extremely urgent to jump-start the multilateral disarmament process. In this regard, we welcome the efforts already under way, including those under the auspices of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon aimed at starting substantive work by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In particular, we look forward to the imminent start of negotiations on banning the production of weapons-grade fissile material within the frame of the Conference's balanced programme of work.

Russia actively contributes to the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important tool for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime, facilitating the process of nuclear disarmament and improving regional and international security levels. We reaffirm our support for the Semipalatinsk Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, which entered into force in 2009, and the Treaty of Pelindaba, which did the same in Africa. We would like to announce that Russia is now implementing the domestic procedures necessary for ratifying Protocols I and II of the Pelindaba Treaty.

I would also like to focus particular attention on the necessity of finding ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The NPT Review Conference in May succeeded in agreeing on concrete steps to lay the foundation for a mechanism

that would begin to set up the practical arrangements for such a regional zone free of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. As a co-author of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, Russia is satisfied that these steps are based on the ideas and proposals that we put forward earlier.

We must not forget the inextricable links between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. It is essential that all States abide strictly by their non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In that regard, we attach great importance to increasing the efficiency of the verification activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We consider the additional protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreement to be an effective instrument for improving the Agency's potential in this area. In the future, the additional protocol, together with the safeguards agreement, should become the universally recognized norm for verification of compliance by NPT States parties with their non-proliferation obligations, as well as an essential new standard in the field of nuclear export control. We intend to contribute further to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, including through the national system of safeguards support.

Russia also supports the universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the involvement of new countries in the multilateral efforts implemented within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

We note the importance of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in the context of global non-proliferation efforts, and support the full implementation of its provisions by all countries. It is important that achievements on the non-proliferation track enable us to create conditions for building a proliferation-resistant architecture of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This would guarantee the legitimate right of all interested States to develop nuclear energy.

The first practical step towards the realization of that proposal was the establishment by Russia and Kazakhstan in 2007 of the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk. Armenia and Ukraine have already begun participating in the work of the Centre. Our initiative is open to all other States

developing nuclear energy and abiding by their non-proliferation obligations.

To conclude, allow me to reiterate Russia's determination to cooperate constructively with all States in order to address the issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and international security. We are available for consultations with the members of the First Committee on an array of resolutions on the issue of disarmament, including the draft resolution on bilateral reductions of strategic nuclear arms and the new framework for strategic relations.

Mr. Abdullah (Malaysia): On behalf of my delegation, allow me at the outset to express our appreciation to the Secretary-General for his report on the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* (A/65/137), submitted under agenda item 97 (cc). We also extend our appreciation to those delegations that have submitted the information requested pursuant to resolution 64/55 of 2 December 2009.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality and Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* constitutes a significant milestone in international efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament to the extent that it lends a powerful moral argument for the total elimination of such weapons. In no uncertain terms, the world court declared that all Member States are obliged to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Given the multitude of complexities surrounding international disarmament negotiations at present, it is imperative that we muster the requisite political will and moral courage to achieve the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In that regard, every year since 1996 Malaysia has introduced a draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*" and will do so again this year.

With a view to achieving the broadest support possible, important decisions of the International Court of Justice have been retained in their existing form, specifically in paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/65.L.50. The draft resolution also provides positive updates, which take into account recent

progress on the nuclear weapons convention and on the application of international humanitarian law in cases involving any use of nuclear weapons, particularly the reference to the nuclear weapons convention and international humanitarian law in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions on nuclear disarmament in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which the Conference adopted by consensus.

The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* remains a significant contribution to the field of nuclear disarmament and lends much weight to the moral argument calling for the total elimination of such weapons. Support for the draft resolution is a reaffirmation of our commitment to the multilateral process in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We thank the sponsors of the draft resolution and we invite others to join in sponsorship. We hope that the draft resolution will continue to receive the support of all Member States.

Mr. Mayr-Harting (Austria): Allow me to congratulate and thank you, Mr. Chair, and the other members of the Bureau for your excellent work in presiding over this Committee.

My country associates itself fully with the statement on this thematic issue made by the representative of Belgium on behalf of the European Union, but we also wish to stress a number of points to which we attach particular importance.

Turning first to the outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), held in May, this year may be remembered in the future as the year when, for the first time, a world without nuclear weapons was articulated as the goal of nuclear disarmament by NPT States parties. Austria was honoured to have been able to contribute to the negotiation of the NPT Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), which contains a number of very welcome commitments and some important new elements.

All States parties committed themselves to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the objective of a world without nuclear weapons. States parties also took an important step towards the

delegitimization of nuclear weapons through the new reference to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the need to comply with international humanitarian law. The States parties to the NPT also agreed to apply new principles of verifiability and transparency, in addition to the existing principle of irreversibility agreed upon at the 2000 Review Conference.

Action 5 of the action plan establishes a framework in which nuclear-weapon States are called upon to engage on a number of vital issues and are given a time frame for reporting, which places the onus on those States to deliver. We very much welcome France's announcement regarding the permanent five talks next year, and hope that this will lead to frequent meetings.

As regards nuclear testing, the action plan calls for a strong commitment by nuclear-weapon States to ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by them would have a beneficial impact on ratification, in particular by annex 2 States.

New provisions on transparency mark a significant advance since the 2000 Review Conference, in particular action 21, which places strong pressure on the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and invites the Secretary-General to establish a publicly accessible repository.

Finally, the action plan calls on all States to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons, and notes the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament, which calls, *inter alia*, for consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments backed by a strong system of verification.

This last point places the prospect of a legal framework, such as a nuclear-weapons convention, on the international disarmament agenda for — and I would like to underline this — the first time in an agreed document. This process has now begun, and it is now up to us to identify the appropriate sequencing of steps. Of course, nothing will come of these commitments if the multilateral disarmament machinery is not fit for this purpose. This brings me to the second part of my statement.

While much can be done through bilateral agreements, the new commitments made this year require us to immediately start putting into place the central components for reaching global zero, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty. As the Austrian Federal Minister for European and International Affairs, Mr. Michael Spindelegger, indicated at the High-level Meeting on 24 September, we must address the blockage in the Conference on Disarmament or accept that it faces becoming obsolete. For this reason, Austria strongly supported the initiative of the Secretary-General to convene the High-level Meeting and was pleased that it succeeded in shining a spotlight on the unacceptable situation in the Conference, which threatens to hamper our disarmament efforts.

Together with a group of other sponsors, Austria has therefore submitted a draft resolution entitled "Follow-up to the High-level Meeting held on 24 September 2010 — Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations" (A/C.1/65/L.34). We will introduce the text on Monday in the "disarmament machinery" cluster, but I would like to say at this stage that we see the next year as crucial for the Conference on Disarmament. Foreign Minister Spindelegger has already explained Austria's position; there is no need to repeat it here. But it is clear that, in our view, the Conference on Disarmament now has one more chance.

The process towards pursuing the legal foundations for a world without nuclear weapons has already begun, and it is up to us not only to identify the appropriate sequencing of steps, but also to associate ourselves with the best partners and institutions in order to proceed in the most effective manner. In Austria's view, civil society will assume a paramount role in the process. For this reason, Austria is supporting the establishment of a competence centre for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in Vienna. This centre will act as a hub and a platform for independent expertise, monitoring and advocacy regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Some time ago, we invited submissions from interested partner institutions, and today was the deadline for receipt of submissions. We will announce further details of how this will take shape in the coming weeks. In this way, Austria hopes to make a further contribution towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, which is the only absolute guarantee

against the use of nuclear weapons. That should be our ultimate goal — to ban these immoral weapons outright in the same way that nations have come together to ban other weapons of mass destruction, which cause untold human suffering, ruin economies and pollute our fragile planet.

Mr. Im Han-taek (Republic of Korea): This year was marked by the taking of several significant steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In April, the United States and the Russian Federation, the two largest nuclear Powers, signed the New START treaty, pledging to reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads in their respective arsenals. In this vein, the Republic of Korea welcomes the joint draft resolution presented by both countries (A/C.1/65/L.28), and we hope that it will be followed by early ratification and further negotiations.

Subsequently, the Nuclear Security Summit, the first of its kind, was held in Washington, D.C., where world leaders gathered to develop a shared understanding of the gravity of the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to reduce this threat through enhanced nuclear security. This progress in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation set a positive atmosphere for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) a month later in May, and this momentum ultimately led to the adoption of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) by consensus for the first time in a decade.

The Republic of Korea welcomes the results of the eighth NPT Review Conference and affirms that it should continue to function as a cornerstone of global peace and security. We believe that the outcome represents a delicate balance among the NPT's three pillars, which is vital to the durability of the regime. Nevertheless, the Republic of Korea, as an ardent supporter of multilateral efforts towards disarmament and non-proliferation, believes that nuclear-weapon States must do their part to make further progress on nuclear disarmament, while non-nuclear-weapon States should maintain their strong commitment to non-proliferation.

Secretary-General Ban's dedicated and continuing efforts to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world, including his presentation of the five-point proposal in 2008, which stressed the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

and immediate negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), are also praiseworthy. His disarmament efforts continued with the hosting of the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations on 24 September.

The High-level Meeting in September was indeed timely and significant. To break the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, both internal efforts by the Conference and external political stimulus are needed. We hope that all States Members of the United Nations will earnestly embrace the Chair's summary of the Meeting (A/65/496) to bring the Conference back on course as promptly as possible.

Above all, the negotiation of an FMCT is a matter of urgency, not only for nuclear non-proliferation but also for nuclear disarmament. It is disappointing, as was inarguably illustrated at the High-level Meeting, that even though the Conference on Disarmament adopted its programme of work (document CD/1864), it could not embark on an FMCT negotiation last year. Therefore, my delegation sincerely hopes that negotiations on an FMCT, among other things, will commence in the near future on the basis of an agreed programme of work.

North Korea's nuclear programme represents not only a serious threat to regional peace and security, but also an unprecedented challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. The international community has demonstrated a unified and resolute position against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear ambitions by adopting relevant Security Council resolutions as well as the Final Document of the NPT Review Conference. We look forward to continued efforts by the international community to urge North Korea to abandon its nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

Despite North Korea's repeated acts of defiance of international concerns, my Government will continue to exert efforts for a peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. We are maintaining a two-track approach by implementing sanctions while leaving the door open to dialogue. However, we are not willing to engage in dialogue for the sake of dialogue. Rather, we look forward to talks that will lead to substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. That is why North

Korea needs to first demonstrate its sincerity regarding denuclearization by taking concrete actions.

We will continue consultations with the countries concerned on the resumption of the Six-Party Talks, while closely watching North Korea's behaviour. Also, once the Six-Party Talks resume, my Government will pursue a definitive resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue through a "grand bargain" initiative, which aims at reaching a single comprehensive agreement encompassing all steps related to irreversible denuclearization and corresponding measures. We take this opportunity to urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to make the strategic decision to live up to its commitments to denuclearization so that it can attain security, prosperity and better relations with the world.

This year, the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the September High-level Meeting represented milestones in our common efforts to realize a world free of nuclear weapons. While keeping up the momentum generated by recent developments in the international non-proliferation and disarmament arena, we all have to redouble our efforts, individually and collectively, through the faithful implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference outcome to further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Mr. Aly (Egypt): Our general debate has offered us a valuable opportunity to exchange views in a detailed manner on assessing the extent of progress witnessed in the field of nuclear disarmament. We have noted the potential represented by the signing of the New START treaty, and we very much welcome the statements we heard here this afternoon by the delegations of the United States and the Russian Federation on that subject. We intend to work closely with them to ensure overwhelming support for their draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.28.

We also note the success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and a number of other developments, including the convening of the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations, as well as other emerging signs of the renewed determination of the international community to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world. We also witnessed most clearly a collective aspiration for much

more to be achieved in the area of nuclear disarmament.

Currently chairing the Non-Aligned Movement, Egypt remains a strong supporter of the NPT regime, a key driving force in both the international and the regional nuclear disarmament contexts, and an active member of the New Agenda Coalition, working closely across regions to promote the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world. We acknowledge that, despite promising signs of progress, actual progress on nuclear disarmament has remained indeed limited. We note with interest the announcement of a conference of nuclear-weapon States to be held in Paris next year, and we hope that its outcome will represent a significant development in terms of transparent, verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, we note that much more still needs to be done to bring about NPT universality, to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with legally binding unconditional negative security assurances, and to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and, more importantly, on a nuclear-weapons convention banning their acquisition, stockpiling and use within a specified time frame — by 2025 at the latest.

Indeed, at the international level, reaching agreement on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work for the Conference on Disarmament, and launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and serious discussions on the requirements for the earliest possible negotiations on a nuclear-weapons convention, a legally binding instrument providing for unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and an instrument on the prevention of an arms race in outer space would significantly advance the nuclear disarmament agenda.

As much as the effectiveness of the NPT depends on achieving its universality, strengthening its regime comprehensively will require the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, including an FMCT, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, a legally binding instrument on unconditional negative security assurances and eventually a nuclear-weapons convention. For Egypt, the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted as an integral part of the indefinite

extension package of the NPT at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference remains central to the effectiveness of the NPT in the Middle East and to its regional relevance in that region, as much as it remains central to the achievement of peace and security in the region.

In this context, we see the particular prominence of the adoption by consensus of the plan of action at the 2010 NPT Review Conference as a step on the road to the actual realization of such pending goals. The full implementation of the plan of action will require a sincere effort at both the regional and the international levels, including the agreed 2012 conference, to be convened by the Secretary-General, to initiate a regional process aimed at the establishment of a zone free of nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East — a goal that Egypt continues to strive towards since putting forward its relevant initiatives in 1974 and 1990.

It is in this context that Egypt presents again this year two draft resolutions aimed at maintaining the international consensus on the crucial importance of the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The first draft resolution, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East” (A/C.1/65/L.1), has enjoyed consensus for many years and remains a symbol of a regional vision of a peaceful Middle East where the threat of nuclear weapons, arms races and destructive doctrines of nuclear deterrence have no place. The draft resolution has only been technically updated as compared to last year’s resolution 64/26. We hope that the draft resolution will again be adopted by consensus this year to maintain the important vision it embodies.

The second draft resolution, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/65/L.3*), which Egypt presents annually on behalf of States members of the League of Arab States, is also an extremely important one. It addresses the crucial issue of the need to avert the risks of nuclear proliferation in the region. It calls for achieving the universality of the NPT in the region and for placing all nuclear facilities and activities in the Middle East under the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and it takes stock of progress in the context of NPT review conferences to realize such goals. The draft resolution has also been technically updated, including the addition of one new footnoted preambular paragraph, from the consensus

language adopted in the 2010 NPT action plan to reflect that essential development since the adoption of resolution 64/66. Egypt hopes that the draft resolution will again command the traditional overwhelming support it enjoys and in fact looks forward to it being adopted by consensus.

Mr. Li Yang (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): Since the sixty-fourth session of the First Committee, fresh progress has been made in the international nuclear disarmament process. The ideal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons has struck deep roots in people’s minds. The countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, the United States and the Russian Federation, signed a new bilateral nuclear disarmament agreement, the New START treaty. Drawing broad attention from the international community, the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) concluded successfully with substantial outcomes to cap the progress made in the past decade. China welcomes these developments.

At the same time, achieving the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons in order to establish a world free of nuclear weapons remains a daunting task. China believes that the international community should seize the opportunity to implement the outcomes of the eighth NPT Review Conference by embracing a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, and creating a favourable international security environment for nuclear disarmament.

It is important to preserve international peace and stability and to increase security for all countries so as to establish the conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament. It is also imperative to consolidate and strengthen the hard-won momentum for nuclear disarmament by continuously advancing the nuclear disarmament process and substantially reducing the threat of nuclear weapons. To this end, the international community should continue to make unremitting efforts in the following areas.

All nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith their obligations under article VI of the NPT and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic reductions in their arsenals in a verifiable and

irreversible manner, which would contribute to creating conditions for the ultimate realization of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament.

We welcome the signing of the new bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation and look forward to its early ratification by both sides. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at an early date and the early commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty are of great importance to advancing the nuclear disarmament process. The international community should continue to make even greater efforts to this end. In addition, the international community should develop at an appropriate time a viable long-term plan composed of phased actions including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon States should earnestly reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their respective national security policies, unequivocally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. We call on all nuclear-weapon States to conclude an international legal instrument in this regard at an early date.

Nuclear disarmament must follow the principles of maintaining global strategic stability and undiminished security for all. The development of missile defence systems that disrupt global strategic stability should be abandoned. Multilateral negotiation processes to prevent the weaponization of and an arms race in outer space should be vigorously promoted.

The international community should extend strong support to efforts made in relevant regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. As requested by the eighth NPT Review Conference, a conference will be convened in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. China hopes that all relevant parties will make joint efforts to achieve positive outcomes from this conference.

Mr. Aly (Egypt), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. It is firmly committed to a nuclear strategy of

self-defence. China has adhered to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and has made an unequivocal commitment that it will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

This open, explicit and transparent nuclear policy makes China unique among all nuclear-weapon States. China has never deployed any nuclear weapons on foreign territory. China has not participated and will not participate in any form of nuclear arms race. China will continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security. China supports the early entry into force of the CTBT and the early commencement of the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. China will continue to work with the international community to actively contribute to advancing the international nuclear disarmament process.

Mr. Kim Yong Jo (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Nuclear weapons, by their very existence, are becoming an issue of ever more serious concern due to their negative impacts on the survival of humankind. Looking back at the past year, we can all bear witness to the fact that some commitments to taking a positive approach were made, but unfortunately they were not backed up with practical action.

Today, more than 20,000 nuclear weapons are still in existence and being used to threaten and blackmail sovereign States and humankind as a whole, which is a stark reality that cannot be denied. In the light of that, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would like to highlight its position on nuclear disarmament.

First, priority should be given to nuclear disarmament. It is to the total elimination of nuclear weapons that the international community aspires. In particular, the monopoly of one State over nuclear superiority can never be absolute in view of the ongoing changes in the system of the international relations, which has been steadily towards multilateralism.

The wanton refusal by the largest nuclear-weapon State to disarm its nuclear arsenal and its making it a backseat issue is a challenge to the aspirations of the international community. I want to stress that such an

attitude will only invite more States to have an interest in and start to acquire nuclear weapons. Moreover, the main factor causing the past decade's deadlock in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament is the largest nuclear-weapon State's refusal to disarm its nuclear arsenal while it repeatedly overemphasizes the issues of non-proliferation and a ban of fissile materials.

Today, bilateral efforts at nuclear disarmament are no longer a method for achieving comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament is of a multilateral nature and should be achieved in a verifiable and irreversible manner under international legally binding control within specific time frames.

As a member of the Group of 21 in the Conference on Disarmament and of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea supports the Non-Aligned Movement's common position of attaching the highest priority to nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we highly appreciate the initiative of the countries of the Middle East to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in their region as a contribution to nuclear disarmament and peace in the world.

Secondly, non-proliferation should not be misused as a pretext to attack or press sovereign States. The two-faced position of the United States on nuclear issues in relation to the Korean peninsula and the Middle East clearly shows the true purpose of its loud championing of so-called non-proliferation.

In the case of the Korean peninsula, the nuclear issue was created by the United States itself when it first introduced its own nuclear weapons into South Korea in 1957 and increased their number to over 1,000 by the 1970s. Nevertheless, the United States has concealed its own crimes of horizontal proliferation on the Korean peninsula and, under the pretext of the non-proliferation, has been pursuing a hostile policy against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as it manoeuvres to overthrow our regime.

By contrast, with regard to the nuclear issue in the Middle East, the United States openly keeps silent on the issue of the possession of nuclear weapons by Israel. The fact that Israel's reckless acts have reached the highest level, such as attacking humanitarian ships going to our Palestinian brothers and sisters with its heavily armed commando troops in May, is due purely to the silent support of the United States.

As long as the United States continues its nuclear threats against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, my country will continue to equally increase its nuclear deterrence, while remaining faithful to its proclaimed commitment to non-proliferation as one of the responsible nuclear-weapon States.

May I take this opportunity to express our sincere hope that this Committee, in charge of disarmament, will redouble its efforts to achieve practical success in nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, we would like to reaffirm that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will actively cooperate with this Committee and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the future, as in the past.

Mr. Aiyar (India): Twenty-two years ago, on 9 June 1988, India's then Prime Minister, the young Shri Rajiv Gandhi, presented to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament an action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order that set out a road map to attain the goal of nuclear disarmament, followed by general and complete disarmament, in a time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, phased and verifiable manner within 22 years, that is, by this year, 2010 (see A/S-15/50, annex I).

Tragically, we are no nearer attaining that goal today than we were 22 years ago. The promise of a nuclear-weapon-free world, which seemed a real possibility near the end of the Cold War, has been belied. There has been a welcome reduction, of course, in numbers by the two largest possessors of nuclear weapons, but the global threat posed by nuclear weapons has not abated. The possibility of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction has added a new dimension to that threat.

The one ray of hope is that there is a far wider measure of consensus on the imperative need to move towards that goal than there was 22 years ago. The Cold War has been over for almost two decades, and the voices of wisdom, particularly on the part of those who were once the most ardent advocates of a policy of deterrence based on nuclear weapons, are beginning to be heard. Several world leaders have expressly acknowledged the necessity of moving towards global zero. We are encouraged by President Obama's statement in Prague, on 5 April 2009, to "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons".

The Secretary-General, too, has called for the consideration of a nuclear-weapons convention in his five-point plan. Yet, negotiations are still to commence in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva aimed at ensuring the universal, non-discriminatory, time-bound, phased and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, as presaged in the Rajiv Gandhi action plan.

For its part, India remains committed to the objectives of that plan and the realization of its vision of ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. We believe that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process, underwritten by a universal commitment to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. That might best be undertaken at this session of the General Assembly by building the international consensus that would facilitate work in that regard by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

We believe that progressive steps for the delegitimization of nuclear weapons are essential to achieving the goal of their complete elimination. Measures to reduce nuclear dangers arising from the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, the de-alerting of nuclear weapons, and measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons are all pertinent in that regard.

India's resolutions in the First Committee give expression to a large number of such proposals, which are justifiably gaining increasing international support. We have also co-sponsored resolutions by others seeking to initiate, with all deliberate speed, the processes that could lead to an international convention on a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order. We reiterate our desire to work with our fellow States Members of the United Nations to achieve that goal.

Addressing the threat to international peace and security posed by nuclear weapons in a sustainable and comprehensive manner requires their global elimination on a non-discriminatory basis. While non-proliferation is important and all States should fully and effectively implement the obligations arising from the agreements or treaties to which they are parties, we must not lose sight of the essential and mutually reinforcing linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation. Progress on nuclear disarmament would reinforce non-proliferation as no other measure

can, and progress on non-proliferation cannot be a precondition for progress on nuclear disarmament.

International efforts in that regard should build the necessary confidence among States to ensure that international treaties and agreements are multilaterally negotiated and freely accepted, which remains the true test of their legitimacy and credibility. India has acceded to and is in full implementation of the two non-discriminatory international conventions banning biological and chemical weapons. In that connection, I recall Premier Rajiv Gandhi saying, while presenting his action plan to the special session of the General Assembly in 1988:

“We have an international convention eliminating biological weapons by prohibiting their use in war. We are working on similarly eliminating chemical weapons. There is no reason in principle why nuclear weapons too cannot be so eliminated. All it requires is the affirmation of certain basic moral values and the assertion of the required political will, underpinned by treaties and institutions which ensure against nuclear delinquency.” (*A/S-15/PV.14, pp. 8 and 9*)

India's position on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) needs no reiteration. There is no question of India's joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.

It is but natural that the countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should bear a special responsibility for nuclear disarmament. In that regard, we welcome the new Russia-United States agreement to cut their arsenals. Between the two, they still hold more than 90 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world, and the New START agreement is a step in the right direction. Even as we applaud the revitalization of the Russia-United States bilateral arms control process, we believe that it is not a substitute for a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework for achieving global and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

As part of its credible minimum nuclear deterrent, India has espoused the policy of no first use against nuclear-weapon States and non-use against non-nuclear-weapon States, and is prepared to convert those policies into multilateral legal arrangements. We

support negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.

We are committed to a unilateral and voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. As a nuclear-weapon State and a responsible member of the international community, we will participate constructively in the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament as part of its programme of work. India is also ready to work with others in the international community to strengthen nuclear security against the threat of nuclear explosive devices or fissile material falling into the hands of non-State actors.

Our highest priority, however, remains nuclear disarmament, as it has been since Mahatma Gandhi in 1945 expressed his horror at the use of nuclear weapons and Premier Rajiv Gandhi outlined his action plan for ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order — a road map that, if accepted then, would have given us this year a world free of nuclear weapons and anchored in non-violence.

In a working paper submitted to the General Assembly in 2006, India suggested a number of measures in this regard, including reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and such specific legal measures as a global no-first-use agreement, a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and a nuclear-weapons convention for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

On 13 August 2007, in a speech to the Lok Sabha, our Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh, reiterated India's position in the following words:

“We must not forget India's long-standing commitment to the noble ideas of nuclear disarmament and our refusal to participate in any arms race, including a nuclear arms race. Our commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear weapons remains undiminished. It was this vision of a world free of nuclear weapons which Shri Rajiv Gandhi put before the United Nations in 1988 and this still has universal resonance.”

More recently, at the start of this session of the General Assembly, our Minister of External Affairs, Shri S. M. Krishna, stressed our

“abiding commitment to achieve universal and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame — a vision that was most eloquently articulated in the Assembly by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988”. (A/65/PV.23, p. 4)

In that same context, speaking at the High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations, India's External Affairs Minister called for the intensification of dialogue among United Nations Member States for strengthening the international consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation. That was also the intent of our 2006 working paper containing proposals that reflect the spirit and substance of the Rajiv Gandhi action plan. The idea was to stimulate debate and discussion on what could be done today to implement the abiding vision of that plan.

The time for action is now. In this twenty-second year since the presentation of our action plan, there is a growing international consensus on beginning intergovernmental negotiations on nuclear disarmament, taking into account the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi action plan, the working paper we circulated in 2006 and previous and present proposals, including proposals made by concerned members of international civil society.

Hence, with a view to taking action aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament, we call for an intensification of discussion and dialogue among Member States to start building — if possible at this session of the General Assembly — an international consensus to commence negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Danon (France) (*spoke in French*): My country associates itself with the speech delivered the day before yesterday on behalf of the European Union. I would like to add a few thoughts at the national level.

For the past year, the nuclear agenda has been particularly full and marked by a series of accomplishments which we welcome, notably the conclusion of the New START treaty, the Nuclear Security Summit and the 2010 Review Conference of

the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Our common road map for nuclear issues is now the Final Document adopted by consensus at the NPT Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)). Libran Cabactulan, who made a major contribution to that remarkable outcome, reiterated yesterday what he believed to be the specific obligations of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the action plan outlined in the Document, beginning with actions 3, 5 and 21. However, we feel that this approach is too limited. The action plan is part of a package focusing on the three pillars of the Treaty. In adopting it by consensus, the international community demonstrated that, for the first time, it was ready to address the nuclear issue in a comprehensive and balanced way. Each State party must now assume its proper part in those jointly adopted actions.

I reaffirmed in my speech during the general debate (see A/C.1/65/PV.3) that France would continue its resolute action in support of disarmament, the fight against proliferation and more effective use of civilian nuclear energy by everyone. That being so, we will focus particular attention in all forums — including the Group of Eight, the presidency of which we will assume next year — on reducing the greatest threat to our security today, that is, nuclear proliferation. I reiterate that strengthening the non-proliferation regime is an absolute priority for us.

Still, within the framework of our work today, I want to stress above all nuclear disarmament and the resolve of the nuclear-weapon States to continue implementing concrete actions aimed at ensuring full compliance with their commitments under the Treaty.

No one can doubt France's determination. We are one of the rare States that have taken irreversible disarmament measures. In less than 15 years, we have reduced by half the number of our nuclear warheads and, in the interests of transparency, have made public the total capacity of our arsenal — 300 warheads. We have completely dismantled our ground-to-ground component and have reduced by 30 per cent our airborne and sea-based components. We ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 12 years ago and have dismantled our nuclear test sites. We stopped producing plutonium and uranium for nuclear weapons and dismantled the corresponding facilities. Our strictly defensive doctrine strictly limits the use of

nuclear weapons, restricting their use to extreme circumstances of legitimate defence.

Our determination to work with the other nuclear-weapon States is also perfectly clear.

In this respect, I recall that, as those present know, we have invited our fellow permanent members of the Security Council to Paris for the first follow-up meeting to the Review Conference. There, we will begin to consider how to achieve the three pillars of the Treaty by 2015. I also recall that this meeting will be held in the spirit of transparency established a year ago in London among the same partners.

But there is one thing I wish to stress — the success of the action plan concerns everyone. We will succeed if all States parties do their part to implement the measures adopted. In that way, we will progress together towards a safer world.

That having been said, I do not minimize the responsibilities that fall to the nuclear-weapon States, especially in the area of nuclear disarmament. France is shouldering its responsibility through concrete actions, as I have mentioned. I simply note that improving the strategic situation, to which we all contribute, is always a necessary precondition for taking steps to reduce nuclear arsenals. Thus, for example, the significant reduction in the number of warheads in the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France over the past 20 years was made possible by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the long-awaited reunification of Europe. In the same way, only a sustained momentum for resolving the heightened tensions that affect, in differing but always very dangerous ways, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and the Korean peninsula will allow us to make decisive progress on disarmament in these parts of the world.

We must therefore work simultaneously on targeted strategies to resolve these tensions and on strengthening collective security mechanisms. By following this route, which is both narrow and realistic, we will make tangible progress towards genuine disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

I now come to the topic that has been mentioned many times here and which fuels a broadly felt frustration year on year: the deadlock in the multilateral disarmament negotiations. In May 2009, we came very close to a fresh start in the Conference

on Disarmament with the adoption of a new programme of work, which inter alia prepared the way for negotiations on a cut-off treaty. As I said at the opening of this session, we must together examine the persistent reasons for this deadlock and, as the European Union has done, make constructive proposals to overcome the impasse.

We thank the Secretary-General once again for having taken the initiative to organize the High-level Meeting of 24 September, which helped to shed light on these discussions. We know that the work of the Conference on Disarmament was stalemated as a result of political animosity and that procedural improvements will not be enough to end the deadlock.

Above all, I should like to recall that we must together first make clear to those countries that believe they can profit from the deadlock that they are now working against history. Yesterday, Pakistan confirmed that it does not wish to participate in the next stage — ending production of fissile material for nuclear weapons — despite the fact that the international community as a whole deems it necessary for moving forward together on the reduction of arsenals. That is both its responsibility and fully commensurate with its sovereignty.

However, Pakistan justified its choice by citing reasons that, to say the least, were not convincing. Its analysis of the attitude and vision of nuclear-weapon States was characterized, in our view, by a great number of historical misinterpretations. Regarding the work of the Conference on Disarmament, its national concerns lead it to propose that the international community modify the order of emergency priorities that were set by Pakistan itself. I will not dwell on the offensive ad hominem attacks that we heard yesterday at the end of Pakistan's speech. I hope that episode is now over, and simply call for greater calm and dignity in our discussions.

I conclude by addressing the work of our Committee. The draft resolutions have been submitted; we will now discuss and, in some cases, amend them. I would like to make two recommendations. First, in my view, it is important that the wording of the draft resolutions reflect, as far as possible, the recent developments of which we are all aware. Too many resolutions, reaffirmed year after year, reflect situations that no longer exist.

Equally important, in my view, is the fact that certain resolutions should not seek to reopen compromises that were difficult to achieve, for example within the framework of the NPT Review Conference. The current wording of certain draft resolutions seeks thereby to modify and indeed to amplify certain obligations undertaken in the action plan adopted by consensus in May. That is hardly productive. In May, we strove together to reach consensus that would enable us to move towards greater security for everyone. Let us endeavour to preserve that spirit, which allowed us to secure such multilateral gains.

That having been said, Sir, you can count on the full cooperation of my delegation in ensuring the greatest success of the work of our Committee.

Mr. Moktefi (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): At a moment when global conditions are, on the whole, favourable to international peace and security, the multilateral disarmament process continues to limit progress and provoke serious concern. The positions taken by many delegations over the past few days make sufficiently clear their apprehensions and fears that the disarmament process will continue to languish in the face of recurrent disagreements and vain hopes.

The decisions announced in favour of nuclear disarmament and the abolitionist global zero option have, of course, raised expectations that more flexible positions will be adopted and new momentum given to disarmament. In reality, despite the satisfaction expressed with regard to the results achieved, especially at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the possibility that developments will lead to concrete and substantial commitments remains but a distant hope.

That is why it is vital that transparent, irreversible and verifiable measures be taken with a view to ultimately achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Be that as it may, nuclear-weapon States have particular responsibilities and obligations to uphold.

Algeria reiterates its commitment to the NPT, which we consider to be the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Any piecemeal or selective approach to respecting the terms of the NPT risks stripping that instrument of its substance and giving ammunition to its detractors, be

they signatories or not. It is essential that the balance among the three pillars of the NPT be preserved at all costs.

To that end, it is time for disarmament and non-proliferation questions to receive equal treatment. It would be inappropriate to pursue the goals of disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons through efforts to combat horizontal proliferation alone, since nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are interdependent and inseparable.

My delegation therefore remains profoundly concerned by the fact that none of the 13 measures stipulated by consensus at the sixth NPT Review Conference of 2000 has even begun to be implemented. Moreover, proposals submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement during the eighth NPT Review Conference of 2010, with a view to defining a timetable for the implementation of those 13 measures, have yet to find favour with the nuclear Powers. The obligations under article VI of the NPT should be put into practice in a tangible and verifiable manner so as to allay the fears of non-nuclear-weapon States. These States continue to feel threatened in the absence of a legally binding instrument for negative security guarantees.

More than four decades on from the agreement of the NPT, the weak progress achieved to date on disarmament continues to frustrate hopes of seeing a world finally rid of the nuclear threat. The 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice reminded us that nuclear weapons are in contravention of international humanitarian law. To eradicate the threats posed by these weapons, the NPT must be universalized and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must finally enter into force. To that end, we call on those States that have not yet done so, especially annex 2 States, to ratify it as soon as possible.

The terms of the arrangement on the basis of which the NPT was adopted must be respected in order to ensure the credibility of the Treaty. The right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy is more than an element of that arrangement; it undeniably represents a catalyst for economic and social development. The ever greater emphasis being placed on the non-proliferation track is giving rise to restrictions that reflect neither the spirit nor the letter of article IV of the NPT.

Algeria believes that the establishment of a multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanism should not

be an obstacle, especially for the development of scientific capabilities in the area of nuclear research. Security and safety concerns are already addressed in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, even if there is still room for improvement in that respect. In any case, the multilateral mechanism should not lead to a monopolistic and selective approach that puts developing countries at a disadvantage. My delegation reiterates its attachment to the legitimate and inalienable right of all States parties to the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Moreover, there is a need to seriously tackle the problem of nuclear terrorism. There exists a real risk of terrorist groups' acquiring and using nuclear materials or weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, Algeria stresses the importance of enhancing international cooperation in this area so as to respond more effectively to this threat.

Algeria welcomes the entry into force last year of the Pelindaba Treaty creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, which represents an important African contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and world peace. As a result, there is interest extending this example to other areas such as the Middle East to meet the wishes of the international community. It was in this context that we supported the agreement concluded during the 2010 NPT Review Conference relating to the launching of a process leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, pursuant to the 1995 resolution.

With regard to the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria remains committed to supporting the effective resumption of work in that unique multilateral disarmament negotiating body. It would not be wise to strip the Conference on Disarmament of its prerogatives, to replace it with another forum, or even to legitimize the dissociation of one of the fundamental themes of its mandate. To overcome this stalemate, my delegation believes that the contents and objectives of the programme of work (CD/1864) adopted in 2009 under the auspices of the Algerian presidency remain valid and could serve as the basis for work, provided that the spirit of compromise and political will that some parties have shown emerges again at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament in 2011. A comprehensive and balanced approach to the decalogue would certainly be a way of garnering consensus. In

any case, it would be timely to hold a fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which would provide the appropriate framework for conducting the sort of comprehensive analysis needed to revitalize the work of the various forums that make up the disarmament machinery.

In conclusion, I express the hope that through our debates and the resolutions we will subsequently adopt, our work will make a genuine contribution to breathing new life into the nuclear disarmament process.

Mr. Lauber (Switzerland) (*spoke in French*): It is a pleasure to see you, Sir, presiding over our meeting this afternoon. I will read an abridged version of our statement and copies of the full text will be distributed.

In the field of nuclear weapons, 2010 was marked primarily by the holding of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Switzerland welcomes the adoption by the Conference of a Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) containing an action plan on the three pillars of the NPT. Many States, including Switzerland, had hoped for a more ambitious action plan in the field of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, the plan is valuable in that it represents a road map that will make it possible to assess the implementation of the various measures adopted.

Switzerland welcomes a number of innovative elements contained in the Final Document of the Review Conference. On the one hand, the objective of nuclear disarmament is expressed for the first time in terms of a world free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, it proposes new avenues for achieving this objective. This concerns, in particular, the Secretary-General's five-point plan and his recommendation to consider developing a nuclear-weapons convention. Based on our belief that it will ultimately be necessary to develop such a framework in order to finally eliminate nuclear weapons, Switzerland welcomes the fact that the Final Document mentions and thereby supports the Secretary-General's proposal.

Another first was the expression of concern on the part of the Review Conference with regard to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the Conference reaffirmed the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. As our Minister for Foreign Affairs, Micheline Calmy-Rey, stated at the Review

Conference, Switzerland considers the use of nuclear weapons immoral and illegal under international humanitarian law because such weapons cause massive damage and have indiscriminate effects. Switzerland will continue to insist on these points. In this regard, it intends to promote discussion of the current validity of concepts used to legitimize nuclear weapons, starting with the concept of deterrence. It also intends to stress the true humanitarian impact of any use of nuclear weapons.

The modest scope of the section of the action plan devoted to nuclear disarmament makes the full implementation thereof all the more important. In this respect, Switzerland believes that the prompt entry into force of the New START agreement is of particular importance. Switzerland therefore calls upon the United States and Russia to finalize the ratification process as soon as possible.

Such a development would certainly contribute to the implementation of action 5 of the action plan of the Review Conference, which is undoubtedly a key provision. It represents necessary progress in both quantitative and qualitative disarmament. In this context, we welcome the intention of the permanent members of the Security Council to meet in Paris in 2011 and we await the results of that meeting with great interest.

The issue of reducing the role and importance of nuclear weapons is particularly important. Progress in this area by all nuclear-weapon States would have a positive impact in terms of both disarmament and non-proliferation. Switzerland notes the lack of real reductions in this respect in the recently updated nuclear doctrines. It hopes that NATO, which will adopt a new strategic concept in November, will take the lead in reducing the role of these weapons in its doctrines.

The decisions taken by the North Atlantic alliance at its upcoming summit in Lisbon will be important to implementing other provisions of the action plan. That applies in particular to the need to make progress, including on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, Switzerland calls on the NATO nuclear-weapon States to take full account of the Final Document of the Review Conference in their deliberations.

Switzerland welcomes the fact that the NPT Review Conference again highlighted the importance of de-alerting and underscores the legitimate interest of

non-nuclear-weapon States in seeing progress made in that area. From that viewpoint, Switzerland, together with New Zealand, Malaysia, Chile and Nigeria, is introducing again this year a draft resolution on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems (A/C.1/65/L.42). The analogous resolutions enjoyed wide support in 2007 and 2008, showing the conviction of the majority of countries that progress must be made in that area.

The provisions of the action plan are also directed at the Conference on Disarmament, starting with the topic of the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). The need to negotiate a treaty in that area as soon as possible is underscored. Such a development would be all the more welcome because an FMCT can contribute to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Switzerland therefore regrets that persistent obstacles affecting the Conference on Disarmament prevent any progress in that area, despite the fact that the vast majority of States wish to move forward.

Tangible progress within the Conference on Disarmament on security guarantees is also necessary. Forty years after the entry into force of the NPT, it is high time that the States that have renounced nuclear weapons receive the assurance that they will not be attacked or threatened by such weapons.

In view of those aspects, Switzerland can only agree with the proposal made by the Secretary-General after the 24 September High-level Meeting on Revitalizing the Work of the Conference on Disarmament and Taking Forward Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. At the beginning of the 2011 session, that body must adopt a programme of work that will open the way to the start of negotiations. For its part, Switzerland is ready to support a programme of work that initiates negotiations not only on an FMCT, but also on the four core issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

Switzerland is also convinced that there is a link between nuclear disarmament and nuclear proliferation. In that regard, the NPT Review Conference's decision to convene a meeting in 2012 on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction is a significant development. Holding such a meeting should allow progress on an entire range of issues related to regional proliferation in the Middle East. Switzerland therefore

calls on all States concerned to participate fully in that process.

With regard to nuclear proliferation, Switzerland remains concerned. It calls on both North Korea and Iran to comply with the relevant Security Council resolutions. For its part, it sees no alternative to diplomatic channels to resolve those regional nuclear proliferation issues.

Ms. Kelly (Ireland): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition: Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden and my own country, Ireland.

I take the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.25, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments". The text of the draft resolution has been circulated to all missions. A limited number of additional copies are available from the delegation of Ireland, if anyone needs them.

The members of the New Agenda Coalition are firmly committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in all its aspects. That is clear from the text of our draft resolution, which welcomes the adoption by the NPT Review Conference in May of the substantive Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) in its entirety. It also reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes, and calls on all States to comply fully with all commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

However, as the Committee is well aware, the specific focus and *raison d'être* of the New Agenda Coalition is nuclear disarmament. We make no apology for that. We believe that implementation of disarmament commitments has been neglected for many years. As we said in our statement in the general debate (see A/C.1/65/PV.2), it was dissatisfaction at the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament in the aftermath of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference that led to the establishment of the New Agenda Coalition in Dublin in 1998 and that continues to inform our work today. The lack of satisfactory implementation of the practical steps of 2000 and the calling of some of those steps into question were a major disappointment to us, as was the failure of the 2005 Review Conference.

We therefore welcome the adoption by this year's Review Conference of a substantive outcome, with conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions on all three pillars of the Treaty and on the Middle East. We believe that the true test of the value of the Review Conference outcome will be the implementation of the commitments undertaken. The draft resolution underlines the importance of early progress, and encourages the taking of various steps in that regard.

We believe that early engagement and substantive progress in the implementation of the steps agreed in May would be an important signal of the seriousness with which nuclear-weapon States view their undertakings and of their commitment to implementing the action plan on nuclear disarmament. Providing information on activities undertaken is an important means of increasing confidence, and we encourage all nuclear-weapon States to do so.

The Chair returned to the Chair.

The draft resolution also reiterates our long-held views on issues such as the importance of the NPT and its universalization, as well as of the fulfilment of past commitments.

We encourage all Member States to support the draft resolution. We hope that, in line with the broader trends in international affairs in the area of nuclear disarmament, the growing support for our resolution that has been seen in recent years will be continued this year.

Mr. Macedo (Mexico) (*spoke in Spanish*): In the statements made on behalf of the Rio Group and the New Agenda Coalition in the general debates of the plenary of the General Assembly and of the First Committee at this session, Mexico has noted the progress made by the international community in the area of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, in 2010. That progress, known to all, lays down the guidelines for the ultimate achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Since we now have an essential and clear road map for channelling efforts, it is time to take concrete action to achieve that objective. That is what my delegation wishes to talk about today. The point of departure is the series of actions adopted by consensus during the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT). In particular, my delegation underscores action 5, whereby it is agreed that:

“The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security.”
(*NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 21*)

For Mexico, some elements of the concrete progress referred to in the paragraph just quoted are as follows. First, we hope we will be able to greet the new year in 2011 with a ratified New START treaty, which will help to realize the commitment it reflected at its signing last April. In that respect, we welcome the introduction this afternoon of draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.28 by the United States and the Russian Federation. We hope that next year the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty will become a reality, and that we can move closer to its greatly desired entry into force.

Concerning the role that nuclear weapons play in the national security doctrines of certain States, Mexico reiterates its firm position that the only absolute guarantee against the threat or use of nuclear weapons is their complete elimination. Thus, such doctrines, which are completely obsolete and ineffective in addressing the current challenges to international security, cannot and must not remain in force. We reaffirm our total rejection of the claim of deterrence as a justification of the possession of nuclear weapons, no matter how limited in number they may be.

In this regard, my delegation deeply regrets that the opportunity that the NATO summit to be held in Lisbon next month might have presented will not be used to revise and modify an archaic strategic concept that continues to support the policy of nuclear deterrent. Mexico also insists on the immediate removal, in conformity with article II of the NPT, of the almost 200 atomic bombs currently located in European countries that do not possess such weapons themselves. Furthermore, the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council to be held next year in Paris in follow-up to the meeting in London in 2009, will be key for the States of that group to reach meaningful agreements leading to full compliance with their obligations under article VI of

the NPT through transparent, verifiable and irreversible measures.

All of this will help to generate the climate of cooperation and trust that we urgently need in order to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those areas of the world where they do not yet exist, particularly the Middle East. As on other occasions, Mexico, in its capacity as depositary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, will introduce a draft resolution on the consolidation of the regimen under that instrument (A/C.1/65/L.51). The draft resolution takes note of the progress made in this area and welcomes the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia that took place on 30 April. The text, prepared on the basis of the actions agreed in the framework of the NPT Review Conference in May, particularly action 9, calls on the nuclear-weapon States that formulated interpretative declarations at the moment of signature or ratification of the relevant Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco to withdraw those declarations so that we can consolidate a zone that is genuinely free of the threat of nuclear weapons. We hope that, as on previous occasions, the draft resolution can be adopted with the full support of the United Nations, which is what the first nuclear-weapon-free zone established in a densely populated region deserves.

The qualification of the word “progress” that we give today to the recent measures adopted will depend directly on the impact that they will have in years to come. The natural consequence of understanding and recognizing clearly our obligations and challenges in the area of disarmament is that it becomes inexcusable to divert efforts from their fulfilment and realization. In other words, now is when we have to test the veracity of the speeches, the demonstrations of good faith, of the spirit of cooperation and, above all, of genuine commitment to nuclear disarmament. We hope that the urgency of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons that we heard repeated so many times in 2010 will not be limited to the few pages that remain on the calendar.

Mr. Ferami (Islamic Republic of Iran): At the outset, Sir, let me join with others in expressing our appreciation for your commendable work and that of the other members of the Bureau in managing this meeting.

Nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the disarmament agenda. It forms a fundamental part of the package agreed within the framework of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. The continued existence, development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads thus continue to threaten international peace and security and are sources of horror, distrust and threat.

Although the international community has noted the recent New START agreement signed in April, the Treaty’s provisions unfortunately do not go beyond the decommissioning of nuclear weapons, and its parties do not have any obligation to destroy those weapons. Moreover, no multilateral verification mechanism has been envisaged in the aforementioned treaty. It therefore does not take into account the principles of increased transparency, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and irreversibility that were agreed on by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences.

As a result of the blatant violations of the legally binding commitments under article VI of the NPT, the integrity of the NPT has unfortunately been endangered, and the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in the Treaty’s credibility eroded. The world will not wait indefinitely for nuclear-weapon States to live up to their international obligations regarding their nuclear-weapons programmes.

There is no doubt that the NPT is the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and full implementation of the Treaty in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner would safeguard the world from the potential devastation of nuclear weapons. But our collective efforts towards the universalization of the NPT and an enhanced commitment and adherence to it on a global scale have yet to yield results. Accordingly, among other things, in the important region of the Middle East, the Zionist regime still remains a non-party to the Treaty, while being helped and supported technologically and financially by certain nuclear-weapon States, in blatant contravention of articles II and III of the NPT. In this context, the obligations of the States parties to the NPT concerning the firm and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources and devices, and assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States that are not party to the Treaty must be observed.

We are greatly disappointed that, despite the successful conclusion of the eighth Review Conference in May, forwarding a programme of action for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the early reaction of the Zionist regime and its main protector have dimmed the prospects for success of this forthcoming road map. As a result of that Conference, 189 countries of the world called on the Zionist regime, the only name mentioned in the Conference's document, to accede promptly to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon party and to bring all its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The conference in 2012 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East will be a very suitable forum in which that regime may accede to the NPT without any conditions.

Now let me touch upon some other items under this cluster. The doctrines of nuclear deterrence or making nuclear disarmament conditional upon a multilateral process for maintaining the so-called international and regional balance and security are not viable or credible justifications for retaining such weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. They will bring about neither peace nor international security, but rather constitute an impediment to progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

We would like to reiterate that the deployment of hundreds of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon States — especially in the European Union (EU) region, including Belgium, as well as other parts of the world, including Japan — and training fighter pilots from the host countries to handle and deliver the nuclear bombs against other States are serious concerns for the international community and contravene both the letter and the spirit of the NPT. It is obvious that both the nuclear-weapon and hosting States are in clear non-compliance with the NPT. Instead of threatening others and crying wolf at other countries' behaviour, these States, especially the EU member States hosting nuclear weapons, should themselves comply with the NPT and observe their obligations.

It is unacceptable that the nuclear-weapon States and those remaining outside the NPT continue to retain and even earmark tens of billions of dollars to modernize their nuclear arsenals, imperilling regional and international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East region. This is a dangerous and destabilizing trend of vertical proliferation. It also

constitutes non-compliance by the nuclear-weapon States with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty.

The decisions and actions adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference and the other review conferences are not to be overshadowed or forgotten with the passage of time, but to be enhanced and strengthened. In this regard, in stressing the validity of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the necessity for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains that any attempt to undermine these decisions should be deplored.

It should be clear that the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 does not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. It should neither be interpreted as nor result in an indefinite extension of the lack of implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations. It also does not foresee an indefinite preservation of the status of non-members outside the Treaty, which would defeat the potential for realizing its universality, in particular in the Middle East region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran would like to reiterate its long-standing position that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, which could start in 2011, the year that the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran has called the year of nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, other States and international, national, governmental and non-governmental organizations are called on to lend their active support to and participate in the year of nuclear disarmament. In this regard, the Islamic Republic of Iran itself is planning to hold the second international conference on nuclear disarmament next spring in Tehran to commemorate the efforts made and to encourage other States and organizations to join their minds and pool their efforts to exert pressure for the sake of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

We fully support the positions of the Non-Aligned Movement in favour of the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon instrument. Such

negotiations must lead to legally prohibiting, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country, and provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons by 2025. Pending the conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention, the nuclear-weapon States must honour their obligations under the NPT and immediately cease any kind of development and research on nuclear weapons and any modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities. They must refrain from making any threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. They must withdraw their nuclear weapons from the territories of other countries and destroy them, and stop maintaining their nuclear weapons in a trigger-alert situation.

In conclusion, let me reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic Iran, as a victim of weapons of mass destruction, will vigorously pursue the goal of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, but there is no doubt — I repeat, there is no doubt — that non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligation pending the full implementation of outstanding nuclear disarmament undertakings by nuclear-weapon States.

The Chair: The Committee has heard the last speaker in our discussion on the nuclear-weapons cluster. We have thus concluded the thematic debate on the nuclear-weapons cluster, in accordance with our programme.

Before I turn to other issues, I would like to inform members that we have a request for the floor from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the Conference on Disarmament. He has to leave New York today owing to unforeseen circumstances beyond his control. He had intended to deliver his statement on Monday, 18 October, under cluster 3, “Conventional weapons”. I propose to hear, therefore, that statement today. I thank the Committee for its understanding and cooperation.

Mr. Mbaye (Senegal) (*spoke in French*): I would start by thanking you, Mr. Chair, and all our colleagues for your understanding, which allows me this afternoon to make a statement that was planned for Monday, 18 October. I am extremely grateful, as I must, as you said, be in Geneva on Monday as a matter of urgency.

(*spoke in English*)

It gives me great pleasure to convey to you, Sir, my warm congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. I reiterate to you my country’s full support to you in your task.

Senegal is fully committed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) and to the humanitarian principles enshrined therein. The Convention and its Protocols address the use of weapons incompatible with the principles of humanity and the laws of war. They form an integral part of international law applicable to armed conflict. The Convention also provides an important framework within which to consider how best to protect civilians and minimize the effects of certain inhumane weapons on combatants.

The efforts of the high contracting parties have made the Convention an indispensable element of today’s humanitarian disarmament and arms control machinery. Senegal remains committed to the framework presented by the Convention, which places prohibitions or limitations on conventional weapons while taking account of military needs and humanitarian considerations.

I will now speak in my capacity as Chairperson of the 2009 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, held in Geneva on 12 and 13 November 2009, based on the recommendation of the Meeting. Paragraph 29 of the final report (CCW/MSP/2009/5) stipulates that in the context of exercising my authority as Chairperson of the Meeting, on behalf of the High Contracting Parties, to achieve the goal of universality of the Convention and its annexed protocols,

“the Meeting requested the Chairperson to consider reporting to the sixty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly on his endeavours”.

On the universalization of the CCW, I am pleased to inform the Committee that the number of high contracting parties to the Convention has increased from 110 countries at the time of the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties last year to 113 States parties this year. I would like to congratulate the three new States parties to the CCW: Antigua and Barbuda, which acceded on 23 August 2010; the Dominican Republic, which acceded on 21 June 2010; and Qatar, which

acceded on 16 November 2009, in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3, of the Convention, which stipulates that

“at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Convention or of accession thereto, that State shall notify the Depositary of its consent to be bound by any two or more of these Protocols”.

In this regard, the three new States parties to the Convention have acceded to the following instruments under the Convention. Antigua and Barbuda has also acceded to Protocol I, Protocol III and Protocol IV. These Protocols and the Convention will simultaneously enter into force for Antigua and Barbuda on 23 February 2011. The Dominican Republic has also acceded to the amended article 1, Protocol I, Protocol II, Amended Protocol II, Protocol III and Protocol IV. These instruments, as well as the Convention, will simultaneously enter into force for the Dominican Republic on 21 December 2010. Qatar has also acceded to Protocol I, Amended Protocol II, Protocol III, Protocol IV and Protocol V. These Protocols and the Convention entered into force for Qatar simultaneously on 16 May 2010.

This is just a snapshot of the update on current accessions undertaken in the context of the Convention. Since last year's Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, there have been more than 20 successful ratifications to the Convention and to the five Protocols annexed to the Convention and to the Convention's amended article 1, on the scope of application. These accessions include those that are initiated by the States that are already party to the Convention which have recently become party to any or all of the Protocols and/or the amended article 1 of the Convention. Universalization will continue to be a priority in the coming year as well.

The number of high contracting parties to the Convention is steadily increasing. This is a result of substantial efforts in recent years to promote the universality of the instrument. The plan of action to promote the universality of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, as adopted by the Third Review Conference, seeks to facilitate progress in that regard. In the framework of CCW universality, the joint action between the European Union and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs in 2007 supported the universalization of the Convention by organizing a

series of regional and subregional seminars and contributing to the CCW sponsorship programme. The objective of the seminars was to share knowledge and experience of the Convention in Latin America and the Caribbean, East and West Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands.

Senegal, as a member of the African Union, has also done its part in being active in efforts at strengthening the Convention's universal adherence within the Union. Those efforts culminated in a formal proposal made by Senegal to include one item in the agenda of the most recent meetings of the Union concerning the accession of African countries to the CCW. In that respect, I would like to underscore the decision of the African Union, notably the decision of the accession of African countries to the CCW, which was adopted by the fifteenth ordinary session of the Assembly of the Union, held on 27 July in Kampala, Uganda. That historic decision in essence calls for the mass accession of countries in Africa to the CCW so that States in the region can fully contribute to the strengthening of international humanitarian law. I hope that that effort will give a big push to those countries in my region that are still outside the CCW to join the Convention.

In this context, the CCW sponsorship programme has contributed to promoting and improving the implementation of the Convention and its Protocols. The programme established by the Third Review Conference received substantial funding from the high contracting parties, including the European Union. It provided an opportunity for States with insufficient resources to familiarize themselves with the CCW framework.

The high contracting parties recognize the value and importance of the sponsorship programme within the framework of the Convention for strengthening the implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols, promoting universal observance of the norms and principles enshrined therein, supporting their universalization, enhancing the cooperation and exchange of information among the high contracting parties, and ensuring broader geographical representation at meetings of the Convention. The 2009 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties also called upon those States in a position to do so to contribute to the sponsorship programme.

The high contracting parties to the CCW are encouraged to comply fully with the decision on the compliance mechanism applicable to the Convention adopted by the Third Review Conference and to submit their national reports as required. The Meeting emphasized yet again the importance of compliance with the provisions of the Convention and its annexed Protocols by all high contracting parties, their commitment to fully implementing the provisions enshrined therein, and their determination to consult and cooperate with each other in order to facilitate the full implementation of the obligations of each party contained in the Convention and its annexed Protocols, thereby promoting compliance.

In this respect, the Meeting also expressed its satisfaction at the steps undertaken in the implementation of the relevant decision on compliance. This included the establishment and maintenance by the Secretariat of the compliance database and the roster of experts. The Meeting encouraged the high contracting parties to submit, on an annual basis, national compliance reports and to nominate national experts for inclusion in the pool of experts.

Let me recall that the recommended deadline for submission of national reports was fixed by the 2008 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties as 1 October of each calendar year. The Meeting also encouraged the high contracting parties to nominate national experts for inclusion in the pool of experts.

Furthermore, in accordance with the established practice, the next review conference will be held in 2011 and preparations are currently under way under the auspices of Ambassador Gancho Ganev of Bulgaria, who is the Chairperson-designate of the 2010 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention. Since his appointment, Ambassador Ganev has been actively consulting with all the contracting parties on preparations for the fourth review conference. Two meetings on the preparations for the review conference have been organized during the two sessions of the CCW group of governmental experts held this year in April and August-September, respectively.

Another issue that will be under the responsibility of the Chairperson-designate is mines other than anti-personnel mines, which the high contracting parties decided last year to keep under consideration under the overall responsibility of the Chairperson-designate. I

sincerely wish Ambassador Ganev the very best in successfully discharging his duties.

Taking into account the importance of securing the continuity and stability of the support provided by the Secretariat to the high contracting parties and observer States with regard to the effective and comprehensive implementation and universalization of the Convention and its annexed protocols, including the extent of information and cooperation among the high contracting parties, the States parties decided to establish an implementation support unit, while noting that the increased work relating to the CCW and its Protocols could benefit from a strengthened Geneva branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament. This unit within the Office would ensure continuity and stability and preserve institutional memory in the implementation of the Convention and its annexed Protocols.

(spoke in French)

I once again thank members for their understanding and exemplary patience. The document will be provided to the Secretariat to be made available to delegations. This is the briefing that I was to give as Chairperson of the most recent conference.

The Chair: I now call on those delegations that have asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) *(spoke in Arabic)*: We listened yesterday to the statement made by the representative of Canada, and we are concerned that she, in an uncalled-for manner, repeated this odd and disturbing position once again at this meeting. Her repeated engagement on this issue makes it evident that it is deliberate ill will, both politically and in other respects, that brings our colleague to mislead the public here.

Statements that cast doubt on my country's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are out of place and not truthful. It is obvious that our colleague is in no position whatsoever to offer advice or criticism when the matter relates to her country's assessment of the extent of commitment to prohibiting nuclear proliferation and the peaceful nature of the nuclear activities. I am obliged to remind the representative of Canada that Syria preceded Canada in acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). While

my country took this courageous and credible step, Canada was unable to follow suit.

My country launched an initiative in the Security Council in 2003 on behalf of the Arab Group to make the Middle East a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Syria is committed to the provisions of the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and all the IAEA safeguards. Syria receives IAEA inspectors periodically and all IAEA reports confirm its full commitment to and observance of its agreement.

In clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law and my country's national sovereignty, in September 2007 Israel committed an act of aggression against Syria, demolishing a military installation under construction that had no connection to any nuclear activity. This act of aggression calls for clear and strong condemnation. If our colleague from Canada were acting in good faith, she would have spoken otherwise, especially since the IAEA considers Israel's unilateral attack on and demolition of that site has undermined the Agency's ability to verify the nature of the installation.

Syria has allowed the IAEA team to visit the site of Al-Kibar and to take environmental samples from it without hindrance. Syria has provided all the information requested and answered all the questions posed by the IAEA in this respect. After visiting the site, the IAEA concluded, as stated in the reports of the Director General to the Board of Governors, that the site is free of any nuclear activity. In this respect, Syria reiterates its full interest in the implementation of the three pillars of non-proliferation. It emphasizes that it cooperates with the IAEA on all issues of concern, in accordance with the statute of the IAEA and its commitments, as well as the provisions of the safeguards agreements concluded with the IAEA since 1992.

Mr. Kim Jong Jo (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Thank you, Mr. Chair, for kindly once again giving me the floor so that I might exercise the right of reply. In order for the meeting to be adjourned by 6 p.m. so that we do not have to disturb representatives' enjoyment of their dinnertime, I shall keep my statement to no more than three minutes.

The delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly rejects the arguments made by some delegations, in particular those of South Korea

and Japan, with respect to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. This issue has naturally been raised several times and in connection with several topics.

The nuclear issue on the Korea peninsula was created by the deployment by the United States of nuclear weapons in South Korea and persists through the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear attack on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by the United States. The United States policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has gone so far beyond mere hostility as to pose a nuclear threat by designating our country as a target of a pre-emptive strike, thus forcefully and inevitably driving us to possess a nuclear deterrence.

The current United States Administration excludes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea from the list of countries to which negative security assurances are provided in its recently published Nuclear Posture Review. If any other country found itself in the same situation as our country, it would very easily be able to understand why the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had no choice but to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

In terms of nuclear weapons, it is well known to the international community that the United States of America was the first country in the world to manufacture nuclear weapons. In addition, it is the only State in the world that has ever used these inhuman and criminal weapons. During the Cold War period, the United States of America committed the crime of the horizontal proliferation of its nuclear weapons from the territory in which we find ourselves today to South Korea and to countries in Western Europe. That is the truth and the reality. This policy has continued for more than 60 years to threaten the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its nuclear capacity. That is the reality we are now facing on the Korean peninsula.

Unfortunately, the delegations of South Korea and Japan intentionally ignore these realities and truths and try to deal with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea without even mentioning the root cause of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula, treating the actions of the United States of America — I am sorry to say — as if they were blind, deaf and dumb.

The stance taken by Japan and South Korea on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula cannot help in the search for a lasting solution to the issue. That is

why the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly urges them to try to abandon their anachronistic stance on the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

As for the Six-Party Talks, it is our consistent position that the nuclear issue should be solved through diplomacy, including dialogue, negotiations and so on. The responsibility for the deadlock in the Six-Party Talks rests entirely with the United States and Japan, together with South Korea. To begin with, these three parties totally rejected the spirit of mutual respect and equality which is the lifeblood of the 19 September joint statement by denying the right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to use outer space for peaceful purposes. This right is guaranteed by international instruments, including the Outer Space Treaty.

The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula will come only when the United States abandons its hostile nuclear threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and when it can prove that it has done so through practical deeds, for example by concluding a peace agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, as proposed by our Government earlier this year.

Japan and South Korea would be well advised to refrain from any acts of war detrimental to the early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, supposing that they really want to see such early resumption of talks.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue to redouble its efforts to attain the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in the context of building a world without nuclear weapons on an equal footing with other parties to the Six-Party Talks.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.