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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Chair man: Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish) : I wish to extend a **warm welcome to the participants** in the United Nations disarmament **fellowship programme** for 1989, who I understand are doing part of their **studies in New York** and are attending this meeting. I trust that their presence in meetings of the First Committee will be of value to them.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 TO 69 and 151 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic) : First, permit me, Sir, on behalf of my delegation and in my own name, to convey to you - very briefly, of course - **warmest** congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Your highly appreciated activities over a long period, **both** in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and here in the **First Committee**, guarantee business-like and effective work by our **Committee**. **Our best wishes also go to the** Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur of the **Committee**, and I wish to take this opportunity to commend the dedicated and effective work of our Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Secretary of **our Committee**, Mr. Sohrab Kheradi. You may rest assured, **Sir**, of the constructive and active co-operation of my delegation.

We note with satisfaction that - in spite of tendencies to the contrary - positive trends clearly **continue** to develop in **world politics**, as was reflected in the general **debate** in the **General Assembly**, and as is being confirmed here in the **First Committee**. Much remains to be done, however, to make the incipient turn for the better in international relations irreversible, to eradicate old clichés and prejudices and to achieve tangible results when it comes to **ensuring lasting peace** and security in the world.

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

We welcome the agreement reached between the USSR and the United States to hold a summit meeting late in the spring or early in the summer of 1990 and the intensification of Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space issues, as well as of other bilateral discussions.

It is of great importance that it has finally become possible for talks on conventional disarmament and on security- and confidence-building measures in Europe to begin, as a result of the signature of the Concluding Document of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

We have great expectations with regard to the implementation of the decisions of the Ninth Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries in the disarmament field.

The Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the Canberra Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons helped strengthen the international consensus on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We thank the organizers of those conferences for their initiative.

The scope and intensity of the political dialogue for the achievement of mutually acceptable solutions to the problems of disarmament and detente have generally increased. The German Democratic Republic is promoting that process to the best of its abilities.

The fiftieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, which was unleashed by German fascism, reminds us anew of the lessons of history. In its now 40-year history the German Democratic Republic has always been true to its antifascist traditions and true to its commitment to do everything to ensure that never again will war begin on German soil, but only peace. Continued and concrete

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

efforts for international peace and security, arm limitation and disarmament were and remain at the core of my country's foreign policy.

Allow me to recall that as early as 1983, when international conditions were extremely complex, the German Democratic Republic called for dialogue and understanding and made a contribution of its own to bringing about the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty. It made a specific and constructive contribution to regional disarmament by advancing, With Czechoslovakia, its proposals for the creation of nuclear- and chemical-weapon-free zones and of a zone of security and confidence in Central Europe, and it is proving its readiness for disarmament by unilaterally reducing its armed forces and military spending.

Unilaterally and independent of negotiations, the German Democratic Republic will by next year have cut its armed forces by 10,000 troops, 600 tanks and 50 aircraft. Defence spending will be reduced by 10 per cent. A factory for dismantling tanks has been put into operation, even though specific experience has been gathered in arms conversion. The German Democratic Republic fully recognizes that more openness is required in the military field and confidence should be promoted. It participates in that effort through many activities. As Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer said in his statement to the General Assembly On 29 September, the German Democratic Republic will make use of the United Nations instrument for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and provide the available data as from 1990.

Along with the other Warsaw Treaty States the German Democratic Republic has further developed its programme of peace and disarmament. This includes the areas of European and international security and takes account of General Assembly

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

resolutions and initiatives by non-aligned and **Western States**. It is **and** will remain our aim **to** continue disarmament with determination and not to allow any hiatus to occur.

The **process** of arm limitation and disarmament **has been put** into motion and the first substantive results have been obtained. Nevertheless, it is **becoming clear** that there **are** still considerable obstacles in the **way** towards **liberating** the world from all **weapons** of mass destruction and **proceeding** to drastic reductions of armed forces and **armaments**. In general, negotiations are **being** held at too **slow** a pace. Now, as before, attempts are being made **to** exclude certain **categories** of weapons in order to obtain unilateral military advantages. The **large** potential of multilateral **negotiations** is not **being** used **sufficiently**. We must not allow multilateral disarmament negotiations to lag behind European or bilateral talks. The relationship **between** bilateral and multilateral **disarmament** efforts must be **strengthened**, as called for in General **Assembly** resolutions **43/75 E** and **43/77 B** and **43/78 E**.

In the view **of** the German Democratic Republic, it **is** necessary to strengthen the political factors of security and stability in all their aspects in order **to** advance the process of disarmament and to make it continuous and irreversible. When it **comes** to **security** matters the **emphasis** should be shifted from military to political **means**. A reasonable sufficiency of military potentials for defence purposes should **replace super** armament. It **is** not missiles that should be modernised but, rather, the security policies of nations. **Human** **sum** would thus be saved that could then be **used** for development purposes. That would be in line with the **appeal** in Article 26 of **the** Charter to promote the maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments **of** the world's human and economic resources, which in **turn** requires a comprehensive approach.

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

The **first steps** in that direction have **been** made. In **Europe** and **other regions** a **dialogue** is **now being** conducted on military doctrines and security **concepts**, which was also initiated **by** the **1982** report of the Independent **Commission on Disarmament** and **Security Issues - the Palme Commission** - and which was **stimulated by** United Nations studies on security **concepts** and **on the relationship between** disarmament and international secur **ity**. A recent example is the **symposium on non-offensive defence concepts** held **early** in **September** at the initiative of the United Nations Institute for **Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)** and the United States Association for the United Nations, which was attended **by representatives**, scientists and **scholars** from all **groups** of States, **We** believe that the time **has come** to extend that discussion and **to** involve the United Nations. **Discussion** of the **issue** in the world Organization would correspond **to the mandate** set forth in Articles 1 and 13 of the Charter, which call for the **United Nations to be a centre** for **harmonizing** the actions of nations in the attainment of international peace and secur **ity and** in the **promotion** of international co-operation in the political field .

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

It fills us with satisfaction to note that there is far-reaching agreement where the priorities of disarmament are concerned. Action must follow. What is important now is not to take any measures that would complicate the disarmament process or even give fresh impetus to the arms race. This is the decisive conclusion we draw from the duty to prevent nuclear war, and indeed my kind of war. Progress in the disarmament field is needed so as not to put in jeopardy what has been achieved. We therefore consider the following to be priority tasks.

First, the early conclusion of a treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on a 50 per cent reduction in their strategic offensive weapons while observing the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. The most recent negotiations between the Soviet and American Foreign Ministers have obviously paved the way for this. Further steps in nuclear disarmament remain on the agenda of bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

Secondly, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Parallel to the resumed Soviet-American talks and the measures announced for the coming into force of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, the Conference on Disarmament must finally be enabled to meet its responsibility in this field. This would also consolidate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The German Democratic Republic wishes to see the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons strengthen the Treaty and create favourable conditions for its extension. Furthermore, the German Democratic Republic supports the initiative by a group of non-aligned States to transform the Moscow Treaty of 1963 into a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban treaty and to convene, after thorough preparation, an amendment conference in accordance with the request by 41 parties to the Treaty. The discussion of the legal and verification aspects involved, using the expertise of the Conference on Disarmament, will give new impetus to the efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Zachmann, German,
Democratic Republic)

Thirdly, the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of **chemical weapons** as early as in 1990. The latest initiatives of the USSR and the United States **regarding measures** to be taken before and after the convention's conclusion are commendable. **Furthermore we welcome the broad agreement on the basic issues** of the convention, as reflected **in the rolling text**. Yet the negotiations are **still being stalled by unsettled** questions of detail and **by special positions**. **What is required now** are steps of a new quality, in order to make use of the political will declared at the Paris and Canberra Conferences and to **bring about the rapid conclusion** of the convention. With a view to the early conclusion of the **convention**, involving effective participation world wide, and in the interests of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, it must **be clear** that with the **entry into force of the convention**, at the latest, the production of chemical **weapons must be stopped**.

Fourthly, a drastic cut in armed forces and **armaments in Europe, combined** with the implementation of a new **generation of confidence- and security-building measures**. The rapid succession of constructive proposals by all the parties involved **brings the conclusion of the first accords within reach, although** we do not overlook **the remaining obstacles**. The German Democratic Republic **is in favour of agreements** that fix equal collective **ceilings** for the number **of troops** and also for the main **categories** of armaments in Europe as a whole as well as in its various **regions**.

The **Step-by-step** fulfilment of these priority **tasks** will result in a **corresponding** reduction in **military expenditures, thus releasing resources that the countries concerned, and in particular the developing countries, need ever more urgently for their economic and social development**.

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

Furthermore, the German **Democratic Republic** also resolutely **supports** the **implementation** of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean **as** a Zone of **Peace** and the convocation **of** the pertinent conference, to be held in Colombo next **year**. **We** **welcome** the sustained constructive efforts for the creation of a zone **of** peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic region. Likewise, **we are paying great attention** to the activities undertaken by the South Pacific Forum to implement the **Rarotonga Treaty**.

I shall **now** make some remarks **regarding** the Vienna **negotiations**. They are of particular importance for the German Democratic **Republic** as a **country** situated at the sensitive divide between the two military alliances. Detailed **studies** carried out by members of the **Scientific Council for Peace Research** in the German Democratic Republic have **shown** that because **of** the close relationship between nuclear and conventional **armed forces** and the **existing high degree** of **industrialization**, in particular in the nuclear and chemical **industries**, any military conflict in Europe would **lead** to an **escalating** catastrophe that in the end would be **impossible** to contain. Certainly, no further explanation is necessary **regarding** the regional and global **consequences***

Bearing this in mind, the German Democratic Republic, together with the other States Parties **to** the Warsaw Treaty, is making an active contribution to the Vienna **negotiations**. An agreement on drastic reductions in **those** weapons **that can** be used for surprise attacks is **now** a matter of priority. This applies especially to **fighter aircraft, attack** helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery **systems**. Their reduction has to be coupled with a reduction in armed forces personnel. The readiness **of** member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization **now to** negotiate on all proposed weapons **categories** is to be

(Mr. Lachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

welcomed. The offer made in April 1989 by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to start separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual-capability weapons, is now, as before, on the table. That issue remains a question of the greatest interest for my country, as it is one of the parties directly involved.

This session of the First Committee faces great tasks. My delegation will endeavour to have a constructive share in their fulfilment. This year too the German Democratic Republic will act to help bring about General Assembly resolutions aiming at the prevention of nuclear war - for instance through assumption of the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons - and nuclear disarmament. We reaffirm the proposal to elaborate, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, principles for nuclear disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament.

As I mentioned at the outset, we believe that the time has come to intensify the discussion, within the framework of the United Nations, of the creation of defensive military structures and co-operative security concepts. My delegation is very much interested in conducting appropriate consultations with other delegations. In the light of the first disarmament steps, both agreed and unilateral, the issue of armaments conversion is gaining in importance.

(Mr. Bachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

There too the United Nations could promote an exchange of views and valuable experiences. My delegation, will actively support initiatives in that direction. We believe also that the time has come to discuss the use of science and technology for disarmament purposes, such as armaments conversion and verification, and to adopt appropriate measures. Of fundamental importance is the complex examination of the impact of scientific and technological developments on international security, in keeping with General Assembly resolution 43/77 A, which we strongly support.

The progress the United Nations has achieved most recently in the settlement of conflicts and the maintenance of peace has met with broad international appreciation. Comparable progress in the multilateral disarmament process has still to be made. That state of affairs should prompt us to examine further the role of the United Nations in the disarmament process, in the light also of the experience gained at the three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The German Democratic Republic supports all efforts to expand and strengthen the activities of the Organization along the following lines.

First, the United Nations should promote the disarmament process through a comprehensive dialogue on fundamental issues of disarmament and security and should give fresh impetus to ongoing negotiations, in particular at the Conference on Disarmament, through concrete recommendations and tasks. With the Disarmament Commission and this Committee, along with the other subsidiary bodies, the Organization has the mechanisms we need. It is necessary that those bodies make full use of their mandates. We are in favour of continuing the tradition of disarmament decades by adopting a short and substantive declaration of the 1990s as the third disarmament decade. The need for such action has not become less urgent.

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

Secondly, we consider the United Nations as an important clearing-house for ideas and information on disarmament matters. That function becomes even more significant with the emergence of new areas of multilateral disarmament such as the impact of new technologies on the arms race, arms conversion, multilateral verification, the limitation of the naval arms race, and problem of comprehensive and conventional disarmament, including the reduction of the arms trade. What is needed, after all, is to identify areas ready for negotiation and to strive for agreements.

Thirdly, the Organization could have a greater share in the practical implementation of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. In that context, we welcome the activities of the Secretary-General. Drawing on the experience of other bodies - for instance the International Atomic Energy Agency - the United Nations, as a representative of the international community, could in future play a considerably greater role in the area of verification.

The work done in the Department for Disarmament Affairs under the guidance of its Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, merits our great respect. With limited resources the Department accomplishes an enormous volume of work, including that connected with the World Disarmament Campaign.

This morning I have made some general remarks. As the debate progresses, my delegation will speak again on a number of specific items on our agenda.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): "The stone-deaf mute began thus to describe
the worst sound he had heard:

'You could not hear it.

Yes, just before my eardrums burst apart

the last sound came - a sigh of surging reeds -

when the Phototurb burned and blasted Dourisburg.'

'You could not hear it,' whispered the deaf mute,

'My ear was not in time to hear

when souls were torn apart

and bodies hurled away

as six square miles of townland twisted

themselves inside out

as the Phototurb destroyed

the mighty town which once was Dourisburg.'"

Thus wrote the late Swedish poet and Nobel laureate Harry Martinson in his
visionary epio Aniara, conceived in the years following Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A week ago I returned from my second visit to Hiroshima, now again a blooming
city, though with unbearable memories. A week ago, the 1985 Nobel peace-laureate
organization, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, gathered
at their world conference. They appealed from the hypocentre in Hiroshima for an
immediate cessation of all nuclear testing, for a permanent halt to the production
of bomb-grade fissile material and for the conversion of secret weapons
laboratories to open scientific institutes, redirected to address environmental
problems.

(Mrs. Theor in, Sweden)

Since the first - and so far only - nuclear weapons to be used with direct, hostile intent were exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki 44 years ago we have experienced periods characterized by tension and mistrust. But in the past few years we have seen a remarkable transformation on the international scene. We have seen dramatic unilateral disarmament initiatives. We have also witnessed significant progress in the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers. I hope we are soon going to see the favourable international climate vitalise the multilateral disarmament process.

The so-called window of vulnerability appears to be forgotten. But are we now merely facing a temporary window of opportunity, or are we rather witnessing a historic break with the past? There are indications that the latter is the case.

Let us not underestimate the potential in present developments, in what appears to be a fundamental change in super-Power relations, but let us not unduly simplify the complex, disregard the sensitive, or overlook the difficult.

Behind us lies the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - in front of us the much more intricate issue of strategic weapons.

Hitherto the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) have not led to substantive results and have certainly not fulfilled the hopes of expediency that were prevalent a couple of years ago. But I expect that the recent signals from both sides, indicating a steady narrowing of the gap, will prove to be true.

So long as nuclear weapons continue to exist they remain the ultimate threat. In the last decade of the twentieth century, mankind must be relieved from the threat of nuclear war, from which no country and no individual could ever escape.

What mechanisms should be utilized to eliminate that threat? A complete ban on nuclear tests would constitute the most important measure for the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and must therefore be the highest priority for nuclear disarmament.

(Mrs. Theor in, Sweden)

Nevertheless, nuclear **tes ting con tinues**. It continues in defiance of the demand by an overwhelming majority of States **for an urgent halt to all nuclear tests**. It continues in defiance of widespread public concern about the **medical, environmental and other effects of such tests**. The **nuclear-weapon States continue to find technical and political excuses to justify persistent testing to improve the design of nuclear charges**.

I should like to **recall** that more than a quarter **Of** a century ago the **super-Powers, with the partial test-ban Treaty, gave expression to their determination to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time**. Five years **later**, in the non-proliferation Treaty, they **restated** their determination. They **declared** their intention **to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear-arms race**. They **undertook to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating to a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament**.

Today, 26 years after the partial test-ban Treaty and 21 years after the non-proliferation Treaty there are no negotiations on a comprehensive test ban.

The **goal of the international community is to verify that nuclear tests are no longer performed, not that the nuclear Powers be able to verify each other's nuclear tests**. The goal of the international **community is verified non-testing, not test control**.

To be perfectly clear, my criticism applies to all nuclear-weapon-States, whether or not they are parties to the partial test-ban Treaty or the non-proliferation Treaty,

My Government holds that multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty should be accorded the highest priority.

(Mrs. Theor in, Sweden)

It is **imperative, therefore**, that the intensive informal consultations that have **taken** place in the Conference on Disarmament this **year produce an agreed mandate for an ad hoc committee**. A comprehensive **t-t-ban Treaty** would be the **clearest** demonstration by the **nuclear-weapon Powers** of a **commitment** to take effective **measures** for the **cessation of the nuclear-arms race**.

The non-proliferation **Treaty** is the **major legal** instrument in the disarmament field, with **as many as 140 parties**. **Nevertheless**, a **significant** number Of States **have not** yet adhered to the Treaty.

The Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, which will take place **next year**, will be crucial to the future of the **Treaty** and the whole non-proliferation **regime**. Implementation of the Treaty **commitment8** since the latest Review Conference in 1985 **is** to be **followed UP**.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have all fulfilled their **comitments** under the non-proliferation Treaty, but the nuclear-weapon States **have** yet to live **up** to **their undertakinqs** in Article **VI**.

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermedia **te-Range** and Shor **ter-Range Missiles** - the INF Treaty - may be **reqarded** as a concrete step towards nuclear disarmament, **but** the **super-Powers** in particular have to **follow** up the Treaty with more substantial cuts in their arsenals, with a **view** to **ultimately eliminating** nuclear weapons **altogether**.

In order to ensure the continued viability of the non-proliferation **regime** and pave the way **for** 1995, the year the Treaty **is** to be extended, the nuclear-weapon **States** have to manifest concrete nuclear disarmament measures, in conformity with their non-proliferation **Treaty** undertaking to **negotiate** nuclear disarmament in good faith and at an early stage. The initiation of substantive work on a **comprehensive test-ban treaty** in the Conference on Disarmament, **pr lor** to next year 's Review Conference, is the very minimum to be expected in this **reqard**.

(Mrs. Theor in, Sweden)

Furthermore, Sweden **reiterates** its call upon the nuclear-weapon **States** to stop their **production** of **fissionable material for weapons purposes completely.**

We welcome the decision by the **Soviet Union to cease** the production of **highly enriched uranium for nuclear-weapons purposes** and to shut down two **reactors producing plutonium for nuclear weapons.** We also note that the **production of Plutonium and tritium for weapons has been discontinued in the United States.**

Today's favourable **political climate** should be **conducive to negotiating a out-off** - a definite stop of all **production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.** Such an **agreement** would be a **breakthrough** in endeavours to **bring the nuclear-arms race to an end.**

The twin processes of **arm reduction** and confidence-building are mutually **reinforcing** and closely interrelated.

In the European **context,** parallel **negotiations** on conventional disarmament and confidence- and **security-building** measures are **under way** in Vienna. **My Government** would have *preferred* to see the two negotiations integrated into **one, and we hope that in due course they will be merged.**

We **must never** allow **regional security** to be the **exclusive concern** of certain States or alliance³ only. **Nor must we separate** disarmament from the other **efforts** to build confidence and **security.**

By **adopting** resolution **43/75 G on objective information on military matters,** which commanded not only an **overwhelming** majority but also favourable votes by all five **nuclear-weapon States,** the General **Assembly** furthermore expressed the belief that balanced and objective information on all military **matters, in particular of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States,** would contribute to the building of confidence **among States.** Therefore, the nuclear-weapon **States, in**

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

particular, must honour this recommendation and consistently display openness and transparency in all areas of military activity,

Specifically, there is a dire need for more openness, transparency and confidence-building with regard to naval nuclear deployment. My Government does not a priori recognize a greater need for secrecy at sea than on land or in the air. The resistance in principle to greater openness at sea is a sign of fear. If a sanctuary of military secrecy of this kind is upheld, demands for openness in other military spheres will lose credibility. My Government firmly holds that this applies in both the conventional and the nuclear fields. It definitely applies to nuclear weapons.

As the President of the United States so eloquently stated in the General Assembly a few weeks ago,

“Openness is the enemy of mistrust, and every step towards a more open world is a step towards the new world we seek.” (A/44/PV.4, P. 57)

It is widely presumed that the risks of nuclear war by accident may be greater at sea than on land. There is now a growing international recognition that serious negotiations on naval disarmament are long overdue. At least every fourth nuclear weapon is earmarked for maritime deployment. Limitations on sea-borne nuclear missiles are urgently required.

An important step, as proposed by the Palme Commission and supported by my Government, would be to prohibit all nuclear weapons on all ships and submarines, other than those classes specifically designated by agreement, as an interim measure in anticipation of the complete denuclearization of naval forces. Such a ban should include all sea-launched cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

My Government has for many years stated that tactical nuclear weapons at sea should be brought ashore. Sweden, therefore, welcomes the decision by the United

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

State0 Navy unilaterally to phase out several types of tactical nuclear weapons deployed at sea, and urges the other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit.

As the former United States Secretary of the Navy recently stated, tactical nuclear weapons at sea are the product of a naive view of nuclear warfare that prevailed 30 years ago. The unavoidable conclusion is that there should be complete removal of all sea-based nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States,

The great number of tactical nuclear weapons on board warships is a cause of concern. One of the reasons is the policy pursued by nuclear-weapon States neither to confirm nor to deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board any particular ship at any particular time. This practice is a source of public concern in many countries, especially when warships of nuclear Powers, in accordance with international law, make use of their right to innocent passage through those countries' territorial waters or when they call at their ports.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The policy of neither **confirminq** nor **denying** does not build confidence **among** States. Instead, while naval **visits** are intended to **be** confidence-buildins, **that** practice in fact undermines confidence and should be abandoned. **How** can **nuclear-weapon** States reconcile the policy of neither **confirminq** nor denying with their **participation** in the unanimous General **Assembly** endorsement of the need for objective information on all military **matters**, in **Particular** from **nuclear-weapon States?**

The **high** seas are **part** of **our** **common** **heritage**. All **States**, **regardless** of the size of their **navies**, have a stake in **maintaininq** an **up-to-date** international **régime** of principle and rules guiding the conduct of naval units. The **legal régime** governing the freedom of the high seas **has**, however, not **fully** kept up with **developments** in the twentieth century. For **example**, current law of **sea** warfare, **datinq** from the turn of the century, need to **be** **modernized**. At **this** year's **session** of the Disarmament **Commission**, Sweden therefore presented a proposal for an updated protocol **concerninq** the **use** of **sea-mines**.

Furthermore, the inherent vulnerability of naval units is increased **by** the lack of **an** explicit and **mul**tilaterally accepted code of conduct for naval forces **exercising** in **close** proximity at sea. The need for and Potential of **such** a multilateral code is **shown** by the successful implementation of several bilateral **agreements** on the prevention of incidents at sea. **My** **Government** **calls** for negotiations on a multilateral **agreement** on the **prevention** of incidents at sea and **has** **proposed** that the Conference on Disarmament add that **matter** to **its** agenda.

So **long** as nuclear weapons continue to exist there **is** a risk that **they** will be used **aga**in. Therefore, **definitely** to prevent the risk of **nuclear** **war** all **nuclear weapons** **must** be eliminated. All **mechanisms** to attain nuclear disarmament **must** be **utilized**, along with normative **rules** and **legal** **instruments**.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It may be argued that a process of customary law is **emerging**. The Practice of the **nuclear-weapon** States has included, first and foremost, the actual **non-use of** nuclear weapons for **more** than 44 years. **By adhering** to the non-proliferation Treaty, **most** other States have explicitly agreed to refrain from the nuclear option **altogether**.

The major nuclear-weapon States themselves are central actors in the **process of delegitimizing nuclear weapons**: not only the use but ultimately also the **very** possession of nuclear weapons. The **most** widely acclaimed manifestation of this emerging norm was the **solemn** declaration by the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva in 1985 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. **Furthermore**, in their joint declaration of 8 January 1985 on their **agreement to commence negotiations on space and nuclear arms, both strategic and** intermediate-range, the United States and the Soviet Union **affirmed** that **ultimately those negotiations** should lead to the **complete** elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The time has **come to go** from words to deeds, **to demonstrate** that a nuclear war **must** never be fought. The time has **come** to examine the **modalities of prohibiting** in international law all use of nuclear weapons. The time has come to **take** decisive measures to ensure that nuclear weapons will **be completely** eliminated everywhere.

A couple of years ago the name of the town of Halabja was **engraved** in our collective **memory**. With the **gas attack** on innocent civilians - **men, women** and, not least, children - in Halabja, the world community was reminded of the horror of chemical warfare. **As** in Hiroshima, a large number of **victims were** children, **both** born and unborn.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

Chemical weapons can be eliminated only through a comprehensive convention banning those weapons. In order to prepare for a total ban, interim measures reducing existing stockpiles are welcome. Such measures will not, however, remove the threat posed by chemical weapons.

The Conference on Disarmament has made steady progress on the text of a comprehensive convention banning chemical weapons. However, when contrasted with the political commitment and sense of urgency conveyed by the 149 States that participated in the Paris Conference in January this year, the absence of a decisive breakthrough in those negotiations is disappointing.

My Government notes the declarations made in the General Assembly by the United States and the Soviet Union concerning reductions of their chemical arsenals. Sweden welcomes the progress made in the bilateral consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union concerning verification procedures and the order of destruction for existing stockpiles. That should facilitate the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

The recently concluded Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held in Canberra, displayed the valuable support of the international chemical industry for the urgent task before us and should add impetus to the negotiations in Geneva.

Expressed in the United Nations, in Paris and in Canberra, the political intent to rid the world of the chemical-arms menace must now be translated into tangible results at the forthcoming session of the Conference on Disarmament in the form of an accepted treaty text=

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

The Conference on Disarmament has decided that the chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Committee for chemical weapons during next year's session should be entrusted to Sweden's permanent ambassador for disarmament in Geneva. My Government will do its utmost to facilitate a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. Admittedly, there are still issues to be solved before a convention banning all chemical weapons can be concluded, but this is more a matter of political will than of technicalities. It is also, I might add, a matter of political credibility for all States concerned.

Between Hiroshima and Halabja there have been more than 150 so-called conventional wars and armed conflicts. The brutalization of warfare continues. Notwithstanding the application of highly advanced technologies, war remains grossly indiscriminate. In the First World War, civilians accounted for some 5 per cent of the casualties. Since then, the proportions have continuously shifted. By the time of the Viet Nam war, they were just about reversed. That means that most victims are often children: children stepping on trapped mines; children caught defenceless in air attacks; children wised to death; children even exploited as soldiers. Modern man appears to be waging war against children.

In order to rid the world of war we need both hearts and minds. In order to save the world for our children - those already born as well as those yet to be born - we must make use of all the talent, all the strength we can muster.

We must not limit ourselves only to the dry facts - the logic and reasoning of one half of our brains. We must also dare to mobilize the emotions, the dedication and the creativity of the other half of the brain. We owe this both to ourselves and to our future generations.

Mr. PEJIC (Yuqoelavia) : At the outset, Sir, I should like to congratulate you **most** warmly on **your well-deserved** election to the **office** of Chairman of the Committee. It **is a particular** pleasure for the Yuqoelav delegation to **see** you, an **outstanding** diplomat **from** friendly **non-aligned Venezuela**, guiding our work at **this year's session**. Your election **is also** a **great** tribute to your **exceptional political wisdom** and your **skill** and **knowledge** in the field of **disarmament**, and we are confident that you will **guide** our work very **effectively** **this year**.

Our congratulations go **also** to the other officers of the First **Committee**.

(Mr. Pejic, Yugoslavia)

we are also very pleased this year to see Mr. Akashi, the Under-Secretary-General, and Mr. Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, on the rostrum. That gives me an opportunity to thank them for their important contributions to our work.

The consideration of the question of disarmament at this session of the General Assembly has been influenced by important changes in international relations that, in their substance and scope, could bring about a turning-point in this most-armed of all times. The initial positive processes are being strengthened. That is evident, and welcome, from attempts to solve some long-standing regional problems, so-called hotbeds of crisis. New prospects are opening that we trust will usher in a more constructive era in international relations and bring about substantial progress in the field of disarmament.

As the most direct form of the negation of military might and its use in international relations, disarmament remains one of the key factors in the continuation and stabilization of recent positive developments. However, progress in international relations cannot be expected to last, much less to underpin, international security unless economic stability and development are ensured. Those problems, particularly the problem of the development of developing countries, will therefore have to be addressed by the international community as a priority in the years to come. In that context we particularly emphasize the multifold linkage between the two key problems of the present-day world, disarmament and development. There is no doubt that progress towards general and complete disarmament would open up new perspectives for the accelerated development of all.

From their first summit conference in Belgrade in 1961 to the most recent gathering in my country's capital last September the non-aligned countries have

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placed the question of diarmament at the oentre of their political activity. In so doing they have striven to make a constructive contribution to the process of disarmament, to atimulate dialogue between the super-Powers, to strengthen regional and multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament - in a word, to tranetorm the world divided by blocs and spheres of inf luenoe into a world in wh icn the interes ts of all its members will be respected and promoted. They have thus played their own part in the opening of the process now under way.

The monopoly the super-Powers and their allisnoes possess makes their responsibilities and obligations to br inq about general and complete diarmament of primary importance. Disarmament is not possible without neqotiations and agreements between them, which after all has been proved every so otten by developments in their relations. The extensive dialogue we have witnessed recently has produced the f irst subs tan tial agreement ever in the t ield of nuolear disarmament. Great expectations have been aroused that muet not be lett untulf illed. For that to happen, however, it is necessary that the Soviet Union and the United States speed up their neqotiations to eliminate the remaining nuclear arsenals. Yuqoslavia welcomes the onqoinq neqotiations on substantial reduction of the offensive strategic nuclear arms of the super-Powers and expects that they will be completed soon. At the same time it is neaeeeary to undertake appopr late measures to br inq about a comprehensive nuclear test-ban and prevent the extension of the arms race into outer space. To achieve those goals, however, other nuclear-weapon States should be brought to the neqotiating table, since those goals are unattainable without their participation.

The recent developments in international relatione echo, among other thinge, the repeated claims of the non-aligned oountriee, made over the long history of

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their coming together, that **disarmament** is one of the **key factors** in the **creation** of new relations of **trust** and **confidence** in the world. To make it genuine and functional, however, it is important that all countries be **included, in accordance** with their obligations and responsibilities. **Only** non-nuclear-weapon **States** cannot make an **equal contribution to the negotiations** on nuclear disarmament for the **very simple** reason that they **possess no nuclear weapons**. Yet, because of the **all-destructive** nature of those weapons, those **States** cannot be left out, either, and their voices should be heard and **respected**. In other **areas, however, such as** conventional **disarmament**, their role is indispensable and no solution **can** be achieved without their participation. It is therefore necessary that we give another chance to multilateralism in **this important area of international relations**.

As the only **institutionalized** international forum for universal co-operation the United **Nations** carries both exceptional **weight** and **responsibility** in international deliberations. Yuqoelavia is pleased to note that the awareness of the irreplaceable **role** of the United **Nations** is increasingly being **recognized** in the search for solutions to major **issues of international relations**. Disarmament, however, has **remained outside** recent **trends** to strengthen the **role** of the United **Nations, so** it is plausible to argue that the results of the consideration of questions of disarmament in the United **Nations** so far are not consistent with **those trends** and the **best interests** of all. It can even be **said** that the consideration of those **issues** in the United **Nations** is in a **state of stagnation**. That was **particularly** evident at the third special **session** of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, **as well as** during **this year's session** of the United **Nations** Disarmament **Commission**, where it proved impossible to surmount the **difficulties** that hampered our work in **this** field.

(Mr. Pejic, Yugoslavia)

It is my country's firm belief, however, that the fears of some about having major issues of disarmament considered in the world Organization are unjustified. There is no practical evidence that achievements in multilateralism have in any way been detrimental to bilateral or any other negotiations. On the contrary, each and every success in disarmament negotiations has always been fully supported in the United Nations.

In our assessment, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has today become increasingly important as the only multilateral negotiating body in that field that includes, among its 40 members, all nuclear-weapon States. We all should contribute to its full affirmation. Here also it is difficult for us to understand certain apprehensions that the consideration of the most important questions of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, could have harmful effects on bilateral negotiations. In the opinion of my delegation bilateral efforts would in that way only profit from wider support, encouragement and verification by a part of the international community. That would also reflect the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, the necessity of which is widely recognized. There is therefore no justification for further postponement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on the most important questions on its agenda, among which the total elimination of nuclear weapons remains the primary objective. Such attempts go against the grain of recent developments.

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban is one of the top priorities of today's negotiations in the field of disarmament. Envisaged as a logical continuation of the partial test-ban Treaty, the comprehensive nuclear-test ban figures as one of the main objectives of both multilateral and bilateral negotiations. Yugoslavia welcomes the readiness of the big Powers to negotiate on the ban, but it would like to see the Conference on Disarmament commence substantial negotiations in this area

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as soon as possible. As a sponsor of the initiative to hold a conference on amending the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, Yugoslavia is in favour of convening that conference as soon as possible in 1990, in accordance with the conclusions of the ninth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade last September.

(Mr. Pejic, Yugoslavia)

A **comprehensive** nuclear-test ban **is** not easy **to** achieve, but that **Conference** could **make a** welcome contribution to this end. Besides, it would bring all 116 **States parties** to the Treaty to the negotiating table for the first time and **have them discuss** the **comprehensive nuclear-test** ban. There **is** no need to **emphasize** that a **comprehensive** test-ban treaty would **greatly** contribute to the **strengthening** Of the **non-proliferation** Treaty.

In another **category** of weapons of **mass** destruction - chemical weapons - some concrete **progress** has been made in the Conference on Disarmament towards conclusion Of a **comprehensive** convention. In **this** context, **my** delegation welcomes the results of the Paris Conference and the useful **consideration** of the issue at the **Conference at** Canberra. It is our earnest hope **that**, in conjunction with the **recent** bilateral **understandings** between the Soviet Union and the United States, these conferences will help facilitate the conclusion of a **comprehensive** convention **on chemical weapons at an early date**. No interim **measures** on the non-proliferation of chemical weapons should, **however**, be **allowed** to divert us from **achieving** our goals, or dilute the recent momentum in respect of **agreement** on the need to eliminate **such** weapons once and for all.

Until recently, conventional disarmament has not **figured** prominently on the agendas **of** either multilateral or bilateral negotiations. Now, however, its **importance** has **increased**. The **arms** race in **this** area **is accelerating**. **Conventional weapons** are used in attacks against the integrity and independence **of** **countries** the **world over** on a **mass scale** and **account** for over 80 per cent of world military expenditure, since **money** and efforts are **not** spared on their **modernization**. This **gives** a new dimension to this problem, which **has** recently **assumed** **alarming** proportions. At their recent summit conference in **Belgrade**, the non-aligned countries have undertaken **to make** their own contribution to the

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initiation and realization of the process of conventional disarmament at the global, regional and subregional levels.

In this context, let me call attention to the successful completion of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), to which European non-aligned and neutral countries have made an important contribution. The Meeting has resulted in the opening of negotiations on conventional disarmament between NATO members and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty within CSCE as the first substantial multilateral negotiations on conventional armament and on confidence-building measures. We believe that the continuation of the current negotiations will result in appropriate agreements that, by their political and military implications, will have a favourable effect on relations in Europe, which has for years been the most heavily armed continent and the centre of ideological and military-political confrontation, and on relations throughout the world.

Despite our present hopes and optimism, much remains to be done. We need further progress and concrete results. If we fail to achieve them, if the present momentum is lost, what should have been a positive turning point in the field of disarmament might turn out to be just a temporary respite.

Let me therefore conclude my statement with yet another message from the Belgrade Summit:

“The world has the rare opportunity to expand and strengthen positive aspects of present-day relations. The prospects for disarmament need to be widened in scope and provide for all members of the United Nations to participate and accelerate the initiated process. The world of today needs realistic and constructive universal action in order to replace the arm race by competition in furthering common objectives which carry the promise of a safer future for all.”

(Mr. Pejic, Yugoslavia)

I have just concluded my traditional statement in the general debate but I should like to share an idea concerning the character of our debate. I feel, as of course we all feel, that the general debate in the First Committee, in which the countries Present their views, has for years played an exceptionally important role in achieving our goals. This debate should be continued, but I have a feeling - and this is just an idea - that we should probably give some thought to its character. It seems to me that we should try to make it more of a dialogue than a monologue, more an exchange of views on the most important issues before the United Nations. A really open exchange of views would, together with the presentation of countries' positions, better facilitate the progress we would like to achieve in seeing the United Nations as a central focal point for the solution of the problems of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish) : I consider the comment just made by the representative of Yugoslavia concerning the nature of our debate interesting. I am certain that delegations taking part in the proceedings of the First Committee will take his comments into account, and that we shall be able to exchange views on these proposals.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands) : First of all, I would like to congratulate you cordially, Mr. Chairman, on your election to the chairmanship of the Committee. My delegation's congratulations also go to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that your talents, your command of modern diplomacy, and your dynamic leadership will enable the First Committee to carry out its work in an excellent way. we enjoy working under your guidance.

The international political climate has been continuing to show a substantial improvement. In the words of the former President of the General Assembly, Mr. Dante Caputo, "conflict has yielded to dialogue". The Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization also refers to this encouraging and sustained

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trend. It is gratifying to note that the assistance of the world Organization is being sought more than ever before. Undeniably, many parts of the world are still afflicted by tension and conflict, but the overall trend is auspicious. Events in Namibia, for example, or in the conflict between Iran and Iraq demonstrate the potential for positive and fruitful action by the United Nations.

The momentous changes taking place in certain parts of Eastern Europe are leading towards greater openness and transparency, and are thus helping to dispel the climate of fear and distrust. East-West relations are more promising than they have been since the Second World War. The ongoing dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union is producing substantial results in the field of arms control, inter alia as we can see from the recent bilateral consultations at the ministerial level in Wyoming. To quote from the joint statement on United States-Soviet relations, "...openness and co-operation increasingly replace mistrust and competition".

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

The Ambassador of France, speaking on behalf of the Twelve Member States Of the European Communities, outlined our arms-control and disarmament policies. My delegation whole-heartedly endorses Ambassador Morel's intervention.

My intention now is to consider the consequences of an improved international climate for priorities in the arms-control process. I shall then consider the general implications, and finally, against that background, I shall examine a few issues which we consider to be of particular importance - nuclear-arms reductions, conventional stability, confidence-building, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons.

Over the years efforts have been made to find ways of reducing tension, improving security, and achieving greater political stability. Various solutions have been formulated, some of which are still valid today; in the reality of our own time. A good example is the Zorin-McCloy Agreement of September 1961, which formed the basis for the establishment of the organizations which preceded the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and which signalled a new beginning for the arms-control process.

The Agreement provides an example of what in those years could be considered to be innovative thinking. I should like to quote the following passage from it to illustrate this point:

"To implement control over and inspection of disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organisation and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification". (A/4879, principle 6)

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Nether lands)

Today, while we have abandoned the international disarmament organization in favour of treaty-specific verification, the principle of verification - and even intrusive verification - has become generally accepted as one of the prerequisites for arms control. A study is to be concluded in the near future to determine what the United Nations can contribute in this field. The progress that has been made shows that our efforts can indeed yield fruit.

Numerous developments have taken place since 1961, and a more realistic and pragmatic approach has gradually helped transform these once abstract ideas into effective arms-control measures. In the 1960s the international community sought refuge from the fear of armed conflict and nuclear war in a belief in concepts of security which contained the promise of a non-violent and peaceful world. Unfortunately, however, the impressive nature of the debate all too often masked the fact that no real arms control, let alone disarmament, was achieved. Many States relied on others to bear the brunt of arms reductions, instead of seeking common ground and making mutual concessions.

Although some continue to adhere to these broad political concepts, the arms-control process has evolved differently. Trust and security can be based only on verifiable actions and deeds, in a step-by-step process.

Bold measures can indeed be taken, but they should be carefully studied and prepared. A diversified, gradual and more direct approach proved to be more successful, as it addressed specific issues relating to particular armaments and military forces, whether on a bilateral, regional or global basis. In the recent past this receptiveness to change has emerged in the East-West context and in various regions of the world. We have witnessed the inception of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT) and the non-proliferation Treaty.

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More recently a start was made on dismantling intermediate-range nuclear forces, while an agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons should be reached soon. Much more can be expected in the near future. Specific arrangements are being made to reduce conventional forces and armaments in Europe, while military confidence- and security-building measures are being implemented, and their scope is likely to be further expanded. Chemical weapons will, it is hoped, soon be banned completely and for ever.

Agreements have also been concluded which are designed to prevent minor incidents from leading to large-scale conflict. Particularly inhumane methods of waging war have been abolished. I would refer in this connection to the Environmental Modification Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention and the so-called dirty-weapons Treaty. Nuclear weapons have been banned from the sea-bed and outer space. The nuclear environment has been stabilized by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and nuclear-weapon-free zones have been established where appropriate. The time has now come to concentrate our efforts on identifying measures in arms control and, above all, to achieve significant reductions: real disarmament.

Agreements on arms control and disarmament are, in themselves, not enough. They must be based on verifiable treaty provisions. Verification is essential in order to foster confidence and, consequently, the courage needed to proceed further. In East-West relations and in certain negotiating forums strict and effective international control has become the accepted standard practice, and in some cases inspectors are granted:

"unrestricted access without veto to all places, as necessary for the purpose of effective verification". (ibid.)

This has paved the way for arms control and disarmament measures which were inconceivable at a time when some States still considered national technical means

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of verification **as** the only means **of** verification, and when **most others** did **not** even have **those means** at all,

Effective verification made it **possible** for the **first time to** monitor the **dismantling** of nuclear-weapon **systems**, as the Treaty on the **Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short ~~ter~~-Range Missiles - INF Treaty** has shown. **Effective** verification will also provide the basis for a **chemical weapons convention** and for the **reduction of conventional arms**. We are on the brink of a **new era of increasing arms control**. As the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs stated this year on **28 September**, when **addressing** the **General Assembly**

"**Real disarmament, such** as we could only dream of **at the beginning** of this **decade, is now beginning to materialize.**" (A/44/PV.11, p. 61)

What general conclusions can be drawn?

First, arms control agreements must be **specific** and **effectively** verifiable.

No Government will accept new **security arrangements** solely on the basis of **trust**.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Secondly, the reduction of nuclear and conventional arm is not an end in itself. What we want is to eliminate destabilizing capabilities and create a secure, stable balance of forces at lower levels. In Western Europe this goal is apparent from our position in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Those negotiations will, we hope, produce a stable balance of that nature, one that takes account of vital security considerations. That means that, in our case, security in the foreseeable future will depend on an appropriate combination of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, disarmament negotiations should address those factors that in their interrelationship make up the body of our security policy. The various rounds of negotiation in Vienna on conventional disarmament in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures are crucial to our security, and hopefully will result in more openness and transparency with regard to the military situation and provide for greater security with fewer and more equitably distributed armaments. The talks on conventional forces in Europe will in turn open up negotiations on strategic-nuclear-force missiles, which are likewise intended to achieve equal and verifiable levels.

A fourth conclusion is that although nuclear weapons have played an essential role in maintaining our security, that would not necessarily be the case in other parts of the world. Post-Second-World-War Europe is different from other parts of the world. Regional conflicts follow their own patterns and imperatives, which differ from those in Europe. The security measures we have adopted would have no bearing on the causes of conflict in other parts of the world and would consequently not serve to increase security in those other areas. The same applies to nuclear weapons, which could have a destabilizing effect if introduced in to areas where they were hitherto absent.

(Mr. Waagenmakers, Nether lands)

If regional **security** is to be **increased** and regional conflicts **solved**, the underlying **causes** of tension and conflict **must** be addressed, **Weapons are often the symptom** rather than the **cause of armed** conflict. If nuclear weapons **have** indeed **served as a** deterrent, they have **only** done so in the **specific context of** East-West relations. It **is** undeniably **true** that the **fewer** nuclear weapons there are and the fewer the **States** that possess them, the more **secure** the world will be. On the other hand, it **is** not **true** that **nuclear weapons in themselves** are the **cause of tension or** anxiety, That **is borne out when** we consider the **millions of casualties** in the many **conflicts that** have been fought with conventional **arms since the Second World War**. In that connection I fully **endorse** what was said just a moment ago by the Ambassador of Yugoslavia. Regional conflicts unfortunately continue **today**, even **though** the situation **is expected to** improve,

We **are** not denying the fact that nuclear weapons entail **risks**. However, we **favour a Copernican denial of** the **exclusive centrality** of **nuclear** weapons in the arms-control process. The issue **of** nuclear weapons must be seen in the **broader context** of their interrelationship with conventional **arms**,

A fifth conclusion is that the prevention **of war in general** and the verification of arms-control and **disarmament agreements in particular constitute a specific field of expertise**. A new discipline is **emerging** that in the future may enable security arrangements to be inspected, sometimes on a **world-wide scale**.

It is for that **reason that** the Netherlands **acknowledges** that the United Nations could play a **significant** role in the field of **verification**, particularly **as regards** multilateral treaties, if the parties so desire. **We are eagerly awaiting** the report that the working party set **up** by the Secretary-General will submit to the **General Assembly** next year. That **group**, ably led **by** its Canadian chairman, seems to be making excellent **progress**.

(Mr. Waqenmakprs, Nether lands)

The fact that verification procedures are beset by a range of technical difficulties is apparent, for example, from the detailed provisions in the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - as well as from the intensity of the negotiations on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament and the bilateral nuclear and space talks. The issues under debate in the American-Soviet nuclear and space talks are extremely complicated precisely because both States are fully aware that agreements must be thoroughly verifiable. An agreement on strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of a 50 per cent reduction in nuclear arsenals would certainly be a most powerful boost to security throughout the world. It is gratifying to know that a START treaty can now be achieved and implemented without first having to reach a defence and space agreement. It is equally encouraging that issues concerning cruise missiles and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles no longer stand in the way of a START agreement.

I should like to say a few words on a number of specific issues. Notwithstanding the existence of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, biological weapons still constitute an increasing threat, particularly in view of the fact that present-day civil technology makes it more and more easy to produce biological weapons. This is a very serious development. The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the biological-weapons Convention will be held in 1991. In view of the dangers posed by the renewed and growing interest in biological weapons as an acceptable means of warfare, we submit that efforts should be made at an early stage to seek more effective ways of enforcing the provisions of the Convention or of extending the scope of the Convention itself. The Review Conference could decide to broaden earlier agreed confidence-building measures

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while **encouraging** more universal **adherence** to the Convention. **Various issues** relating to potential negotiations on a **verification protocol** should **also be** looked **at**. **Together with the Austrian and Australian delegations** we will submit a draft resolution on **biological** weapons in general, **as well as on the 1991 Review Conference** in particular. We hope that that draft resolution will **meet with consensus**.

This year the negotiations on **chemical** weapons have **been put into overdrive**, first **by the Paris Conference**, then by the redoubling of **our** efforts in the **negotiations** in Geneva and, finally, by the **successful Conference** in Canberra. Both Governments **and industry** are **now** committed **to** conclude a **chemical-weapons convention** as **soon as possible**. Together with the results of the bilateral **negotiations** we have a **basis** to start the long and undoubtedly intensive final **sprint** toward⁸ the **achievement** of **such** a convention. We must **organize** ourselves well for this final phase in the negotiations, **For example**, we **should** make a **clear** distinction **between** the negotiations on the convention itself and the preparatory work that **is** needed to implement the convention after its entry **into** force.

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The next **intersessional** talks should result in a draft of a rather **short convention**, with the necessary details included in a number of annexes. Next year we should concentrate on resolving the relatively few important issues remaining before we can finalize the convention, such as challenge and ad hoc verification, order of destruction, assistance and a number of legal and institutional problems. We must avoid getting bogged down in details. It will be unavoidable, indeed a litmus test for confidence in the convention, to leave details to be solved by the Preparatory Commission, and later by the Director General of the Technical Secretariat under the guidance of the Executive Council.

Certain issues relevant to the implementation of the convention should be studied now, such as the necessary verification instrumentation that still has to be developed. For such specific issues it seems useful to set up a few open-ended expert panels, where relevant with industry. To support this often technical work, a small expert team needs to be engaged in the Conference on Disarmament Secretariat in the coming years as a forerunner of the staff of the Preparatory Commission and the Technical Secretariat,

If we really want to conclude the negotiations in the next year or two, we should adopt an ad hoc meeting schedule for the chemical weapons negotiations: sessions of, say, eight weeks, with four-week intervals for obtaining fresh information. The negotiations should continue during the General Assembly to avoid losing precious time, as happened during the final spurt towards the non-proliferation Treaty in 1967. Of course, we realize that these proposals mean a change in established practice. My answer to that is: so what?

We warmly welcome the outcome of the recent bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons. The success of those talks will undoubtedly act as a catalyst for the negotiations in Geneva. The agreed bilateral data exchange and verification measures will be an essential element in

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strengthening confidence in the future convention. Indeed, the proposal by President Bush for a radical reduction in chemical weapons even before the entry into force of the convention, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's positive response, should serve as an example to others. If the United States and the Soviet Union were to reduce their stockpiles ahead of a convention, this would have a most reassuring effect on States that do not possess chemical weapons. It is our strong desire that the process of destruction of chemical weapons stocks be initiated by all concerned.

The progress made both bilaterally and in the Conference on Disarmament raises again the question whether the foreseen destruction period of ten years cannot be shortened, thus enabling the world to get rid of all chemical weapons around the year 2000. It raises also the question how to get as many States as possible, including States that possess or could possess chemical weapons, to join the convention. Various proposals have been made on this score. My delegation submits that a solution needs to offer the prospect of a convention that enhances the security of all States, that is truly global, and that includes a total ban on the production of chemical weapons after the entry into force of the convention.

An issue of immediate concern is the involvement of non-members of the Conference on Disarmament in the chemical weapons negotiations. The Paris Conference clearly and unequivocally stated that "any State wishing to contribute to these negotiations should be able to do so". This was a consensus statement and we should not - we must not - destroy this consensus in practice by objecting to the participation of States that wish to join. It is the underlying and inescapable premise of the arms control process that one negotiates about security because one feels threatened, not because one feels secure. Excluding States from

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the negotiations, **especially** in potential **conflict areas**, **runs counter to** the goal Of **achieving** universal adherence to the convention **and** thus has a **direct bearing** on the security of all.

To **use sporting phraseology**, we must **now** prepare **ourselves** to come into the home stretch **for** a chemical weapons convention. In this collective **endeavour**, **intellectual ingenuity** and steadfastness of **purpose** are required, The Netherlands is prepared to contribute its share in both. **We** have **redoubled** our **efforts in** terms of manpower - **or** should I say **person-power** - in the Conference on Disarmament delegation, which has **recently been** expanded.

We will also have to tackle the question where to locate the institution that would supervise the implementation of the convention. **on this subject, may I be allowed** to remind delegations of the offer that the **Netherlands** Minister for Foreign **Affairs** made in his address to the General **Assembly** at its third **special** session devoted to disarmament, on 1 June **1988**, namely that the Netherlands is ready to host the **institutions** to be **set** up under the convention, we will shortly elaborate this offer in **more concrete terms**.

So far, the **preparation** of the Fourth Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty has been **successful**. In the view **of** the Netherlands, **promoting** the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remains essential if we **are** to achieve a more secure world, and it is a **corner-stone** of our **security policy**.

Of course, the enforcement of treaty provisions can be **improved, but we should** not close **our eyes to** the **progress** that has been made since the last Review Conference, in 1985, **such** as the achievements in the field of nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union, or the **INF** Treaty, about which much has already been said. We Look forward to further **agreements in** due course, and in **particular**, we hope that an agreement on START will be signed at the next Soviet-United States summit meeting.

(Mr. Wagenvoort, Netherlands)

An issue that directly **concerns** the security of **each** and every **one of us is** the application of nuclear **safeguards** to ensure **that no fissile** material is diverted for military **purposes**. The International Atomic **Energy Agency** (IAEA) is **doing** satisfactory work in applying nuclear safeguards, and we would urge those who **have** not done so to conclude **agreements** with **IAEA**. **Eventually, when time and** Circumstances **permit**, safeguards should **be** applied universally. **Safeguards are** essential too for the promotion **of** peaceful nuclear **co-operation**. **We** see no reason at all to regard as **discriminatory** the requirement **that** peaceful nuclear co-operation should take place under the proviso of applying **safeguards**: they improve **security** for everyone. While safeguards can **be** applied on the **basis of** other agreements, the Netherlands has a distinct preference **for** the **full-scope** safeguards situation under the NPT. We would **urge** those **States that are not** parties to the Treaty to reconsider their position. The **opportunity exists, and** the Fourth Review Conference should **persuade every State** that its security interests are better served by **acceding** to the Treaty.

(Mr. Waqenmakers, Nether lands)

Security is threatened not only by the proliferation of nuclear materials but also by their means of delivery. We note the interest expressed by the Soviet Union in achieving, together with the United States, more effective control over the Proliferation of missiles and associated technology for military uses. We sincerely hope that effort will be productive so as to enable others to follow suit.

Some progress has been achieved in the field of nuclear testing, and more steps seem possible. I refer here, inter alia, to the Wyoming joint statement of 23 September. The verification protocols of the peaceful-nuclear-explosions and threshold-test-ban Treaties are likely to be concluded very soon now, and ratification is on the agenda for 1990, we hope before the review conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Netherlands expects the United States and the Soviet Union to seek further limits on testing in conjunction with the process of actual reductions in nuclear weapons. As things stand, that step-by-step process leading to a comprehensive test ban seems to offer more fruitful prospects than do political gestures such as the amending conference of the partial test-ban Treaty. We hope that here too realism will prevail.

At the same time, the Conference on Disarmament should take up its work on such concrete matters as the verification provisions for the multilateral test-ban Treaty, in compliance with the commitment undertaken by the nuclear Powers in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. Those commitments remain fully valid.

The Netherlands Government's views on nuclear-weapon-free zones are well known. One of the essential requirements for such a zone is that arrangements must be freely arrived at in negotiations between the States directly concerned in the region. We noted that this requirement was not clearly focused upon in last

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Nether lands)

year's resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Therefore, we hope that prerequisite will be adequately reflected in the Secretary-General's study on the subject commissioned for next Year.

There is also an unsatisfactory situation concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Past General Assembly resolutions have appealed to France not to delay ratification of protocol I of the Treaty. Another difficulty is the fact that not all Latin American States are themselves full parties to the Treaty. As a result, its zone of application has not yet been fully established. The pertinent draft resolution to be submitted to the First Committee this year could reflect that situation by making a balanced appeal to the States concerned.

The question of arms transfers continues to receive priority, and rightly so in view of the vast sums of money involved in arms expenditure in both industrialized and developing countries. Last year's resolution on arms transfers should be considered as a modest first step towards greater openness and transparency in world-wide arms transfers, including the problem of the illicit arms trade. The Netherlands looks forward with keen interest to the outcome of the study, which might open the way to stricter control world-wide by nations of their export policies.

As to outer space, my delegation acknowledges the realities. Those realities are basically twofold: there is an arms-control régime in existence, consisting of the outer space Treaty and other agreements; and, secondly, further measures will depend very much upon the bilateral efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, we would favour a discussion - hopefully more productive than has been the case this year - in the Conference on Disarmament on what can be done multilaterally further to enhance stability and fill the gaps in the régime. Rules of the road for satellites and other confidence-building measures might well be worth discussing in depth.

(Mr. Wagenvoort, Netherlands)

If I have mentioned only a few **subjects specifically, this should certainly not be seen as a lack of political interest in other issues.** It has been the central theme of my intervention today that the **inescapable** requirement for **successful** bilateral and multilateral **arms control** is the need to be **practical and realistic**, and to **concentrate on specific subjects.** Only **tangible results which serve security** will win the confidence of the **nations** we represent. The **Netherlands sincerely hopes** the **First Committee's** work **this year** will **reflect such realism.**

I might **add** that in *that* context I feel **very much encouraged** by the final **comments of the Ambassador of Yugoslavia.**

Mr. BELONOGOV (Union of **Soviet Socialist Republics**) (interpretation from **Russian**): I wish **first** of all on behalf of the delegation of the USSR to convey **my** heartfelt **congratulations** to **Ambassador Taylhardat** on **his election** to the important post of **Chairman of the First Committee.** We shall do **everything** to support **him** in **his** efforts to **promote meaningful and constructive dialogue**, the need for which he **so** **forcefully and eloquently described in his** opening statement.

The **Soviet Delegation** also **greet**s the **Vice-Chairmen; the Rapporteur; the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Akaishi; and the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Komatina,** who are with **us** in **this** **Conference Room** today.

This year our discussion of key **disarmament and security problems** is being conducted in a **particularly propitious** international **political atmosphere.**

The **international** community has reached a **turning-point; it can now put behind it the cold war,** along with the **perception** of international relations **as** an arena of conflict, which nourished it. We are **witnessing the emergence of an** entirely new model of international relations, which are **becoming demilitarized, democratic and humanized;** before our **very eyes, this is changing** traditional approaches to national **and** International security.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

New unprecedented opportunities are presenting themselves to the world community, but they must be seized and translated into tangible material guarantees of universal security and platforms for wide-ranging interaction.

That is why it appears that the task of collectively seeking ways and means of shaping a new model of international security has moved to centre-stage in the work of the United Nations and has become the main theme at the present session. It is all the more important to study the theoretical and practical aspects of this task on the basis of joint efforts by States Members of the Organization, since a large number of countries have already addressed it in practical terms at the national level,

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

As for the Soviet Union, the principles of Soviet foreign policy, approved by the First Congress of People's Deputies, define the country's national security as part and parcel of overall and equal security, and emphasize that it must be ensured above all by political means, while relying on the prestige and potential of the United Nations. Together with the other Warsaw Treaty member States, the Soviet Union has firmly embarked on restructuring its military policies in line with the principles of non-offensive defence and reasonable efficiency.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries is active in advancing promising initiatives designed to find mutually acceptable solutions to key problems. The countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are also proposing more realistic ideas and assessments. There is a greater readiness amongst them to take a fresh look at some of their positions that had until only recently been regarded as immutable.

Soviet-United States relations are becoming a major factor in improving and stabilizing the international climate. It is no secret that the status of these relations is often viewed as indicative of the sentiments prevailing in world politics. Today it indicates a transition from mutual understanding to interaction. The significance of this transition, as evidenced by the Wyoming meeting, goes far beyond the framework of Soviet-United States co-operation to co-operation in all areas - East-West, North-South and global.

We believe that these trends should be encouraged in every way in order to promote joint progress, which, on the basis of common agreement, must be translated into negotiating forms. The United Nations could be the driving force behind this process, since it embodies and at the same time mobilizes the collective intellect of the international community. Intellect, as Kant put it, is a faculty providing us with principles of a priori knowledge. Thanks to this faculty, the international community knows that a world free from mutual suspicion, intolerance,

(Mr. Belonoqov, USSR)

the **risk** of self-destruction and **outdated** policies of violence will have an **immeasurably greater** potential for **progress** and prosperity and for **satisfying** the intellectual and material needs of man and society.

A Priori knowledge, wisdom and vision underlie the international community's ideals, enshrined in the United Nations Charter. That knowledge enables us to **predict with accuracy**, for example, the catastrophic consequences of nuclear war. However, it does **not** free us from the risk of its outbreak nor from relapses into **thinking** of the use of military force, nor from the age-old reflex action of **ensuring** our protection against a threat by the shield of arms. In order to **bridge** the gap between ideals and reality, to get over a morass of suspicions and set out on a firm path of confidence, specific actions are **required, conforming** to the new realities of the dawning period of peace.

We see **these** realities in nuclear disarmament, which began after the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - had entered into **force**; in the negotiating efforts to reach agreement on 50 per cent reductions in Soviet and United States **strategic** offensive arms; in a **stepped-up** search for a solution to the **nuclear-testing** problem; in emerging outlines of a convention to **ban** chemical arms; and in the business-like attitude of the **participants** in the negotiations on conventional forces and **confidence-building** measures in Europe. Soviet-Chinese relations have also been **largely** instrumental in **bringing** about changes for the better.

It is important that our **dialogue** assume the form of a specific **search** for new security structures resting on confidence and the desire to lower the levels of military confrontation. Given the **eager** exchange of views on ways to build a **common** European home, with the United Kingdom and France **participating** actively, one can say that the permanent members of the **Security** Council have reached an

(Mr. Belonoqov, USSR)

improved understanding, which helps realise the ideals inherent in the Charter. The list of positive realities could be extended, In our view, the important thing is that they all demonstrate the emergence of solid structures for overall security. We regard this as a good basis for a substantive discussion in the United Nations on the parameters of a new international security model.

This foundation was also laid in the discussion, which was full of interesting, **unorthodox and fresh ideas, on a comprehensive approach to enhancing international security, a discussion which has been going on at the United Nations since the forty-first session of the General Assembly. The discussion, widening in scope and combining theoretical inquiry and a business-like and substantive analysis of specific questions calling for multilateral examination and solutions, enables us to focus today on those areas of military and political security in which a solid groundwork has either been laid or is being laid. We are convinced that our dialogue on a comprehensive approach to international security will continue to promote mutual accommodation as we switch over from thinking based on power to the power of thinking.**

For objective reasons, so far it has been mainly the Soviet Union and the United States that have been discussing specific and practical aspects of the key element of the new security model - nuclear disarmament. However, as the disarmament process unfolds, it will probably be an increasingly international effort. Even today no one doubts that the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles not only enhances the security of the Soviet Union and the United States but also enhances overall security and promotes relations of confidence among all States. Many countries and the international community as a whole have made their contribution to this historic agreement, along with the Soviet Union and the United States. More radical steps that will follow to bring

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

about deep cuts and, ultimately, the elimination of nuclear weapons will require not only political support but also specific efforts by all States to internationalize the dialogue and negotiating processes and to promote policies of confidence.

As is well known, there are two different approaches to nuclear disarmament today. On the one hand, there is a desire to take the process to its logical conclusion - to eliminate nuclear potential altogether. On the other, an understanding of the risk inherent in excessive nuclear arms coexists with a desire to preserve them as a security guarantee on a limited scale and for a limited time.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

We do **not wish to over-dramatize** the **differences** in approach. we **unders**tand that our **partners'** **concerns** are due mainly to lack of confidence. In that connection it is **noteworthy** that, influenced by the **positive changes** in the over-all political situation, **even the most confirmed proponents** of **security guarantees** based on military **force** have begun to speak of **so-called minimum** deterrence. We **regard** that as the first manifestation of a **political** will to break the **vicious** circle of mutual intimidation.

Today it is important to determine the minimum deterrence potential needed to **provide** defence guarantees until **such time as** solid overall security **structures** have **been** created, **rendering** any justification of a **nuclear** potential unwarranted. We have a **specific suggestion** in **that regard**. We propose holding a **meeting** of **experts** from nuclear **Powers** and from States on whose territory nuclear **arms** are stationed to consider in depth the **parameters** of **minimum nuclear** deterrence. We hope that **delegations** will **comment** on this proposal.

In that **connection** we would like to make it clear that we do not rule **Out the** need for deterrence **mechanisms**. In the **new** model for **security**, the role of deterrence **machinery** would be taken **over by agreed obligations** in **treaty form**. A **broad-based** and ramified infrastructure must, of course, be created to verify strict compliance with **such** obligations. **At the same time, agreed** standards of **maximum openness** and transparency in military activities must be adopted for effective **verification**. In other words, a new model for international **security** requires transformation of the nuclear-force deterrence **pattern** into a **political, legal, transparent** and verifiable deterrence. Our considerations draw, inter alia, on the experience of bilateral Soviet-United States interaction in **bringing about** nuclear disarmament.

At the **Wyoming** talks the two sides set **themselves** the common objective of **creating** more **stable, constructive** and solid relations with openness and

(Mr. Relonogov, USSR)

interaction **increasingly replacing** mistrust and **competition**. A number Of **understandings** exist that are **designed** to promote that objective, and they **have** particular **significance** in light of the **next** in the series of **Soviet-United States Summit meetings**, to be held in the United States late **newt spr ing** or **ear ly summer**. They include **agreement to move** towards **reach ing and implementing a treaty on strategic offensive weapons**, even if no **agresment on anti-ballistic missiles** has **been reached** in the interim, provided the parties continue to **observe** the **Treaty On the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed in 1972**. **Of course** the provision permitting withdrawal from a treaty **on strategic offensive weapons must** remain in force if a party does not **comply** with the **anti-ballistic missile Treaty**. The Soviet Union has **announced** its decision to **destroy** the Krasnoyarsk radar installation, and **the United States** has said that it has dropped its **proposals** concernins a **ban** on mobile intercontinental ballistic **missiles** at **the strategic nuclear-arms** talks. The Soviet side **has raised** the **possibility** of solving the problem **of** sea-launched cruise missiles in the broader context of naval **armaments**. The Soviet aide, has **responded positively** to the United States proposals on verification and stability **measures**. while we do not **intend** to mention all **the solutions** that have been found, **we would mention specifically the agreements reached** to promote an early chemical-weapons **ban**, **the preparations** to ratify the 1974 and 1976 threshold **nuclear-test agreements**, **which** will allow the imposition of further restrictions, the **progress made** at the Vienna talks and the **practical Use** of broad **openness and conf idence-building** measures. A breakthrough in all of those areas is yet to happen, **but there is now** a far **greater** chance **of achieving one**. That, in summary, **is** the picture of the development of Soviet-United **States** relations in the field of disarmament.

Moving to the issues listed for **discuss ion** in the First Committee, we should **emphas ize** that, as was stated by the **representative** of France when **speak ing** on

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

behalf of the members of the European community, they all need to be addressed urgently on a multilateral basis. For instance, it appears to us that they could now be resolved through an agreement among all nuclear Powers on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war. We believe that that would provide a format for multilateral discussions on nuclear-disarmament problems. Such a format would enable us to draw upon bilateral experience in initiating a meaningful discussion on confidence- and stability-building measures among all nuclear Powers. The Soviet delegation has been authorized to submit the following basic elements of such an agreement for the Committee's consideration: the obligation of the parties to act so as to prevent situations that could lead to an outbreak of nuclear war; the obligation of the parties to continue to improve, in ways they deem appropriate, their organizational and technical measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of the nuclear weapons they control; reciprocal notifications of planned intercontinental-ballistic-missile or sea-launched-ballistic-missile launches, indicating the date and the launch and impact areas for any such launch; reciprocal notifications of all major exercises involving the parties' strategic nuclear forces; reciprocal notifications when systems for early warning of missile attack detect unidentified objects or when interference with such systems or relevant communication systems occurs, if such phenomena could pose the risk of nuclear war; the obligation of the parties to notify each other immediately of any accidental or other unexplained incident that may lead to the explosion of combat nuclear devices or be interpreted as capable of causing damage to the other side; the obligation of the parties, when an unexplained nuclear incident occurs, to act

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

so as to **diminish** the likelihood of their actions **being misinterpreted**; and the **right** of the parties to **seek clarifications from each other** in situations involving **unexplained nuclear incidents** when, in their view, **clarifications are needed to prevent the risk of nuclear war.**

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

In addition, the **agreement** could incorporate the **following** obligations assumed by the **parties**; not to **deploy** their **nuclear ships**, submarines or aircraft within **agreed areas**; to take **measures to prevent** and combat nuclear terrorism; and to **provide reciprocal** notification of planned **long-range** cruise missile launches **beyond** national territory. The agreement could also provide for **hot lines** to be established between the **capitals** of all **nuclear Powers** to transmit **urgent messages, notifications** or **requests** in situations **requiring** swift **clarification**. In this **connection**, national **nuclear-risk-reduction** centres, on the basis of the Soviet-United **States experience**, could be considered for **establishment** in the United **Kingdom**, France and China. Consideration could also be **given** to elaboration of an **agreement** on **measures to reduce** the risk of nuclear war within the framework of **consultations among** the permanent **members** of the **Security Council** or in any other format. The important **thing** is that **such** a dialogue should be **in**.

The measures Proposed by the Soviet Union are aimed at **building** confidence, security and **strategic** stability at all **phases** of a **balanced** transition towards minimum levels of nuclear capability, until they are eliminated, while maintaining reasonable sufficiency and defensive emphasis in all the elements and **structures of** military Potentials of States. We do not **relegate** a multilateral discussion on the entire **range of** these issues to a dialogue **among** the five permanent **members of the Security Council**: we believe that all States should participate in such a **dialogue**. This would give expression to **democratized** international relations. In an effort to specify a new security model, we believe it would be advisable to conduct consultations in the United Nations **Military Staff Committee among** military **experts** from **States** members of the Security Council with representatives from other **countries joining** in wide-ranging discussions on politico-military problems, **peace-keeping** operations and other issues.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

A nuclear-test ban is a major crossroads where there is a **confluence** of the paths **leading** to a **new security model**; by **winding down** the **nuclear-arms race** and by **building** confidence.

It has already been pointed out that **tangible progress** has **also been made** at bilateral **Soviet-United States** talks, but for **all** the importance of **Soviet-United States** bilateral efforts, the **banning** of all **nuclear** tests remains an **objective** for multilateral interaction. We **agree** fully with the representatives of **Mexico and New Zealand** who spoke yesterday, **stressing** the need to **find** a radical solution to this problem. This morning, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Maj **Britt Theorin**, spoke eloquently of this, as did Ambassador Pejio, the **representative** of Yugoslavia. It is **high** time the red spotlight **hindering** **multilateralism** turned **green**. For our part, we **are willing** to use all available **resources**. We also maintain our proposal to **re-establish**, at any time, a moratorium on all **nuclear** tests if the United States reciprocates. Other **nuclear Powers** could join in later.

We believe it **necessary** to start **concrete discussion** on a **comprehensive** nuclear-test ban at the Conference on Disarmament and to examine **carefully** and in detail the proposals submitted at that multilateral **negotiating** forum. Finally, an initiative by a **number** of non-aligned **countries** **offers** yet another **approach** - to consider extending the 1963 Treaty to underground nuclear **explosions**.

An international agreement on the **verifiable cessation and prohibition** of the production of **fissionable materials** could **become a solid component** of a new model of **security**. We believe that at this session a stand should be taken in *favour* of **initiating** concrete work on an **agreement** to **end and ban** the production of fissionable materials.

As **regards** the creation of favourable conditions for possible talks, unilateral steps on the part of **States** would *contribute to this end*. The Soviet

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

Union has announced that this year it will end production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes, that one reactor for weapons-grade plutonium was shut down in 1987, that two more plutonium reactors are scheduled to be shut down in 1989 and 1990, and that all such reactors will be shut down before the year 2000. We also propose that agreement be reached on refraining from military applications of nuclear materials released as a result of nuclear disarmament agreements and on developing appropriate verification mechanisms. At the same time, scientific and technological studies could be made with a view to utilizing such materials for peaceful purposes. Thus, not only would a channel for the nuclear-arms race be blocked, but a system of safeguards to prevent the revival of nuclear weapons would be taking shape.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is crucial to devising a new security model. Multilateral discussions on this issue should be intensified at the Conference on Disarmament, and a meaningful examination of the interesting proposals submitted by a number of countries, including the proposals put forward recently, should be undertaken. In our view, there should be a positive response to the proposal of the Federal Republic of Germany to draw up a multilateral code of conduct in outer space, and to the proposal of France to set up an international centre to process pictures received from outer space. As you know, last summer the USSR put forward the initiative for the establishment of an international space observation agency. It is significant that in this area, too, a comprehensive approach is emerging, encompassing both disarmament measures and issues of verification, openness and confidence. Such an approach is also being followed at the talks on banning nuclear weapons, at which it is highly visible. Progress in each of these areas brings completion of work on the convention nearer.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

It is important in our view that, along with efforts to ban chemical weapons, vigorous action should be taken to create the conditions that would preclude their use or proliferation.

The rich experience gained by the international community in verifying the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the steps taken to prevent the spread of chemical weapons make it possible to address, in the United Nations, such a major challenge as finding a means to prevent the unchecked spread of missiles and missile technology. Recently, some very alarming symptoms have been observed, a symptom that may pose a serious threat to the security of all.

(Mr. Relonoqov, USSR)

In that connection it is important to strike a **balance**; while **placing** barriers in the **way** of the spread of nuclear weapons, we must not prejudice the interests **of States** in the peaceful exploration of outer **space**. We believe it would **be** fruitful to create international machinery **embracing** both **technologically advanced** supplier States and countries interested in developing space **programmes** of their own. **That** machinery would function **under** effective international control, **providing** adequate safeguards **against the re-transfer** or use for **military** purposes of missiles and missile **technology** .

Since last year **the** United Nations has **been** seized of another problem: **how** to limit the military uses of **scientific** and technological achievements. We think that **problem** is closely related to the whole **range** of military **problems**, and in fact contains a preventive potential. Indeed, if timely measures are taken to **prevent** scientific and technological **developments from leading** - as they have thus far - to the **emergence** of **increasingly** sophisticated **means** of destruction, there will **be no** need at later **stages to mobilize efforts to ensure** the non-proliferation, limitation and prohibition of those **weapons**.

Pursuant to a United Nations decision, a national **group** of experts, **including** prominent scientists and **people's** deputies of the USSR, has **been set up in the** Soviet Union to assess military **applications** of science and **technology**.

Disarmament and regional crisis settlement are two major **areas** where efforts to design a new international model of security overlap in addressing the problem of **limiting** and **reducing** international arms transfers.

The Soviet Union supports the idea of opening at the United Nations a **register** of arms sales and transfers, and is **ready** to take part in formulating its **parameters**.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The active efforts in virtually all areas of **arms control contrast sharply** With the artificially-preserved lull in **matters relating to naval armaments. Exempting** that important and universally-applicable component of the **military** power Of States and alliances from the processes of shaping a new international model of security would leave open a **dangerous area** of the arms race and would run counter to the principle of undiminished **security** for all **parties**; it could **destabilize** the overall world military and **strategic** situation.

In **our view**, we could **begin by** working out **confidence-building** measures and **sea-lanes** security guarantees. We support Sweden's proposal on **formulating**, in the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral agreement **on the prevention** of accidents on the **high** seas and a new protocol **on the mining** of **seas**.

Naval problems could, for example, be dealt with in special consultations between all States concerned, in particular the major naval Powers. Such consultations could address **mutual** concerns in this area, **mechanisms** and the ultimate objectives of future talks, as well as ways of making gradual progress towards those **goals**.

A review of the entire **range of** bilateral, **regional** and multilateral efforts to find a new security formula commensurate **with modern political awareness shows that success is greatest** where openness prevails. **Although each case** has its own degree of **transparency**, we are convinced that **agreement** at the **United Nations On common parameters** for **openness** would **make** it much **easier** to identify the best options in specific areas of **building** universal, **equal security**. In our view, next Year 's discussions in the Disarmament Commission on criteria **for openness** could launch a **multilateral** process of naming openness and glasnost as major elements Of international **security**. For its part, the Soviet Union has announced its total defence expenditures for **1989**, 77.7 billion rubles, and the main items in its

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

military **budget** and the total numerical strength of its armed forces. We intend to **provide** the United Nations with annual data on the total strength and major **categories** of **weapons** of the Soviet armed forces. We also reaffirm our intention to **begin applying** United Nations standard reporting **procedures** to our military expenditures, with effect from the forty-fifth session of the General **Assembly**.

Moreover, **my** delegation is **authorized** to announce today **the** readiness of the Soviet **Union** to submit to the United Nations data on the strength of Soviet **troops** stationed outside the Soviet Union. **As** stated by **Mr. Shevardnadze** at this session of the General Assembly, our ultimate goal is not to have a **single** Soviet soldier outside the country.

The conversion of military industry is a factor in and a reliable material **guarantee** of international security. Conversion has started in our **country**, making it **possible to** use the production capacity and material resources thus released for **the manufacture** of consumer **goods** and equipment for the civilian industrial sector - and that is only the **beginning**. Full conversion plans have now been prepared for three defence plants. What we are **calling** partial conversion has already begun at many defence plants.

We are prepared to turn our country into a practical laboratory of conversion, and we think it is necessary to begin multilateral co-operation in that major area, under United Nations auspices .

Last May, the Soviet Union provided the International Labour **Organisation** with the relevant information on the conversion of our defence **industry**. This **could** serve as additional **background material** for continued research, broad international co-operation and the **sharing** of experience in accordance with Mikhail S. Gorbachev's proposal to establish a team of experts to conduct an in-depth study of the **problems** of conversion, to be **followed by** a report to the Secretary-General and by discussion of the matter by the General **Assembly**.

(Mt. Belonogov, USSR)

We are convinced that, if implemented, conversion would demonstrate the **resolve** of States to curtail their military **programmes**, confirm their **willingness** to **pursue** disarmament and contribute to **strengthening** international **confidence**.

We agree with the **view** expressed by the **Secretary-General**,

Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, in his **report** on the **work** of the Organization, **that** :

“There is a ubiquitous desire to turn over a new leaf, to **try** innovative approaches for the solution of old problems”. (A/44/L. P. 28)

We must work together earnestly to make positive **changes** irreversible, particularly since the **agenda** of the First Committee **is becoming ever** more crowded **and** the discussion of its items ever more detailed and substantive. For **its** part, the Soviet Union is **prepared to promote** the effectiveness of the **Committee's work**.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The USSR supports the idea of holding informal consultations during the current session of the General Assembly to consider drawing up recommendations on means to improve the Disarmament Commission's work. It would be a mistake to believe, as one of Voltaire's famous characters did, that in this best of possible worlds all is for the best. Now more than ever we should focus our **common will** and harness it in concrete joint action.

We are confident that the business-like atmosphere prevailing in the First Committee this year will help translate the constructive ideas put forward by various delegations into the agreed language of United Nations recommendations and will reinforce the Organization's role as an intellectual centre for the world community's concerted efforts in the sphere of international security.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish) : I call on Mr. Kheradi, Secretary of the First Committee, who wishes to make a statement on points of information.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee) : I wish to draw representatives' attention to a notice in today's Journal regarding informal consultations concerning the Disarmament Commission to be held tomorrow at 3.30 p.m. in Conference Room B.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish) : I should like to remind representatives that the list of speakers on disarmament items will be closed today at 6 p.m. I hope that delegations that have not yet registered to speak will do so as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.