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**VERBATIM** RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. FAHMY (Egypt) (Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. BRAUTIGAM (Federal Republic of Germany) : I wish first to offer the Chairman my congratulations on his election to his responsible office. His considerable experience in the field of disarmament and arms control in Geneva is a reassurance to us that our work in the coming weeks will be skilfully and competently guided. May he, the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur enjoy a successful tenure of office.

The representative of France has already made a statement on behalf of the Twelve and thus also on behalf of the Federal Republic of Germany. I am adding the following remarks on behalf of my Government.

The object of our efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control is to create a more peaceful world with fewer weapons and less tension and with greater security and stability. We are primarily, of course, concerned with our own continent - Europe - but we are aware that we face a common global task.

Our efforts have obviously produced considerable progress since last year's session of the General Assembly. We note with satisfaction that the climate of East-West relations is better now than at any time in the past. As a result, the general conditions for arms control and disarmament have remained favourable. The era of abortive negotiations, of appeals that went unheard and of mutual demands belongs to the past. Now agreements are being signed and implemented.

The reduction of land-based intermediate-range nuclear-weapon systems of the United States and the Soviet Union - including those on German territory - continues on schedule and will lead to the elimination of a whole class of weapons. The Stockholm agreements of 1986 on confidence-building in the

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conventional **sphere** are also being put into practice. And there **is reason** to believe that the current negotiations in Vienna and Geneva will prove **successful**. We **must maintain** this **momentum** of disarmament and extend it to all **areas of arms** control. **None** must be left out.

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What **are** the specific implications for **each** area? We **consider** conventional stability in **Europe** to be the most urgent priority in the field of arms control. The **prospects of achieving** greater stability and **security** for our continent are good. In the **negotiations** on conventional **forces** in **Europe** the **States members** of the two alliances have **been conducting** in Vienna since the beginning of **March**, the two **sides see** eye to eye on the aim of a first agreement, which is **to** eliminate disparities in **those** weapon **systems** that are **decisive** for either **side's** capability for surprise **attack** and **large-scale** offensive action. We want to **achieve this** aim primarily **by** establishing parity below the level of **the** weaker **side** in each of the **main** weapon **categories**. Specifically, this means that, **from** the Western point **of** view, neither **side** should be allowed to **possess** more than 20,000 main **battle** tanks, 16,500 artillery pieces, 28,000 armoured troop carriers, 5,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 combat helicopters.

Parity alone is **not** stability. We **know** from past experience that a conventional balance - that is to **say**, with the two **sides** having equal military capabilities - is in itself not sufficient to prevent **war**. Hence our objective in an initial agreement is not only to reduce and limit force holdings **but also to** establish measures which will curb the **use** of military power - **the** so-called **stabilizing measures**. In a later phase, we want to **achieve** further reductions and limitations of arms, as **well** as a restructuring of forces, with **the** aim of **making** them more defence-oriented.

In pursuance of the expanded **Western** proposal of 13 July 1989, the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NAM) countries put forward proposals in Vienna on 21 September concerning **stabilizing** measures, information **exchange**, verification and non-circumvention. The West has thus completely filled in the framework for a first agreement on conventional forces in Europe and once again shown itself to be

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the forerunner in developing the conceptual **foundations** of conventional **arms control**. It **has at** the same time **underscored** the seriousness of its **ir tention** to **bring about** a first substantive agreement within a year.

**Our** Eastern negotiating partners have adopted a **constructive** attitude. This **is borne out by** their response yesterday **to the Wes** tern neqotia ting package on exchange of informs **tion**, verification and **stabilizing** measures. We note with **satisfaction** that in these areas **too**, despite some considerable differences Of opinion on **detail**, **the East** accepts the essence of the Western concept.

The negotiations on **confidence-** and security-bu ilding measures l **ikewise** afford an opportunity to create **co-operative** security structures. In **this** oontext, we aim **to make up for the lack** of **tr** anaparency , to extend the range of predictability in the military sphere, to promote **military** contacts **and thus create mutual confidence**. **Our** aim is to introduce specific **measures to minimize** the possibility **Of** miscalculating military activities and the danger of misunderstandings, and in this way enhance the ability to avoid and manaqe cc ises.

**Another** important aspect of these negotiations focuses On the discussion of security concepts and **mili tary doctrines**. **One major** objective in this **context** is to reconcile the actual size, deployment **and structure** of forces with declared def ens ive security concepts. The objectives pursued in **both sets** of negotiations are bold and unprecedented, hut the speed **at** which they **are** proqressing shows that the road taken is the right one ard promises results. The new architecture of **co-operative Security** we are dealing with in Vienna is of fundamental and, **ultimately** , **global** significance. There is **no** European copyright for **it**. We therefore **consider** it necessary that this session of the **General Assembly** debate the ways and **means** of reducing **the** capability of armed forces for offensive action.

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In recent years we have time and again witnessed the terrible effects Of chemical weapons. The danger of further proliferation of these treacherous weapons is growing. Only a **global** and comprehensive ban can **remove** that danger. Time is not working for **us**; hence every effort **must be** made at the **Geneva** Conference on **Disarmament** to bring about the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive, **global** and verifiable convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In the **course** of this **year**, following the impressive consensus among the **149 participating** States at the Paris Conference in January, the **work** of the **Ad Hoc** Committee on Chemical Weapons has been considerably intensified. Progress has on the whole been less than we expected because the crucial breakthrough has not been achieved, **but** it has been possible to carry the draft convention further **along** in important areas. **Together** with numerous contributions from the participants in the negotiations, it offers a good basis for speedy and practical **solutions to** the remaining problems.

The successful Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons, held **at Canberra**, has produced a new dimension of **support** from the chemical industry for the **Geneva** negotiations on chemical weapons, which will have a favourable impact on the progress of work there and on preparations for the implementation Of the convention banning chemical **weapons**. That Conference also revealed that all countries have a responsibility to exercise restraint and **to** take immediately the necessary steps to prevent the spread of chemical **weapons**.

In his address to the General Assembly a few **weeks ago**, the President of the United States of America presented extensive proposals for expediting the destruction of chemical weapons. We welcomed that initiative, just as we welcomed the comprehensive bilateral agreements between the United States **Secretary** of State

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and the Soviet Union Foreign Minister on an early exchange of data, questions Of verification and the modalities of the chemical weapons destruction phase. In our view, these proposals and agreements are highly conducive to transparency and confidence building, and we are convinced that they will accelerate the solution of the problems still on the agenda in Geneva.

I wish to repeat that my Government will do everything possible to achieve a global and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons at the earliest possible date.

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As to the prohibition of **biological** weapons, the exchange of relevant data provided for **in the** Final Declaration of the September 1986 Conference, the second to review the biological weapons Convention, **is crucial** for **securing greater** transparency as regards compliance with the Convention. At the third review conference, scheduled for 1991, States parties **will** have to show whether they have fulfilled **their** obligation to exchange data. This will also test the credibility of their commitment to global arms control.

We therefore appeal to those contracting States that have not yet done so to communicate the necessary information to the United Nations Secretariat as **agreed**. At the third review conference, as **Foreign** Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced in his address to the Geneva Conference on **Disarmament** on 2 March, the Federal Republic of Germany intends to seek the adoption of verification measures supplementary to the Convention.

Owing to the destructive **power** of **nuclear** weapons, which is **beyond** human **imagina**tion, nuclear-arms control is of **special impor**tance in the United Nations debate on disarmament.

The Federal Republic of **Germany** renounced the possession of nuclear **weapons** many years ago. That is why it is not party to the negotiations on **nuclear-weapon** reductions. But as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a country in which nuclear weapons are based, it has a direct interest in **those** negotiations. Given the present situation in Europe, our aim cannot be to seek the complete removal of nuclear weapons. After **all**, it is partly due to the existence of nuclear weapons that Europe has been spared war for over 40 years. **For the** foreseeable **future**, and provided they are kept at the lowest possible level, nuclear weapons will remain a stabilizing factor in East-West relations in Europe.



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Good progress is being made towards reducing nuclear weapons to the lowest level necessary for safeguarding peace. The ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva on deep cuts in their offensive-weapon arsenals have received a fresh stimulus as a result of the meeting of their Foreign Ministers in Wyoming. The changed political climate between East and West and, specifically, the readiness to seek compromise solutions demonstrated at that meeting, **boost** our hopes that the progress achieved can quickly be translated into tangible results at the conference table.

The comprehensive concept of arms **control** and disarmament adopted at the last NATO summit opens up a specific arms-control **perspective** with **regard** to short-range nuclear **weapons**. The United States is willing to negotiate on the partial reduction of United States and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range to an **equal** and verifiable level as soon as the implementation of an agreement on conventional forces in Europe has been reached. This will close a major gap in the field of nuclear-arms control.

The implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - in which the Federal Republic of Germany is involved as a basing country - is proceeding smoothly, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. This is a **good** omen for future negotiations and agreements. That Treaty is also a good example **of** how arms control agreements can do more than lead to the removal of **a whole class of weapons**. They **can also** enhance confidence building and help nations **accustom** themselves to **arms** control as part of the normal way of life. It is my country's hope that in future decades disarmament and arms control will be an unspectacular routine affair, not only in Europe and North America but **all over the globe**.

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My Government advocates a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, to be Put **into** effect as **soon** as possible. This peesupposes a tried and effective global verification **régime**. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Federal Republic Of **Germany** is **making** practical contributions to this end. My **Government** will be participating in the experimental global exchange of seismic data beginning in **January** 1990. We appeal to all countries with the technical potential to do the same.

**My Government** welcomes the progress achieved by the United States and the Soviet union towards giving effect **to** the two so-called threshold agreements **and** hopes they will soon be ratified so that talks can begin on further restrictions on nuclear tests. Such step-by-step restrictions on the way to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban are, in our **view**, the only real option. The appropriate forum for multilateral debate on **all** matters relating to a test ban is the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

The non-proliferation Treaty has proved itself to be the corner-stone of international stability and a basis for efforts to safeguard peace. My Government welcomes the fact that another 15 non-nuclear-weapon States have signed the Treaty since 1985. We appeal to all countries which have not yet done so - nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike - to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Recent developments in relations between the United **States** and the Soviet Union on matters of arms control clearly indicate that both are increasingly aware of their responsibility deriving from article VI of the Treaty to negotiate on nuclear disarmament in good faith. The Federal Republic of Germany is strongly committed to ensuring that the **Treaty remains** an effective instrument for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the basis for international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy beyond the year **1995**.

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The General Assembly and this Committee are the only forums in which all nations can intensively discuss the current situation and the tasks that lie ahead in the field of disarmament and arms control. Let us, therefore, make use of **them**.

It will be helpful if we bear in mind both the possibilities and the limitations of debates on disarmament within the **ambit** of the United Nations. We can, and indeed we should, closely **follow** and comment upon the ongoing arms-control negotiations, but we should not try to duplicate them. We can, and we should, discuss the priorities of the arms-control agenda, but we must keep realities in mind as we do so.

In the past the Committee has debated and developed important principles of arms control and disarmament. There is, for example, the requirement **for** transparency of military budgets. Other examples are the call for objective information on military matters and the long-standing efforts of my Government to highlight the need for **confidence** building, which were confirmed by means of a consensus resolution last year.

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This year **my delega tion** will introduce a new topic in this debate on principles : the defensive orientation of armed **forces**. It is time **to** realise that **no country** can **be** allowed **to** retain **the** capability to launch a eurpr **ise** attack **or** initiate large-scale offensive action.

The important debate we are **about** to have in this **Committee** on the principles, **state** and **tasks** of disarmament **and** arms control **must not be impaired by** the rituals of repetition, **by** a propensity for **mutual** recrimination, **and by a lack of** willingness **to r arch a consensus**. This **year's sess ion** of the United **Na tions** Disarmament **Commission** is **a** warning to us all not to **allow our** debate on **disarmament** to lapse into **s ter ility** . This, too, we shall have to discuss in the **weeks** ahead.

We want **our** debate **to** be lively and topical. There will **be no** need to avoid controvetay provided that we **stick to the** issues. We hope to **conclude our** debate **by** articulating **the will of the community of** nations, which would then translate **into an** appeal to the negotiators.

My delegation will play an **active** and **constructive** part in the work of this Commi ttee. It will introduce and explain the **motives for** its own initiatives, and it will set out my **Government's** position on the various items **on** the agenda. The **Chairman** can **be** assured of our support in the work.

MC. IBÁÑEZ (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like first of all to congratulate **Ambassador Taylhardat on** his election **as Chairman** of this **important Committee and** to say how delighted I **am** to see him in charge of our **work**. I **am** convinced **that** under his expert and **able** leadership we shall achieve progress **on** the **tortuous** and always difficult path towards disarmament. I also wish to congratulate the other **members** of the **Bureau** on their election. I also

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express my sincere appreciation for the outstanding work accomplished by last year's Chairmen, Ambassador Roche of Canada.

Last Monday, Ambassador Morel of France made a statement on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community to which, of course, my delegation fully subscribes. However, I should like to explain in further detail the position of my Government on some of the subjects on our agenda to which we attach special importance.

The overall international climate affects the work of the General Assembly every year. Since we met in this forum last year, the international situation has steadily improved as a result, among other things, of the growing ease of bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as of the progress achieved in the process of democratization and of respect for human rights in certain countries. All this allows us to have an increasingly hopeful view of the future. In this framework of international security and disarmament, the United Nations has played, and must continue to play, an essential role. Towards that end, we must seek ways to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations by rationalizing our work and by seeking consensus on those subjects which provide a solid basis for concentrated efforts. In this respect, we are convinced that the time has come to approach in a pragmatic way the rationalization and reorganization of our work in the First Committee.

For instance, what sense is there in continuing to present year after year identical draft resolutions which have been adopted without a vote? Once this organ has reached consensus on a given draft, that text and that specific subject ought to disappear from our agenda. On the other hand, the example of the results obtained in the last two years in the field of chemical weapons should be followed in other areas of our agenda, grouping or merging in a single draft resolution all the texts which are presented on the same subject. Thus, the number of drafts

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submitted to the Committee **would** be considerably reduced and the Committee **would only** have to study and **take** action on an **expanded** text for every cluster Of items.

We ate **also** concerns? **about** the situation in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, particularly in view of the **lack of results** of its substantive session this year. **We therefore** consider it **imperative** to review its **working methods** as well as **its** agenda, in order to focus the efforts of **delegations** on a smaller number **of** subjects which are more **likely** to secure line **desired** consensus. We are **convinced** that this is the only way to preserve the role which we **believe** to be essential, that is, that the Disarmament Commission **must** continue to play **its** role **as** a universal forum **for** debate and in-depth study of specific **subjects** on the disarmament **agenda**.

**Likewise**, we shall continue to support fully the irreplaceable role **of** the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, as the **s**ingle mul tilateral disarmament negotiating forum. **For** that reason and because **of** the fact that **far some years** we have been participating actively **as** invited observers, we still hop@ to **become** full-fledged msmbecs in order to **contribute more effectively** to **its** work.

The **crea tion of a clima te of confidence** and transparency among States, which is intrinsically related to national **perceptions** of security, is a corner-stone for the building of **détente**. There fore, as the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affa **its**, Mr. Fer nandez Ordoñez, indicated in his statement before the **General Assembly**, we must con tinue to seek the **reduction of the existing imbalances** in the various categories of weapons, to increase this confidence and to achieve a greater military stability at significantly lower Levels of forces than those of today. We are convinced that it is possible to maintain the security of all States by agreeing to and implementing in a parallel way measures of arms control and disarmament. In this process an essential role should be played by the

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verification systems in order to ensure compliance with **what has** been agreed and to prevent the appearance of distrust, which can limit our possibilities **of success**.

Spain attaches special importance **to** the events which are **occur**ing in Europe, **and** specifically **to** the initiation in Vienna on 6 **March 1989** of the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe and on confidence- and **security-building** measures, both in the framework of the process of the Conference c.. Security and Co-operation in Europe (**CSCE**) . We believe conventional disarmament to **be an** essential and inseparable **part of** disarmament seen as a whole. We have stated on **several** occasions that the adoption in this field of regional **measures which take** into account the **speci fic** characteristics of the region is one **of the most** important and **ef fec**tive ways of contributing to the **process** of arms control and disarmament.

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For years now we have been witnessing with deep concern **the accumulation of** armaments of this **type** in **many** parts of the world, **but** especially in **Europe**, where imbalances and **asymmetries** jeopardize the stability of the old continent and, consequently, world peace itself,

Therefore, Spain, **together** with the other **countries** of the Atlantic Alliance, is applying no effort **to** achieve **substantial** progress in the negotiations **taking** place in Vienna. In the Final Communiqué of the last **summit**, the States members of the Alliance expressed their intention **that** the said **negotiations** would **be** completed **in** the middle of next year. We believe that the achievement of **a** stable and **secure balance** of conventional **forces** at a lower level, as well as the implementation of a new set of **confidence-** and security-building measures, will reinforce all that **has** been achieved in the Stockholm Document, thus **increasing** the **security** not only **of** the **European** continent but also of the international community as a whole.

**In** this connection, my Government wishes to express its deep concern at the proliferation of ballistic missiles in countries that, traditionally, did not have them. Currently these rockets are equipped with conventional **charges**, but they could carry nuclear or chemical warheads in the future. These missiles have recently been used in different conflicts. It is for this **reason** that on 10 **March** last the Spanish Government, as further evidence of its interest in **promoting** **international** peace and **security** through arms control, adopted a set of **guidelines** on transfers of elements **capable** of **being** used for the production of missiles of this type - **turning** the so-called **régime** of the Seven into the **régime** of the **Eight**.

The adoption **of** this **régime**, which is a **positive** contribution to the disarmament process, is a consequence of my **Government's** deep concern about the conventional-arms race, as well as about possible nuclear proliferation. These **guidelines** **are** not intended to hinder either national space **programmes** or related

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international **co-operation**, provided that **such** programmes do not **contribute to the** deployment **of systems that can carry** nuclear **or** chemical war heads or weapons capable of **causing massive** and indiscriminate destruction. **We** are pleased that this subject **was** addressed by the United States Secretary of State and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs at their **meeting** in **Wyoming**.

In **the** field of **nuclear weapons**, we welcome the progress achieved **by** the United States **Secretary** of State and the **Soviet** Minister for Foreign Affairs in their Wyoming **meeting** towards a reduction of **50** per cent **in** the nuclear **arsenals** of **both countries**. The formal breaking of the link between **an agreement on Strategic Arms Reduction Talks** with the anti-ballistic-missile Treaty) **the announcement** of the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar, a new Soviet approach **to the problem of** the sea-based **Cruise missiles**; a constructive approach to the subject of inter-continental ballistic missiles, and an agreement on the principles **that should** govern verification measures, as well as **stabilization measures**, including prior notification of **strategic** exercises - these things lead us to believe that a **treaty** to reduce **by** half the strategic nuclear arsenals of **both** countries will **be** signed soon.

Disarmament and arms control **must not be** confined to the East-West dimension. The recent Paris Conference stressed the urgent need to conclude swiftly a treaty for the complete elimination of chemical weapons - a treaty placing a global **ban on** the production, stockpiling or **use** of these weapons, and **containing** binding Provisions for **the** destruction of **stocks**. I **must** mention the Canberra Conference, involving the chemical industries of a large number of countries, which concluded successfully **just a few weeks ago**.

**Chemical weapons**, because of their **special** characteristics and their indiscriminate nature, as well as the danger of their proliferation, are a threat

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to the entire international community, Consequently, one of my country's main priorities in the field of disarmament is to seek their eradication. Therefore, we welcome the rapid progress that has been achieved in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union for the banning and elimination of these weapons. This progress was confirmed at the recent meeting between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze - I refer to the agreement on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and of the establishments involved specifically in their production, and to the fact that an exchange of verifiable data between the two countries regarding their stockpiles of chemical weapons is contemplated.

We hope that this progress will have a decisive and vital impact on the negotiations within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament with a view to the conclusion of a total and comprehensive agreement eradicating these weapons and banning their production, stockpiling and use. Regional approaches, or approaches that would have similar effects, would hardly provide a sufficient or satisfactory evolution.

One subject to which my Government attaches importance is that of a global ban on nuclear tests. We welcome the progress that has been achieved in this field, and we hope that it will allow the ratification, in 1990, of the verification protocols to the Treaty on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the threshold test-ban Treaty.

Spain considers that a gradual, step-by-step approach, with the final goal of a total test ban, is the most appropriate way to achieve our objective. We are also convinced that the Geneva Conference on Disarmament must play an essential role, in tandem with the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR.

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Finally, during the past year we have witnessed the holding of two **meetings** of the Preparatory Committee for the **forthcoming** Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty. My country, which recently acceded to the Treaty, and **which** attaches great **importance** to **non-proliferation**, has announced **its candidature** for one of the vice-chairmanships at the conference. We hope that the Conference will **enjoy** the fullest **co-operation of all the Parties**, so that the validity **of** the Treaty may **be enhanced**.

At the beginning of **my** statement I stressed **the importance that my country attaches to the work** done **by the United Nations in the** field of international security and disarmament. **Because** of the role played **by both** the First **Committee** and the Disarmament **Commission** as universal forums for the consideration **of** these **subjects, I can** assure this **Committee** that my delegation **will** spare no **effort** to **contribute** constructively to the success of its **work**.

Mr. AKSIN (Turkey): I wish to express **the great** satisfaction **of my** delegation at the fact that Mr. Taylhardat is guiding the **work** of this **important Committee**. I wish also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee on **the 1st** election.

In **addition**, I want to extend **my delegation's** heartfelt sympathy to the delegation of the United States **following** the tragic **earthquake** that **has struck** California. Likewise, **our** deep **sympathy goes** to the Chinese delegation following the **tragic** losses caused by the earthquake in China.

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Over the past 12 months positive developments have taken place in the field of East-West relations, arms control and disarmament, thus confirming the climate of optimism and expectation we identified in our debate last year.

The successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened the way for the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe that are currently in their third round at Vienna. Turkey takes an active part in this new process of negotiations between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, where new and promising proposals have been put forward and progress has been made towards establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. There is already a convergence of views on the principle of equal collective ceilings and a new willingness to correct imbalances between the two sides through asymmetrical reductions. We hope that that constructive spirit will continue to prevail and contribute to further progress in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe.

Turkey also attaches importance to the second set of negotiations in Vienna between the 35 States participants in the CSCE on confidence- and security-building measures, which it views as an indispensable corollary to disarmament efforts. Indeed, any progress in the field of arms limitation is directly linked with the security concerns and perceptions of the countries involved. Hence, confidence- and security-building measures have a primary role to play in securing more openness, transparency and comparability in military matters in order to reduce uncertainty and insecurity.

The implementation in good faith of the Helsinki Final Act and its concluding documents in all their aspects will decisively contribute to the promotion of an atmosphere of confidence and goodwill in Europe and thus to the smooth progress of the negotiations under way in Vienna.

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The Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, scheduled to take place in Geneva in August-September 1990, has already held its first and second sessions and has completed an important part of its work under its mandate.

As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Turkey holds the view that strict adherence to the Treaty is of vital significance. While the Treaty has so far performed its essential function, the need to strengthen further the non-proliferation régime remains. We are for universal adherence to the Treaty and hope that the forthcoming Review Conference will encourage greater international co-operation in the field of non-proliferation as a means of contributing to international security. Similarly, increasing international co-operation in nuclear safety and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be given firm and universal support.

The convening of the Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons at Paris in January 1989 and the unanimous adoption of a final declaration encompassing various aspects of that important problem have constituted a major development in the disarmament area. The timing of the Conference was right, coming at a time of accelerating proliferation and use of chemical weapons and when the rapid increase in the toxicity and effectiveness of chemical-warfare agents has added to their destructive capability.

The appeal in the final declaration addressed by the participating States to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to redouble its efforts to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction appears to be having an impact. Further progress has been achieved this year by the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, and the draft convention has now reached an advanced stage of

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preparation. Turkey hopes that the Conference on Disarmament will move ahead to the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention that **would** globally ban the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical **weapons**, under effective verification.

In **this** connection we think that the highly mobile character of chemical weapons would render any chemical-weapon-free zones or any other regional or partial special-status arrangements unrealistic. My country does not have chemical weapons in stock, nor does it aspire to possess any in the future.

We are pleased that the Government-Industry Conference against Chemical Weapons hosted **by the** Australian Government in September has been **another step** towards the elimination of chemical weapons. The world's chemical industry has declared its **support** for a global convention banning chemical weapons and has stated its willingness to participate with Governments in the necessary national measures to prepare for the effective entry into force of the convention. Turkey recognises the importance of such **co-operation** between Governments and industry and the necessity - as expressed by the **representative** of Australia in the Committee - of a correct balance between the security concerns of **Governments** and the commercial **concerns** of industry.

The memorandum of understanding agreed in Wyoming **on a bilateral** verification experiment, including the exchange of data **on** United States and Soviet chemical-weapon stockpiles and visits and inspections of chemical-weapon sites to verify that data, should contribute to fostering confidence in a future convention.

We **welcome the** proposals made **by** President **Bush** in his address to the **General Assembly** for a radical reduction in chemical weapons even before the entry **into** force of the convention on a **global ban** and the positive **Soviet** response **contained** in the statement **by** Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Such bilateral **steps** constitute an encouragement for the multilateral negotiations on the convention at **Geneva**.

(Mr. Aksin, Tur key)

After the entry into force of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - and its ongoing implementation, the hopes of the international community are focused on the successful conclusion of an agreement on the substantial reduction and limitation of strategic arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. A satisfactory strategic-arms-reduction treaty would contribute significantly to the maintenance of the momentum in the arms-control process and enhance overall strategic stability. We are glad that at the recent meeting in Wyoming between the United States Secretary of State and Soviet Foreign Minister progress was registered towards that goal as well as on a range of related issues.

The question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban remains one of the important issues on the disarmament agenda. We note with satisfaction that some progress has been achieved between the two major nuclear-weapon States in the framework of their negotiations on limiting and eventually banning nuclear testing through a step-by-step process. We note that the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to arrive at an agreed mandate for an ad hoc committee in this field, but that some consultations have been conducted.

We continue to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with the agreement of all concerned States, in those regions where nuclear weapons do not exist. That should make a contribution to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Where nuclear weapons already exist, the attempt to create nuclear-weapon-free zones can bring about security gaps and cannot be implemented without other complementary disarmament measures.

(Mr. Akain, Turkey)

Turkey attaches importance to the continuation and **success** of the **arms-control** and disarmament process as **a** whole, which it views as a comprehensive, integrated endeavour **encompassing** nuclear as well as conventional **and** chemical weapons and **confidence-** and security-building **measures**.

We also value highly the role played by the United **Na tions** and its organs within its **process** and stand ready **to contribute to the enhancement** of that role. We hope that the **pragma tic** and **realis tic** approach that **has** led to the **successes** registered in recent **years** in various arms-reduction endeavours elsewhere will **also** prevail in the work carried out here in the First Committee and that the United **Nations** will **thus be** able to **exert** greater influence on **global disarmament efforts**.



Mr. AL-ZADGALY (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic) : My **delegation** would like first to express **its** condolences to the **delegations** of the United States and China **on the** great **loss** suffered by those **two countries** as a result of **earthquakes**. We **ask the** two **delegations** to convey our condolence<sup>8</sup> to their **Governments** and to thn **bereaved families**.

Pursuant to rule 110 of the rules of procedure - a rule you have urged **us** to observe in the First Committee Mr. Chairman - I shall deal directly **with** substantive **matters**. At the **outset**, I **assure** you that our **delegation** will co-operate with you and will wholeheartedly **participate** to in the Committee's work and **deliberations**, so that **recommendations** and resolutions can be put **forward that** will express the sincere **desire** of all **delegations** to Achieve greater success and unanimity on the many issues relating to **international peace** and security that **are** of concern to us here **as one** in **international** community.

My delegation agrees with you, Mr. Chairman, and with most of the delegations that have already spoken, that the meetings of the First Committee are taking Place this year at a very **important** juncture, when there are many **factors that give us** reason to feel reassured and hopeful in the present climate of **détente**. The ratification by the United States and **the Soviet Union** of the agreement they reached to **remove** short-range and **medium-range** nuclear weapons from **Europe** has deep political significance. **It proves** that the two countries are convinced of the futility of the theory of **nuclear** deterrence in the **establishment** of peace and tranquillity, and **that** they believe that **dialogue**, negotiation and **respect** for **mutual interests** can form the **basis** for the building of common **international** security.

Therefore my delegation welcome and **supports** the **agreement** reached last month between the **leaders** of the two countries to work **for** the achievement of the second objective - that **is**, to reduce their arsenals of offensive strategic **weapons** by

(Mr. Al-Zadgaly, Oman)

50 per cent and to make a start on a genuine limitation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, we are of the view that there cannot be a full discussion of the non-proliferation of those weapons if it does not take place in the framework of the intention to remove them completely. The international community's desire to achieve that objective has prompted it to welcome the foregoing initiative as the first step on the road to complete nuclear disarmament.

This climate of détente and the dialogue between the two countries have begun to have positive and tangible results, as evidenced by the easing of international tension. They constitute a sound basis for the creation of a safer world and augur well for an expanded dialogue that could lead to the solution of a greater number of international problems.

On this occasion I should like to make some observations on those issues which Oman regards as important and which should be dealt with here. I recall the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That Document painted a bleak picture, but it was realistic at that time. It expressed a feeling that is still prevalent among the countries of the world today - that we must either stop the arms race or face annihilation - and it placed the issue of nuclear weapons on the list of items to be dealt with as matters of priority.

It is important that we should not allow the recently created positive international climate to be dissipated; on the contrary, we must try to build on this climate because of our belief in the triumph of peace based on justice and love between peoples.

The importance of bilateral disarmament negotiations cannot be denied, but they should not detract from the importance of multilateral negotiations, nor should they be regarded as an alternative to them. Bilateral and multilateral

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negotiations should complement and strengthen each other in order to reverse and halt the arms race. The issue of disarmament is of importance and interest not only to certain States but to mankind in general. Thus it is incumbent upon us to support and supplement the efforts of the United Nations concerning issues of importance to mankind, such as the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war and the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. If the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament have not met the expectations, it is because of the lack of the political will to implement the resolutions and programmes worked out in that respect. Furthermore, national interests have taken precedence over the common international weal. We must make collective, concerted efforts to work out a comprehensive and complete programme of disarmament.

The report submitted last year by the Secretary-General on a study - carried out with the help of a group of experts - on the climatic effects of nuclear war calls for serious consideration of the effects of certain conflicts on the rest of the world and for the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests under water, underground and in outer space. We urge delegations to facilitate the work of the ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament on the multilateral negotiations on a treaty banning all nuclear tests and explosions.

The Sultanate welcomes and supports all international efforts called for by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in recent years, aimed at halting the production, stockpiling, proliferation and use of chemical, toxin and bacteriological weapons. These efforts should lead to the strengthening of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, a truly multilateral instrument, in order that agreements on limiting the use of chemical weapons could be reached. We therefore welcome the results of the Paris and Canberra Conferences and emphasize the need to establish a link between the banning of nuclear weapons and the banning of chemical weapons, in

(Mr. Al-Zadgaly, Oman)

accordance with the priorities mentioned in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this connection, the right of all States to peace and security must be ensured.

The beginning of preparations for the Fourth Review Conference of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty constitutes a true challenge for the international community. The fact that the Sultanate is not a party to that Treaty does not prevent us from speaking out against the proliferation of the futile and dangerous nuclear-weapons race. We call for concrete measures to stop the vertical and horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. We hope that the results of the Review Conference will eliminate the doubts that have been held that the Treaty will impose a fait accompli and merely perpetuate the status of the nuclear-weapon States and of those which have renounced those weapons or do not possess them. We in the Sultanate reject the idea of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We call attention to the risk of such weapons falling into the hands of certain countries which have aggressive intentions and which might use those weapons as a means to threaten a non-nuclear-weapon State. That could lead to suspicion, destabilization, an increase in regional and in international tensions, and the legitimization of the arms race. It would also waste natural and other economic resources because of the need for the means of legitimate military defence.

The Sultanate of Oman, like other peace-loving countries members of the Organization, feels that it is becoming increasingly important to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. While supporting the creation of such a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone of peace, we draw the international community's attention to Israel's increased nuclear capability and its refusal to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place its nuclear facilities under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. That is a true threat to the security of the Middle East region and impedes the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone there.

(Mt. Al-Zadgaly, Oman)

Thus there is a real **risk of** destruction and instability.

The **Sultanate of Oman** supports **the efforts** of the **Secretary-General** to prepare a **study for presentation** next year. We **believe** that it is the duty **of the** international **community** today to **consider seriously** the **establishment** of a nuclear-weapon-free **zone** in the Middle **East**, taking into account the **circumstances** and nature of the region. **This could** greatly strengthen **international peace and security**.

Oman, **since** it became a member of the **Ad Hoc Committee** on the Indian Ocean has made **every effort** to **push forward** the preparatory process for the **Conference on the Indian Ocean** as a zone of peace, in **accordance** with the **Declaration**. We **hoped** that the new trend of optimism in international **relations** will **make a significant and decisive** contribution to the work **of the Ad Hoc Committee** on the Indian Ocean so that the Conference may be held in **Colombo** in 1990 as a **first step** towards the implementation of the **Declaration of the General Assembly**. However, the difficulties created by certain countries may prove an obstacle to **this**. We call upon these **countries** to follow a **policy of détente** and **intensify efforts** to ensure that the Conference **is held** at the scheduled time.

In **this** respect we welcome the declaration of the **countries of South Asia**, which demonstrates their desire not to acquire or **possess** nuclear **weapons**, and we hope that this will lead to a binding legal agreement and to the **crystallization** of the idea of **establishing a** nuclear-weapon-free zone in **South Asia**.

The Sultanate of Oman supports all **proposals** calling for **restriction** of the practice by certain **transnational corporations** of **disposing** of nuclear, chemical, toxic and radioactive **wastes** in the territories of developing countries, **particularly** in Africa, the Middle **East** and the South **Pacific** and especially **since** the countries **concerned** are not responsible for **those wastes**. **This is a serious**

(Mr. Al-Zadgaly , Oman)

question that deserves attention because it involves immoral practices which threaten mankind and the environment in which we live. We consider it urgently necessary in all environments to **limit** the dumping of such wastes and **to** conclude comprehensive legally binding agreements in this respect.

The concept of common international security makes it incumbent upon us **to consider** outer space as the common her **itage** of mankind, which should be used solely for peaceful purposes. We call **upon** the countries that are technologically, scientifically and economically capable of **so doing** to make sure that Outer space is not used in any way illegally or unreasonably but is used only for purposes that serve peace and **humani ty**.

We are seriously concerned by the release of the news last year that Israel had launched a rocket carrying a satellite to spy on the **defensive** military capabilities of Arab and African countries and by the landing of an intermediate-range Israeli rocket on the coast of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in recent week **s**. We regard **these** as aggressive acts which could lead to insecurity and instability in the Middle East region and the Mediterranean, and thus involve the countries of the region in an arms race in outer space.

The question of naval armament is a **thorny** issue which merits attention. In this connection, the **Sultanate of Oman** considers it necessary **to** take measures **to** build **confidence** and security by decreasing the risks of incidents and confrontations on the seas, in particular by ships carrying nuclear weapons. It is important that international measures complement those **adopted** at the bilateral level and are negotiated within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. They should include guarantees of the security of non-military activities on the seas and the security of coastal States and the safety of ships belonging **to** countries not parties to a conflict.

(Mr. Al-Zadgaly, Oman)

Any discussion of disarmament would be incomplete if it did not include conventional disarmament. Since the Second World War there have been armed conflicts in which conventional weapons have been used. These have led to the death of millions of people and the wastage of vast sums of money on the purchase of such weapons. It is important that this aspect of the arms race be given due attention, and that all countries abide by the Charter of the United Nations by refraining from the threat or use of force and from interference in the internal affairs of any State. This would give countries the sense of security that must be ensured before any disarmament efforts are made. In this connection we welcome the efforts made within the framework of the Stockholm Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to reduce the numbers of conventional weapons.

The Secretary-General, in his report last year on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race, stated that there were two options before the international community, either to pursue armament or to turn with urgency and determination to a sound and balanced process of economic and social development within the framework of a more stable international economic and political order. The international community supported the validity of this argument when it adopted by consensus the Final Document of the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which declared that disarmament and development are among the most urgent challenges of our time. More than \$35 billion is being spent annually on military research and development at a time when many countries are suffering from famine, drought and desertification.

In spite of progress in the field of development, scientific achievements are devoted to the arms race and the production of instruments that threaten the very existence of mankind, such as nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Al-Zadgaly, Oman)

There is an urgent need to encourage the reduction of military budgets. International peace and security would **be promoted** if all countries in all **regions** took practical steps to reduce military arsenals to the minimum necessary to meet their legitimate security concerns. An agreement on these issues would release huge resources which could **be used for** development and to **make the world** more stable, prosperous and peaceful.

As we approach the **1990s, developments** in the countries and regions of the world make it clear that peace could **be established** through **diplomacy** and negotiations - two **important** means which are especially significant in the field of **diplomatic** relations.

**Because** we believe in the need to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, we consider it to **be high time** to re-evaluate the work in this field of the competent organs of the United Nations, foremost among which is the Conference on Disarmament. It has made great efforts to achieve progress in the field of disarmament and the time is opportune to **support its work** so that better results may be achieved. A start on giving full effect **to the 1983** resolution calling **for** expansion of the membership of the **Committee - now the** Conference - on Disarmament would be a **good** first step. There is an urgent need, also, **to** evaluate and **rationalize** the work of **the Disarmament Commission** and the First Committee so that through their efforts they may strengthen international peace and security.

Mr. RAZALI (Malaysia): My delegation is pleased **to** extend greetings and a promise of **co-operation** to the Chairman of the Committee and the members of the Bureau.

**Listening to** the Statements in the last few days, it is clear that the positive **atmosphere** that permeated our deliberations last year continues **to** prevail



(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

during our current **deliberations**. It is our hope that the continuing **favourable developments** in East-West relations and the **trends** towards openness and interaction between the two super-Powers will leave a similar **mark** on **our work this time**. It is **also** our hope that efforts at streamlining the work of this **Committee**, undertaken in the last **few** years will be further **consolidated under** the chairmanship of the representative of Venezuela.

What is clearly **discernible** from the statements made thus far **is** the mood of optimism concerning serious and sustained dialogue on the disarmament question. **To** a large extent this sense of optimism derives from the achievements **thus far**, particularly in the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States. **We** welcome the announcement that the **verification** protocols **in** respect of the Treaty on nuclear **explosions** for peaceful purposes and the threshold test-ban Treaty are being prepared for **signature** at the **projected** summit meeting between the United States and the USSR early next year. We hope that the agreements signed and the understanding reached in Wyoming and the **projected** summit between the two Super-Powers will **strengthen** and consolidate the disarmament process.

In welcoming these **positive developments** in the bilateral disarmament negotiations my delegation cannot but express its disappointment that the substantial improvement in the relationship between the two major Powers has had little impact on the multilateral disarmament process.

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

We are disappointed to see that in the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum in Geneva, there was very little tangible progress made, except in the area of chemical weapons. It is sad to say that movement in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament has been so insignificant over the years that for the most part the issues before the Conference have remained very much frozen in time, languishing in inertia. In the meantime, the international community remains, as ever before, in pious hope of some dramatic breakthrough that will breathe new vigour into these negotiations of vital importance.

Malaysia would urge serious and expeditious treatment of the issues on the multilateral disarmament agenda, for the fate of humanity may well depend on the eventual success of these negotiations. The issues of priority in the disarmament process have been well identified. Clearly, high on the multilateral agenda, as has been established in the Conference on Disarmament for over a decade, are the negotiations on nuclear weapons in all their aspects. The horrendous destructive power of these weapons of mass destruction has been tragically demonstrated and remains a lasting reminder of the insanity of nuclear war. Studies on the effects of nuclear war on the life of the planet, as catalogued in the Secretary-General's report, have graphically portrayed the grim dénouement of such insanity. In deed, even a nuclear war fought on a limited scale would unleash death and destruction on a planetary scale, triggering the Arctic nuclear winter, reducing Earth to a darkened, frozen planet. A nuclear war, however limited, should therefore never be contemplated. We are gratified to note that this was recognized by the leaders of the two super-Powers when they declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought ". Humanity awaits in hope of the solemnization of this pledge in a binding treaty for ever banning the use of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, we would urge the nuclear Powers to seriously engage in discussions on reducing the

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risks of such wars. In this regard, we consider the proposals put forward by the Soviet representative a few days ago to be useful startingpoints for a serious dialogue among the nuclear Powers on this aspect of the nuclear issue.

The Conference of Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned countries held at Belgrade recently issued a comprehensive statement on the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on the disarmament issue, to which the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia made reference in his statement. In closely associating itself with the statement, Malaysia calls for urgent and serious negotiations, at the multilateral level, on the nuclear issue in all its aspects. Delay or procrastination would only breed inertia and, worse, increase the level of armaments, which would make negotiations that much more difficult.

The matter is of great urgency because of the spiralling growth of such weapons since the end of the Second World War, despite the various agreements reached between the two super-Powers. Although we hail the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - it provides for the elimination of only about 4 per cent of the nuclear-weapons arsenals of the two super-Powers, leaving the remainder of those arsenals intact - not to mention those of the other nuclear Powers that are not covered by the INF Treaty. It is therefore imperative that, as we urge the two major Powers to press ahead with their negotiations, there should be an equal impetus in the multilateral negotiating process. We should tap the full potential of negotiations at the multilateral level, specifically in the Conference on Disarmament, so as to complement negotiations at the bilateral level. This is because, although we recognize the crucial nature and important contribution to the disarmament process of the bilateral negotiations between the two super-Powers and welcome the progress made in these negotiations, those negotiations cannot be a substitute for

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negotiation at the multilateral level as regards the comprehensiveness of their coverage or the universal impact of their achievement.

In our quest to rid the Earth of the nuclear scourge, a fundamental issue that must be addressed as a matter of urgency is that of nuclear testing. Malaysia is convinced that complete nuclear disarmament is impossible of attainment unless and until there is agreement on a comprehensive test ban. We believe that there will be no genuine nuclear disarmament as long as the nuclear Powers continue to maintain their nuclear deterrence by modernizing their nuclear weapons through testing. The nuclear-weapon States must recognise that the key to nuclear disarmament lies, not just in eliminating existing nuclear-weapon stocks, but also in not improving the sophistication and destructive power of such weapons. They should recognize that a nuclear-test-ban treaty is an indispensable step on the road to nuclear disarmament. We would therefore urge them not to try to rationalise or justify the continuation of nuclear tests on some political or technical grounds.

Malaysia attaches the greatest importance to the early cessation of all nuclear testing and will support any move that will serve to advance that objective. In this connection, and in the face of the prolonged inertia in the Conference on Disarmament on the crucial issue of a comprehensive test ban, Malaysia has endorsed the initiative for the convening of an amendment conference that would seek to transform the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Clearly, this initiative is a manifestation of the deep frustration felt by many countries over the lack of progress in the negotiations on this subject. It is also a manifestation of the increasing alarm at the spiralling nuclear-arms race, which knows no logic but its own relentless pursuit of superiority. We believe that with more than the required support needed for the convening of the amendment conference, the message of the international community

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is clear. We therefore look forward to the early convening, in 1990, of the amendment conference, which will effectively contribute towards the goal of nuclear disarmament.

We also believe that there is an important link between the attainment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We believe that, at a time when the international community is actively preparing for the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT in 1990, in anticipation of the renewal of that Treaty five years later, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would contribute greatly to strengthening and preserving the relevance and validity of the NPT. We all agree on the importance and success of the NPT in checking the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We all agree on the need, not only to maintain the validity of this Treaty, but also to strengthen it by securing its universal ratification and applicability. Clearly, it is the expectation of every State Party to the NPT that the Fourth Review Conference will once again express unanimous support for the objectives of the Treaty and commitment to its provisions. My Government continues to subscribe to the view expressed in the Final Declaration of the First Review Conference, and echoed in the Third Review Conference, that "strict observance of the articles of the Treaty remains central to the objective of averting further proliferation of nuclear weapons". It believes that, in pursuance of this objective, serious efforts should be made to seek universal adherence to the NPT. It also believes that one of the surest ways of inspiring universal confidence in the NPT, thereby inviting adherence to it, is for the parties to the Treaty to fulfil their obligations, including those under article VI.

If the nuclear Powers are serious in their desire to eliminate nuclear weapons, they will have no other recourse than to work for the cessation of all nuclear testing. On a more fundamental level, they will also have to have the

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courage to rethink and reassess the validity of their military doctrines. In an age when nuclear wars cannot be won and therefore must never be fought, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence has become obsolescent. While the doctrine of deterrence might have been valid in, and have served, earlier and less apocalyptic times, it clearly does not do so in a nuclear age. It is out of step with the dynamics of our times and ought to be seriously re-examined. Human experience dictate8 that if you carry a stick you must be prepared to use it, Yet in a world that is only at the press of a button away from Armageddon, it is the height of insanity for anyone to contemplate the use of these awesome instruments of total annihilation. It is clear that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence cannot be carried to its logical conclusion and is therefore no longer a credible proposition in the nuclear age, given the unacceptable costs of nuclear warfare.

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Indeed, no **less** than the **Leaders** of the two **super-Powers** themselves had **recognized** this reality, **when** they declared their **now famous** dictum, which I **quoted** earlier. Since **they obviously meant what they said** - it would be dreadful to think otherwise - there **is** no alternative for those that keep faith in that doctrine other than **its serious** and **early** reappraisal. In this regard we **find** the **proposal** made by the Soviet delegation for a meeting of **experts** from the nuclear **Powers** and States **hosting** nuclear weapons to consider the **parameters** of minimum **nuclear** deterrence a **sound** and practical approach in the **serious** examination of the **doctrine in the context of our times**.

Equally **important** and **urgent** is the need to advance the **negotiations** on another priority **issue**, namely, effective **international** guarantees to assure **non-nuclear-weapon** States **against** the **use** or threat of **use** of nuclear **weapons**. Obviously the most effective measure to **assure** non-nuclear-weapon **States** is **nuclear** disarmament and the effective prohibition of **nuclear weapons**, but until **these** are achieved it is important to provide **assurances** on the **non-use** or threat of **use** of nuclear **weapons to these countries**. Having given up the nuclear option, it is **the** natural expectation of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty that **these so-called negative security assurances** will be secured. **Malaysia** therefore shares the view and **supports** the **proposal, as** **contained** in General Assembly resolution **43/68**, that pending the total elimination of **nuclear weapons** there should be a legally binding instrument to **assure the** non-nuclear-weapon States against the **use or** threat of **use of** nuclear weapons,

Another **matter of** profound concern to my Government is the proliferation of **chemical weapons** and their use in regional conflicts. Malaysia abhors the **use** and proliferation of **such** weapons of **mass** destruction and **joins** in the demand of the **international community for the elimination of such inhumane weapons through the** conclusion of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. We are **encouraged** by

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the discernible progress made in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in the preparation of that convention. We also welcome the reaffirmation of the validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical weapons during the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, held in January this year. We note that the Paris Conference has generated new and increased confidence in the prospects for a global ban on chemical weapons as reflected by the increased impetus, at least initially, in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. It remains our hope that the confidence generated at that Conference, which was attended by no less than 149 countries, would have provided the inspiration for States to renounce totally the use of these terrible weapons and to co-operate fully in ensuring the effectiveness of the projected chemical weapons Convention.

We believe that the recent Government-industry Conference in Canberra on chemical weapons has provided an important perspective - that of industry - in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. We are also encouraged by the positive developments in the United States-Soviet talks on chemical weapons. The understanding reached on data exchange and verification measures between them, the proposal on the reduction of chemical-weapon stockpiles made by the President of the United States, and the positive response by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union in the General Assembly should provide a major incentive in the next and subsequent rounds of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament,

My Government monitors closely the progress of the negotiations on the projected convention in the Conference on Disarmament and would urge the negotiators to speed up their work and not lose the valuable momentum that has been generated. While fully appreciating the technical and political complexity of the issues under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament as well as the unprecedented scope of the future convention, we would nevertheless urge the parties concerned to show greater political will and accommodation so as to enable



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the early **conclusion** of the **convention**. It **is our hope** that the convention will have **universal** adherence and **applicability** so that the **use** of such weapons of mass destruction will be for **ever** banished. We would also **urge** the early **conclusion** of that convention since unilateral measures, however **welcome, are** only temporary in nature and limited in **their** scope and **impact and** will not lead to **the** complete elimination of these **weapons**. Equally inadequate and ineffective are regional measures to do away with such weapons.

**Malaysia also** subscribes to the view that outer space is the **common heritage** of mankind and should therefore **be** preserved for purely peaceful **purposes**. We believe that, given the rapid advances in space technology and the **more** than likely possibility of **the** extension of military competition into **outer space**, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive **régime** regulating the **use** of **outer space** by the **international community**.

**Malaysia also** follows closely developments on the other **issues on the** **multilateral** disarmament and **international security** agenda. We believe that greater efforts **must** be made **both** at the international and regional levels for the limitation and regulation of the conventional arms **race**) **including** those at **sea**, as this would significantly contribute to the **lessening of** world tension. We also subscribe to the view **the other confidence-building measures, such as greater openness** and transparency in military matters, are important contributions to the **disarmament process** and **international peace and security**. In this regard **Malaysia supports the** creation of zones of **peace** and nuclear-weapon-free zones in various **parts** of the world as important and necessary **confidence-building** measures in the complex global disarmament process. In our view, the creation of **such zones** of peace and nuclear-weapon-free **zones** would **contribute** to the strengthening **of** the fabric of international peace and security.

In our own region of South-East Asia, **Malaysia** continues to believe in

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the validity and relevance of such a zone as providing a structure for regional order and stability and remains committed to the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia. Malaysia remains equally committed to the promotion of the idea among countries of the region of the eventual establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia and draws a lot of satisfaction and inspiration from the successful establishment of the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone.

My Government continues to believe there is an inherent relationship between disarmament and development and that disarmament contributes directly and indirectly to economic and social development. In a developing country like Malaysia, an extra dollar spent on the purchase of arm would mean a dollar less spent on building schools, hospitals, roads and bridges. The logic of these examples may be simplistic, but it is unassailable. The hard lessons learned by the developing countries in the utilisation of their scarce resources give them valuable insights which some of the developed countries cannot grasp.

As we address the issue of global disarmament in the context of international peace and security in this and other forums, it is appropriate for us to pause and consider the larger dimensions of the question. It is the view of my delegation that, in narrowing our focus on the specific issues of disarmament before us we should not be oblivious to the dangers to international peace and security inherent in the numerous regional conflicts around the globe. A number of these conflicts, such as the conflict in the Middle East, not only have a very long history but are prone to external interference and therefore to exacerbation into wider conflicts involving major actors on the international stage. The issue of international peace and security is indivisible. We cannot afford to have a blinkered view of the disarmament process and pursue our narrow goals of world peace through disarmament in a compartmentalised fashion, separate from, and paying scant

(Mr. Razali, Malaysia)

attention to, the objective realities **of** regional conflicts **around us**. The international **community** has the collective responsibility to **seek peace** and **security not only through disarmament but** also through the **resolution** of these conflicts. In **this** regard, special **responsibility** and leadership are expected of the United Nations, in particular the Security **Council** and its permanent **members**.

The CHAIRMAN: I call **on** the representative of **China**, who wishes **to make** a s ta tement .

**STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Mr. TAN Han (China) (interpretation from Chinese) : A number of delegations have expressed condolences with regard to the earthquake disaster in China. The Chinese delegation wishes to express its heartfelt thanks for those condolences, which we shall transmit to our Government and people.

Me. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America) : I do not want to prolong the meeting, but I am compelled to do so briefly.

Earlier this week Ambassador Ronald Lehman, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, expressed our Government's appreciation for the condolences expressed by the Chairman on behalf of the members of the First Committee on the occasion of the catastrophic earthquake that occurred on 17 October in northern California. Since Ambassador Lehman was here and his remarks were made we have heard and been genuinely touched by the remarks of our First Committee colleagues expressing their sorrow and Lending their support in these hours of tragedy.

We have seen similar outpourings of grief and expressed our own condolences on those occasions in the past when tragedy has befallen the States of our colleagues. Such occasions are poignant and important reminders that as we go about our work in this Committee there is an ever-present brotherhood underpinning our relationships that unifies all the States members of this body and always manifests itself during times of tragedy.

On behalf of our Government, I wanted to express our heartfelt appreciation for the impressive, not not unexpected, support we have received from our colleagues.

**ORGANIZATION OF WORK**

The CHAIRMAN: **Before** adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform **members** of the Committee that the **following delega tions are** on the **lis t** of speakers **for Monday** morning s meeting: Greece, Roman la, Kuwait, Niqeria and Bahrain.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.