


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**GENERAL
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THIRTY-FIFTH SESSION
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FIRST COMMITTEE
40th meeting
held on
Monday, 24 November 1980
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 40TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

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Mr. Rossides (Cyprus) - A/C.1/35/L.41

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 11.00 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 32, 34 TO 37, 40 TO 42 AND 44 TO 48 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: German Democratic Republic, A/C.1/35/L.7; Niger, A/C.1/35/L.28, A/C.1/35/L.32/Rev.1, A/C.1/35/L.35, A/C.1/35/L.38, A/C.1/35/L.41, A/C.1/35/L.42, A/C.1/35/L.45 and A/C.1/35/L.46; Byelorussian SSR, A/C.1/35/L.44; and Italy, A/C.1/35/L.28.

Mr. Waliur RAHMAN (Bangladesh): Since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI), Bangladesh has been participating in the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in order effectively to contribute towards the process of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

From the very inception of the Declaration, many members intimately concerned with this question have become increasingly aware that the road leading to its implementation was beset with obstacles deriving not only from the military presence of super-Powers but also from various complexities resulting from inter-regional relationships. It is pertinent to recall that the General Assembly adopted the Declaration at its twenty-sixth session against the background of certain developments, as well as the determination of the people of the littoral and hinterland States to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to resolve their political, economic and social problems in conditions of peace and security. The Declaration has thus focussed on two essential elements, namely the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of littoral and hinterland States, individually and collectively, and the creation of conditions of peace so as to enable them to concentrate their energies on the solution of their various socio-economic problems unimpeded.

My delegation has observed with concern the escalation of military preparations in the region. While we urge all concerned to co-operate

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fully with this Committee in the implementation of resolution 2832 (XXVI), my delegation pledges its full support to any effort to free the Indian Ocean from big-Power rivalry, as well as to the removal of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction from the area. We would also support measures to establish an institutional framework within the universal collective security system that may finally be worked out for resolution of disputes among littoral and hinterland States themselves and to ensure that peace in the region is not threatened by any country or group of countries.

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As we have stated at the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States held in July 1979, my delegation believes that, if we are to proceed in a realistic and systematic manner, it will be necessary to have a legal instrument to which all interested parties can subscribe. It is therefore necessary to give consideration to the setting up of appropriate machinery to initiate the drafting process for such a treaty. In the view of my delegation, the question of entrusting the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with the task of initiating the drafting process deserves to be given serious consideration.

My delegation has noted with anguish and concern certain developments in the area since the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States held in July last year. In view of the prevailing situation in the area, it is incumbent upon all of us to make a determined effort to hold the Conference in Colombo in 1981.

We have noted with satisfaction that in its paragraph 28 the report of the Ad Hoc Committee referred to the inclusion of new members in the Ad Hoc Committee as a positive step. Wider and more intensive exchange of views on issues pertaining to the Declaration permitted a comprehensive identification and analysis of the issues related to the implementation of the Declaration. As pointed out in the draft resolution, some progress has already been made in harmonizing different views. We hope that with greater effort and understanding we will be able to remove the remaining differences; that would permit a Conference on the Indian Ocean to reach a successful conclusion in Colombo in 1981, as envisaged in resolution 34/80 B. We urge all concerned effectively to contribute to the forthcoming preparatory meetings towards that end.

Before concluding, I should like to congratulate Ambassador Balasubramaniam on his painstaking efforts over the past months in guiding the Ad Hoc Committee towards the adoption of a consensus text. The 'friends of the Chairman', of which my delegation did not have the privilege of being a member, also deserve our commendation for the yeoman's service they have rendered. I should like to place on record the appreciation of my delegation for the co-operation of the Secretariat, particularly that of the Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Kheradi, in the work of the Committee. Without the effective support of the Secretariat, the Committee would have found it difficult to complete its work successfully.

Mr. KOR BUN HENG (Democratic Kampuchea)(interpretation from French):

My delegation has already had an opportunity, on 27 October, to state its position on items on the agenda for discussion in our Committee. Today my delegation would like to add some remarks, in particular on agenda item 121 and on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.1.

Each year the Soviet Union proposes an item for consideration by the General Assembly, accompanied by a draft resolution. I shall quote only two examples of this: "The strengthening of international security" in 1969, that is, after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and "Inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism in international relations", only a few weeks after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

This year, after the invasion of that Islamic and non-aligned country, an invasion which took place after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in identical circumstances and under identical pretexts, the Soviet Union has proposed to our General Assembly a draft resolution entitled, "Urgent measures for reducing the danger of war".

Many delegations have already given their views on that item, agenda item 121. My delegation would like to make the following comments:
Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.1

"Calls upon States belonging to military alliances to refrain from actions conducive to the expansion of the existing military-political groupings through the admission of new members"; (A/C.1/35/L.1, para. 1)
and

"Calls upon States which are not members of the existing military-political groupings to refrain from joining such groupings". (ibid., para. 2)

My delegation would like to state, first, that for some years now, the Soviet Union has signed with a certain number of third world countries treaties entitled "Treaty of friendship and co-operation", valid for 25 years and automatically renewed for a further 10 years unless renounced by one or another of the high contracting parties on 12 months' notice.

On 3 November 1978 it signed such a treaty with Viet Nam. Article 6 of that Treaty states, inter alia, that

"In case either party is attacked or threatened with attack, the two parties signatory to the Treaty shall immediately consult each other with a view to

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Kampuchea)

eliminating that threat, and shall take appropriate...measures to safeguard peace and the security of the two countries". (A/33/362-S/12920, annex, p. 3)

That article is nothing but a military clause camouflaged as a so-called treaty of friendship and co-operation which, in effect, helped Viet Nam to invade Democratic Kampuchea on 25 December 1978.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has always invoked the Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship and co-operation to justify the invasion of Afghanistan.

These treaties of friendship and co-operation are in fact nothing but treaties of aggressive military alliances which, after a year, led to the invasion of neighbouring States by the signatories and which, in fact, serve the Soviet strategy of world expansion.

Secondly, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam is using the same procedure to serve its strategy of regional expansion. On 18 July 1977, it signed with Laos a treaty of friendship and co-operation of 25 years duration, which gave it the legal basis for the annexation of Laos. On 28 February 1979, two months after its invasion of Kampuchea, it claimed to have signed with the puppet régime it had installed in Phnom Penh by force of arms a so-called treaty of friendship and co-operation, on the basis of which it claims to justify the occupation of Kampuchea by 250,000 Vietnamese soldiers.

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On 22 March 1979, Laos, which became a vassal State of Viet Nam, signed in its turn a 25-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the puppet régime of Phnom Penh. Thus their game was complete. Those three treaties signify the constitution by force of Vietnamese arms of the "Indo-Chinese federation" which is to set the seal on the absorption of Laos and Kampuchea by Viet Nam. This "Indo-Chinese federation", the creation of which has been a main objective of the Vietnamese Communist Party since its foundation in 1930, is a political and military grouping which is to serve as a springboard for Vietnamese expansion throughout the whole of South-East Asia. That Vietnamese regional ambition has been powerfully assisted by the Soviet Union because it is an integral part of Soviet world expansionism. It is the deep-seated cause of the growing tension in South-East Asia and of the growing danger of the war's extending to the whole region.

My second comment on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.1 is the following: this draft resolution calls for the cessation of the increase of armed forces and conventional weapons, as a first step towards their subsequent reduction. The whole world knows that after more than 10 years of propaganda on disarmament and détente, the Soviet Union has now acquired supremacy in the field of conventional weaponry. Its military expenditures amount to 15 per cent of its gross national product, and with \$8 billion of arms sold and delivered in 1979, it has become the foremost merchant of weapons and death.

Furthermore, it is thanks to the sophisticated Soviet conventional weapons supplied abundantly to Viet Nam that the latter can continue its aggression and occupation of Kampuchea and continue killing the Kampuchean people. It is the same Soviet weapons which have been destroying Afghanistan and massacring its people. These crimes have been severely condemned by the thirty-sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights, in resolutions 29 (XXXVI) and 3 (XXXVI).

Now the Soviet Union is proposing that no State should increase its armed forces or its armaments. It is clear that it is trying to maintain its supremacy in this field and thus to preserve the fruits of its acts of aggression and its expansion and to continue with impunity its crimes against the peoples and countries which refuse to allow themselves to be subjugated by it.

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Everyone agrees that the international situation is worsening and that the dangers of a third world war are increasing every year. The international community is disquieted about this and it is aware of the fact that effective measures must be taken to prevent a new world conflagration from breaking out. International peace and security have been further threatened since the invasion of Kampuchea and the invasion of Afghanistan by expansionist forces.

The Security Council, to which is entrusted primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is unable to act because of the repeated vetoes of one of the permanent members, in this case, the Soviet Union, but the General Assembly is aware of its responsibility to "preserve succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind". To this end, it has adopted by an overwhelming majority a certain number of relevant resolutions to resolve the problem of Kampuchea and that of Afghanistan, caused respectively by the Vietnamese and the Soviet invasion.

The votes show that neither arrogance nor threats can intimidate peoples and countries determined to defend their independence, their honour and their national identity. The international community has been too much trampled underfoot and scorned by those who have for too long claimed to cherish peace while in fact only starting wars and flouting the United Nations Charter and the sovereignty of States. It has learned how to judge the sincerity of intentions, not by grandiloquent fine-sounding words, but by deeds. It knows very well that the expansionists and their partisans continue to reject scornfully the desire for peace and justice of all peoples of the world, of which our General Assembly has several times been the spokesman. The authorities in Hanoi, with the Soviet Union's enormous assistance of \$3 million a day, have been intensifying their war of aggression and racial extermination in Kampuchea, obstinately pursuing the objectives of their expansionist regional ambition. For its part, the sponsor of

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draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.1, while proposing "urgent measures for reducing the danger of war", is busy stepping up its own acts of war and invasion in Afghanistan, threatening neighbouring countries, doggedly pursuing the objectives of its world expansionist ambition.

The most urgent measures to eliminate - and not merely reduce - the dangers of a world war have already been decided on by our General Assembly in many relevant resolutions, both general and specific in nature, concerning wars of aggression, including resolutions 34/22 and 35/6 on Kampuchea, and resolutions ES-6/2 and 35/37 on Afghanistan. It is up to the invaders of Kampuchea and Afghanistan to abandon this law of the jungle which thus far they have adopted as their code of international conduct, to respect the Charter of the United Nations and the laws governing international relations, and honestly to apply all the aforementioned United Nations resolutions.

I have completed my prepared text, but I should like to add the following comment: if the Hanoi and Moscow expansionists withdraw from Kampuchea and Afghanistan as their representatives have withdrawn from this room vainly to try to escape my words, I think the international community will applaud them.

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.46.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): It is now my privilege to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.46, co-sponsored by six delegations: those of India, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico. As its title indicates, the goal of the draft resolution is a study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations - a campaign which will make it possible to conduct a mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament as advocated by the General Assembly in the Final Document of its first special session devoted to disarmament. The importance of that mobilization and the urgent need for it were also recognized at the inaugural meeting of that session by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The sponsors of the draft resolution feel that in order to carry out this campaign, which should be permanent in nature, two basic things will be needed, and these are the points described in the third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution as:

"the definition of some basic rules which, without detriment to the necessary flexibility, ensure a minimum of co-ordination

That is one point. And the other is:

"the establishment of a practical and generally acceptable system" - and I should like to stress those two terms - practical and generally acceptable - "for the financing of such a campaign"

on the understanding that it would have to be the United Nations that would be entrusted with the administration of the fund or funds established for that purpose.

The second preambular paragraph, on the basis of the Final Document, defines the two general objectives of the campaign: "to intensify and broaden the dissemination of information about the arms race and the efforts to halt and reverse it", on the one hand, and, on the other hand, "to promote programmes of study and education concerning disarmament".

The nature of the activities to be undertaken in the campaign in connexion with those two general goals is well illustrated in the different

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specific measures listed in paragraphs 100 to 108 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. The specific mention of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and non-governmental organizations concerned with disarmament matters in those paragraphs of the Final Document makes it highly advisable that those entrusted with that study maintain the necessary contacts with UNESCO as well as with those other organizations.

As far as the financial implications are concerned, the draft resolution has been very carefully worded to reduce them to a minimum. It has been stated not only that the group of experts to help the Secretary-General in preparing the study should be a small group but also that in so far as circumstances permit preference should be given to members of the United Nations Secretariat, whose salaries are already covered under the regular budget of the Organization.

Therefore, the Secretary-General has been able to calculate, as representatives can see in paragraph 10 of his report to the Assembly on the fourth and fifth sessions of the Advisory Board on disarmament studies, document A/35/575, mentioned in the fourth preambular paragraph of the draft resolution, that the total allocation needed for the proposed study would be in the order of \$35,000. That is equivalent to what is spent in two seconds - two seconds - for the world arms race.

We are convinced, moreover, that with all its apparent modesty the draft resolution that we are submitting today may very well in the long term be considered as one of the most important resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. If, as we believe, the proposed study proves itself an effective tool for giving momentum to the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the benefits that may be derived from it will be truly incalculable.

Therefore, we trust that the First Committee and, subsequently, the General Assembly, will adopt the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.46, entitled "World Disarmament Campaign", by consensus.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): In introducing draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.41, which is sponsored by Algeria, Argentina, Bahamas, Ecuador, India, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia and Cyprus, my purpose is to give, in as few words as possible, the main gist of it.

Before doing so, I should like to say that there is a slight revision in the operative paragraph 2. The words "eliminate tensions and conflicts and" are deleted, and the words "in a positive spirit" are added after the word "proceed", so that the second operative paragraph now reads:

"Calls upon all States to proceed in a positive spirit towards measures under the Charter of the United Nations for a system of international security and order concurrently with efforts at effective disarmament measures".

The thrust of this draft resolution is to give emphasis to the importance of halting the arms race. The preamble expresses the grave concern felt over the escalating arms race, spending on which has reached the figure of \$600 billion. The aim of the sponsors is to draw attention to the graveness of the situation, particularly in these times, where there are very ominous international developments and the danger of a nuclear conflagration seems to be nearer than ever before. Therefore we have to go to the basic matters, as one has to in critical situations, and to deal more with the centre of the problem than with the periphery. We know that the arms race has been going on while efforts for the reduction or limitation of armaments have been unproductive.

The third preambular paragraph of the draft resolution "considers that the lack of effective international security is a generating factor in the escalating arms race" because it is very hard to get nations to disarm or to desist from a competition in armaments when their security is based purely on the use of force and armaments and there is no alternative to armaments for their protection. Competition therefore becomes inevitable.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

This brings me to the purpose of this draft resolution.

In its preamble it recalls that, according to Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Charter, the primary purpose of the United Nations is

"To maintain international peace and security and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression".

This is the basic and paramount Article of the Charter, and its purpose. As far as the principles of the Charter are concerned, the main and basic principle is the non-use of force - the prohibition of the use of force. In addition, Article 2, paragraph 5 speaks of the need for all Members to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes" to give validity and effect to its resolutions on matters of international peace and security.

We recognize that we have to do something to get out of this present state of insecurity and anarchy. But where else can we turn but to the United Nations Charter for a substitute for the use of force? We are operating under the aegis of the United Nations and we cannot ignore its Charter or its basic purposes and principles. We must therefore recognize that compliance with the purposes and principles of the Charter would promote world order and security, which is so necessary in these demanding times. Then, convinced that in order to do anything to promote security we have to have a degree of co-operation between States, and that we cannot achieve that co-operation in the atmosphere of hatred and antagonism caused by the arms race, the sixth preambular paragraph expresses the conviction that

"confidence in the effectiveness of the United Nations and the resulting climate of trust will facilitate co-operation between Member States on matters of common interest for peace and survival, irrespective of any differences in political or social systems".

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

When humanity as a whole is facing the threat of its complete annihilation, it is not permissible to prevent co-operation in meeting that danger because of political or social differences. Everything will have to be done in its proper place. If it is a matter of the survival of mankind, we have to co-operate and to put aside our differences, and that is the meaning of the sixth paragraph of the preamble of this draft resolution.

In its seventh preambular paragraph the draft resolution recalls paragraph 12 of the Final Document (resolution S-10/2) of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament saying:

"The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful co-existence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding".

The following paragraph of the Final Document goes on, in fact, to say:

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations".

The last preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.41 and the following operative paragraphs say that the General Assembly:

"Considering that the objective of halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and proceeding to effective disarmament measures, compatible with national security, can be realistically served through applying the collective security system provided for in the Charter, parallel to disarmament efforts,

"Reaffirms its resolution 34/83 of 11 December 1979 on disarmament and international security;

"Calls upon all States to proceed in a positive spirit towards measures under the Charter of the United Nations for a system of international security and order concurrently with efforts at effective disarmament measures;

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

"Recommends that the main organs of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security give early consideration to the requirements for halting the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and developing the modalities for the effective application of the system of international security provided for in the Charter;

"Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to facilitate the Council towards carrying out this essential responsibility under the Charter;"

In the matter of the permanent members using their influence to facilitate the Council's moving in the right direction, I should like to say a few words about this essential responsibility.

What this draft resolution is asking is not a matter of political will. It is not open to the Member States to say they have not the political will to proceed to the measures of international security and peace provided for in the Charter, because those provisions of the Charter are mandatory, and therefore all Members of the United Nations have to comply with them. By complying with them they would create a measure of international security and order which would render the cessation of the arms race possible and disarmament effective.

This draft resolution, therefore, has a wider scope. It is not intended merely to aid disarmament - although it does effectively aid this most important part of the United Nations work - but also provides for the order needed in the world to prevent conflicts and wars.

Article 11 of the Charter says:

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament".

The disarmament aspect of our work is very important, but it is a part of the whole procedure for the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, I submit that this draft resolution could be adopted by consensus.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): On many occasions the Venezuelan delegation has affirmed the importance it attaches to efforts made to promote the mobilization of public opinion at the international level on behalf of disarmament. We have clearly and repeatedly stressed the growing need to get specific machinery moving and to intensify and improve existing machinery in order properly to inform public opinion of the implications of the arms race, in particular the nuclear-arms race and of the growing risks and dangers stemming from it. An informed public opinion, aware of the implications of all aspects of the arms race can no doubt constitute very valuable assistance in promoting the goals of disarmament and their attainment, and in stemming the arms race.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament underscored the importance and significance of mobilizing world public opinion in favour of disarmament. During the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, upon the initiative of the Venezuelan delegation, a draft resolution was adopted in this Committee which was geared precisely towards fostering and channelling initiatives aimed at providing information, not only on the negative impact of the arms race but also on the efforts made with great resolve and perseverance by the United Nations to halt the arms race and reverse it, especially the nuclear-arms race, which is a growing threat to the future of mankind.

We are pleased to see that within the United Nations there has been considerable progress made in the important task of informing the public, but a great deal still remains to be done. The very dynamics of the arms race imposes growing demands, requirements that we must meet in an unswerving manner. We must at least equal the extremely fast and alarming pace of the arms race, particularly in nuclear weaponry, in our own efforts to inform public opinion and stem that race. That is why we commend the draft resolution in document A/C.1/35/L.46 that has just been introduced by Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico. It seems to us that the study proposed in it can make an appreciable contribution to the attainment of the goals that we have set ourselves in this specific sphere of our disarmament efforts, through the establishment of a small group of experts, as the document states, with preference given to members of the United Nations Secretariat.

The study on the organization and financing of a world disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations deserves our most enthusiastic support since, as can be seen in the document, it is necessary and appropriate to define some basic rules that make possible the ensuring of a minimum of co-ordination towards the achievement of a world disarmament campaign, as well as a practical and generally acceptable system for the financing of such a campaign.

As can be seen from a considerable number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, resolutions that emerged from this Committee, studies and reports on different disarmament items can be very important.

For those reasons the Venezuelan delegation has decided to join the group of sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.46 and would ask the Secretariat to take note of that information. It is our hope that that draft resolution will be adopted unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN: It is now my intention to begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, which has 17 sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Sweden at the Committee's 29th meeting on 7 November 1980.

I should like to remind the Committee that the representative of Sweden has made an editorial change, in operative paragraph 4 (b), by replacing the word "in" by the word "between" in the phrase "expenditures among different States and in different years..." The subparagraph would therefore read:

"To examine and suggest solutions to the question of comparing military expenditures among different States and between different years as well as to the problems of verification..."

I call on the Committee Secretary to make a statement on the financial implications of this draft resolution.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary of the Committee): As I reported to the Committee at a previous meeting, in accordance with rule 15⁴ of the rules of procedure:

"The Secretary-General shall keep all committees informed of the detailed estimated cost of all resolutions which have been recommended by the committees for approval by the General Assembly."

Once that information has been provided to the First Committee, the financial implications of any draft resolution should be examined first by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and later by the Fifth Committee.

As stated in rule 153 of the rules of procedure, no resolution in respect of which expenditures are anticipated by the Secretary-General will be voted by the plenary Assembly unless its financial implications has been considered by those bodies.

The financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 were circulated to the Committee this morning for its information and are contained in document A/C.1/35/L.51.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote before the voting.

Mr. SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, on the understanding that the reduction of military budgets is incumbent, first and foremost, upon nuclear-weapon States whose military expenditure accounts for the greatest part of the resources devoted to armaments and that those States will take the necessary steps to reallocate savings generated by the process of reduction to the economic and social development of the less developed countries. It follows that those same nuclear-weapon States, as well as other militarily significant States, should be the first to display their willingness to make use of the reporting instrument before it is generally utilized by all those States which have significantly less important military expenditures.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Soviet Union would like to make the following statement in respect of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10.

No one can deny the advantages that would accrue to the peoples by the real reduction of military budgets. A number of useful decisions have been taken by the United Nations on this score. In particular in 1973, on the proposal of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on this subject, in which it addressed an appeal to all States permanent members of the Security Council to reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent during the next financial year, and to allot 10 per cent of the funds saved to assist developing countries. But the implementation of those important initiatives has not made progress, since certain States, including permanent members of the Security Council, have been openly sabotaging all decisions and resolutions appealing for a reduction in military budgets by using trumped-up pretexts.

Representatives of those States like to argue about the problem of the comparability of military budgets and the verification of their reduction, and always speak of the attainment of practical agreements on the matter. These are invented pretexts and excuses. As a result, world military budgets are growing continually and dangerous decisions are being taken which

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

seriously subvert efforts to reduce military budgets. In this respect, we would remind representatives of the decision taken in 1978 by countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) automatically to increase their military budgets annually until almost the end of this century.

The Soviet Union is consistently striving to change this system and to bring in the practice of the systematic reduction of military budgets. In a memorandum of the Soviet Union, entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees", submitted at this session of the General Assembly, we once more stress the willingness of the Soviet Union, at any time, to enter into negotiations with other States which have large economic and military potential and with all the States permanent members of the Security Council to devise concrete measures for each of them to reduce their military budgets, either by a percentage or in absolute terms.

The Soviet Union is prepared also to reach agreement on the sum to be diverted to the economic development of developing countries by each State which reduces its military budget.

On the basis of its position regarding the need for a speedy decision on this question of reducing military budgets, the Soviet delegation is unable to support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.10 and will abstain in the vote on it. The draft is restricted to the usual proposals about carrying out endless studies on the comparability of budgets and on accounting machinery and diverts us from the attainment of practical agreements on the reduction of military budgets. In essence, it leads only to an increase of the United Nations budget - as we have just heard - by \$1.5 million.

Mr. GBEHO (Ghana): I have asked for the floor in order to explain the position of the Ghana delegation concerning draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, on which the Committee is about to take a decision.

Ghana fully supports the general objectives of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, which is aimed at encouraging greater transparency in military matters. We also appreciate the effort being made by the international community to find a solution to the problem of instituting a standardized form of reporting on military expenditures as a means of increasing confidence among States and promoting the goal of general and complete disarmament. However, it goes without saying that the success of such an effort will depend on the full co-operation of all States. Unless all States, particularly the militarily significant ones, co-operate in terms of operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the value of the projected exercise would be greatly reduced if not nullified.

As of now, responses to the request for military expenditures have been uncomfortably few, and there is no guarantee that co-operation from all States will be forthcoming. This raises difficulties for my delegation, which places premium on the full co-operation of all States and which, therefore, has reservations on operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution.

In view of the foregoing, the Ghana delegation will be compelled to abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10.

Mr. MORBER (Hungary): First of all, my delegation would like to state that Hungary continues to support all genuine measures leading to the reduction of military budgets with a view to curbing the arms race and freeing for economic and social development resources now being used for military purposes.

That is why, from the very beginning, we have supported those draft resolutions that serve the above-mentioned aim. The preamble of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 suggests that:

"the systematic reporting of military expenditures is an important first step in the move towards agreed and balanced reductions in military expenditures."

(Mr. Morber, Hungary)

In our view, the first and most important step towards the achievement of these goals would be for all States, particularly the most heavily armed States, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development.

In the light of this, I should like to draw attention to the fact that while the Soviet Union has recently reduced its defence expenditures to an amount estimated at 17.05 billion roubles, which represents 5.7 per cent of its total budgetary expenditures, the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), following the 1978 Washington decision, regularly continue to increase their military expenditures. This shows that the reporting system or its refinement will bring no solution to that problem. The decisive issue is one of political will. If this will does not exist, there will be no solution. Since in my delegation's view the draft resolution before us would not contribute to the solution of the question of the reduction of military budgets, we will not be able to support it and will abstain when it is put to the vote.

Mr. MANGAL (Afghanistan): As a small, non-aligned country, Afghanistan is always in favour of general and complete disarmament. Among disarmament measures, we continue to support the well-known proposal on the reduction of military budgets of States, particularly by the permanent members of the Security Council in order to release substantial resources for international economic and social development activities.

However, we have serious doubts about the conclusions contained in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10. Among those conclusions, the following seem to us most questionable: first, that the reporting instrument would contribute to increasing confidence among States and, secondly, that the reporting of military expenditures, even on a systematic basis, would move us towards agreed and balanced reductions on military expenditures, without appropriate international negotiations and agreements on the basic question of the reduction of military budgets.

For these basic reasons, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10.

Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire)(interpretation from French): The delegation of Zaire will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 on the reduction of military budgets. In so doing, however, we do not in any way wish to give the impression that we are endorsing the idea that all States Members of the United Nations have equal responsibility with regard to the arms race. We believe that this draft resolution is basically addressed to the great Powers and military Powers which take delight in increasing their military budgets for all-too familiar reasons. The realization of our objective of reducing military budgets, which is the purpose of this draft resolution, can only be achieved if all the military Powers and all the great Powers support not only the concept of the draft resolution, but its stated terms.

If it is not made completely clear that all the great Powers and military Powers concerned support the idea of stemming and reversing the arms race and that they wish to reduce expenditures and military budgets in order to release resources needed for economic and social development, then once again it will be obvious to all how futile some of our endeavours here in the United Nations are. Nevertheless, because of the principle involved, we shall vote in favour of the draft resolution in the hope that the great Powers and military Powers will understand the meaning of this appeal and that they will ally themselves to a growing degree with the concerns of the overwhelming majority of States, for it is not merely that majority's views with regard to this serious problem that will lead to its solution.

Mr. DABO (Guinea) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation has very attentively studied draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 in its French version and, although I am not completely fluent in that language, it seems to me that the translation leaves a great deal to be desired.

Paragraph 2 of the draft resolution conceals the real objective sought by the Committee. We have very serious reservations with regard to that paragraph, and for that reason we shall probably be compelled to abstain in the voting.

Mr. MESHARRAFA (Egypt): My delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 on the understanding that all measures contained in this draft resolution are addressed mainly to nuclear-weapon Powers and militarily significant States.

Mr. CALDERON (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): With reference to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, the Bolivian delegation shares the view expressed by the representative of Brazil. That is why we are going to vote in favour of the draft resolution.

The PRESIDENT: I shall now put to the vote draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Kampuchea, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway,

Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, India, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Poland, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Viet Nam, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 was adopted by 106 votes to 0, with 25 abstentions.

The PRESIDENT: I now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their votes at this stage.

Mr. SARAN (India): In the explanation of our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.9 we already stated the position of the Indian delegation on the question of the reduction of military budgets. The general considerations we set forth in that statement apply to draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 as well. However, I should like to make a few additional comments on the draft resolution currently before us.

(Mr. Saran, India)

My delegation cannot accept the notion contained in the draft resolution that reduction in military expenditure could be carried out on the basis of maintaining "the military balance". We do not subscribe to the concept of military balance or the concept of the balance of power, which have been used to justify the actions of some States inimical to the promotion of international peace and equal security for all States. The reduction in military expenditures must be related to the concept of equal security for all States and should have as its aim the improvement of global security, leading to greater confidence and trust among nations.

Judged from this perspective, it is the five or six militarily significant States which can contribute to those aims by substantially reducing their already over-inflated military expenditures. Such reductions would not lead to diminished security for them but would, on the contrary, significantly improve global security environment. They would also release the resources urgently required for economic and social development.

The concept of maintaining some sort of a military balance puts heavily armed States and those allied to them in interlocking military arrangements on the same footing as the other countries belonging to the developing world. This is especially true of those countries which are non-aligned and which are still struggling to preserve their sovereignty, integrity and independence against external threats and interference.

The draft resolution recommends that all Member States should make use of the reporting instrument elaborated by the ad hoc group of qualified experts appointed by the Secretary-General to report annually their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available to the Secretary-General. The first such report is to be presented not later than 30 April 1981. My delegation is of the view that it would have been more proper and logical, in the first instance, to invite Member States to give their comments and recommendations with respect to the study carried out by the ad hoc group of qualified experts rather than to endorse the reporting instrument elaborated by the study without further delay. Since

(Mr. Saran, India)

the reporting instrument has not yet been the subject of detailed debate and examination, we cannot accept the commitment to abide by that instrument to report on military expenditures. In any event, the open debate on our defence budget in our parliament ensures that relevant information in this regard is made speedily available to public scrutiny.

It is in view of these considerations that my delegation has abstained in the vote on this draft resolution.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 because it considers that the subject of that resolution deserves our attention.

In connexion with operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, recommending that all Member States make use of the reporting instrument and report annually their military expenditures for the latest fiscal year for which data are available to the Secretary-General, presenting their first report preferably not later than 30 April 1981, I should like to state that the action recommended in this paragraph could prove to be useful and effective only if all the members of the international community participate in it.

Mr. FINDLAY (Australia): Because of the importance that Australia attaches to the question of the reduction of military budgets, the Australian delegation voted in favour of both resolutions on this subject. As the Australian Prime Minister stated at the first special session devoted to the disarmament, Australia supports the principle of the reduction of military budgets;

"carried out in ways which would not be destabilizing or create new tensions". (A/S-10/PV.16, p. 41)

As an earnest of our interest in the subject, Australia has participated in the test of the military budget reporting instrument provided for in resolution 34/83 F. We regard the successful carrying out of this test, with the participation of 14 States, to be an important step forward. We are conscious, however, that for the reporting instrument to fulfil its promise as a valuable tool in the eventual attempted reduction of military budgets, there must be universal participation in it.

In voting in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, which deals principally with the reporting instrument, Australia would have preferred the inclusion of a specific call to those States that did not participate in the test, especially those with different social and economic systems, to begin reporting their annual military expenditures to the Secretary-General in 1981. Australia believes that the future success of the reporting instrument hinges on the participation of all States, not just those that volunteer to participate in the test.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 and supports measures for achieving a reduction of military budgets. I wish, however, to comment on one aspect of the draft resolution which, in our view, is less than ideal.

As delegations will have seen from my Government's reply to the Secretary-General in appendix II of document A/35/479, the United Kingdom fully supports the aim of greater openness in the reporting of military budgets, which would contribute to the building of confidence among States. In this connexion, my Government has supported the work of the panel of military experts which has been testing a reporting matrix. At the same time, the United Kingdom has stressed the need for the completion of the proposed reporting instrument by a representative sample of Member States: that is, in the language of operative paragraph 1 (a) of resolution 33/67:

"States from different regions and representing different budgeting and accounting systems".

We have therefore noted with disappointment that so far no party to the Warsaw Pact has contributed by sending a representative example to the Secretary-General for the test. This is even more disappointing in the case of the Soviet Union in view of the scepticism with which its normally published military expenditure statistics are regarded.

My delegation welcomes the recognition in operative paragraph 4.(a) of resolution A/C.1/35/L.10 that further testing and refinement of the proposed matrix is necessary. We also welcome the emphasis that has been placed on the need for further examination of the question of comparability and verification. But, in our view, the recommendation in operative paragraph 2 ought to have been directed principally at States from those regions which have not so far participated in the testing of the reporting instrument.

Mr. AL-MAHMOUD (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): Referring to the statement of the Secretary-General regarding the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.10, I should like, on behalf of the Arab Group, to have an explanation as to why Arabic was not included in the administrative and financial implications of the study, since, of course, Arabic is an official language of the Organization.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Secretary of the Committee to reply to that inquiry.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary of the Committee): In accordance with rule 51 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly:

"Arabic shall be both an official and a working language of the General Assembly and its Main Committees."

The body which would be set up by the draft resolution that we have considered today is not technically a Main Committee of the General Assembly, but simply an expert group. In that sense, usually no provisions are made for servicing such groups in Arabic. The text of the relevant rule of procedure of the General Assembly guides the Secretariat on this specific question, and we have worked out the financial implications of this resolution on that basis.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action upon the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.19. This draft has eight sponsors, including Zaire, which has just become a sponsor: it was introduced by the representative of the Philippines at the 33rd meeting of the First Committee, on 18 November 1980.

I call on the Secretary of the Committee to make a statement regarding the financial implications of this draft resolution.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Secretary of the Committee): I wish simply to indicate that the financial implications of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.19 are set forth in document A/C.1/35/L.50, which has been distributed to Committee members for their information.

The CHAIRMAN: The sponsors of this draft resolution have expressed their wish that it be adopted by the Committee without a vote. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee adopts the draft resolution without a vote.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.19 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now take action on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.24. This draft resolution has six sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Sri Lanka at the thirty-fifth meeting of the First Committee on 19 November 1980

I now call on the representative of the Netherlands, who wishes to explain his position before the Committee takes a decision on this draft resolution.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Speaking on behalf of the nine States members of the European Community, I should like to draw the Committee's attention to certain aspects of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference contained in document A/35/28 before a decision is taken on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.24. In studying the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, representatives will have noted that in part three of the report, entitled "Conclusions and recommendations", the Committee considered, inter alia, that:

"no consensus with respect to the convening of a world disarmament conference under the present conditions has yet been reached among the nuclear-weapon States whose participation in a world disarmament conference has been deemed essential by most Members of the Organization". (A/35/28, para. 14)

The deterioration in the international situation, as reflected in that paragraph of the report, has made it more difficult to solve the question of convening a world disarmament conference. Indeed, the Committee itself does not suggest that such a conference should be held until after the conclusion of the second special Assembly session devoted to disarmament in 1982.

In these circumstances, while not opposing consensus, the Nine doubt whether further meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee would lead to the advancement, before the conclusion of the second special session, of the idea of a world disarmament conference.

The CHAIRMAN: The sponsors of this draft resolution have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote.

(The Chairman)

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees to adopt the draft resolution without a vote.

It was so decided.

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.24 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Albania who wishes to explain his position after the Committee's decision.

Mr. BALETA (Albania)(interpretation from French): The Albanian delegation dissociates itself from the consensus which emerged on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.24. It has stated in the past in the First Committee that it is opposed to the idea of convening a world disarmament conference, which is based on a proposal made some time ago for purely propagandistic purposes.

Meetings of all kinds and at all levels, discussions, never-ending negotiations, and very numerous and diverse documents on disarmament problems have not been lacking. But that has not helped us take a single step towards disarmament. On the contrary, armament and the arms race have continued at break-neck speed.

Two years ago, a special session of the General Assembly was convened to promote disarmament. Since then the number of resolutions has doubled and discussions on disarmament are going on all year round in numerous bodies. The dream of disarmament is becoming even more illusory. A second special session will take place in 1982. Why then do we need a world disarmament conference? Why convene such a conference? If it takes place, will it produce better results? By what miraculous means, hitherto unknown, will it be able to achieve concrete results? We do not believe at all in this possibility and we cannot give our support to the idea of convening that conference.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee has now concluded its consideration of and action on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.24.

It is now my intention to begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1. That draft resolution has two sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Pakistan at the 30th meeting of the First Committee on 10 November 1980. A recorded vote has been requested on this draft resolution.

I now call on representatives who wish to explain their votes before the vote.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)(interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to state some views in explanation of vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to concluding a convention on security guarantees for non-nuclear States, and is convinced that the conclusion of such a convention would strengthen the non-proliferation régime, the obligations assumed under it, and assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons against them.

We note with satisfaction that the Pakistani draft once again reaffirms the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international agreements on this subject. The draft notes that in the Committee on Disarmament there is no objection, in principle, to the idea of concluding a convention and recommends that the Committee actively continue negotiations to that end.

Bearing that in mind, we shall vote in favour of the Pakistani draft.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I should like to draw attention to the fact, however, that on this question there is another draft resolution, under item 45 of the agenda, of which the Soviet Union is one of the sponsors. What new elements are proposed in that other draft resolution? How does it differ from the draft resolution submitted by Pakistan? First and foremost, we have taken into consideration that in the Committee on Disarmament and outside that Committee there has been broad-based support for the idea that, on the recommendation of the General Assembly, the Security Council might take up the question of concrete measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Naturally, such an interim agreement could not replace the attainment of arrangements acceptable to all which might be reflected in an international instrument of a legally binding nature. On this question a consensus was attained in the Committee on Disarmament, as reflected in the report of the ad hoc working group of the Committee and also in the report of the Committee on Disarmament.

Taking into account the results of the negotiations held in the Committee on Disarmament, a group of delegations drew up a proposal on this matter, which is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. That is the difference between the two draft resolutions.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): On behalf of the nine member States of the European community, I wish to explain our vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 and at the same time, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, which is closely related.

First, I should like to stress that our Governments wish to see progress made in the important field of security assurances. We would therefore have preferred to have been able to support a draft resolution at this session of the General Assembly which invited the Committee on Disarmament to continue its consideration of this subject. We appreciate the fact that in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1, introduced by Pakistan,

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

account is taken of possible different approaches to the achievement of effective international arrangements in this matter. Nevertheless, we find that the text does not altogether reflect the balance of opinions expressed during consideration of the subject this year in the Committee on Disarmament and that it gives pre-eminence to the idea of an international convention. Nor does the draft resolution contain any reference to the fact that nuclear-weapon States have made statements on assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States in regard to the use of nuclear weapons.

For these reasons, the Nine have regretfully decided to abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1.

On the other hand, draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, put forward by Bulgaria and four other countries, seems to us to be in a rather different category. Among other things, it takes no account of any approach to the question of security assurances other than that advocated by the sponsors. It also includes a qualification of non-nuclear-weapon status-which is not acceptable to our delegations.

The Nine will accordingly abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44.

Mr. MENZIES (Canada): I should like to explain the Canadian votes on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 and draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44.

In recognition of the great importance that many countries attach to this subject, and consistent with Canada's nuclear non-proliferation objectives, my delegation will support draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1. Although we agree with its substance, we continue to have some problems with it, as we did with the text submitted by Pakistan last year, namely, the considerable extent to which it favours an international convention over other possible mechanisms. Given the international climate and the already existing voluntary guarantees of the nuclear-weapon States, it is extremely unlikely that common language can be agreed. We also do not entirely share the view expressed in the draft resolution's final preambular paragraph.

(Mr. Menzies, Canada)

We shall abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, as it clearly does not allow for any other possibility than an international convention to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For reasons already stated, we do not consider this approach to be realistic.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to direct my remarks to both draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 and draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 on negative security assurances.

Sweden will abstain on both those draft resolutions and I will now explain this vote. Sweden favours in principle the idea of negative security assurances, by which we understand co-ordinated and binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have explicitly abstained from acquiring such weapons.

The responsibility to formulate co-ordinated assurances acceptable to all States must in our view rest primarily with the nuclear Powers themselves. Such assurances should be made in a legally binding form. They could, for example, be given in the form of a co-ordinated declaration submitted in the Security Council of the United Nations or in the form of a treaty between the nuclear-weapon States.

As to the question of the legal framework for negative security assurances, the two draft resolutions now before us seem to favour an international convention whereby nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would enter into some kind of mutual obligation. The Swedish Government has strong reservations as regards such arrangements. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have already done their share in adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and there is no reason for them to repeat this obligation.

Our reservations as regards the idea of an international convention in this field are also related to certain fundamental features of Sweden's policy of neutrality. One of the draft conventions to which reference is made contains provisions which seem incompatible with some basic principles of this policy. Although in principle we favour negative security assurances, I wish strongly to underline that they cannot be regarded as substitutes for real nuclear disarmament and should in no way divert our efforts from curbing the nuclear arms race.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia

Against: None

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Central African Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Grenada, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 was adopted by 114 votes to none, with 24 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the voting procedure on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. This draft resolution has eight sponsors and was introduced by the representative of Bulgaria at the 37th meeting of the First Committee, on 20 November 1980. Separate votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 5 and 6.

I call on the representative of Zaire, who wishes to explain his vote before the voting.

Mr. KAMANDA wa KAMANDA (Zaire) (interpretation from French): Much as we supported the idea of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, we do not fully understand the concept of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The Committee will note that draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", mentions the convention only twice: once in the heading, and, secondly, in operative paragraph 7. Nowhere else is there a reference to an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; instead, there is reference to an international convention guaranteeing non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. So I do not understand what the significant difference is between this draft resolution and draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1, which we have just adopted.

(Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Zaire)

This draft resolution that only refers to guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States contains some major ambiguities. As we understand it, our objective is to make the nuclear-weapon States give definite guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not use those weapons against the latter. We do not think that the Security Council can be called upon at this stage to approve or not approve a declaration in which a great Power might say "I promise not to use nuclear weapons against a State that does not possess such weapons". The idea that the Security Council could endorse such a statement is rather ambiguous and might even be an obstacle to the future conclusion of an international convention on guarantees to be given to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Because of all those ambiguities and because we do not really understand how this is intended to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons, we will abstain on the draft resolution as a whole, independently of our vote on the two paragraphs on which a separate vote has been requested.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. The Committee will vote first on operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan,

Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United States of America

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Denmark, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, Yugoslavia

Operative paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 was adopted by 90 votes to 12, with 28 abstentions.*

* Subsequently the delegation of the United Kingdom advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote against.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to a separate vote on operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Angola, Bahrain, Barbados, Benin, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia

Against: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America,

Abstaining: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Central African Republic, Denmark, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Morocco, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, United Republic of Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire

Operative paragraph 6 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 was adopted by 84 votes to 13, with 28 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 as a whole. A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia

Against: Albania, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Burma, Canada, Central African Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guatemala, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Cameroon, Zaire

Draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 was adopted by 100 votes to 2, with 30 abstentions.*

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their votes at this stage.

Mr. BALETA (Albania) (interpretation from French): The Albanian delegation wishes to explain the position it took in the vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. I wish to say from the outset that in the view of my delegation there are many reasons for not supporting such a draft resolution. As is well known, the question of concluding an international convention such as is advocated in this draft resolution was raised in 1978 by the Soviet socio-imperialists as part of what has become their ritual attempt to use the United Nations as a tool for propaganda.

The delegation of Albania opposed this idea at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly and voted against resolution 33/72 A. We acted likewise during the following session on resolution 34/84. Since the draft resolution which has been adopted by the Committee pursues the same objectives in the same terms, we again oppose it. It is, however, important to raise one question: is it possible that effective guarantees can exist for non-nuclear-weapon States that would shelter those countries from the use of nuclear weapons or from the threat by the super-Powers to use such weapons against them so long as the arsenals of nuclear weapons remain intact and continue to be increased and improved?

We believe that in these conditions the kind of guarantees that have been mentioned can only be formal or fictitious, especially if we take into account the aggressive policies of the greatest protagonists of nuclear weapons, the imperialist super-Powers, that is, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

* Subsequently the delegation of Cyprus advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

(Mr. Baleta, Albania)

The nuclear Powers think only about intensifying preparations for nuclear war and constant nuclear blackmail against all countries. If they talk about concluding a convention to give so-called guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon countries, or say that they are disposed to do so, it is only to camouflage their actions and to lead others to forget the danger, to weaken the opposition to nuclear weapons and to make those countries content with empty legal texts instead of nuclear disarmament.

If a convention is concluded and adopted, of course, by the nuclear Powers, it will be used by those Powers for their own purposes alone. They will tell the others: "Now you have nothing to complain about. You have a convention, you have a guarantee, so stop demanding nuclear disarmament and protesting about the nuclear threat".

It should also be stressed that the imperialist Powers and all aggressors disregard all conventions when they decide to strike, they strike with all the means at their disposal.

We cannot, therefore, share the view that, for the lack of anything better, it is worth signing a convention, since we know that the nuclear Powers could violate it at any moment. We believe that an international convention, especially of the sort that the imperialist Powers want, would cause a great deal of harm and no good at all.

That is why my delegation voted against draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, which is a direct descendant of resolution 33/72A. For the same reasons, my delegation did not participate in earlier votes on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1.

Mr. LEHNE (Austria): Austria, as a non-nuclear-weapon State situated between the two military alliance systems of Europe, both of which include nuclear-weapon Powers, has a natural interest in the question of arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

While such arrangements should never be seen as a substitute for nuclear disarmament, they may have a valuable confidence-building effect and contribute to the strengthening of non-proliferation.

The Austrian Government therefore welcomes the unilateral declarations issued by Governments of nuclear-weapon States during the special session on disarmament and is following with great attention the efforts undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament to reach agreement on more effective arrangements. We have noted with some disappointment that as a result of the divergence of the strategic doctrines and security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon States, these efforts have so far met with little success. We nevertheless believe that the Committee on Disarmament should continue its work on this matter. In its future considerations, the Committee on Disarmament should primarily concentrate on the substantive aspects of the five unilateral formulas and explore basic means by which these formulas might be extended and harmonized. The establishment of a consensus on the substantive contents of co-ordinated and harmonized assurances should take precedence over discussions on the legal form in which they might find their final expression.

(Mr. Lehne, Austria)

In this connexion it has to be stressed that Austria continues to have reservations about the elaboration of an international convention. In our opinion States which have demonstrated their renunciation of the nuclear-weapons option by adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to the Treaty of Tlatelolco cannot be expected to undertake any further obligations to attain the benefits of security assurances. Since draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.44 and A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 seem to prejudge the further course of action in the direction of the eventual conclusion of a convention my delegation abstained on both.

Mr. KAREM (Egypt): The delegation of Egypt in the Committee on Disarmament, in the person of Mr. Mohammed EL-Baradei, had both the pleasure and honour of presiding over the work of the ad hoc working group established on the subject dealt with in draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 to which we attach cardinal importance. While we have just voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44, we were bound by the spirit of compromise and co-operation and therefore decided not to pursue a negative position vis-à-vis certain of its elements.

The recommendation that the Security Council should examine declarations regarding the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States, which is an interim arrangement in the view of my delegation, should not be a substitute for the efforts to achieve such a convention and here it might be pertinent to recall what is stated in the report of the Committee on Disarmament under "Conclusions and recommendations" on page 20:

"It was, however, suggested that any interim arrangement should not be a substitute for the indispensable renewed efforts to reach agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

(A/35/27, para. 49, subpara. 17)

Furthermore, operative paragraph 4 of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44 which calls upon States participating in talks on the question, does not define those States. We would have liked to see the language referring to and calling upon nuclear-weapon States participating in talks within the framework of the sole multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Karem, Egypt)

Finally, my delegation's understanding of the phrase in operative paragraph 5 referring to non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territory is that it refers to all non-nuclear-weapon States.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The delegation of Finland voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 and A/C.1/35/L.44, both of which deal with the question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

From the point of view of non-nuclear-weapon States the question of security assurances to be given them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a most legitimate concern. Finland has welcomed the recent unilateral assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States as expressions of political commitment. They contribute to the further consideration of the question but they obviously fall short of the goal of effective international arrangements. Recent developments in the field of nuclear-weapons technology have given a new dimension to that question. Finland believes that all approaches towards achieving arrangements for non-use assurances should continue to be explored, including the further development of unilateral declarations as well as multilateral agreements. All interested Governments should be involved in the process and have an opportunity to express their particular security concerns.

In view of those basic considerations, Finland supported both draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.5/Rev.1 and A/C.1/35/L.44.

Mr. OYONHO (United Republic of Cameroon) (interpretation from French): Cameroon abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.44. We believe that the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is very important and cannot be governed by mere unilateral declarations, however solemn these may be, by the nuclear-weapon States. That is why we support the idea of the urgent conclusion of an international convention of a binding character for all, to strengthen and spell out such guarantees.

Furthermore, we wonder what effect such unilateral declarations in the Security Council might have, knowing as we do that more and more this Council's decisions are flouted.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.