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## VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 16TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. MULLOY (Ireland)

(Vice-Chairman)

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## The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

# AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

#### GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. CULBRANDSEN (Norway): First I should like to extend to the Chairman and the other officers of the Committee my delegation's sincere congratulations on their election.

We have just embarked on the Second Disarmament Decade. It is to be hoped that that ambitious label will better fit the 1980s than the preceding Decade.

We are facing dangerous arms races of qualitative as well as quantitative dimensions in the nuclear as well as the conventional field. The continuous and escalating arms competition represents a basic threat to man and ultimately to his survival. It is also a deplorable misuse of scarce resources in a world marked by increased poverty and distress.

Allow me to remind the Committee that it bears a special responsibility in the search for new initiatives to curb the arms race. My Government is prepared to do its utmost to bring about a more urgent and effective course of action to achieve that end, both in the deliberations of this Committee and in United Nations disarmament activities as a whole.

Last year Norway welcomed the conclusion of the SALT II agreement as the most important achievement during 1979 in the field of nuclear arms control.

For its part the Norwegian Government continues to urge rapid ratification of SALT II and entry into the third phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks as a matter of the highest priority. The SALT III deliberations should embrace and reflect the concept of substantial nuclear arms reductions. In this connexion we attach particular importance to the initiation of preliminary talks and subsequent negotiations with the aim of preventing a new and ominous race on the continent of Europe with

competitive deployment of theatre nuclear forces. The cardinal task ahead in this field is agreement on such comprehensive reductions in deployment systems that plans for additional deployment can be buried altogether. Such an outcome would indeed amount to a major reversal of the dangerous trends.

The nuclear-weapon States have not only a responsibility but a true obligation to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and arsenals.

The Second Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty ended in Geneva in September last without coming to agreement on a final declaration that could be adopted by consensus. Norway finds that outcome regrettable, especially since in fact general agreement was attained in many significant areas of concern. The Conference did, however, accomplish what it set out to do: that is, to review the operation of the Treaty during the last five years. Virtually every delegation maintained that that important arms-control Treaty, designed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, represented a unique accomplishment in the arms-control field and that it continued to serve the security interests of every party to the Treaty.

The basic disagreements during the Review Conference related to the ability and determination of the nuclear-weapon States to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in international relations by negotiating real reductions of their arsenals. It became evident that a large number of countries felt that the nuclear-weapon States had not fulfilled their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue such negotiations effectively.

It would seem timely for this Committee to express its concern and support for those negotiations entering into a more constructive and speedy phase. That applies particularly in regard to the question of arriving at a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a treaty would constitute a non-discriminatory instrument of essential relevance to the promotion of non-proliferation.

The tripartite report to the Committee on Disarmament of 30 July 1980 shows that some degree of progress has been made towards the important target of concluding such a treaty.

There are several technical issues connected with the implementation of a comprehensive test ban. However, the benefits of an agreement and the risks involved in violating such an agreement should in our view now outweigh the technical obstacles to an agreement that would also embody the principle of verification.

My Government would like to see the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes halted.

A ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would place nuclear-weapon States on a more nearly equal basis with non-nuclear weapon States than has so far been the case. The nuclear-weapon States would then have to accept the same IAEA safeguards as are required of non-nuclear-weapon States, thereby eliminating one important element of discrimination between the two categories of States.

The question of assuring the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States has so far not been satisfactorily resolved. Horway accepts the arguments of those States which hold that Security Council resolution 255 (1968) of 19 June 1968 does not provide sufficient guarantees to non-aligned States.

Those States that are not parties to alliance security systems involving nuclear-security guarantees and which have been asked to renounce their option of acquiring nuclear weapons have a legitimate claim to guarantees against being attacked or threatened by attack with nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility for finding a solution to this problem, which indeed is of crucial significance to the entire non-proliferation régime. The recipients of assurances, on their part, should be prepared to consider constructively alternative options for promoting an internationally acceptable non-nuclear-weapons régime.

Norway considers that on the subject of negative security assurances some significant progress has been achieved. Each of the nuclear-weapon States made declarations at the 1978 United Nations special session on disarmament. Some definitional issues will remain ambiguous, but a general framework for extending assurances in a manner which will curtail the political utility and use of nuclear weapons in international relations has been suggested. In our view, we should remain flexible with respect to the modalities for negative security assurances and be aware of the need to find constructions which will reinforce rather than weaken regional security arrangements.

In this connexion, Norway supports the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important component in a non-proliferation régime, provided such associations are based on a voluntary agreement among of the States concerned and reflect the special circumstances obtaining in the region in question. We welcome the significant fact that all nuclear-weapon States have now ratified Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The other Review Conference held this year in the field of arms control and disarmament concerned the Convention banning the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on their Destruction. The statistics are quite positive: 31 States have ratified

the Convention, six new States have joined it and 37 other States have signed but not yet ratified it. In the final consensus declaration the States Parties to the Convention reaffirmed their strong determination to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons.

In the wake of this successful Review Conference, it would appear more logical and pressing than ever before that a similar convention concerning chemical weapons be agreed upon. It is to be hoped that the <u>ad hoc</u> working group set up by the Committee on Disarmament will render some positive results to that end in the near future. My Government lends its strong support to those endeavours. In April of this year, we announced that Norway will not allow the stationing or storage of chemical weapons on its territory. This policy parallels Norway's policy with regard to the stationing and storage of nuclear weapons.

Concerning the <u>ad hoc</u> panel carrying out the pilot test of a military expenditures reporting instrument, my Government has familiarized itself with the panel report which has been presented to the Secretary-General. We have reason to remain hopeful that that innovative report will prove useful as a first basis for further progress towards an international reporting system with the aim of reducing world-wide military expenditures.

In this connexion, let me mention the useful and constructive Danish proposal for a United Nations study on all aspects of the conventional arms race and on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. We support that initiatve.

Norway also has considerable expectations regarding the progress of the work carried out in the field of disarmament and development by the United Nations group of experts. Most of the research reports have been submitted to the group and the prospects seem good for a constructive report being presented to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

We are now more than half way between the first and second special sessions on disarmament. The outcome of the next session will in great measure depend on the extent to which by 1982 effective steps have been taken to complement the Programme of Action adopted by the first session.

This Committee should, in our view, put forward ideas and suggestions on how best to organize and structure the preparatory work for the upcoming session. The Committee may also turn its attention to the agenda of the next special sesion and identify those disarmament initiatives which are deemed most critical with respect to the follow-up of the Programme of Action.

For its part, the Norwegian Government is prepared to do its utmost to help to make sure that the second special session will be a successful one. In addition to the great number of highly important matters which need to be dealt with at that session, my Government also wishes attention to be paid to a proposal which we put forward at the first special session, and which was reflected in the final document, resolution S-10/2, in paragraph 125(a). This concerns the suggestion that all countries adopt a procedure whereby major new weapons and military programmes are made the subject of analysis as to their impact on arms control and disarmament efforts. The idea has not generated widespread support. We are open to a consideration of functional equivalents which are acceptable to the States involved and in conformity with their decisionmaking procedures. The goal of incorporating arms-control considerations and their explicit evaluation into national decisions on arms procurement is, we believe, an important one and we are willing to co-operate in the formulation of acceptable procedures to that end.

Mr. SUFMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, my delegation joins the many others who have already most warmly congratulated you and the other officers of the Committee on your election to guide our deliberations in the First Committee this year. We assure you of our fullest support in the responsibilities you have assumed.

In deciding to speak today, I had in mind that my statement would be made during Disarmament Week. My Government values the opportunity which Disarmament Week provides to improve public understanding of the dangers of the global arms race and of the efforts which are being made to curb it. This year, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Lord Carrington, made a statement on the subject to a meeting of the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom in London on 24 October. In his speech, he described the British Government's arms control policy and the prospects for progress in the various international negotiations. I shall be making copies of Lord Carrington's speech available to all delegations this afternoon.

Since this Committee last met, international relations have moved into a difficult period, not to say a dangerous one. Hardly had the General Assembly closed last December when the forces of a permanent member of the Security Council were sent to occupy a small neighbouring country. Ten months later, they are still carrying on military operations in that country in defiance of world opinion. And serious conflicts continue in other parts of the world. Those events cannot be ignored by those of us in the United Nations who are seeking to strengthen international security and to make progress in arms control.

My delegation is indeed most conscious of how little has been achieved in arms control since we were last assembled here. We are disappointed but I cannot truly say that we are surprised. It is evident to us that arms control and disarmament agreements are a reflection of the international atmosphere. That does not mean that there should be no arms control efforts when international confidence is at a low level or when there is little trust between parties. But in those circumstances agreement is likely to be even more difficult to negotiate. The plain fact is that we shall not see dramatic steps in disarmament until further progress is made in removing the causes which drive Governments in many parts of the world to build up their armed forces.

At the same time, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, arms control is and will remain an integral part of our search for international peace and security. But we cannot realistically expect progress in arms control if we do not bear in mind that it must at the same time genuinely enhance our security. Every State has an inherent right to self-defence in order to maintain its own security - a right which is moreover enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. But negotiated measures of arms control can be of substantial importance in restraining the arms race. They contribute to our security, both in a collective sense through multilateral measures, and bilaterally.

An important arms control activity in which my Government is currently engaged is the negotiation between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. I wish to make it clear that we remain committed to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban and will continue to play a full part in those negotiations.

In common with its partners and allies, the United Kingdom therefore wants to see faster progress in achieving concrete measures of arms control - measures in which arms control and security go hand in hand.

The position taken by the NATO alliance on the limitation of theatre nuclear weapons is an excellent example of that approach. The continuing build up in Soviet medium-range missiles and the introduction of the Backfire bomber targeted on Western Europe led to a progressively serious military imbalance in that area. Faced with that imbalance, the NATO alliance was obliged to take the decision to modernize its own long-range theatre nuclear forces in order to maintain its security. We also needed to provide a more equitable basis from which meaningful and balanced arms control negotiations on theatre nuclear forces could proceed. Experience has shown that arms control negotiations are more difficult to achieve when one side has a large and growing advantage over the other. We want to see a balanced arms control solution rather than another round in the arms race. But the American offer to negotiate was repeatedly rejected over many months before the Soviet Union finally agreed to come to the negotiating table. My Government welcomes the fact that those negotiations have now begun.

In the view of the United Kingdom, the only secure route for progress, therefore, is through the negotiation of balanced and verifiable agreements. And the kind of arms control agreements which make most sense are obviously those between States or groups of States currently confronting each other. Experience shows that agreements can only emerge from serious and painstaking negotiation. They will not come about by making sweeping declarations. Declaratory measures have no real significance in arms control terms.

In judging the individual draft resolutions which have been or soon will be submitted here in the First Committee of the General Assembly, we should therefore consider whether they will make a constructive and tangible contribution to arms control and the enhancement of security. In my delegation's view, our Committee's primary role should be to encourage progress in existing negotiations and to discuss serious proposals in potential new areas of arms control.

We should also judge proposals against the behaviour of the States which put them forward. It cannot have escaped the attention of any delegation in the Committee that the proposal presented under the title "Urgent Measures for Reducing the Danger of War" (A/35/241) was put forward precisely by that State whose intrusion by military force into a neighbouring country has been strongly deplored by the General Assembly. We shall all draw our own conclusions about the intrinsic merits of the proposed resolution and about the motives of its sponsors. I would comment only that I do not believe this unoriginal device will deflect attention from the military occupation of Afghanistan. We do not intend ourselves to support the proposed resolution and we do not believe, moreover, that it deserves support.

A number of speakers in this debate, conspicuously the representative of Mexico, in his intervention of 15 October, have drawn attention to the priority which they attach to nuclear disarmament. We are all acutely sensitive to the horrors that the use of nuclear weapons would entail. The United Kingdom has nuclear weapons precisely in order to prevent a nuclear war from occurring. For it must be recognized that in Europe nuclear weapons have for many years been an integral part of the East-West security system. Nuclear disarmament should in our view take place as part of a far-reaching arrangement providing at the same time for the reduction and limitation of major conventional armouries. Otherwise there would come about a large disparity in power between countries with large conventional armed forces and those without such forces. Such

a disparity would be unacceptable in terms of national security and undesirable in terms of the destabilization which would result. It is illusory to believe that just because nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive power they can be treated in isolation for arms control purposes.

We therefore consider that this Committee should give greater attention to conventional arms control. As a first step, my Government supports the idea of a United Nations study of the conventional arms race. In view of the importance of conventional arms in conflicts actually in progress today, we hope that at this session of the General Assembly we shall agree to launch a study. Its findings could then make an important contribution to the second special session on disarmament in 1982.

As members will know, my Government has been persistent in arguing that arms control and disarmament measures must be verifiable. That is often the most difficult question in arms control negotiations. But it is self-evident that if we want the obligations undertaken in arms control measures to contribute to security, all the parties to an agreement must be confident that other parties will observe its terms.

I shall give one example of a field in which the problem of verification is central to negotiations now in progress, but where we also have a current illustration of the need for verification. I refer of course to chemical weapons, where we believe that reports of their use in armed conflict merit impartial and effective investigation. One of the useful results of the discussions on chemical weapons during the present year in the Committee on Disarmament has been the wider understanding of the central role which adequate verification will have to play in a total ban on the means of chemical warfare. We hope that this work will reinforce the bilateral negotiations which are in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union.

We note with interest the Advisory Board's recommendation for a United Nations study of the verification problem. We should like to consider this further. If this idea is approved it will be important to find out what lessons can be drawn from past experience in monitoring arms control agreements.

I have one further positive conclusion that I would draw from our work in the disarmament field during 1980. This is that the measures of arms control which are most likely to succeed in the present international climate are ones that are practical and specific rather than universal and general.

There is a recent illustration of what can be achieved, even in the current atmosphere, when there is a solid piece of work to do, and I refer to the successful United Nations Conference on inhumane weapons, which concluded in Geneva earlier this month. The Conference achieved a Convention and three Protocols which represent a significant contribution to humanitarian law in armed conflict. I am certain that we all welcome this step forward. Let us resolve that in the coming year we shall apply the same practical approach to some of the central, and admittedly more difficult, items on the arms control agenda.

Mr. RAZALI (Malaysia): The Malaysian delegation has listened with great interest to the statements made by various delegations in this Committee. These statements reflect weighty positions of Governments and, in some cases, offer constructive contributions to the attainment of our eventual goal - an end to the arms race, disarmament and a world no longer threatened by a holocaust of destruction. In terms of avowed declarations and principles, there is nothing lacking. In fact, if all our declarations could be dovetailed into concerted actions we would be well on the road towards a world rid of the threat of destruction.

We are all very much aware of the total obliterative power of a nuclear war. The agonies and misery of Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide us with very stark reminders. However, despite initial progress, exemplified by the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and related agreements of 1971, 1972 and 1977, we have now come to a period of serious inaction. The momentum arising from the high expectations of the earlier period seems to have dissipated, endangering past achievements and adding further dimensions of risk to the international community. While committees and groupings in various forums ponder over issues of existence, the international situation continues to worsen. The politics of military might and the brandishing of weapons of maximum destruction in the promotion of exclusive national interest have dimmed cherished goals. In the fragile relationship between the security of nations on the basis of armament and the universal aim of security for all through disarmament, armament has sharply overtaken disarmament. That we can be safe and secure only if we are armed to the teeth is a perversity that violates all the tenets that this body has always stood for.

Malaysia is a country straddled by geography and history in an area which has been a cockpit of conflicting power imperatives. Powers vie for dominance and primacy in the region. Intra-regional problems take on the dimension of major-Power involvements. In these circumstances, peace, security and unthreatened continued existence are articles of faith for Malaysia. We will not be part of the intensified political rivalry of major Powers, which has seriously exacerbated world tension. Malaysia cannot subscribe to the proposition that peace and security are sustained only by the precarious balance of mutual armed deterrence, which guarantees neither permanent peace nor continued survival.

At the highest level we must reassert our conviction that there must be a relaxation of the tense international climate. The major Powers cannot continue to determine contentious issues between themselves in an atmosphere of heightened and escalating tension. Malaysia urges those Powers to renew efforts towards de-escalation with greater determination and political will. It is time to disavow the link between security and the accumulation of weaponry. The militarization of political power is a great obstacle to disarmament and peace. Malaysia welcomes the inception of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation and reduction of theatre nuclear weapons. However, while we see merit in the claim that there is immediate need to maintain military balance between East and West, our support is dampened by the realization that such efforts are still being made in the context of power advantage and deep suspicion.

Malaysia's enduring commitment is to general and complete disarmament. We do not subscribe to concepts of limited nuclear warfare or localised conflagrations, whatever the exigencies. We continue to believe in the indivisibility of fundamental issues. Détente in Europe, or its demise, will have direct ramifications elsewhere. To believe otherwise is an exercise in self delusion and an act of folly.

Malaysia calls for the early ratification of SALT II and for the two major Powers to refrain from actions that would prejudice not only the ratification but steps that should follow upon ratification. Malaysia recognizes the complexity of the issues before us. We understand the realities of a rational and balanced approach, but substantial and decisive progress must continue to be the objective.

It may be necessary in the present situation to think of the tasks before us in terms of long-term and immediate interests. But all too often immediate interests are interwoven with narrow perceptions of advantages, and long-term interests are sacrificed in the process.

The negotiations subsequent to the signing of the partial nuclear test\_ban Treaty of 1963 are a case in point. Malaysia has the distinct impression that discussions on this issue have become bogged down in extraneous considerations in a climate of suspicion. Today, 17 years later, it is still unclear when an acceptable and verifiable comprehensive test\_ban treaty will be achieved and what its content will be.

As regards the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the second Review Conference was not successful in bringing together opposing views. On the other hand, quantitative and qualitative proliferation is continuing at an alarming pace. Indications that South Africa may be in possession of nuclear armaments provide an extra and sinister dimension in an already uncertain climate. This damages the credibility of the Treaty and causes the germination of dangerous tendencies towards even greater proliferation. The obligation of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear, as regards the Treaty is clearly a steadfast commitment to the concept of universality, and Malaysia would like to join in the common appeal to this end. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important step towards preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The establishment of nuclear-free zones in various regions would constitute an effective non-proliferation measure.

While giving priority to nuclear disarmament, my delegation does not wish to diminish the urgency of concurrent measures to reduce the conventional arms race. Conventional weapons account for four fifths of the world's military budget. The accumulation of such weapons, particularly in conflict regions, increases tension and heightens escalation towards armed conflicts which could assume serious proportions. States in such conflict areas invariably become pawns in the rivalry of the big Powers for spheres of influence. This type of situation creates conditions of instability in the regions concerned and would lead to a spiralling of the conventional arms race beyond the limits of self-defence. Measures to curb the level of conventional armaments necessitate mutual agreement on the need for a more stabilized military relationship, and this in turn, must be accomplished by other measures to create the necessary conditions conducive to the relaxation of tension and to mutual trust and confidence. The realization of these measures would induce the right political climate for a halt to the conventional arms race.

The First Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, in March 1980, is an important step towards limiting the potential and widespread use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It will be recalled, however, that no agreement has been concluded with regard to chemical weapons, despite the General Assembly resolution of 1971 urging all States to reach an early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. Reports are now being mentioned of chemical weapons being resorted to. Whatever their veracity, it is necessary that all States, particularly those that already are in possession of these weapons, should be fully committed to their international obligations.

It is a matter of record that Malaysia has always supported the idea of establishing zones of peace in various regions in the world.

The concept of zones of peace envisages the establishment of conditions which would be conducive to peace, stability and co-operation among States within the region. It is our belief that the creation of such zones constitutes a constructive and positive effort towards eliminating big-Power rivalry for spheres of influence, preventing potential regional conflicts, reducing tension among States, and promoting regional co-operation for the economic and social development of countries in the region. That concept is directly related to the concept of regional disarmament and contributes to the attainment of general and complete disarmament. We are happy that the report of the Secretary-General of 8 October 1980 (A/35/416) recognizes the positive merits of the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality concept for South-East Asia as advocated by Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore.

The goal of establishing a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean offers for the countries in the region concerned prospects of increased stability and security. My Government fully supports all efforts to bring about an early realization of this proposal. We appeal to the major Powers to respect the aspirations of the countries in the region. Elements of the deteriorating relations between the major Powers should not be manifested in that region.

The report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, referring to disarmament, states inter alia:

"It is, after all, an abiding irony that all Governments are aware of the dimensions, the significance and dangers of the arms race and are committed in principle to disarmament, and yet we see less actual progress in this field than in almost any other major international problem." (A/35/1, page 12)

Clearly, as we enter the second Disarmament Decade, and despite the grim and inauspicious start, there is much to be done, minus the propaganda and the polemics.

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Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): My delegation welcomes the opportunity during the annual sessions of our Committee to hear different views of the problem of disarmement and different approaches to their solutions. The current session is particularly ominous, as we are convened here in an atmosphere of considerable apprehension caused not only by the international tension but also by the accelerating arms race, thus providing an inauspicious start for the second Disarmement Decade. Despite the concern expressed in the Final Document of the special session on disarmement that mankind is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced, the arms race has continued. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It was therefore hoped that the convening of the special session on disarmement, which agreed on a Programme of Action and priorities, would lead to rapid progress towards its objectives.

To our dismay and disappointment, however, we have been witness to the very meagre efforts devoted to halting and reversing the arms race. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons has continued unabated, negotiations on a comprehensive test ban have shown no substantial progress, and nuclear disarmament is not at all in sight. In fact, the spectre of the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear war looms even larger. Spiralling military expenditures year after year, coupled with the steadily deteriorating international situation, have seriously diminished the security of States. Under these circumstances, the question arises whether the provisions of the Final Document, which was the result of consensus, are to be discarded as utopian and whether the concerns expressed in it are limited merely to our annual routine statements in this very forum. We must also ask ourselves in all sincerity if we should be resigned to the fate of living with the present state of affairs, with the risk it entails to our and succeeding generations, or if we should all be actively concerned with genuine measures of disarmament. These are the hard realities that confront us as we begin consideration of the various agenda items before us.

Indonesia has always viewed with grave concern the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war and has consistently supported efforts to eliminate the danger of the use of nuclear weapons. I should like to recall in this connexion that as early as the sixteenth session of the General Assembly in 1961 Indonesia co-sponsored resolution 1653 (XVI), which condemned the use of those weapons as a violation of the Charter and a crime against mankind. Since then a number of technological achievements have made even more clear the devastating results of a nuclear war. As Harvard professor Michael Mandlebaum remarked perceptively in an article titled "The Bomb, Dread and Eternity", appearing in the Fall 1980 issue of the periodical International Security:

"Nuclear war could destroy all those things that make symbolic immortality possible. The difference between past wars and a full-scale nuclear conflict is the difference between the end of an era and the end of a culture. Nuclear weapons, unlike any other weapons known to man, have the power to make everything into nothing."

Indeed, the fact that the world continues to live in the shadow of nuclear catastrophe is stressed in the report of the experts on a comprehensive study on nuclear weapons. It declares that nuclear weapons themselves have become the most serious threat to international security and disputes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to support weapons programmes.

"It is inadmissible", the study says,

"that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear weapon States ...". (A/35/392, annex, para. 497)

Finally, the report asserts that disarmament should be pursued in a global context, taking into consideration the security interests of all States, not just the nuclear-weapon States.

In this context the immediate goal of disarmament must be the cessation of nuclear weapon tests. Despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly, testing has continued unabated, leading to widespread dissatisfaction and casting doubts on the political will of the countries concerned to bring about its cessation. My delegation hopes that a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be achieved next year in the multilateral framework of the Committee on Disarmament and without prejudice to the ongoing trilateral negotiations. Without a comprehensive test ban and without applying measures for halting vertical proliferation it would be unrealistic to expect the Non-Proliferation Treaty to play the role which has been assigned to it.

The dissatisfaction felt by many developing countries with that Treaty that was expressed at the First Review Conference was renewed with greater vigour at the Second Review Conference. My delegation very much regrets the failure of the Conference to adopt a final declaration, which was to contain an assessment of the operation of the Treaty, which came into effect 10 years ago, and recommendations as to future action to ensure that its provisions are fully observed, especially by the nuclear States. Although such a declaration did not emerge from the Conference, my delegation hopes that nuclear-weapon States will take seriously into account the concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the lack of progress in implementing the provisions of the Treaty relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It should be recognized that the Treaty is not intended to perpetuate the distinction between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. If the nuclear-weapon States hold the view that it is and want to preserve all the advantages the Treaty gives them without accepting its obligations, then the concept of the universalization of the Treaty as an instrument to prevent proliferation may lose its credibility. Furthermore, the ever growing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, coupled with the failure to implement article VI, has constituted a threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and may well result in reconsideration of their continued adherence.

The success of efforts to develop an international consensus to prevent proliferation depends on the willingness to curb nuclear arsenals. The final document of the tenth special session contained a recommendation that

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility." (resolution S-10/2, para. 48)

My delegation therefore calls upon nuclear-weapon States to interpret and implement the provisions of the Treaty in accordance with its letter and spirit and to take concrete steps with a view to ensuring that they are fully implemented.

These discouraging trends are further augmented by the concern generated by the report of the experts that South Africa has both the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Without in any way underestimating the grave dangers of nuclear weapons in general, it must be said that Pretoria's acquisition of nuclear weapons capability takes on ominous dimensions owing to the <u>apartheid</u> régime's proclaimed determination to preserve white supremacy by all means at its disposal. Such a situation, the report warns, may well invite illogical responses and actions. We cannot but view such a development as particularly threatening to the security of Africa and to international peace: it also constitutes an obstacle to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The conclusion of a treaty to ban weapons of mass destruction would contribute not only to the ending of the qualitative arms race but also to the attainment of the objective of using scientific and technological developments for peaceful purposes. The Committee on Disarmament, which considered the issue at length, recognized the need to study all aspects of radiological weapons to avoid any loop-holes in the treaty. Such an approach is intended not as a hindrance to the conclusion of a treaty but rather to promote clearly defined objectives.

The immediate goal of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and to make meaningful progress by ensuring the cessation and reversal of the arms race. A comprehensive programme without a time-frame would merely be a compendium of disarmament measures the achievement of which would be elusive. The commitment to a time-frame, in the opinion of my delegation, demonstrates political determination on the part of militarily significant States to take the initial steps towards the ultimate

goal. We fully realize that disarmament is a complex issue, but we cannot deal with it effectively in the absence of concrete direction towards its achievement.

On the question of security assurances, these should redress the present imbalance in the obligations assumed by the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. It is to be regretted that the search for a common approach to an effective international instrument to assure the non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has so far failed. The most effective security against these deadly weapons is of course their prohibition and eventual elimination. Since such action might be difficult to achieve in the near future, my delegation supports the adoption of interim measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States through an internationally binding legal instrument. Obstacles to the achievement of an agreed formula can be overcome if the nuclear-weapon States include in their consideration the fact that such action also benefits their peoples, as part of mankind, which must be saved from annihilation. The Committee on Disarmament cannot be expected to solve the problem unless the nuclear-weapon States change their views and attitudes concerning their perceived immunity from catastrophe.

My delegation welcomes with satisfaction the success achieved at the recent United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restructions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. It has shown us that difficulties and differences can be overcome if there is the necessary political will on the part of the States, especially those possessing a preponderance of military power. Had such will been manifested on the priority items of disarmament we certainly would have achieved greater progress than has been possible in the past.

As a State bordering on the Indian Ocean, Indonesia continues to attach great significance to the implementation of the United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. This has become particularly urgent in view of the current situation in that region. In this regard, the Conference on the Indian Ocean scheduled to be held in 1981 should address itself to the objectives embodied in the Declaration.

The forthcoming second special session on disarmament will indeed have a formidable task to fulfil, particularly in the context of the very limited achievements in our endeavours to promote disarmament. Consequently, in order

that that session may accomplish its task of formulating a disarmament strategy, it is essential to make thorough preparations on the basis of the constructive efforts of all States.

In conclusion, I should like, despite the Assembly's ruling, to offer to the Chairman and other officers of the Committee my delegation's most sincere congratulations. We are confident that under the Chairman's leadership our deliberations will result in positive conclusions.

Mr. THIOUNN PRASITH (Democratic Kampuchea) (interpretation from French): First of all, my delegation would like to extend to the Chairman its warmest congratulations on his unanimous election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. This is a further tribute to his great qualities as a diplomat and to his country, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, whose role in the Non-Aligned Movement continues to grow as does its role among the Islamic countries and in the international arena as a whole. We should like to repeat our assurance of our whole-hearted co-operation and our best wishes for success in his task.

It was 35 years ago that the United Nations was founded and its Charter proclaimed. In the first paragraph of the preamble to that Charter there is a solemn reaffirmation of the determination of the peoples of the world, united in this Organization,

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind".

Since that memorable date our Organization, to its credit, has striven to live up to the hopes placed in it by all our peoples, who aspire only to live in a world free from war, in a community of nations in which they can decide freely on their own destiny, without any foreign interference, and devote themselves to the economic, social and cultural development of their countries in accordance with the identity and civilization of each, maintaining relations among themselves on the basis of respect for the sacred principles of the Charter.

For three decades now the General Assembly has continued to deal with the problem of general and complete disarmament and it has adopted some important resolutions in order, as is stipulated in Article 26 of the Charter, to "promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security" through appropriate arrangements for bringing about disarmament. It suffices in this regard to recall that in 1969 the General Assembly proclaimed the first disarmament decade, to begin in 1970, and in 1976 it adopted resolution 31/189 B which provided for holding a special session devoted to disarmament. At that tenth special session, which was due to the initiative of the non-aligned countries, the General Assembly reaffirmed in its Final Document the determination of the international community to bring about general and complete disarmament, to do everything possible to strengthen international peace and security, to eliminate the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, to take concrete measures to halt and reverse the arms race, to settle disputes by peaceful means and to reduce military expenditures so that the resources thus released can be devoted usefully to the development of the well-being of the peoples and the improvement of the economic conditions of the developing countries.

The year 1980 marked the beginning of the second Disarmament Decade.

Many meetings and negotiations on disarmament have continued this year within the United Nations framework; the Committee on Disarmament, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the second review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of use of certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, meetings of experts on the existing relationships between disarmament and development, the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations on the Indian Ocean and so forth, just to mention some of the most important.

These many meetings have not shown any encouraging progress. Furthermore, the United Nations resolutions and the measures adopted by the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, have not been implemented.

Today, we cannot but note with regret that in spite of all the efforts made by our Organization and by all those countries which love peace and justice and are Members of the United Nations, international peace and security based on general and complete disarmament remain an illusion. Although the voices of the medium-sized and small countries are being heard ever more loudly, there has so far still been no encouraging progress. On the contrary, tension in the world has been increasing from year to year. The conventional and nuclear arms race remains uncontrolled. Each year hundreds of billions of dollars are swallowed up in expenditures to produce and improve weapons of all kinds while hundreds of millions of people, particularly in the third world, continue to languish in poverty and to suffer from hunger. In 1979 these expenditures had already reached \$500 billion, while assistance to developing countries amounted to barely 5 per cent of that figure. The establishment of a new international economic order is as remote as ever. Together with this situation, new focal points of tension and armed conflict have arisen in Asia, Africa and in the Middle East, imperilling international peace and security. All these conflicts are harbingers of a new world-wide conflagration which may very well break out in the next few years.

Since the invasion of Kampuchea by the Vietnamese regional expansionists and since the invasion of Afghanistan by the expansionist international great Power, all peoples of the world who love peace and justice have been perfectly well aware that the root cause of the deterioration in international relations is not to be sought only in the arms race, but, above all, in the policy and in the wars of aggression and expansion of these regional and international hegemonists undertaken in order to expand their spheres of influence and domination regionally and in the world at large.

For more than 10 years now, under the cover of its propaganda on disarmament and on détente, the great expansionist Power has increased and refined its conventional nuclear and chemical weapons. Its military expenditures now amount to 15 per cent of its gross national product. From 1976 to 1979 its sales and deliveries of arms on the world market rose from \$3.4 billion to \$8 billion. This Power has now become the world's foremost dealer in guns and in death. Its air forces and its navy have been increasing from year to year. Its warships, whether powered conventionally or by nuclear means, scour the Pacific, violating the territorial waters of coastal States. It has more ships in the Indian Ocean than any other naval Power.

This quantitative and qualitative increase in the military strength of the great expansionist Power is not something that was undertaken for defensive purposes but, rather, for purposes of world domination. The invasions of Kampuchea and Afghanistan are incontrovertible proof of this.

In Afghanistan at the present time 100,000 Soviet soldiers equipped with the most modern and most sophisticated weapons have for almost a year continued to put the country to fire and the sword. They have been slaughtering the Afghan inhabitants of whole villages and have been using even chemical weapons in the vain attempt to overcome the determination of the Afghan people to be independent and free. They are using Afghanistan as a springboard from which to extend the domination of the world expansionists over the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

It is because of the tremendous military aid they received from this great expansionist Power that the Hanoi authorities ventured to commit aggression against and invade Kampuchea, my country. In 1979 this great expansionist Power sent to Viet Nam more than 3 million tons of weapons and military equipment. With these weapons the Vietnamese expansionists put my country to the sword and have already killed more than 3 million of its inhabitants by starvation, conventional weapons and chemical weapons. In the populated central regions of the country the inhabitants of whole villages have been murdered by the Vietnamese invaders. Their blood is mingled with that of the martyrs of Lidice and of Oradour-sur-Glane.

In the more remote areas the Vietnamese invaders have been lavish in their use of chemical weapons. Kampuchea is now a testing ground for these weapons, which are, by the way, prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use in time of war of asphyxiating and toxic gases and other bacteriological means of warfare. The range covers different chemical products and toxic gases which are lethal or incapacitating. These products are often put into the drinking water of wells or streams. They are also spread by aircraft or fired by heavy artillery. A Vietnamese artillery officer who deserted his unit, the Seventh-Fifth Division operating in the north-west of Kampuchea, revealed last April that almost all types of canons used by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea are supplied with toxic gas shells the use of which is authorized at the regimental level. They are used in profusion in Kampuchea. He stated that toxic gases of Soviet manufacture known as HZ have often been used.

Scores of thousands of Kampuchean civilians, particularly women and children, have been killed or seriously poisoned by those chemical weapons. Spread by aircraft, those weapons are lethal aerosols that kill people and vegetation. Fired by heavy artillery, poison gases cause death within a radius of 200 metres. Some them cause nausea and haemorrhage; others cause suffocation after the paralysis of the face and the respiratory muscles; others again cause foaming at the mouth, crises of hysteria, swelling and gangrene. As secondary effects they create impotence in men and deformed foetuses in women.

This is an endeavour to exterminate a whole people. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to issue a pressing appeal here for immediate and effective measures to be taken in order to prevent these war criminals from continuing their filthy crimes.

The international community is perfectly well aware that those who claim to be the champions of disarmament are the very ones who are building up their arsenals of conventional and nuclear weapons; those who clamour most about détente are the very ones who are actually endangering international peace and security. How can one talk of disarmament and détente when, thanks to Soviet assistance amounting to \$3 million a day, 250,000 Vietnamese soldiers are now occupying Kampuchea and sizable military reinforcements of manpower and of Soviet materiel continue to be sent to Kampuchea to carry out massacres among the people of Kampuchea and prevent it from exercising its right to decide its own destiny? How can one talk of disarmament and détente when 60,000 Vietnamese soldiers are occupying Laos and the regional expansionists from Hanoi are opening their military bases to the air and naval forces of the great world expansionist Power and are threatening to extend the war to the whole of South-East Asia? How can one talk of disarmament and détente when 100,000 soldiers of that great expansionist Power are occupying Afghanistan and sowing death and destruction there? Finally, how can one talk of disarmament and détente when the regional and world expansionists are continuing to trample underfoot the United Nations Charter, the principles of non-alignment and the rules governing international relations?

Denounced and condemned by all peoples and countries that truly cherish peace and Justice throughout the world, those warmongers remain arrogant and go so far in their cynicism as to undertake the basest manoeuvring in order to prevent their victim, Democratic Kampuchea, from making its voice heard in the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. Those manoeuvres serve only to shed light on their ambitions for world domination and their awareness of guilt in the face of the condemnation of the international community. Like the people of Kampuchea which is waging a heroic war of national resistance against the Vietnamese regional expansionists both for its own survival and for the sake of world peace, my delegation would like to repeat here its request and emphasize its right to take an active part in the work of those two Committees so as to make its contribution to the safeguarding of international peace and security and, in particular, to make the Indian Ocean a real zone of peace.

The international community is now faced with the gravest challenge of our times since the one issued by Hitler with his invasion of Austria in 1937 and his invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. For two years, that is ever since the invasion of Kampuchea and the invasion of Afghanistan, that challenge has become ever more defiant. All peoples and countries that cherish peace and justice are now aware that if we do not face up to that challenge in time, if we do not take the necessary effective measures to discourage those ambitions for regional and world expansion, it is futile to hope that we can put an end to the unbridled arms race and particularly to the certain danger of a third world conflagration. First, as long as the invasion and occupation of Kampuchea and Afghanistan go on, war is liable to spread throughout South-East Asia, to South Asia and to the Middle East. The struggle for general and complete disarmament is inseparable from the struggle against the war of aggression and annexation of the regional and world expansionists. order to put an end to those wars and safeguard world peace the United Nations has already adopted, by overwhelming majorities, General Assembly resolutions 34/22 and 35/6 on Kampuchea and ES-6/2 on Afghanistan. Those resolutions call for the total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea and Afghanistan so that the people of Kampuchea and the Afghan people can exercise their inalienable right to decide their own affairs free from foreign interference.

Here we should like to call on all peoples and countries that cherish peace and justice in the world to strengthen their solidarity and to work together to compel the regional and global expansionists to apply the relevant resolutions and to renounce the law of the jungle that those expansionists wish to impose in international relations.

My delegation remains convinced that the people of Kampuchea and the Afghan people in their resolute struggles backed by the solidarity and support of all the peoples and countries that cherish peace and justice will prevail over the aggression and diplomatic manoeuvring of the expansionists to slake their ambition for world and regional domination and will then embark upon a true process of disarmament and an era of peace, thus making their contribution towards saving succeeding generations from the securge of war.

Mr. MENZIES (Canada): I should like to begin by joining other speakers in congratulating Ambassador Naik on his accession to the Chair and all the other officers of the Committee who are presiding over our session here in the First Committee. Their skill and experience will stand this Committee in good stead in the deliberations that will follow; with their guidance we are confident that they will be fruitful.

Canada views its participation in disarmament and arms control negotiations as one of the most important aspects of its foreign policy. The cause of arms control and disarmament is no less than the cause of human survival on this planet. The achievement of verifiable arms control agreements is one of the essential foundations of international security and, as such, is a cardinal objective for Canada. To that end the Prime Minister of Canada, at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, put forward a number of proposals to contain the ominous growth of the world's nuclear arsenals and in further pursuit of that objective an Ambassador for Disarmament has been appointed for the first time.

This Committee is reviewing developments in the field of disarmament in the light of recent events. The conclusions we reach will enable us to assess prospects for the future. The Committee can equip itself to look ahead towards 1982, for at the second special session devoted to disarmament we will be passing judgements on both the machinery set up in the disarmament field and the over-all progress realized in implementing the programme of action. The intervening period between now and 1982 is therefore critical if we are to break the present impasse and take positive steps towards the realization of measures we all agreed to in the Programme of Action.

The present international atmosphere is bound to have an effect on our deliberations. An independent and non-aligned country has been invaded by its larger and more powerful neighbour. Other military conflicts have also broken out. In the arms control context, the words of the Canadian Prime Minister - that "Declarations of good intent are no substitute for real disarmament. They need be violated only once." - take on topical significance.

The arms control process is painfully slow under the best of circumstances. In 1979 we anticipated the ratification of SALT II and looked to the drafting of the comprehensive test-ban treaty in 1980. We were disappointed. The lesson is that, in matters of international security obtained through arms control negotiations, the process of negotiation is inextricably linked to world events. We regret that SALT II has not been ratified. In our judgement, SALT II serves the security interests of all and sets the stage for further significant advance. We are pleased to note, however, that the Soviet Union has set aside preconditions for the commencement of bilateral talks with the United States on the limitation of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. Besides the intrinsic importance of these talks, they will, we hope, be a prelude to an early full resumption of the SALT process.

The continuation of this process and a comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty are essential if we are to slow, to halt and to begin to reverse the momentum of nuclear weapons development. Canada considers that a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes achieved by strengthening and making more equal the impact of the non-proliferation régime would also contribute to achieving that objective. We therefore continue to advocate this concept. As a result of past General Assembly resolutions, it is before the Committee on Disarmament.

We are pleased that the work of the Committee on Disarmament is strengthened this year by the presence of all nuclear Powers at the negotiating table and by the establishment of working groups. These groups will provide opportunities for all Member States to play a more active role. Canada is particularly pleased that a working group on a chemical weapons treaty has begun study of some of the main questions, including verification. We believe that verification is at the heart of any effective arms control proposal.

There have been a number of reports and accusations concerning the use of chemical weapons. In these circumstances, we believe it important that there be objective means to verify or finally put to rest rumours that undermine confidence in agreements already reached in this field. Unless there are such means, it will be all the harder to reach future agreements on the basis of mutual respect and confidence.

As for the negotiations outside the Committee on Disarmament, the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and the bilateral talks on the chemical weapons treaty are of fundamental importance. Adequate provision for verification is an essential part of the eventual conclusion of agreements in these areas. We share, for example, in the frustration over the apparent deadlock in negotiations leading to a comprehensive test-ban treaty, but that is no reason for us to settle for a moratorium on nuclear testing which, of course, makes no provision for verification and leaves it up to the nuclear Powers to begin testing, as they see fit, at the end of the period. Indeed, a moratorium is likely, in our view, to delay the negotiations and consequently any conclusion of a treaty, which is, after all, our common goal.

The urgency of the early realization of an effective multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty has been underlined not only by the continuing rapid pace of underground testing, but also by the recent Chinese atmospheric test, China's first since 1978. Radio-active residue from the Chinese test has passed over Canada with effects we have not yet assessed.

The Review Conferences on the Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons Convention and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have taken place within this last year. While much useful work was accomplished and a large measure of agreement realized at the NPT Review Conference, Canada would have preferred an agreed final document.

It might have focused on the Conference's reaffirmation of the validity of the means established to prevent proliferation as provided by the Treaty, but would also have renewed the commitment of the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to articles IV and VI.

There are three subjects highlighted in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which have as yet received relatively little attention.

The first is that of conventional disarmament referred to in paragraph 81. Useful discussions on conventional weapons took place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission last spring. This should be just the beginning of our efforts to show balanced progress in the field of arms control. The recent successful conclusion of the United Nations Weapons Conference is a contribution to the development and elaboration of international humanitarian law.

The second subject is that contained in paragraph 80, which says
"... to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held" (resolution S-10/2, para, 80).

The fact is that there already is an incipient arms competition in outer space.

The continuation of this competition could well have a destabilizing effect on the present balance of weaponry, and it is consequently Canada's view that

efforts should be intensified to reach an international agreement on this matter.

The third subject is the central issue of any meaningful arms control agreement: it is verification. Point 9 of the permanent framework of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament recognizes the necessity of adequate verification as a vital ingredient in negotiations. To encourage understanding of the complexities of verification, Canada presented in the Committee last June a compendium of arms control verification proposals. A second paper quantifying some aspects of this research was submitted more recently. A conceptual paper is in preparation, as is an updated version of the compendium. While these papers may help to develop an understanding of the basic elements of verification, there is also a need for papers on the verification problems of particular agreements under negotiation.

We believe that recent events and the atmosphere that has consequently been created are strong arguments in favour of making verification an integral part of arms control agreements. There is therefore all the more reason to press ahead.

In conclusion I wish to assure the members of this Committee of the determination of the Canadian Government to make a sustained effort to contribute to the process of arms control and disarmament. The unsettling events which have transpired since this Committee last met and the consequent deterioration of the international climate have convinced us that even greater efforts must be made. In this regard we should recall that the process of arms control and disarmament is not an end in itself but rather a means to an end. The end, of course, is to secure the peace and stability of this planet so that we might without distraction deal with the array of other vital problems which confront us. In all these respects Canada remains deeply committed.

Mr. NGIRULPATSE (Burundi) (interpretation from French): The conduct of our debates and our work has most rightly been entrusted to a very distinguished personality, Ambassador Niaz Naik of Pakistan. His wide experience and his personal qualities are in our view a guarantee of the success of our work. My delegation extends its warmest congratulations to him.

A few days after the signature of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, the explosion of the first atomic bomb signalled the advent of the nuclear era. Disarmament in general, and nuclear disarmament in particular, have since been the special responsibility of our Organization, and its ultimate goal. In its first resolution, adopted in January 1946, the General Assembly requested that specific proposals aimed at the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass descruction be submitted to it.

The delegation of Burundi is gratified at the important albeit modest results achieved thanks to the continued efforts of our Organization in the field of arms control. Here we must credit the United Nations with the conclusion of the following agreements: the Treaty aimed at the Prohibition of Muclear Weapons in Latin America: the Treaty on the Mon-Proliferation of Muclear Weapons; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, which was signed by my country

(Mr. Ngirumatse, Burundi)

in October 1963; the Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which excludes nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from that environment. and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Muclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor.

Despite that progress, the arms race has been gathering momentum in recent years, thus seriously affecting development.

Is it not alarming and disquieting to see the enormous sums that are throughout the world spent on both conventional and strategic weapons as compared to the sums devoted to development? Annual world rullicary expenditures rose from \$US 120 billion in 1960 to \$200 billion in 1970. and they reached the alarming figure of \$500 billion in 1980. The developed countries alone account for four fifths of military expenditures. the world devotes 25 times as much effort to armaments as it does to development. The different resolutions adopted by the General Assembly since the onset of the First Dispression of Decade give proof of the interest of the international community in the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures. Mo one doubts that disarmament and assistance for development are closely interlinked, since disarmament, if ever it becomes a reality, could release enormous sums that could be devoted to the development of the less privileged countries. In the area of food, a mere 1 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the industrialized countries would suffice to raise to \$4 billion a year the amount of assistance for the development of the agriculture of the poor countries, which would eradicate the hunger and endemic famine that dangerously affect the populations of those countries. In the poor countries, 10 children die of hunger each minute, whereas in the same amount of time the world squanders a million dollars on the artifacts of war. One last example: the World Health Organization spent \$83 million in 10 years to eradicate smallpox throughout the world. And members are aware that that sum is not enough to buy a single modern strategic bomber. We must conclude that, because of the expenditures it entails, the arms race constitutes both an obstacle to development and a threat to international peace and security.

In his statement in the general debate of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Burundi, Mr. Edouard Wzambimana, stated:

... the Government of Burundi sincerely hopes that the conclusions of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament will be followed by action and that general and complete disarmament can get under way. (A/35/PV.18, p. 57)

In his report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General has noted with regret that the goal of disarmament appears to be more remote than ever. Even if our Organization can be gratified at having spared the world a nuclear holocaust, we must unfortunately note that no less lethal localized wars have not spared certain Hember States of this Organization.

The report of the Disarmament Commission adopted on 6 June 1980 on the elements of a draft resolution entitled "Declaration of the 1980s as the second disarmament decade" notes with regret that the objectives of the First Disarmament Decade have not been achieved. Nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction have remained a pious wish, and enormous sums that could be used for the economic development of the poor countries continue to be squandered.

The Final Document of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, stresses that, on the one hand, the arms race in all its aspects runs counter to efforts aimed at reducing international tension with a view to establishing a viable system of international peace and security and, that, on the other hand, peace and security should be founded on scrupulous respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The delegation of Burundi sincerely hopes that the aims of the Second Disarmament Decade will be achieved and to that end it calls on all States sincerely to collaborate with the Disarmament Commission so that by the end of the Decade nuclear disarmament will have become a reality and international peace and security will be better guaranteed.

The delegation of Burundi requests the negotiation and conclusion of an international agreement totally banning the testing of nuclear weapons and their development and the manufacture and use of radiological weapons — in other words.

a treaty guaranteeing that nuclear weapons will not be used to threaten non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of Burundi is gratified at the signing by the Soviet Union and the United States of the SALT II accords, and it expresses the hope that they will soon be ratified. It requests the two countries to undertake negotiations on the SALT-III accords. Burundi rejoices at the considerable progress achieved at the Helsinki Conference and hopes that even more significant progress will be achieved during the Conference in Madrid.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Burundi, in his address before the General Assembly at the present session, stated:

"With a view to strengthening international peace and security, the delegation of Eurundi considers that the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace should be implemented by all States." (A/35/PV.18, p.58)

The Sixth Conference of Non-Aligned States held in Havana reaffirmed the determination of the non-aligned countries to unite their efforts to achieve the objectives embodied in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and reiterated its conviction that the presence in the Indian Ocean and its natural extensions of military bases, military installations and supply facilities, nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of the military presence of any of the super-Powers, viewed within the context of rivalries within the great-Powers, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Declaration making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

At its twenty-ninth session, in 1974, during its consideration of the item "General and complete disarmament", the General Assembly reiterated its request to all States to consider the African continent as a denuclearized zone and to respect it as such. It reiterated the request it had addressed to all States to respect the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1964 and to abide by it. It further reiterated its request to all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, installing, transporting, stockpiling and using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on the African continent.

The delegation of Burundi appeals to all States to respect the spirit and the letter of the various resolutions adopted by the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations General Assembly on the denuclearization of Africa. It requests all States, and first and foremost the Western Powers, to refrain from supplying South Africa with nuclear material and technology. Indeed, is it not horrifying to learn that South Africa was able to acquire between March 1975 and 1980 more than 203 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium as a result of the complicity of certain Members of this Organization, and this in defiance of the resolutions and recommendations adopted by the majority of its Members?

We know that the aim of the defence policy of the South African Republic is to maintain the system of <u>apartheid</u> through military means. That system, which is abhorred by the entire international community, would have ceased to exist despite the enormous military expenditures devoted to it - that is, 20 per cent of the national budget, or five per cent of the gross national product - if all the Members of our Organization had complied with the relevant decisions taken by this Organization to isolate South Africa politically, economically and militarily.

The total cessation of nuclear tests is one of the principal objectives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. That item has appeared on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1957, and 36 resolutions have been devoted to it. It is regrettable to note that nuclear—test explosions have grown in number and force since the signature of the treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear tests, and that 90 per cent of them have been conducted by the first three countries to negotiate and sign that treaty.

The delegation of Burundi requests those three countries to expedite the negotiations which were begun three years ago in Geneva on the total prohibition of nuclear tests. The conclusion of such an agreement could prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of weapons and curb the arms race in its qualitative and quantitative aspects.

With respect to the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament the delegation of Burundi requests that those fellowships be granted to a greater number of nationals from the developing countries.

As regards the freezing and reduction of military budgets, the delegation of Burundi requests the Disarmament Commission to pursue its efforts aimed at the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, in particular among the militarily most powerful States and the Member States of the Security Council and requests that the funds thus saved be re-allocated to the economic and social development of the neediest countries.

In order to prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation, nuclear States should guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons and should conclude an agreement on the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of States which at present do not possess such weapons.

In-depth studies should be made of both the proposal to dismantle military alliances and that aimed at minimizing international tension and reducing the number of regions where the military presence of the great-Powers invites confrontation.

The arms race squanders human and material resources, diverts the economy from its humanitarian objectives and hinders national development efforts, but its most salient characteristic is that it undermines national, regional and international security. It implies the constant risk of war between the great Powers, including that of a nuclear war with incalculable consequences.

The international consequences of the arms race are: the squandering of human and material, non-renewable resources, the reduction of international aid for development, extremely destructive localized wars from which foreign interests are not absent and an inequitable distribution of assistance at the international level as a result of political and strategic considerations in the donor countries.

Our Organization should spare no effort to achieve general and complete disarmament. Nuclear-weapon States should understand that the political or military usefulness of nuclear and strategic weapons is meaningless when compared with the risks that those weapons entail for the survival of mankind. The delegation of Burundi joins other delegations in requesting: that the reduction of the military budgets of all States, and in particular of the States Members of the Security Council, should take effect to mark the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade; that serious preparation for the special session on disarmament to be held in 1982 should be undertaken; that there should be an early ratification of the SALT II agreements and the establishment of a climate of understanding between the great Powers; that the military rivalry between great Powers in nuclear-weapon-free zones should cease forthwith; and that guarantees should be given by the nuclear States that they will not use nuclear weapons against States that do not possess such weapons or install nuclear weapons in the territory of countriesxwhere there are none at present.

Burundi will spare no effort to improve the climate of understanding, peace and international co-operation among nations.

By way of conclusion, I should like to ask all countries represented here to unite their efforts to overcome the obstacles that stand in the way of general and complete disarmament. Any refusal to co-operate in this field and any procrastination would run counter to the vital immediate and future interests of mankind. This appeal is addressed above all to the permanent members of the Security Council, to which our Organization has entrusted the special responsibility of safeguarding peace. The future and security of our peoples will brook no excuse. We cannot shirk the highly moral obligations to present and future generations which we assumed when we signed the United Nations Charter.

I pledge to the Chairman and to all the other officers of the Committee the full co-operation of my delegation in the conduct of the work of this Committee.

Mr. SHELDOV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The international community has entered a new decade, a decade proclaimed by the United Nations the Second Disarmament Decade. Stages such as this are always conducive to analysing weighing and evaluating what has gone before, giving some thought to future prospects and determining ways and means of achieving the goals we have in our sights.

Taking a look back at the 1970s, we can note with satisfaction that the last decade was an important stage in strengthening co-operation and good-neighbourliness among States with different social systems and a period of positive change throughout the whole complex of inter-State relations and the consolidation of international peace and security. It was not possible to achieve everything that lay within the framework of real possibilities, but the development of international relations on the whole was given a positive momentum. We cannot but note with great regret that recently we have seen an intensification of attempts by the forces of imperialism and hegemonism to slow down and even arrest that momentum, wipe out all the positive achievements and throw international relations several decades back into the past to the time of the cold war of evil memory.

In an attempt to lend all this even the semblance of some kind of argumentation, those forces pile up everything they can think of and even go to the length of alleging that détente has not justified itself. However, it should be stressed that the fruits of détente require frugal husbanding, not a barbarous attitude a thoughtful and considered attitude, not the approach of a reckless gambler that is willing to stake in this dangerous game the fate of international peace and security and even the very existence of mankind.

Feverish military preparations have reached unprecedented levels in the United States, as have relentless, unbridled propaganda and, it might even be said, the extolling of the virtues of war, which without any doubt would be a world-wide catastrophe. There are people who argue with shocking cynicism that the launching of a nuclear war is something quite ordinary and, it would appear, want to condition the present generation to this kind of criminal thinking.

Let us take just one of the most recent examples - Directive 59. No matter how artful its authors have been in their attempts to mislead the peoples of the world, even in circles friendly to the United States it is acknowledged that the threshold of risk is lowered, that nuclear weapons have ceased to be a political weapon of deterrence and are becoming a weapon designed for military application. Can we really permit people to habituate themselves to the idea of the inevitability of a world thermo-nuclear conflagration?

A stream of provocative inventions, fictions and malicious slander against the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, has engulfed the United States, and is spread to other places with the help of mass communications media that are under the control of the United States. And all that is done contrary to the General Assembly resolution prohibiting war propaganda adopted as far back as 1947.

In a word, aggressive imperialist forces are clearly aiming at reviving the cold war and creating a situation threatening universal peace and international security.

In the search for what might be called further "argumentation" to justify their policy of exacerbating the international situation, certain representatives, in this Committee and elsewhere, are blowing up the so-called Afghan question to artificial proportions. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR considers it necessary to state with the utmost clarity that all this clearly has a specific aim: namely, to maintain tension and to justify and camouflage military activity. It should be recalled that as far back as May 1978 the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies took decisions to increase military budgets automatically and considerably for many years to come. In December 1979 the decision was taken to manufacture and deploy in Western Europe the new American medium-range nuclear missile. Long before the events in Afghanistan, the United States began to sabotage SALT II and to undermine many talks, while for the rest it began to apply the brakes.

Incidentally, today's statements by the delegation of the United Kingdom and certain other speakers have shown that in doing this they are trying to divert attention from the Soviet proposals submitted to this session of the General Assembly in the draft resolution on certain urgent measures for reducing the danger of war.

Whatever the short-term consideration, whatever the personal ambitions and subjective intentions of various politicians of the United States and its allies, one thing is clear: the game they are playing is extremely dangerous.

At the same time, there still exist real possibilities of preventing a return to the cold war and establishing normal smooth relations among States. Those possibilities lie in the course of consistent progress toward the easing of international tension.

In the circumstances of the time, there is no sensible alternative to the policy of détente. What is needed is the concerted efforts of all peaceloving forces to halt the unfavourable development of international events, to defend and consolidate détente and to extend it to all parts of the world.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Brezhnev, has pointed out that

"States and peoples have no more urgent task at this time than that of preventing the imperialist policy of acting from a position of strength from squeezing out détente so that the wheels of the armaments machinery revolve at an even faster and more dangerous rate."

A particular and important feature of the existing situation is the fact - and this should be stressed - that so far there is no need to begin again at the beginning. A great deal of ground has been covered which must be husbanded frugally and developed further. In the 1970s, talks on various aspects of limiting and halting the arms race assumed an intensive nature and led to the achievement of certain positive results. Recently, these talks have slowed down and, on a number of major issues, have been broken off by the United States of America. Their resumption and successful conclusion is one of the urgent tasks the General Assembly must call upon the United States to undertake.

Apart from this, States in various international forums have before them a broad range of constructive proposals covering all the areas of limiting and halting the arms race and carrying out concrete measures for disarmament which the members of the Warsaw Treaty have defended in the interest of the world community. The Soviet Union memorandum in document A/35/482, entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees," sets forth an all-embracing programme of appropriate measures.

One of the main highways to disarmament is the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race, accompanied by the simultaneous adoption of measures to strengthen political and international legal security guarantees for States. All those who stand for lasting peace and genuine international security must see that it is precisely on this point that the efforts of States must be focused in order to halt and subsequently to reverse the arms race. It is only by the adoption of immediate and urgent measures in the field of nuclear disarmament that we can reduce the threat posed to mankind by the vast accumulations in the world of nuclear missile potential capable of annihilating every living thing on our planet several times over.

In February 1979 the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries; in the Committee on Disarmament, submitted a concrete proposal for talks on halting the nuclear arms race. The most important prerequisite for success of

these talks would be the participation in them of all States possessing nuclear weapons, and also of a certain number of States that do not possess them. The subject of the talks was very clearly defined: the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons in all their forms and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of these weapons, up to and including their total elimination. Achievement of agreement on this important problem would undoubtedly lead to a consolidation of the security of States. In light of the fact that in the Committee on Disarmament an overwhelming majority of States supported early consultations aimed at preparing for talks on that subject, the negative attitude of individual Powers has an odious ring to it.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR believes that the United Nations must make its contribution and take measures to bring about an early start on preparatory consultations and on the talks on nuclear disarmament themselves, taking effective steps to combat the unconstructive and negative position of the Western countries and China. A major issue - and the solution to this problem will go far to determine the cessation of the arms race - is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests. This would put an end to the qualitative refining and perfecting of such weapons and would prevent the creation of new forms of such weapons.

In the light of the constructive steps taken by the Soviet Union to accommodate its partners, the major reason why the talks held so far have not been brought to a successful conclusion is the artificial difficulties created by the United States and the United Kingdom.

We hope that the new initiative of the USSR in its proposal, submitted at this session and supported by many delegations, not to conduct any nuclear explosions within a period of one year beginning from a date to be agreed upon by the nuclear Powers, will do a great deal to assist in the achievement of the goal of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing. Although the treaty which is being worked on could come into force with the participation of

only three nuclear Powers, there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that a genuine long-term and effective solution to the problem of an all-embracing and total prohibition of nuclear-weapons testing can be achieved only with the participation in such an agreement by all nuclear Powers without exception.

A new, urgent and alarming reminder of this was the recent very powerful nuclear explosion in the atmosphere carried out by China. We should clearly realize and understand that the testing of nuclear weapons knows no political or geographical boundaries, and is not limited or confined to the continents where it is carried out. As an indissoluble part of working out and implementing measures for limiting armaments and bringing about nuclear disarmament, measures should be undertaken to strengthen the international political and legal guarantees for State security. An important step in this direction would be the early elaboration and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, a draft of which has been submitted by the Soviet Union for consideration by the United Nations. This proposal was supported, as was demonstrated during the last session of the Special Committee on the non-use of force, by the overwhelming majority of United Nations Member States. The conclusion of that treaty, which precludes the possibility of using both nuclear and conventional weapons, would be in keeping with the interests of all States, large and small, regardless of their social systems. Unfortunately, practical work to this end has been blocked for a number of years by those who oppose the establishment of lasting and reliable peace. It is difficult to avoid the simple and clear-cut conclusion that anyone who is not in favour of renouncing the use of force is for it.

In the context of the struggle for the consolidation of international security, an element of vital importance is the total implementation of the principle of the inadmissibility of the policy of hegemonism proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session at the initiative of the Soviet Union.

The dilemma - the consolidation of security or the stepping up of tension; peace or war - is indissolubly linked with a very acute and cardinal issue of the present international situation, which is the ratification of the SALT-II Treaty. The forcible conversion of this into a passing, transient element which for quite a long time now has been observed with profound alarm by the whole of progressive mankind, is fraught with the most serious and dangerous consequences.

As the USSR has repeatedly, unambiguously and clearly stated, and as it reiterates in the afore-mentioned memorandum which was published as an official document of the United Nations:

"The Soviet Union is prepared to ratify the SALT-II Treaty and to comply with all its provisions, provided that the United States acts likewise. It also confirms its willingness to participate - after the SALT-II Treaty has been ratified - in negotiations on further limitations and reductions of strategic arms." (A/35/482, annex, para. 8)

The importance of the problem of preventing the possibility of a sudden attack or the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons is something which is assuming literally vital importance. The Soviet Union has repeatedly and persistently called for work on relevant measures. The urgency and immediacy of such measures was particularly stressed by the recent nuclear false alarms among the armed forces of the United States, to which attention has already been drawn by many delegations in this discussion. Situations in which calculations of mere minutes separate life from death on this planet and separate us from a nuclear holocaust must never be allowed to be repeated, and a guarantee of this should be not the further sophistication or improvement of the electronic technology which, it is asserted, has created these situations, but rather the sound consolidation of measures of a political nature.

We must not allow the fate of mankind to be made a counter in the game of electronic Lotto.

of particular significance in a cessation of the nuclear arms race would be the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, an important constituent element of which was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This year marked the tenth anniversary of its entry into force. The past years have shown that this Treaty is viable, optimal and a well-balanced instrument for co-operation among States in the interests of averting the spread of nuclear weapons and of the use of atomic energy for constructive purposes. Along with other delegations, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR vigorously condemns the attempts of certain countries - particularly those situated in areas of heightened military danger - to acquire nuclear weapons, and also other States which are striving to acquire such weapons for aggressive purposes.

It should be pointed out that measures to strengthen the non-proliferation régime in no way erect a barrier to international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Quite the contrary: it is only with the existence of such measures, which reliably bar the path of access to the creation of nuclear weapons, that there can be an active expansion of such co-operation to the mutual advantage of all sides. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, of vital importance is the USSR proposal for the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States. Among the most important means of halting the spread of nuclear weapons are territorial limitations on their deployment. This includes the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and this is something which has recently been supported by the socialist countries. These goals would also be served by implementation of the USSR proposals on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where they do not exist at present. If we can manage to agree on that, the non-proliferation régime for nuclear weapons would become even more reliable and solid.

MP/ahs

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have consistently favoured the exclusion of chemical weapons from military arsenals. The Byelorussian SSR is one of the sponsors of a joint draft convention on this subject submitted as far back as 1972. The many years of talks on this problem have clearly been slowed down by the American side. The motives for this position become clear in the light of recent reports published, for example, in <a href="The New York Times">The New York Times</a>, that the House of Representatives of the United States Congress had adopted a military construction appropriations bill which provided, <a href="interalia">inter alia</a>, for the modernization of the American chemical weapons arsenal - particularly the production of a new type of such weapon, the so-called binary gas.

In the light of this development, we must take urgent, decisive steps to conclude work on a convention.

Among the problems of disarmament, of particular importance is the question of prohibiting new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, a subject which has been discussed in the Disarmament Committee on the initiative of the Soviet Union. Although that Committee did do a certain amount of work in accordance with General Assembly resolution 34/79, it has been unable to achieve practical results because of the unconstructive position of the United States, its allies in the NATO bloc and China. If anyone has any doubts as to the desirability of concluding a comprehensive agreement on prohibition of the development or manufacture of new types or new systems of weapons of mass destruction, arguing that as and when the need arises it will be possible to conclude individual agreements, the experience we have had in this matter is worth considering.

In 1946 the Soviet Union took the initiative of proposing the conclusion of an international convention on the permanent prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. At that time it was relatively easy to solve the problem, but 34 years have since gone by and the atomic weapons of those years seem practically fossilized in comparison with the new monstrous variety of such weapons which exists today. But the Western Powers and China still do not want to agree to their prohibition.

People of sober thought and good will clearly understand that the sooner we put an end to all work in the field of creating new means of mass destruction, the sooner the peoples of the world will be able to look to the future more confidently. At the same time, it is well known that the Soviet Union is prepared to come to agreement on the prohibition of individual new types of such weapons also.

The agenda should also include an item on the early conclusion of work on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. In the Committee on Disarmament, as is well known, preparations for such a treaty are in progress, and we are convinced that it must be concluded at a very early date. Final work on and implementation of such a treaty would be an important step towards limitation of the arms race.

Serious efforts must be undertaken for the timely and early prohibition of the neutron weapon, the appearance of which in the arsenals of States is a growing threat. The best way of solving this problem would be to ban the neutron weapon by means of an international treaty. As will be recalled, the draft international treaty on the prohibition of the manufacture, stockpiling, development and use of the neutron weapon has been put forward by the USSR and other socialist countries.

Many speakers in the discussion have touched on the important problem of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. In this area too there are a number of constructive proposals from the socialist countries which could serve as a basis for progress in this sphere. Among the large-scale high-priority problems which require speedy and effective solution, of particular importance is that of supplementing political détente with military détente on the European continent where any armed conflict would carry with it the danger of its growing into a world thermo-nuclear catastrophe. The unique features of the situation in Europe also include the fact that it is there that we find the greatest opportunities for improving the political climate and for stimulating the positive processes which are already being developed on that continent.

In recent years, the Soviet Union and other socialist States have put forward a number of initiatives aimed at strengthening détente on the European continent. Specifically, a proposal was made to conclude, among all participants in the European security conference, a treaty on non-pre-emptive use of nuclear or conventional weapons against other States. The Soviet Union, along with other parties to the Warsaw Pact, is in favour of convening a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. The subject of this conference could be confidence-building measures among European States as well as other measures aimed at reducing concentrations and quantities of armed forces and armaments on the European continent.

It is now time for the Western countries to demonstrate political will and make a constructive response to the new major steps towards narrowing the differences between the sides initiated by the socialist States participating in the Vienna talks and enunciated in their proposals dated 10 July 1980.

The delegation of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic welcomes the beginning of talks in Geneva on the basis of the Soviet proposal for the discussion of, simultaneously and in organic connexion with, questions regarding toth medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and American forward-based nuclear systems. These talks were begun on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which proposed discussion of the question of medium-range nuclear missiles even before the decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy American medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

This must be well known to the representative of the United Kingdom, although in his statement today he actually asserted the opposite.

The success of these talks, which have been followed with attention and hope by the European and world public, could create a change for the better in the dangerous development of events arising from the decision of NATO to manufacture and to deploy in certain Western European countries a new mediumrange American missile. An altogether appropriate question, incidentally, arises here: do these missiles increase or reduce the security of the peoples of Western Europe? The answer to this question is clear to anyone with common sense. So what are the motives? What are the reasons behind the decision to deploy these missiles? This, we feel, was answered by the French newspaper L'Echo, which said that:

"The building, emplacement and deployment in western Europe of 1,000 or 1,200 nuclear missiles is, no matter how you look at it, a very good deal for American industry. It must be a very attractive prospect for the Atlantic lobby to have mobilized its forces in an attempt to bring about the conclusion of what is clearly the deal of the century."

We cannot put it any more clearly than that. But this amounts to irresponsible - and I might go so far as to say criminal - toying with the very lives of millions upon millions of people in the name of the selfish, material interests of the militarists and their money-bags.

Of great importance for the strengthening of peace would be the adoption of measures to ease military tension not only in Europe but also in the Mediterranean region, the Indian Ocean and other parts of the world. The course of the present discussion has shown that many delegations share the view that it is desirable to take measures for disarmament on the regional level.

Among the important questions confronting the General Assembly at this session is that of preparatory work, with the participation of all interested countries, for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are convinced that this could at the same time promote the implementation of the important provisions of the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Like a number of previous speakers, we believe that for decisions to be genuinely effective, a world disarmament conference must be convened after the second special Assembly session.

Underlying all the facets of the arms race, however diverse they may be, there is only one foundation: appropriate financing. The reduction of military expenditures, therefore, is one of the simplest and at the same time most effective means of halting the arms race and making a start on disarmament. Here too the Soviet Union has shown initiative and made a concrete proposal for the reduction of military budgets of States which possess major economic and military potential - including the permanent members of the Security Council - either in percentage terms or in absolute terms, with the relevant proportion of the funds released subsequently handed over for increased economic assistance to developing countries. References to the need for working out a so-called standardized system of accounting for military budgets and for introducing some kind of control can only be viewed as camouflage, which conceals a reluctance to agree to reduce military expenditures.

To sum up what has been said, I should like to stress that in the present international circumstances it is extremely important not to slacken, but rather to intensify efforts and actions by all peace-loving forces to strengthen international security, to deepen détente and to achieve concrete measures in the sphere of curbing the arms race and bringing about disarmament.

We have marked the thirty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, whose Charter, on behalf of the peoples of the world, has proclaimed the determination to "spare succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Inspired by this noble and lofty goal, this unswerving will of the peoples - which was embodied with renewed force in the charter of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace adopted last month in Sofia - the States Members of the United Nations must realize that they are obliged to do everything possible to put an end to the senseless arms race, to build an impenetrable dam against the danger of war and to foster and consolidate peace.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): I am speaking in the exercise of my right of reply to the statement made this morning by the representative of Libya and I am doing so with considerable distaste.

Since the beginning of this debate a number of Arab representatives have chosen the debate on disarmament and peace as a suitable opportunity to attack Israel. Last Friday this Committee celebrated United Nations Day and Disarmament Week. Two Arab delegations celebrated by conducting warfare, verbal warfare, against my country. Israel's contribution to the celebration of Disarmament Week in the United Nations was made by not responding to the attacks against it and by waiving the exercise of its right of reply on that particular day.

A new record of unbridled hypocrisy was reached when Iraq, a country at present engaged in military hostilities, first paid pious lip-service to the ideals of peace and disarmament and then proceeded to accuse Israel of aggression. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that today Libya, which is allied to the other combatant in that conflict and which openly boasts of exporting violence abroad and instigating wars in Africa and in the Mediterranean, should also come to this Committee to exalt the virtues of peace and disarmament and likewise unleash the usual venomous accusations against Israel.

I am not going to reply to those mendacious diatribes by honouring them with explanations or denials. I have, however, a practical suggestion to make. I should like to suggest, through you, Mr. Chairman, that those Arab speakers who feel impelled each year to repeat their perennial attacks against Israel do so in writing. Their statements would then be duly included in our records and in this way much of the Committee's time would be saved for the purpose of discussing disarmament and peace. If the Arab representatives were to look up from their prepared texts as they were inveighing against Israel to see the expressions of utter boredom and listless resignation on the faces of so many members of this Committee, they would no doubt accept my suggestion. By doing so, they would be doing the Committee a favour and acting in their own enlightened self-interest.

(Mr. Eilan, Israel)

As an earnest of Israel's goodwill, we forgo the right of second reply should my remarks be commented upon by later speakers.

Mr. AWANIS (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): I have to apologize to you, Sir, for exercising the right of reply at this late hour, but my delegation is compelled to reply to the allegations of the representative of the Zionist entity who has accustomed us in this Committee to falsification of the truth to camouflage the designs and intentions of the entity he represents and its desire to impose its domination over the occupied Arab territories.

My delegation wishes to make the following comments. First of all, the representative of the Zionist entity spoke of the armament of Iraq. This reference on his part does not surprise us because his intention is to divert the attention of world public opinion. As he knows, the Zionist entity, which does not have sufficient weapons - at least, so it claims - continues to occupy by force of the arms provided by the United States of America the whole of Palestine and the territories of three Arab States. Despite scores of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Zionist entity refuses to evacuate those territories.

I should like to remind this Committee that the military budget of the Zionist entity represents about 45 per cent of its total budget.

The representative of the Zionist entity mentioned directly or indirectly the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The Foreign Minister of Iraq,
Mr. Saadun Hammadi, has already explained before the General Assembly and the Security Council the position of Iraq. I need hardly, therefore, waste members' time by repeating it. I simply wish to recall to the representative of the Zionist entity that the position of Iraq can be summed up as follows: it is a question of its national sovereignty over its territory and its territorial waters. We have no intention of annexing territory that belongs to any other country.

## (Mr. Awanis, Iraq)

The representative of the Zionist entity spoke of the conclusion of an agreement on the Middle East and compared this, in the light of his draft resolution, with the Treaty of Tlatelolco in force in Latin America.

The comparison between the Middle East and Latin America does not accord with the truth. The situation in the Middle East appears to be similar to a large extent to the situation in South Africa. In both cases there is an aggressor State which, through the force of arms and with the assistance of international imperialism, has imposed its domination, and on the other hand, there are countries against which aggression is committed. As for Latin America, there are there countries with a common history and there is no aggressor State among the countries of Latin America. How, then, can a State call for the holding of negotiations and the conclusion of a treaty when it does not respect any of the obligations deriving from international agreements and refuses to place its military installations under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

The position of the Zionist entity was condemned by the General Assembly in resolutions 33/71 and 34/89.

My delegation reserves the right to exercise its right of second reply if necessary.

Mr. SAED (United Arab Emirates) (interpretation from Arabic):

I do not wish to waste the time of my brothers in this Committee, but my
delegation reserves its right to reply to the charges made by the representative
of Israel at the next meeting of this Committee.

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Mr. SHEIKH (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): I should like to reserve my right of reply to the mendacious allegations of the representative of Israel until tomorrow.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.