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Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Western Sahara

Working paper prepared by the Secretariat

I. Reports and good offices of the Secretary-General

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution [72/95](#), the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly at its seventy-third session a report on the question of Western Sahara ([A/73/219](#)). The report covered the period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018 and contained a review of the activities carried out by the Secretary-General in the exercise of his good offices.
2. During the period under review, pursuant to Security Council resolutions [2351 \(2017\)](#) and [2414 \(2018\)](#), the Secretary-General also submitted two reports on 29 March and 3 October 2018 to the Council on the situation concerning Western Sahara ([S/2018/277](#) and [S/2018/889](#)). The present working paper provides a summary of the aforementioned reports, with additional information regarding the consideration of that question by the Security Council and the General Assembly.
3. In its resolution [2351 \(2017\)](#), the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2018. The Council called upon all parties to cooperate fully with the operations of MINURSO, including its free interaction with all interlocutors, and to take the steps necessary to ensure the security of and unhindered movement and immediate access for the United Nations and associated personnel in carrying out their mandate, in conformity with existing agreements. The Council also called upon the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to resume negotiations. It requested that the Secretary-General brief the Council on a regular basis, and at least twice a year, on the status of progress of those negotiations under his auspices, on the implementation of the resolution, challenges to MINURSO operations and the steps taken to address them.
4. In his report to the Security Council dated 29 March 2018 ([S/2018/277](#)), which covered developments since his previous report dated 10 April 2017 ([S/2017/307](#)),



the Secretary-General informed the Council that on 16 August 2017, he had announced his decision to appoint Horst Koehler (Germany) as his new Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, to replace Christopher Ross (United States of America), whose mandate had ended on 30 April 2017. Mr. Koehler had taken up his functions on 8 September. The appointment had been welcomed by the parties and neighbouring States, who pledged to support his efforts.

5. From 15 to 24 October 2017, the Personal Envoy had undertaken his first visit to the region. He had travelled to Rabat, Rabouni (Algeria), Tindouf (Algeria), Algiers and Nouakchott. In Rabat, he had been received by King Mohammed VI, who had welcomed the appointment and expressed his commitment to the negotiating process. The Prime Minister, Saadeddine Othmani, had also expressed his support for the efforts of the Personal Envoy to resolve the conflict. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Morocco, Nasser Bourita, had reiterated his country's continued commitment to a political solution to the conflict which was based on the Moroccan autonomy initiative of 2007. He had stressed that the resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara would require Algeria to take on a more important role.

6. In Rabouni, the Personal Envoy had met the Secretary-General of the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), Brahim Ghali, who had reiterated the movement's unconditional commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, while highlighting the suffering of the Sahrawi people, in particular the youth and those living in refugee camps. He had called upon Morocco to return to the negotiation table without preconditions. The Personal Envoy had also met the members of the Frente POLISARIO leadership and representatives of women and youth.

7. During a visit to the Awsard refugee camp near Tindouf, the Personal Envoy had witnessed the profound frustrations and emotions of a refugee population that continued to endure the consequences of a conflict that had lasted for far too long.

8. On 22 November 2017, the Personal Envoy had briefed the Security Council in New York on his first visit to the region. He had expressed cautious optimism, observing that he had witnessed a "certain yearning" for a solution among all interlocutors. Since his briefing to the Council, the Personal Envoy had continued his dialogue with the leadership of the parties and neighbouring States. On 14 December, in substantively identical letters, he had extended invitations to the parties to the conflict and the neighbouring States to hold bilateral in-depth consultations, to which they all responded positively.

9. Thus, on 25 and 26 January 2018, the Personal Envoy had met the Secretary-General of Frente POLISARIO in Berlin. On 6 March, he had held consultations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Morocco in Lisbon. On 8 February, he had met the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Mauritania in Berlin, and on 15 February, the Minister of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria, also in Berlin.

10. In his observations and recommendations, the Secretary-General was encouraged by the steps taken by his Personal Envoy to relaunch the political process since his appointment and welcomed his visit to the region. While all stakeholders had reiterated long-held positions, the Secretary-General was encouraged that the Personal Envoy had been able to hold discussions at the highest level throughout the region. The numerous private and public expressions of support for those efforts were also an important signal that a new dynamic was already in play. To maintain the positive momentum, additional steps needed to be taken by the parties, neighbouring countries and other relevant interlocutors. In its resolutions since the beginning of 2007, the Security Council had directed the Secretary-General to facilitate direct

negotiations between the parties without preconditions, in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, working with realism and a spirit of compromise. The Council had also called upon the parties to show political will, work in an atmosphere favouring dialogue and discuss each other's proposals to prepare for a fifth round of formal negotiations. The Secretary-General called upon the parties to continue to work with his Personal Envoy in that new spirit and dynamic and to genuinely commit themselves to the negotiating process in accordance with the guidance provided by the Council in its resolutions. The conflict over Western Sahara had lasted for far too long and must be brought to an end for the sake and the dignity of the population, including those who had been displaced for more than four decades, as well as for the stability of the wider region, which was facing myriad political, economic and security challenges. In that regard, the work of the Personal Envoy, MINURSO and the United Nations agencies remained indispensable.

11. On 21 March 2018, the Personal Envoy had briefed the Security Council. The Council had expressed full support for the efforts of the Personal Envoy. On 27 April 2018, the Security Council adopted resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#) (see para. 48 below).

12. The situation in Western Sahara, as far as MINURSO had been able to observe, had remained generally calm during the reporting period. However, tensions between the parties, including on the unresolved issues concerning Guerguerat, as well as security concerns, had continued.

13. The Guerguerat area had remained calm and free of the presence of elements of either party for the reporting period until late December 2017, when a small group of Frente POLISARIO military had briefly entered the buffer strip to deliver a message to MINURSO observers. In its message, the Frente POLISARIO announced that it would block a car rally scheduled to pass through the Territory to Mauritania. As at 4 January 2018, a small group of Frente POLISARIO elements had established what the Frente POLISARIO leadership had described as a daylight-hour "monitoring post" inside the buffer strip. They had subsequently clarified that they would not interfere with the race, but only observe it as it passed through, which they had done.

14. Morocco had strongly objected to the Frente POLISARIO presence. On 4 January 2018, MINURSO had received advance notification by Morocco of the redeployment of 260 troops from Awsard to Bir Gandouz, about two hours from Guerguerat, to secure the race if necessary. On 9 January, MINURSO had been informed of the troops' return to their initial location.

15. On 6 January 2018, the Secretary-General had expressed deep concern about recent increased tensions in Guerguerat, calling on the parties to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid escalating tensions. He had also called for regular civilian and commercial traffic not to be obstructed and for no action to be taken that might constitute a change to the status quo of the buffer strip. In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of Frente POLISARIO on 5 January, the Secretary-General of the United Nations had requested that the parties refrain from actions that could undermine the efforts of his Personal Envoy to relaunch the political process.

16. On 3 October 2018, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council the report ([S/2018/889](#)) which covered developments that had occurred since his previous report dated 29 March 2018 ([S/2018/277](#)). In that report, the Secretary-General stated that during the period under review, overall calm had prevailed throughout the Territory on both sides of the berm, although the previously reported underlying tensions between the parties continued.

17. Meanwhile, "police" of the Frente POLISARIO had not been present in the buffer strip in Guerguerat since 22 April 2018.

18. While no major threats to the ceasefire had been recorded to date, MINURSO had reported a number of new violations of military agreement No. 1.

19. During the reporting period, insofar as MINURSO had been able to observe, Morocco had continued to make considerable investments in infrastructure and economic development projects west of the berm. Morocco maintained that the investments and projects benefited the people of Western Sahara and were implemented in full consultation with them. Frente POLISARIO continued to protest that the investments and development activities, as well as the exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara, were in violation of international law and of the status of Western Sahara as a Non-Self-Governing Territory. Frente POLISARIO also claimed that all expressions of dissent, especially public pro-referendum or pro-independence demonstrations, by the Sahrawi population west of the berm were systematically and violently repressed by Moroccan security forces.

20. Frustration and anger at the lack of progress in the political process continued to prevail among the general population of the refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria, compounded by persistent difficulties, such as rising malnutrition, brought about by the steady reductions in humanitarian aid. No significant security incidents had been reported in the refugee camps during the reporting period and, unlike previously, MINURSO had received no reports of major public demonstrations against the political and military leadership.

21. In a letter dated 30 March 2018, King Mohammed VI had written to the Secretary-General denouncing repeated alleged provocations and violations of the ceasefire and related military agreements by Frente POLISARIO. In his letter, he had drawn particular attention to the alleged announced intention of Frente POLISARIO to move some of its administrative structures to Bir Lahlou or Tifariti, east of the berm. Assurances had been later given by Frente POLISARIO that no administrative structures would be moved.

22. The Secretary-General had also received a letter from the Secretary-General of Frente POLISARIO claiming that, on 19 May 2018, a Sahrawi student at Ibn Zohr University in Agadir, Morocco, had been murdered as a result of the country's policy against the Sahrawi population and that a campaign against peaceful Sahrawi demonstrators had been conducted in Laayoune and Smara during the visit by the Personal Envoy to the Territory.

23. On 19 May 2018, in response to increasing tensions between the parties, the Secretary-General had called for maximum restraint to be exercised, in accordance with Security Council resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), and in order to maintain an environment conducive to the resumption of dialogue under the auspices of his Personal Envoy.

24. On the political front, the Personal Envoy had stepped up efforts to advance the political negotiations between the parties. From 23 June to 1 July 2018, he had carried out a second visit to the region, during which he had travelled to Algiers, Dakhla, Laayoune, Nouakchott, Rabat, Rabouni, Smara and Tindouf to gain a better understanding of the situation and to discuss with all relevant actors the way forward in the political process and had held discussions with a wide range of high-level officials of both the parties and neighbouring States and civil society representatives.

25. In Rabouni, the Personal Envoy had met with Mr. Ghali as well as with the negotiation team led by Katri Idoh. Both had expressed full support for the Personal Envoy and his mission as well as their serious intention to help to find a solution for Western Sahara. Mr. Ghali had confirmed to the Personal Envoy, as a sign of good faith, the withdrawal of Frente POLISARIO from Guerguerat and its commitment not to return or move any institutions to Tifariti or Bir Lahlou. Mr. Ghali, however, had

expressed concern about the “settlement policy” and new “administrative configuration” of Morocco, which had been changing the demographic composition of Western Sahara.

26. In Rabat, the Personal Envoy had met with the Prime Minister of Morocco and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and had been assured of the full support of Morocco for his work. The Minister for Foreign Affairs had reiterated the call, made in Security Council resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#), for a realistic, practicable and enduring political solution and had stressed the commitment of Morocco to its autonomy proposal of 2007, which, in his view, should be the basis for negotiations. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated that, while tension in Guerguerat had significantly decreased, Morocco had been still very concerned about Frente POLISARIO “provocations” east of the berm.

27. In Algiers, the Personal Envoy had met with the Prime Minister of Algeria, Ahmed Ouyahia, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdelkader Messahel. Both had reiterated the country’s consistent assurances of its full support as a neighbour and stressed the importance of self-determination. While insisting that it had not been a party to the conflict and could not take the seat of Frente POLISARIO at the negotiating table, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had announced that Algeria had been prepared to step up its role in the political process, as a neighbour, as required by resolution [2414 \(2018\)](#).

28. In Nouakchott, the President of Mauritania, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ismael Ould Cheikh Ahmed, had also expressed full support for the Personal Envoy and for the political process. Both had emphasized the strong cultural ties that had existed between Mauritania and the Sahrawi people. They had confirmed that Mauritania had been also ready to scale up its engagement in the political process in the hope of putting an end to the conflict. The President had stressed that finding a peaceful solution to the conflict had been crucial for the entire region, which had been struggling with drug trafficking, extremism and poverty.

29. In Laayoune, Dakhla and Smara, the Personal Envoy had met with a large number of locally elected officials. They had highlighted developments in the education, health and economic sectors and had stated that the people west of the berm had been grateful for the support received from Morocco, particularly the \$7.7 billion development plan. They had noted, however, that it had been important to gain clarity on the legal status of Western Sahara, as the current uncertainty had hampered foreign investment.

30. The Personal Envoy had also convened meetings in Dakhla and Laayoune with civil society representatives, who had presented a wide range of views. Some had expressed full support for the Moroccan autonomy plan and had urged the United Nations to find a political solution that would allow the people in Tindouf to return to the homeland and benefit from the development seen in the Territory.

31. However, other civil society representatives had expressed concern about Moroccan-funded development projects in the Territory, claiming that they had not benefited the original Sahrawi population. They had stressed that the “elected” officials in the Territory had not represented the Sahrawi people in their entirety, but rather the interests of an elite minority. Those non-governmental organizations had been unanimous in declaring self-determination to be the only way to resolve the conflict.

32. Following the visit, the Personal Envoy had briefed the Security Council on 8 August 2018 and had informed the Council that he had intended to invite the parties and neighbouring States to a first round of direct negotiations in the fourth quarter of the year to build trust and discuss the way forward in the political process. He had

received broad support from the Council for his initiative. On 28 September, the Personal Envoy had sent invitations to the parties and immediate neighbours for preliminary talks, to be held in Geneva on 5 and 6 December. Morocco had responded positively on 2 October to the invitation of the Personal Envoy for the initial round-table meeting in Geneva. On 3 October, Frente POLISARIO had also accepted the invitation to attend the initial round-table meeting.¹

33. With regard to the activities of MINURSO, cooperation between MINURSO team site commanders and the parties had been generally satisfactory. During the reporting period, MINURSO had recorded six violations of military agreement No. 1 by the Royal Moroccan Army, in addition to 10 long-standing violations. MINURSO had recorded 13 general violations of military agreement No. 1 by Frente POLISARIO.

34. On mine action, as at 1 September 2018, 48 known cluster strike areas and 26 known minefields had remained to be addressed east of the berm.

35. Concerning substantive civilian activities, Frente POLISARIO had yet to agree to officially receiving the Special Representative of the Secretary-General at its headquarters in Rabouni, in accordance with long-established practice. Frente POLISARIO insisted that the meeting be held in the Territory of Western Sahara, although meetings with other senior officials continued to take place in Rabouni. On 18 April, the Secretary-General of the United Nations wrote to Secretary-General Ghalibash requesting him to resume the accepted practice, but as yet there had been no change in its position. That situation represented a significant obstacle to the relationship between MINURSO and Frente POLISARIO.

36. Frente POLISARIO argued that MINURSO regularly met with the Moroccan coordinator in Laayoune and should therefore be free to meet with Frente POLISARIO inside the Territory. That position was part of a broader request by Frente POLISARIO for equal treatment with Morocco as a party to the conflict. The Moroccan authorities argued that any meetings held by MINURSO in the Territory with any representatives of Frente POLISARIO, who were normally based in Rabouni, would constitute a recognition of Frente POLISARIO control over the Territory east of the berm, which Morocco denied, as well as an implicit and unacceptable recognition of the “Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic”.

37. Concerning assistance to the protection of Western Saharan refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had continued to provide international protection and, together with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP), had continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Sahrawi refugees living in the five camps near Tindouf. WFP had continued to cover the refugees’ basic food and nutrition needs through the monthly distribution of 125,000 basic food rations. UNHCR and WFP had continued to work closely together on the prevention and treatment of anaemia, stunting and malnutrition among pregnant and lactating women, girls and young children. UNICEF was also present in the camps and provided support in maternal and child health programmes, including support for the expanded programme of immunization, child protection and education activities. The main challenge for humanitarian actors had remained the funding shortfall.

38. The confidence-building measures, pursuant to Security Council resolution [1282 \(1999\)](#) and subsequent resolutions, to allow family links between Sahrawi refugees in the Tindouf camps and their communities of origin in the Territory of Western Sahara remained on hold.

¹ On 9 October, both Algeria and Mauritania sent replies accepting the invitation. On 5 and 6 December, the initial round-table meeting was held in Geneva.

39. With regard to human rights, during the reporting period, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had received a number of reports alleging that demonstrators had been forcibly dispersed during protests related to the right to self-determination, the disposal of natural wealth and resources and the rights of detainees. OHCHR continued to receive reports alleging lack of accountability for human rights violations perpetrated against Sahrawis, including arbitrary arrest, torture and ill-treatment. OHCHR continued to be concerned by reports of alleged excessive surveillance operations targeting human rights defenders and journalists, particularly those located in Western Sahara. The Moroccan authorities continued to restrict access to Western Sahara for foreign visitors, including journalists and lawyers from Morocco.

40. In its concluding observations of July 2018 on the fourth periodic report of Algeria, the Human Rights Committee, reviewing compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, had raised concern about the “de facto devolution of authority to the Frente POLISARIO, especially jurisdictional authority”, in the camps at Tindouf, and about the reports that, as a result, victims of violations of provisions of the Covenant in the camps did not have access to an effective remedy in the State party’s courts.

41. With regard to the African Union, at its thirty-first session, held in Nouakchott on 1 and 2 July 2018, the Assembly of the African Union, in its decision 693 (XXXI), had decided to establish an African mechanism, comprising the Troika of the African Union² as well as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, to support the United Nations-led efforts and to report regularly on the implementation of its mandate to the Assembly and, as necessary, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at the level of Heads of State and Government. It had also decided that the issue of Western Sahara would be raised only within that framework and at that level.

42. In his observations and recommendations, the Secretary-General was encouraged that the parties, despite occasional violations and tensions, continued to maintain the ceasefire and generally observed related military agreements. He was concerned, however, about the rise in tension between the parties and increasingly uncompromising rhetoric. Maintaining peaceful and stable conditions on the ground was essential to providing a climate for the resumption of the political process. He called on the parties to continue engaging with the Mission to resolve the remaining long-standing and recent violations, in full respect for the Mission’s mandate, the ceasefire and related military agreements.

43. The Personal Envoy’s visit to the region had allowed him to further improve his understanding of the current situation in Western Sahara. The commitment of Frente POLISARIO not to go back to Guerguerat and not to move new institutions to the area east of the berm were positive developments and demonstrated its readiness to come back to the negotiating table. Algeria and Mauritania had both confirmed their readiness to take on a more active role in the negotiating process. The willingness on the part of Morocco to facilitate the visit to Western Sahara was also an encouraging sign. The Secretary-General urged the parties and the neighbours to respond positively to the invitation of his Personal Envoy to come to the negotiating table in good faith and without preconditions.

44. The Secretary-General was concerned by the disruption in the relationship between MINURSO and Frente POLISARIO, which had prevented his Special Representative and the Force Commander from meeting with their counterparts. He

² The Troika is composed of the outgoing, the current and the incoming Chairpersons of the African Union.

had therefore called once again on Frente POLISARIO to resume the meetings with senior MINURSO leadership in Rabouni, in accordance with the long-established practice.

45. The Mission's role was predicated on its ability to impartially and independently fulfil the mandate set forth by the Security Council, and the Secretary-General had called on the parties to fully respect that independence.

46. The two parties held divergent views on questions related to the ceasefire and related agreements, and neither had expressed an interest in making adjustments.

47. MINURSO remained a core element of the United Nations effort to reach a just, durable and mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict in Western Sahara that would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. MINURSO had consistently proved to be an effective conflict prevention tool since its inception in 1991, a period that had seen no exchanges of fire between the parties. The Mission's mediation efforts had proved to be successful in de-escalating serious tensions, in resolving potential violations of the military agreements and in maintaining the parties' confidence in the ceasefire arrangements. Notwithstanding its constraints and limited resources, the Mission successfully kept the Secretariat and the Security Council informed of developments in and related to Western Sahara and supported regional stability. The role of MINURSO had been critical to allow for the Personal Envoy, through intensive efforts over the past six months, to make notable progress towards a political solution to the question of Western Sahara. He had therefore recommended that the Council extend the mandate of MINURSO for one year, until 31 October 2019, to give his Personal Envoy the space and time for his efforts to create the conditions necessary for the political process to move ahead.

II. Consideration by the Security Council

48. Following its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General of 29 March 2018 (S/2018/277), the Security Council adopted resolution 2414 (2018) on 27 April 2018, by which the Council decided to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2018. Expressing full support for the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, and welcoming the engagement of the parties and neighbouring States with him in his efforts to facilitate negotiations, the Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in that respect, and affirmed its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy in the context to relaunch the negotiations with a new dynamic and a new spirit with the aim of reaching a mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. The Council also encouraged the parties to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to identify and implement confidence-building measures, including to engage women and youth, and encouraged neighbouring States to support those efforts.

49. Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 3 October 2018 (S/2018/889), the Security Council adopted resolution 2440 (2018) on 31 October 2018, by which it decided to extend the mandate of MINURSO until 30 April 2019.

In the same resolution, the Council expressed its full support for the intention of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to initiate a renewed negotiations process before the end of 2018, noted that invitations to an initial round-table meeting in Geneva on 5 and 6 December 2018 had been sent on 28 September 2018, welcomed that Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, Algeria and Mauritania had responded positively, and encouraged them to work constructively with the Personal Envoy, in the spirit of compromise, throughout the duration of that process to ensure a successful outcome. The Council also called upon the parties to respect their relevant obligations and assurances and refrain from any actions that could undermine United Nations-facilitated negotiations or further destabilize the situation in the Western Sahara.

III. Consideration by the General Assembly

50. During the debate held from 10 to 12 October 2018, the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) heard statements by 78 petitioners on the question of Western Sahara (see [A/C.4/73/SR.4](#), [A/C.4/73/SR.5](#) and [A/C.4/73/SR.6](#)). On 8, 12, 15 and 16 October, Member States addressed, among other things, the issue of Western Sahara. Member States supported the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, with a number of them welcoming the round table to be held in Geneva in December proposed by the Personal Envoy. Some of them expressed strong support for the right of the Saharans to self-determination and reaffirmed their support for the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. Others expressed the view that the autonomy plan put forward by Morocco offered a realistic and viable option that could provide the best prospect for achieving a mutually acceptable solution to the question (see [A/C.4/73/SR.2](#), [A/C.4/73/SR.6](#), [A/C.4/73/SR.7](#) and [A/C.4/73/SR.8](#)).

51. At its 9th meeting, on 17 October, the Committee had before it a draft resolution entitled “Question of Western Sahara” ([A/C.4/73/L.3](#)), submitted by the Chair, which it adopted without a vote.

52. On 7 December, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution [73/107](#). In that resolution, the Assembly, among other things, welcomed the commitment of the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue and the ongoing negotiations between the parties, called upon the parties to cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross and to abide by their obligations under international humanitarian law, requested the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to continue to consider the situation in Western Sahara and to report thereon to the Assembly at its seventy-fourth session, and invited the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its seventy-fourth session a report on the implementation of the resolution.