

**REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION
WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE DECLARATION
ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE
TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES**

VOLUME III

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-SEVENTH SESSION

SUPPLEMENT No. 23 (A/8723/Rev.1)



UNITED NATIONS

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UNITED NATIONS

New York, 1975

NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

The report of the Special Committee is divided into five volumes. The present volume contains chapters VIII to X;* volume I, chapters I to IV; volume II, chapters V to VII; volume IV, chapters XI to XXI; and volume V, chapters XXII to XXVII; each volume contains a full table of contents.

* The present version of chapters VIII to X is a consolidation of the following documents as they appeared in provisional form: A/8723/Add.1 and 2 of 28 August 1972 and A/8723/Add.3 of 1 September 1972.

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A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 835th and 838th to 845th meetings, between 1 and 28 March, at Headquarters, at its 859th, 860th, 862nd, 868th and 869th meetings, between 19 and 27 April, during its meetings in Africa and at its 884th and 886th meetings, on 18 and 23 August 1972, at Headquarters.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 2878 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 on the implementation of the Declaration, by paragraph 10 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session". Further, the Special Committee took into account General Assembly resolutions 2765 (XXVI) of 16 November 1971, 2769 (XXVI) of 22 November 1971, 2796 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971 and 2877 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, relating to the Territory. The Special Committee also paid due regard to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Southern Rhodesia.
3. During its consideration of the question, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex to the present chapter) containing information on action previously taken by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the latest developments in the Territory.

Petitions

4. In addition, the Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Southern Rhodesia:
 - (a) Cable dated 18 January 1972 from Mr. Romesh Chandra, Secretary-General, World Peace Council (A/AC.109/PET.1200);
 - (b) Letter dated 4 February 1972 from Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/PET.1201);
 - (c) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. S. M. Mtambanengwe, Secretary for Political Affairs, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) (A/AC.109/PET.1217);
 - (d) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. N. M. Shamuyarira, Secretary for External Relations and Finance, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) (A/AC.109/PET.1219);

(e) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. Edward Ndlovu, Acting National Secretary, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) (A/AC.109/PET.1220);

(f) Cable dated 13 April 1972 from Mr. Eddison Zuobgo, Deputy Secretary-General, African National Council of Zimbabwe (A/AC.109/PET.1222);

(g) Letter dated 24 January 1972 from Mr. Jöe Nordmann, Secretary-General, International Association of Democratic Lawyers (Brussels) (A/AC.109/PET.1230);

(h) Letter dated 31 January 1972 from Mr. J. J. de Félice, President, Comité Français contre l'Apartheid (A/AC.109/PET.1231);

(i) Letter dated 18 June 1972 from Mr. Dennis Brutus, Acting Chairman, International Campaign Against Racism in Sport (ICARIS) (A/AC.109/PET.1232).

5. The Special Committee also had before it the following written petitions relating, inter alia, to the Territories in southern Africa:

(a) Letter dated 15 March 1972 from the Reverend L. John Collins, President, International Defence and Aid Fund (A/AC.109/PET.1208);

(b) Letter dated 17 March 1972 from Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London) (A/AC.109/PET.1209);

(c) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Sean Gervasi (A/AC.109/PET.1210);

(d) Letter dated 24 March 1972 from Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PET.1211);

(e) Letter dated 22 March 1972, from Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Secretary, World Peace Council (A/AC.109/PET.1212);

(f) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/PET.1213);

(g) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. A. Fataar, Joint Secretary, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) (A/AC.109/PET.1218);

(h) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. T. T. Nkobi, Chief Representative in Zambia, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa (A/AC.109/PET.1221).

6. At its 843rd to 858th and 866th meetings, on 21, 24 and 28 March and 17, 18 and 26 April, the Special Committee, by adopting the 165th to 167th and 169th to 172nd reports of the Sub-Committee on Petitions (A/AC.109/L.770 to L.772, L.784 to L.786 and L.792) decided to grant the requests for hearing contained in the petitions referred to in paragraph 4 (c), (d), (e) and (f), and 5 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h).

7. At the 843rd meeting, on 21 March, the Reverend L. John Collins, President, International Defence and Aid Fund, made a statement and replied to questions put to him by the representatives of the Ivory Coast, India and Mali (A/AC.109/PV.843). At the same meeting, Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London) made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.843). Statements in connexion with the hearings were made by

the Chairman and by the representatives of Mali, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/PV.843).

8. At the 844th meeting, on 24 March, Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Mr. Gordon Schaffer and Mr. Gleb Staroutchenko, representatives, World Peace Council, made statements and replied to questions put to them by the representatives of India and the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same meeting, Mr. Sean Gervasi made a statement and replied to questions put to him by the representative of India (A/AC.109/PV.844). Statements in connexion with the hearings were made by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.844).

9. At the 845th meeting, on 28 March, statements were made by Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom, and by Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PV.845). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.845).

10. At the 835th meeting, on 1 March, the Vice-Chairman (Czechoslovakia) made a statement concerning the consultation he had held with Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the African National Council of Zimbabwe (A/AC.109/PV.835). The Chairman also made a statement in that regard (A/AC.109/PV.835).

General debate

11. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 838th to 842nd meetings, at Headquarters, between 8 and 20 March. Statements in the general debate were made by the following representatives: Sierra Leone and Trinidad and Tobago, at the 838th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.838); Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Sierra Leone, at the 839th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.839); Indonesia, Iraq, India and Tunisia, at the 840th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.840); Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iran, the United Republic of Tanzania and Sierra Leone, at the 841st meeting (A/AC.109/PV.841 and Corr.1); and the Syrian Arab Republic, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia and Mali, at the 842nd meeting (A/AC.109/PV.842).

12. At the 845th meeting, on 28 March, statements relating to the item were made by Mr. Mamadou Moctar Thiam, Executive Secretary of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.845).

Meetings in Africa

13. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee considered the item at its 859th, 860th and 862nd meetings at Lusaka, Zambia, on 19 and 20 April, and at its 868th and 869th meetings at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 27 April, as follows.

14. At the 859th meeting, on 19 April, Mr. Edward Ndlovu, Acting National Secretary, Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), made a statement and, together with Mr. Saul Ndlovu, Director, Bureau of Publicity, ZAPU, replied to questions put to them by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ivory Coast and the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.859). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and Iraq and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.859).

15. At the 860th meeting, on the same day, Mr. Simpson Victor Mtambanengwe, Secretary for Political Affairs, Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), made a statement and replied to questions put to him by the representatives of Iraq and the Ivory Coast (A/AC.109/SR.860). Mr. Nathan M. Shamuyarira, Secretary for External Relations and Finance, Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), made a statement and replied to questions put to him by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/SR.860). Statements in connexion with the hearings were made by the representatives of Iraq and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.860).

16. At the 862nd meeting, on 20 April, Mr. Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, made a statement and replied to a question put to him by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India, Iraq, Mali and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862). At the same meeting, Mr. W. M. Tsotsi, Vice-President, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA), made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862).

17. At the 869th meeting, on 27 April, the Reverend Canaan Banana, Vice-President, African National Council of Zimbabwe, made a statement and, together with Mr. Ronald Sadomba, Deputy Foreign Secretary of the same organization, replied to questions put to them by the representatives of India, Fiji, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and Czechoslovakia (A/AC.109/SR.869). Statements in that connexion were made by Mr. D. Ouattara, Director, Political Department, OAU, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.869).

Draft resolution

18. At the 868th meeting, on 27 April, the representatives of Afghanistan and Ethiopia introduced a draft resolution on the item (A/AC.109/L.787), sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

19. Following statements in explanation of vote by the representatives of Sweden, China, Czechoslovakia, Venezuela, Fiji and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.869), the Special Committee, at its 869th meeting, on 27 April, adopted the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.787) by a roll-call vote of 20 to none, with 2 abstentions (see paragraph 23 below). The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Fiji, Sweden.

The representative of Ecuador made a statement in explanation of vote (A/AC.109/SR.869). The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania made a further statement (A/AC.109/SR.869).

20. On 8 May, the text of the resolution (A/AC.109/403) was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/10634). Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to States, including the administering Power, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, and to OAU.

Participation of Southern Rhodesia in the XXth Olympic Games

21. At the 884th meeting, on 18 August, the Chairman, on behalf of the Committee, made a statement concerning the participation in the XXth Olympic Games of the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia (see para. 24 below).

22. At the 886th meeting, on 23 August, the Acting Chairman made a statement relating to further developments concerning the above-mentioned subject (see para. 25 below).

B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

23. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/403) adopted by the Special Committee at its 869th meeting, on 27 April, to which reference is made in paragraph 19 above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Zimbabwe African People's Union, the Zimbabwe African National Union, the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe and the African National Council of Zimbabwe,

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970,

Deeply disturbed at the continued oppression of the people of Zimbabwe, including in particular the killings, unlawful detentions and denial of fundamental human rights by the illegal racist minority régime, a situation which the Security Council has reaffirmed as constituting a threat to international peace and security,

Strongly deploring the failure and refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to take effective measures in order to terminate the illegal racist minority régime and to discharge its primary responsibility as the administering Power by enabling the people of Zimbabwe to exercise freely their right to self-determination and independence,

Deploring also the fact that measures taken so far have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end, due primarily to the continued and increasing collaboration which certain States, in particular South Africa and Portugal, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations and of the relevant decisions of the United Nations, continue to maintain with the illegal régime, thereby seriously impeding the effective application of sanctions against the illegal régime,

Reaffirming that any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal racist minority régime on the basis of independence before majority rule would be a direct contravention of the provisions of resolution 1514 (XV);

Bearing in mind the manifest opposition of the people of Zimbabwe to the "proposal for a settlement" relating to the future of the Territory agreed upon by the Government of the United Kingdom and the illegal racist minority régime,

Deeply disturbed by the continued presence and intervention of South African forces in Southern Rhodesia, which assists the racist minority régime and seriously threatens the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring African States,

Recalling the relevant provisions of resolutions 2796 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971 and 2878 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, in which the General Assembly called upon the Government of the United Kingdom to co-operate with the Special Committee in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence and the legitimacy of the struggle of the people and their national liberation movements to secure by all available means at their disposal the enjoyment of that right;
2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and that any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the national liberation movements representing the majority of the people of Zimbabwe and must be endorsed freely and fully by the people;
3. Strongly condemns the failure and refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the United Nations, to terminate the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and calls upon that Government to take forthwith all effective measures to bring down the rebellious minority régime;

4. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, to effect the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, detainees and reestrictedees in Southern Rhodesia and urges it to convene, as a matter of urgency, a constitutional conference of all leaders and national liberation movements representing the people of Zimbabwe, with a view to the transfer of all powers to the people on the basis of universal suffrage and majority rule;

5. Strongly condemns the policies of the Governments, particularly the Governments of South Africa and Portugal, which, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and contrary to their specific obligations under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, continue to collaborate with the illegal racist minority régime in its racialist and repressive domination of the people of Zimbabwe, and calls upon those Governments to cease forthwith all such collaboration;

6. Condemns the continued presence and intervention of South Africa forces in Southern Rhodesia in violation of the decisions of the Security Council and calls upon the administering Power to effect the immediate expulsion of all such forces from the Territory;

7. Condemns any violation as well as any failure of Member States to enforce strictly the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 25 of the Charter;

8. Requests all Governments which so far have not done so to take more stringent enforcement measures to ensure strict compliance by all individuals and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council, and urges all Governments to refrain from taking any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority régime;

9. Requests all States, directly and through their action in the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system of which they are members, to extend to the people of Zimbabwe, through their national liberation movements and in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, all the moral and material assistance necessary in their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable rights;

10. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom, in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 2878 (XXVI), to co-operate with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly and to participate actively in the work of the Special Committee in connexion with the latter's consideration of the question, as well as to report to that Committee on the implementation of the present resolution;

11. Draws the attention of the Security Council, in view of the further deterioration of the situation resulting from the intensified repressive measures taken by the illegal racist minority régime against the people of Zimbabwe, to the urgent need to widen the scope of sanctions against the

illegal régime to include all the measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter and, having regard to their refusal to carry out the mandatory decisions of the Security Council, to the need, as a matter of priority, to consider imposing sanctions against Portugal and South Africa;

12. Decides to keep the situation in Southern Rhodesia under continuous review.

24. The text of the statement made by the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee, to which reference is made in paragraph 21 above, is reproduced below:

(1) The Special Committee recalls that, at its session in 1971, it adopted two consensuses on the subject of the participation in the XXth Olympic Games of the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia. In these consensuses, the Special Committee, considering that the decision of the International Olympic Committee to permit the participation of that group clearly contravened the aims and purposes of the relevant Security Council resolutions, requested all States to take steps to ensure the exclusion of the group from participating in the Twentieth Olympic Games and to refrain from any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

(2) At its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution 2796 (XXVI), called upon all States to take all appropriate steps to ensure the exclusion of the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia from participating in the XXth Olympic Games and requested the Secretary-General to draw the attention of the President of the International Olympic Committee to the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) for appropriate action.

(3) In the light of these decisions, and, bearing in mind the special responsibility entrusted to this Committee by the General Assembly with respect to the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration to all colonial Territories, it is all the more regrettable that the International Olympic Committee and the Organizing Committee of the Games continue to maintain the arrangements which permit the participation of this group in the Games. It is patently clear that the participation of the group in the Games, in whatever form or under whatever conditions, contravenes the terms of the aforementioned decision of the United Nations.

(4) In this regard, the Special Committee expresses its deep sense of satisfaction at the decision of several Member States, acting in the spirit of the Committee's decisions and of the General Assembly resolution, to take steps to withdraw from the Games in the event of participation by the so-called National Olympic Committee of Rhodesia.

(5) Further, the Special Committee expressed the hope that even at this late hour, measures will be taken to prevent such participation and thereby conform to the decisions taken by the United Nations.

25. The text of the statement made by the Chairman on behalf of the Special Committee, to which reference is made in paragraph 22 above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee expresses its satisfaction at the recent decision of the International Olympic Committee to expel the so-called National Committee of Rhodesia from the XXth Olympic Games at Munich. The Special Committee is most appreciative of the initiative taken by several Member States in this regard, leaving no other alternative to the International Olympic Committee but to comply with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. This proves once again that decisions of the United Nations can bring about positive results in the field of decolonization and that no problems are incapable of solution in this regard given political will and commitment on the part of the States Members of the United Nations.

ANNEX*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

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A. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1971 AND EARLY 1972

1. The question of Southern Rhodesia has been under continuous consideration by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples since 1962 and has been the subject of a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council. a/ The text of the relevant resolutions and consensuses adopted by these bodies during 1971 has been made available to the Committee.

Action taken by the Special Committee

2. During 1971, the Special Committee considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its meetings between 4 March and 6 October and adopted the following resolutions and consensuses on the question which appear in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly: b/

<u>Resolution/consensus</u>	<u>Meeting</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Consensus of 4 March 1971	782	chap. VI, para. 31 (A/8423/Add.2 (Part I))
Resolution of 30 April 1971	795	" " para. 32 "
" of 2 July 1971	807	" " para. 33 "
" of 24 August 1971	820	" " para. 34 "
" of 9 September 1971	825	chap. V, para. 19 (A/8423/Add.1)
Consensus of 6 October 1971	828	chap. VI, para 41 (a) (A/8423/Add.2 (Part II))
" of 6 October 1971	828	" " para 41 (b) "

Action taken by the General Assembly

3. The General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth session, on the recommendation of its Fourth Committee, adopted four resolutions on the question of Southern Rhodesia, as follows:

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Meeting</u>
2765 (XXVI) of 16 November 1971	1984
2769 (XXVI) of 22 November 1971	1991
2796 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971	2012
2877 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971	2028

a/ For information on action prior to 1971, see the Special Committee's most recent report to the General Assembly: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VI, annex I, paras.1-8.

b/ Ibid., chaps. V and VI.

Action taken by the Security Council

4. The Security Council considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at its 1602nd to 1605th, 1609th, 1622nd and 1623rd meetings, held between 25 November and 30 December 1971. The proceedings of the Council are contained in the records of the aforementioned meetings.

5. At its 1604th meeting, on 2 December, the Security Council decided, in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, that the leaders of the two main political parties in Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), should "be invited to appear before the Council to state their views on the proposals on Southern Rhodesia". Following that decision, the President of the Security Council addressed a letter on the same day to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations in which, inter alia, he expressed his hope that the Government of the United Kingdom, "as the Administering Authority of the Territory, will take the appropriate steps to ensure compliance with this decision of the Security Council".

6. In a letter dated 21 December (S/10470), the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom replied to the President's communication as follows:

".....

"I am instructed by my Government to say that they have considered carefully the hope expressed in Your Excellency's letter that they would take appropriate steps to ensure that Mr. Nkomo and Reverend Sithole were able to respond to the invitation to address the Council. As you know, however, Mr. Nkomo is in detention and the Reverend Sithole is serving a prison sentence in Rhodesia. In these circumstances my Government regret that, as I said during our consultations before you announced that there were no objections to the issuance of the invitation, they are not in a position to require the Rhodesian authorities to allow either Mr. Nkomo or the Reverend Sithole to come to New York."

7. On 30 December, a draft resolution, sponsored by Burundi, Sierra Leone, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic (S/10489), was circulated to the Council. At its 1623rd meeting, held on the same date, the Security Council voted on the draft resolution. The result of the vote on the draft resolution as a whole was as follows:

In favour: Argentina, Burundi, China, Nicaragua, Poland, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, United States of America.

The draft resolution was therefore not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

8. At its 1627th to 1639th meetings, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between 28 January and 4 February 1972, the Security Council considered the questions relating to Africa with which it is currently seized. The proceedings of the Council are contained in the records of those meetings.

9. On 3 February 1972 a draft resolution (S/10606), sponsored by Guinea, Somalia and the Sudan, was circulated to the Council. The Security Council voted on the draft resolution at its 1639th meeting, on 4 February. The result of the vote on the draft resolution was as follows:

In favour: Argentina, China, Guinea, India, Panama, Somalia, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Yugoslavia.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Abstaining: Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, United States of America.

The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY

1. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Proposals for a settlement

The 1969 "Constitution"

10. It will be recalled that in May 1969 the United Kingdom Government, after repeated failures to negotiate a settlement in accordance with the Five Principles, c/ discontinued contacts with the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia. Subsequently, on 2 March 1970, the illegal régime proclaimed Southern Rhodesia to be a republic and brought into effect the "Constitution" approved in 1969. On the same day, the United Kingdom Government declared that "the purported assumption of a republican status by the régime in Southern Rhodesia is, like the 1965 declaration of independence itself, illegal".

11. As previously explained, d/ the 1969 "Constitution" permanently precluded any possibility of progress beyond parity of representation in the "House of Assembly" between Europeans and Africans. The "Constitution" further contained an entrenched "Land Tenure Act" regulating the ownership and occupation of land, which in effect divided the land of Southern Rhodesia almost equally between Europeans and Africans, apart from certain areas designated national land and unreserved land. e/ The "Constitution" also contained a Declaration of Rights, which was not enforceable by the courts and which, moreover, included a provision permitting the régime to order detention or restriction without trial.

Further contacts between the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime

12. On 9 November 1970, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, stated in the House of Commons that however long the odds were against a settlement, one more try should be made in order to prevent the consequences of a final rupture with the illegal régime which would be serious for both the Europeans and the Africans of Southern Rhodesia and for southern Africa as a whole. To this end, he announced, he had sent a communication of a preliminary

c/ Unimpeded progress to majority rule; guarantees against retroactive amendment of the Constitution; immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; progress towards ending racial discrimination; any basis proposed for independence must be acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole.

d/ For details of the 1969 "Constitution", including the entrenched provisions, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. V, annex, paras. 14-29.

e/ European land, 44,952,900 acres; African land, 44,994,500 acres; national land, 7 million acres.

nature to "Prime Minister" Ian Smith, to try to establish whether there was a realistic basis for a negotiated settlement. Following further written exchanges, which the United Kingdom Government stated it found encouraging, a special envoy, Lord Goodman, was dispatched to Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, on four occasions, between April and October 1971, for detailed exploratory discussions with the illegal régime. In the light of these discussions, the United Kingdom Government decided that a basis for negotiation had been established. f/

13. Negotiations on an official level between representatives of the United Kingdom and the illegal régime were held in Salisbury from 14 to 24 November 1971. The United Kingdom Government was represented by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the Attorney-General, Sir Peter Rawlinson, and the special envoy, Lord Goodman. The illegal régime was represented by Mr. Ian Smith, "Prime Minister", Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", and Mr. John Howman, "Minister of Foreign Affairs". British officials also met with a number of African representatives, including Mr. Joshua Nkomo, leader of ZAPU, who is under detention. The great majority of Africans interviewed expressed strong opposition to any settlement proposals in which representatives of the African people did not fully participate and which did not, inter alia, provide for immediate majority rule and repeal of the "Land Tenure Act".

Terms of the proposals

14. Provisional "proposals for a settlement" were signed by the officials representing both the United Kingdom Government and the illegal régime, on 24 November and on the following day were presented to the British Parliament, the Southern Rhodesia "Legislative Assembly" and to the United Nations Security Council. A White Paper giving the text of the proposals, including a new declaration of rights, was published by the United Kingdom Government on 26 November (S/10405). In brief, the proposals provide for acceptance of the 1969 "Constitution" as the basic governing instrument of a Republic of Rhodesia. The 1969 "Constitution" would be modified as follows: (a) to allow for progress to African majority rule through the creation of an African higher roll, enrolment on which would be restricted to those Africans meeting the same educational and financial qualifications as the European electorate; (b) to prevent retrogressive amendment of the modified constitution; and (c) to confer a right of appeal to the High Court against violations of the anti-discrimination provisions contained in a new declaration of rights, which would be an entrenched provision of the modified constitution (see below).

15. The proposed declaration of rights would forbid the adoption of new discriminatory legislation, but would contain a provision to the effect that any legislation which had been in force for 10 years could not be declared inconsistent with any provision of the declaration. As regards existing legislation, the proposals called for the establishment of an independent review commission, whose function would be to examine the problem of racial discrimination in all fields, with particular attention to the "Land Tenure Act". These recommendations would be given effect to by the new Government of Rhodesia, "subject to considerations which any government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding character". Further details of the proposals are as follows.

(a) Progress to majority rule

16. At the outset, the composition of the present "House of Assembly" (66 members, of whom 50 are Europeans, and 16 are Africans, 8 directly elected by the African lower roll and 8 indirectly elected by Tribal Councils) would remain unchanged. However, a new African higher roll would be created and two additional African higher roll seats would be added whenever the number of voters registered on the African higher roll increased by 6 per cent compared with the number of European voters, until 34 additional seats had been created, resulting in parity in the number of African and European members (100 members in all). The first two additional members would be elected by voters on the African higher roll and the next two by indirect election under the existing system of tribal electoral colleges, this sequence to be repeated until parity was reached. Membership would at that time be composed of 50 Europeans, 8 Africans elected, as at present, by the African lower roll, 24 indirectly elected Africans (the present 8, plus a further 16), and 18 directly elected by African higher roll voters. After parity was reached, a referendum would be held among all enrolled Africans to determine whether the practice of indirect elections should be abandoned, with all seats in the future to be allocated to the African higher roll, or whether it should be retained, at least in part. Subsequently, following a review by a commission, 10 common roll seats would be created, allowing Africans to reach a small majority in Parliament, or an alternative arrangement, commanding general support, would be instituted.

17. No changes would be made with regard to the composition of the present "Senate", which comprises 10 Europeans, 10 indirectly elected Africans, and three government appointed senators.

(b) Extension of franchise with respect to the African lower roll

18. The proposals provide for a reduction in the franchise qualifications for the African lower roll which are similar to those of a "B" roll under the 1961 Constitution. The financial qualification would be reduced in two stages, each time by 10 per cent, and would thereby enable a larger number of Africans to be enfranchised. Any increase in the number of Africans enrolled on the lower roll, however, would not be matched by a commensurate increase in their parliamentary representation, which would be fixed, as at present, at eight members.

(c) Situation of detainees and restrictees

19. According to the illegal régime, there were, in November 1971, 93 African detainees, of whom 31 were to be released "as soon as the necessary arrangements /could/ be made", and two restrictees. If a settlement were reached, the new Government of Rhodesia would undertake a special review of all cases "to see whether, in the light of changed circumstances, they could be released or the restrictions could be removed without prejudice to the maintenance of public safety and public order". The recommendation of the review tribunal, whose work would be observed by a United Kingdom observer, would be binding on the new Government.

(d) Racial discrimination

20. As stated above, in the event of a settlement, an independent review commission would be established to examine the problem of racial discrimination in all fields, including especially, that of the allocation and use of land as fixed

by the "Land Tenure Act", which would remain an entrenched provision of the new constitution. One of the related tasks of the commission would be to consider the creation of an independent and permanent land board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved. The recommendations of the commission would not be binding on the new Government of Rhodesia if there were considerations which "any government would be obliged to regard as of an overriding nature".

21. The terms of reference of the commission would be:

(a) To examine all existing laws and administrative practices in Southern Rhodesia so as to determine which acts are discriminatory.

(b) To make recommendations to the new Government of Rhodesia on ways of making progress towards ending racial discrimination.

(c) To give special attention to the "Land Tenure Act" and to consider:

(i) The question of removing any restrictions on the entry into European areas of Africans wishing to attend multiracial places of education, or to be admitted to multiracial hospitals, and any other restrictions on occupation.

(ii) The question of removing any restrictions on the right of an African member of the professions to practise in a European area.

(iii) In the light of the national interest, the question of the equitable allocation of land in relation to the needs of the respective sections of the population.

(iv) The possible creation of an independent and permanent multiracial land board to preside over the long-term resolution of the problems involved, and

(v) Membership of the commission, which would be agreed on with the United Kingdom Government, would be established as soon as possible after the test of acceptability of the proposals as a whole had been completed.

(e) Assurance against retrogressive amendment of the Constitution

22. The illegal régime gave assurances that if a settlement were reached it would not introduce or support any amendment to entrenched provisions of the modified constitution before either (a) the first two African higher roll seats had been filled; or (b) until three years had elapsed, whichever was sooner. Furthermore, until parity of representation was reached, any bill to amend an entrenched provision would require, in addition to a two-thirds affirmative vote in each house of the legislature, the affirmative vote in the new house of assembly of a majority of the total European and African membership voting separately. After parity had been reached, at which time there would be 18 directly elected African higher roll members of parliament, amendments to entrenched provisions would require only a simple two-thirds majority vote, since the support of at least 17 members of the new house of assembly would be required for passage.

23. Specially entrenched provisions of the modified constitution would include: (a) the new franchise arrangements; (b) the new declaration of rights; (c) the section relating to declarations of emergency; and (d) a number of provisions of the electoral act.

(f) Renewal of declaration of emergency

24. The proposed constitution retains provisions for declarations of emergency, with the modification that they be renewed every nine months instead of every twelve months as at present.

(g) Land

25. According to the illegal régime, there are at present five million acres of unoccupied land in African areas. Following a settlement, the new Government of Rhodesia would undertake to make additional land available to Africans as the need arose. A proportion of the aid referred to below (see paragraph 27 below) would be allocated immediately to the improvement of areas currently occupied or intended for African occupation.

26. The illegal régime also agreed to suspend eviction proceedings against Africans living in the European area, especially the Epworth and Chishawaska missions, until the proposed commission on racial discrimination had made its report.

(h) Development programme

27. The United Kingdom Government would provide up to £5 million annually for 10 years in capital aid and technical assistance to be matched by sums provided by the new Rhodesian Government, in addition to annual expenditure currently planned. This money would be used for economic and educational development in African areas, including new irrigation schemes, intensive cultivation projects, industrial projects and the improvement of communications in tribal trust lands and African purchase areas, as well as expanded facilities for Africans in agriculture, technical and vocational training, the training of teachers and administrators, and for education at the primary, secondary and higher levels.

(i) Declaration of rights

28. The proposed declaration of rights which would be entrenched in the new constitution would provide for protection of rights and freedoms relating to life, personal liberty, slavery and forced labour, deprivation of property, arbitrary search or entry, freedom of conscience and expression, protection of law, assembly and association and freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, tribe, political opinions, colour or creed, subject in each case to specific exceptions. Freedom of assembly and association, expression, conscience, freedom from arbitrary search and entry might be suspended "in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or town and country planning". Trial proceedings, except for the verdict of a court, might also be kept secret for the same reasons.

29. As regards freedom from discrimination, the proposed declaration would provide that no law shall contain any discriminatory provision and that no public officer

shall perform any executive or administrative act in a discriminatory manner; discrimination is defined as being either subjected to restrictions or accorded privileges on the basis of race, tribe, colour or creed. Any person who alleged that provisions of the declaration had been contravened in relation to himself, would have the right to apply to the Appellate Division of the High Court for redress. (The Court would have the right to deny, without hearing, any application which, in its opinion, was merely vexatious or frivolous.) If any provision of any law was held to be unconstitutional, any person detained under such a provision could apply to the Appellate Division to question the validity of his further detention. The Court could not, however, declare any provision of any act enacted after the coming into effect of the new constitution to be inconsistent with the proposed declaration of rights if that provision had been in force, in prior form, for the preceding 10 years.

30. Elsewhere in the proposals, it is stated that vacancies in the public service would be filled according to merit and suitability, regardless of race.

31. With regard to arrest and detention, the proposed declaration would provide that any detained person must be informed "as soon as reasonably practicable" of the reasons for his arrest and detention and must be permitted at his own expense to obtain a legal adviser of his own choice, and be brought without delay before a court.

32. A person placed in preventive detention "in the interests of defence, public safety or public order" could be held for no longer than 14 days without a ministerial order and no longer than 42 days without having his case submitted for review at intervals of not more than nine months. No person released from detention upon the advice of the tribunal could be redetained within the period of six months from his release on the same grounds as those on which he was originally detained. No compensation for unlawful arrest or detention would be made provided that the judicial officer acted reasonably and in good faith.

33. The proposed declaration of rights would further provide that, during a state of public emergency all rights to personal liberty, property, freedom from arbitrary search or entry, protection of law, freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association, and protection from discrimination might be abridged. Whenever a person was "lawfully" detained during a state of emergency, his case must be reviewed by a tribunal not later than three months after the commencement of his detention, and thereafter at intervals of not more than nine months.

(j) Implementation of the proposals

34. It was stated in the White Paper that the proposals for a settlement would be confirmed and implemented only after the United Kingdom Government had satisfied itself that they were acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. For this purpose, it was agreed that a commission, consisting of a chairman, deputy chairmen and a number of commissioners to be appointed by the United Kingdom Government, would canvass public opinion throughout the Territory in order to ascertain directly from all sections of the population whether or not the proposals were acceptable, and would report accordingly to the United Kingdom Government. The commission would visit in particular all centres of population, local councils and traditional meeting places in tribal trust lands and would have access to persons in detention or under restriction, as well as to Southern Rhodesian residents abroad.

35. Before and during the test of acceptability, normal political activities would be permitted, provided they were conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner, and radio and television time would be made available to political parties represented in the "House of Assembly".

36. If the United Kingdom Government was satisfied that the proposed terms were acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the illegal régime would take the necessary legislative steps to implement them. After these had been completed, the United Kingdom Government would introduced legislation in Parliament to confer independence on Southern Rhodesia as a republic, and to terminate economic and other sanctions.

Statement by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the House of Commons

37. On 1 December 1971, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, declared in the House of Commons, inter alia, that he had been conscious during recent years that Britain's influence on the situation in Southern Rhodesia was running out, and that the Government must exercise it while any of it remained to try to obtain the best deal for Rhodesian Africans. That was the sole reason he had assumed the responsibility of trying to find a settlement. As to the essential question of when majority rule would be achieved in Southern Rhodesia, Sir Alec said no definite answer was possible. There were a large number of variables such as how many Africans would register, how many would receive secondary and technical education, and above all, what would be the pace of industrial and agricultural advancement; he felt that under all these headings, however, the prospects for the advancement of Africans was good.

38. Speaking later in his own constituency, Sir Alec stated that the Southern Rhodesian settlement had to be accepted or rejected and that no new negotiations were possible. He therefore hoped that all Rhodesian Africans, Asians and Europeans, would recognize that the proposals represented the best that could be achieved by negotiation and that it was in their common interest to accept them.

Statements by Mr. Ian Smith

39. Presenting the proposals for a settlement to the Southern Rhodesian "Parliament" on 25 November, "Prime Minister" Ian Smith commended the proposed new constitution as a fair and practical instrument, which would "meet the needs of all fair-minded Rhodesians", and would enable them to comply with the most important principle, the retention of government in "civilized hands". He also said it would be a fruitless exercise to try to assess how long it would take Africans to reach parity of representation, as there were many imponderables which could affect the situation. It was the "Government's" carefully considered opinion, in view of the expansion of the economy and the increase in immigration to which the country could confidently look forward, that no European need harbour any anxiety about the security of his future in Rhodesia. g/ Regarding the possible rejection of the

g/ On 1 December, Mr. Smith said in a television interview that Africans would not be in power in Southern Rhodesia for at least 10 years and that he did not know what the situation would be in 100 years or 1,000 years. He said that he did not believe Africans were fit to govern the country at present and that they would not be fit in 10 years.

settlement proposals by the African population, Mr. Smith said that the only alternative to accepting the agreement was to maintain the status quo, which meant that the 1969 "Constitution" would remain in force.

Action by the United Kingdom Parliament

40. The House of Commons approved the proposals for a settlement on 1 December 1971 by a vote of 297 to 269. The proposals were approved in the House of Lords on 2 December by 201 to 76 votes.

Communiqué by the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

41. The secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in a communiqué issued on 26 November 1971, declared, inter alia, that the "settlement" was an "outright sell-out, for generations to come, of five million Africans to 240,000 white Rhodesians committed to white supremacy and apartheid". The communiqué characterized as a "bait which cannot fool anyone", both the principle of "parliamentary parity and majority rule at an indefinite time", and the "programme of education" for Africans to be financed by the United Kingdom; these measures could not replace "the fundamental rights, dignity and freedom of five million Africans". The OAU Secretariat further stated that any agreement reached on the question of Southern Rhodesia "without the participation of the African people and its representative organizations, the Zimbabwe African People's Union and the Zimbabwe African National Union, can only be null and void".

42. The OAU secretariat stressed that "more than ever, the only guarantee for Africans to make steady progress towards the immediate establishment of majority rule is to take their affairs into their own hands and to assert their rights by whatever means". The "settlement" went against the resolutions and decisions of OAU on the questions of decolonization and apartheid and as such could only be "fraught with consequences for the Commonwealth and the future relations between Great Britain and independent Africa".

Action by the United Nations General Assembly

43. In its resolution 2877 (XXVI), adopted on 20 December 1971, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its grave concern at the "proposals for a settlement" which, if implemented, "will entrench the rule of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia and will perpetuate the enslavement of the African people of Zimbabwe", and point to the fact that the "proposals for a settlement" were agreed upon without the participation of the representatives of the African people of Zimbabwe. The Assembly rejected the proposals as constituting a "flagrant violation of the inalienable right of the African people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence as provided for in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)" and reaffirmed that "no settlement which does not conform strictly to the principle of 'no independence before majority rule' on the basis of one man, one vote, will be acceptable".

Reaction in Southern Rhodesia to the announcement of the proposals for settlement

44. Even before the arrival of the British commission to test the acceptability of the proposals for settlement, there were reports of reactions in the Territory.

45. Previously, on 17 November, during the negotiations between the United Kingdom and the illegal régime, Sir Alec Douglas-Home had received a seven-page memorandum signed by the Rev. N. Sithole, leader of ZANU outlining ZANU's position with respect to the "settlement"; the Rev. Sithole is serving a prison sentence in Salisbury, having been convicted of allegedly conspiring to assassinate "Prime Minister" Smith and two members of his "cabinet". In the memorandum, the Rev. Sithole said that the people of Zimbabwe were "uncompromisingly opposed to the granting of independence before majority rule" and that they could not accept any terms of settlement which placed them at the mercy of a white minority. He further said that the five British principles were devoid of any political meaning for the African people, being based on the fundamentally wrong assumption that the white minority would, with the passage of time, hand over power to the African majority of whom they [the whites] were so fearful. The African people could not be a party to the United Kingdom Government's "cunning designs to keep them colonized" when other peoples in Africa and Asia had been decolonized. They desired to determine their own destiny, and not be guided and controlled by a white minority.

46. In December 1971, the African National Council of Zimbabwe was formed to organize a non-violent campaign for rejection of the proposals. The Council, which describes itself as a non-political organization, formed solely to oppose the settlement, is headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the American United Methodist Church and includes among its leadership a number of former political detainees. On 3 January the African National Council of Zimbabwe issued a five-page document describing the settlement proposals as a sell-out of the African people and urging Africans to reject them. The Council criticized the all-white composition of the Commission to test the acceptability of the proposals, as announced in London, and said that a test of acceptability by the Commission would be no substitute for a referendum.

47. Opposition to the proposals also came from influential religious groups, including the Christian Council of Rhodesia, which includes 12 Protestant churches and several religious organizations, and from leaders of the Roman Catholic Church. Meeting in Salisbury on 30 December, the Christian Council, in a resolution adopted by 25 votes to 9, called for their rejection "in the light of the serious defects" and on the grounds, inter alia, that "the majority of the House of Assembly would for all time be elected by race, instead of by a common voter's roll". On 20 January, the Rhodesian Catholic Bishops' Conference likewise condemned the proposals which "reserve at least for the foreseeable future the privileged position of the white section of the population...". A similar view was expressed by Mr. Garfield Todd, former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Addressing a public meeting of 2,000 Africans in Bulawayo on 10 January, he urged Africans to reject the proposals and to call for a new dialogue between black and white Southern Rhodesians.

48. On the other hand, the Council of Chiefs, meeting in Salisbury on 4 January, expressed unanimous support for the proposed settlement and strongly recommended its approval by "all Africans who have the interests of their people at heart". The Council believed that the settlement would lead to progress and prosperity which would benefit all Southern Rhodesians.

49. As meetings were called throughout the Territory by the chiefs and the African National Council of Zimbabwe to explain the terms of the proposed settlement, there were reports in the press of increasing tension. On 6 January, 11 African residents of the Belingwe Tribal Trust Land in Matabeleland were reportedly arrested in a first outbreak of violence at such a meeting. Warnings were issued by the illegal régime that it would "clamp down hard" if "intimidatory tactics" were resorted to.

50. As early as December, the African National Council of Zimbabwe, which was actively campaigning against the proposed settlement, complained that some district commissioners were impeding its work, and, in particular, resorting to technical and other arguments to refuse authorization for the holding of meetings. On 13 January, the Council called a press conference at which a spokesman charged that more than 200 applications to hold meetings in rural areas had been refused. It was claimed that, in some instances, the applicants had been told that there were instructions to the effect that no Africans other than members of "Parliament" should be allowed to address meetings before the British Commission to test opinion had toured the Territory. One of the reasons said to have been adduced was that Council spokesmen would not be able to explain the proposed settlement because of its legal wording.

51. Nevertheless, the African National Council of Zimbabwe reported that it was successfully holding meetings without official sanction. On 16 January, after the arrival of the Commission, it was reported that the Council was producing 550,000 pamphlets in Shona explaining its opposition to the proposals and that it would distribute 20,000 automobile stickers with the word "No".

Arrival of the Commission to test the acceptability of the proposals for settlement

52. The British Commission appointed to test the acceptability of the proposals to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole arrived in Salisbury on 11 January 1972. The Commission is headed by Lord Pearce and comprises three deputy chairmen (Lord Harlech, Sir Maurice Dorman and Sir Glyn James) and 16 commissioners, h/ all British with experience in African or colonial affairs.

53. On the following day, after a meeting with Mr. Smith, who was reported to have assured the Commission that it would receive all necessary co-operation, Lord Pearce issued a statement in which he said that the Commission's first task was to ensure that the proposals were fully understood; to this end about 700,000 copies of simplified versions of the proposals in English, Shona and Ndebele had been made available for distribution. Appealing to the "silent majority" to come forward and make their views known, he stressed the Commission's impartiality and hoped that the test would be conducted in a calm and peaceful atmosphere without intimidation or obstruction from any quarter. If the Commission found that opinion in Southern Rhodesia was equally divided, or if it could not be sure of Southern Rhodesian opinion, its findings would be negative. He explained that, after a week of preparation in Salisbury, seven teams of two commissioners each, accompanied by interpreters, would go to different areas of the Territory where they would hold meetings to explain the proposals and receive written and oral evidence of opinion; at the end of 10 days they would return to Salisbury to assess the success of this method and to modify the approach if necessary. After all evidence had been collected, the Commission would return to London where the evidence would be evaluated and a report made to the Secretary of State.

54. On 13 January, the Commission's office in Salisbury began receiving statements of opinion. At the outset, forms were issued on which the applicant was invited to indicate whether his opinion was favourable or unfavourable. The following day, however, after over 8,000 forms had been returned, mostly rejecting the proposals,

h/ On 18 January, two additional commissioners were appointed and instructed to proceed immediately to Southern Rhodesia because of the unexpectedly heavy volume of work.

they were discontinued; instead applicants were invited to submit their wishes in writing by mail. Lord Pearce denied a rumour that the forms had been withdrawn at the request of the illegal régime.

Incidents following the arrival of the Commission

55. As the test of acceptability began to get under way, there were demonstrations of opposition and outbreaks of violence in various parts of the Territory. Even before the Commission began its work, there had been disturbances at Gwelo, Belingwe, Bulawayo and Shabani which had been suppressed by the police and which the illegal régime characterized, in a statement, as the work of agitators, adding that it would not tolerate any attempts to break down law and order and would take firm action against all those involved. On 13 January, an apparently unrelated riot at an asbestos mine at Shabani, where 3,000 African workers were striking for higher wages, resulted in the death of one person and wounding of nine others as the result of gunfire by police.

56. As the Commission's teams dispersed throughout the Territory to carry out their investigations, incidents occurred which were directly related thereto, notably at Gwelo, where rioting, reportedly involving 8,000 and 6,000 Africans respectively, occurred on 17 and 18 January, the rioters being repelled from the town centre by tear gas and armed troops. On 19 January, rioting was reported in the Harare township on the outskirts of Salisbury, resulting in the shooting of three rioters, and in Fort Victoria and Umtali. On 3 February, Bishop A. Muzorewa stated that altogether 31 Africans had been killed by the police during the disturbances. i/

57. The outbreak of disorders led to the further strengthening of restrictions by the illegal régime. Several public hearings by the Commission were cancelled on security grounds and a number of persons, including Mr. Josiah Chinamano, an ANC treasurer and a former education secretary of ZAPU, and several other members of ANC were arrested and detained. On 18 January, the former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr. Garfield Todd, and his daughter were arrested and placed in detention by an order signed by the "Minister of Justice, Law and Order". The reason given in the detention order was the belief that they were "likely to commit or incite the commission of acts... which would endanger the public safety or disturb or interfere with the maintenance of public order". In reply to a request by Lord Pearce for an explanation, "Prime Minister" Smith stated that Mr. Todd and his daughter had been detained not because of their public opposition to the settlement proposals, but on "security grounds and /because of/ the need to maintain law and order".

58. Lord Pearce, in a statement issued on the same date, said that the Commission had been aware from the outset that difficulties would arise concerning the phrase in the White Paper that "normal political activities will be permitted... provided they are conducted in a peaceful and democratic manner". That there was a problem of law and order could not be denied, but he disputed the contention of the illegal régime that it had permitted political meetings whenever considerations

i/ Between 20 and 22 January, the illegal régime reported that eight Africans had been killed by police during riots at Umtali, bringing the total number of casualties during these incidents in the Territory to 13.

of law and order allowed. He further stated that if people were detained simply to silence them, then, even in existing conditions, that was not allowing normal political activity. He added, however, that the Commission was loath to make a premature judgement on all allegations and counter-allegations and that it was keenly aware of the need to see that a fair balance between political activity and the maintenance of peaceful conditions was achieved.

59. In the United Kingdom House of Commons, news of the arrests produced expressions of concern with regard to the conditions surrounding the Commission's investigation, and it was announced by Sir Alec Douglas-Home that a senior official of the Foreign Office would be dispatched immediately to Southern Rhodesia to assess the situation.

60. On 21 January, "Prime Minister" Smith, in a radio broadcast, warned of the consequences of trying to undermine law and order, which was, he said, playing into the hands of the minority régime. Declaring that his party, the Rhodesian Front, would be happy to retain the status quo, he nevertheless hoped that the majority of Africans, in their own interest, would reject efforts to intimidate them and "would come forward in a quiet and dignified manner to present their views to the Commission". "If the present generation of Africans are so stupid", he said "as to reject this offer of advancement for their people, they will bear the curses of their children forever".

61. On 23 January, a spokesman for the Commission said that the incidents of the previous six days had not disrupted the Commission's work and that less than 10 per cent of its meetings had had to be postponed. j/ Sir Alec Douglas-Home, reporting to the House of Commons, said that, despite conditions, the Commission's work was going ahead and Lord Pearce felt that it was able to continue. There was evidence that some elements in the Territory were seeking to disrupt the Commission's work and that there had been instances of intimidation: he could not, therefore, question the right of the illegal régime to maintain security provided the minimum force was used. It was stated in the press on 26 January, that Lord Pearce had declared at an open meeting of the Commission, that he was investigating the reported detention of about 300 persons by the illegal régime since his Commission arrived; Lord Pearce also stated that the régime had refused to reveal the number of detained persons and the reasons why they were being held.

62. After 23 January, the Commission held a series of meetings with various groups of politicians and representatives of various shades of opinion in the Territory. In a statement issued after a meeting with the Commission on 24 January, the eight African members of the "House of Assembly" elected by tribal electoral colleges, stated that they had rejected the proposals because, inter alia, Africans had not been consulted in the negotiations and they had no confidence that a Rhodesian Front government would work towards ending discrimination.

j/ Unofficially it was reported on 22 January that out of about 50 public meetings held by the commissioners, mainly in tribal areas, only one had resulted in a favourable response.

63. Spokesmen for the multiracial Centre Party, which opposes the Rhodesian Front Party in the "Assembly", said that they accepted the proposals under duress as the only alternative to an indeterminate period of uncertainty and tensions. The party admitted, however, that its membership was split on the issue.

64. Leaders of the African National Council of Zimbabwe appearing before the Commission on 28 January, expressed the belief that it might be many years before a sufficient number of Africans could satisfy the educational and financial qualifications for the higher voting roll to increase their parliamentary representation. They maintained that it was unreasonable to expect Africans to endorse a settlement which would maintain the privileges of a white minority indefinitely. Their basic position was that no settlement could be achieved without the active participation of the African people, through the leaders of their choice. Consequently, they "unhesitatingly rejected" the proposals.

Other political developments

Continuation in force of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965

65. On 10 November 1971, the House of Commons approved the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965 (Continuation) Order, 1971. The purpose of the Order is to continue in force section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, which gives the Queen in Council the power to take whatever measures are necessary to deal with the situation in the Territory brought about by the illegal declaration of independence; the Order authorized, inter alia, the continuation of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia for another year.

Developments relating to the "Land Tenure Act"

66. It will be recalled that the policy of the illegal régime since the so-called "declaration of independence" has tended progressively towards the physical separation of racial groups. Thus, the "Land Tenure Act", the provisions of which are entrenched in the 1969 "Constitution", divided the land of Southern Rhodesia into three categories - European, African and national - coloured persons (mixed race) and Asians being classified, for purposes of the "Act", as Europeans. The "Act" also provided for the progressive elimination, on payment of compensation, of pockets of land occupied by one racial group within large areas allocated to the other racial group.

67. As far as is known, the illegal régime took only limited action under the "Act" during the period under review. The following developments regarding the removal of Africans from European areas were, however, reported in 1971.

(a) Eviction of Tangwena people

68. It will be recalled that members of the Tangwena tribe have for years been resisting eviction from their homes on the white-owned Gaersi Ranch which is in an area designated as European land. In September 1969, after the Tangwenas had ignored court orders for their removal to adjoining tribal trust lands, their dwellings on the Gaersi Ranch were destroyed by officers of the "Internal Affairs Department" and the occupants forcibly evicted. On 25 November 1970, a number of Tangwenas having returned to the Gaersi Ranch, "government" officials again

destroyed all homes and, in addition, confiscated all cattle, which were subsequently sold at auction. Some Tangwenas were also fined and given suspended jail sentences for resisting removal.

69. In mid-January 1971, the illegal régime announced that the last Tangwena families had been evicted from the Gaersi Ranch but that most of them were continuing to resist resettlement in the area designated as their new homeland: the majority, led by Chief Rekayi Tangwena, were living in the hills and evading the police. On 29 March, Chief Tangwena was charged in Salisbury's regional magistrate's court with an offence under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, and on 2 July he was fined \$R 75 and given a six-month suspended sentence. On 30 April, it was reported that some Tangwenas had again returned to the area and had once more been evicted.

(b) Eviction of Africans from the Epworth Mission

70. In October 1971, the illegal régime announced its intention to evict 3,500 Africans from the 9,000-acre Epworth Mission of the British Methodist Church, where many of them had been born. Plans called for their resettlement in urban townships or designated rural areas. The eviction of 1,000 African tenant farmers from the 13,000-acre Roman Catholic mission station at Chishawaska, a few miles east of Salisbury, and of 5,000 Africans from land belonging to the Forestry Commission at Stapleford, near the Mozambique frontier, was also reported to be under consideration. Church leaders have condemned the planned evictions and have vowed support for their registered tenants in the event of any attempt at their forced removal.

71. In the proposals for settlement negotiated with the United Kingdom (see above), the illegal régime gave an assurance that, if the proposed settlement is approved, it would take no steps to evict African tenants from Epworth, Chishawaska or other areas until such time as the commission to investigate the question of racial discrimination had reported and its recommendations had been fully considered.

(c) Roman Catholic schools

72. It will be recalled that, under the "Land Tenure Act", all predominantly European, Asian and Coloured schools, even those which were previously multiracial, must, as from 2 March 1971, apply for permission to accept African pupils. It is believed that the intention is to restrict African enrolment to 6 per cent in predominantly European schools and 15 per cent in predominantly Asian or Coloured schools.

73. On 17 February 1971, the Roman Catholic Church, which had vigorously opposed the legislation, agreed under protest to instruct its schools in European areas to comply with the "Act". Subsequently, however, on 7 November, the Catholic Bishops Conference announced that it would disregard the "Act" and would admit children to Catholic schools on the basis of merit, regardless of race. It was stated that the decision was taken because the "government's" ideology was incompatible with the Church's teachings and because further negotiations would serve no useful purpose.

Cold Comfort Farm

74. In early 1971, the illegal régime took action to suppress Cold Comfort Farm, a small multiracial agricultural co-operative society, on the grounds that its members allegedly sympathized and actively supported the cause of "terrorists" seeking to overthrow the régime. The society was proclaimed to be an unlawful organization and its land a "protected area". Earlier, in December, the society's treasurer, Mr. Guy Clutton-Brock, had been declared a prohibited immigrant and had been ordered to leave the Territory. Mr. Clutton-Brock denied that the society had engaged in any "illegal" activities and said that it was concerned solely with establishing cordial relations between the races. He was expelled from Southern Rhodesia on 5 February.

75. Between January and March, officials of the régime occupied the farm and returned its 38 members to their home areas. The property was subsequently sold to a Southern Rhodesian businessman, the "government" retaining the proceeds of the sale. One of the African members of the society, Mr. Arthur Chandzingwa, was arrested and later brought to trial, charged with being an officer of ZAPU. Mr. Didymus Mutasa, chairman of the society and one of its founders, has been under detention without trial since early 1971.

University of Southern Rhodesia

76. On 25 August 1971, the illegal régime withdrew education grants from 24 African students for having participated in demonstrations in March and July. On appeal, 10 of the students had their grants restored. It was later reported that the remainder would be enabled to continue their studies with funds from private sources.

Developments concerning internal security matters

77. A meeting between security chiefs from South Africa, Mozambique, Angola and Southern Rhodesia was held in Salisbury on 15 and 16 February 1971. Present at the talks were Major-General Hendrik van der Bergh of the South African Bureau of State Security; Major Silva Pais, chief of the Portuguese Direccão-Geral de Segurança (DGS) who is also in charge of security in Angola and Mozambique; Dr. Antonio Lopes, Chief Security Officer in Angola, Mr. Antonio Vaz, Chief Security Officer in Mozambique; and Mr. Gomes Lopes, an inspector of the Mozambique Security Organization. It was assumed that the purpose of the talks was to plan closer links in combatting the activities of freedom fighters.

78. On 18 March 1971, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", announced that on the recommendation of a review tribunal the illegal régime had released 23 Africans under detention for "subversive activities". Two of the Africans were freed unconditionally and 21 on permit (subject to limitations on their movement). The tribunal, which considered 118 cases in all, recommended that 95 Africans remain in detention because of the likelihood that they would resume "subversive" activities if released.

79. On 28 May, "President" Clifford Dupont told the opening session of "Parliament" that no "terrorist" incursions had been made into Southern Rhodesia during the previous 12 months. He said, however, that there was a constant need to maintain the strength of the régime's security forces in both men and material.

80. On 10 June 1971, the Southern Rhodesian "Parliament" adopted a 12-month extension to the state of emergency by a vote of 36 to 15. Moving the extension, Mr. Lardner-Burke stated that while the "government" wished to revoke the emergency at the earliest opportunity, conditions continued to make it impossible. These were the threat of "terrorist" infiltration from Zambia and the threat posed by United Nations sanctions against the economic survival of the country. He said, however, that the powers granted under the state of emergency were used only to a limited degree and that applied in isolated cases, they were a deterrent.

81. During the last week of June 1971, a cache of arms and equipment was reportedly discovered by police in a Salisbury warehouse, resulting in the arrest of a number of Africans. On 23 September, the African manager of the warehouse, Mr. Denys Mangwana, was sentenced in Salisbury High Court to 20 years in jail for possessing arms of war. Mr. Mangwana pleaded guilty to the charges, telling the High Court that the arms had been smuggled into the country and were to be used in Southern Rhodesian towns by "freedom-fighters". Two other Africans whose names were not disclosed, were also tried in connexion with the case but their sentences are not known.

82. During July and August, 129 African freedom-fighters, members of both ZANU and ZAPU, were reported to have crossed into Southern Rhodesia from Zambia and surrendered to Southern Rhodesian immigration officers. On 8 November, two members of this group were charged in Salisbury High Court with the killing of four members of the Southern Rhodesia security forces in 1967. The two men, who were not named, pleaded not guilty to the charge, as well as to the charge of possessing offensive weapons and using explosives with intent to injure members of the security forces. In presenting evidence, Mr. Brendan Treacy, "Director of Public Prosecutions", said that both men were members of ZAPU and were part of a group of 81 "guerillas" who had crossed the Zambesi River into Zambia on 1 August 1967, at which time the killings were allegedly committed. On 12 November, both men were found guilty in the High Court and sentenced to death.

83. On 29 August 1971, Southern Rhodesian security forces reported having killed seven freedom-fighters belonging to the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and having captured another in an engagement on the Southern Rhodesia side of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border, south-east of Mukumbura. The incident was believed to be the first engagement between Southern Rhodesian troops and FRELIMO. According to the communiqué issued by the Southern Rhodesian security forces, the incident occurred after the FRELIMO group had "ransacked a kraal and had tried to intimidate its inhabitants". Various press reports indicated, however, that there was evidence that the FRELIMO group had crossed into Southern Rhodesia in search of food and there was no suggestion that the group was co-operating with either ZANU or ZAPU.

84. On 31 August, Mr. Desmond Lardner-Burke, "Minister of Justice, Law and Order", tabled in "Parliament" a new unlawful organizations bill. The bill would grant the illegal régime all powers currently contained under the emergency regulations and, furthermore, would enable the illegal régime to prosecute persons returning to Southern Rhodesia for having been members of a banned organization while outside the country. The provisions of the bill would remain in effect when the state of emergency was lifted.

85. The bill would allow the "President": (a) to outlaw any organization whose activities he considered were "likely to endanger, disturb or interfere with defence, public safety or public order", and (b) grant the police wide powers of search without warrant and the right to "call upon" any person believed to be a member or a former member of a banned organization and demand to see a list of members and office bearers. Refusal to co-operate would be subject to five years' imprisonment and a \$R 2,000 fine. Membership in a banned organization, which would be similarly penalized, would be presumed in the case of any person who had attended a meeting of an unlawful organization, or who had in his possession any books, documents, writings or cards of a banned organization "unless the contrary was proved". Alleged extra-territorial offences could be prosecuted upon the return to Southern Rhodesia of suspected persons.

86. The bill was given a second reading on 3 September 1971, at which time Mr. Lardner-Burke said that the bill was not being introduced with any immediate use in mind. It was a measure of insurance which the "government" hoped to have to use only rarely. It was essential, however, that the unlawful organizations bill should be put on a normal footing and that it should not lapse if the state of emergency was revoked.

87. On 22 November, Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa stated that South African police would remain along the Zambesi River as long as it was considered necessary in the interests of the safety of South Africa and its people. He said that the police were stationed along the Zambesi not to fight Rhodesia's war or anybody else's war, but to intercept "terrorists" headed for South Africa.

New African Nationalist Party

88. On 1 October, the establishment was announced in Lusaka, Zambia, of the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), a nationalist party said to include former members of ZAPU and ZANU.

89. The chairman of FROLIZI is Mr. Shelton Siwela. In a statement to the press he was reported to have said that Zimbabwe could no longer afford the inter-party squabbling which had heretofore prevented the formation of a united front. He hoped to develop FROLIZI into a broad front which would include trade unionists, students and businessmen. However, he felt that a military struggle was the centre of the confrontation and that it would be the guerilla army on which any progress would initially depend.

Action concerning Southern Rhodesia by OAU

90. The Council of Ministers of OAU, meeting at its seventeenth ordinary session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 15 to 19 June 1971, adopted a resolution on decolonization k/ in which, inter alia, it noted with grave concern that "the sanctions against the racist minority régime in Zimbabwe remain ineffective largely because of the support received by it from the South African and Portuguese

k/ CM/Res. 241 (XVII).

régimes, and that the United Kingdom Government is attempting to negotiate with that régime"; noted further "the strengthening of the unholy alliance of colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa and the increasing intervention of the South African régime in Zimbabwe and the territories under Portuguese domination"; strongly condemned "the attempts by the Government of the United Kingdom to negotiate with the illegal and racist régime of Salisbury, the eventual recognition of this régime", and called urgently on the United Kingdom "to abide by its international commitments and the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly of the United Nations".

91. The Council of Ministers also adopted a resolution 1/ calling for a special session of the Security Council in Africa to deal, inter alia, with the question of Southern Rhodesia.

1/ CM/Res. 243 (XVII) which appears in document S/10272.

2. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

92. In April 1971, the illegal régime published an Economic Survey of Rhodesia for 1970 containing selected statistics on the state of the economy. According to the survey, the gross domestic product of Southern Rhodesia increased from \$R899.4 million in 1969 to \$R970.7 million in 1970, representing a growth rate in real terms of 4.6 per cent, as against 9.8 per cent in 1969. Apart from agricultural production, which had been adversely affected by weather conditions, all sectors had contributed to the increase, the sector where there was the greatest growth being manufacturing production, the value of which increased by 14 per cent (to \$R580 million). Building construction increased by 12 per cent (\$R234 million) and the value of mining production rose from \$R88 million in 1969 to \$R99 million, representing an increase also of 12 per cent.

93. As concerns the balance of payments, the survey reported a small surplus of \$R0.8 million on combined capital and current accounts, compared with a much larger surplus of \$R20.7 million in 1969. Total exports reportedly rose by 14 per cent to \$R274.1 million (from \$R239.8 million in 1969), of which domestic exports accounted for \$R256.3 million, re-exports \$R6.1 million, and gold sales \$R11.7 million. Imports increased in total value by 18 per cent to \$R234.9 million (from \$R199.4 million in 1969) leaving a trade deficit of \$R32.7 million. The net deficit for invisible transactions grew from \$R30 million in 1969 to \$R40.4 million, resulting in a current account deficit of \$R7.7 million in 1970. Net inflow of capital amounted to only \$R8.5 million. It was expected that the Territory's foreign currency resources would remain under considerable strain owing to the heavy demand for imports due to substantially increased investment in the public sector and the expansion taking place in primary and secondary industry.

94. The survey also contained an outline of planned investment in the public sector during the period 1971-1974. The investment programme calls for over-all expenditure of \$R359 million, of which 88 per cent would be applied to economic services and 8 per cent to social services. Of the former, \$R121 million would be allocated to the transport sector, primarily for Rhodesia Railways; \$R87 million to local government bodies for public works; and \$R14 million would be spent on housing for Africans in urban areas.

Southern Rhodesia and sanctions

95. Sanctions reduced Southern Rhodesia's national exports (excluding re-exports) from \$US399 million in 1965 to \$US249 million in 1966 and \$US245 million in 1968. Thereafter, exports rose to \$US308 million in 1969 and \$US360 million in 1970, a figure which was still 10 per cent less than the 1965 level. Exports valued at approximately \$US55 million went to African countries bordering on Southern Rhodesia which have made it clear that they cannot afford to apply sanctions fully; no official information is available as to the direction and nature of the balance of the exports. It has been estimated that in 1970 South Africa received Southern Rhodesian exports amounting to about \$US95 million, leaving some \$US220 million unaccounted for. This amount of exports appears to have reached world markets

mainly via South Africa and Mozambique and to have been reflected in world 'trade as imports of the reporting countries from those neighbouring countries. A similar situation exists with regard to Southern Rhodesia's imports, less than 5 per cent of which were reported in the trade statistics of exporting countries as exports to Southern Rhodesia.

96. During 1971, the Congress of the United States of America voted to approve an amendment to its Military Procurement Bill, 1972, that would have the effect of permitting the importation of chrome to the United States from Southern Rhodesia. This action resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly on 16 November 1971, of resolution 2765 (XXVI) in which, inter alia, it expressed grave concern at the decision of the United States Congress and called on the Government of the United States to take the necessary measures to prevent the importation of chrome from Southern Rhodesia.

97. Following the signature of the amended bill by the President of the United States on 17 November, the issue was taken up by the Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 253 (1968) of 29 March 1968 which, on 3 December 1971, submitted an interim report (S/10408) to the Security Council. The Committee recommended that:

"(1) The Security Council should recall resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, in which acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided that 'in furtherance of the objective of ending the rebellion, all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:

(a) the import into their territories of all commodities and products originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of this resolution...';

"(2) The Security Council should state that if any legislation were passed, or act taken, by a Member State with a view to permitting the importation from Southern Rhodesia of any commodity falling within the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore, then that would set a dangerous precedent and weaken the effectiveness of the sanctions.

"(3) The Security Council should call upon all States not to pass or implement legislation or take any other act that would permit the importation from Southern Rhodesia of commodities falling under the scope of the obligations imposed by resolution 253 (1968), including chrome ore.

"(4) Taking into account the fact that the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia remain in force, as confirmed by resolution 288 (1970), the Security Council should emphasize the need for increasing vigilance in this field and, accordingly, call upon all States to take more effective measures to ensure full implementation of the sanctions."

98. On 25 January 1972, the United States Treasury Department formally lifted import restrictions on shipments of chrome and "other strategic and critical materials" from Southern Rhodesia.

Budget for 1971/72

99. On 15 July 1971, Mr. John Wrathall, the "Minister of Finance", introduced in the "House of Assembly" the budget for the fiscal year 1971/72. The budget provides for a current account expenditure of \$R236.5 million, and revenue receipts of \$R229.1 million, leaving a deficit on current account of \$R7.4 million. An accumulated surplus of \$R6.8 million brought forward from the preceding year would reduce the estimated over-all deficit to \$R600,000 for 1971/72. The increase in estimated current expenditure, compared with the preceding year, amounted to nearly \$R21 million. Estimated revenue receipts rose by approximately \$R22.3 million, an increase which was attributed to natural growth and not to increased taxes. Loan account expenditure was estimated at \$R61.6 million, compared with \$R57.8 million in the preceding year.

100. The biggest increase in expenditure was for civil service salaries (\$R12.25 million) and subsidies to the Tobacco Corporation to offset trading losses (\$R3 million). The allocation for the armed forces was increased by \$R1.2 million (to \$R12 million) mostly to offset pay raises. The allocation for the air force was reduced by \$R889,000 (to \$R7.5 million) owing to reductions in maintenance and running costs.

101. During 1971 the illegal régime successfully floated two loans totalling \$R50 million to finance development and repay maturing debts. At the end of 1971, the total amount of money raised by the régime since the illegal declaration of independence amounted to about \$R240 million.

Agriculture

102. As stated above, adverse weather conditions during 1970, resulted in a 1.4 per cent decline in the value of agricultural production, which amounted to \$R234 million. The production of Virginia flue-cured tobacco, which is limited by the "government" because of sanctions, fell by 8 per cent and deliveries of both cotton and maize to the marketing boards were 36 per cent less than in 1969. Increased production was reported, however, in the case of irrigated crops, especially wheat, which was reportedly sufficient in volume to satisfy more than half the Territory's requirements. The value of slaughtered beef and dairy products increased by 20 per cent and 12 per cent respectively compared with output in 1969.

103. In March 1971, it was announced that the target for the 1971/72 tobacco crop would again be 132 million pounds, as for the preceding season, and that the support price paid to producers by the illegal régime would be 23 cents per pound. (In 1970/71, the target had originally been 100 million pounds, but had subsequently been increased and the average price reduced from 33 cents to 23 cents.) It was also announced that the targets for the 1972/73 and 1973/74 tobacco crops would not be less than 120 million pounds at the same average price. Low-quality tobacco would no longer be accepted. In November, the president of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association was reported to have said that tobacco production would be restored to the pre-sanctions level by the 1973/74 season.

104. In the 1971/72 budget estimates, the sum of \$R19 million was allocated to meet the trading losses of the tobacco industry, bringing the total spent for the purpose

since the imposition of sanctions to \$R68 million. This does not take into account the potential losses inherent in the stockpile, believed to amount to between 250,000 and 300,000 tons.

105. On 4 September, the "Minister of Agriculture" was reported to have said that the battle to diversify Southern Rhodesia's agricultural economy appeared to have been won and that, in view of priorities in other sectors, less financing would be made available in the short term for this purpose. In the 1970/71 budget, \$R12 million had been allocated for payment of subsidies and other forms of assistance to farmers. This appropriation was reduced by \$R1.5 million in 1971/72.

Manufacturing and related enterprises

106. The output of the manufacturing industry was valued at a record \$R580 million in 1970, reflecting an increase of 14 per cent over the previous year. With the exception of transport equipment, textiles and clothing, all sectors of the manufacturing industry recorded higher percentage growth rates in 1970 than in 1969. Increases in output of more than 20 per cent were recorded for chemical, rubber and petroleum products, non-metallic mineral products and paper and printing. Foodstuffs, metals and metal products, beverages and tobacco and wood and furniture all registered increases of more than 10 per cent. The output of the building industry increased by 23 per cent and that of civil engineering by 4 per cent, giving a combined increase of 12 per cent for the construction sector as a whole. This increase was reflected in an over-all rise of 15 per cent in electricity consumption. During 1970, the demand for electricity by manufacturing increased by more than 20 per cent.

107. According to statements made by officials of the illegal régime, the manufacturing sector of the economy has expanded by about 60 per cent since 1965. The most pressing problem confronting manufacturers is the shortage of foreign exchange. In order to sustain the rate of growth, more foreign exchange would be needed for the purchase of machinery and raw materials.

Mining

108. The total value of mineral production in Southern Rhodesia in 1970 amounted to a record \$R99 million, on an "at mine basis", compared with \$R88 million in 1969 (an increase of 12 per cent), with the volume of production increasing by 10 per cent. During the year, more than 40 different minerals were produced, the sales value of which was reportedly well in excess of the "at mine" value. The industry employed more than 3,200 whites and 48,000 Africans and paid wages and salaries totalling more than \$R35 million.

109. There is no detailed information regarding the total production and value of specific minerals. According to Mr. I.B. Dillon, "Minister of Mines", copper and nickel are growing most rapidly in importance and have already outstripped in value the annual production of such "traditional" minerals as coal, chrome, asbestos and gold. (Gold production, he reported, accounted for only 12 per cent of the total value of minerals produced in 1970, whereas 30 years ago it had accounted for 75 per cent.) Other minerals being newly exploited are the tungsten and refractory minerals, such as wolfram, Kyanite, flintclays and magnesite.

110. One of the most important developments in the mining industry during 1971 was the announcement made in July by the South African-based Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co., that it plans to develop a large nickel and copper mine at Shangani, 60 miles north-east of Bulawayo. The company stated that it would invest \$R20 million in the mine which, when fully operative, would have a yearly output of about 4,500 tons of refined nickel, together with a relatively small amount of copper produced as a by-product. The ore reserves at Shangani are believed to be substantial. In December, it was reported that the company was continuing explorations in the Shangani area and at Danba, Inyate District, 20 miles from Shangani, where further nickel-copper deposits had been found. Reports suggested that the combined production from these two locations could equal or surpass the output of the two established nickel mining companies, the Rhodesian Nickel Corporation (a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation) and the Empress Nickel Mining (owned by Rio Tinto of Rhodesia).

111. In January 1972, Rhodesia and General Asbestos Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Turner-Newall, Ltd., announced that a new \$R25 million asbestos mill was nearing completion at King Mine, Mashaba, 161 miles from Bulawayo. The mill was believed to be the largest single private development project ever undertaken in Southern Rhodesia. It is expected to start production in April 1972 and to reach full capacity by the end of the year, making it the main asbestos producer in the Rhodesian and General Group. The mill was reported to be financed by blocked funds.

112. It was also reported that large-scale prospecting for gold was being conducted in tribal trust lands by the Tribal Trust Land Corporation. In a statement to the annual meeting of the Chamber of Mines of Rhodesia, the official in charge of the mineral survey of tribal trust lands was reported to have said that these areas possessed many untapped mineral resources and that their value when exported "would amount to some \$R300 million".

113. It was further reported that the American Methodist Church in Southern Rhodesia had registered a claim to a rich copper deposit on 2,400 acres of mission land near Inyati. The Church reportedly had done so to protect the mission (which includes a school, church and hospital) and the people living on the land, but it was willing, subject to such protection, to enter into an agreement with a mining company to extract the copper. A spokesman for the Church said that whatever revenue it might eventually receive would remain in Southern Rhodesia.

Petrol supplies

114. On 13 May 1971, the illegal régime abolished petrol rationing which had been in force since 1965. In announcing this, Mr. Jack Mussett, the "Minister of Commerce and Industry", said that the "government" had come to the conclusion that the high cost of administering rationing and the inconvenience caused to the public was no longer justified. According to reports in the press, it had been known for some time that there was no shortage of petrol in the Territory, supplies of which were believed to be coming from South Africa and Mozambique.

Railways

115. On 24 May 1971, the illegal régime announced its decision to build a direct rail link to South Africa. The link, estimated to cost \$R8.1 million, will go south from Salisbury and cross the Limpopo River into South Africa at Beit Bridge. The present line to South Africa, which passes through Botswana, is expected to be running at capacity in about four years, by which time Southern Rhodesia expects a 55 per cent increase in its southward bound traffic. Work on the new link is expected to begin in 1973 at the latest.

CHAPTER IX

(A/8723/Add.2)

NAMIBIA

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A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Namibia at its 843rd, 845th and 846th meetings, between 21 and 30 March, at Headquarters, at its 861st, 862nd and 866th to 869th meetings, between 20 and 27 April, during its meetings in Africa, at its 871st and 885th meetings, on 16 May and 21 August, at Headquarters.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 2878 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 on the implementation of the Declaration, by paragraph 10 of which, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session". Further, the Special Committee took into account other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the Territory, in particular resolution 1805 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, whereby the General Assembly requested the Special Committee to discharge, mutatis mutandis, the tasks formerly assigned to the Special Committee on South West Africa, as well as other resolutions adopted subsequently by the General Assembly concerning Namibia. The Special Committee also paid due regard to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council concerning Namibia.
3. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee had before it a working paper prepared by the Secretariat (see annex I to the present chapter) containing information on action previously taken by the United Nations bodies directly concerned with Namibia, as well as on the latest developments concerning the Territory.

Petitions

4. In addition, the Special Committee had before it the following written petitions relating to the Territory:
 - (a) Two letters dated 15 March and 17 April 1972 from Mr. Mishake Muyongo, Acting Vice-President, and Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) (A/AC.109/PET.1202 and Add.1);
 - (b) Letter dated 21 April 1972 from Mr. William Nelulu, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF) (A/AC.109/PET.1225);
 - (c) Letter dated 19 April 1972 from Mr. Werner Mamugwe (A/AC.109/PET.1228);

- (d) Letter dated 25 April 1972 from Messrs. Hiovandu Hambapu J.K. Mbaba, Kanyemba M. Amtenya and Uazapi Katijikondee (A/AC.109/PET.1229).

5. The Special Committee also had before it the following written petitions relating inter alia to Territories in southern Africa:

- (a) Letter dated 15 March 1972 from the Reverend L. John Collins, President, International Defence and Aid Fund (A/AC.109/PET.1208);
- (b) Letter dated 17 March 1972 from Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London) (A/AC.109/PET.1209);
- (c) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Sean Gervasi (A/AC.109/PET.1210);
- (d) Letter dated 24 March 1972 from Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PET.1211);
- (e) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Secretary, World Peace Council (A/AC.109/PET.1212);
- (f) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/PET.1213);
- (g) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. A. Fataar, Joint Secretary, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) (A/AC.109/PET.1218);
- (h) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. T.T. Nkobi, Chief Representative in Zambia, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa (A/AC.109/PET.1221);
- (i) Letter dated 24 January 1972 from Mr. Joë Nordmann, Secretary-General, International Association of Democratic Lawyers (A/AC.109/PET.1230).

6. At its 843rd to 845th, 856th, 858th and 866th meetings, on 21, 24 and 28 March and 17, 18 and 26 April, the Special Committee, by adopting the 165th to 167th, 169th, 171st and 172nd reports, 1/ respectively, of the Sub-Committee on Petitions, decided to grant the requests for hearing contained in the petitions referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) and 5 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) and (h) above.

7. At the 843rd meeting, on 21 March, Mr. Mishake Muyongo, Acting Vice-President, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), made a statement and replied to questions by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.843). At the same meeting, the Reverend L. John Collins, President, International Defence and Aid Fund and Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London), made statements (A/AC.109/PV.843). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.843).

1/ A/AC.109/L.770, L.771, L.772, L.784, L.786 and L.792.

8. At the 844th meeting, on 24 March, Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Mr. Gordon Schaffer, Mr. Gleb Staroutchenko and Mr. Mishake Muyongo, representatives, World Peace Council, made statements and replied to questions by the representatives of India and the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/PV.844). At the same meeting, Mr. Sean Gervasi made a statement and replied to questions by the representative of India (A/AC.109/PV.844). Statements in connexion with the hearings were made by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.844).

9. At the 845th meeting, on 28 March, statements were made by Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom, and by Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PV.845). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.845).

General debate

10. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 845th and 846th meetings at Headquarters on 28 and 30 March, at its 867th meeting at Lusaka, Zambia, on 26 April and at its 868th meeting at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 27 April. Statements in the general debate were made by the representative of Indonesia at the 845th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.845), by the representatives of Sierra Leone and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the 846th meeting (A/AC.109/PV.846 and Corr.1), by the representatives of China and Afghanistan at the 867th meeting (A/AC.109/SR.867), and by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, India, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Bulgaria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq at the 868th meeting (A/AC.109/SR.868). At the 845th meeting Mr. Mamadou Mactar Thiam, Executive Secretary, Organization of African Unity (OAU), also made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.845). During the general debate at Headquarters, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and his representatives participated in the work of the Committee in accordance with established practice.

Meetings in Africa

11. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee considered the item at its 861st and 862nd meetings at Lusaka, Zambia, on 20 April and at its 866th to 869th meetings at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 and 27 April, as follows:

12. At the 861st meeting, on 20 April, Mr. Moses M. Garoeb, Administrative Secretary, South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), made a statement and replied to questions by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.861).

13. At the 862nd meeting, on 20 April, Mr. Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, made a statement and replied to a question put to him by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India, Iraq, Mali and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862). At the same

meeting, Mr. W. M. Tsotsi, Vice-President, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA), made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862).

14. At the 866th meeting, on 26 April, Mr. William Nelulu, South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF), made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.866).

Draft consensus

15. At its 869th meeting, on 27 April, the Chairman, at the request of the Special Committee, submitted for its consideration the text of a draft consensus on the item (A/AC.109/L.788). Following statements by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ivory Coast, Iran and Ecuador, the Special Committee adopted the draft consensus without objection (see paragraph 19 below).

16. On 8 May, the text of the consensus was transmitted to the President of the Security Council (S/10635) and to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia. Copies of the consensus were also transmitted to States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

Representation at the Namibia International Conference

17. At the 871st meeting, on 16 May, the Chairman informed the Special Committee of the receipt of an invitation from the International Preparatory Secretariat for the Namibia International Conference, Brussels, to attend the Conference in May 1972. At the same meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided without objection to accept the above invitation and to send a delegation of observers, consisting of Bulgaria and Indonesia, to the Namibia International Conference. The delegation of observers was constituted as follows:

Ambassador Guero Grozev, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations

Ambassador Chaidir Anwar Sani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia
to the United Nations

18. At the 885th meeting, on 21 August, the representative of Bulgaria introduced the report (see annex II) on behalf of the delegation of observers. At the same meeting, following a statement by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.885), the Special Committee approved the report without objection.

B. DECISION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

19. The text of the consensus (A/AC.109/404) adopted by the Special Committee at its 869th meeting, on 27 April, to which reference is made in paragraph 15 above, is reproduced below:

(1) Having considered the question of Namibia within the context of the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and having heard the statements by the national liberation movement of that Territory, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples expresses once again its grave concern at the extremely dangerous situation created by South Africa's outright defiance of the decisions of the United Nations in respect to Namibia and its increasing use of force as a means of perpetuating its illegal occupation of the Territory.

(2) The Government of South Africa has continued to violate its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and to obstruct the United Nations in the discharge of the special responsibility towards the Territory and people of Namibia which the United Nations assumed under the terms of General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, by its persistent refusal to accept the decision of the General Assembly terminating the Mandate and to comply with the repeated demands of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling for its immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the Territory. The obstruction by the Government of South Africa of the efforts of the United Nations to implement its decisions is further demonstrated by South Africa's total disregard of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice delivered on 21 June 1971. 2/

(3) This situation, which seriously undermines the authority of the United Nations, is further aggravated by South Africa's persistent extension to Namibia of its criminal policies of apartheid, as a consequence of which the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants are denied their most fundamental human rights, and by the various illegal measures to which it has resorted, including the creation of new so-called self-governing "homelands", aimed at destroying the unity and territorial integrity of Namibia and consolidating the illegal presence of South Africa in the Territory.

(4) On the basis of the testimony presented to the Special Committee by the liberation movement and from other information available to it, it is evident that the South African authorities in Namibia have further intensified their oppression of the Namibian people and their efforts to suppress the people of that international Territory and their national liberation movement. In so doing, the Government of South Africa has increased its collaboration with Portugal, particularly in regard to recent joint operations by South Africa and the latter's

2/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16.

military forces in the adjacent areas of Namibia and Angola, and has continued to extend further assistance to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia in open defiance of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council. These authorities have, in collusion, stepped up their military operations against the peoples under their domination who are struggling to exercise their legitimate right to self-determination and independence, and the resultant situation continues to threaten the peace and security of neighbouring African States.

(5) The Special Committee commends the people of Namibia for their stalwart resistance to South African oppression and in particular for the massive and unprecedented strike of Namibian workers which continues to paralyse the economy of the Territory. It notes that the strike, although principally directed against the inhuman contract system of labour recruitment and the exploitative conditions under which Namibians are employed, constitutes in reality a manifestation of the people's mass opposition to the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The violent reaction of the Government of South Africa to the strike, its extensive use of military force to suppress the subsequent unrest in Ovamboland, resulting in numerous deaths among the Ovambo people, the arrest and detention of thousands of others and the illegal trial in Windhoek of strike leaders, demonstrate the lengths to which the Government of South Africa is prepared to go in order to maintain its illegal domination of the Territory.

(6) The Special Committee condemns the Government of South Africa both for its persistent non-compliance with the relevant decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly and for its ruthless use of armed force to suppress the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Namibian people. The Special Committee further condemns the support which South Africa receives in the pursuit of its policies of economic exploitation of the Namibians from some of its supporters in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, in particular, from its major trading partners and those financial, economic and other interests which operate in the Territory. The Special Committee calls upon the Governments concerned to withdraw forthwith all such support that they accord to South Africa. The Special Committee further calls upon all States to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970 and 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972.

(7) Mindful of the obligations of Member States under Article 25 of the Charter and bearing in mind the direct responsibility of the United Nations towards the people of Namibia, the Special Committee expresses the hope that the Security Council, in the light of the continued failure of South Africa to comply with the Council's latest demand for its withdrawal from Namibia, contained in resolution 310 (1972), will take effective measures, in accordance with the Charter, to secure South Africa's compliance therewith.

(8) Pending such action by the Security Council, the Special Committee once again calls upon all States, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, to extend their full co-operation to the United Nations with a view to bringing about an early solution to the situation, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

(9) The Special Committee reaffirms its solidarity with the people of Namibia in their legitimate struggle to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and calls upon all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, in consultation with the

Organization of African Unity, to provide the people of Namibia, through their national liberation movement, with the increased moral and material assistance which they require in their struggle against foreign occupation and oppression.

(10) The Special Committee affirms that any solution with regard to the question of Namibia must enable the people of the Territory to achieve self-determination and independence as a united whole.

ANNEX I*

WORKING PAPER PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.761.

A. ACTION TAKEN IN 1971 AND EARLY 1972 BY THE UNITED NATIONS
BODIES CONCERNED WITH NAMIBIA

General

1. In 1971, the question of Namibia continued to be the constant preoccupation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was established by General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 to take over the administration of the Territory and prepare it for independence. The question has also been considered by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. a/ It has also been the subject of several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council and of an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. b/ The text of the recommendations adopted by the bodies concerned with this question during 1971 and early 1972 has been made available to the Special Committee.

Action taken by the United Nations
Council for Namibia

2. In its sixth report to the General Assembly, covering the period from 13 October 1970 to 28 October 1971, the United Nations Council for Namibia set out a number of recommendations to the General Assembly, in view of the "increase in the volume and scope of its current activities and in order to enable it to undertake additional administrative and executive tasks as required in the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and of Security Council resolution 301 (1971)". c/

3. In a letter dated 8 February 1971, d/ addressed to the President of the Security Council, the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia

a/ For information on action prior to 1971, see the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 1-16.

b/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports, 1971, p. 16. A limited number of copies were distributed under the document symbol S/10267.

c/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/8424). See also para. 10 below.

d/ S/10108.

transmitted a letter dated 11 January 1971 addressed to him by the Acting Commissioner for Namibia, announcing that the travel documents scheme authorized by the General Assembly e/ had entered into operation; the first United Nations travel and identity documents were issued on 30 December 1970 by the Office of the Commissioner for Namibia in Lusaka to two Namibians residing in Zambia.

4. On 19 January 1972, the Council for Namibia decided to authorize its President to issue a special statement relating to the Ovambo labour dispute in the Territory. The text of this statement was subsequently transmitted to the Security Council. f/

Action taken by the Special Committee

5. In 1971, the question of Namibia was considered by the Special Committee within the context of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. During its consideration of the item, the Special Committee adopted the following decisions relating to the question which appear in its report to the General Assembly: g/

<u>Resolution/consensus</u>	<u>Meeting</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Consensus of 4 March 1971	782	chap. VI, para. 31 (A/8423/Add.2)
Consensus of 2 September 1971	823	chap. VII, para. 19 (A/8423/Add.3 (Part I))
Resolution of 9 September 1971	825	chap. V, para. 19 (A/8423/Add.1)
Decision of 21 October 1971	830	chap. VII, para. 24 (A/8423/Add.3 (Part II))

Action taken by the General Assembly

6. The General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth session, considered the question of Namibia in the light of the reports of the United Nations Council for Namibia and of the Special Committee h/ and adopted the following two resolutions on the recommendation of its Fourth Committee:

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Meeting</u>
2871 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971	2028
2872 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971	2028

e/ General Assembly resolution 2372 (XXII) of 12 June 1968.

f/ S/10522.

g/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chaps. V-VII.

h/ Ibid., chap. VII.

Action taken by the Security Council

7. The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Namibia, established originally pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 276 (1970) of 30 January 1970, was re-established by resolution 283 (1970) of 29 July 1970 and presented its report to the Security Council on 23 September 1971. i/ The annex to the report contains the replies received from 40 States in response to the Sub-Committee's request for relevant information.

8. The Security Council considered the question at its 1583rd to 1585th, 1587th to 1589th, 1593rd to 1595th, 1597th and 1598th meetings between 27 September and 20 October; at its 1598th meeting, on 20 October, the Council adopted resolution 301 (1971) concerning the Territory. The proceedings of the Council are contained in the records of the aforementioned meetings.

9. At its 1627th to 1639th meetings, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between 28 January and 4 February 1972, the Security Council considered the questions relating to Africa with which it is currently seized. At its 1638th meeting, on 4 February, the Council adopted resolutions 309 (1972) and 310 (1972) concerning the Territory. The proceedings of the Council are contained in the records of those meetings.

Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice^{1/}

10. On 21 June 1971, the International Court of Justice delivered its advisory opinion to the following effect:

"(1) that the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory;

"(2) that States Members of the United Nations are under obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia and to refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with the Government of South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration;

"(3) that it is incumbent upon States which are not Members of the United Nations to give assistance within the scope of subparagraph (2) above, in the action which has been taken by the United Nations with regard to Namibia."

i/ S/10330 and Corr.1 and Add.1.

j/ S/10267.

B. INFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY^{k/}

1. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

General

11. Notwithstanding the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice which it rejected for reasons which were subsequently explained by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1/ South Africa has remained adamant in its refusal to comply with United Nations resolutions calling for the withdrawal of its administration from Namibia and has continued to obstruct the United Nations Council for Namibia from proceeding to the Territory in accordance with the mandate given it by the General Assembly in 1967. Within the Territory itself, the period under review saw further extension of the South African system of apartheid, notably with respect to the establishment of racial "homelands" as prescribed by the Odendaal Commission in 1964, m/ and South African and other companies, operating under the sanction of the de facto administration, continued to derive substantial benefits from their exploitation of the Territory's natural and human resources. During 1971 and early 1972, however, several developments occurred, including a major labour stoppage by Ovambo workers, indicating that large segments of the Namibian people, particularly among the Ovambos, are prepared, regardless of the consequences, to resort to hitherto unused means to express their dissatisfaction with South Africa's policies in the Territory. The present working paper includes information on the measures taken by South Africa in application of those policies and on the reactions thereto among the Namibian people.

Implementation of the Odendaal Plan

12. During the period under review, further steps were taken by South Africa towards reorganizing the administrative and governmental structure of Namibia along the broad lines recommended by the Odendaal Commission in 1964 and largely embodied in the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act of 1968 and the South West Africa Affairs Act of 1969. The first of these acts, it will be recalled, purported to introduce a radical change in the

^{k/} This working paper contains information on developments concerning Namibia in 1971 and early 1972. For previously published information, see the most recent reports of the Special Committee and of the United Nations Council for Namibia: Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. I; ibid., Supplement No. 24 (A/8424).

^{1/} See S/PV.1584 and 1589.

^{m/} For a summary of the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (Part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chap. IV, paras. 18 and ff.

internal political structure of the Territory by providing for the creation of so-called autonomous "homelands" for each of the six main, non-white ethnic groups, henceforth called "Native nations", and their removal from the jurisdiction of the territorial Government n/ which, according to the Act now extends only within the so-called "white" area, covering about 43 per cent of the land area of Namibia. The Act of 1969 further diminished the authority of the territorial Government by purporting to deprive it of legislative and administrative competence in respect of no less than 25 broad categories of subjects, covering the majority of powers hitherto exercised by it, and transferring control over those subjects to the legislative and executive branches of the Government of South Africa. Thus truncated and deprived of its hitherto quasi-autonomy, the territorial Government was reduced functionally to the status of a provincial government in the Republic.

13. Since the passage of the foregoing legislation, the South African Government has taken a series of measures designed to complete the reorganization. On the one hand, it has been engaged in the process of establishing the "homelands" provided for by the 1968 Act, a process which has involved not only the creation in each case of new administrative and governmental machinery but also the acquisition and transfer of land and the resettlement, sometimes by force, of large population groups. So far two "homelands", Ovamboland and Kavangoland, have been formally established, comprising basically the former "Native reserves" of the same name, and others are in process of being created. Details of the various steps taken in 1971 are given below.

14. On the other hand, in accordance with the policy laid down in the Act of 1969 which led, in 1970, to the transfer of 22 territorial government departments to the Republic, the Government of South Africa has also been engaged in amending, revising or repealing legislation to bring territorial laws into line with those of South Africa and making South African legislation applicable to the Territory. Thus in 1971 the South African Parliament enacted or amended a number of laws in diverse fields (ranging from censorship to social welfare) and purported to make them specifically applicable to Namibia. These laws, together with the apparent change in policy which they were intended to reflect, are described and analysed in the latest report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. o/ It was also reported in the earlier part of the year that legislation would soon be introduced in the Territory's Legislative Assembly to set aside more state land for occupation by Africans; the land would be in the districts of Gibeon, Keetmanshoop, Bethanie, Outjo and Grootfontein.

n/ The Act purportedly provided for the creation of six "homelands" to be called Damaraland, Hereroland, Kaokoland, Okavangoland, Eastern Caprivi and Ovamboland and authorized the establishment in each of legislative and executive councils. The legislative councils would be empowered to legislate on a number of matters but in all cases the State President of the Republic of South Africa would retain the right to amend or repeal such legislation or to make new laws for a "homeland" by proclamation. For further details see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/7623/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 36-44.

o/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/8424), paras. 85 to 91.

15. In March 1971, the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, Mr. M.C. Botha, was reported to have stated that the differences which existed between the ruling National Party on the one hand and the United Party and the Progressive Party on the other regarding the development of Bantu "homelands" were in the process of disappearing. Implicitly confirming this development, the leader of the United Party and leader of the opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaf, was subsequently quoted as stating that should the United Party come to power it might have no choice but to continue with the National Party's policy of "homelands" on the grounds that the momentum towards the independence of the Bantustans might have become irreversible. However, Sir de Villiers Graaf heeded that a great attraction would remain for a Bantustan to remain within a federal South Africa.

16. In connexion with the position of the various South African political parties on the "homelands" question, a review made during the year by a Johannesburg newspaper revealed the following:

(a) The National Party favours the creation of a "homeland" for each racial group, with the citizens of each "homeland" enjoying full rights within its borders, including the right to become independent.

(b) The United Party believes that South Africa is a multiracial indivisible country that should be governed as a "communal federation". Control of the central Government would be invested in the white population, with a considerable degree of autonomy being granted to the members of each racial or tribal group.

(c) The Progressive Party believes in a non-racial but qualified franchise with the greatest possible decentralization of power to the provinces, some of which would be African.

17. In what can be taken as a representative expression of the official Government position on the question of Bantustans, Chief Ushona Shiimi, the Chief Councillor of Ovamboland, was quoted as stating that if a plebiscite were held on the question of whether South Africa should continue to administer the Territory, the people of Ovamboland would vote unanimously in favour of the Republic. p/ A similar position was also reported to have been adopted by Chief Shashipapo, the Chief Councillor of the Kavango "homeland".

18. Conversely, in what appears to be a dissenting opinion among South African officials in Namibia with regard to the development of "homelands" in the Territory, Mr. R. Minnaar, a member of the "Legislative Assembly", was reported to have made a plea during the year for better understanding between the European and African communities in Namibia, adding that there were still people in South Africa who failed to see how sensitive a matter the relationship between the races really was and that the African population could not merely be moved to "homelands" and left there.

p/ Chief U. Shiimi's claim to speak for the Ovambo nation was repeatedly denounced during the year by various Ovambo groups. See for instance para. 64 below.

19. In August, following an open letter addressed to Mr. H. Vorster, the Prime Minister of South Africa, by Bishop Leonard Auala of the Evangelical-Lutheran Ovambokavango Church, formerly the Finnish Mission, and moderator Paulus Gowaseb of the Evangelical-Lutheran Church, formerly the Rhenish Mission, which was severely critical of South African administration of Namibia (see para. 56 below), it was reported in the press that the South African Government was profoundly concerned about the situation in the Ovambo "homeland". This was apparently confirmed by visits to Ovamboland by Dr. Hilgard Muller, South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Botha, and other government officials.

20. Following a conference in Pretoria under the chairmanship of Mr. Botha and attended by Mr. J.M. de Wet, the Commissioner-General for the Native Peoples of South West Africa, and the heads of the various departments of "homeland" administrations in the Territory, the South African Government announced a development programme for the Ovambo, Kavango, Damara and Herero "homelands". Some of the main aspects of the programme are as follows: in Ovamboland and Kavangoland, where legislative and executive councils have already been established, certain powers currently vested in the South African Department of Bantu Administration Development and the Department of Bantu Education would be delegated to the appropriate local authorities. In Damaraland three regions, each with its own community authority, would be set up; these authorities would later be expanded into legislative and executive councils. In Hereroland, the two community authorities now functioning would be developed.

21. The formulation of economic policies would become the responsibility of the South African Department of Economic Affairs in consultation with the South African Bantu Investment Corporation. q/ Regarding agricultural development, efforts would be made to improve the quality of livestock, a karakul breeding station would be established at Grootberg, an experimental farm would be established at Okamatapati and farmers would be taught improved techniques of cultivation and pasturage. Other projects would include pig and poultry farming schemes, a co-operative for marketing karakul products, and the breeding of elands. In addition, unused agricultural land, especially in Kavangoland, would be put to productive use and tests would be conducted on the possible use of indigenous and exotic woods. A programme for boreholes and dams would be given the highest priority; some 100 new boreholes a year were being planned in Hereroland.

22. With regard to education, a programme to accelerate expansion of the present network of schools would be implemented. Trade schools would also be established as well as special schools for the training of the blind and the deaf.

23. As regards health services, 6 hospitals and 16 clinics would be set up in Ovamboland, 1 hospital and 16 clinics in Kavangoland, 1 hospital and 4 clinics in Damaraland, and 1 hospital and 7 clinics in Hereroland. Finally, programmes would be started for the tarring of roads as well as for drainage and sewage, and new townships would be set up, notably near Arandis, to provide for mining requirements in the area.

q/ The Corporation is already responsible for specific development projects and is engaged in the implementation of a five-year plan to develop the various "homelands".

"Homelands"

24. Only a limited amount of information was received during the year on the situation in the various "homelands". That information can be summarized as follows.

(a) Ovamboland

25. As already reported, Ovamboland, which was proclaimed a "homeland" in October 1968, has the largest area and population of all the projected "homelands". r/ According to South African sources, more than half of the 40,000-odd migrant workers currently employed in the central and southern parts of Namibia come from Ovamboland and neighbouring Kavangoland, and it is estimated that the equivalent of \$US 5.7 million is remitted annually to the Ovambo "homeland" by migrant labour.

26. For the financial year 1970-1971, the budget of the Ovamboland Legislative Council was reported to amount to R 3,428,901. s/ Of this total, public works accounted for some R 1.9 million, education and culture for some R 1 million and agriculture for R 289,000. The sources of revenue are believed to include the proceeds of taxation of Ovambo citizens working in other parts of Namibia and funds made available by the South African Bantu Trust Fund, the Department of Bantu Administration and Development, and the Department of Bantu Education. In addition, certain development projects were said to be financed by the Bantu Investment Corporation.

27. A number of important developments affecting the Ovambo people and the system of migrant labour took place during the year. An account of these events is given below in paras. 96 and ff.

28. Chief Ushona Shiimi, the government-appointed Chief Councillor of the Ovambo Legislative Council, died in an automobile accident in Ovamboland in the middle of November. He was succeeded by Mr. Philemon Elifas, who was elected on 14 January 1972 during an extraordinary plenary session of the Legislative Council in Oshakati, Ovamboland.

(b) Kavangoland

29. With respect to the local system of government, which was established in 1970, it was announced in 1971 that each of the five members of the Kavango Executive Committee would be responsible for one of the following departments: Authority Affairs and Finance; Public Works; Education and Culture; Justice and Community Affairs; and Agriculture. The Kavango civil service is said to comprise about 390 posts, of which 25 are occupied by non-Africans. In addition, professional assistance and advice is reported to be available on request from the head office of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education.

r/ Official records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8424/Rev.1, chapt. VII, annex, para. 51.

s/ One rand equals \$US 1.40.

(c) Damaraland

30. The Damara "homeland" was constituted out of 223 farms which the South African Government purchased from white farmers. The total Damara population is said to be about 63,000, of which some 45,000 are still living outside the "homeland". According to South African government sources, however, the Damaras, who were previously scattered in "white areas" throughout Namibia, are now voluntarily moving to their "homeland".

31. On 4 August 1971, an interim administration was set up in Damaraland, headed by the Paramount Chief of the Damaras, Mr. David Goraseb, who, together with ten Damara headmen, was officially installed by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education. Paramount Chief Goraseb was reported to have stated on that occasion that his people refused to choose between South Africa and the United Nations and did not wish, at this stage, to become involved in international politics. The 10 headmen were reportedly elected on a one-man one-vote basis, the first time this had happened in any African area in Namibia, and 33 councillors were also reportedly elected by secret ballot.

(d) Hereroland

32. As in previous years, the Hereros have continued to resist the resettlement efforts of the South African government and to follow a course favouring the United Nations. In a statement in Windhoek on 28 June, Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the Herero leader, reportedly stated that the white settlers who had property in Namibia and had made the Territory their home would be well-advised "to abandon an outgoing government so as to win the confidence of the indigenous population" "The future of these whites", Chief Kapuuo stated, "lies only in their good neighbourliness with the indigenous population". Commenting on the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, Chief Kapuuo added that the Court's ruling reflected the position of the Herero people who felt that it was for the inhabitants of Namibia and not for the South African Government to decide the future of the Territory.

33. In the latter part of the year, two sets of legal proceedings were reportedly being considered by the Hereros. In the first case, Chief Kapuuo was expected to sue Barclays Bank for refusing to pay out funds from an account held in the name of the Herero people on the grounds that the South African authorities had not replied to the bank's request for information regarding the succession of the late Chief Hosea Kutako whom Chief Kapuuo claims to have succeeded. In another legal action, Chief Kapuuo was reported to be considering legal proceedings against British mining companies operating in the Territory on the grounds that by the time the future of Namibia was finally settled in favour of its rightful inhabitants, the Territory's mineral resources would have been entirely exhausted. It was subsequently reported that Chief Kapuuo had in fact contacted a firm of attorneys in London, instructing them to find avenues of action which could prevent South Africa from granting concessions to overseas companies without consulting the African population of Namibia.

(e) Eastern Caprivi

34. In July, it was announced that the area of jurisdiction of the Commissioner-General for the Native Peoples of South West Africa was being extended to include the Eastern Caprivi area which had previously been under the direct jurisdiction of the South African Government. According to press sources, the area of the Eastern Caprivi, which is reported to cover 1,153,387 hectares, would be given a legislative council in the "not too distant future".

(f) Bushmanland

35. Although the Odendaal Plan contained provisions for the creation of a Bushman "homeland", no information was available in 1971 to indicate whether substantive progress had been made towards the implementation of this project.

(g) Rehoboth Gebiet

36. The Rehoboth area, which is traditionally known under its German title of Rehoboth Gebiet, has possessed certain limited powers of local government for many years. In June 1971, a new party, the Rehoboth Baster Vereniging (Rehoboth Baster Association) was formed to oppose the ruling Volksparty (People's Party) and declared itself ready to negotiate with the South African government with a view to self-rule for the Rehoboth Gebiet. It will be recalled that the Volksparty has always refused to co-operate with the South African Government.

37. On 29 June, elections were held in the Gebiet to elect seven members to the Rehoboth Advisory Council for a three-year term. Although opposed by candidates of the newly formed Bastervereniging, the Volksparty candidates were re-elected to all seven seats. The vote was considered to be an expression of confidence in the Volksparty and continued opposition to the Rehoboth Investment and Development Corporation, a South African government-controlled body. Confirming this interpretation of their mandate, the members of the Advisory Council did in fact subsequently call on the South African Government to repeal the 1969 act which had set up the Rehoboth Investment and Development Corporation. It will be recalled that the Rehoboth Basters have claimed for some time that their community has sufficient funds to develop itself and that the South African Government should make it possible for the local advisory council to have access to those funds to finance the development of the area. A report released in June by the Territory's Controller and Auditor-General appeared to confirm this claim.

38. Shortly after the election, the seven newly elected Volksparty Councillors made the following statement:

"On behalf of the population of Rehoboth, the Advisory Council welcomes the latest decision of the International Court of Justice in regard to South Africa's administration of the Territory of South West Africa. An urgent appeal is consequently directed to the United Nations Security Council to implement this decision of the Court as soon as possible, because the South African Government is continuing its rapid application of apartheid within South West Africa."

39. It was subsequently reported that leaders of the Rehoboth Baster community had invited Herero Chief Clemens Kapuuo and a number of Herero councillors to hold talks with the Rehoboth Advisory Council. Confirming his acceptance of the invitation, Chief Kapuuo was reported to have stated that the proposed conference, which was scheduled to take place "behind closed doors" in the latter part of August, would deal with matters of general interest such as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice and other political matters. No further information is available regarding the holding of the proposed conference.

(h) Namaland

40. No progress was reported in 1971 regarding the establishment of a "homeland" for the Nama people.

(i) "Coloureds"

41. The question of the future of the "Coloured" population in Namibia continued to be largely overshadowed by a debate taking place in South Africa over the future of the "Coloureds" in the Republic. In this connexion, the South African Prime Minister stated in June, and again in August 1971, that a separate "homeland" for the "Coloured" people was not practical politics either now or in the future, adding that the only two courses that remained open were integration or separate development. A similar position was also taken by Mr. J.J. Loots, the South African Minister of Coloured Affairs, who stated in September that the idea of a separate Coloured homeland was not only impractical but impossible. Later in the same month, the Minister of Coloured Affairs stated that the South African Government was doing all it could to enable the "Coloured" people to have their own municipalities in terms of the policy of separate development, and that the Government had agreed that "Coloured" municipal councils should be established as soon as possible in selected areas.

42. At the end of July, a group of Afrikaner intellectuals, professors, lecturers and writers in the Cape Province and in the Transvaal issued a manifesto calling for the restoration of full citizenship rights to the "Coloured" population of South Africa. Although this proposal was rejected by the Prime Minister and by Mr. P.W. Botha, the leader of the Nationalist Party in the Cape Province, the manifesto reportedly caused serious embarrassment to the party by demonstrating the increasing alienation between the nationalist establishment and its traditional areas of support in the Afrikaner universities. Speaking in the South African House of Assembly on the "Coloured Affairs" section of the appropriation bill, the leader of the opposition United Party, Sir de Villiers Graaf, was reported to have stated that his party was prepared to give the "Coloured" people representation in Parliament, such representation being limited to six members in the House of Assembly and two in the Senate. These representatives would be elected on a separate roll and could be either "white" or "Coloured".

43. A statement issued in August by the Federal Coloured People's Party of South West Africa called for political equality and full South African citizenship for the "Coloured" population. The statement strongly attacked the regulation in the appropriation bill providing that "Coloured" persons must have permits to enter the Territory and can only settle there provided they have obtained a permanent residence certificate. At the same time, the Federal Coloured People's Party of South West Africa called for the dissolution of the

"South West Africa Coloured Council", a body established and financially aided by the South African Government. Later in the year, the chairman of the Coloured Council reportedly expressed his disappointment at what he termed "the disunity of the Coloureds" in the Territory, and declared himself in favour of the creation of a homeland for the "Coloured" population.

Other developments

Situation in Windhoek and Katutura

44. During the year, the Windhoek-Katutura area, which has one of the largest concentrations of migrant labourers in the Territory, was the scene of several incidents which exemplified the deterioration of the social climate resulting from the application to the Territory of the policies of the South African Government.

45. In early March, following a traffic accident in Katutura in which an Ovambo worker was killed, several hundred Ovambo labourers clashed with the police and it was several hours before order was restored. The following month another riot occurred in Katutura in which one man was killed and several were wounded. The riot was said to have stemmed from the tensions between Herero residents of the township and a group of 360 Xhosa, Zulu and Tswana workers brought in from the Republic to work on a local power station project. Following this incident, 19 Herero workers were detained for questioning.

46. On 11 June, a massive raid was conducted by the police on the Ovambo single quarters compound in Katutura, a fenced group of buildings containing some 5,000 Ovambo migrant labourers. In what the local press termed "the biggest clean-up operation" in the history of Namibia, the entire Windhoek municipal police force, assisted by members of the South African police, held 800 Ovambos for "screening" and later arrested 92 of them. Of these, 91 were fined R 30 (or 30 days in jail) for being in Windhoek illegally and were subsequently repatriated to Ovamboland. Two months later African members of the Katutura Township Advisory Board informed the Chairman of the Board that the tense situation prevailing in Katutura could erupt at any time into a major conflict.

47. In what appears to be a response to the unrest in the township, the Windhoek Municipal Council decided at the end of September to create a specially trained police unit recruited with the help of the Ovambo "Government" to maintain law and order in the Ovambo compound. Commenting on this action, the local press stated that most of the social problems in the Ovambo compound could be traced to the system of migrant labour which, the report said, had been "widely condemned by churchmen and sociologists for its adverse effects on family life". The contract labour system was the source of yet another manifestation of discontent which occurred later in the year among labourers in Windhoek-Katutura and the resulting strike which was started in the area by the Ovambo workers soon spread throughout the Territory (see paras. 96 and ff. below).

48. According to both official and press sources, a critical housing shortage now exists in Katutura, and the shortage is expected to become even more acute in the coming years because the Administration has ceased construction in the township. In April, for example, when the South African Department of Bantu Administration and Development finally rejected a year-old request of the

Windhoek municipality to build an additional 105 houses in Katutura. In view of the seriousness of the situation, the Windhoek City Council is reported to have unanimously passed a recommendation that urgent representations be made to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development to approve plans for extension of the township. It was considered doubtful, however, that the Department would approve the request. In connexion with the housing problem, it will be recalled that although Africans are allowed to purchase a house on a cash basis, they cannot become owners of, or enjoy property rights over, the grounds, which remain the property of the municipality.

Freedom of movement

49. It was announced in May that, from 1 February 1972, all residents of Namibia would be required to have identity documents. Later in the year, six inspectors were appointed by the Administration to enforce control over the entry and residence in the Territory of "prohibited people".

50. In reply to a question raised in the South African Parliament on 15 June, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development stated that of "about six" applications which he had received during the current parliamentary session to visit the karakul belt district of Namibia, two had been withdrawn at his request and three refused. One, dealing with scientific research, had been approved. The Minister added that as no special record was kept of such applications, the particulars thereof could not be readily ascertained. It was reported in the press a few days later that the South African Government had refused permits to members of a scientific expedition sponsored by an oil company to visit the karakul belt to study a little-known tribe. Later in the year, other reports indicated that three press agencies, as well as representatives of a local Namibian newspaper, had been refused permission to visit Ovamboland. At about the same time, a United States congressman who was visiting the Republic of South Africa was refused permission to travel to Namibia on the grounds that his request had been made too late.

Internal politics

51. In a by-election held in May in the Windhoek East constituency to fill a vacancy in the Territory's "Legislative Assembly", the opposition United National South West Party (UNSWP) candidate reduced the majority of the ruling National Party by polling 732 votes against 1,145 for a Nationalist. According to local press sources, however, this achievement was to be interpreted not as a gain in the popularity of UNSWP, but as an expression of the white electorate's disenchantment with the National Party's policy.

52. At the opening of the twenty-eighth annual congress of the South West Africa National Party on 17 August in Windhoek, the South African Prime Minister urged party and non-party members alike "to keep a cool head" in the current world situation, and reaffirmed his country's policy never to bow to external pressure when its security was at stake.

53. Earlier in the year, it was announced that the Herstigte Nasionale Party of South West Africa (HNP) was breaking away from its parent body in the Republic

on the grounds that communication with party headquarters in Pretoria was difficult and travel expenses to attend congresses and executive meetings in that city' precluded any possibility of having the Territory's branch of the HNP properly represented at such meetings. Announcing the secession, Mr. H.S. Bothma, the Secretary of HNP reportedly stated that HNP in the Territory would "stand with the Afrikaner's traditional policy of racial separation and /is/ profoundly concerned about the leftward movement by the National Party and the United /National South West/ Party". Sometime later, Mr. Bothma was quoted as stating that the leaders of the parent body in the Republic had made it clear that they were not prepared to co-operate with HNP in the Territory. According to a press report on this matter, HNP in the Republic recognizes a Mr. I. Potgieter as party leader in the Territory whereas Mr. Bothma's group recognizes a Mr. S. Becker as its leader.

54. It was announced in Pretoria in August that Mr. B.J. van der Walt, a former member of Parliament and the then South African Ambassador to Portugal would replace Mr. J.H.G. van der Wah as Administrator of the Territory.

Churches

55. A number of developments involving local churches took place in Namibia during the year. In most cases, they revealed a deep and growing dissatisfaction on the part of religious authorities with South African policies in the Territory. t/

56. The most notable development in this connexion was an open letter which Bishop Leonard Auala, the President of the Church Board of the Evangelical-Lutheran Ovambokavango Church, and Mr. Paulus Gowaseb, the President of the Church Board of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of South West Africa, addressed on 30 June to the Prime Minister of South Africa. The text of the letter, which was subsequently published in the Windhoek newspaper Allgemeine Zeitung, u/ read as follows:

"Following the announcement of the advisory opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice at The Hague on 21 June 1971, various leaders and officers of our Lutheran churches have been approached individually by representatives of higher authority with inquiries as to their views regarding the advisory opinion. This indicates to us that the authorities are interested in ascertaining the views of the churches in this connexion. We should therefore like to take this opportunity to inform you of the views of the Church Boards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in South West Africa and the Evangelical-Lutheran Ovambokavango Church, which represent the majority of the indigenous population of South West Africa.

"We believe that South Africa, in its attempts to develop South West Africa, has failed in the case of the non-white population to implement human rights as proclaimed by the United Nations in 1948. Allow us to mention the following examples in this connexion:

t/ A total of 50 clergymen have reportedly been expelled from Namibia in recent years.

u/ The letter was written in German. No information is available as to whether a translated text appeared in any English language newspaper in the Territory.

"(1) The Government maintains that, through the racial policies which are being applied in our country, life and freedom for the population are preserved and promoted. In reality, however, the non-white population groups are constantly discriminated against and intimidated in their daily life. Our people are not free, and from the way in which they are treated they do not feel secure. In this connexion, we would cite article 3 of the Declaration of Human Rights.

"(2) We cannot consider South West Africa with all its population groups as anything but a single entity. The Group Areas Acts have denied people the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the country. This is not in accord with article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights.

"(3) Our people are not free to express and publish their thoughts and opinions. Many experience humiliating espionage and intimidation aimed at ensuring that they express generally accepted and publicly recognized views, but not what they really feel in their hearts and are truly convinced of. In such circumstances, how can articles 18 and 19 of the Declaration of Human Rights be put into effect?

"(4) The present policy of the Government makes it impossible for political parties among the indigenous population to co-operate in a truly responsible and democratic manner in constructing the future of South West Africa as a whole. We believe that in this connexion it is important that the right to vote should be granted also to the non-white population (articles 20 and 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights).

"(5) The practice of job reservation is an impediment of the right to free choice of employment, resulting in unemployment and lower rates of pay. There can be no doubt that the contract labour system disrupts healthy family life, because the prohibition of residing in one's place of work prevents the family from living together. This is in contradiction to articles 23 and 25 of the Declaration of Human Rights.

"It is the urgent wish of the Church Boards that your Government, in accordance with the decision of the International Court of Justice and in collaboration with the United Nations, of which South Africa is a Member, should seek a peaceful solution to the problems of our country and ensure the full implementation of human rights, and that South West Africa should become a separate and independent State."

57. The letter provoked a political storm in Namibia, where the two churches have a collective membership of some 300,000 and the two leaders are widely respected men reportedly not given to political activism. Interviewed by the press a few days later, Dr. Auala and Mr. Gowaseb confirmed the contents of their letter, adding that the African population had understood them and was grateful for what they had done.

58. In the ensuing debate, the German Evangelical-Lutheran Church of South West Africa, a "white" church, dissociated itself from the terms of the letter on the grounds that the views expressed exceeded the limits of proper church interests. However, the church welcomed the fact that the letter called for dialogue and

expressed its hope that new possibilities for dialogue with government bodies would be found.

59. On the other hand, the Reverend C. Winter, Anglican Bishop of Damaraland, strongly supported the stand taken by the two African church leaders in a pastoral letter which was distributed on 25 July 1971. On the basis of his own contacts with the African population, the Bishop reaffirmed his conviction that the overwhelming majority of the Africans totally rejected apartheid because of the five reasons given by the leaders of the two churches. In addition, Bishop R. Koppman of Windhoek and Bishop E. Scholotterback of Keetmanshoop publicly associated themselves with the open letter to Prime Minister Vorster, stating with regret that a major section of the privileged minority of the country did not wish to be informed of the human tragedy and daily noticeable injustices suffered by the non-white population. The Roman Catholic Church reportedly has about 120,000 adherents among all races in Namibia.

60. Dr. Auala and Mr. Gowaseb followed up their letter to the Prime Minister with a pastoral letter to their own congregations in which they stated, inter alia:

"We are concerned about the future of this country and about the future of the various peoples who live here. We not only feel this concern today but because of the judgement of the World Court given on 21 June 1971, we can no longer remain silent. We feel that if we, as the Church, remain silent any longer, we will become liable for the life and future of our country and its people.

"The judgement of the World Court was the answer to the prayer of many of our people, because this judgement involves the hope of freedom and recognition of personal worth. We believe that our people would not have taken themselves to other bodies and also not to the United Nations if the Government of South Africa had not withheld from them the basic rights of man.

"The mandate which was given to South Africa included the obligation to create conditions of peace and freedom and to guarantee such conditions for all the inhabitants of South West Africa.

"True peace does not allow people to hate each other. But we observe that our people are caught up with fear and that the hate between people is increasing, especially between white and non-white. In our opinion this fatal development is caused and upheld by the policy of apartheid. We believe that a false impression arises when it is stated that peace reigns in our country. The peace is maintained by forceful measures.

"...

"...

"The true development of the inhabitants of South West Africa on a Christian basis ought to lead to unity and fraternity between the races. We are convinced that this must be the lasting goal for further and future development. The Government, by the application of the Homelands Policy, contributes to the creation and continuation forever of the division between the races.

"It is stated that this policy is intended to lead the races to self-government and independence. But our small race groups cannot really be aided by separation. They will be isolated and denied the chance to take a proper part in the development of the country.

"We want to also inform the members of our congregations that we are determined to inform the Government of this state of affairs and of our conviction of what changes must occur. We appeal to you to maintain the peace and with a peaceful disposition to continue seeking our brothers in all racial groups. We want to advise you also to build bridges and not to break down contact."

61. Shortly after these events, Mr. J.M. de Wet, Commissioner-General for the Native Peoples of South West Africa, met with Dr. Auala and later stated that he had recommended a meeting between Dr. Auala and Mr. Gowaseb on the one hand and the South African Prime Minister on the other. In a private four-hour meeting on 18 August, the Prime Minister received eight representatives of the two churches of South West Africa headed by Dr. Auala and Mr. Gowaseb. The church representatives reportedly reaffirmed the opinions expressed in the open letter of 30 June. Following the meeting, which he characterized as "penetrating and purposeful", the Prime Minister stated that he had left the church representatives in no doubt as to the position of the South African Government. He added that he had also emphasized to them that the Government would continue to govern the people of the Territory in consultation with the various nations, and that law and order would be maintained. The church leaders were subsequently quoted as stating that one result of their talks with the Prime Minister would doubtless be better mutual understanding between the white and non-white communities in the Territory, and also that they had pointed out to the Prime Minister that there was no solution to the problem of living together in the Territory under a policy of separate development.

Namibian liberation movements

62. Armed resistance to the South African police and armed forces continued in 1971, mainly in the Caprivi Strip. Available information on Namibian armed resistance activities is contained in the latest report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. v/ In addition, it was reported on 6 January 1972 that a South African police officer had been killed and three policemen injured on the previous day by a land mine explosion in the Eastern Caprivi.

63. Following the proposal by the South African Government in February 1971 to hold a plebiscite in Namibia to enable the population to decide whether it wished to remain under South African administration or would prefer United Nations supervision, Mr. Sam Nujoma, the President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), outlined the following conditions for a genuine plebiscite in the Territory:

1. A general climate of peace, harmony and free political activity must prevail throughout the Territory to ensure the participation of all Namibians, irrespective of race, creed or colour.

v/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 24 (A/8424), paras. 102-107.

2. Since Namibia is at present under South African military occupation, all South African troops and police should be withdrawn from the Territory.

3. All Namibian political prisoners currently in South Africa as well as those being held in Namibia should be unconditionally released.

4. All Namibians currently in exile should be allowed to return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment.

5. All Bantustans, which aim at dividing the people on an ethnic basis, should be dismantled; the plebiscite should be conducted on the principle of one-man one-vote.

6. The plebiscite should be conducted under the supervision of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

64. Subsequently, hundreds of leaflets were purportedly distributed in Katutura, exhorting the Ovambo to oppose the policies of Chief Councillor Ushona Shiimi who had aligned himself with the South African Government and claimed that the entire Ovambo nation rejected the International Court's advisory opinion (see also paras. 101-102 below). The views expressed in the leaflets - which reportedly did not call for violence - were that there could be no justice and human rights under the current South African Government, and that these aims could only be achieved through the United Nations. The source of the leaflets was not known.

65. In a declaration issued in New York on 14 September, three representatives of another Namibian liberation movement, the South West Africa National United Front (SWANUF), announced the formation of a "Provisional Government" of Namibia.

66. Also in September, it was announced that a multi-nation SWAPO conference would be held in Brussels, Belgium, in February 1972 under the sponsorship of the Belgian Socialist Party. The purpose of the conference is reportedly to publicize in Europe, and particularly in a member country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the efforts being made to end South Africa's rule over Namibia.

67. It was subsequently announced in the press that the World Council of Churches, at the meeting of its Executive Committee in Sofia, Bulgaria, had decided to allocate a further \$US 200,000 to a number of southern African liberation movements, including the sum of \$US 25,000 to SWAPO. The grants, which were said to have been made possible through contributions received from churches, organizations and individuals, are intended, according to the World Council, for "humanitarian purposes such as legal aid and social, health and educational services of... organizations of oppressed racial groups actively engaged in combating white racism".

2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

68. Information concerning the economy of the Territory is contained in previous reports of the Special Committee w/ and in the most recent report of the United Nations Council for Namibia. x/ Supplementary information on the main developments during 1971 is set out below.

69. A more detailed account of recent economic developments in the Territory will be included in the working paper to be prepared by the Secretariat in connexion with the Special Committee's study of the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in southern Africa.

Public finance

70. It will be recalled that public finance in the Territory is regulated by the South West Africa Affairs Act, 1969, which transferred a major part of the powers and functions formerly exercised by territorial authorities to the Government of South Africa. Under the terms of the Act, the territorial administration retains powers of taxation over the following items only: personal income tax, business licences, dog and game licences, wheel tax, motor vehicle tax and certain fines. Taxes collected by the Government of South Africa include taxes on mines, companies (other than mining), prospecting and claims, diamond exports, diamond profits, undistributed profits, stamps, transfers and rents.

71. The revenue collected in the Territory by the Government of South Africa is paid into a special account of the South African Consolidated Revenue Fund called the South West Africa Account. Additional money paid into this account includes money appropriated for it by the South African Parliament and a share of the Republic's customs and excise receipts. This account is used to defray expenditure by South Africa in the Territory as well as to make statutory payments to the Territorial Revenue Fund.

72. The Territorial Revenue Fund is made up of the revenues collected by the territorial authorities and is augmented by amounts paid into it from the South West Africa Account. These include a relatively large sum calculated according to a formula set out in the South West Africa Affairs Act, 1969, and a smaller amount representing a percentage of taxes on companies (other than mining) equivalent to that paid to the provinces of the Republic.

73. According to the report of the Controller and Auditor-General of South Africa for the financial year ending 31 March 1970, the Republic collected R 104,287,145 in revenue from Namibia during that period. Some of the major sources of revenue were income taxes from diamond mines, R 15,600,000; from mines other than diamond mines, R 8,500,000; and from other companies, R 10,400,000. In addition, the Government collected R 6,277,000 in diamond export duties and R 6,045,000 in profit taxes on diamonds. During the same period, the Exchequer of the South African Government issued R 79,119,311 in

w/ For the most recent, see ibid., Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 116-156; ibid., Supplement No. 23A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), appendix I.

x/ Ibid., Supplement No. 24 (A/8424).

grants to its various departments in the Territory, including R 12,971,000 to the Department of Water Affairs and R 12,674,000 to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. These expenditures were defrayed from the South West Africa Account.

74. Information released by the Administrator in May 1971 indicated that Namibia's gross national product in 1970 amounted to R 350 million. This figure, in the Administrator's view, served as "conclusive proof of the viability of the Territory's economy".

75. Estimated expenditure from the South West Africa Account for the year ending 31 March 1972 amounted to a total of R 103,372,400, an increase of R 5,838,500 over the previous year's estimates. Of this amount, R 18,385,000 were to have been allocated to the Department of Bantu Administration and Development: R 13,000,000 to the Department of Water Affairs; R 3,500,000 to the Department of Transport; and R 3,405,000 to the Department of Bantu Education.

76. The territorial budget for the financial year 1971/72, which was introduced in May 1971, provided for a total expenditure of R 31,592,000 and a total revenue of R 54,462,000. Of the R 22,870,000 in anticipated excess revenue over expenditure, R 21,500,000 were scheduled to be appropriated to the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund, leaving a net surplus of R 1,370,000 in the Territorial Revenue Fund at 31 March 1972. As a surplus of R 10,051,506 already existed from previous financial years, the total accumulated surplus at year end in the Territorial Revenue Fund was thus expected to be R 11,421,506. This amount was to be utilized to offset the major part of an anticipated deficit of R 13,292,081, corresponding to the difference between R 54,462,000 in anticipated revenue and the combined estimated expenditure from the Territorial Revenue Fund and the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund, which was expected to amount to R 67,754,081. To compensate for the above-mentioned factual deficit of R 13,292,081, the credit balance of the Territorial Development and Reserve Fund was to have been reduced from approximately R 38 million to about R 24 million.

77. Of the R 54,462,000 in anticipated territorial revenue for 1971/1972, R 28,900,000 were scheduled to be a contribution from the South West Africa Account in the Territorial Revenue Fund; R 3 315,000 were to be derived from sales duties; R 2,300,000 from interest on loans made to local authorities and hospital boards; and most of the remainder from income taxes on individuals and taxes on non-resident shareholders.

Mining

Diamonds

78. The main development during the year was the unexpected closing in September of the Strathmore diamond mine at Terrace Bay, about 270 kilometres north of Swakopmund. With the exception of a small maintenance crew, all the African and non-African employees were dismissed.

79. It was also reported that although Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (CDM), a subsidiary of de Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., had ceased

foreshore and sea mining of diamonds off the coast of Namibia in April, work would not be abandoned on this type of operation. According to industry sources, however, it was decided that no further regular reports would be issued until mining operations were resumed or significant developments were revealed by prospecting operations.

Base metals

80. Although specific data are lacking on activities in most sectors, y/ the mineral industry appears to have continued to contribute significantly to the economy of the Territory and the two major mineral producers - Tsumeb Corporation, Ltd. and CDM - are reported to have maintained a high level of operations. In addition, it was reported that, notwithstanding the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, North American and French mining companies were intensifying their prospecting activities in the Territory.

81. In local developments, it was announced in September that Strathmore was closing its tin mine in the Territory for an indefinite period. According to unconfirmed reports, the mine, which is reported to be one of the most modern in the base mineral industry in southern Africa, would be taken over by the government-controlled Iron and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR). It was also reported in May that a new copper mine was scheduled to go into production near Windhoek later in the year, and that copper exploration was being conducted in a 10-million hectare area of the Territory. In that connexion, FEDSWA, a consortium headed by the General Mining and Finance Corporation, subsidiary of Federale Mynbou Bpk. of South Africa, is said to be undertaking a major project in the area.

Uranium

82. It was reported in May that the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, General Mining and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC) had confirmed their intention of starting operations at the recently-discovered uranium deposits at Rössing, about 70 kilometres from Swakopmund. The cost of the venture, which is scheduled to become one of the largest open cast mining operations in the world, is estimated to be about R 90 million, most of which would be financed by the three partners. Production, at an undisclosed rate, is due to begin by the mid-1970's and sufficient sales contracts are reported to have been arranged to ensure a profitable scale of operation. Asked to comment on the possibility of South Africa receiving uranium supplies from Rössing, a spokesman for IDC was quoted as stating that at this stage no arrangement of this nature had been made. It is, however, generally understood that most of the production would be exported and that the ore would be concentrated before being shipped through Walvis Bay.

83. In connexion with the projected mining operations at Rössing, it was announced in early January that the Deutsche Urangesellschaft, a mining concern

y/ Mineral production statistics are not made public on instructions from the South African Government.

in the Federal Republic of Germany, had decided not to take part in the operation, following the Federal Government's decision no longer to guarantee supplier credits to companies taking part in similar schemes in southern Africa.

Petroleum

84. Despite the withdrawal of the Gulf Oil Company, Chevron Oil and H.M. Mining and Exploration Company from their off-shore concessions, and that of Shell and British Petroleum from their concessions in the interior, the search for oil is reported to be continuing in Namibia. It appeared, however, that the only remaining companies were de Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd., the Société Nationale de Pétrole d'Aquitaine, and the Etosha Petroleum Company (Pty) Ltd., a subsidiary of Brillund Mines, Ltd. of Canada.

Fishing

85. Following much controversy over regulations and the conduct of operations, the 1971 fishing season in Namibia ended in September amidst indications that, for the first time, the nine land-based factories in the Territory had failed to achieve their quota target of 810,000 tons, z/ while the Willem Barendsz, the only South African factory ship operating off the coast of Namibia, had achieved just over 50 per cent of its 200,000-ton quota. A statement made in August by a representative of the fishing industry indicated that the shortfall for each of the land-based factories averaged between 15,000 and 20,000 tons, a situation which was expected to result in a serious loss of profits for the canning industry.

86. According to industry sources, the rapidly deteriorating situation was partly a consequence of the split-quota regulation which had compelled factories to restrict the catch of pilchards in order to continue fishing operations with other species. Accordingly, in order to prevent further loss of production, the fishing companies requested that the quota regulation be rescinded or that the ratio be changed to 50,000 tons for each of the two categories of catch. Another reason given by the industry to account for the poor 1971 season was the fact that a number of foreign owned fishing flotillas had been operating without restriction outside the 19.2 kilometre limit, thus depleting the resources that the South African Government was endeavouring to protect within Namibian territorial waters. To remedy this situation, it was generally felt that, following the example of a number of States with a fishing industry, the Namibian territorial zone ought to be extended to 200 miles to prevent over-exploitation. Members of the industry stated that unless the South African Government took drastic protective measures, pilchard were in danger of becoming extinct in Namibian waters.

87. A similarly bleak picture emerged in July with regard to the Namibian crayfish industry - formerly one of the Territory's major industries - when it appeared that catches for the season had fallen 40 per cent short of the 150,000-unit aa/ quota for the year. The former quota of the industry, which is

z/ At the start of the 1971 season the land-based factories were pegged at 30,000 tons of pilchard and 60,000 tons of "other" species. In addition, they were subjected to the stipulation that all fishing had to cease once the pilchard quota was filled.

aa/ One unit is 9 kilograms.

based at Lüderitz, was 274,000 units. Despite increased prices on the world market, the crayfish industry is now widely believed to be on the verge of complete collapse and the Lüderitz operators are reportedly looking forward to the development of a whitefish factory for which resources appear to be plentiful.

88. In related developments, it was announced in August that two Portuguese transport firms based in Angola - Comércio e Construtora de Frigoríficos, Lda. and Sociedade Comercial Abastecedora, Lda. - had applied for licences to road-haul fresh fruit and vegetables from Benguela and Nova Lisboa to Windhoek in return for which they would convey frozen whitefish from Walvis Bay to Angola. It is not known whether the licences have been approved by the South African authorities in Namibia.

89. Following ratification or acceptance by the Republic of South Africa, Japan, Portugal and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the South-East Atlantic Ocean came into force on 24 October. The Convention seeks to regulate fishing of heavily exploited stocks in the waters off the coast of Africa between 6 degrees south and 50 degrees south latitude and 20 degrees west and 40 degrees east longitude. It provides for the establishment of an International Commission for the South-East Atlantic Fisheries, which will undertake studies and make recommendations for the rational exploitation of the area's fisheries. Other States which, at the time of this writing, had signed but not ratified the convention were Belgium, Cuba, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Spain.

Agriculture

Cattle farming and marketing

90. Following a critical year during which production was severely affected by the drought that prevailed over most of the Territory, bb/ Namibian cattle farming appeared to have recovered after satisfactory rain-falls in most areas, and 1971 was termed a record year by the "South West Africa Meat Control Board".

91. Despite improved conditions, however, the agricultural sector is reported to be experiencing serious difficulties due to overstocking, deterioration of the grazing areas and mismanagement. With regard to marketing, the Territory was reportedly producing between 100,000 and 150,000 cattle annually over and above its own needs and South Africa's limited import quotas. cc/ In a move apparently designed to compel white farmers to reduce their stocks, the South African Government announced on 20 August that it would discontinue its aid in the form of subsidized fodder, and subsequently that state aid for the transportation of livestock by rail to and from emergency grazing areas would cease on 31 December 1971. The Government announcement added, however, that the fodder subsidy scheme and the railway rebate scheme would not be withdrawn in areas where pasturage distress still existed until these areas were officially removed from the distress list.

bb/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex, paras. 149-152.

cc/ A weekly import quota of 6,060 has been set by the Republic for all cattle from Namibia.

92. In an effort to find additional marketing channels, a number of meetings were held during the year by farmers' and meat producers' associations. Recommendations included stepping up local slaughtering and processing so as to accommodate the extra cattle which could not be marketed locally; marketing cattle throughout the year and not only during peak periods when cattle are in their best condition; and ascertaining the demand before exports were contemplated.

93. It was reported in July that the Okahandja meat processing factory, closed since October 1964, had been reopened and was exporting 25 metric tons of frozen meat a week through Cape Town. While the United Kingdom market was said to remain a major outlet for frozen meat produced in the Territory, a new market was reported to have been opened up in Greece. According to reports, a Greek firm, which had obtained a permit to import Namibian frozen meat, was understood to have consulted the Walvis Bay municipality regarding slaughtering facilities and the possible erection of cold storage chambers for some 200 metric tons of deboned meat a month. Contracts were also reported to have been concluded for the weekly export of 75 tons of frozen meat to be flown to France and Switzerland from Windhoek. Export operations are scheduled to start at the beginning of 1972.

Karakul farming and marketing

94. Figures published in the Windhoek press during the year indicate that a total of 1,049,124 Namibian karakul pelts were sold in London in early July during the second of five pelt auctions held in 1971 in that city. French, German and Italian firms were reported to be the major buyers of the pelts which averaged over R 8 per unit. During a previous sale in February, which was reported to be the best of 23 auctions, a consignment of 860,854 pelts had been sold at prices 10 to 15 per cent above those of the previous auction. In addition to organizing sales drives and participating in fur exhibitions in the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Australia, the United States, Canada, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, representatives of the Karakul industry in Namibia also attended The Second International Karakul Symposium, held in Pietra-Neamt, Romania, in September. The Symposium was attended by some 200 experts and scientists from 23 countries, including seven from the Territory. It was subsequently reported that South African and Namibian firms expected to derive an estimated R 30 million from their 1971 export of 3.5 million karakul pelts.

95. For comparison purposes, pelts exported and prices realized during two previous years were as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Pelts exported</u> (millions)	<u>Value</u> (million rands)	<u>Average price</u> <u>per pelt</u> (rands)
1968	3.4	19.1	5.58
1969	5.3	31.6	5.94

3. SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

Labour

Industrial labour

96. In December over 13,000 Ovambo contract labourers went on strike in protest against the labour system enforced by the South African administration in the Territory. They refused to go back to work under the current working conditions and demanded to be repatriated to Ovamboland if their demands were not met.

97. The strike, which was widely reported in the world press, started in Windhoek on 13 December when some 5,000 Ovambos walked off their jobs, paralysing the city's building industry and disrupting the retailing, manufacturing and transport industries. It spread to Walvis Bay on the following day when the entire Ovambo labour force of 3,120 denounced their contracts and requested to be allowed to market their labour freely at higher rates of pay. In the following days, the Ovambo strike action spread to the Tsumeb Corporation mine, the largest copper producer and one of the biggest employers of contract labour in the Territory, where the departure of some 4,000 workers brought production to a standstill. Although a white skeleton staff kept the copper smelter open on a nominal basis, the mine's lead smelter - the only one in southern Africa - had to reduce its monthly target of 8,000 tons to 750 tons, which was reported to have caused serious disruption of industrial operations in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. By the end of December, the Ovambo strike had spread to the Tsumeb Corporation's Kombat mine, the lead and vanadium mine at Berg Aukas, the copper mine at Klein Aub and the tin mine at Rosh Pinah. By the middle of January, the strike action had compelled Tsumeb to shut down its three-year old Matchless mine near Windhoek, and was affecting 23 industrial centres, including 11 mines.

98. According to press reports, the effects of the strike on the Territory's copper and lead production were so severe that it could take up to one year for that sector to resume full efficiency.

99. It was subsequently reported that the strikers had received wide popular support in a number of Namibian cities. In Windhoek, for example, live-in domestic personnel were found to be hiding what the police termed "agitators" and a number of African policemen were dismissed for "collaboration" with the strikers. With few exceptions, efforts by both tribal and government authorities to recruit African strike breakers from other population groups appear to have met with little success. The use of convict labour was reported.

100. As requested by the Ovambo workers, and also presumably to avert possible disturbances, the South African Government, from the very beginning of the strike in Windhoek, arranged for the strikers to be sent back to their "homeland" by train and by road. Between 16 December, when the first trainload of 1,000 men left Windhoek, and the end of the month, 13,000 Ovambo workers were reported to have been repatriated to Ovamboland.

101. The Ovambo workers made known their demands in a leaflet which was widely circulated throughout Namibia by an ad hoc strike committee, formed in Ovamboland after the strikers had returned to their "homeland". These included the following:

(a) Freedom for the individual to sell his labour to the highest bidder in an employment of his own choice.

(b) Freedom to change employment at any time.

(c) Freedom for workers to take their families with them to their place of work.

(d) Payment according to the prevailing rate for the work done and not according to colour, and sufficient wages to allow workers to buy their own food and pay for their own transportation costs.

102. In addition, the strikers demanded the removal of the police post at the border of Ovamboland; the replacement of the passbook by an identification card; the creation of employment bureaux in all tribal regions and towns; and mutual respect between employer and employee.

103. On 29 December, Mr. Botha, and government officials in the Territory, held talks in Pretoria with representatives of commerce and agriculture and of the mining and fishing industries in Namibia. Following the talks, the Minister stated that his department and employer organizations were reviewing the contract labour system, certain aspects of which had to be either amended or abolished. However, more negotiations between the parties were necessary.

104. On 10 January 1972, it was announced by the South African Press Association, quoting government sources, that the contract labour system would be abolished in the Territory and would be replaced by a series of agreements between tribal authorities and the local administration. The report added that the new plan would be discussed at a meeting between government authorities and the Ovambo "Legislative Council" on 19 January at Grootfontein. The following day, however, the first part of the report was denied by Mr. Botha, and on 12 January an undisclosed number of police reinforcements were flown from Pretoria to Ondangua, Ovamboland, as a precautionary measure against possible disturbances in the area. At the same time, Mr. de Wet, the Commissioner-General for the Native Peoples of South West Africa, charged that foreign white agitators were trying to provoke an uprising among the Ovambos.

105. The Grootfontein Labour Conference opened as scheduled on 19 January. Among the participants were Mr. Botha, his deputy, Mr. P. Koornhof, Mr. de Wet, Mr. J.H. Louw, Director of SWANLA and various other high-ranking South African officials, and representatives of the Ovambo and Kavango legislative councils headed by Chief Councillors Elifas and Shashipapo, respectively. The press was not admitted to the conference.

106. In a brief statement released at the end of the conference on the following day, it was announced that a new labour system had been worked out and agreed upon, whereby the controversial SWANLA would be abolished and labour relations between the Ovambo and Kavango tribal "governments" on the one hand and the Government of South Africa on the other, would henceforth be handled on the basis of an official agreement between the parties. Under the new system, the Ovambo "Government" will provide regional labour employment offices where work seekers will be registered. In addition, a written agreement will be entered into between

the employer and employee, which will state the name of the employer; the name and identity of the employee and particulars of the basic wages payable; payment for overtime; bonuses and other benefits; possible salary advances; the duration of the period of service; and particulars regarding shifts and working hours. The agreement will also explain the general conditions of service applicable. Other points agreed upon were reported to include provisions concerning the right of both employer and employee to terminate the employment; home leave during the period of service; paid leave at the end of the period of service subject to agreement between the employer and employee; the opportunity for the employee to change employers; and free medical treatment and free medicine.

107. No indication was given that the above arrangements would be subject to a test of acceptability by Ovambo workers. It will also be noted that the new system makes no provision for collective bargaining in respect of wages and working conditions.

108. In the wake of the strike, 13 men dd/ - one "Coloured" and 12 Ovambos - were arrested in Windhoek and appeared in Magistrate's Court in that city on 12 January. They were provisionally charged with the following:

(a) Using violence, threats or intimidation to persuade people or a person to desert their or his work.

(b) Intimidating certain people or hampering them in regard to their work.

(c) Succeeding, by acting individually or in consort with others, in causing people to commit a breach of contract with their employers. Following their indictment, the accused were remanded in custody pending the opening of their trial, which was scheduled to open at the end of January.

109. On 19 January 1972, the Council for Namibia met to consider the labour strike and authorized the President of the Council to issue a special statement which was subsequently transmitted to the Security Council. ee/ In his statement, the President declared, inter alia,

"After hearing the petitioners, the Council for Namibia decided unanimously to express its complete solidarity with the strikers in their determined struggle against oppression and exploitation and support of their just demands.

"The Council calls for an immediate end to the contract labour system, which is in clear violation of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"The Council further calls upon all foreign corporations operating in the Territory to cease using the contract labour system forthwith.

dd/ Charges against one of them were subsequently withdrawn.

ee/ S/10522.

"It urges these corporations to refuse to become party to any settlement of the strike which does not take into account the just demands of the Namibian workers."

110. A few days after the Grootfontein agreement, a number of incidents were reported in Ovamboland involving Ovambo workers and South African police forces. Following one such incident in which over 80 miles of border fence between Angola and Ovamboland were destroyed, the South African Government announced on 26 January that units of the armed forces would be sent to the "homeland" to assist the local police in protecting "international boundaries". ff/ The South African Government also admitted that Ovambo workers had burned cattle kraals, obstructed the activities of white officials, interfered with workers seeking employment with South African citizens, attacked police patrols, and taken part in a number of other incidents directed against individual South African citizens and African members of the Ovambo "Government". On 2 February 1972, six Ovambos were reported to have been killed and several others wounded during clashes with the South African police.

111. Despite a virtually total ban on news from the area imposed by the South African authorities, there were indications in early February that an anti-apartheid opposition party was being formed in Ovamboland under the leadership of Mr. Johannes Nangatuuala, a former employee of the Ovamboland "Government" who was reportedly dismissed from his post after expressing support for the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. There were also indications that although an estimated 1,000 Ovambo labourers had returned to work and another 2,000 had expressed willingness to do so, most of the repatriated Ovambo labour force was still in Ovamboland.

Agricultural labour

112. It was announced in August that the South West African Agricultural Union, during its annual congress at Windhoek, had decided to increase by 30 to 50 per cent the wages of the estimated 35,000 contract labourers from the "homelands" employed by the farming industry in the Territory. Since, however, a 40 per cent pay rise would only increase monthly wages by approximately R 8, it appeared doubtful that the decision would significantly improve the condition of African labourers in the agricultural sector, where salaries were last adjusted in 1964. In that connexion, it was pointed out in the local press that, because of the low salaries and bad working conditions in that sector, more workers had left their employ with white farmers in 1971 than during the previous five years. To remedy this problem, one of the solutions, reportedly suggested by farmers during the congress as being thoroughly effective and time tested, consisted in withholding the wages of contract labourers until their contracts were terminated.

113. The difficulties currently experienced by white farmers in recruiting Ovambo labourers were expected to increase substantially following the Grootfontein labour agreement as it was widely predicted that the new system would result in even stronger demands by the Ovambos in regard to industrial employment.

ff/ Shooting incidents were reported on the Angolan side of the border where Portuguese troops were said to have taken positions.

White and non-white wages

114. Following the announcement by Barclays Bank and Standard Bank, the two largest banks in South Africa, that they would apply the principle of equal pay for equal work to all their clerical employees without consideration of race, Mr. Botha denounced this principle as a product of "integrationist thinking" which was no part of the Nationalist Government's policy. He added that the Government did not "dare set such high economic standards for the non-white population that they would not be able to meet them if they should one day become independent". This attitude was in apparent conflict with a statement made in the South African House of Assembly on 9 June by Mr. Jan Loots, the Minister of Coloured Affairs, who, although a member of the Nationalist Party, had pledged himself to strive for equal pay for equal work for the "Coloured" population. In the same connexion, Prime Minister Vorster reportedly stated, during a press conference in Pretoria on 22 November, that he agreed in general terms that the gap between non-white and white salaries had to be lessened. He pointed out, however, that there were no legal differences in wages between the three categories established by the existing legislation.

115. There is no information available as to whether the present dispute in South Africa has spread to Namibia.

Education

116. At the official opening on 6 August of the newly expanded multi-million rand Ongwediva high school and teacher training complex near Oshakati, Ovamboland, Mr. Botha, the South African Minister of Bantu Administration and Development and of Bantu Education, stated that the number of Bantu pupils in the Territory had risen from 47,000 in 1956 to 94,000 in 1970 while the number of pupils in post-primary education had risen from 300 in 1962 to 2,500 in 1970. This, the Minister added, showed "the beginnings of modern, literate communities capable of facing up to the challenges of self-government in the twentieth century".

117. With regard to teacher-training, which, the Minister stated, had "always been given high priority", the Government hoped to increase the annual output of African teachers from the present 3,000 to 4,500 by 1975. gg/ He added that 29 students from the Territory were currently studying in Bantu universities in South Africa, while four were training in Durban to become doctors.

118. A few days after the opening of the Ongwediva high school, it was officially announced that the school had been closed "for administrative reasons". It soon appeared, however, that this action had been taken following a boycott of the opening ceremony by the students and the decision of a part of the student body not to return to school. It was subsequently announced that those students who wished to return would be required to re-apply for admission and that such applications would have to be made in the presence of parents, "so as to eliminate undesirable elements". At about the same time, letters published in a local newspaper claimed that the standards of education had dropped since the takeover by

gg/ As the total output of teachers by the Ongwediva training school for the 15-year period between 1955 and 1970 was 346, these figures would appear to apply to the training of African teachers in both the Republic and the Territory.

the Department of Education; hh/ that racial discrimination prevailed; that pupils were arbitrarily expelled; and that the South African Government's concept of education included "bringing tear gas and guns".

119. Also in August, some 500 Ovambo students from the Ongwediva school staged a protest demonstration at the Ondangwa offices of the Department of Bantu Affairs, requesting to see Chief Councillor Ushona Shiimi and Mr. de Wet, the Commissioner-General for the Native Peoples of South West Africa. Although police intervened, no incidents were reported and the demonstration ended after the students had delivered a letter to the Commissioner in which they welcomed and assented to the ruling of the International Court of Justice; pointed out how the Court's decision stressed the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia; and expressed disappointment at the Chief Councillor's claim to speak for the entire Ovambo nation. The letter also expressed dissatisfaction with racial discrimination, deprivation of Freedom of movement, arbitrary removal of people from their homes, imprisonment without trial and dismissal from work.

120. In another development, 70 Namibian students were ordered to leave Windhoek's Augustineum College on 21 September after a threatened walk-out involving an estimated 350 students. According to an official communication, this action was taken following disturbances at the school and the subsequent refusal of a number of students to submit to corporal punishment. Between 40 and 50 students were expected to be expelled from the school.

Public health

121. In addition to the planned extension of health services in various "homelands" (see para. 23 above), it was announced in May that the Administration intended to give priority to the building of several hospital complexes in Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Keetmanshoop and Lüderitz. These hospitals would be built as near as possible to the residential areas of the various groups but would share central services such as kitchen and laundry. In Windhoek, where building operations were already under way, two non-white hospitals were expected to be completed in 1973 and the entire complex by 1976 at an expected cost of R 29 million.

122. It was also reported in May that the Territory's Department of Health was taking massive safety precautions against a possible outbreak of cholera and yellow fever in Ovamboland. Following an unconfirmed report that two Ovambos had died of cholera after being brought to Windhoek, checkpoints were reported to have been set up on all roads leading to Ovamboland and all travel in and out of the area restricted. There have been no further reports on the situation.

hh/ The Department of Bantu Education assumed the responsibility for the education of the African population in the Republic in 1955.

ANNEX II*

REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF OBSERVERS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO THE NAMIBIA INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, BRUSSELS, 26-28 MAY 1972

1. At the 871st meeting, on 16 May 1972, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 17 April 1972 received from the International Preparatory Secretariat for the Namibia International Conference, Brussels, Belgium; the text of which is reproduced below:

"We have the honour of inviting you to the Namibia International Conference which will take place from the 26 to 28 May 1972, at the Palais des Congrès, Coudenberg, Brussels, Belgium.

"The Namibia International Conference was convened by the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia in the belief that, given the urgency of the Namibian questions, there was a vital need for a serious and detailed discussion of the latter on an international level.

"As formulated as a result of the International Preparatory Conference, which was likewise held in Brussels from 14 to 15 February 1972 to discuss the modalities and preparatory stages of the main conference, the aims and objectives of the Namibia International Conference are as follows:

"1. To internationalize the case of Namibia and remind the world of its international obligations as regards the international territory of Namibia;

"2. To bring home to the world, more especially to the western world, the question of Namibia as an international responsibility and remind them of the support this involves towards the Namibian people;

"3. To inform world public opinion of the generally little-known situation prevailing in Namibia;

"4. To encourage western European countries to rethink their present relations - political, economic, military, etc. - with South Africa as regards the international territory of Namibia;

"5. To encourage the world to realize the plight of the Namibian people and recognize the fact that SWAPO of Namibia is the legitimate spokesman of the struggling and oppressed people of Namibia and that SWAPO is a force to reckon with;

"6. To gain support - political, moral and financial - for SWAPO and the struggling people of Namibia;

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.819.

"7. To formulate resolutions which will help in finding ways and means of gaining independence and freedom for Namibia;

"8. To forward the resolutions of the Namibia International Conference to the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity of Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and to the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly for information and to assist in the discussions concerning the Namibian question."

2. At the same meeting, the Special Committee, on the proposal of the Chairman, decided without objection to accept the above invitation and to send a delegation of observers, consisting of Bulgaria and Indonesia, to the Namibia International Conference. The delegation of observers was constituted as follows:

Ambassador Guero Grozev, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations

Ambassador Chaidir Anwar Sani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations

3. Two other United Nations bodies, namely, the Special Committee on Apartheid and the United Nations Council for Namibia were also represented at the Conference by delegations of observers, as follows:

Special Committee on Apartheid: Philippines and Syrian Arab Republic.

United Nations Council for Namibia: Egypt, Guyana, Nigeria, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

4. In the light of the provisions of the General Assembly resolutions relating to the control and limitation of United Nations documentation, including in particular resolution 2836 (XXVI) of 17 December 1971, and bearing in mind the relevant provisions of the consensus adopted by the Joint Meeting of the three General Assembly bodies on 13 September 1971, a/ the three observer delegations subsequently agreed that a full account of the Namibia International Conference itself should be included in the relevant report of the delegation of observers from the United Nations Council for Namibia. b/

5. In brief, the Conference examined various aspects of the question of Namibia at plenary and commission meetings and adopted a number of proposals on political, economic and legal matters. Among the actions taken by the Conference was the adoption of a Declaration on Namibia, which, inter alia, stipulated that, since the future of Namibia could only be determined by its people, all negotiations and dealings with the occupying Power must be conducted with the consent of the Namibian people and with their proper participation. In the Declaration, the Conference called for the recognition of SWAPO as the true and legitimate representative of Namibia and demanded that it be accorded formal status in all international forums and institutions concerned with Namibia.

a/ A/8388.

b/ To be issued under the symbol A/8724.

6. The delegation of observers from the Special Committee attended the plenary session of the Conference as well as meetings of the Commission on Namibia and the International Community and the Political Commission. The statement made on behalf of the Special Committee by the representative of Bulgaria before the plenary session is reproduced in appendix I to the present report. The observations of the representative of Indonesia on the Conference are set out in appendix II.

7. The delegation's participation in the conference in an observer capacity was yet another manifestation of the Special Committee's solidarity with the struggle of the people of Namibia for freedom and independence, constituting a further positive step in the Committee's efforts to intensify its co-operation with the national liberation movement and the non-governmental organizations concerned with Namibia.

APPENDIX I

Statement by Mr. Guero Grozev, Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations, at the Namibia International Conference, Brussels, May 1972

1. I should like, on behalf of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and on my own behalf, to express our thanks for the invitation addressed to us to participate in the work of this important Namibia International Conference. In expressing our wishes for the complete success of the Conference, we should like to reiterate our conviction that it will accomplish its tasks and play a vital role in assisting the heroic struggle of Namibia to liberate itself from South African colonialism.
2. The invitation which you addressed to the Special Committee constitutes further proof of the extension of the co-operation established in our common efforts to eradicate colonialism, apartheid and racism.
3. I take this opportunity to greet SWAPO, the national liberation movement, and its leaders, headed by Mr. Sam Nujoma, and to assure them that the Committee on decolonization, and the Bulgarian delegation in particular, are following with the keenest interest and the most profound admiration their struggle against colonialism, for freedom and independence. We support this just and legitimate struggle and shall continue to give it our assistance until final victory is won.
4. I should also like to convey our greetings to the Belgian National Congress and to offer our thanks to it for organizing this Conference.
5. We have therefore been brought together here in this hall by the grave problem of Namibia, where the colonialism, racism and apartheid imposed by the Republic of South Africa prevail most blatantly and persistently.
6. In numerous resolutions the General Assembly and the Security Council have condemned the policy of colonialism and occupation of the Pretoria régime with regard to Namibia. Rejecting the usurpation of the inalienable rights of the people of Namibia, the United Nations has reiterated Namibia's sacred right to self-determination and independence and the legitimacy of its struggle. In one of the latest resolutions on this matter adopted by the Security Council, namely resolution 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972, the guilt and responsibility of the Pretoria régime for the violation of, and the threat to, international security are referred to in more precise terms. Paragraph 6 of that resolution stipulates that the continued occupation of Namibia by the Republic of South Africa is not only contrary to the Charter, but also creates conditions that threaten peace and security in the region.
7. The United Nations resolutions regarding Namibia have also been supported by the International Court of Justice. On 21 June 1971, the Court made known its position by declaring that the continued occupation of Namibia is an illegal act

and that the Republic of South Africa is under obligation to withdraw from the Territory of Namibia. a/

8. The recent visit to this country of Mr. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, reflected the general desire to grant independence and freedom to that Territory as quickly as possible.

9. Despite all the decisions and urgent and insistent demands of the United Nations and of world public opinion, the fascist and racist régime of the Republic of South Africa obstinately refuses to comply with them. It continues its terror and its occupation of Namibia by establishing there the rejected and inhuman system of apartheid. It is introducing measures there aimed at disrupting the unity and territorial integrity of the country by the unrelenting creation of Bantustans. Pretoria represses as brutally as possible every legitimate and just manifestation of the people of Namibia aimed at achieving their freedom and independence and exercising their right to the wealth of their own soil.

10. It is therefore perfectly natural, in this state of affairs, that the struggle for independence should be extended and strengthened, and that the national liberation movement should be consolidated.

11. The recent events in Namibia already highlight the mass struggle against the colonizer, the invader and the racist. The wave of strikes by 13,000 Namibian miners in December 1971 and January 1972 is a new phase in the struggle for national liberation. It testifies to the arrival of the young working class of Namibia on the political scene. The workers of Namibia have not been cowed, nor will they be, by the arrests, torture and murders to which they have been subjected by the South African fascists. The conclusion drawn by SWAPO that the strike is not over because the struggle of the people of Namibia is not over either, is therefore a just one. There is no doubt that this important form of struggle of the Namibians for freedom and independence will have far-reaching and lasting consequences.

12. The struggle waged by SWAPO, the national liberation movement, in the defence of the rights and freedoms of the people of Namibia is a heroic and glorious one. Its members and fighters have devoted their entire lives to the most noble duty of all - the duty to fight for the freedom of their homeland. To quote the immortal lines of Khristo Botev, the well-known poet and revolutionary, who died a brave death in such a struggle against the foreign invader in the last century:

"For he who falls in the struggle for freedom does not die..."

13. In the Committee on decolonization and in all United Nations bodies, we steadfastly support the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and independence, in accordance with the specific resolutions of the United Nations. That right can be abolished by no one, and certainly not by the Pretoria régime, which stands guilty before humanity for the crimes committed against Namibia.

14. This question was discussed in great depth with the representatives of SWAPO during the meetings held recently by the Committee on decolonization at Conakry, Lusaka and Addis Ababa. The analysis that was made proved that Pretoria is

a/ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I. C. J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

intensifying its reprisals against the population of Namibia and its national liberation movement. The colonial and racist régimes of Portugal and Southern Rhodesia hasten to support this régime several times condemned. The notorious 'unholy alliance' is intensifying its military activities against the peoples of Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Zimbabwe who are fighting for their independence.

15. But that is not all. Pretoria and Portugal are violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their African neighbours. They are thus creating a serious threat to international peace and security and violating the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia.

16. It is a well-known but unpalatable fact that many Western imperialist States Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and above all the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are continuing to provide strong moral and material assistance and to give their support to the Republic of South Africa. Such assistance is nothing less than overt and premeditated support of the colonial and racist policy of the Republic of South Africa, a shameless challenge to the manifest will of the United Nations. All that enables the South African régime to reject defiantly the mandatory decisions of the world Organization.

17. The list of the various Western monopolies and large Western companies that act in connivance with South African companies by increasing their investments in Namibia is a long one. They are contributing to the entrenchment of South African colonialism in that country. Many facts unmask the role of the capital and monopolies of the United States, United Kingdom and others, which support the colonial policy of the Republic of South Africa.

18. I should like to reassure the Conference and the representatives of SWAPO of the solidarity of the Special Committee on decolonization with the struggle waged by the people of Namibia for independence." We categorically condemn the obstinate refusal of the Republic of South Africa to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on Namibia.

19. As the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and a member of the Special Committee since its establishment, I wish to confirm the steadfast position of principle of the Bulgarian Government with regard to colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism. We shall continue wholeheartedly to assist, with all our strength and with all our means, this struggle against the colonial and fascist régimes for the elimination of all vestiges of the infamous colonial system. We shall continue to give our full support to all those waging a just and legitimate struggle for their national and social liberation and, in this case, to the Namibian people. In the future, too, we shall fully support the glorious struggle of SWAPO and assure it of our solidarity in its efforts to fulfil the aspirations of the people of Namibia.

20. In the United Nations and in the Committee on decolonization, the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue, as it has done hitherto, to strive resolutely for the strict implementation by all Member States of all United Nations decisions on Namibia. This heroic country must ultimately achieve its independence and occupy its rightful place among the States that have rejected the colonial yoke forever. The united and general action of all the progressive countries and forces

of the world will force the régime of the Republic of South Africa to implement the decisions of the United Nations, and those who support that régime to yield before the resolute will and determination of the Organization and of world public opinion.

21. Mr. T. Zhivkov, Chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, recently declared that "the People's Republic of Bulgaria will continue actively to support the struggle against racism and all forms of colonial domination in order to eliminate this scourge which poisons relations among men and peoples, increases tension between States and endangers international peace and security .

22. In conclusion, Mr. President, I should like once more to wish your Conference every success and a fruitful session. May it make its contribution to the common struggle for the elimination of colonialism, racism and apartheid from the face of the earth and for the freedom and independence of Namibia.

APPENDIX II

Observations by Mr. Chaidir Anwar Sani, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, on the work of the Namibia International Conference, Brussels, May 1972

1. The representatives of the Namibian people gathered together in Brussels because they were unable to hold a similar conference on the soil of their homeland, where they are deprived of the most fundamental human and political rights. Many of them have suffered the pain of exile from family and friends in order to organize the struggle for independence from the outside and to voice the pleas of their people before the world, before the various organs of the United Nations, including the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Since its establishment in 1961, the Special Committee has sought to maintain a close reciprocal relationship with the representatives of all peoples not yet free from colonial domination, and has welcomed every opportunity to manifest its solidarity with them. The members of the Special Committee therefore are particularly grateful to the organizers of the Conference for the invitation to be represented and for the opportunity to express the pledge of the Committee's continuing support of and co-operation with the Namibians in their struggle for liberation.

2. It is hardly necessary to remind any Namibian how long that struggle for their rightful independence has been going on. The question of Namibia is not a new one on the agenda of international problems. As a concern of the League of Nations, the Territory, then called South West Africa, was placed under the administration of South Africa as part of the new international mandate system. At that time, the idea of a mandate - defining clearly the inalienable rights of colonial peoples and the solemn responsibility of the administering Powers - represented a significant development in the history of decolonization. With the superseding of the League of Nations in 1945, a new concept called trusteeship replaced the old mandate system. By rights, the Government of South Africa should have consented, as did other nations administering mandates of the League of Nations, to transferring the Territory to trusteeship status. Instead, the South African Government resisted all involvement of the United Nations in the administration of Namibia with the insolence and fatuous legal arguments which have by now become so familiar. From the very first session of the United Nations General Assembly, the proper status of Namibia has been the subject of a number of resolutions, with which South Africa persisted in its non-compliance. Since that time, every Territory previously under a League of Nations Mandate has either attained its independence or been transferred to the trusteeship of the United Nations with the single exception of Namibia, as a unique case in the history of decolonization.

3. In 1960, the liberation of colonial Territories entered a new era. In that year, the United Nations threw its entire weight as an organization behind the accelerating independence movement by adopting the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly

resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The Declaration affirmed, inter alia, that:

"immediate steps shall be taken in Trust and non-self-governing Territories, or all other Territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the people of those Territories, without any condition or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete freedom and independence".

Considering the special status of Namibia, the Declaration applies to it with special urgency. Because of its diverse aspects, the question of Namibia has come up in several different organs of the United Nations and has been most thoroughly studied. The extension of apartheid to the Territory and the abominable system of contract labour made Namibia a concern of the Special Committee on Apartheid, and other human rights bodies of the United Nations. The threat to world peace and security posed by armed struggle and brutal repression within the Territory led the Security Council to take up the issue in turn. Finally, within the context of the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), the Special Committee has, since the beginning of its deliberations in 1962, concerned itself with the achievement by Namibians of their inalienable right to freedom and independence. Because of the comprehensive scope of the Special Committee's terms of reference, it has best been able to place the problem of Namibia within the context of decolonization throughout all of southern Africa, keeping in mind in particular the inter-relatedness of the struggles of the peoples in Southern Rhodesia, the Portuguese colonies and Namibia itself.

4. Under the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly, the Special Committee has provided a forum for petitioners from Namibia and elsewhere to publicize information which otherwise might have gone unnoticed. Further, in its report to the General Assembly each year, the Special Committee has put forward specific conclusions and recommendations relating to the Territory with a view to the speedy and full implementation of the Declaration. Yet, despite all the efforts of the Special Committee, the Government of South Africa persisted in its recalcitrance until finally, in 1966, the General Assembly took the unprecedented action of revoking the Mandate of South Africa a/ and itself assumed direct responsibility for administering the Territory of Namibia until independence. To assist it in this task the Assembly in 1967 created a body concerned solely with Namibia, the United Nations Council for Namibia. Since then, the Council and the Special Committee have pursued parallel and complementary courses, the former concentrating on practical questions of administration, the latter dealing with the broader question of anti-colonial strategy within the larger context of the southern Africa Territories and all other Territories which have not yet attained independence.

5. The revocation of the Mandate in 1966 was a bold but necessary stroke. In June of last year, the International Court of Justice upheld the correctness of that decision. Nevertheless, the Government of South Africa has still not budged

a/ General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966.

from its illegal occupation of Namibia. In the intervening months between then and now, all the United Nations bodies concerned with Namibia have redoubled their efforts to force a South African withdrawal and to establish a United Nations presence in the Territory. The Security Council, at its meeting at Addis Ababa in January and February of this year, adopted two separate resolutions in this connexion. The first b/ authorized the Secretary-General to initiate contacts with all parties concerned, including the Government of South Africa, with a view to establishing the necessary conditions so as to enable the people of Namibia to exercise their right to freedom and independence. It should be pointed out that all the United Nations bodies concerned have a special part to play in assisting the Namibians to achieve their liberation. In this regard, the Special Committee, at its 843rd meeting on 21 March 1972, associated itself firmly with the view expressed by the Acting Vice-President of SWAPO, Mr. M. Muyongo, that negotiations with the Government of South Africa on the status of Namibia must in no way imply or give the impression of a change in the attitude of the United Nations towards South Africa's illegal occupation of the Territory.

6. In the second resolution approved by the Security Council, c/ the central issue was once again identified to be the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, and the obligations of all States, especially the permanent members of the Security Council, to bring about the desired results through the observance of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

7. In April 1972, the Special Committee held a series of meetings in African capitals and heard, as a matter of priority, representatives of the national liberation movements of the Territories in southern Africa, including SWAPO.

8. On 27 April, the Special Committee adopted a consensus on the question of Namibia d/ after due consideration of the statements it had heard. In that consensus, the Special Committee reaffirmed its unalterable demand that the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa should cease immediately and unconditionally. It rejected any solution which did not preserve the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia. It condemned South Africa for its obstinacy and its defiance; it also condemned all those States which openly or furtively aided and abetted the South African régime. For the strike of the Namibian miners earlier this year the Special Committee had the following comments to make:

"... the strike, although principally directed against the inhuman contract labour system of labour recruitment and the exploitative conditions under which Namibians are employed, constitutes in reality a manifestation of the people's mass opposition to the illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa".

The Special Committee expressed its solidarity with this spirit of the Namibian people while calling for increased moral and material assistance from States and

b/ Security Council resolution 309 (1972) of 4 February 1972.

c/ Security Council resolution 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972.

d/ A/AC.109/404.

the specialized agencies, as well as from national and international organizations. It endorsed the resolutions of the Security Council aimed at ending the subjection of the Namibian peoples.

9. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with which the Special Committee is concerned, is a monumental document. At the time of its drafting, a number of States disapproved of the use of the phrase "granting of independence" because they felt that it misrepresented the reality of the independence struggle. It implied, they thought, that the colonial Powers bestowed independence as a privilege in a gesture of magnanimity. To look closely at the history of decolonization is to discover quite a different story. Furthermore, the Declaration expressed quite unambiguously the principle that independence is the inalienable right, and not merely the privilege, of all peoples. The Namibian people have been demanding this right over many years, never more so than in recent months. In the final analysis, their destiny is in their own hands. No one knows this better than they. The Special Committee similarly realizes the limits of its own competence to end the captivity of Namibia or any of the other remaining Territories in southern Africa not yet free. The Special Committee does not delude itself into thinking that it can be the instrument for their deliverance, although it might wish it could be. Those of us whose countries have emerged from the experience of colonial rule have learned that the only true liberation is self-liberation. The re-birth of self-rule cannot be achieved without the pangs of struggle and adversity. The people of Namibia will soon arrive at this glorious moment by virtue of their courageous determination. The Special Committee, for its part, will continue to direct its energies towards hastening the arrival of that moment.

10. The best wishes and gratitude of the Special Committee go to SWAPO, which conceived and organized the Namibia International Conference. Having chosen Brussels, the hub of European activities, as venue for the conference, the leadership of SWAPO was able to publicize fully the situation in their homeland and to set in motion a wave of thinking among the public in those countries which have considerable contacts with South Africa, so that the negative effects of these contacts might be eliminated. This collaboration - political, economic, military and otherwise - between South Africa and its major trading partners and allies is one of the chief obstacles in the way of independence for Namibia. SWAPO has seen this with perspicacity, and the conference was their constructive attempt to discredit the shameful policy of collaboration in the eyes of an ever greater segment of public opinion in Western Europe and North America.

11. In conclusion, it may be pertinent to quote the following two paragraphs from the consensus of the Special Committee, to which reference is made in paragraph 8 above:

"(9) The Special Committee reaffirms its solidarity with the people of Namibia in their legitimate struggle to exercise their right to self-determination and independence and calls upon all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to provide the people of Namibia, through their national liberation movement, with the increased moral and material assistance which they require in their struggle against foreign occupation and oppression.

"(10) The Special Committee affirms that any solution with regard to the question of Namibia must enable the people of the Territory to achieve self-determination and independence as a united whole."

CHAPTER X

(A/8723/Add.3)

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

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A. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. The Special Committee considered the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 840th, 843rd and 845th meetings between 14 and 28 March at Headquarters, at its 848th to 854th, 856th to 859th, 861st, 862nd and 866th meetings between 10 and 26 April during its meetings in Africa and at its 871st, 873rd, 875th and 876th meetings between 16 May and 1 August at Headquarters.
2. In its consideration of this item, the Special Committee took into account the provisions of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, including in particular resolution 2878 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 on the implementation of the Declaration, by paragraph 10 of which the General Assembly requested the Special Committee "to continue to seek suitable means for the immediate and full implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2621 (XXV) in all Territories which have not yet attained independence and, in particular, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism and report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session". Further, the Special Committee took into account General Assembly resolution 2795 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971 concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration. The Special Committee also paid due regard to the relevant resolution of the Security Council relating to the question.
3. During its consideration of the question, the Special Committee had before it working papers prepared by the Secretariat (see annex II to the present chapter) containing information on action previously taken by the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as the latest developments in the Territories. The Committee also had before it a letter dated 25 March 1972 from the Permanent Representative of Portugal to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (see annex III to the present chapter).

Petitions

4. In addition, the Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

Angola

- (a) Letter dated 15 January 1972 on behalf of "the people of Cabinda" (A/AC.109/PET.1204).
- (b) One cable dated 17 February 1972 from the Steering Committee, and one letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. Iko Carreira, Co-ordinator a.i. East Front, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.1205 and Add.1).

- (c) Letter dated 25 April 1972 from Mr. Paul Touba, Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) (A/AC.109/PET.1223).

Mozambique

- (d) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Vice-President, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) (A/AC.109/PET.1215).
- (e) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. Absolom T. Bahule, Secretary-General, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET.1216).

Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde

- (f) Cable dated 26 November 1971 from Mr. Romesh Chandra, Secretary-General, World Peace Council (A/AC.109/PET.1206).
- (g) Cable dated 8 December 1971 from Mr. Youssef El Sebai, Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PET.1207).
- (h) Two letters dated 7 April and 25 May and one cable dated 18 July 1972 from Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) (A/AC.109/PET.1214 and Add.1 and 2).

Territories in general

- (i) Three letters dated 29 September 1971 and 1 and 9 March 1972 from Mr. Sietse Bosgra and one letter dated 10 May 1972 from Mr. K. A. Hudes, Angola Comite (A/AC.109/PET.1195 and Add.1 and 2).
- (j) Letter dated 10 December 1971 from Mr. P. Biquard, World Federation of Scientific Workers (A/AC.109/PET.1203).

5. The Special Committee also had before it the following written petitions relating, inter alia, to the Territories in Africa:

- (a) Letter dated 17 March 1972 from Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London) (A/AC.109/PET.1209).
- (b) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Sean Gervasi (A/AC.109/PET.1210).
- (c) Letter dated 24 March 1972 from Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PET.1211).
- (d) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Secretary, World Peace Council (A/AC.109/PET.1212).
- (e) Letter dated 22 March 1972 from Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/PET.1213).
- (f) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. A. Fataar, Joint Secretary, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA) (A/AC.109/PET.1218).

- (g) Letter dated 17 April 1972 from Mr. T. T. Nkobi, Chief Representative in Zambia, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa (A/AC.109/PET.1221).

6. At its 840th, 843rd to 845th, 848th, 856th, 858th and 866th meetings, on 14, 21, 24 and 28 March and 10, 17, 18 and 26 April, the Special Committee, by adopting the 153rd, 165th to 169th and 172nd reports, respectively, of the Sub-Committee on Petitions, 1/ decided to grant the requests for hearings contained in the petitions referred to in paragraphs 4 (b), (c), (d), (e), (h) and (i), and 5 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g).

7. At the 843rd meeting, on 21 March, Mr. Martin Ennals, Amnesty International (London) made a statement (A/AC.109/PV.843). A statement in that connexion was made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/PV.843).

8. At the 844th meeting, on 24 March, Mr. Emilson Randriamihasinoro, Mr. Gordon Schaffer and Mr. Gleb Staroutchenko, representatives, World Peace Council, made statements and replied to questions put to them by the representatives of India and the Syrian Arab Republic. At the same meeting, Mr. Sean Gervasi made a statement and replied to questions put to him by the representative of India (A/AC.109/PV.844). Statements in connexion with the hearings were made by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Bulgaria and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.844).

9. At the 845th meeting, on 28 March, Mr. Sietse Bosgra, Angola Comite, made a statement and replied to a question by the representative of Yugoslavia. At the same meeting, statements were made by Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United Kingdom, and by Mr. Mursi Saad Eldin, Deputy Secretary-General, Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) (A/AC.109/PV.845). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.845).

Special Mission to the liberated areas

10. At the 840th meeting, on 14 March, the Chairman informed the Special Committee of the results of his consultations with the General Secretariat of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with the national liberation movements concerned, held in pursuance of paragraph 13 of the Special Committee's resolution of 14 September 1971 2/ and in the light of paragraph 16 of General Assembly resolution 2795 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971, concerning the dispatch of a group to the liberated areas of Angola, Mozambique or Guinea (Bissau) (A/AC.109/PV.840).

11. At the same meeting, the Special Committee, on the basis of the information furnished to it by the Chairman, decided without objection that the special mission to visit the liberated areas should consist of Ecuador (Chairman), Sweden and

1/ A/AC.109/L.762, L.770 to L.773, L.784 and L.792.

2/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, para. 32.

Tunisia, to be accompanied by two secretariat members. An account of the Committee's consideration of the report of the Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) is contained in paragraphs 12 and 28 to 32 below.

Meetings in Africa

12. During its meetings away from Headquarters, the Special Committee considered the item at its 848th to 854th meetings, held at Conakry, Guinea, between 10 to 13 April, at its 856th to 859th, 861st and 862nd meetings held at Lusaka, Zambia between 17 and 20 April and at its 866th meeting, held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 26 August, as follows:

13. At the 848th meeting, on 10 April, on the occasion of the opening of the Special Committee's meetings away from Headquarters, the Chairman of the Special Mission which had visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) between 2 and 8 April (Mr. Horacio Sevilla-Borja of Ecuador) submitted orally a preliminary report of the Special Mission (A/AC.109/SR.848). The two other members of the Special Mission, the representatives of Sweden (Mr. Folke Löfgren) and Tunisia (Mr. Kamel E. Belkhiria) also made statements (A/AC.109/SR.848). The Secretary-General of Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), Mr. Amílcar Cabral, also made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.848). Following statements by the Chairman and by the representatives of Ethiopia, Trinidad and Tobago, Czechoslovakia, India and Mali (A/AC.109/SR.848), the Special Committee decided to request the United Nations Office of Public Information to give the widest possible dissemination to the preliminary report of the Special Mission as well as to the statement made by Mr. Amílcar Cabral.

14. At the 849th meeting, on 11 April, statements were made by Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Mr. Corca Djalo, Mr. Sotero Fortes, Mr. Carlos Reis, Mr. Tchernó Ndjai and Mr. Carlos Alberto Teixeira de Barros, members of PAIGC, and replied to questions by the representatives of India and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/SR.849). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of the USSR, Bulgaria, the United Republic of Tanzania and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.849). At the 850th meeting, on the same day, Mr. Amílcar Cabral and Dr. Lucho Robles made statements and Mr. Cabral replied to questions by the representatives of Iran, India, Czechoslovakia and Ecuador (A/AC.109/SR.850). Statements in that connexion were made by the representative of Guinea and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.850). Further statements were made by Mr. Amílcar Cabral at the 851st and 852nd meetings on 11 and 12 April (A/AC.109/SR.851 and 852).

15. At the 856th meeting, on 17 April, Mr. Pascal Luvualu, member of the Executive Committee, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), made a statement and, together with his associate, Mr. Paulo Jorge, replied to questions by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sweden and the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.856 and Corr.1). Statements in that connexion were made by the representative of China and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/SR.856 and Corr.1). At the 857th meeting, on 18 April, Mr. Luvualu and Mr. Jorge replied to questions by the representatives of Mali, Afghanistan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Iran, India, the Ivory Coast, Ecuador and Indonesia (A/AC.109/SR.857).

16. At the 858th meeting, on 18 April, Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Vice-President, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), made a statement and replied to

questions by the representatives of Trinidad and Tobago, Czechoslovakia, India, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan and Ethiopia (A/AC.109/SR.858). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of Iraq, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mali and Bulgaria (A/AC.109/SR.858).

17. At the 859th meeting, on 19 April, Mr. Paulo Gumane, President, Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique (COREMO), made a statement and replied to questions by the representative of Iran (A/AC.109/SR.859).

18. At the 862nd meeting, on 20 April, Mr. Alfred Nzo, Secretary-General, African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, made a statement and replied to a question by the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India, Iraq, Mali and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862). Mr. W. M. Tsotsi, Vice-President, Unity Movement of South Africa (UMSA), also made a statement at the same meeting (A/AC.109/SR.862). Statements in that connexion were made by the representatives of India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.862).

19. At the 866th meeting, on 26 April, Mr. Paul Touba, Frente Nacional Para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA), made a statement and replied to a question by Mr. D. Ouattara, Director, Political Department, OAU (A/AC.109/SR.866).

General debate

20. The Special Committee held the general debate on the item at its 851st and 852nd meetings, at Conakry, Guinea, on 11 and 12 April. Statements in the general debate were made by the representatives of China, Iraq, Indonesia, India, the Ivory Coast, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, at the 851st meeting (A/AC.109/SR.851) and by the representatives of Ecuador, the Syrian Arab Republic, Bulgaria, Mali, Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan at the 852nd meeting (A/AC.109/SR.852).

Draft resolution relating to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde

21. At the 853rd meeting, on 12 April, the representatives of Iraq and India introduced the following draft resolution relating to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde (A/AC.109/L.774), sponsored by Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the situation regarding Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Having considered the oral report presented at its 847th meeting, on 10 April 1972, by the representative of Ecuador, Chairman, and the representatives of Sweden and Tunisia, members, of its Special Mission to the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau),

Having heard the statements of the Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and other representatives of the movement concerning the Territory,

Taking note of the fact that there are States which are ready to accord recognition to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde as the sole effective power in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Deeply disturbed by the intensified armed aggression by Portugal against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and in particular by the ruthless mass destruction of villages and property, as confirmed in the oral report of the Special Mission,

Seriously concerned at the repeated violations by the armed forces of Portugal of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States - particularly the aggression against Guinea on 22 November 1970 which was condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 290 (1970) of 8 December 1970 - violations which seriously disturb international peace and security in the African continent as reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972.

Deploring the policies of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, in disregard of the repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, both through its struggle and through reconstruction programmes in the liberated areas, and expressing its deep gratitude to the Government of Guinea for its continued moral and material support to the national liberation movement, including, in particular, its inception of a concrete assistance project in close collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and within the framework of the United Nations Development Programme,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the legitimacy of the struggle by the people through their national liberation movement to achieve that right by all available means;

2. Affirms its recognition of the liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory, and requests all States and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde;

3. Strongly condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and calls upon Portugal to desist forthwith from all acts of repression against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, to withdraw immediately all its forces from the Territory, and to transfer, without further delay all powers to political institutions freely elected and representative of the people in accordance with the Declaration;

4. Expresses its appreciation to the members and the secretariat of the Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April 1972 and its deep gratitude to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde for its assistance and co-operation which enabled the Mission to complete its task successfully;

5. Expresses its conviction that the successful accomplishment by the Special Mission of its task - which established beyond any doubt the fact that de facto control in these areas is exercised by the national liberation movement of the Territory, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde - constitutes a major contribution by the United Nations to the process of decolonization;

6. Strongly condemns Portugal for resorting to the widespread and brutal use of military force in an attempt to prevent the Special Mission from completing its task and for the resultant loss of civilian life and destruction of hospitals, schools and villages in direct contradiction of its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations, and expresses its deep sympathy to the people and the national liberation movement for the loss and suffering thus incurred;

7. Requests all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, through their national liberation movement, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, and to keep the Secretary-General informed of the concrete action taken or envisaged by them in the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council, as a matter of urgency, the oral report of the Special Mission and the statements of the Secretary-General and other members of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, and to draw the Council's attention, for appropriate action, to the serious situation obtaining in the Territory, bearing in mind in particular the indiscriminate use of armed force by Portugal in its attempt to prevent the Mission from completing its task, as disclosed in the above-mentioned report and statements;

9. Decides to keep the situation in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde under continuous review.

Statements in connexion with the draft resolution were made at the same meeting by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Sweden, Iran,

Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Mali, Guinea and Ecuador (A/AC.109/SR.853). Mr. Amilcar Cabral also made a statement (A/AC.109/SR.853).

22. At the 854th meeting, on 13 April, the representative of Iraq, on behalf of the sponsors, submitted orally a revised text of the draft resolution referred to above (A/AC.109/SR.854).

23. At the same meeting, following statements in explanation of vote by the representatives of China, Sweden, the Ivory Coast, Tunisia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (A/AC.109/SR.854), the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution, as orally revised, by a roll-call vote of 22 to none (see para. 34 below). The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: None.

24. In pursuance of paragraph 8 of the resolution, the text of the resolution, together with the records of the relevant meetings, was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 16 April (S/10624). Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to States, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

Draft resolution on the item

25. At the 861st meeting, on 20 April, the representatives of Trinidad and Tobago and Mali introduced a draft resolution sponsored by Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, the Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia (A/AC.109/L.780). Statements were made by the representatives of India and Sweden (A/AC.109/SR.861).

26. At the 862nd meeting, on the same day, statements were made by the Chairman and by the representatives of Fiji and Venezuela (A/AC.109/SR.862). Following statements in explanation of vote by the representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ivory Coast, Sweden and Ecuador (A/AC.109/SR.862), the Special Committee adopted the draft resolution by a roll-call vote of 22 to none (see para. 35 below). The result of the voting was as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Mali, Sierra Leone, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: None.

Abstaining: None.

27. Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 10, the text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 8 May (S/10633). Copies of the resolution were also transmitted to States, including the administering Power, to the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system and to OAU.

Report of the Special Mission to Guinea (Bissau)

28. At the 871st meeting, on 16 May, statements were made by the representative of Tunisia and by the Chairman (A/AC.109/PV.871). At the 873rd meeting, on 6 June, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 31 May 1972 (A/AC.109/408) addressed to him by the Chairman of the African Group for the month of May, inviting the Chairman of the Special Mission which visited Guinea (Bissau) to address the OAU Council of Ministers at its nineteenth ordinary session. At the same meeting, the Committee decided, without objection, to accept the invitation.

29. At the 875th meeting, on 31 July, the Chairman of the Special Mission established by the Special Committee at its 840th meeting, on 14 March 1972 (Mr. Horacio Sevilla-Borja of Ecuador) introduced the report of the Special Mission (see annex I). At the same meeting, the Special Committee, by adopting the 175th report of the Sub-Committee on Petitions (A/AC.109/L.811), decided to take up, as a matter of priority, the communication from the Secretary-General of PAIGC referred to in paragraph 4 (h) above (A/AC.109/PET.1214/Add.2). Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mali, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Ethiopia (A/AC.109/PV.875).

30. At the 876th meeting, on 1 August, following statements by the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic, Iran, China, Afghanistan, Venezuela, the Ivory Coast, Yugoslavia, India and Trinidad and Tobago, as well as by the Executive Secretary of OAU (A/AC.109/PV.876), the Special Committee adopted the report of the Special Mission (see annex I) and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein (see paragraph 36 below). At the same meeting, on the proposal of the representatives of Ethiopia and India, the Special Committee decided to recommend the issuance, as appropriate, of a United Nations commemorative stamp to mark the visit of the Special Mission to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau).

31. At the same meeting, the Special Committee also decided to request its Chairman to transmit to the President of the Security Council for the attention of that body the report of the Special Mission, together with the records of the relevant meetings. Accordingly, on the same day, the Chairman transmitted these documents to the President of the Security Council (S/10754).

32. Having regard to the information contained in the communication referred to in paragraph 29 above, the Special Committee decided to request the Chairman, in transmitting the report of the Special Mission to Mr. Amilcar Cabral, to convey to him and to the people of Guinea (Bissau) the Committee's deep sense of indignation at the further act of aggression by the Portuguese authorities and to express its support for and solidarity with the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde in their struggle for liberation of their country.

33. At the same meeting, the representative of Tunisia made a statement on behalf of the members of the Special Mission (A/AC.109/PV.876).

B. DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

34. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/400) adopted by the Special Committee at its 854th meeting, on 13 April 1972, to which reference is made in paragraph 23 above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the situation regarding Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Having considered the preliminary report presented at its 847th meeting, on 10 April 1972, by the representative of Ecuador, Chairman, and the representatives of Sweden and Tunisia, members, of its Special Mission to the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau),

Having heard the statements of the Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and other representatives of the movement concerning the Territory,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Expressing its profound indignation at the intensified armed aggression by Portugal against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, and in particular at the ruthless mass destruction of villages and property, as confirmed in the preliminary report of the Special Mission,

Seriously concerned at the repeated violations by the armed forces of Portugal of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of independent African States - particularly the aggression against the Republic of Guinea on 22 November 1970 which was condemned by the Security Council in its resolution 290 (1970) of 8 December 1970 - violations which seriously disturb international peace and security in the African continent, as reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

Deploring the policies of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, in disregard of the repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Taking note of the fact that there are States which are ready to accord recognition to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde as the sole effective power in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Noting with satisfaction the progress in the struggle for realization of national independence and freedom being made by the national liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, both through its struggle and through reconstruction programmes in the liberated areas, and expressing its deep gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Guinea for its continued moral and material support to the national liberation movement, including, in particular, its inception of a concrete assistance project in close collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and within the framework of the United Nations Development Programme,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the legitimacy of the struggle by the people through their national liberation movement to achieve that right by all available means;

2. Affirms its recognition of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory, and requests all States and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde;

3. Strongly condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council and calls upon Portugal to desist forthwith from all acts of repression against the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and to withdraw immediately all its forces from the Territory;

4. Expresses its appreciation to the members and the secretariat of the Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April 1972 and its deep gratitude to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde for its assistance and co-operation which enabled the Special Mission to complete its task successfully;

5. Expresses its conviction that the successful accomplishment by the Special Mission of its task - establishing beyond any doubt the fact that de facto control in these areas is exercised by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of the Territory - constitutes a major contribution by the United Nations in the field of decolonization;

6. Strongly condemns Portugal for resorting to the widespread and brutal use of military force in an attempt to prevent the Special Mission from completing its task and for the resultant loss of civilian life and the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages in direct contradiction of its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations, and expresses its deep sympathy to the people and the national liberation movement of the Territory for the loss and suffering thus incurred;

7. Calls upon all States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, directly or in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, through their national liberation movement, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable right to self-determination and independence, and to keep the Secretary-General informed of the concrete action taken or envisaged by them in the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Decides to transmit to the President of the Security Council, as a matter of urgency, the preliminary report of the Special Mission and the statements of the Secretary-General and other members of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, and to draw the Council's attention, for appropriate action, to the serious situation obtaining in the Territory, bearing in mind in particular the indiscriminate use of armed force by Portugal in its attempt to prevent the Special Mission from completing its task, as disclosed in the above-mentioned report and statements;

9. Decides to keep the situation in Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde under continuous review.

35. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/402) adopted by the Special Committee at its 862nd meeting, on 20 April 1972, to which reference is made in paragraph 26 above, is reproduced below:

The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having considered the question of Territories under Portuguese domination,

Having heard the statements of the representatives of the national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Recalling the preliminary report of its Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April 1972,

Recalling its resolution of 13 April 1972 with regard to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, 3/

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples under colonial and alien domination to self-determination, freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,

Recalling the programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970,

3/ See para. 34 above.

Deeply disturbed by the continued and intensified armed repression by Portugal of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, in order to stifle the legitimate aspirations of those peoples for self-determination and independence,

Strongly deploring the repeated acts of aggression committed by the armed forces of Portugal against independent African States which border the Territories under its domination - the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of those States which seriously disturbs international peace and security in the African continent, as reaffirmed in Security Council resolution 312 (1972) of 4 February 1972,

Deploring also the policies of those States, particularly some of the military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, in disregard of repeated appeals addressed to them by the United Nations, continue to provide Portugal with military and other assistance, without which Portugal could not pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde,

Seriously concerned at the continued and intensified activities of those foreign economic, financial and other interests which, contrary to the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, are directly or indirectly assisting Portugal in its colonial wars and obstructing the realization by the peoples of Territories under Portuguese domination of their legitimate aspirations for self-determination and independence,

Aware that the Cabora Bassa and Cunene River projects are designed to entrench further Portuguese domination over Angola and Mozambique,

Noting with deep concern that the constitutional changes introduced by the Government of Portugal in 1971 are not intended to lead to the exercise of self-determination and the attainment of independence by the African people of the Territories, but are designed to perpetuate Portuguese domination,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and other Territories under Portuguese domination to self-determination and independence, as recognized by the General Assembly in its resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of the struggle by those peoples through their national liberation movements to achieve that right by all available means;

2. Strongly condemns the persistent refusal of the Government of Portugal to implement resolution 1514 (XV) and all other relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and the intensified colonial war waged by that Government against the African peoples in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, including in particular the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, ruthless and total destruction of their villages and property and the use of chemical substances, such as herbicides and defoliants, in Angola;

3. Strongly condemns Portugal for its repeated violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of independent African States bordering its colonial Territories and, in particular, for its recent act of aggression committed against the United Republic of Tanzania;

4. Calls upon the Government of Portugal to cease forthwith all military operations and other repressive measures against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, to withdraw without any further delay all its forces from these Territories and to effect the full and immediate implementation of resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to those Territories;

5. Requests all States, particularly those military allies of Portugal within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which so far have not done so, to refrain from extending any form of assistance to Portugal, military, financial or otherwise, which enables it to pursue its policies of colonial domination and oppression of the peoples concerned, and to discontinue and prevent the sale and supply of any military equipment and material which Portugal uses to pursue its colonial wars in those Territories;

6. Expresses its satisfaction at the progress achieved by the national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde in their struggle for the realization of national independence and freedom and in the reconstruction programmes instituted by them in the liberated areas;

7. Requests all States and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, either directly or in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, to render to the peoples of those Territories, through their national liberation movements, all the moral and material assistance necessary to continue their struggle for their freedom and independence and to report thereon to the Secretary-General;

8. Calls upon all States to take forthwith all possible measures to put an end to all activities which exploit the African Territories under Portuguese domination and the people therein and to discourage nationals and companies under their jurisdiction from entering into any activities or arrangements which strengthen Portugal's domination over, and impede the implementation of the Declaration with respect to, those Territories;

9. Declares that any assistance to or participation in such projects as the Cabora Bassa or the Cunene River projects constitutes direct collaboration with Portugal which would contribute to Portugal's efforts to maintain its colonial domination and that it is the moral obligation of all States to take all possible measures to prevent such collaboration by nationals or companies under their jurisdiction;

10. Draws the attention of the Security Council, having regard to the explosive and critical situation resulting from the policies of Portugal in the colonial Territories under its domination and from its constant provocations against the African independent States bordering those Territories, and in the light of the outright disregard by Portugal of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, particularly Security Council resolution 312 (1972), to the urgent need for taking, as a matter of priority, further effective measures to obtain the compliance by the Government of Portugal with those decisions;

11. Expresses its appreciation for the renewed invitations extended to it by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique to visit the liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique, and, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2795 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971 and mindful of the success achieved by its Special Mission which visited Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April 1972, requests

its Chairman to continue his consultations with the Organization of African Unity and with those liberation movements to work out the necessary modalities for the dispatch of a special mission to the Territories as appropriate;

12. Invites the Secretary-General to make maximum use of the information provided by the national liberation movements of the colonial Territories in the preparation of the relevant documentation for the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2879 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971, to continue to take effective and concrete measures through all the media at his disposal to give widespread and continuous publicity to such information;

13. Decides to keep the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination under continuous review.

36. The text of the conclusions and recommendations contained in the report of the Special Mission to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) (see annex I), endorsed by the Special Committee at the 876th meeting on 1 August, to which reference is made in paragraph 30 above, is reproduced below.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) In its resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, the General Assembly determined that the Territories under Portuguese administration, including Guinea called Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde, were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations. Thus, under the terms of Article 73 of the Charter, Portugal, as the administering Power, is under the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of the Territories concerned, and, to that end, among other things, to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each Territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.

(2) Since the adoption of resolution 1542 (XV), however, the Government of Portugal has continued to maintain the fiction that these Territories are overseas provinces of Portugal and has persistently refused to recognize the inalienable right of the people of the Territories to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and other relevant United Nations resolutions. Moreover, in a futile attempt to suppress the national liberation movements in the African Territories and to stifle the legitimate aspirations of their peoples to free themselves from colonial domination, the Government of Portugal has resorted to the extensive use of armed force, involving all the techniques of modern warfare, against the defenceless peoples of the Territories.

(3) During its recent visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau), the Special Mission had ample opportunity to witness the devastation and misery caused by Portugal's actions, particularly the widespread and indiscriminate bombing of villages and the use of napalm to destroy crops. At the same time, the Mission was profoundly impressed by the manifest will of the people, despite their incalculable hardships and suffering, to carry on the struggle until freedom and independence were won under the able leadership of the national liberation movement, PAIGC. The Mission lauds, on the one hand, the courage and determination of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde and, on the other, the devotion and commitment on the part of PAIGC to guide and assist the people in their attainment of the goals set out in the Charter.

(4) That the struggle for the liberation of the Territory continues to progress and that Portugal no longer exercises any effective administrative control in large areas of Guinea (Bissau) are irrefutable facts. According to PAIGC, the liberated areas now comprise either more than two thirds or between two thirds and three fourths of the Territory. This has been verified by many foreign observers and journalists. It is also evident that the population of the liberated areas unreservedly supports the policies and activities of PAIGC, which after nine years of military struggle exercises free de facto administrative control in those areas, and is effectively protecting the interests of the inhabitants in spite of Portuguese activities.

(5) The Special Mission was impressed by the enthusiastic and whole-hearted co-operation which PAIGC receives from the people in the liberated areas and the extent to which the latter are participating in the administrative machinery set up by PAIGC and in the various programmes of reconstruction. Accordingly, the Mission believes that the Special Committee's recognition of PAIGC, as being the de facto and the sole and authentic representative for the aspirations of the people of the Territory, should be taken fully into account by States and the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system in dealing with matters relating to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde.

(6) In an attempt to retain its colonialist domination over those areas of the Territory which it still controls and, more recently, in order to prevent the Special Mission from carrying out its task, the Government of Portugal has increasingly resorted to the indiscriminate use of military force and has continued other acts of harassment and aggression not only against the people of the Territory but also against Guinea and Senegal, the independent African States bordering the Territory. The Mission views with serious concern the resultant critical and explosive situation which seriously disturbs peace and security in that region of Africa.

(7) Having observed at first-hand the conditions of terror and harassment under which the people of the liberated areas continue to live, the Special Mission is convinced of the urgent need for concerted action by the international community to exercise pressure on the Government of Portugal to induce it to discontinue forthwith all acts of repression against these people and to withdraw at once all its forces from the Territory.

Humanitarian considerations alone call for such action. In this connexion, the Mission wishes to draw attention to the statement made by Mr. Amílcar Cabral before the Security Council meeting held at Addis Ababa on 1 February 1972. 4/ The Mission considers it imperative that the supply of arms to Portugal by some of its allies 5/ should cease immediately, for the Mission is convinced that without such support Portugal would be unable to pursue its colonial wars against the peoples of Guinea (Bissau), Angola or Mozambique. The Mission suggests that the Special Committee might wish to pay particular attention to that aspect of the situation and consider requesting the Secretary-General to seek information from Member States as well as from other sources relating to the arms supplied by them to Portugal.

(8) The Special Mission was able to observe the marked progress achieved by the people of the Territory through their national liberation movement, PAIGC, both in their struggle and in their work of reconstruction. In the liberated areas visited by the Mission, the colonial administrative machinery has been replaced by new administrative, political and judicial institutions representative of the people 6/ and educational and health services have been created, often where none previously existed. As the Mission has shown elsewhere in the present report, however, there is an acute and grave need to furnish material assistance to the people in their fight against hunger and sickness. Among their primary requirements are, in the first instance, staple foods, dietary supplements, medical care, particularly maternal and child care, and medicinal supplies as well as educational and training assistance. 7/ The Mission believes that all States, the specialized agencies and other international organizations should do their utmost to provide, or to increase their supply of such assistance on an emergency basis. In that connexion, the Mission notes with regret that, while some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations system have recently dispatched special representatives to consult with OAU for the purpose of working out programmes of assistance to the colonial peoples and to their national liberation movements, very few concrete measures have so far been taken by the agencies to meet these needs. The Mission is of the firm view that in order to bring about the desired results, the efforts of these agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system must be effectively co-ordinated. In that regard, the Mission notes the recent decision of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) to convene, with the participation of OAU, an ad hoc interagency meeting to consider arrangements for closer co-operation, on the basis of concrete proposals for multidisciplinary action. The Mission hopes that this interagency meeting

4/ S/PV.1632.

5/ The PAIGC has provided a partial list of the arms being supplied to Portugal. See annex I, appendix VI.

6/ Some of the forms being used by PAIGC in the liberated areas are reproduced in annex I, appendix X.

7/ A list of priorities prepared by PAIGC appears in annex I, appendix V.

will take place as soon as possible so that a steady flow of assistance to the people of the Territory can be assured at an early date. The Mission also attaches great importance to the need for States members of the governing bodies and deliberative organs of the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system to take effective action along the lines indicated by the General Assembly in paragraph 10 of its resolution 2874 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971. It will be recalled that, in that paragraph, the General Assembly requested all Governments to intensify their efforts in the specialized agencies and organizations of the United Nations system of which they are members in order to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Declaration and other relevant United Nations resolutions.

(9) The Special Mission hopes that the information gathered by it during its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) will serve to focus the attention of the whole world on the serious problems which exist in Africa. Its findings reveal the heroic struggle in which the people of the Territory under the leadership of PAIGC are so fiercely engaged in their determination to free their Territory from the colonial war which Portugal is waging in its desperate attempt to stave off defeat. Unable to regain control over the liberated areas or to vanquish the national liberation movement, the Portuguese authorities have resorted to widespread and indiscriminate aerial bombardment with the resultant loss of civilian life and in particular the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages. The Mission believes that a co-operative effort should be made by all Governments and competent national and international organizations to arouse world public opinion with a view to assisting the people of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde to achieve self-determination and independence. The information and evidence which the Mission was able to obtain should be brought to the attention of the whole international community as a means of bringing about an intensification of diplomatic and political pressures on the Government of Portugal in order to obtain its compliance with the decisions of the United Nations.

(10) Particular efforts should be made, in the view of the Mission, to publicize regularly the terrorist activities of the Portuguese military command against the civilian populations. The importance of the role to be played in that connexion by the United Nations Office of Public Information has to be underlined. The Mission expresses its hope that, in the discharge of the tasks entrusted to him by the General Assembly in its resolution 2879 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 concerning the dissemination of information on decolonization, the Secretary-General will take into account the views expressed by the Mission in this report and will take concrete measures, utilizing all the media at his disposal, including special publications, radio and television, to disseminate the relevant information. The Mission also hopes that Member States will co-operate fully with the Secretary-General in carrying out the above-mentioned tasks.

(11) Throughout its visit to the Territory, the Special Mission was profoundly impressed by the earnestness and dedication of the national liberation movement, PAIGC, and by its realistic and open-minded approach to the problems which it confronts in the ultimate liberation of the whole of the Territory. The Mission is strongly of the opinion that there is a need for the Special Committee to maintain direct and continuous contact not only with PAIGC but also with other national liberation movements of the colonial

Territories in order to enhance the Committee's capacity for assisting the peoples of those Territories in their struggle for liberation. The results of the recent meetings of the Special Committee away from Headquarters, which enabled it to contact a number of national liberation movements in Africa, were both fruitful and encouraging. The Mission believes that such contacts should be maintained in a more systematic and co-ordinated manner. Mindful of the decision adopted by the Special Committee at its 825th meeting on 9 September 1971, in which the Committee requested its Working Group to study the possibility of associating representatives of the national liberation movements of colonial Territories more closely with the work of the Special Committee, the Mission expresses the hope that the Committee will be able to submit appropriate recommendations to that effect when it reports to the General Assembly at its forthcoming session.

(12) Finally, the Special Mission believes that the experience gained by its visit to Guinea (Bissau) has demonstrated the value of such contacts in terms both of the first-hand information which it was able to obtain and the constructive role which it was able to play as a link between the international community and the peoples of the colonial Territories. The Mission considers that there is a vital need for the Special Committee to dispatch similar missions to visit other colonial Territories as a means of collecting adequate information on conditions in those Territories and on the wishes and aspirations of the people regarding their future status. In the light of the renewed invitations received from other national liberation movements, the Mission is of the opinion that the Special Committee should dispatch as appropriate visiting groups to the liberated areas of other Portuguese colonial Territories in southern Africa.

ANNEX I*

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE AT ITS 840TH MEETING ON 14 MARCH 1972

Chairman: Mr. Horacio SEVILLA-BORJA (Ecuador)

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.804.

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INTRODUCTION

1. In May 1971, the Special Committee dispatched an ad hoc group, composed of six of its members, to countries in Africa for the purpose, inter alia, of consulting with representatives of the national liberation movements of colonial Territories in that continent. During the course of these consultations, two of these movements, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) extended invitations to the Special Committee to visit the liberated areas of Angola and Mozambique respectively.
2. The Special Committee, by endorsing the observations of the Ad Hoc Group at its 814th meeting on 11 August 1971, a/ decided in principle to accept these invitations. Later, in a resolution which it adopted on 14 September, b/ the Special Committee requested its Chairman, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the liberation movements concerned, to work out the necessary modalities for such visits.
3. Subsequently, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, the Secretary-General of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), invited a United Nations mission to visit the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau).
4. Preliminary consultations between the Chairman of the Special Committee and the Assistant Secretary-General and the Executive Secretary of OAU concerning all three invitations took place in September 1971. On the basis of these consultations, the Special Committee, in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session, indicated its intention to dispatch during 1972 a group of its members to the liberated areas of certain colonial Territories in southern Africa. c/ The Special Committee stated that the purpose of such a visit would be to secure first-hand information on conditions in those areas and to ascertain the views and aspirations of the people regarding their future. d/ It should be noted in this connexion that Portugal has consistently disregarded repeated requests by the General Assembly and the Special Committee to receive United Nations visiting missions to the Territories under its administration. It should also be noted, in the same context, that the invitations to visit the liberated areas came from the national liberation movements of the Territories concerned, the legitimacy of whose struggle had long been recognized by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. II, para. 18.

b/ Ibid., chap. VIII, para. 32.

c/ Ibid., chap. I, para. 200.

d/ See also appendix VII for a list of books, films and newspaper and magazine articles by other visitors to the area.

5. At its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2795 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971 (105 votes to 8, with 5 abstentions) concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, noted with satisfaction the intention of the Special Committee to send a special mission to the liberated areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). Furthermore, in its resolution 2878 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 (96 votes to 5, with 18 abstentions), the General Assembly approved the report of the Special Committee, including the programme of work which it envisaged for 1972, which included a visit to liberated areas of the Territories under Portuguese administration.

6. On 14 March 1972, on the basis of further consultations with the Administrative Secretary-General of OAU and the liberation movements, the Chairman proposed to the Special Committee at its 840th meeting the creation of a special mission to visit the liberated areas in one of the Territories under Portuguese administration. The Mission would be composed of not more than three members accompanied by two members of the Secretariat (a secretary and a photographer). Following a statement by the Committee Secretary concerning the administrative and financial implications (A/AC.109/PV.840), the Committee decided without objection to approve the Chairman's proposal on the understanding that for security reasons no announcement would be made concerning the Mission's destination until after the visit had been completed. At the same meeting, the Special Committee, by endorsing nominations by the Chairman, decided that the Special Mission would be composed of the representatives of Ecuador, Sweden and Tunisia. Accordingly the Mission was constituted as follows:

Mr. Horacio Sevilla-Borja, Deputy Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations (Chairman)

Mr. Folke Löffgren, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Mr. Kamel Belkhiria, First Secretary of the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations

7. The Special Mission was accompanied by the following Secretariat staff: Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gaye (Principal Secretary) and Mr. Yutaka Nagata (photographer).

8. Prior to the departure of the Special Mission, it was agreed that (a) on the basis of the consultations with OAU and the national liberation movements concerned, the Mission should, for the time being, visit only the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau); (b) the visit would commence from a point bordering the Republic of Guinea and would conclude within a maximum period of 10 days thereafter; all necessary arrangements for the visit would be made by PAIGC in close co-operation with the Government of Guinea.

9. Bearing in mind the earlier decision of the Special Committee to hold a series of meetings away from Headquarters in 1972, starting at Conakry, Guinea, in the first week of April, the Special Mission, after consultations with the parties concerned, departed one week in advance of the Committee and visited the

liberated area of Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April. An account of the visit, together with the Mission's observations, conclusions and recommendations, is set out below. Annexes to the present report contain supplementary information. e/ In addition, it may be noted that the voluminous material collected by the Mission in the form of taped interviews, photos, films etc., is available at United Nations Headquarters.

10. At the 848th meeting of the Special Committee held at Conakry on 10 April, the members of the Special Mission, in their statements to the Committee (A/AC.109/SR.848), presented a preliminary oral report of the work of the Special Mission. In the light of the preliminary information furnished by the members of the Special Mission and the testimony given by Mr. Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of PAIGC, and other members of PAIGC, the Special Committee, at its 854th meeting held at Conakry on 13 April, adopted a resolution relating to the situation in Guinea (Bissau) (A/AC.109/400). In this resolution, the Special Committee, inter alia:

"2. Affirms its recognition of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the liberation movement of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde, as the only and authentic representative of the people of the Territory, and requests all States and specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to take this into consideration when dealing with matters pertaining to Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde;

"...

"4. Expresses its appreciation to the members and the secretariat of the Special Mission which visited the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) from 2 to 8 April 1972 and its deep gratitude to the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde for its assistance and co-operation which enabled the Special Mission to complete its task successfully;

"5. Expresses its conviction that the successful accomplishment by the Special Mission of its task - establishing beyond any doubt the fact that de facto control in these areas is exercised by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde, the national liberation movement of the Territory - constitutes a major contribution by the United Nations in the field of decolonization;

"6. Strongly condemns Portugal for resorting to the widespread and brutal use of military force in an attempt to prevent the Special Mission from completing its task and for the resultant loss of civilian life and the destruction of hospitals, schools and villages in direct contradiction of its obligations as a State Member of the United Nations, and expresses its deep sympathy to the people and the national liberation movement of the Territory for the loss and suffering thus incurred;"

e/ A map of Guinea (Bissau), provided by PAIGC, appears in appendix VIII.

11. The Special Mission wishes to place on record its appreciation to the leaders of PAIGC, in particular its Secretary-General, Mr. Amilcar Cabral, for their constant assistance and co-operation and for the facilities which they placed at the Mission's disposal during its visit to the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau). It also wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of the Republic of Guinea whose co-operation was indispensable to the completion of the task, the former Administrative Secretary-General of OAU and other officials of that organization for their generous co-operation and assistance. The Mission wishes furthermore to record its thanks to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for making available the necessary supporting staff and facilities and, in that connexion, to acknowledge with appreciation the services and dedication of the staff as well as the assistance extended to the Mission by United Nations offices.

12. A particularly warm tribute is due to the officials and cadres of PAIGC who accompanied the Mission throughout its visit and to the people of Guinea (Bissau) who bore the brunt of Portugal's efforts to prevent the Special Mission from completing its task (see appendix III below). The Mission deeply regrets the loss of life, especially among the civilian population, which resulted therefrom.

1. CHRONICLE OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

Mission's activities

13. In view of the delicate nature of its assignment, the Special Mission endeavoured from the outset to maintain the utmost secrecy with regard to its movements. Neither the date of its departure from Headquarters nor its destination was made public. The purpose of such secrecy was to minimize the risks both to the local population and to the members of the Mission which might arise from the Mission's presence in the liberated areas. As a further precaution, it was decided, prior to departure from New York, that the precise timing and duration of the visit would have to be determined after the Mission arrived at the headquarters of PAIGC. Accordingly, when the Mission left New York on 28 March 1972, its immediate destination was Conakry, Republic of Guinea where the PAIGC headquarters is located.

14. The Mission arrived in Conakry on 31 March and accompanied by Mr. Roger Polgar, the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) at Conakry, paid a courtesy visit on the same day to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guinea where it was received by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Camara Damantang. The latter assured the Mission of his Government's readiness to furnish it with every assistance and co-operation for the successful accomplishment of its task. The Mission also had a brief meeting with representatives of the local OAU Office at Conakry.

15. Immediately thereafter, the Mission paid a first official visit to the headquarters of PAIGC where it was received by Mr. Aristides Pereira, Deputy Secretary-General, and a member of the Permanent Commission of the Executive Committee. Also present were two other members of the Executive Committee,

Major Constantino Teixeira and Mr. Abilio Duarte. The Secretary-General, Amilcar Cabral, was away on an official trip abroad. Arrangements for the visit to Guinea (Bissau) were discussed at the meeting and it was decided that the Mission should schedule its departure for the following day.

16. The Mission left Conakry on the morning of 1 April, attired in military fatigues with United Nations insignia and accompanied by an armed escort under the command of Major Constantino Teixeira. The night of 1 April was spent at a PAIGC base, located on the Guinean side of the frontier. Here a meeting was held with Major Pedro Pires, the PAIGC commander of the frontier region, in the course of which the members of the Mission were briefed on the military situation inside Guinea (Bissau) and plans were made for crossing the frontier.

17. Describing the situation inside the Territory, Major Pires informed the Mission that during the five days preceding its arrival, Portuguese military activity in the frontier region of Guinea (Bissau) had attained a degree of intensity never before experienced. The whole region had been subjected to intensive bombardment both by artillery from adjacent Portuguese forts and from the air. He attributed it to the Mission's presence in the area and expressed his firm conviction that the Portuguese authorities had been aware of the Mission's movements since its departure from New York. Before the Mission's departure, the sector had been comparatively quiet for some time and a number of foreign observers and delegations had visited the liberated area in complete tranquillity.

18. Major Pires said that, generally, the war in Guinea (Bissau) had been increasing in intensity for some time. Portuguese army units were for the most part entrenched in the few remaining fortified camps in the liberated areas. These were besieged by the forces of PAIGC and were being supplied by air or by river craft. A new factor, however, had been the large-scale introduction by the Portuguese of troop-carrying helicopters, which gave the Portuguese troops a vastly greater freedom of movement and were also used as gunships for aerial attacks. Major Pires was convinced, however, that Portugal no longer had any prospect of winning the war and that the Portuguese Government was continuing its resistance only because to do otherwise would weaken its position in Angola and Mozambique.

19. In the morning of the following day, the members of the Special Mission woke up to the sound of artillery fire from the nearest Portuguese fort of Guilejé. Among other things, they talked with a young soldier of the PAIGC liberation army who had been severely wounded during fighting at Como in 1963. The soldier, Joaozinho da Costa Dozes, said that he had joined the liberation forces when he was 14 years old and had been twice wounded. He showed the Mission a part of his hips which were covered with deep scars and said that, as a consequence of his injuries, he suffered from paralysis of his genital organs. He had not asked the party to allow him to go to Europe for treatment because he wanted to participate in the struggle for the liberation of his people until the final victory.

20. During the night of 2 April, the Special Mission, accompanied by an escort of 60 PAIGC soldiers, was driven to the frontier at a point not far from Kandiafara, on the Gogon River, and entered Guinea (Bissau) in a jeep at 2325 GMT. After the crossing, Portuguese artillery in a nearby camp began again an intermittent bombardment of the frontier area.

21. After crossing the frontier, the Special Mission and its escort left the jeep and the truck. They travelled on foot throughout the remainder of their visit to the liberated areas. During the first night, the Mission soon entered forest cover where they were joined by additional PAIGC troops. There followed a long march in a north-westerly direction. The march was made mostly in darkness through forest, swamps and savannah. During the march, the Mission traversed three rivers by means of primitive and dangerous bridges made from tree trunks, waded across brooks and streams and crossed numerous rice paddies.

22. A few hours after sunrise on 3 April, the Special Mission arrived at its first destination deep in the forest of the Balana sector, a heavily guarded PAIGC army base camp composed of several tents, huts and barracks which is the headquarters of the Political Commissariat of the Southern Region. Here the Mission met, among others, the following PAIGC leaders and members of the Executive Committee: Mr. João Bernado Vieira, ("Nino"), the commander-in-chief of the liberation army; Mr. Vasco Cabral, in charge of party ideology; Mr. Carlos Correia, in charge of security and a member of the Permanent Commission of the National Committee of the Southern Region; Mr. José Araujo, in charge of production and a member of the Permanent Commission of the National Committee of the Southern Region; Mr. Fidelis Almada, in charge of justice; Mr. Bari Abdulai, Political Commissioner of the armed forces in the Southern Region; and Mrs. Teodora Gomes, a member of the Political Brigade in the Southern Region.

23. Shortly after the Special Mission's arrival at the base camp, Portuguese reconnaissance aircraft, fighter bombers and helicopters were clearly visible flying over the camp at frequent intervals. On a number of occasions, the members of the Mission, on the advice of the leaders of PAIGC, were obliged to take shelter. It was consequently decided, in the interest of security, to move the Mission to quarters deeper in the forest.

24. A few hours after nightfall on the same day, the Special Mission left the base camp and continued its march in the direction of the Cubacaré sector. In the course of this march, the Mission was escorted by a detachment of more than 400 soldiers, not counting units assigned from local village forces from time to time. During the march, which lasted 13 1/2 hours, the Mission passed through many rice paddies and traversed four rivers including the Balana River, and was able to see evidence of the devastation caused by the war. While still in the Balana sector, the Mission passed through several villages, among them Setche-Kul, Yem I, Yem II, Flack-N'Gol and Rotche Nbnle, which had been heavily destroyed by aerial bombing. The surrounding fields showed evidence of heavy artillery shelling, crops had been burned by napalm and there were many shattered huts and graneries. During its march, the Mission visited the village of Xen-Kuntoi, which was totally destroyed on the following day by aerial bombardments, and passed within a distance of 2 kilometres of the Portuguese military encampment of Kadanda.

25. In the morning of 4 April, the Special Mission arrived at the Areolino Lopez Cruz school in the Cubacaré sector (Catio region) where it stayed for two nights. This school, which is named after a former teacher who was killed during a Portuguese attack, provides elementary education for 65 pupils between 10 and 15 years of age, most of whom are either orphans or children of PAIGC soldiers. Because of the danger of aerial bombardment, the school, like others existing in the liberated area, is housed in temporary quarters, hidden deep in the forest and is frequently transferred from one place to another. It is staffed by six teachers, including the director, Mr. Lucas Pereira, who was educated abroad, and is administered with the participation of a committee of students. During its stay, the Mission had an opportunity to inspect the school and other facilities, assist at a working class and discuss with the teachers the problems which they encountered in providing education to the children of the liberated areas. The Mission also witnessed an artistic performance of theatre, dances and poetic reading given by the children.

26. While in the Cubacaré sector, the Special Mission attended a mass public meeting held in the forest at a distance of approximately one and a half hours march from the Areolino Lopez Cruz school. The meeting, which lasted three hours, was attended by almost 200 people from 14 villages: Darsalam, Catésse, Calaque, Carfal, Santa Clara, Cadique, Cabante, Catchamba, Cassintcha, Sogubol, Farim, Camarempo, Flaque N'Bitha and Caiquene.

27. The atmosphere of the meeting was friendly and fraternal and members of the Special Mission, who mixed with the crowd, had an opportunity to hold numerous individual conversations and thereby gain an insight into the conditions of life of the villagers who live under constant threat of attack from the air. The Mission was introduced to the gathering by Mr. José Araujo, a member of the Executive Committee of PAIGC, who also introduced the other PAIGC leaders present, namely Mr. Abdoulaye Seck, who is in charge of security in the south; Mrs. Satu Djassi, who is responsible for the administration of public health in the Cubacaré sector; Mr. Fidelis Almada, the PAIGC Secretary in charge of justice affairs; and Mr. Vasco Cabral, the member of the Executive Committee in charge of ideology.

28. Introducing the Special Mission, Mr. Araujo said that more villagers from the Cubacaré sector would have attended the meeting had it not been for the fact that the Portuguese forces had intensified their bombing of the sector during the preceding few days. For the benefit of the assembly, he explained the role of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and its action to promote the development of friendly relations among peoples and to bring about the liquidation of colonialism. PAIGC's objectives, he said, were the same as those of the United Nations for its struggle was also aimed at ending colonialism and racism and the exploitation of one people by another. The leaders of PAIGC had a profound faith in the United Nations and, for that reason, the presence of the Special Mission in the liberated area of Guinea (Bissau) was a very important event for PAIGC and the Guinean people. At the conclusion of his speech, the crowd gave the Mission an ovation.

29. The Chairman of the Special Mission, in his reply, paid tribute to the people of Guinea (Bissau) and the leaders of PAIGC who were building a new future filled with promise for their country. Recalling that the primary purpose of the United Nations was to maintain international peace and security, he pointed out that peace meant not only the absence of war but also the ending of injustice and exploitation. That was why the United Nations was doing its utmost to put an end to colonialism wherever it existed. Much progress had been made since the United Nations had been created in 1945 but a great deal still remained to be done. He explained that the purpose of the Special Mission was to bring the help of the United Nations to the people of Guinea (Bissau) in its struggle for national liberation. After the Chairman's speech, some of the villagers spoke of the atrocities and material damage inflicted upon the people of their village by the Portuguese army.

30. After the meeting, the Special Mission discussed, among other things, the administration of justice in the liberated area with the president of the Cubacaré sector court and also had a talk with Mrs. Satu Djassi concerning problems of public health (see section 2 below). The Mission also talked with the political officer in charge of women's brigades who drew attention to the significant change which the liberation struggle had brought about in the status of women. As the Mission was able to observe throughout its visit, women in the liberated areas have been successful in asserting their political, economic and social rights and are playing an important role within PAIGC as militants and in the fields of security, justice, health, education and production.

31. In the evening of 6 April, the Mission set out on its return journey accompanied by a heavily armed escort of 200 PAIGC troops. En route, the Mission passed through and inspected three villages, Botche N'Bunhe, Botche Sansa and Botche Djate, which had been completely destroyed by Portuguese military action only a few days previously and bore evidence of extensive artillery and aerial bombardment, including an unexploded bomb, which was shown to the Mission in the village of Botche Djati. f/ The Mission found the villagers living in the open among the ruins, from which there arose the smell of freshly burnt huts. The Mission also saw destroyed granaries with a large quantity of burnt rice.

32. Stopping for a few hours at the base camp of the Political Commissariat of the Southern Region where it arrived in the early hours of 7 April, the Mission held discussions with PAIGC leaders, including Mr. Vasco Cabral, concerning their plans for the holding of elections both to the regional councils and to a future territory-wide parliament (see section 2 below) and the measures being taken to re-establish commerce and trade in the liberated areas.

33. The Mission spent the night of 7 April at the main headquarters of the Central Command of PAIGC, a few hours march from the border of the Republic of Guinea. Here it was again welcomed by Mr. João Bernardo Vieira ("Nino"), the commander-in-chief

f/ The bomb bore the following markings: MI-7, 61A; TNT; BPE-1-124; 8/69; 50-7KG-0.035-M3.

of the PAIGC armed forces of liberation, and discussed the health problems in the liberated areas with a Cuban doctor who was working in the area as a volunteer. Later on during the night, the Mission met a caravan of some 200 civilians returning from the Republic of Guinea to Guinea (Bissau) marching with, among other things, newly purchased cattle to replace those bombed out by the Portuguese.

34. In the early morning (0725 GMT) of 8 April, the Special Mission crossed the frontier into the Republic of Guinea. After a brief rest at the PAIGC military base, and following a ceremony during which the members of the Mission received from Major Pires the insignia and flag of PAIGC, it proceeded to the town of Boké in the Republic of Guinea where it encountered other members of the Special Committee who were visiting the region. Later that day, the Mission returned to Conakry where, it rejoined the Special Committee.

35. On 10 April 1972, the members of the Mission presented a preliminary report to the Special Committee (see appendix II below).

36. During the five days and six nights which it spent in Guinea (Bissau), g/ the Mission travelled on foot a distance of approximately 200 kilometres and visited nine localities:

Base du Commissariat politique de la région du sud
Botche-Kul
Yem I
Yem II-Kumba
Flack-N'Gol
Internat Areolino Cruz
Lieu du meeting avec les villages
Botche Djate
Base du Commissariat du Front

In the course of its visit in the south-western part of the country, it had an opportunity to see the devastation wrought by artillery, aerial bombardment and airborne troops on the villages and cultivated fields of the inhabitants, to visit a school and to meet with a large number of the non-combatant population of the liberated area as well as personnel of the administration, PAIGC authorities and local political leaders. The Mission was able to talk with villagers - students, children, teachers, judges, physicians and nurses. The Mission also had direct contact with the members of the liberation army, was able to visit their camps and installations and to see for itself the nature and extent of the liberation struggle. The Mission's stay in the liberated area, originally intended to last four days, was extended to one week.

37. The Mission's observations on the situation prevailing in Guinea (Bissau) are set out in section 2 below.

g/ The itinerary of the Mission appears in appendix I.

Portuguese reaction to the Mission

38. It will be recalled that, shortly prior to the Mission's departure from New York, the Permanent Representative of Portugal, in a letter dated 25 March 1972 (see annex III to the present chapter) communicated to the Secretary-General the views of the Government of Portugal. The Permanent Representative stated, inter alia, that entry into the territory of a State Member of the United Nations without the consent of the legally constituted Government could not but be construed as an act calculated to violate all rules of international law. The Government of Portugal vehemently protested the proposed violation of its sovereignty and formally declined all responsibility for the consequences. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative said that the "decision to visit the 'liberated areas' of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces constitutes yet another act of sheer propaganda which can only serve to feed the illusion of certain interested political sectors which refuse to admit that the terrorist organizations do not control any part of Portuguese territory".

39. Subsequently, in press releases issued on 11 and 17 April, by the Foreign Ministry and the Permanent Mission respectively, an endeavour was made to deny that the Special Mission had, in fact, visited Guinea (Bissau).

40. Meanwhile, although the Portuguese authorities had no official information as to the precise destination or date of the proposed visit, every effort was made to deter the Mission from its task. According to information provided by PAIGC, a state of emergency was declared in Guinea (Bissau) at the time of the Mission's departure from New York and military activity on the part of Portuguese armed forces in the Territory attained the highest level of intensity since 1964. Between 28 March and 8 April, the date of the Mission's return to the Republic of Guinea, intensive aerial and artillery bombardments, accompanied by reconnaissance flights and helicopter-borne commando operations took place, especially in the Balana-Kitafine region and Cubacaré sector in the south and south-west where the Mission was present. In the Cubacaré sector, four villages were destroyed while the Mission was in the vicinity and, according to PAIGC, Portuguese forces, during the period, destroyed two hospitals, one health centre and three schools. In all, 25 persons including women and old persons (see appendix IV, below) were reported to have been killed by Portuguese military action during the period. The Mission wishes to note that according to a press release subsequently issued by the Government of Portugal, the Portuguese "Overseas Minister" was at Bissau during the Mission's visit to the liberated area.

41. Although the Mission did not itself come under fire, its members were able to hear the bombardments and to see the reconnaissance planes and helicopters flying overhead; in some cases, members were obliged to hide under shelter and seek protection in the bush. The Mission was also able to inspect the destruction caused to villages and crops.

42. The cessation of this activity on 8 April, the day following the Mission's exit from the Territory, is evidence that Portugal's purpose was to prevent the Mission from accomplishing its task and thereby uphold its contention that there are

no liberated areas under the control of PAIGC. The Mission notes in this connexion that during the last year many foreign observers, including parliamentarians, journalists and photographers, have visited the liberated areas, both in the northern and southern parts of the country, some of them remaining there for long periods, as the numerous reports, articles and films on the Territory bear witness. In most cases, these visits have met with considerably less difficulty than those inflicted upon the United Nations Special Mission.

2. OBSERVATIONS OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

43. This section of the report is based on the information obtained by the Special Mission during its visit to Guinea (Bissau), both from direct observation of the operation of economic and social conditions inside the liberated area, and from discussions with the inhabitants, local officials and leaders. The Mission has also made use of information supplied to it by the leaders of PAIGC both before and after its visit to the liberated area.

Educational conditions

44. According to the leaders of PAIGC, the development of education is one of the highest priorities in the programme of reconstruction. Under Portuguese rule, it is said, nearly 99 per cent of the population was illiterate and very few Africans had access to education beyond the elementary level. In the whole of Guinea (Bissau) there were, according to PAIGC, only 14 Africans who had graduated from a university.

45. PAIGC's policy for the liberated area aims at the rapid elimination of illiteracy, the institution of free and compulsory education at the primary level and a crash programme for the training of technicians and professional personnel. From the outset of the liberation struggle, a mass literacy campaign has been in force in which all who are unable to read and write are required to participate.

46. PAIGC also takes credit for having established more than 200 schools, scattered throughout the liberated area, with an enrolment in excess of 20,000 pupils. ^{h/} These schools are organized and centrally administered by PAIGC which, among other things, has laid down regulations relating to their administration, teaching staff and curricula. The Areolino Lopez Cruz school in the Cubacaré sector, which the Special Mission visited, is located for security reasons in the forest, where it is safe from air attack. The school is housed in temporary structures, and contains 65 boys and girls ranging in age from 10 to 15 years, divided into four elementary classes. The children do not begin school until the age of 10 because of the hardship and risks involved. The curriculum includes the

^{h/} The two regions visited by the Mission, the regions of Balana-Kitafine and Catio, reportedly possess a total of 61 schools organized by PAIGC.

following subjects: history, geography, Portuguese, natural sciences, arithmetic, ideological training, PAIGC policy and, for the girls, home economics. There are six teachers, five men and one woman, including the director of the school. The school is administered by the director, Mr. Lucas Pereira, assisted by a Pioneer Committee of seven pupils elected by their schoolfellows. The school is active in cultural and artistic training which the Mission was able to appreciate when the pupils gave a performance in its honour. The Mission was impressed both by the artistic talents of the children and by the profound moral and political content of the programme, the theme of which was the mobilization of the masses and the guerilla war in Guinea (Bissau). The Mission is of the view that these performances presented to an international audience would greatly enhance the comprehension of the general situation in the liberated areas.

47. Although the Mission did not have an opportunity to visit them it was informed that PAIGC maintains secondary schools, such as the Sara boarding school, in the liberated area. These schools are at present reserved for particularly gifted pupils or for the children of freedom fighters killed in action. A number of students are pursuing university courses in other countries on fellowships offered to PAIGC.

48. Apart from such fellowships, PAIGC has received substantial assistance from several countries, including Sweden and the German Democratic Republic, which have published readers and arithmetic textbooks prepared by PAIGC for use in its schools. Assistance has also come from the United Nations Educational Scientific and Culture Organization (UNESCO), which has offered to publish 20,000 arithmetic textbooks and, according to PAIGC, has also offered to supply educational materials to a total value of \$US 64,000. As the Mission was able to observe, however, such assistance will satisfy only a small part of the need in the liberated areas for educational materials and assistance.

Health conditions

49. The basic principles governing the organization of health services in the liberated area are set out in PAIGC's Mots d'ordre general (General instructions). Essentially, the aim is to provide health services first to active freedom fighters and then to the population of the liberated areas in general. The medical services are under the direction of the PAIGC military command.

50. The facilities so far established consist of a central hospital in each of the three regions, smaller hospitals at the sector level and health centres located in the sectors, each of which consists of three or four villages. In addition, health teams visit the villages frequently to bring medical care to sick persons who cannot be moved, to evacuate others to the health centres or hospitals and to instruct the villagers in child-care and hygiene. i/

i/ The two regions visited by the Mission, Balana-Katafine and Catio, reportedly have a total of three hospitals and 20 health centres.

51. The hospitals are directed by medical doctors, who are either Cuban volunteers or nationals of Guinea (Bissau). The health centres are run by medical assistants who are members of PAIGC, and each health team consists of two nurses, one male and the one female.

52. The hospitals located at military base camps give first priority to the treatment of wounded combatants and to the victims of Portuguese bombardments. Subject to this, treatment is given to sick persons generally.

53. In its discussions with medical personnel, the Special Mission was told that there was a widespread prevalence of malaria, malnutrition, beri-beri, tuberculosis and dropsy. The medical personnel were particularly concerned about malnutrition, especially among children, which they attributed largely to lack of protein due to the systematic slaughtering of livestock by the Portuguese military forces. For this reason, one of the many tasks of the medical teams was to encourage the population to raise livestock.

54. From time to time, PAIGC undertakes large-scale vaccination among the local population; in 1971, for example, a vaccination campaign succeeded in protecting the inhabitants of the liberated areas from an epidemic of cholera which was widespread in the neighbouring areas of the Republic of Guinea and Senegal. Efforts to vaccinate people, however, are hampered by the lack of cold storage facilities. There is no electricity in the liberated areas but portable refrigerators indispensable to the vaccination campaign are expected shortly.

55. The Mission was told, however, that the efforts of the health services were hampered by a serious lack of medical equipment and supplies, especially supplies of antibiotics, anti-parasitic drugs and vaccines. There was a similar shortage of vitamins and milk. Another difficulty is the transport situation. It is not easy to carry seriously wounded or sick people to the hospital at Boké or to hospitals in other areas.

56. The training of medical personnel was also a major concern. At present, some doctors are being trained abroad on fellowships made available to PAIGC. Nurses are first given accelerated basic training at one or other of the three main hospitals and are then sent abroad for specialized training or to undergo a one-year course to complete their general studies. In order to qualify as medical assistants, nurses receive a further two-month course at centres in the liberated areas, after which they are posted to health centres in the interior of the country. Mrs. Satu Djassi, for example, who was trained as a nurse and is now responsible for public health matters in Cubucaré explained to the Mission that her training had consisted of one year at a PAIGC hospital in the Republic of Guinea and a further one-year course at Kiev, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Administration of justice

57. The judicial system in the liberated area is based on a text adopted in 1966 but only fully applied in 1969. Essentially, there are three tiers of courts.

In addition, there is a special temporary court. At the lowest level there are village courts, each consisting of three villagers chosen by their peers. The competence of a village court is restricted to the settlement of minor disputes and petty theft and the judgements are flexibly based on traditional customary law. The role of the village court, according to Mr. Fidelis Almada, PAIGC's Secretary for Justice, who has studied in Portugal and practised law in São Paulo, Brazil, is primarily to maintain harmony among the villagers. Fines may be imposed, and if the convicted person does not pay the fine he may be required by PAIGC to do some form of compulsory labour. The village courts do not have power to pass sentences of imprisonment. PAIGC leaders explained that the party does not maintain prisons, both for reasons of economy and because it considers rehabilitation preferable.

58. An appeal lies from the village courts to sectoral courts which are composed of five members as follows: the political commissioner of the sector, who is responsible for security; a representative of the Office of the Secretary for Justice; two representatives of the people; and a member of one of the village courts in the sector. Besides hearing appeals from the village courts in the sector, a sectoral court has jurisdiction to try more serious offences and to hand down sentences of up to five years' compulsory labour. Such compulsory labour may consist, for example, of transporting armaments or military equipment to the liberated areas.

59. Above the sectoral courts, there exists the military court, which is the highest permanent judicial body. The court is composed of five members: a representative of the PAIGC Council of War; a representative of the security authorities; a representative of the Office of the Secretary for Justice; and two representatives of the people. The court is competent to review judgements of the lower courts and to try, as a court of first instance, crimes of espionage, homicide and rape. The sentences handed down by the military court may include the death penalty in case of high treason.

60. Apart from these permanent judicial bodies, there is a special temporary court which is responsible for hearing serious cases of flagrante delicto. This special court is comprised of three members: the political commissioner of the region; the official responsible for security; and the commander of the armed forces.

61. Explaining the judicial system to the Mission, Mr. Fidelis Almada, in charge of justice, said that the courts were independent of PAIGC and the armed forces; for example, he cited a case in which a person who had been accused by the security service of being a spy had nevertheless been acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence. All court hearings are public and the accused may plead in his own defence or be represented by a person of his choice or otherwise the representative of the Secretary for Justice may defend an accused person or may appoint a competent villager for that purpose. In the event of judicial error, the Secretary for Justice may take initiative to ensure that the judgement is reviewed. Furthermore, except in cases of espionage, any convicted person may appeal to the Secretary-General of PAIGC.

62. Mr. Almada told the Members of the Special Mission that the problem which most concerned his department was the preparation of a civil and penal code for Guinea (Bissau). He said that the code would be popularly inspired and would be based on African customs and values. It would, however, be an instrument for combating certain undesirable practices, such as forced marriage.

Reconstruction of the economy

63. PAIGC's policy in the liberated areas is aimed at eliminating all vestiges of the economic organization and exploitation imposed by the Portuguese and replacing it with a new economic system appropriate to the needs of the country. As the economy of the liberated areas is essentially agriculture, this has involved the abandonment of the exclusive concentration on the cultivation of groundnuts as the country's principal cash crop, and the diversification of agriculture to meet local requirements. Crop diversification has reportedly progressed despite the constant aerial bombardments and the destruction of harvests. PAIGC has established demonstration centres to instruct the villagers in techniques of crop diversification, collective farming, etc., and an embryonic system of co-operative farming has already been created. The main products of Guinea (Bissau) today are groundnuts, rice, palm kernels and palm oil, cola nuts, rubber and wax.

64. Trade is transacted on a barter basis and Portuguese currency is no longer used. People's stores, organized by PAIGC, exist throughout the liberated areas where the villagers may exchange their produce under the barter system for basic necessities such as clothing, cooking utensils and other manufactured goods which consist largely of gifts received by PAIGC from foreign countries and international organizations. Local produce accumulated in the people's stores is used for the needs of the liberation army for distribution in regions where there is a shortage, and the surplus is exported to neighbouring countries. PAIGC exports quantities of rice, cola nuts, beeswax and crocodile skins.

Establishment of a national assembly

65. It will be recalled that in his statement to the Security Council during its meetings in Addis Ababa 1/ Mr. Amilcar Cabral said that the people of Guinea (Bissau) had already achieved self-determination through nine years of armed struggle and possessed all the component parts of a State in development. He said that the people would shortly elect regional councils and a People's National Assembly.

66. During its visit, the Special Mission discussed these plans with Mr. Vasco Cabral, the member of the Executive Committee who is responsible for ideology.

1/ S/PV.1632.

According to Mr. Cabral, the creation of an elected national assembly would represent, in the view of PAIGC, a major step forward towards de jure recognition of the independence of Guinea (Bissau) by foreign countries. It would also involve significant changes within Guinea (Bissau). PAIGC had been considering such a step since 1969 but had preferred to wait until all the conditions existed before entering upon what would be a new phase in the struggle for independence. Now, however, these conditions had been fulfilled because the people had already achieved self-determination by liberating more than two-thirds of the Territory and by creating a sovereign political, economic, social and cultural entity. He said that Guinea (Bissau) was in fact an independent State, part of whose territory was occupied by a foreign army.

67. He explained that the People's National Assembly would be composed of 120 deputies, of whom 40 would be representatives of PAIGC from the northern, southern and eastern regions and the Bijagos Islands, and 80 would be representatives of mass organizations, such as the Union des Travailleurs Guinéens, the Union de la Jeunesse et des Etudiants and the Union des Femmes Guinéennes.

68. A five-member Special Commission had been established by PAIGC at the end of 1971 to supervise preparation for the elections. Of the five members, one or two were permanent representatives of PAIGC, while the others were representatives of the region where the Commission happened to be working.

69. It had already been established by PAIGC that, in order to be eligible for election, a candidate must accept the general PAIGC line, must be committed to the cause of liberation and must possess moral integrity. Candidates would be proposed by the villagers in collaboration with PAIGC. The election itself would be on two levels: in the first phase, the inhabitants of each region, divided into sectors, would elect the regional councillors by universal suffrage and secret ballot; in the second phase, the councillors of each region would elect one third of their members to represent the region as deputies in the People's National Assembly. Of the deputies elected from each region, three-fifths would represent mass organizations and two-fifths would be from the ranks of PAIGC.

70. The age qualification for voters would be 15 years. He added that the elections would take place before the commencement of the rainy season in July-August 1972.

3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

/The conclusions and recommendations of the Special Mission were endorsed by the Special Committee without modification and are reproduced in paragraph 36 of the present chapter./

APPENDIX I

ITINERARY

28 March 1972		Left New York for Conakry via Paris and Houadhi' Bou
31 March 1972	0630	Arrived at Conakry
	1030	Courtesy visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	1200	Meeting with leaders of PAIGC
1 April 1972	0900	Left Conakry for Boké
	1600	Arrived at Boké
	1800	Left Boké for the frontier
	2015	Arrived at Kandiafara
	2115	Left Kandiafara
	2130	Arrived at the base of Major Pires
2 April 1972	2245	Left the base for the frontier
	2315	Crossed the frontier
	2330	Left the two vehicles behind
	2335	Explosion heard
3 April 1972	0729	Arrived at the base of the political Commissariat of the Southern Region
3 April 1972	2130	Left the base for the Cubacaré sector
4 April 1972	1030	Arrived at the Areolino Lopez Cruz boarding school
	2030	Entertainment by pupils
5 April 1972	1400	Left the boarding school for a village meeting
	1530	Arrived at the meeting place
	1800	Left for the boarding school
	1930	Returned to the boarding school
6 April 1972	0830	Visited the school's dining room
	0930	Attended history, geography and mathematics classes
	1030	Interview with Satu Djassi, in charge of health in the Cubacaré sector

	1045	Interview with Mr. Fidelis Almada, member of the Executive Committee
	1200	Student parade
	1600	Visited a homecraft class
	1730	Left the Areolino Lopez Cruz boarding school
7 April 1972	0030	Passed through the destroyed village of Botche Djate, where there was an unexploded bomb
	0430	Arrived at the base of the Political Commissariat
	1630	Interview with Mr. Vasco Cabral and the person in charge of the People's Stores
	1800	Left the base of the Political Commissariat
	2200	Arrived at the headquarters of the Front Command ("Nino" Base)
8 April 1972	0005	Left the base for the frontier
	0725	Crossed the frontier
	0945	Arrived at the base of Major Pires

We left Conakry 1 April 1972 by Land Rover at 0900 GMT for Boké located about 170 kilometres (direct by air) "as the crow flies" north-west of Conakry. We continued our journey to Kandiafra on the Cogon River from Boké in a west-north-westerly direction (approximately 290° - 300°) at an average speed of 50-55 kilometres per hour. The direction was confirmed by the fact that the late afternoon sun was almost constantly shining against the windshield of our car at an angle of about 11.30-12.30 o'clock (12.00 o'clock is dead ahead). We arrived at Kandiafra at 2000 GMT, on 1 April 1972, after two hours driving from Boké. We had travelled approximately 100-110 kilometres. We crossed the Cogon River by ferry at 2115 GMT, on 1 April 1972, reached the opposite bank five minutes later and immediately proceeded to the frontier camp of Commandant Pires a/ in the direction of about 315° or due north-west for 10 minutes at an average speed of 20 kilometres per hour. The direction of travel was established by celestial navigation. In other words, we were then approximately 103-113 kilometres away from Boké in the direction of about 300°.

We departed by jeep from the camp at 2245 GMT, on 2 April 1972, for the liberated areas of Guinea (Bissau) at an average speed of 20 kilometres per hour for the next 45 minutes going due west or approximately 270°. Again this was

a/ See map on page 129 of this appendix, position "A".

established by celestial navigation. The distance covered during this period was about 15 kilometres. In the meantime, we crossed the frontier at 2315 GMT, on 2 April 1972.

We began our march at that point b/ at 2330 GMT, on 2 April 1972, in the direction of approximately 270° or due west (by a compass and by celestial navigation) until 0200 GMT, on 3 April 1972, to reach the point where we took our first rest. c/

Judging that an average distance travelled by foot is about 4 kilometres per hour, we walked approximately 10 kilometres. If we add the distance between Boké and Pires Camp (103-113 kilometres) from Pires Camp to the point where the march began (15 kilometres) and the 10 kilometres covered in the two-and-a-half-hour march, we would be 128-138 kilometres away from Boké in the direction of 300° - 315° .


Draw a circle with 128-138 kilometres d/ radius from Boké on a map and pay particular attention to the portion of the circumference in the area of 300° - 315° from Boké.

It is clearly beyond the frontier, thus proving we were in the Territory of Guinea (Bissau).

b/ Ibid., position "B".

c/ Ibid., position "C".

d/ See page 131 of this appendix.



APPENDIX II

PRELIMINARY REPORTS BY THE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL MISSION AT THE 848th MEETING OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON 10 APRIL 1972

A. Report by Mr. Horacio Sevilla-Borja, Chairman of the Special Mission

The United Nations has made its appearance in an area which, as part of a Territory that is still under colonial domination, has been liberated from the physical, administrative and political presence of the colonial Power by indigenous forces.

The Organization, represented by the Special Mission of this Committee, has just spent seven days -- to be more exact 130 hours -- in part of the Territory of Guinea (Bissau) that has been liberated by the military and political action of the indigenous nationalist forces, led by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC).

This is an unprecedented event in the very creditable campaign, carried out by the United Nations since its establishment, to wipe the system of colonial domination from the face of the earth. It is for the General Assembly and this Committee to determine the legal, political, constitutional and administrative implications of the fact that the blue flag -- the symbol of peace -- of the United Nations, has been raised and has flown proudly over villages, schools, roads, encampments, forests and farmlands of the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau). We, the three members of your Special Mission, do not wish at this juncture to be the ones to draw attention to what those implications may be; we merely wish to suggest at this point that, after this visit, the situation can never be the same again.

We believe that we have carried out the difficult assignment you gave us. This was by no means a conventional Mission; it was very different from those normally carried out in the diplomatic field. We have some very difficult moments, as a result both of the primitive living and transport conditions -- the product of over 100 years of reactionary colonial domination -- and of the virtual state of war that exists, which was markedly intensified by the Portuguese forces during our visit. Added to all this is the fact that we lacked the training for long treks of up to 15 hours at a stretch at times, and of 8 and 13 hours at others, through forests, rivers and swamps. It should be pointed out that we found it difficult to adjust ourselves to different ways of life: sleeping in the open, irregular meals, unfamiliarity with the latent dangers of the forest. It was only the determination of the people of Guinea (Bissau) and their faith in ultimate victory which encouraged us and gave us strength; and it was the courage of my colleagues, their sense of responsibility and defiance in the face of injustice, which enabled us to complete the Mission as we had planned.

We have brought a great deal of information and evidence with us from our visit and we have gained invaluable personal experience in the field. We shall

provide the Committee with photographs, films, documentation and sound recordings later and we hope to formulate our observations and experiences in specific recommendations. However, the task of putting such material in order, classifying and preparing it, will obviously take some time. We intend to submit a full report, as detailed and comprehensive as possible, with charts, testimony and reproductions of documents. In the meantime, we can understand the natural desire of the members of this Committee to hear our first impressions. We shall be pleased to comply, although they are obviously still disjointed, incomplete and undigested as a result of the intense emotions we have experienced during the last seven days. We - the three members of the Mission - have not even had time to co-ordinate this preliminary oral report. I therefore request that these first impressions be considered as strictly preliminary and also that my colleagues on the Mission be allowed to speak after me so that they can enlarge upon, clarify or correct my ideas.

Our first and main impression was that the existence of the so-called "Liberated Areas" is an undeniable fact of life, despite the persistent denials of the Portuguese which have created doubts among their closest allies and in spite of the innumerable reports by journalists and non-governmental delegations from various quarters who have visited the Territory of Guinea (Bissau). The military forces and administrative officers of PAIGC are actually in control of the situation and they are the real masters of the extensive areas we visited. Using various means of transport, we were continually on the move throughout those seven days. We found the same situation everywhere: the established presence of admirably well-organized guerilla forces; overwhelming support among the people of the villages, hamlets and settlements for those who are fighting bravely to free them; comprehensive administrative organization covering every facet of community life.

It is a really admirable and commendable fact that, after only a few years of a struggle recognized as legitimate by the United Nations, PAIGC, although considerably inferior to the enemy in material and military potential, has been able to gain control over vast areas of the Territory of Guinea (Bissau) which are continually being wrested by force from the domination of their illegal occupiers.

Even more admirable is the work being done by PAIGC to organize the civil life of the community and, while in the throes of the struggle, to create a new society, with its own institutions suited to the characteristics of the Guinean people rather than foreign cultures forcibly imposed, a new society which dignifies its basic component, the human being, by providing equal opportunities, community work and social justice and by eliminating traditional antiquated customs and tribal differences fostered by the colonizer, a society which is emerging with great speed from the Dark Ages of inept and unjust colonial domination into the dawn of a future in which there will be dynamic progress free from exploitation.

We shall never forget our visit to day-schools and boarding-schools where, under the direction of PAIGC and with a team of teachers trained abroad, comprehensive education is given to children, many of whom were born in Liberated

Areas and have never seen a Portuguese soldier or civilian. It is true that the smiles and gaiety typical of their age, which is a joy to behold, seem for the present to have departed from the faces of those children. But it must be remembered that, at the same time as they are being educated, they have to take part in defence and reconstruction work and they even have to bring their own school materials from the frontier on long and dangerous treks. The schoolchildren of Guinea (Bissau) live in constant fear of bombing, because, for reasons we cannot understand, the schools seem to be the favourite targets for the indiscriminate Portuguese bombardments which have already taken many young lives. While on the subject of education, I must mention the tremendous value of the bilateral international co-operation given by different countries. For example, we were gratified to see that the children learned their lessons from textbooks in Portuguese printed in Sweden and donated by the Swedish Government. PAIGC has set itself the goal of providing education for all children of school age and completing a literacy programme for adults in the Liberated Areas, which would never even have been dreamed of under the colonial system.

PAIGC has several hospitals and health posts scattered over the Liberated Areas; these not only care for people wounded in the war, the majority of whom are civilians, but also carry out curative and preventive campaigns against diseases endemic in those regions and give intermediate-level personnel medical training, thereby creating a new kind of soldier for peace working for his people. Here, I should also stress the value of existing international co-operation provided in the form of experts, drugs and equipment, which helps to meet the tremendous needs.

Throughout the areas under its control, PAIGC has also organized people's stores where goods are bartered, a system that helps the people to overcome the problems of over-production of traditional products such as rice and provides them with consumer goods and prime necessities which they could not afford under the colonial administration.

Much could be said about the reconstruction work being carried out, about the administration of justice based on people's courts, about the system of community administration, and particularly about the preparations being made throughout the Liberated Areas for the elections to the National Assembly, scheduled to be held next June, which will constitute the first formal manifestation of self-determination. However, we shall cover these points fully in our final report and I shall therefore omit them from this brief statement.

Thus the United Nations, through its specialized agencies, can do a great deal in the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau) to meet the tremendous needs of its people who are doomed to suffering and even to starvation just because they committed the "crime" of insisting on their right to self-government, a right recognized as inalienable in the United Nations Charter.

It is particularly important to refer in this preliminary report to the attitude adopted by the Portuguese Government on the occasion of the visit of the

Committee's Special Mission which was approved by an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly. Not only did Portugal try to prevent the visit at the diplomatic level (even going so far as to threaten the security of its members in a note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to state that sending the Mission was a violation of international law. How ironical to hear Portugal speaking of respect for the principles of international law!) but, what is even more serious and fundamental, it also used all its military might to prevent the visit and destroy three delegates who were carrying out an official United Nations Mission.

This is an act which should be given all due consideration by this Committee and the Security Council. For some long time Portuguese military activity has not been as intense as in the last few days, since the membership of our Mission was announced in New York. The fact is that Portugal tried to prevent our visit by force, with no concern whatsoever for the lives of the official representatives of the Organization, of which it is also a Member. Moreover, the top-ranking Portuguese military authorities left Lisbon for the town of Bissau during our visit to take direct charge of the operations. Fortunately, thanks to the military strength of the nationalist guerillas and the system of defence against aerial bombardments, from which we had to take shelter on several occasions, and since the only major military action open to the Portuguese was in the air (bombing and troop movements by helicopters), we were able to carry out our mission, accomplish all that was planned and return safe and sound. The schoolchildren in the Liberated Areas sing a creole song: "Guerrilla na terra; Tugassinho na núven" (Guerilla on the ground; little Portuguese in the clouds), which describes the present military situation perfectly: the guerillas operate on the ground and are in control there and the Portuguese only operate in the sky and are unable to land.

It was, however, painful for us to see with our own eyes the atrocities committed by the Portuguese troops. Villages have been burned and their inhabitants are sleeping in the open with the stench of the recent fires in their nostrils. Crops have been destroyed by countless costly bombing raids. Cattle have been killed and there were constant reconnaissance flights. We also saw powerful unexploded bombs that had been dropped by modern planes in the fields of the Liberated Areas. It should be recalled in this connexion, that Portugal does not even produce toy planes or bombs because it is too under-developed. If the legally organized international community is incapable of preventing certain Powers from continuing to provide Portugal with aid and modern military equipment for pursuing this terrible and unjust war, we can do little to achieve our aims in this Committee.

The fact that we carried out our mission successfully, despite Portugal's military and special diplomatic efforts, constitutes further proof, for those who are still in doubt, of Portugal's weakness in Africa. It also serves to emphasize the significance of the United Nations presence in Guinea (Bissau) in company with the liberation movement of the Territory and under its protection.

I do not wish to weary the members of the Committee any further. In this report I have refrained from giving details of dates, names and locations of the places visited and names of the village leaders with whom we spoke, for fear that they may be subjected to Portuguese reprisals in the future. We shall discuss this matter in detail with the PAIGC leaders for our final report, in order to ascertain how much information we can make public.

I have left to the last a point which I consider highly important: I wish to thank my colleagues of the Mission for their co-operation and to express my gratitude and congratulations for the assistance, protection and help given to us by the members of PAIGC.

I was lucky to have the co-operation of Mr. Folke Löfgren of Sweden. Although he comes from a country whose environment and landscape are very different from those of the tropical lands we visited and although he represents a country which takes legitimate pride in having been free from war for a long period of its history, he stoically and bravely withstood the hardships of the jungle and the earth tremors caused by Portuguese bombardments. I noted that he was touched at the gratitude expressed to him so enthusiastically by the simple people of Guinea (Bissau) for the assistance provided by the Swedish Government in the struggle for liberation. The evils of colonialism and the inspiring example of the Tunisian people's struggle for independence are still fresh in the mind of Mr. Kamel Belkhiria of Tunisia, my other colleague on the Mission or adventure. His help was also invaluable. The co-operation and help afforded us by the two valuable members of the United Nations Secretariat who accompanied us deserve mention in a separate chapter. They were Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gaye of Senegal, Secretary of the Mission, and Mr. Yūgata Nagata of Japan, the photographer. Not only did they do their duty to the full, they were also loyal friends in difficult circumstances.

I would like to express our very particular gratitude to the PAIGC leaders who accompanied us on the mission. Special thanks are due to their worthy and capable Secretary-General, Mr. Amílcar Cabral, and through him to his entire efficient team of colleagues for their attitude. With the enthusiasm and perspicacity of modern statesmen, and in difficult circumstances they are building a country which sooner or later will be a member of the international community as an independent State. A special word of thanks is due to Major Constantino Teixeira and his troops, whose responsibility it was to ensure our safety; his skill as a military strategist and his constant protection gave us confidence and peace of mind even in the most difficult moments.

Finally, I should like to express the gratitude of my colleagues on the Mission and myself to the members of the Special Committee for having given us the opportunity to serve on this Mission and thereby to offer material and specific proof of the dedication and support of our countries and Governments for the cause that is closest to the hearts of the African people. This first experiment by the United Nations in its search for new ways of assisting peoples in their noble struggle to free themselves once and for all from the ignominious colonial yoke was an unforgettable personal experience for us.

B. Report by Mr. Folke Löfgren, member of the Special Mission

As the Chairman of our Special Mission, the distinguished representative of Ecuador, has said, at a future date we shall submit a complete report on our important Mission. Today therefore I can only offer you some preliminary comments, particularly since our Mission is not yet ended. We have to meet with the representatives of PAIGC for discussions and to obtain further information; we also need to reflect and confer a little among ourselves, the members of the Mission, and draw up a report from the voluminous material which we have collected.

Before making any further comment on the Mission itself, I should like to say a few words of appreciation.

I should like to begin by thanking the representatives of PAIGC and all the people of the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau), whose hospitality impressed us all. Of course, their job was not always an easy one because, inter alia, our physical stamina did not facilitate their work. Nevertheless, I will cherish precious personal memories of the many occasions on which I received aid and encouragement from soldiers whose names I do not know. I hesitated a little as to whether or not I should mention the name of one particular PAIGC representative, but I finally decided that it is almost my duty to express my special thanks to Constantino dos Santos Teixeira, not only because he was the only person who accompanied us from beginning to end, but also because we were greatly assisted by the confidence he inspires. I now know why his courage has already become a legend and can be compared only with his kindness. I am convinced that an army under a military leader like Constantino Chu-Chu Teixeira is bound to be victorious. I wish to convey my special thanks to this comrade, who is great in every sense of the word, because I believe that he will transmit my expression of gratitude to all his comrades.

I also wish to thank the Government of the Republic of Guinea, whose warm and generous assistance and hospitality did much to help and encourage us, both morally and materially. Its assistance was in fact essential to the Mission's success.

Next I wish to thank my two colleagues on the Mission, Mr. Sevilla-Borja and Mr. Kamel Belkhiria. I believe that our Mission would have been much more difficult without the friendship and solidarity which united us. I should like to say a special word about the Chairman, my friend Horacio Sevilla-Borja. His task was not always easy for there were harrowing moments in our Mission when very important decisions had to be taken. At these moments, it was a great relief to be able to count unhesitatingly on his judgement, tact, discretion and great kindness.

Lastly, as far as expressions of gratitude are concerned, I wish to thank the United Nations Secretariat which provided us with Mr. Cheikh Gaye as Secretary and Mr. Yutaka Nagata as photographer. I cannot imagine that this choice was a pure coincidence and it was of inestimable importance. Not only did these two friends

perform their professional duties with the greatest efficiency, but above all their moral support and outstanding courage were quite indispensable to us.

I think we all realize that the Mission itself will prove to be highly important. However, on the political and legal levels, its results and implications are not yet clear. That is why I cannot make any specific recommendations. We shall need a lot more work and thought and consultations with the Secretariat and with our own Governments.

At this stage, however, I should like to make a few comments of a somewhat descriptive nature.

Firstly, the most impressive part of our Mission was, I think, the direct contact we had with the work done by PAIGC in the Liberated Areas. It is true that this phenomenon - and I use the word advisedly - was by no means unknown to the Swedish Government and people. I have here two books recently published in Sweden on Guinea (Bissau) and there are many more. Nevertheless it was extremely touching to see for ourselves what strong will and noble ambition can accomplish in extremely difficult conditions and with very limited means. I think that this combination of boundless energy and humanism is fairly unique in the contemporary world and deserves to be given general recognition and support. Heroic though the military struggle may be, however, the Swedish Government feels perhaps even greater admiration for the determination to build a new and just society in dignity. The following preliminary recommendation could therefore be made: we visited a boarding school where the children gave such a remarkable performance in an evening of acting and singing that in my opinion it deserves the widest possible audience. Would it be possible for the United Nations to invite a group of these young artists to New York? Such a project could have a great impact and make everyone realize what admirable work is being done in the Liberated Areas.

Secondly, it is my unhappy duty to tell you about the Mission's shocking experience of Portuguese repression. Using United Nations terminology we speak of the administering Power, but all that that Power administers in the Liberated Areas is terror and terror alone, especially bombing from the air, helicopter-borne detachments burning and destroying, bombardments from their isolated fortresses in the Liberated Areas and mine-laying. I think it is too early for definite ideas, but I think it might be a duty of the United Nations to be more active or to find ways and means of observing, verifying and exposing these dreadful activities regularly.

The Chairman of the Mission has already referred to the Portuguese activities directed against the Mission. I might add in all truth that before our departure in our naiveté we did not dream that it was possible to flout the will of a large majority of the Members of the United Nations in such a flagrant, aggressive and shocking manner, especially since we were not going as soldiers, but as peaceful envoys of the United Nations.

Thirdly, I should like to say a few words about the possibility of helping PAIGC in its admirable work. As you know, for three years my Government has been providing PAIGC with humanitarian assistance. This year Swedish assistance amounts to the equivalent of almost a million dollars. I did not go as an inspector and it was not possible to follow all that has been done with the Swedish aid, but I can frankly say that I was impressed by what I saw. And I am firmly convinced that PAIGC deserves to receive much more assistance from abroad, that it is quite capable of administering and using such assistance despite very difficult conditions and that this fact should be recognized and studied both by the United Nations and its specialized agencies and by Governments. International solidarity calls for such action.

Lastly, let me conclude by saying that my Government is proud to have participated in such a Mission and thus to have strengthened the bonds of friendship that link it to PAIGC. It also regards such participation as a further contribution to the urgent work of the United Nations: decolonization and the restoration of respect for the highest human values.

C. Report by Mr. Kamel Belkhiria, member of the Special Mission

It is perhaps superfluous to add anything to the preliminary statements which the Chairman, Mr. Sevilla-Borja, representative of Ecuador and the representative of Sweden made to this Committee on our Mission inside the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau).

For a whole week, we lived with the freedom-fighters and the hard-working Guinean people. We shared their daily life, their food and their water. We shared their difficulties, their labour, their cares and their problems, but we also shared their enthusiasm, their hopes and their elation. In short, we were united with them for better and for worse. Our keen interest was equalled only by their determination to fight on and to wage the sacred struggle to the end, until the rest of their Territory is completely free.

During our whole stay in the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau) with the valiant Guinean people and their brave army, jet aircraft, which are Portuguese only in name and markings, persisted in their harassment, reconnaissance flights and bombings wherever we were thought to be in the Territory.

The jets disappeared only to be replaced by giant helicopters recently delivered to the Portuguese troops to destroy whole villages of peaceful peasants. Two kilometres away from our camp on 3 April two helicopters destroyed a village in a vain attempt to intimidate us and sabotage the Mission. Despite all this, the Mission completed its assignment. Our faith was the same as that of the fighters and we therefore shared a common cause. It was this unswerving determination which enabled us to march for four whole nights, defying hostile nature and the danger of an enemy surprise attack. It enabled us to carry on to the remotest villages to establish contact with the inhabitants, listen to them

and learn about their living conditions. We were impressed by the villagers' maturity, their critical ability and their love of their country. We were also agreeably surprised by the large-scale campaign launched by PAIGC to improve the living conditions of the Guinean citizens in the economic, social, cultural and educational sectors. Squads of nurses are teaching the people the rules of hygiene and child care. There is a school in which 70 pupils are being given intensive instruction before entering the final classes at Conakry. PAIGC is thus providing the people with health and educational facilities and inculcating in them a civic sense. The military organization is admirable. An economy based on barter adapted to the realities of the country provides for the people's needs.

In short, political, administrative, judicial, social, health and educational institutions have thus been established. What more is needed to constitute a free and sovereign country that is master of its own destiny?

It seems clear to me that Guinea (Bissau) is a model pilot country for peoples fighting for their freedom to model themselves on. Guinea (Bissau) therefore deserves all forms of international moral and material assistance. When I returned to the Republic of Guinea (Conakry), a colleague asked me the following question: "All in all, what impressed you most during your stay in the Liberated Areas?". I replied: "What impressed me most was the insane and hysterical policy of the Portuguese fascists and their blind determination to cling desperately to a Territory which has long since ceased to belong to them."

These are the few comments which I wanted to add to those of our Chairman, Mr. Sevilla-Borja, who led the Mission with great wisdom, courage and self-sacrifice throughout the long march through the free territory of Guinea (Bissau). I would also pay a tribute to the courage and team spirit shown by my colleagues Folke Löfgren of Sweden, our Secretary Cheikh Gaye and Mr. Yutaka Nagata for all the services they organized. I should also like to take this opportunity to pay a most sincere tribute to the leaders of PAIGC and especially to my friend its Secretary-General, Amilcar Cabral, for all the help they gave us during our stay among them and the risks they ran to protect us and ensure our safety. They were ready at all times to sacrifice their lives to save ours. The Tunisian delegation also wishes to salute the brave freedom-fighters on the battlefields.

Lastly, allow me to address a few words to the authorities of the Republic of Guinea and their supreme commander, Ahmed Sekou Touré, President of the Republic, in order to convey to them on behalf of my Government and my country, Tunisia, my deepest and most sincere gratitude for their fraternal welcome and the traditional hospitality of their beautiful country. We are really appreciative and we are profoundly grateful to them.

APPENDIX III

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDENCIA DA GUINE E CABO VERDE (PAIGC), ON PORTUGUESE AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SPECIAL MISSION

I - FORWARD

Following General Assembly resolution 2795 (XXIV) and at the official invitation of our Party, the Special Committee for Decolonization (also called the Committee of 24), decided to send a Special Mission to the liberated regions of our country.

The members of the Special Mission were:

- Ambassador Horacio Sevilla-Borja, representative (councillor) of Ecuador at the United Nations, head of the Special Mission (chairman).
- Mr. Folke Löfgren, representative (councillor) of Sweden at the United Nations.
- Mr. Belkhiria Kamel, representative (councillor) of Tunisia at the United Nations.

They were accompanied by two officers of the Secretariat, Mr. Cheikh Gaye, (Senegal), and Mr. Yutaka Nagata, a Japanese photographer.

As everybody knows, it was not possible to keep this mission secret within the United Nations, because of the war situation in our country, and due to the criminal nature of the colonialists. Indeed the Portuguese immediately launched a vast diplomatic campaign to kill the initiative from the start, with certain powers exerting pressure on the Decolonization Committee. At the same time, the Government mobilized the Portuguese media, their representatives, spokesmen and writers, to start a major campaign of intimidation and threats against the Special Mission, and to discredit the Committee of 24 and the United Nations itself.

In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 25 March 1972, circulated as an official document of the United Nations (A/AC.109/398) of 28 March 1972, M. Antonio Patricio, permanent representative of Portugal, made a "strong protest against this proposed violation of Portugal's sovereignty and the most elementary principles regulating relations among nations ...". He then threatened, echoed later by Portuguese media and by several Portuguese Government spokesmen: "Moreover, an initiative of this nature (the Special Mission) can have consequences for which the Portuguese Government must decline any responsibility. Those who have agreed to participate in illegal activities must take responsibility for the outcome of these acts." And so as not to leave any doubts, Portugal's representative "draws the attention" of the Secretary-General "to the grave nature of the decision taken by the Special Committee of 24 ...".

For anyone familiar with the United Nations diplomatic language, the threat implied in the rhetoric of the Portuguese representative was very clear; the members of the Special Mission were running the risk of possible (even certain) physical liquidation if they dared to cross the borders of our country.

Less diplomatic than the United Nations language was the editorial in the official daily Portuguese paper, Diario de Noticias, of 24 March 1972. After villifying the Decolonization Committee and the United Nations, which they consider capable of the worst lies, the editorial describes as a dream, an event cherished by all Portuguese colonialists; "let us imagine that the three diplomats (of the Special Mission) suddenly find themselves in the middle of an exchange of fire between their terrorist escort and one of the Portuguese patrols which are constantly on the move around all the border areas. What a responsibility for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and what a responsibility for the Government of Ecuador if the eminent Sevilla-Borja were to be hit in an anonymous corner of the African jungle ...".

Their diplomatic operation was a resounding failure - the colonialists did not succeed at all in their campaign of intimidation. Faced with the courage of the members of the Mission and the firm determination of our Party to proceed with the visit that we had promised, the Portuguese Government took the serious and criminal decision to make the Special Mission visit a failure by resorting to every possible means at their disposal, including the physical elimination of the members of the Mission.

These events even though outlined rather briefly show that for the first time, the colonialists have lived up to their own words. The barbaric aggression launched against the southern liberated areas, between 18 March and 9 April, was a desperate attempt by the Government of Lisbon to try and physically eliminate the members of the United Nations.

The Portuguese colonialists set loose all their technical and human resources to achieve their goal. Desperate, they had forgotten that living reality of our country; the existence of people in the liberated areas, proud of its sovereignty, with fighters who are aware of their rights and their role in history at the head.

II. AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SPECIAL MISSION

1. Number of men deployed

Members of the Special Mission left New York on 28 March, without disclosing their destination. But the colonialists did not need that additional information. In any case, the Decolonisation Committee had previously revealed their schedule in Africa, in which the first leg of their visit was to Conakry. Therefore, it was not too difficult to guess that their first country to be visited would be ours.

The day after the Mission left for Africa, the Portuguese Chief of Staff declared a state of alert for the 45,000 colonial troops in our country, 15,000 of which are stationed in the South, mainly in the towns of Bolama (former capital), and Catio, in the important garrisons of Tite (Command Headquarters for the South), Buba, Kebo (near the border with the Republic of Guinea), Empada and in other military camps (Guiledje, Fulacunda, Bedanda, Cacine). Ten thousand special troops were transported in a few days from Bissau to the southern areas as reinforcements. If one adds in the airforce and the naval power in operation during the aggression the total number of troops deployed was around 30,000 men.

If it is true that only a part of these troops could operate during this aggression, none the less they were all ready to intervene whenever necessary, to capture or eliminate members of the Special Mission. In fact the majority of these troops must have had to act since, faced with stiff resistance by our fighters and the population, the units of the colonial army and the special troops were frequently forced to relieve each other during the operations.

One may wonder why the Portuguese, having at their disposal such powerful resources, did not opt for a general "scraping" offensive using thousands of men in a single operation. They already have experience enough - and bitter experience - which has taught them not to embark on such operations. It was in the South, in 1964, the year after the beginning of the colonial war and of our liberation struggle, that the portuguese colonialists suffered one of their worst defeats. They deployed about 3,000 men to recapture the island of Komo - the first liberated area in the South of our country. We fought for 75 days and inflicted on the enemy about 900 casualties, finally expelling the invaders from the islands. Recently (December 1971) during an operation called "Solitary Sapphire", against the liberated zone of Mores (in the north-central area of the country, the colonial troops suffered a crushing defeat. In this operation 102 enemy troops were killed and a large number wounded; the Portuguese commander heading the operation found it honourable to commit suicide.

2. War materials used

The colonialist army used mainly airplanes, helicopters and boats in their aggression. If members of the Mission had been chosen outside the Decolonization Committee, there could well have been a representative of the United States or Great Britain or France among them. It would then have been a tragic irony, for

this representative to risk being killed on our African soil, by the very same war materials that his country gives to Portugal either under NATO or bilaterally. However, it was others who, like us, were taking this chance.

Airplanes - Cessna T-37 C; North American Harvard T-6; Nord-Atlas 2502; Fiat G-91 Nato Type R-4; Sabre F-86-F and Sabre F-86-K (RFA); Lockheed P-2V Neptune (for night bombings).

Helicopters - Alouettes 2 and 3; Saro Skeeter and others.

Boats - Frigates, patrol-boats and corvettes (type "João Coutinho") of French and West German origin, as well as high-speed boats adapted for river operation.

Other war materials utilized - with the exception of armoured cars, tanks and other heavy vehicles which they can no longer use in the southern areas of our country, the Portuguese army resorted to every available weapon in their arsenal, to thwart the Mission. It is worth noting here the continual use of 130 mm cannon, against the liberated areas and the routes that could be used in the Mission.

3. Regions and zones that were subject to terrorist aggression

It was particularly the border region of Balana-Kitafine that suffered most. But, from 2 April the aggression was extended to the Catio region in the zones of Cubucare and Tombali. In effect, unable to control the corridor of Guiledje, which they believed to be the approach route to the south of the country, they suspected (or knew) that the members of the Special Mission would be taken up to Catio region. For this reason, while still maintaining continual assaults and bombardments on Balana, they launched attacks against the zones of Cubucare and Tombali.

It was in fact precisely these zones of Balana (Balana-Kitafine) and Cubucare (Catio region) that were visited by the Special Mission during its week-long stay in the liberated areas of the south.

It should be pointed out that the first acts of aggression were directed against the zone of Kitafine (south-western part of country), which dozens of people of different nationalities have already visited and written about.

4. Characteristics of the aggression

The aggression was characterized chiefly by aerial bombings (night and day) of napalm and fragmentation bombs; terrorist assaults with helicopter troops; landing of special troops along the rivers; steady bombardment of the liberated areas and routes that could possibly be used by the Special Mission.

The Portuguese Air Force attacked the most populated villages, and bombed indiscriminately the bush and forest zones suspected of sheltering the population or providing a support base for the United Nations Mission. The landing of helicopter-troops or river boats was aimed at the destruction of villages and crops as well as the occupation of certain positions important for control of approach routes and bar the way to the Mission and eventually to capture or kill its members.

Cannon fire from Portuguese garrisons in Catio, Bedanda, Guiledje, Kebo and Gadamael were aimed at creating insecurity everywhere, especially along the border areas and along the routes, which would possibly be followed by the Special Mission, as well as in the bush and forest areas.

Members of the Special Mission were able to come into direct contact with these varied aspects of Portuguese terrorist aggression. In fact, they witnessed bombings for several days, photographed villages that had just been bombed and also bombs which had just fell but not exploded; they saw groups of helicopters heading towards landing points for assaults, they visited villages and saw charred remains of crops just burnt by special helicopter-troops. On the return journey they were forced to take cover against canon fire to which they were by then accustomed.

The objectives of the aggression were:

(a) To terrorize the population so that they would refuse to collaborate with the Special Mission;

(b) To intimidate the members of the Special Mission so that they would cut short their work programme;

(c) To destroy as far as possible the social and cultural achievements of our Party in the areas near the border (mainly hospitals, clinics and schools), so that the Special Mission could not confirm their existence.

(d) To lure our fighters to a classical attack whereby the colonialists could use the tens of thousands of men stationed in the south and all the available weapons. That would have enabled them to destroy a large part of our armed forces and capture or kill members of the Special Mission.

The active participation of the population (men, women and young people) in the work of the Special Mission meetings, inquiries, conversations, public meetings, etc. were the best evidence of what one of the people said during a meeting in Cubucare sector: "Whatever the means and the crimes perpetrated by the Portuguese colonialists, and despite all the sacrifices that we have to bear, we would like to declare that we feel happy and proud at the presence of your Mission. No power in the world is able to break our determination to liberate our country from the heinous Portuguese colonialist domination." (Excerpts and literal translation from a tape recording made during a meeting on 5 April 1972.)

Portuguese terrorist actions did not intimidate the members of the Special Mission, who were able to overcome all the difficulties. On the contrary, Portuguese aggression showed clearer than ever the importance of the Mission and strengthened their decision to continue to the end and complete the historic task entrusted to them by the United Nations.

The colonialists were able to destroy some villages, schools and hospitals and were able to burn large quantities of crops of two villages. Although they created some insecurity in the border area of Balana, and despite sacrifices we had to bear, the colonialists made a positive contribution to the work of the Mission. Because of intensive bombing and frequent terrorist assaults, we had to prolong their visit and take them further inland, up to the zones of Cubucare in the region of Catio.

Obviously, we didn't fall into the trap of pitched battle so as to ensure the Mission the necessary safety to complete their work. While deploying the bulk of our armed forces on the Balana and Catic fronts to protect the lines of communication and the members of the Mission, we used small groups specially armed local forces, to harass the terrorist aggressors. Other units of our armed forces launched artillery attacks against entrenched Portuguese camps. This tactic, which inflicted important losses on the enemy, made the search for the United Nations members impossible; like using planes and helicopters to find a needle in a haystack

We were able to frustrate the essential objectives of the aggression, which were: the control of the lines of communication between the border and the liberated areas (military plan); demoralization of the population (moral and political plan). The success of the work of the Special Mission was therefore guaranteed. Certainly the enemy was able to inflict on us some loss of human life, principally among civilian population and able to destroy some of our social and cultural achievements. But at the same time the colonialists gave the Special Mission the most convincing proof of this new reality in our country: the fascist Portuguese colonialists are today nothing but terrorist aggressors against a free and sovereign people who have decided to put an end once and for all to foreign domination on the soil of the motherland.

5. The action of the aggressors

The terrorist act launched by the colonialists in the southern liberated area against the Special Mission was the largest and most intensive military operation ever undertaken by the enemy during its colonial war against our people. This fact shows clearly the importance that the Lisbon Government and the Portuguese staff attach to the Special Mission. For 22 days (from 18 March to 9 April) the colonial army resorted to all means at its disposal in the South, to stop the Special Mission from entering our country on its fact-finding mission as directed by the United Nations General Assembly. The aggression which was intensified from 28 March onwards (after the Special Mission's departure from New York) was, with the exception of the battle of Komo which lasted 75 days, the longest continual confrontation between the colonial forces and our people's armed forces.

Air raids reached an unprecedented level, taking place day and night. We must point out that it was the first time for a year that the enemy resumed night bombings with P-2V bombers and even jet planes. Napalm was used widely. Daily air raids averaged about 15, with a maximum of 23 and a minimum of 5 (in the first days). Air operations were concentrated mainly on the villages, but random bombing of bush underbrush, forests and river ports were daily and frequent machine-gunning of houses and everything that moved was fierce.

During the aggression the enemy carried out 18 landings of helicopter troops. These were aimed at terrorizing the population, destroying social and cultural achievements (in particular schools and hospitals), burning the harvest, placing anti-personnel mines on roads and paths, and occupying key positions on the roadways and waterways. The number of helicopters used, both over-all and in each single operation, was larger than ever before. Sometimes 14 helicopters were used in a single operation, making several sorties between the landing points and the Portuguese camps (Catic, Bolama, Kobo, etc.). In some instances the enemy

was able to remain on the ground for a few days without being discovered by our forces (especially in Unal, Botche-Bunhe, and on the right bank of the river Balana near the villages of Nhacoba and Ntuane). But in general the enemy was forced back to their helicopters by our troops who harassed them and caused serious losses.

There were six troop landings from boats in the area of Tombali and Cubucare, but after suffering losses the enemy were forced back to their boats by our forces. Steady firing of cannons (day and night) from every enemy camp still remaining in the zones under attack were aimed at blocking the route of the Special Mission, and to make as much noise as possible to cover the flight of helicopters to assault points. Thousands of shells were also fired on the territory of the Republic of Guinea near the border. Because of the safety measures that we had taken, this enemy shelling was shown, in the words of the Chairman of the Special Mission, to be "ineffectual, ineffective".

The enemy placed hundreds of anti-personnel mines on certain roads and paths in the bush, which they considered would at some time be used by the Special Mission. Two of our scouts, from the unit that was protecting the Mission, were killed by these mines.

6. Chronological account of the aggression

March 18 - Intensive bombardment of the zones of Balana and Kitafine. In the latter damage was not very great, with bombs landing mostly in bushes supposedly sheltering our fighters. In the zone of Balana, the village of Farabate was severely damaged. While the village was under intensive bombardment, helicopter-troops landed in the zone, trying to advance towards a clinic nearby, with the clear aim of destroying it. Located by the fighters of our local armed forces, the enemy hastily reboarded the helicopters, avoiding a confrontation.

March 19, 20, 21 and 22 - Reconnaissance aircraft frequently circled above Balana, Kitafine and Cubucare. The first two zones were bombed from 9 a.m. until 2 p.m. Extensive machine-gunning by planes of bushes and forests.

March 23 - Generalized bombing of the zones of Balana (near the border) and Kitafine. The village of Fabarate was again bombed, as well as the nearby bushes, where the enemy thought that the clinic, which it had been unable to destroy during the assault on 18 March, was located.

March 24 - Generalized bombing of the zone of Balana; the village of Fabarate was once again the main target. Intensive bombing of the village of Unal and the neighbouring zones. Machine-gunning of the village by planes and helicopters.

March 25 - Intensive bombing of the border areas. Planes dropped their bombs and machine-gunned along the banks of the river Balana, aiming mostly at ports.

A group of 4 Fiats dived over the village of Ndalial and the surrounding areas, bombing and machine-gunning. They had discovered signs of human life: the air attack killed 18 and wounded 23. Among the dead were

3 children and 8 women (among them a young nurse, Mariama Sanha). Among the wounded, 10 were seriously hurt, including a 13-month old baby, son of the nurse who was killed and of Mamadu Cassama, head of educational affairs for the zone of Tombali. Members of the Committee of 24 were later able to see the seriously wounded in our "Solidarity" hospital.

On the same day (March 25) several other raids were carried out against the village of Unal and the surrounding areas.

March 26 - Intensive bombing of the border area, with cannon fire on the Balana river. The enemy tried to land helicopter-troops near Balana, but were turned back. A woman was killed by shrapnel.

The enemy landed helicopter-troops near Campeane, in the area of Kitafine, destroying a hospital and a boarding school. Anticipating the aggression, the buildings had been evacuated earlier. The enemy was thus unable to inflict any loss of life.

March 27 - Frequent raids, lasting the whole day, against border areas (air raids and cannon fire) particularly against villages in the area of Unal.

March 28 - From dawn onwards, steady and intensive bombing of Unal and surrounding areas, followed by intensive cannon fire from the entrenched camps of Bedanda and Buba. At about 9 a.m. the enemy made several landings of helicopter-troops at Unal; 14 helicopters were used for the first landing. Planes bombed the area continuously. During the bombing we lost one fighter and three others were wounded.

N.B. Unal, in the liberated region of Balana-Kitafine, is the key to the South, giving access to all the liberated regions (Catio, Kinara, Cubisseco). The enemy were determined to occupy it, to frustrate the work of the Special Mission. Because of its importance, the enemy hoped to draw us into a fierce battle in this zone. They waited three days in the open before being harassed by our fighters. It will be recalled that 28 March was the day that the Special Mission left New York.

March 29 - Intensive bombing of the border areas throughout the day. The villages of Botche Djati, Botche Sansa, Botche Bedau and Fabarate were the main targets.

A few days later, on the night of 3 to 4 April, the members of the Special Mission were able to see the damage to the village of Botche Djati, when they passed through it.

On the same day, 29 March, the enemy tried several helicopter and boat landings in the area of Tombali and Cubucare. Faced with fierce resistance from our fighters they had to turn back.

The bombing killed one man and wounded three others.

March 30 - Intensive, meticulous bombing against border areas, specially around Balana. Uninterrupted shelling of the borders and the banks of the Balana river.

Reconnaissance planes and groups of helicopters circled the sky. Nord-Atlas planes made several trips between Bissau and entrenched camps on the border (Bedanda, Kebo, mainly).

March 31 - Bombing, strafing and shelling beginning at dawn. At about 11 a.m. the enemy landed helicopter-troops near the village of Botche-NBunhe, previously bombed on 29 and 30 March. The landing was covered by an intensive artillery barrage fired from Bedanda and Guiledje, followed by more protective bombing from squadrons of Fiat G-91 jets. An old man was captured and tortured: he was meant to tell his captors where "DONKA" hospital was located (the name is after a hospital in the Republic of Guinea). Before the arrival of our forces, the enemy was landed by helicopter in the bush near the hospital. For security reasons the hospital had been evacuated earlier. Enemy troops systematically destroyed everything in sight at the hospital, but did not burn the huts so as not to indicate their presence. The enemy spent the rest of the night in the zone.

Other landing attempts were later repulsed. It was on this date that the members of the Special Mission arrived in Conakry.

April 1 - Intensive and large-scale bombing continued. Our fighters located enemy troops that had landed the previous day in the region of Botche NBunhe. An ambush was immediately arranged, and the enemy took up a defensive position. After suffering heavy losses from constant harassment, they were forced to leave the area by helicopter. This was the failure of the enemy plans to control the area and prevent the Special Mission from reaching the more distant regions: Cubucare, Tombali and Como (region of Catio) and Cubisseco.

Later, the Special Mission was able to visit and photograph houses destroyed during the bombing of Botche NBunhe.

In the afternoon, the areas of Balana and Cubucare were heavily bombed.

April 2 - Bombing continued throughout the day. Airborne troops tried again to land in Cubucare and Tombali but were repulsed. But they succeeded in landing near the village of Tchintchidari, which had previously been heavily bombed.

More helicopter landings were made on the Balana-Unal axis, where the enemy laid anti-personnel mines. Two scouts were killed by these mines, and two others wounded. They were from the advance party of the column marching with the Special Mission towards Balana. That evening the two wounded scouts were seen by the members of the Special Mission, who had just entered our country. To allay any anxiety arising from the news that mines had been placed on the road they were to follow, they were told that the scouts had been wounded during a "bombing raid".

Harassed by our forces the enemy troops which had landed in Tchintchidari had to retreat with losses.

In the area of Cubucare, the villages of Catchamba and N'Tchangue were heavily bombed and then burned down by helicopter-troops, who also destroyed the crops. One person was killed by napalm and another seriously burned.

April 3 - The members of the Special Mission met some of the leaders from the Southern Front. They rested.

Intensive bombing of the area of Balana and Cubucare. The village of Botche NBunhe was again the main target of the Portuguese planes, an indication that enemy troops were again trying to make a landing. At about 2 p.m. helicopter-troops landed in the zone, about 2 km from the base being visited by the Special Mission. In order not to put them at risk we avoided any engagement with the troops, but directed our fighters to follow their movements.

After burning the houses and some of the crops in Botche NBunhe (the population had already been evacuated to a safer place) the enemy camped in the area to prevent the Special Mission from moving towards the region of Catio. They stayed until 6 a.m. when, harassed from several sides, they were forced to leave carrying their dead and wounded. (Later, the members of the Special Mission were able to see and photograph destroyed houses and burned crops, as well as people who had lost both.)

That night the decision was made to take the members of the Special Mission to the zone of Cubucare in the area of Catio where, despite the continued bombing, they would be able to do their work in better conditions.

The same evening the BBC in London announced that the Special Mission was in our country.

April 4 - The bombings continued and some attempts were made at landing on the left bank of Balana river. The planes were now concentrating on the Cubucare area. Intensive artillery was maintained in the area.

The Special Mission continued its work.

April 5 - After heavy bombing, helicopter-troops were launched against the village of Ien Kuntoi, from the Bedanda side. The village, which was totally destroyed, had been visited that morning by the Special Mission, which had been warmly greeted by the local people.

There were bombing, strafing and new landing attempts in Balana.

The Special Mission continued its work (meetings, inquiries, taking testimonies, watching social and cultural activities).

April 6 - Less intensive bombing. Enemy troops, harassed and suffering heavy casualties, withdrew from the zone of Botche NBunhe.

The enemy began to bomb the zone of Tombali.

That night the Mission, which had ended its work in the area of Cubucare, began the journey towards Balana.

April 7 - Sporadic bombing and strafing in the Cubucare area, but more intensive on the banks of Balana river. The enemy seemed to have lost all hope of capturing or killing the members of the Special Mission during their visit, but were now trying to do it during their return journey.

In fact, helicopter-troops landed near the villages of Nhacoba and Ntuane, on the right bank of Balana river. Their intention was to attack any small boats on the river during the night. They were sure that, being tired, the members of the Special Mission would be travelling by canoe. They waited there for two nights, after which they were expelled by our forces with heavy losses.

That evening, having finished their work and carried out their programme, the Special Mission started its journey back towards the border. For many hours on the way they could hear the explosion of shells fired by the enemy from the camp of Guiledje.

April 8 - Towards 8.30 a.m. the members of the Special Mission crossed the border. Under the constant protection of our armed forces and accompanied by leaders of the Party they had spent one week in our country.

Enemy forces continued to bomb the region of Balana, Cubucare and Tombali, but only sporadically.

That evening, Radio Conakry broadcast to the world the return to the Republic of Guinea of the Special Mission, after successfully accomplishing the task entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.

April 9 - Two enemy air raids in the morning, in the area of Balana. In the afternoon a message from the Southern Front reached the General Secretariat of the Party: "Situation returned to normal".

We should point out that during the period of aggression, besides other operations carried out against enemy troops our armed forces made 28 attacks against entrenched camps, while engaged in many other activities on the various fronts.

From the above it is clear that the enemy resorted largely to its air superiority to plan and execute its aggression against the United Nations Special Mission, knowing that our anti-aircraft defence is still rudimentary. On the ground, however, it faced tremendous difficulties: it was therefore not able to implement its plan of using helicopter-troops to prevent the successful conclusion of the work of the Special Mission. Once again, facts have shown that the people of the liberated areas are right when they sing:

"The guerrilla rules the land
The little Portuguese ... in the clouds!"

III. A VICTORY FOR HUMANITY

The Lisbon Government and the Portuguese General Staff were certain that their colonial troops would be able to capture or kill the members of the United Nations Special Mission during the visit. But the Portuguese authorities know better than anyone else that we have liberated most of our national territory, and that we are able to take there any guest we invite. They resorted to every available means to eliminate the Mission, and the extent of their defeat can be measured by these means and the criminality of their intentions.

In inviting the United Nations to send a Special Mission to our country, our objective was not to prove the fact that is well known all over the world: the sovereignty of our people over vast areas of our country. We made a deliberate challenge to the colonialists, while erecting a still more concrete basis for the development of United Nations action against Portuguese colonialism. We have also inflicted the bitterest politico-military defeat of their colonial war on the Lisbon Government. We have succeeded in showing United Nations representatives the abominable crimes perpetrated by the colonialists against our people.

Sure of the failure of the Special Mission, the Portuguese Overseas Minister arrived in Bissau in April and the purpose of his visit was to receive personally, in the capital of "the province of Guine, with all their due honours", as the Portuguese official paper "Diario de Noticias" suggested, "the illustrious United Nations delegates who have come illegally to Portugal" ... or their corpses. Unable to do this, the Minister was compelled to inaugurate three sections of a tarred road in enemy-controlled areas, and a broadcasting station which had been in operation since January.

The head of the Portuguese Government, Mr. Marcello Caetano, on the other hand, did not succeed in hiding his hatred of the United Nations and of the Special Mission. On 11 April (three days after the success of the Mission was known all over the world), he made a speech and, speaking about the trip that the President of the Portuguese Republic had made to Brazil he declared:

"... If the United Nations had existed in 1822 what would have become of Brazil? How ridiculous to count the number of Indians, negroes, and whites; to discriminate by race and colour and to reclaim back America for the Indians! To scheme against a minority government and demand one vote for every people, one vote for each man! If the United Nations had existed in 1822 and it had become involved in the problem, with all its decolonization and self-determination prejudices, it would have taken into consideration the first phantom movement and demanded that the Portuguese should leave. A commission of delegates from ignorant nations would make its report, would probably visit the Amazon to find out if the natives agreed or not, and the votes of the savages would prevail over the will of civilized men." (sic).

Further, the head of the Portuguese Government stated:

"There exists in the United Nations a false conception according to which each continent belongs to the races which are considered as indigenous.

This is why the United Nations tries to enforce the principle that in Africa states should be governed by negroes."

And further:

"... The case of Rhodesia could be a good example. Despite all the constitutional guarantees given to the black population, the United Nations refuses to accept the independence (of Rhodesia), because the government, as of now, does not serve mainly the coloured people. The whites, according to this conception, do not have any right to orient and lead the people of Southern Africa."

These words from the head of the Portuguese Government, revealing all the frustration felt by the Government at the success of the Mission, do not need further comment. For all that they show the racist character, the intentions and the most secret plans of Portuguese policy in Africa.

On the other hand, on 20 April the Commander of the colonial army in our country released a communiqué stating:

"Concerning enemy activity, there is an attempt to create secure conditions for the infiltration into the national territory of a small group of foreigners who form the Special Mission of the Committee of 24 ... The positions taken up by the enemy for this purpose have been completely destroyed ..."

The Commander does not even bother to explain how it is possible to conceive and establish safety measures from outside a territory since, according to the Portuguese authorities, our fighters only operate from the outside. The Communiqué however does not deny that a small group of foreigners was able to infiltrate 'national territory'.

It is the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs who shamelessly denied this truth in a United Nations press release on 11 April 1972. In this communiqué, the Minister slanders the distinguished representatives of the United Nations and therefore of the international community, as poor dupes, victims of breach of trust on the part of our fighters, who "made them go walking in the Republic of Guine" for a week, under bombing and plane strafing, facing helicopter-troops and following paths sprinkled with land-mines.

Colonialism is a great evil. But as our people say: "The worst evil is having been colonized by Portugal" whose Government can sink to such sordid depths.

The success of the United Nations Special Mission, despite the Portuguese aggression that hoped to destroy it, is certainly a major victory for our African people, under the leadership of our Party in defence of our inalienable rights. In view of the uniquely criminal nature of Portuguese colonialism and its contempt for African dignity and for the human being, this success is above all a victory for Africa and for humanity.

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY PAIGC ON 10 APRIL 1972

At the invitation of the national leadership of our Party and pursuant to a decision of the General Assembly, a Special Mission of the United Nations, composed of representatives of three Member countries (Ecuador, Sweden, Tunisia) and accompanied by two Secretariat officials (a Senegalese Secretary and a Japanese photographer) has just spent a week (1 to 8 April) in the Liberated Areas in the south of our country.

During its visit, the Special Mission, which was received by some of the top leaders of our Party and of the struggle, was able to see for itself the situation in the country, contact the population, take part in public meetings, visit schools and other social institutions and obtain detailed information on the organization and institutions of the new life which our people are building while coping with the terrorist bombings and attacks of the Portuguese colonialists.

Having learned of the United Nations decision and the timing of the Mission, the Portuguese colonialists unleashed widespread terrorist aggression from 28 March onwards against the liberated south, particularly in the frontier sectors, using most of their regular and special troops, all their aircraft, helicopters and other technical facilities to block the path of the United Nations Mission and sabotage the plan for the visit.

Defying the criminal barbarity of the Portuguese colonialists who burnt several villages with napalm, destroyed two hospitals, a health post, and three schools, and killed 25 people including four children, 13 women and two old people, our fighters inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and provided the security required for the successful accomplishment of the United Nations Mission.

This important victory for our people, the United Nations and all the anti-colonialist forces is a further irrefutable confirmation of the fact that, under the leadership of our Party, our people are sovereign and sole masters of their destiny in the Liberated Areas of our country.

APPENDIX V

LIST OF PRIORITIES PRESENTED TO THE SPECIAL MISSION BY PAIGC

Fabrics

- twill
- drill
- print
- khaki
- white percale
- mosquito netting
- other fabrics

Food-stuffs

- concentrated milk
- powdered milk
- preserved meat, fish and peas
- dried beans

Cleaning materials

- household soap in bars

Tobacco

- matches
- cigarettes

Medicaments

- alcohol
- mercurochrome
- bandages
- compresses
- absorbent cotton

Anti-malaria drugs

- chloroquinol

Antibiotics

- penicillin crystals

Solutions for intravenous injections

physiological solution

isotonic glucose solution

Vaccines and serums

anti-tetanus

anti-gangrene

APPENDIX VI

PARTIAL LIST OF ARMS SUPPLIED TO PORTUGAL PROVIDED BY PAIGC

1. AIR FORCE

Type of equipment and supplier country	Initial quantity	Observations
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		
Republic F-84 G Thunderjet	50	Through AMAP (American Military Assistance Programme)
North American Sabre F-86 F	50	"
Cessna T-37 C	30	1963/1964
C-54 Skymasters	5	1965
Douglas B-26 bombers	20	1965/1966
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY		
Nord 2502	8	
F-86 K Sabre jets	60	Built in Canada 1965
Fiat G-91 Nato type R4	40	1966
Dornier Fiat and Noratlas	140	1968
C-160 Bombers	?	1968
Dornier DO - 27	130	1969
Saro Skeeter Helicopters	10	1969
FRANCE		
Nord 2502	6	Through the Trans-Atlantic Aeronautical Union
Holste Broussard	4	
Junkers Ju-52	?	
Nord 2502	6	Through Nord Aviation
Alouette 2 helicopters	?	
" 2 "	21	1963
" 3 "	54	Nord Aviation - 1968

Type of equipment and supplier country	Initial quantity	Observations
UNITED KINGDOM		
North American Harvard T-3	Hundreds	Fifteen (15) provided by the Royal Navy
North American Harvard T-3	"	Through AMAP
Auster D 5/160	150	1962/1967
NETHERLANDS		
Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon	18	Through AMAP
Lockheed P-2V Neptune	12	"
CANADA		
Beech C-45 transport	19	

2. SHIPS

Type of equipment and supplier country	Initial quantity	Observations
UNITED KINGDOM		
Frigates <u>Alvares Cabral</u> and <u>Pacheco Pereira</u>	2	
Patrol boat <u>Antares</u>	1	
Frigates <u>D. Francisco de Almeida</u> and <u>Vasco da Gama</u>	2	
Frigates <u>Morocambe Bay</u> and <u>Mounts Bay</u>	2	
Patrol boat <u>Regulo</u>	1	
Frigate <u>Dalrymple</u>	1	1966

Type of equipment and supplier country	Initial quantity	Observations
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA		
Minesweepers	8	
Minesweepers (large)	4	
Frigates <u>Corte Real</u> and <u>Diogo Cão</u>	2	On loan
Frigates <u>Almirante Gago Coutinho</u> , <u>Almirante Magalhaes Correia</u> and <u>Almirante Pereira da Silva</u>	3	The United States paid half of the cost from 1966 to 1967
FRANCE		
Patrol boats	3	Paid by the United States
Frigates	4	1966/1969
Submarines	4	1967/1969
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY		
Patrol boats	8	Five were sent to Angola and three - <u>Canopus</u> , <u>Deneb</u> and <u>Belatrix</u> to Guinea
1,400 ton warships (the corvette <u>João Coutinho</u> and others)	3	Through Blohm Voss 1970
ITALY		
Frigate <u>Pero Escobar</u>	1	Paid by the United States
Patrol boats	5	Built in Portugal (paid by the United States)
Long boat LDP 214	1	Built in Portugal by NATO 1968

3. MILITARY VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT

TYPE	ORIGIN	YEAR	OBSERVATIONS
Panhard AML H 607 armoured cars	France	1966	The first consignment of 200 jeeps was provided through the BMC (British Metal Corporation)
Humber armoured cars	United Kingdom	1967	
M-47 tanks	FRG		
Austin Gipsy jeeps	United Kingdom	1965/1967	
Willys jeeps	United States	1964/1966	Through Mercedes Benz
Unimog trucks	FRG		
Berliet trucks	France		Through MABOR (a subsidiary of the United States International Tire Rubber and Co.)
Tires for military vehicles	United States		
Electronic equipment	France	1966	Through BARBIER, BERNARD and TURENNE S.A.

4. WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION (NATO, countries members of NATO and Israel)

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	ORIGIN
PISTOLS	
Walter P 38 9 mm	Germany (Federal Republic)
Beretta M-1951	Italy
MAS M-1950	France
Browning FN 9 mm HP	Belgium - NATO

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	ORIGIN
SELF-LOADING RIFLES	
A.R. 7.62 FN (ARL)	Belgium, FRG, United Kingdom
A.R. G3 7.62 (CETME)	Spain - NATO
A.R. light Beretta Mod. 59-7.62	Italy
A.R. M-16 5.56 mm	
Grenade launching system for A.R. 7.62 FN (ARL) by ENERGA	United States of America
Infra-red system for G3 (CETME)	"
SUB-MACHINE GUNS	
UZI MP 2 A1 9 mm	Israel - NATO
FN type MAG (General use) MGX 15 B 1 7.62 mm	Belgium United Kingdom
MG 1 (MG 3) 7.62 mm	FRG-Denmark, Italy
BREN 7.62 mm	Holland, United Kingdom
Browning M 1918 A 2 30 M2	United States of America, NATO
CARBINES	
American Cal. 30 M-1 (Garand)	United States of America
Mauser Cal. 7.92	Federal Republic of Germany
MORTARS	
60 mm	United States of America
81 mm M-29	United States of America, NATO
120 mm Brandt	Federal Republic of Germany
ROCKET LAUNCHERS	
R.L. light PZ F 44-1	Federal Republic of Germany
Anti-tank R.L. M-20 B1 89 mm m/52	United States of America
Anti-tank R.L. M 9 A 1 M/55 60 mm	"
"TESTER" for anti-tank R.L. M 20 M 7142254	
"TESTER" 17 T 5518-100 for anti-tank R.L. M 9 A 1	

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	ORIGIN
ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENCE	
12.7 AA US Mount, Rifle, Multiple M55 (M 45C)	United States of America
NON-RECOIL GUNS	
57 mm M 18 A 1	United States of America, NATO
75 mm M 20	"
105 mm	United States of America - NATO, FRG
LAND AND SURFACE MINES	
Anti-tank mines	United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Canada
Anti-personnel mines	United States of America, Italy, France
GRENADES	
Fragmentation hand grenades	United States of America
33/46 hand grenades	"
M/954 smoke hand grenades	Canada
DEMOLITION CHARGES ETC.	
Perforating hollow charge 1 Mark 3	United Kingdom
Benglore torpedo	
1 kg demolition blocks	
200 gm and 100 gm cartridges	
Detonators	
Fuses	
Galvanometers	
Electric wire	

TYPE OF EQUIPMENT	ORIGIN
AMMUNITION	
9 mm	NATO
7.62 mm	United Kingdom, United States of America
60 mm mortar shells	France
81 mm mortar shells	Italy
120 mm mortar shells	Israel
Rockets for PZF 44-1	
Rockets for M 20 89 mm rocket launchers	
Rockets for M 9 A1 60 mm rocket launchers	
12.7 for anti-aircraft US Mount	
High explosive shells for 57 mm 18 A1	
Armour-piercing shells for 75 mm M 20	
Small special anti-aircraft rocket launcher with ammunition	United States of America
Scheffler ABFV bursting charges	France
Mine detectors	
Pneumatic boats	

APPENDIX VII

PARTIAL LIST OF BOOKS, FILMS AND ARTICLES CONCERNING THE LIBERATED AREAS OF GUINEA (BISSAU) a/

In Press Release No. 5/72 of 27 April 1972, the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations stated that "there are no 'liberated areas' that are under the control of the PAIGC".

For its part the Special Mission points out that it was not the first to visit the Liberated Areas of Guinea (Bissau). Dozens of people of different nationalities - members of parliament, historians, writers, journalists, film makers, students - have already visited the Liberated Areas. Some of them stayed there for months, others for weeks. These visitors have published reports, studies, newspaper articles, books, films and radio and television newscasts about the Liberated Areas.

The following are a few examples:

Books

The Liberation of Guinea, by Basil Davidson, the British historian
Guinée portugaise et Cap Vert en lutte pour leur indépendance and Lutte armée en Afrique by Gérard Chaliand, the French writer

Guinée Bissau, rapport sur un pays et un mouvement de libération, published in 1971, by Mrs. Birgitta Dahl, a member of the Swedish Parliament in collaboration with Mr. Andreassen

In 1969 the Swedish writer Göran Palm wrote a preface for a selection of speeches by A. Cabral

Films

"Lala Quema" by Mario Marret, 1964

"Nossa Terra" by Mario Marret, assisted by Izidro Romero, 1966

"Lavante Negro" by Nelli, cameraman E. Bentivoglio, 1966

"Madina-Boé" by Jose Massip, 1967

Short films have been made by:

A team from the German Democratic Republic in 1964

Netherlands Television in 1966

A team from Radio Diffusion et Télévision Française in 1966

a/ Provided by PAIGC.

V. Orsini, an Italian film maker, in 1967

A Soviet team in 1968

M. Honorin, a Frenchman, in 1968


Articles

The New York Times of 8 November 1971, an article by William Borders

Tiden, Review of the Social Democrat Party of Sweden, article by
Mr. Lars Rudebeck, April 1971

Expressen, a Stockholm newspaper, a series of articles by Mr. Anders Ehmark,
in 1972

Long Island Press (New York) of 17 May 1972, an article by Larry Heinzerling.



APPENDIX IX

PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL MISSION



1. Members of the Mission, accompanied by PAIGC members crossing a river on a make-shift bridge in the Balana-Kitafine region, Southern Zone, Guinea (Bissau).



2. Mrs. Satú Djassi, in charge of health programmes, in the Cubacaré sector, Southern Zone, addresses members of the Special Mission and the people in the area. Standing with his arms crossed, at left, is Mr. José Araujo, Political Commissar PAIGC. Seated to his left are the members of the Mission: Mr. Kamel Belkhiria of Tunisia, Mr. Horacio Sevilla-Borja of Ecuador (Chairman) and Mr. Folke Löfgren of Sweden.



3. Members of the Mission holding a discussion in a house destroyed by fire as a result of a Portuguese airborne commando attack on 3 April 1972. The house is located at Botche-Djate in the Balana-Kitafine region, Southern Zone, Guinea (Bissau). Seated at centre (left to right): Messrs. Löfgren, Belkhiria and Sevilla-Borja. Standing at right is Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gaye of the United Nations Secretariat.



4. Members of the Mission are seen inspecting an unexploded (50.7 kg T.N.T.) bomb which had been dropped during a Portuguese air raid on Botche Djate in October 1971. Left to right: Mr. Belkhiria, Mr. Gaye, the village Chief, Mr. Löfgren and Mr. Sevilla-Borja.



5. Members of the Mission during their visit to the Cubacaré sector, Southern Zone, Guinea (Bissau). Left to right: Messrs. Belkhiria, Löfgren, Gaye and Sevilla-Borja. At the right is Mr. Yutaka Nagata of the United Nations Secretariat.



6. Members of the Mission visiting the Areolina Lopez Cruz boarding school located in the Cubacaré sector, Southern Zone, Guinea (Bissau). Left to right: Messrs. Belkhiria, Sevilla-Borja and Löfgren.

APPENDIX X

FORMS USED BY PAIGC IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
LIBERATED AREAS OF GUINEA (BISSAU)

- A. School attendance cards in each sector
- B. Hospital statistics
- C. Court records
- D. Birth certificates
- E. Laissez-passer
- F. Invoice
- G. Certificate of purchase

A MAPA DA FREQUÊNCIA ESCOLAR EM CADA SETOR

Ano escolar de _____

Região de _____ Nº de alunos em idade escolar no Sector de _____

M.	_____	Total	Total dos matriculados
F.	_____		

Med. 103 — Tip. do P. A. I. n. C. — 1.000 Ex.

[illegible]

O Responsável

MOVIMENTO DE DOENTES

CONSULTAS

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

HOSPITALIZAÇÕES

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

FERIDOS GRAVES (2)

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

FERIDOS LIGEIOS (3)

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

GRANDE CIRURGIA

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

PEQUENA CIRURGIA

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

DOENÇAS MAIS FREQUENTES

Paludismo _____

Filariose e elefantíase (Cantimbon) _____

Bilharziose (Esquentamento com sangue) _____

Tripanosomíase (Doença de sono) _____

Anemia (Língua e conjuntivas pálidas) _____

Edema (Inflamação das pernas, etc) _____

Desnutrição e Kwashiorkor (crianças magras) _____

Conjuntivite (Dôr de olho) _____

Ceratóite (Dôr do coco de olho) _____

Sarna _____

Impingem _____

Lepra (Impinge burmedjo) _____

Rino-faringite (Catarro) _____

Bronquite _____

Pneumonia _____

Tuberculose Pulmonar — provável _____

CURATIVOS

militares _____

pop. homens _____

" mulheres _____

" crianças _____

TOTAL _____

EVACUAÇÕES A FRONTEIRA

Feridos militares _____

" população _____

Doentes militares _____

" população _____

TOTAL _____

EXTRAÇÃO DE DENTES

militares _____

população _____

TOTAL _____

PARTOS

FALECIDOS

Feridos militares _____

" pop. homens _____

" " mulheres _____

" " crianças _____

Doentes militares _____

" população _____

TOTAL _____

OBSERVAÇÕES

Gastrite (Dôr de estômago) _____

Colite fermentativa (Dôr de barriga) _____

Gastro-Enterite (Vômitos e Diarreia) _____

Dis. Amibiana (Diarreia com sangue) _____

Blenorragia (Esquentamento com pus) _____

Amenorreia (Ca olha Lua) _____

Impotência Sexual (Ca ta reta) _____

Feridos de Guerra em Geral _____

Hérnias Inguinais e Escrotais _____

Hérnias Umbilicais _____

Hidrocelo _____

Apendicites _____

Outras Doenças _____

SERVIÇOS DA POPULAÇÃO E JUSTIÇA

TRIBUNAL POPULAR DE

TÉRMO DE AUDIÊNCIA

Aos _____ dias do mês de _____ de 19____ nesta tabanca, na sala das audiências do Tribunal Popular de _____ onde se achava o Presidente, camarada _____ comigo assessor, no final declarado, aí às _____ horas, presentes os juizes _____, foi aberta a sessão da audiência de Instrução e julgamento. Submetido a julgamento o acusado _____ na causa Nº _____/19____ no qual responde como incurso na lei dos costumes desta região ou no Nº _____ da Lei de Justiça Militar, à chamada compareceu o mesmo. Inicialmente o camarada _____ fez a apresentação do caso. Em seguida foi inquirido o queixoso, o réu e as testemunhas que, em resumo, disseram o seguinte:

Queixoso:

O réu:

1ª Testemunha: _____

2ª Testemunha: _____

3ª Testemunha: _____

Finalmente o camarada _____ fez a conclusão para a sentença. Suspensa a sessão, os juizes retiraram-se para a elaboração da sentença que, uma vez reaberta a sessão, foi lida em voz alta estando o réu de pé.

Nada mais havendo a tratar-se foi encerrada a sessão da audiência. E para constar lavrei este termo que lido e conferido vai ser assinado. Eu _____ o escrevi e subscrevi.

_____, de _____ de 19__

O assessor,

REGISTO CIVIL

Assento de nascimento Nº _____

Nome completo da criança _____

_____ sexo _____

hora do nascimento _____, dia _____, mês _____

e ano _____ lugar: _____

sector de _____, frente _____

(Filiação nome completo): _____

Pai _____

estado civil _____, natural de _____

sector de _____, residência habitual _____

Mãe _____

estado civil _____, natural de _____

sector de _____, residência habitual _____

Avô paterno _____

Avô materno _____

Declarante _____

Testemunhas _____

e _____

Feito em _____ no dia _____ de 197 _____

O Encarregado do registo civil

Testemunhas



D

SERVIÇOS DA POPULAÇÃO E JUSTIÇA

REGISTO CIVIL

ASSENTO DE NASCIMENTO Nº _____

Nome completo da criança _____ sexo _____

Hora do nascimento _____, dia _____, mês _____ e ano _____

Lugar: _____, sector de _____, frente _____

Filiação (nome completo): _____

Pai _____, estado civil _____, natural de _____

_____ sector de _____, residência habitual _____

Mãe _____, estado civil _____, natural de _____

_____ sector de _____, residência habitual _____

Avô paterno _____ e avô materno _____

Declarante _____

Testemunhas _____ e _____

Feito em _____ no dia _____ de 197 _____

O Encarregado do Registo Civil,

Testemunhas

LAISSEZ-PASSER

Dans le cadre de la collaboration fraternelle des pays africains indépendants à notre lutte de libération nationale, nous prions aux autorités frontalières de la République de Guinée et de la République du Sénégal, de bien vouloir accorder les facilités nécessaires au transit de notre véhicule _____ N° _____ qui doit se déplacer de _____ à _____, conduit par notre camarade _____.

Nous certifions que toutes les personnes transportées par ce véhicule sont membres de notre organisation et que les marchandises ou bagages y chargés se destinent à l'usage exclusif de nos combattants.

Personnes transportées:

1		11	
2		12	
3		13	
4		14	
5		15	
6		16	
7		17	
8		18	
9		19	
10		20	

Chargement:

Pour la libération totale de l'Afrique!

Fait à _____, le _____ 19____

Le responsable,

F

ARMAZÉNS DO POVO

Empresa de Comércio Geral

Guiné — Regiões Libertadas

Duplicado

Secção Comercial
do C. C. do P. A. I. G. C.

DEPÓSITO Nº _____

Nota de Remessa de Produtos Nº _____

_____ / _____ de _____ de 19 _____

Remetemos nesta data, pelo nosso _____ Nº _____, conduzido pelo _____
_____ com destino a _____ os produtos abaixo designados:

Volumes	Natureza de Produtos	P. Bruto	Tara	P. Líquido	Estado do Produto

O Responsável dos A. P.

O _____

Recebido conforme em _____ de _____ de 19 _____

G

FRONT

P. A. I. G. C. _____ / _____ / 19_____
Empresa do Comércio Geral
GUINÉ — Regiões Libertadas
ARMAZENS DO POVO
Depósito Nº _____

Nota de Compra de Produtos

Nome _____ Povoação _____

Tem a receber a quantia de _____

O Responsável



BACK

Designação	Deve	Haver
Total		

ANNEX II

WORKING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE SECRETARIAT

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A. GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORIES*

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.765.

I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1971 AND 1972

1. Early in 1961, following the outbreak of disturbances in Angola, the General Assembly, at its resumed fifteenth session, and the Security Council became seized with the question of the situation in that Territory and a sub-committee was appointed to report thereon. a/ The question of the Territories under Portuguese administration and of the non-compliance of Portugal with Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter and with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 have been discussed in the General Assembly since the sixteenth session and in the Security Council since 1963. The Special Committee's conclusions and recommendations concerning these questions have been set out in its reports to the General Assembly at the seventeenth to twenty-sixth sessions. b/ The decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly are contained in the relevant resolutions. c/ The text of the relevant resolutions adopted by these bodies during 1971 and 1972 have been made available to the Committee.

Action taken by the Special Committee

2. During 1971, the Special Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration at its meetings held between 4 March and 14 September and adopted the following resolutions which appear in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly: d/

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Meeting</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Resolution of 13 April 1971	791	chap. VIII, para. 30 (A/8423/Add.4)
" of 2 June 1971	797	" " para. 31 "
" of 14 September 1971	826	" " para. 32

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978).

b/ For the most recent, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII; ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII.

c/ For the most recent Security Council resolutions, see 268 (1969) of 28 July 1969, 273 (1969) of 9 December 1969, 227 (1970) of 18 March 1970, 289 (1970) of 23 November 1970, 290 (1970) of 8 December 1970, 294 (1971) of 15 July 1971, 295 (1971) of 3 August 1971, 300 (1971) of 12 October 1971, 302 (1971) of 24 November 1971. For the most recent General Assembly resolutions, see resolutions 2507 (XXIV) of 21 November 1969, 2707 (XXV) of 14 December 1970 and 2795 (XXVI) of 23 December 1971.

d/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII.

Action taken by the General Assembly

3. The General Assembly, at its twenty-sixth session, on the recommendation of its Fourth Committee, adopted one resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration as follows:

Resolution

Meeting

2795 (XXVI) of 10 December 1971

2012

Action taken by the Security Council

4. At its 1627th to 1639th meetings, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, between 28 January and 4 February 1972, the Security Council considered the questions relating to Africa with which it is currently seized. The proceedings of the Council are contained in the records of those meetings. At its 1639th meeting, on 4 February, the Council adopted resolution 312 (1972) concerning the situation in the African Territories under Portuguese administration.

5. Previously, in 1971, the Council had considered complaints by the Government of Senegal, Guinea and Zambia, against the violation of their territorial integrity and acts of aggression by Portugal and had adopted several resolutions and a consensus on these questions. e/

e/ Security Council resolutions 294 (1971) of 15 July 1971, 295 (1971) of 3 August 1971, 300 (1971) of 12 October 1971, 302 (1971) of 24 November 1971, and consensus reached at the 1603rd meeting, on 13 November 1971.

II. INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TERRITORIES

1. AREA AND POPULATION

6. The Territories under Portuguese administration comprise the Cape Verde Archipelago; Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea; São Tomé and Príncipe and their dependencies; Angola, including the enclave of Cabinda; Mozambique; Macau and dependencies; and Timor and dependencies. These Territories cover an area of approximately 902,220 square miles (2,077,953 square kilometres) and have over 15.6 million inhabitants. The area of Portugal itself is 35,500 square miles (91,900 square kilometres) and the provisional data for the 1970 census gave the population as 8.6 million.

7. In a lecture on Portugal's "geographic expression" at the Institute of Higher Military Studies, Portugal was described as a nation with 4.2 per cent of its area and 41 per cent of its population in Europe and 95 per cent of its area and 55 per cent of its population in Africa.

8. There has been some official dissatisfaction in Portugal with the census and the provisional results which disclosed that over the decade 1960-1970 Portugal's population had steadily declined. In his New Year's address, President Thomaz said that the census had been inadequately prepared and explained, and that the census forms had been badly distributed and badly collected. Also the quantity of information sought had created difficulties, as a result of which there was no accurate information on the population. Census figures are given below:

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u> (provisional)
Angola, including Cabinda	4,840,719	5,673,000
Mozambique	6,592,948	8,233,000
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	512,336	...
Cape Verde	199,661	...
São Tomé and Príncipe	64,149	...
Macau	169,299	...
Timor	517,079	...

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL f/

Constitutional reform

Consideration by the Corporative Chamber

9. The Government bill setting out the proposed constitutional reforms g/ was first studied by a special committee of the Corporative Chamber in March 1971. The Committee's report, written by Professor Alfonso Queiró of Coimbra University, was subsequently adopted by the Corporative Chamber and sent to the National Assembly.

10. The report of the Corporative Chamber considered in some detail the constitutional amendments concerning the overseas Territories and decided that the envisaged changes granting the Territories a greater degree of autonomy did not threaten national unity. It said that the inclusion in the Constitution of provisions which gave a "more authentic expression to the participation of the overseas peoples and social interests in the definition of the law relating to matters not within the 'State Domain'" was in fact a means of promoting unity which, "in our time, is the only manner in which it can and therefore must be maintained."

11. Commenting on the proposal that the larger overseas provinces would be designated "States", the report said that this did not mean the application of a "scientific designation" in accordance with the legal system. It went on as follows:

"The communities made up of the inhabitants of the regions are not, separately, endowed with their own sovereignty in the exercise of which they could formulate their respective constitutions or amend the constitutions which at some time might have been granted to them by the sovereign organs of the State.

"... the legislative, executive and judicial organs of each province express no sovereignty other than that of the Portuguese nation as a whole, which, above all, is manifested or exercised, as far as the Constitution is concerned, through the formulation of a simple constitution.... An entity lacking in constituent power is not a sovereign entity and is not, legally speaking, a state."

12. As regards the wording of article 134 in the government bill, the Corporative Chamber considered that it was unnecessary to state that each province was "endowed with autonomy". h/ It explained that the specific characteristic of "regional

f/ For a summary of the constitutional and political system of the Territories under Portuguese administration, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 18-82.

g/ For the proposed constitutional reforms, see Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.A, paras. 27-59.

h/ The draft text of article 134 read as follows: "Cada província constitui uma pessoa colectiva de direito público dotada de autonomia ...".

autonomy" was the power to enact legislation. Therefore it was not "a question of some kind of natural right, exercised through their own organs, to manage or 'administer' their own affairs." The report also pointed out that the bill did not make clear who would be responsible for the formulation of the statutes of the autonomous regions, and suggested that this point should be clarified. It also suggested that as there were already some services in the Territories which were part of the general administrative organization of the nation, provision should be made in the Constitution for this practice to continue.

13. The Chamber was opposed to stating that all the organs of Government of a territory should be elected. In particular, it opposed an elected governor. It recommended that the Constitution should not specify that the organs to be directed by him had to be elective. The report went on to say:

"Elective administrative organs would presuppose acceptance of the idea that the overseas provinces would have 'their own executive power' which would give the local administration an autonomous character. This would be tantamount to making the overseas provinces states members of an embryonic federation. This would not be consistent, in particular, with the fact that the governor directs the local executive organs."

Discussion in the National Assembly

14. In the second stage, a special committee of 33 members was appointed by the National Assembly to consider the proposed amendments and the observations by the Corporative Chamber. The membership of this committee included several representatives of the overseas Territories as well as some of the deputies who had proposed separate amendments (see below). The Committee of 33 held 46 meetings between March and June 1971.

15. On 15 June 1971, the National Assembly began its specially convened session to consider the proposals on constitutional reform. In addition to the Government bill (Proposta de lei No. 14/X), there were two other bills which had been submitted by Mr. Sá Carneiro and 14 other deputies which contained a series of amendments on various articles, including article 8 on individual rights, and a proposal that the president should be elected by direct vote of the nation (article 72). The other amendment (Projecto de lei No. 7/X), proposed by Mr. Duarte Pinto do Amaral and 14 other deputies, among other things proposed the inclusion of a reference to God in the preamble to the Constitution.

16. After a general debate in which 57 deputies took part, and which lasted about two weeks, the National Assembly decided to consider only the Government's proposal article by article.

(a) Amendments relating to the overseas Territories

17. During the discussion of the constitutional amendments relating to the overseas Territories, most of the deputies from Angola and Mozambique expressed support for the Government proposal which many felt was a long overdue step towards further administrative decentralization in recognition of the economic and social progress in the Territories. Most of them emphasized that the actual extent of the changes introduced would be known only when details had been laid down in the revised Overseas Organic Law and the political and administrative statutes of the Territories which would give effect to the constitutional changes.

18. Several deputies from Angola told the National Assembly that the Territory needed more autonomy and that the Portuguese of Angola knew better what was good for Angola. One deputy, Mr. David Laima, who is also a member of the Angola Legislative Council elected by direct suffrage representing the Luanda District, i/ expressed the hope that the right of the people from the overseas Territories to participate in the discussions on the revisions would be respected. The system as it existed was unsatisfactory because, although under the Constitution Portugal was a unitary corporative state, many parts of the "national territory" did not yet have a real corporative organization. This had created many difficulties and this hybrid policy, which had resulted in wide differences between the theoretical organization and actual structure, could not be allowed to continue. It was unjust, for instance, that the labour syndicates in the overseas Territories had no representation in the Corporative Chamber. In any case, the Territory's representation in the Corporative Chamber was inadequate. j/ This absurd situation was the result of the divergence between theory and practice. Principles could only be respected if they were observed in practice. The participation of the overseas Territories in the political life of the nation had to be on an equal footing with that of Portugal. The policy of treating each region differently effectively denied all Portuguese citizens equal rights to active participation. If the reforms were to be meaningful, the legislative councils of the overseas Territories k/ had to become more representative, and had to be granted the right to meet as necessary. Also, the Economic and Social Council l/ of the Territory should be given powers to play a more direct and permanent role in Government.

19. He also criticized the Government bureaucracy for its inefficiency and the fact that certain individuals considered themselves as having unlimited power. He emphasized that the destiny of the Portuguese nation was not to colonize in order to guarantee the well-being of the colonizers by forgetting the well-being of the colonized peoples.

20. Madame Sincietica Torres, the only Angola deputy of African descent and a member of the Angola Legislative Council representing administrative bodies, said that, in supporting the proposed reforms, she expressed the aspirations of the majority of the African populations of Angola. Total autonomy or hypothetical independence was inconceivable in the Territories as the majority of the population were not yet mature enough to be able to express themselves. The African populations of the Territory needed to be better protected from enemy subversion and unscrupulous acts. She suggested that the territorial Government should establish a new department to protect the rights of the African populations. This was not a request to bring back the Native Statute which violated human dignity. Legislation enacted by the territorial Government was often implemented differently from district to district as in the case of the rural markets, and the Africans needed the help of those

i/ For details on the functions and membership of this Council, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 37-39 and 70-75, and annex I.B, paras. 10-14.

j/ For details on the functions and membership of the Corporative Chamber, see ibid., annex I.B, paras. 24 and 40.

k/ For details on the functions and membership of the Legislative Council, see ibid., annex I.A, paras. 37-39 and 70-75.

l/ For details on the functions and membership of the Economic and Social Council, see ibid., paras. 40 and 76.

responsible for the implementation of the law. Although the Colonial Act and the Overseas Organic Law contained provisions guaranteeing the respect of African possessions and human dignity, in practice those provisions had not always been respected. She said that the state of despair in which the African populations lived was dangerous and added that, "If we do not go to their help, someone else will....".

21. Madame Custódia Lopes, one of the deputies from Mozambique, urged that as the Territories achieved a greater degree of autonomy as envisaged under the Constitution, there should also be increased participation by "all elements" m/ in the territorial and central governments, including territorial representation in the National Assembly. Effective participation, however, required a real effort to expand educational facilities so that, increasingly, more children would be able to obtain the minimum standard envisaged under the law. She also urged that a greater effort should be made to spread the use of the Portuguese language, especially in Mozambique.

22. Although it has not been possible to trace the discussions on all the amendments approved by the National Assembly, the final text shows that most of the comments in the report of the Corporative Chamber were taken into account. The Assembly also approved an amendment proposed by 10 deputies, including four from the overseas Territories n/, to add a provision in article 136 which would make it the responsibility of the central Government not only to ensure respect for individual rights in accordance with the Constitution, but also to ensure respect for "the cultural values of the populations and their traditional customs which are not incompatible with Portuguese moral and public law." o/

(b) Amendment on the presidential election

23. It will be recalled that in 1961 the procedure for the presidential election was changed to replace the system of direct vote by an electoral college. This college has some 500 members, including the 130 members of the National Assembly, 185 members of the Corporative Chamber, the representatives of municipalities (the mayors of municipal councils) in each district or each Territory not divided into districts, and representatives of the legislative councils of the Territories. The seven Territories have 60 representatives in the electoral college designated by the respective Legislative Council as follows: Angola, 24; Mozambique, 24; Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, 2; Cape Verde, 4; São Tomé and Príncipe, 2; Macau, 2; and Timor, 2. p/

m/ This is presumably a reference to the different groups entitled to representation and participation in the central and local organs of government in accordance with the corporative structure of the state. See ibid., paras. 18-82.

n/ Themudo Barata, Timor; Delfino Ribeiro, Macau; Fernando Sá Viana Rebelo, Angola; and Pedro Baessa, Mozambique.

o/ "... dos valores culturais das populações e dos seus usos e costumes não incompatíveis com a moral e o direito público português."

p/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addend. to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chap. V, paras. 5-6.

24. The representatives of the overseas Territories were divided on the proposal that the President should be elected by direct vote. Mr. Laima of Angola supported the change because he considered that the electoral college was not truly representative as not all members were elected and many were appointed, often on a personal basis. Mr. Sá Viana Rebelo, the Mayor of Luanda, another deputy from Angola and brother of the Portuguese Defence Minister, considered that the electoral college system should be continued because the people of Angola "were not ready for the political arguments" that a direct election would entail. Moreover, Angola was at war, and political contests could result in increased subversion.

25. One of the deputies from Mozambique also supported the proposal to restore direct presidential elections because the electoral college was not really representative. The amendment, however, was not adopted.

26. A few days before the final vote on the government bill, a group of more than 60 members of the National Assembly, belonging to the social democratic opposition, issued a statement demanding more changes in the Constitution. The statement said that the envisaged autonomous status for the overseas Territories was "a timid step which was obscure and ambiguous", and that only a democratic political solution, as had been proposed by the opposition during the last elections could lead to real peace in the Territories. q/

Approved constitutional amendments

27. The constitutional amendments approved by the National Assembly were promulgated on 16 August 1971 as Law No. 3/71. Most of the comments made by the Corporative Chamber were taken into account and ambiguities which could have led to wider interpretations were reworded so that the final result carefully balances decentralization and autonomy within the concept of political integration and national unity.

28. The most important changes were the deletion of the phrase characterizing the overseas Territories as "endowed with autonomy"; and the addition of a phrase setting out the responsibility of the organs of sovereignty for drawing up the Statutes of the overseas Territories.

29. As will be seen below, the comments of the Corporative Chamber also influenced the spirit of the revised Overseas Organic Law.

30. After the National Assembly had completed its discussion of the amendments, Mr. Caetano personally addressed the Assembly on 23 July 1971, to deny insinuations that there had been irregularities in the way the constitutional amendments had been voted. He said that he had personally followed the procedures and had found no irregularities and he thought it would have been impossible for the President of the Assembly, who was an experienced parliamentarian and known for his moral integrity, to have allowed any irregularities to arise.

q/ The platform adopted during the elections by the group generally referred to as Social Democrats included the recognition of the right of the Territories to self-determination as defined by the United Nations. See ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 121-126.

31. In November 1971, the newspaper O Século of Portugal reported that Mr. Sá Carneiro, a deputy whose amendments had not been considered in detail by the National Assembly, had introduced a motion declaring illegal the constitutional amendments in Law No. 3/71 of 16 August 1971, and calling for a reconsideration of the Government bill, together with the two series of amendments, paragraph by paragraph. According to the newspaper article, this bill would have to be studied first by the Sub-Committee on Legislation which would have to decide whether the motion would be discussed in the National Assembly in detail.

Revision of the Overseas Organic Law

32. In January 1972, the Government submitted to the National Assembly for approval a bill to revise the Overseas Organic Law of 1963. r/ This bill outlines the main political structure of the overseas Territories in keeping with the constitutional reforms approved last year.

33. According to reports in the Portuguese and international press, the most important provision in the new text is the granting to Angola and Mozambique of the new status of "State". As such, these sources reported that the Territories will each have their own elected organs of government and a wider degree of financial autonomy.

34. The detailed provisions of the proposed new Overseas Organic Law are summarized below. s/

Fundamental principles

35. The bill restates the basic principles contained in chapter VII of the Constitution, as amended in 1971, which provide that the autonomy of the Territories shall include the right to have bodies to elect their own Governments; the right of each Territory to enact legislation on all matters of its own exclusive concern; the right to dispose of their revenue, and the right to have an economic system suited to the requirements of their own development and the well-being of their peoples. t/

r/ Under the Portuguese system, the Constitution lays down the basic principles, the Overseas Organic Law defines the powers and functions of the central and territorial Governments, and the detailed administrative structure and composition of the various territorial bodies are set out in a political and administrative statute for each Territory. For information on the 1963 Overseas Organic Law, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (part II) (A/6700/Rev.1), chap. V.

s/ The analysis is based on a text of the draft Overseas Organic Law published in Província de Angola, 19 January 1972. At the end of February 1972, the official text was not yet available at the United Nations Library.

t/ For the full text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.A, appendix.

Participation of the Territories in the central organs of Government

36. There appears to be no basic change in the pattern of participation of the Territories in the central organs of Government. This participation includes the election of the President, appropriate (adequada) representation in the National Assembly by deputies from each electoral district, and representatives in the Corporative Chamber chosen by the autarquias locais and by the social interests. u/ The overseas Territories are also represented in the Overseas Council and other consultative bodies on a national level. According to press reports, the overseas Territories are to have more representatives in the National Assembly, the membership of which has been increased from 130 to 150.

37. The methods of designating representatives to these bodies are to be set out in the political and administrative statutes.

Central Government

38. The jurisdiction of the National Assembly, the Government v/ and the Courts of Justice in the overseas Territories remains substantially the same. Under the new provisions, the National Assembly retains exclusive legislative competence in: (a) the general régime of the overseas Territories; (b) the definition of the competence of the central Government and the territorial Governments in regard to concessions of land and other rights which involve exclusive or special privileges; and (c) the authorization of contracts, other than those for loans, when requiring security or special guarantees. In addition, it may also legislate on matters affecting the whole of the national territory or when affecting part of the national territory which includes Portugal and one or more of the overseas Territories (Base X.I.c). However, the Government exclusively, through the Overseas Minister may initiate legislation specifically concerning the overseas Territories. As before, it also remains the responsibility of the National Assembly to examine the annual accounts of the Territories.

39. The Government retains the authority to superintend the administration of the overseas Territories so as to ensure national unity and the realization of the higher interests of the State. The Government's competence in respect of the overseas Territories may be exercised by the Prime Minister, the Overseas Minister or other ministers.

40. The Government may legislate in respect of the overseas Territories on matters affecting the higher interests of the State, on matters of common interest to various Territories and on matters which need to be regulated uniformly in the Territories.

u/ For a brief description of the composition of the Corporative Chamber, see ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, para. 24.

v/ The Portuguese constitutional amendments as finally approved only use the term "the Government" instead of "the central Government" to reinforce the idea of a unitary State.

41. The legislative competence of the Overseas Minister has been retained, but the range of subjects on which he may legislate has been shortened. Whereas, previously, he could legislate on the rights, liberties and guarantees as regards the indigenous populations, the duty to safeguard the rights of individuals and the cultural values of the populations now belongs to the sovereign organs of government. Also deleted from the Minister's legislative competence are: (a) the establishment and general régimes relating to economic, social and cultural corporative bodies; (b) the ratification of agreements or conventions with other Territories or foreign Governments, after having consulted the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and (c) the legal bases and conditions of financing public works relating to plans for urbanization development within his competence, or which involve the use of property of the public domain.

42. The Overseas Minister retains the competence to legislate on: (a) the general administrative régime of the overseas Territories and the organization of the general administrative services, including the composition and the system of appointment; (b) the political and administrative statute of each Territory after having heard the views of the respective Legislative Assembly and the Overseas Council in plenary session; (c) the financial administration of the Territories; (d) the statutory conditions of the public services which are not part of the national service; and (e) the authorization of loans not requiring special security or guarantee, w/ and which are not paid from the ordinary budget within the respective economic year.

43. The Overseas Minister retains the power to revoke or annul all or part of the legislation enacted in the Territories when such legislation is unconstitutional, illegal or "contrary to the higher interests of the State". In his exercise of his legislative functions, the Overseas Minister shall normally have the advice of the Overseas Council, except: (a) when an emergency requires him to act immediately; (b) when the Council has not given its opinion 30 days after its advice was sought; (c) when the matter is one on which the Corporative Chamber has already expressed its opinion; and (d) when he is in the overseas Territories.

44. The executive functions of the Overseas Minister include the supervision of the entire public administration of the overseas Territories; the appointment, transfer or termination of the territorial public service personnel; the authorization, with the advice of the territorial Governments concerned, of the concession of public utilities, the issue of shares of the concessionary companies and the authorization for public works relating to urbanization and development; and the supervision of the organization and implementation of the territorial budgets, in accordance with the law.

Territorial Governments

45. Under the terms of the proposed bill, each Territory will have a governor appointed by the Council of Ministers on the advice of the Overseas Minister. The two larger Territories, namely Angola and Mozambique, will each have a governor-general with the rank of minister of state and who may be called to sit

w/ Loans requiring guarantees are within the competence of the Government. In 1961 the authority to approve foreign loans requiring a guarantee to the overseas Territories for development projects was delegated to the Minister for Finance. In 1972, his authority was further extended to approve internal loans requiring a guarantee.

in the Council of Ministers. Governors retain the right to legislate in accordance with the constitutional provisions on matters of exclusive interest to the Territory concerned and which have not been reserved for the exclusive concern of the legislature.

46. Except for the change in rank of the governors-general and their right to attend the Council of Ministers when called, there appear to be no important changes in the powers and functions of the governors.

47. As before, each Territory will have an elected legislature to be known as the Legislative Assembly instead of the current Legislative Council. The political and administrative statute of each Territory will lay down the composition of the Legislative Assembly and its election in such a way as to "guarantee appropriate representation of the citizens in general, the local autonomous bodies, x/ ethnic groups and the social interests in their fundamental forms". y/ The Legislative Assembly will hold two regular sessions a year, the total duration of which may not exceed four months. Emergency sessions of the Assembly may be called in accordance with the statute of the Territory.

48. Compared with the existing Legislative Council, the new Legislative Assembly will have wider powers. These will include the right: (a) to draw up, interpret, suspend or repeal territorial legislation; (b) to ensure compliance in the Territory, with the provisions of the Constitution and with the laws and to review the acts of the territorial Government or administration, being empowered to request the Overseas Council to review the constitutionality of any regulations (normas) emanating from the territorial organs; (c) express its opinion on the political and administrative statute of the Territory; (d) authorize the Government to contract loans within the Territory's competence; and (e) determine the régime governing concessions which fall within the competence of the territorial Government and within the limits fixed by law. The Legislative Assembly will also have the right annually to authorize the collection of local revenue and to defray public expenses, in addition to specifying the principles to which the budget must conform.

49. Currently, only the Governor is consulted on the political and administrative statute and not the Legislative Council. The proposed change gives the elected representatives an opportunity to participate in the formulation of the administrative structure of the Territory for the first time. As regards financial matters, although under the 1963 Overseas Organic Law and the administrative and political statutes, the territorial legislatures have the right only to approve the guidelines of the budget, z/ in practice, in Angola, the

x/ These are the freguesia and the concelho. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 41 ff.

y/ In the corporative system, social interests in their fundamental forms include such groups as the family, local government bodies, syndicates and associations of employers interests and associations of cultural and religious interests.

z/ Loans requiring guarantees are within the competence of the Council of Ministers with certain powers delegated to the Minister of Finance. Other loans are within the competence of the Overseas Minister.

territorial budget has been discussed by the Legislative Council since 1970. The proposed change therefore only formalizes a practice already current in Angola and extends it to other Territories. In the field of planning, the Legislative Council currently only has the right to discuss the annual report of the Technical Commission on planning and economic integration. However, in Angola, in recent years, the Governor-General has usually sent the Territory's development plan to the Council for information.

50. Under the proposed Overseas Organic Law, in Angola and Mozambique, the Economic and Social Council will be replaced by an advisory board with similar powers and functions, except for those deliberative and advisory functions which are to be transferred to the Legislative Assembly. It may be noted that although the right to introduce enactments in the Legislative Assembly is vested equally in both the Governor and the members of the Legislative Assembly, the latter, as at present, may not introduce proposals or amendments involving the increase in expenditure or decrease in revenue as previously established.

51. It will be recalled that in Angola, in particular, dissatisfaction has been expressed in the past in the Legislative Council with the fact that the Economic and Social Council had more responsibility and was consulted by the Governor-General on more questions. On the basis of the information available so far, it is not possible to determine the real extent of the responsibilities of the new advisory board.

52. In Angola and Mozambique, the Governor-General will preside over a government council composed of the provincial secretaries and the Attorney-General. They will exercise "together with the Governor-General and under his direction and responsibility" the executive functions for which he is responsible. The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in the Territory and the directorate of the Maritime Services may be called upon to participate in the Government Council.

53. The Governor will retain the right to veto legislation. Under the present system, the Governor is required to sign and send for publication within 15 days all bills approved by the Legislative Council. If he refuses to sign a bill which the Government introduced, this implies withdrawal of the bill. If he refuses to sign a bill introduced by members of the Council, he has to inform the Overseas Minister, or he may return it to the Council for reconsideration. In the first case, the decision rests with the Minister. In the second case, the Legislative Council may override the decision of the Governor with a two-thirds vote. Under the proposed revision of the Overseas Organic Law, the Governor would no longer have the option of submitting a bill he refuses to sign to the Overseas Minister. He may only send it back to the Legislative Assembly for reconsideration, and he has to comply with the latter's decision if adopted by a two-thirds vote.

54. From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that while the general principles hold out eventual promise for much wider autonomy to the Territories, the new law introduces only minor changes in the existing system of Government in the overseas Territories. Real power remains vested in what the Constitution calls the organs of sovereignty. Since the power of these organs lies in the hands of the Portuguese population in Portugal, it is difficult to see how power could be effectively devolved from the centre to enable the Territories to enjoy a status

comparable to states in a federation as Mr. Caetano envisaged in 1969 in his speech to the Legislative Council in Mozambique. aa/

55. Nor have the hopes Mr. Caetano raised last year in his speech to the National Assembly been fulfilled. It will be recalled that when he introduced the constitutional amendments in the National Assembly he talked about "the appointment of governors delegates of the central Government with rights of inspection and supervision". bb/ Some international press reports at the time assumed that the powers of the governors appointed by Lisbon would be substantially reduced in favour of a much wider degree of self-government in the Territories, and more particularly in Angola and Mozambique. But the information available so far shows that the powers of the legislatures, though slightly widened, will remain restricted and in any case, they can be examined only during four months out of each year; the Governor remains vested with wider powers to legislate than the Legislative Assembly; the Governor as chief executive remains responsible to Lisbon and not to the territorial legislature; the territorial legislature remains powerless both in regard to concessions of the natural resources of the Territory, including land and underground minerals which are defined as the public domain of the State, and in regard to decisions that would affect its economic relations with Portugal and the other overseas Territories. Furthermore, it may not even initiate legislation which would increase expenditures or reduce revenues established previously.

56. On the other hand, it may be useful to examine the changes in the light of views expressed by the economic associations in Angola in 1969 in a petition addressed to the Prime Minister just before the elections to the National Assembly. It will be recalled that in their petition the economic associations suggested that the constitutional reforms should: (a) increase the number of representatives of Angola in the National Assembly; (b) revise the membership of the Overseas Council to make it more representative of the Territories; (c) increase the authority of the Governor-General by giving him a seat in the Council of Ministers; (d) create a post of deputy governor; (e) increase the authority of the provincial secretaries; (f) make the appointment of provincial secretaries subject to consultation with the territorial Legislative and Advisory Council; and (g) revise the membership of these two latter bodies. The proposed text of the new law appears to have met most of those requests.

57. The National Assembly was expected to vote on the revised text of the Overseas Organic Law before the end of April.

58. Early in January 1972, in an article in Africa Confidential commenting on Portugal's overseas policy, it was stated that:

"The contradiction between the promise of autonomy for the colonies and the insistence that they will remain an integral part of 'the nation' has never been resolved."

aa/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, para. 89.

bb/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No.23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.A, para. 31.

59. Later in January, an editorial in A Província de Angola reflected a similar view. Tracing the evolution of the changes in the Overseas Organic Law since 1853, the editorial said that there had been a continuing struggle between two factions, one favouring decentralization of power to the Territories and the other advocating "deconcentration" of administrative functions. It said that under the envisaged provisions in the government bill, "the central Government would effectively continue to assume the widest legislative and executive powers without prejudice to the competence which the Overseas Minister regrettably retained to supervise the over-all administration of the overseas Territories". After summarizing the other provisions, the editorial went on to say that once again one was faced with the choice between decentralization and deconcentration which the new text had adopted. Decentralization was favoured on the grounds that it would facilitate good administration and stimulate development in the Territories. On the other hand, in support of "deconcentration" with a moderate degree of decentralization, it was argued that modern communications had eliminated any disadvantages of such a system and that the metropolitan Government had to retain the power for the political and administration orientation and supervise the general administration of the Territories in order better to safeguard the unity and defence of the higher interests of the nation. Nevertheless, the question had been posed and it would be desirable that everyone in Angola would have a say on the best solution for its future prosperity.

Policy statements

Portugal's overseas policy

60. The international press noted in April 1972 that, in contrast to the moderate tones he had previously used, Mr. Caetano was increasingly adopting a hard line. In an interview with the French newspaper L'Aurore, he proclaimed his unshakable determination to remain in Africa. He said that even if there were a policy in Lisbon to "abandon" the Territories it would be impossible to carry it out because the people of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, whites as well as blacks, were so decided to continue to be Portuguese and so confident in themselves and in Portugal, that it would be impossible to "abandon" them. He further emphasized that, contrary to the charges some people had made, the constitutional amendments giving the overseas Territories a wider degree of autonomy were not the beginning of a withdrawal of Portugal. Mr. Caetano emphasized that to his way of thinking, the autonomy envisaged did not go beyond a greater opportunity for the local administrations to solve more rapidly problems within their competence. There was to be a greater degree of financial autonomy in the Territories and an increase in their legislative powers. It was therefore an "internal reform" in no way jeopardizing the union formed by the overseas Territories and Portugal. He emphasized that the constitutional reforms had nothing to do with independence and added that he was as responsible for the Government of Portugal as for the integrity of the overseas Territories with Portugal and that there would be no independence "so long as I am here".

61. Following an explosion at the Tancos air field in Portugal in which 17 military aircraft were destroyed, Mr. Caetano told a meeting of the National Popular Action, formerly the National Union and the only legal political organization, that Portugal was the victim of an international plot with headquarters in the United Nations and that Portugal faced a war in which there was

no front or rearguard. He said that the war was everywhere, whether in Tancos or in Cabo Delgado (in Mozambique) where the adversary tries to implant his ideas of defeat, favouring the abandonment of the overseas Territories, inciting the soldiers and the young people to emigrate or desert from military service and undermining the morale of youth.

62. Increasingly, Portugal's official spokesmen have identified Portugal as a victim of world revolution. In a lecture given at the Geographical Society to inaugurate the Semana do Ultramar and which was attended by President Américo Thomaz, the speaker developed the theme that "the manoeuvre against Portugal" which was growing in aggressiveness both at the international and local levels, was part of a world revolution waged by the countryside against the cities. Therefore Portugal had to see the problem as one of total war, requiring total mobilization of all resources. In his view, it was necessary to make the people understand the reality and to do everything possible to strengthen national cohesion, to educate the people and create an enlightened conscience. Over and above all, it was necessary "to promote the integration of the homem de cõr (black man) in the life of the region in which he lived so as to make him an active element in his administration and to prepare him for his future".

63. In June 1971, during his visit to Lourenço Marques, Mr. Rui Patrício, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, recalled that when he was appointed Mr. Caetano had told him that the great task of Portuguese diplomacy was to look after the interests of Portugal's overseas policy, to explain it and defend it. He said that this policy was: to defend the integrity of national territory, maintaining the unity of the nation; to develop the populations so to ensure their future progress; to consolidate "our multiracial societies"; and to increase the autonomy of the Territories, strengthening their administration and their economies so as to make the whole nation more cohesive and stronger.

Self-determination, the will of the people and autonomy

64. At a press conference in Brasília, Brazil, in September, Mr. Patrício denied that Portugal maintained a rigid and inflexible position on its overseas Territories either for economic, political and strategic reasons or simply for colonial reasons. He said that the Territories had always been Portuguese provinces for historical, constitutional and social reasons and implied that it was not that Portugal's policy was inflexible but that the relationship between Portugal and the overseas provinces was based on an historical imperative not subject to change. He explained that the overseas provinces had formed part of the Portuguese nation since they had been discovered or inhabited by Portuguese nationals, and had been integrated into the nation without any discrimination and without any conditions. It had been so for five centuries and it was important that it continued to be so. Among other factors was the "portuguesismo" of the inhabitants, and he added that Portugal could not ignore the will of the inhabitants of the "overseas provinces", that led them to fight, arms in hand, alongside metropolitan troops. He said that about half of the defence forces at the frontiers consisted of naturais, persons born in the Territories. He said that nobody defended an idea with weapons unless he shared that idea.

65. Earlier in the year, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had discussed at length the concept of self-determination during a press conference. He said that it was usually understood that for the United Nations, self-determination was the

expression of the will of the people by a majority vote. The history of the United Nations however showed that there had been an evolution over the years. Among others he cited the different procedures the United Nations had approved in respect of the question of self-determination in the cases of: (a) Greenland, Alaska and Hawaii, the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam; (b) Equatorial Guinea; and (c) the act of free choice by West Irian. He said that these examples showed that the United Nations had different criteria for self-determination. He re-affirmed that for Portugal, "self-determination resulted from the wish of the population expressed in the course of history through freely created institutions or consented to by the population without foreign intervention or coercion".

66. At the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, during a debate in the Third Committee, cc/ the representative of Portugal recalled that in his report to the Security Council in 1963 dd/ the Secretary-General had expressed the opinion that the Portuguese Government was not opposed to the principle of self-determination in its non-European Territories. She said that the Government of Portugal was seeking "the appropriate political expression" of socio-cultural reality involving very diverse cultures and a complex ethnic composition. She added that the constitutional changes of August 1971 had been introduced "with a view to recognizing the increasing autonomy in the various Territories". Acknowledging its past mistakes, Portugal, she said, appealed to the international community to accept its pledge "to try to find its own way within the multiplicity of solutions and options recognized by the United Nations". ee/

67. Speaking at a press conference in London in March 1972, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs again declared that Portugal does not reject the principle of self-determination, and recalled the statement by the Secretary-General to this effect in his report to the Security Council in 1963. He said that the campaign against Portugal inside and outside the United Nations was not aimed at ensuring the right to self-determination of the populations of the Portuguese Territories in Africa, but at imposing an alien policy upon Portugal under the pretext of self-determination. The populations would not have a free choice but instead would find no alternative than to make a choice dictated to them by others. Any doubt on this point had been completely dispelled by the Lusaka Manifesto which clearly said that Portugal had to leave Africa. For Portugal, self-determination was a right and a natural prerogative of human beings. This right, however, had to be exercised without any outside interference whatsoever, not even the United Nations. Portugal would assure to all the people the exercise of this right, without any discrimination, as it could not accept the theory that only the povo de côr living in Africa had the right to self-determination.

cc/ On item 55, Importance of the universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination and the speedy granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples for the effective guarantee and observation of human rights:

dd/ S/5448.

ee/ A/C.3/SR.1873.

68. He described in some detail the new constitutional changes and the provisions in the new Overseas Organic Law giving the Territories wider autonomy. He said that, contrary to what many people believed, Portugal was not opposed to decolonization. Both the objectives of its policy in Africa and the reality of the situation in the Territories compelled Portugal to reject the criticisms that had been directed against it, especially at the United Nations. Portuguese policy had always been based on respect for the different cultures and their interpenetration and the right of the various human elements each to pursue their own future. These considerations were combined with efforts towards economic, social and cultural development, and together they explained the Portuguese policy of autonomy which had been given a further impetus in the recent constitutional changes.

3. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURE

Portugal's war effort

69. As previous reports have shown, in recent years, Portugal's war policy has been characterized by a trend towards internationalization. To this end, Portuguese diplomatic activities abroad have aimed at explaining and defending Portugal's overseas policy and the continuing wars, and, at home, efforts have been made to rally public opinion around the Government against "subversive forces" which are identified with foreign support and opposition to the colonial wars. In the Territories, the war is being Africanized: more and more Africans are being recruited into the regular and paramilitary forces to fight against the African liberation movements. Portuguese military communiqués and spokesmen quoted in the international press for instance constantly emphasize guerrilla attacks against the local population. The financing of the war also is being Africanized, with Angola and Mozambique making an increasingly larger contribution to the war costs.

Mobilization of public opinion and internationalization of the war

70. Through these moves, Portugal is in fact preparing for a long-term war. In a year-end review, Mr. Dutra Faria, Director of Portugal's National Information Services, after noting that the war was being won in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and that the liberation movements in the other two Territories had "become less sure of their success", warned that Portugal would still have to face "terrible difficulties for a long time to come". He said that any excessive optimism would be more dangerous and more corrosive than pessimism.

71. The fact that Portugal has to prepare for an endless war has been recognized by Mr. Caetano himself and other government leaders. According to Portuguese official sources, the wars Portugal is fighting are not colonial wars fought by the peoples of the Territories for liberation and independence. Rather, Portugal is the victim of world revolutionary forces intent on eliminating western civilization from those parts of Africa.

72. In April 1971, in an interview with United Press International, Mr. Caetano said that "all the artificial subversion" in the overseas Territories would have long ceased if it were not for the support of the United Nations and countries and Territories which support banditry and racial hatred. In May, he said in a speech at Braga that there was no insurrection of the population in the overseas Territories. As all visitors were compelled to admit, there was racial harmony in the Territories and an enormous effort was being made in education, economic development and social improvement. These Territories, he said, were zones of peace in which, with the support of the naturais, Portugal was maintaining order and stimulating progress. In August, when pressed to say when he expected the war to end, Mr. Caetano implied that this could only happen if States adjacent to the Territories and some foreign countries stopped their aid and if the world-wide mobilization of opinion and propaganda against Portugal were stopped. On that occasion, he emphasized that Portugal had fought alone for 10 years without help. He lamented that there was no understanding in Europe that Portugal was defending western civilization in Africa.

73. It will be recalled that Portuguese military authorities have repeatedly put forward the suggestion for creating a defence organization covering the south Atlantic. Specifically, in October 1970, during the meeting in Lisbon of the Military Commission of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), General Sá Viana Rebelo, the Portuguese Minister of Defence and of the Army, gave further support to this idea. On that occasion, he suggested that Portugal's naval and air bases, which stretched from Cape Verde to Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and Angola, could provide facilities for control of the vast area of the south Atlantic and announced that Portugal would place these bases at the service of NATO.

War strategy

74. As previous studies have shown, for the past several years Portugal has been increasingly preoccupied with economic growth both in Portugal and in the Territories in order to meet the long-term needs of the war. In a lecture given at the Higher Institute for National Defence Studies in December 1971, Mr. Costa André, the Secretary of State of the Treasury, suggested that as defence policy was only one of the multiple instruments used by a State to achieve its national goals, the way in which national resources were used for defence could be expected to vary with internal and external changes. Since the prospective studies of the military and political aspects of the Portuguese situation already undertaken at the Institute had shown that external aid to the liberation movement was not likely to end, it was necessary for Portugal to change its strategy. Whereas in the 1960s circumstances had made it necessary to give priority to military expenditures, it was now important to make a change because one of the tactics of "the enemies of the régime" was to force the Government to devote so much of its resources to defence that it might fail to satisfy the "legitimate material satisfaction of the people". Therefore, in the coming phase it would be necessary to adopt a "structural strategy", the goal of which would be to achieve the effective occupation of the Territories, the social development of the populations, the systematic development of the resources and an "equitable distribution of the fruits of development to all Portuguese". In this connexion, while, in terms of the budget, military expenditures had risen from 35.6 per cent in 1961 to 40.7 per cent in 1969, expenditures on development had dropped from 22 per cent in 1960 to 18 per cent in the next four years and to 14 per cent in 1968, rising to 15.2 per cent in 1969. In his view, while military expenditure was necessary it should be planned in such a way as to have the least unfavourable impact.

75. In July 1971, a signed editorial in the Diario de Noticias of Lisbon on the nature of guerrilla warfare went so far as to suggest that while military action in the Territories was necessary, it would rapidly lose effect if political, economic and social solutions demanded by Portuguese policy and reality were not obtained. In this connexion, comments in the international press suggest that although there is no indication that the Portuguese people blamed the lack of development solely on the sacrifices involved in pursuing the African wars, some sectors in the Government hold the view that the country's economy requires a greater effort.

(a) Africanization of the armed forces

76. The changing priorities of Portugal's war effort are reflected in the trend in recent years towards shifting a greater share of the defence costs to the African Territories (see table 1 below) and towards accelerated Africanization of the armed forces.

Table 1

Military budgets of Portugal and the
overseas Territories
(million escudos)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Portugal</u>	<u>Overseas Territories</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per cent share of Territories</u>
1967	5 347.0	1 800.4	7 147.4	25.2
1968	5 613.0	2 053.3	7 666.3	26.8
1969	6 339.9	2 447.8	8 787.7	27.8
1970	6 349.9	3 222.6	9 572.5	33.7
1971	7 030.6	3 362.2	10 392.8	32.3

77. According to the Secretary of State of the Treasury, between 1960 and 1970, the proportion of the gross national product devoted to defence in metropolitan Portugal rose from 4 to 7 per cent, from 1 to 4 per cent in Angola and from 1 to 3 per cent in Mozambique. The proportion of gross fixed capital investment devoted to defence rose from 23 to 40 per cent in metropolitan Portugal over the same decade, while it rose from 11 to 29 per cent in Angola and from 14 to 28 per cent in Mozambique. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that in recent years Angola and Mozambique had achieved higher rates of growth than Portugal, he said that it had become essential for those Territories to bear more of the burden of their own defence. He considered that it would be possible "to organize the defence of the overseas provinces more and more within the internal ambit of each province".

78. Although the trend towards Africanization of the fighting forces in the Territories has been noted previously in Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, ff/ there was no indication of the extent to which this goal had been achieved until the Foreign Minister announced in 1971 that half of all troops fighting in the Territories were naturais. From various accounts, the process of Africanization is most advanced in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, where,

ff/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.B, paras. 63-66, and annex I.D, paras. 41-45.

according to a year-end review in a Portuguese military communiqué, 38 new units of African militia were formed and the regular forces were increased by one company of African commandos and two detachments of African special fusiliers. Progress had also been made in Mozambique where, according to an official statement made in October 1971, of the 40,000 troops fighting in Mozambique 50 per cent were Africans. gg/

79. During 1971, Portuguese sources also revealed the existence in Mozambique of various new African units, including another company of commandos comprising "white, black and mestiço" Mozambicans. In September, an article in one of the local newspapers described the increase in the number of African volunteers in the Grupos Especiais, which are a special type of militia with basic military training. Commonly known as GE's, these groups of locally recruited men are used mainly within their own ethnic areas. In October the local press described a newly formed African paratroop group, known as the Grupo Especial de Paraquedistas (GEP), also recruited on a voluntary basis. These members receive 20 weeks of special instruction in parachute jumping. The first group, comprising 250 men, was commissioned in June in Beira in the presence of foreign consular representatives.

80. In Angola, Africanization of the armed forces has also been accelerated, but there is no intention of withdrawing the Portuguese armed forces. In December 1971, General Costa Gomes, chief of the armed forces in Angola said that it was not yet possible for local recruits to replace the majority of the Portuguese troops, either the regular or irregular forces, both because there were insufficient numbers and because they were not yet adequately trained for certain tasks, especially in regard to social and economic development. Therefore, metropolitan troops in Angola could only be gradually replaced when enough regular troops were recruited and the irregular troops adequately trained in military and non-military tasks.

(b) Role of the armed forces

81. Two other aspects of Portugal's changing war strategy were highlighted in a year-end speech by the Minister for Defence and the Army. First, replying to a criticism that Portugal had too many troops abroad, he stressed the need to provide for "the maintenance of the military machine", as the enemy, he said "never gives up". Second, he announced that the armed forces would use the most improved and up-to-date methods to deal with "enemy propaganda" both in metropolitan Portugal and in the overseas Territories "where this kind of propaganda seems to be listened to in certain sectors in a suicidal mood".

82. The Portuguese military machine is not only being "maintained", but, as reported previously, over the past few years it has been strengthened and re-equipped. hh/ In particular, the increased use of aircraft for transport of troops is reported to have gone a long way towards solving one of Portugal's major military problems. Aircraft also have been used increasingly in operations against the national liberation movements.

gg/ Unofficially, Portuguese troops in the Territory are estimated at 60,000. See ibid., annex I.B, para. 37.

hh/ For details see the previous reports on military activities and arrangements, and especially ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. II, appendix IV, and ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. II, appendix III; see also ibid., chap. VIII, annexes I.B and I.C.

83. The armed forces are also being given a larger role in the administration of the areas where security is an important problem. The entire Territory of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the district of Cabinda in Angola and the district of Tete in Mozambique have been placed under military administration, and since February 1971, six districts in Angola have been placed under a military governor (see A/AC.109/L.766).

84. As explained by General Arriaga in Mozambique, the role of the armed forces in winning a guerrilla war consists of first, limiting guerrilla activities and second, "conquering" the local population and liberating them from guerrilla control. He said that the attainment of the first objective, required a mobility of troops permitting them to effect surprise contacts, especially with the use of aircraft, "which makes the life of the guerrillas insupportable". To achieve the second objective, the armed forces have been increasingly used in all three Territories in such tasks as road building, construction work and rural improvement projects, especially in areas where the population has been regrouped into "self-defence" aldeamentos. The prototype of this role of the armed forces has been described in the 1971 report on Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. ii/

Military expenditure

85. The Law of Ways and Means approved in November 1971 again established defence and economic development as the two joint budgetary priorities for 1972. In accordance with Decree Law 305/71 of 15 July 1971, the 1972 budget is to follow a new functional classification, with nine main headings: general services and public administration, foreign affairs, national defence, education, public health, social security and social works, housing and community development, other collective and social services, economic services and other functions. However, the system of ordinary and extraordinary budgets is retained.

86. For 1972, the total estimated revenue amounts to 36,876.7 million escudos, jj/ of which 28,702.3 million escudos are ordinary revenue. This represents an increase of more than 4,177.5 million escudos over the ordinary estimated revenue in 1971. Total expenditure is estimated at 36,875.1 million escudos, leaving a surplus balance of 1.6 million escudos. Estimated ordinary expenditure at 22,065.8 million escudos is 2,447.9 million escudos higher than in 1971. The largest increase in expenditure is for national education, with the estimates rising by 733 million escudos over 1971 to 4,520.9 million escudos in 1972. The second largest increase is for servicing of the public debt with the amount rising by 411.5 million escudos to 3,075 million escudos and representing almost 14 per cent of the ordinary expenditure.

87. Total extraordinary expenditure is set at 14,809.3 million escudos with 7,583.4 million escudos for defence and security, 6,192.2 million escudos for the implementation of the Third National Development Plan and 1,033.7 million escudos for other expenditures.

88. It will be seen from table 2 below that over the five-year period 1968-1972, development expenditure has more than doubled, while defence expenditures rose less

ii/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.D.

jj/ 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

Table 2

Budgetary estimates for extraordinary expenditure,
1965-1972
(million escudos)

Estimated extraordinary expenditure				
<u>Estimated ordinary expenditure</u>	<u>Defence and security</u>	<u>Investments under Development Plan</u>	<u>Other investments</u>	<u>Total</u>
1965 10 712.1	3 527.0	2 389.2	111.0	6 027.2
1966 11 026.5	4 011.0	2 203.3	169.5	6 383.8
1967 12 605.4	5 347.0	2 145.4	106.5	7 598.9
1968 13 663.6	5 613.0	2 920.9	137.4	8 671.3
1969 15 286.9	6 339.9	3 521.3	177.1	10 038.3
1970 17 846.6	6 349.9	4 372.3	255.5	10 147.7
1971 19 617.9	7 030.6	4 947.2	453.9	12 431.7
1972 22 065.8	7 583.4	6 192.2	1,033.7	14 809.3

Source: Budgetary estimates for the relevant years.

than 20 per cent. In 1972, for the first time since the early 1960s, estimated development expenditure will amount to almost 80 per cent of the amount spent on defence and security. As already noted above, this new budgetary orientation has been made possible by the rapidly increasing military budgets of the overseas Territories, which provided about one third of the total war costs in 1970 and again in 1971.

89. The estimated expenditures for defence and security in 1972 represent an increase of 552.8 million escudos over the previous year. Of this amount, 500 million escudos is for the "extraordinary overseas forces" for which a total allocation of 4,500 million escudos is provided. Other major items include 1,750 million escudos for the extraordinary re-equipment of the air force; 521.5 million escudos for the purchase of naval vessels; 200 million escudos for common NATO expenses; and 77.5 million escudos for the construction of a new air base.

90. Estimated extraordinary expenditures in 1972 include 299.4 million escudos for the Cabora Bassa project, which is to be the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, and 350 million escudos for financial assistance to the Territories under the responsibility of the Overseas Ministry.

91. Almost all the funds for the extraordinary budget are to be from domestic sources, with only 350 million escudos to be financed by external credit. Surplus from the ordinary budget is to provide 6,634.9 million escudos, and internal loans 5,083.6 million escudos.

Security measures

92. In November 1971 under article 109 of the amended Constitution the Government asked the National Assembly to consider "the state of subversion". This article states: "... when grave subversive acts take place in any part of the national territory, the Government may, when a declaration of a state of seige is not justified, adopt measures necessary to repress subversion and prevent it from spreading, with such restrictions on individual liberties and guarantees as are considered to be indispensable, and when the situation is prolonged, the National Assembly should express itself on the gravity thereof".

93. In his message to the National Assembly, Mr. Caetano said that since 1961 there had been subversive acts in some areas in Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. This situation had made it necessary to reinforce the security forces and to station troops in these Territories, which for 10 years had fought to guarantee tranquility to the populations. The acts of subversion occurred, he said, only along the frontiers with foreign countries which inspired and nurtured such acts. Peace reigned in almost all other areas of these Territories, and, therefore, it had not been necessary to declare a state of siege. However, the fact that subversion was stimulated by foreign countries and strongly supported by international organizations and by extremist parties made it necessary for constant vigilance throughout the national territory, including Portugal itself, where acts and attempts of "terrorism" were intended to weaken the national will to resist or to diminish its defence capacity. Accordingly, the Government needed the powers to adopt such measures as were necessary to deal with subversion. For this reason, the National Assembly was asked to pronounce itself on the state of subversion in accordance with article 109 of the Constitution, as amended in 1971.

94. The National Assembly unanimously approved the Government's request for special powers on 18 November 1971. According to a report in the Portuguese press, among other measures, the decision enables the Government to maintain prior censorship of any written or pictorial material and to restrict individual liberties.

95. The action by the National Assembly was followed by several new measures. On 24 November, two decrees were signed by the Ministry of Interior tightening security. One decree (520/71) makes all activities of registered co-operatives that are not exclusively economic in nature subject to the regulations governing the rights of association. This appears to be because some meetings had been held under the auspices of co-operatives for other purposes. A second decree (521/71) established strict controls over explosives and put the licensing, registration, production, trade, import, storage and use of explosives under the Commander of the Public Security Police (PSP). Then, on 27 November, the Government was authorized to mobilize hospital services (Decree Law 527/71), the civil hospitals in Lisbon were placed under military control and the internes who had been on strike were mobilized.

96. The Government's moves were seen by foreign observers as an indication that it had become deeply concerned over the series of attacks on various facilities, that started in October 1970. In March 1971, an explosion at the Tancos military airfield destroyed 14 helicopters and three Dornier training aircraft. In late May, there was an attack on an express train from Porto. kk/ In July, 15 people were hurt when an explosion blew up a munitions dump at Santarém, 40 miles from Tomar, the headquarters of one of Portugal's seven military regions. Later in the same month, a grenade was found near a ship being built for the Portuguese navy at the Mondego shipyards. In October, there was first an explosion on the ship Niassa, which had been commissioned to carry troops to Africa, and later in the month a bomb attack on the new NATO Comiberlant headquarters at Oeiras two days before the official inauguration. In November, there were again two explosions, one an attack on NATO facilities at the Caparica headquarters near Lisbon, and a second one at army headquarters in Lisbon.

97. A movement known as the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA) has claimed responsibility for a number of these attacks, particularly the attack on Tancos and those on the NATO facilities. The ARA has declared that its activities are a protest against Portuguese fascism and the war in the three African Territories. It is said to have chosen NATO as a target because of the support which it claims that organization gives Portugal to carry out the colonial wars.

98. In one of his radio and television speeches, Mr. Caetano told the country that it was not the populations of the overseas Territories who were against Portugal but groups maintained and subsidized by foreign countries and foreign organizations, not excluding some religious bodies. He said that some countries and organizations, enemies of Portugal, had succeeded in obtaining anti-Portuguese collaborators among the Portuguese themselves.

99. As the foregoing events show, Portugal now increasingly identifies its national security with that of the overseas Territories. This concept was also enunciated by Mr. José Manuel Fragoso, the Portuguese Ambassador to Brazil, in a speech to the Escola Superior de Guerra do Brasil. In a speech entitled "Portugal: national security concepts and policy", Mr. Fragoso said that his country's concept of security was pluri-continental because of its "presence" in Europe, Africa and the Far East; national security required social cohesion of various population elements on those continents because "the security of the whole could not be separated from the traditional objective of the creation of multiracial societies"; and from a political point of view, as Portugal was a "regional State" in which the overseas Territories were considered to be autonomous regions, national security had to be viewed within the traditional and constitutional imperative of a unitary State.

100. In June 1971 the Direcção-Geral de Seguranca (DGS) announced that it had uncovered another "terrorist" group in the northern part of Portugal. Later in July, Mr. Gonçalves Rapazote, the Minister for the Interior, issued a statement announcing that the Government had discovered the infiltration of subversive elements in the armed forces, universities and labour syndicates and that some arrests had been made. In a speech to a meeting of the presidents of the municipal councils at Braga, Mr. Gonçalves said that the DGS had the powers of

kk/ At the time the event was reported as an accident, but in a speech in June, Mr. Caetano mentioned it as an act of subversion.

detention, without charges against the suspect of activities against the security of the State. 11/ He said that in the exercise of these powers the DGS was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior whose responsibility was to see that these powers were legally exercised. He said that the DGS had recently stated that it was not holding any prisoners except those suspected of being guilty, but that final findings rested with the courts.

101. In September 1971, the international press reported "a wave of political arrests" in Portugal. The National Commission for Aid to Political Prisoners was said to have reported that the number of political prisoners had jumped from 79 at the beginning of the year to 160 by 15 August, with 90 under political detention. In May the non-partisan National Commission for Aid to Political Prisoners was reported to have sent a letter to Mr. Caetano protesting the repression of political activities and the absence of legal guarantees. In the course of the discussion on the constitutional amendments in the National Assembly in June, Mr. Sá Carneiro had also criticized the powers of the Portuguese police and had suggested that the National Assembly should appoint a committee to inquire into the activities of the DGS.

102. Both the Minister of Interior and Mr. Caetano himself have denied that anyone was imprisoned for his ideas in Portugal. In an interview with a Stockholm newspaper, Mr. Caetano said that if by political prisoners were meant persons denied liberty because of their opinions, then he could say that there were no political prisoners in Portugal. He added that the Government had investigated and found no grounds for the charges of torture and ill treatment of prisoners.

103. As reported previously, mm/ since mid-1970 the courts have been involved in a number of trials for subversion. In March 1971 in the Boa Hora Court in Lisbon, the Rev. Joaquim Pinto de Andrade was sentenced to three years in prison "with security measures" which, it is reported can result in indefinite detention. It will be recalled that the Rev. Andrade had been held with nine other persons on charges of having connexions with the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and of being involved in subversive activities with a view to helping Angola gain independence. Of the nine other accused, eight received prison sentences ranging from 16 months to four and one-half years, plus security measures, and one woman student from Portugal was acquitted.

104. Between May 1971 and the end of the year, both the Portuguese newspapers and the international press reported a number of arrests in Porto and Lisbon. Most of the cases were reported to have involved "subversive activities" and membership in ARA or other illegal organizations. Except for a few cases, mainly involving students, most of the persons arrested in 1971 had not been tried by the end of the year.

105. In January 1972, a Swiss newspaper reported that the Supreme Court of Justice in Lisbon had ruled in connexion with an appeal that prisoners' confessions made during police interrogations in the absence of their counsel were not valid. This

11/ According to one report, under the preventive detention law, a prisoner can remain in jail up to 180 days without legal advice or contact with the outside.

mm/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.A, paras. 86-91.

ruling upheld the decision of a lower court in a case involving a lawyer who withdrew his confessions in court on grounds that they had been extorted.

106. During the first month of 1972, there were three further bomb attacks in Portugal. In the first case, the explosion occurred at a warehouse belonging to the Companhia de Navegação Carregadores Açorianos. A ship, the Muxima, was being loaded close by with cargo for São Tomé and Angola. The ARA claimed that it had destroyed significant quantities of French supplied war materials destined for Portuguese "parachute units" fighting in Africa. The second bomb explosion occurred about a week later in the centre of Lisbon. The Portuguese authorities were reported to have attributed the explosion also to the ARA. The third explosion occurred in the centre of Porto and caused considerable damage.

107. Following this series of explosions, the Public Security Council met to decide on measures to meet the serious situation. The National Guard and the PSP, which are represented in the Council, were to increase their vigilance and to adopt new measures to prevent further attacks in the urban and suburban areas.

4. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF PORTUGAL AFFECTING THE TERRITORIES UNDER ITS ADMINISTRATION

108. On the diplomatic front, as already noted above, Portugal's efforts have been devoted mainly to explaining and defending the country's colonial policy. Portugal considers that its international relations have considerably improved over the past two years and that the country no longer "stands proudly alone". Among other things, it reached a new agreement with Brazil on reciprocal citizenship, it opened negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC) with a view to establishing some kind of formal relationship and it moved to a closer relationship with the United States of America, first with a visit of the United States Vice-President to Lisbon, and subsequently with the signing of an agreement with the United States on the use of the Azores base and the visit of President Nixon to the islands. In a speech broadcast over radio and television, Mr. Caetano said that "the /Azores/ treaty was a political act in which the solidarity of interests between the two countries is recognized, and it is in the name of that solidarity that we put an instrument of action at the disposal of our American friends, who are now our allies".

109. As part of its over-all diplomatic offensive, during 1971, Portugal invited various foreign official groups to visit the war zones in the three African Territories. In June, the consular corps in Luanda was invited to visit Zaire District in northern Angola, and in October to visit the eastern districts of Lunda and Moxico. On the first visit, the group included the consuls of Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Monaco, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. On the second visit, the group also included the consul of Austria. Official visitors to the war areas in Mozambique and to the Cabora Bassa dam nn/ included several British Members of Parliament, a number of Brazilian deputies, a group of Italian senators and Mr. Kent Crane, Assistant to the Vice-President of the United States. In August 1971, two United States congressmen, Messrs. Diggs and Vanderjagdt, members of the House Sub-Committee on African Affairs, visited Cape Verde and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea. They were accompanied by the military attaché to the United States Embassy in Lisbon and three advisers. In Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, the congressmen visited Bissau, various rural regrouping projects at Nhacra, north-west of the capital, and the town of Mansoa.

nn/ The involvement of foreign economic interests in the Territories, which is another aspect of the internationalization of the war is described in the series of reports on activities of foreign economic interests. See especially ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23A (A/8023/Rev.1/Add.1), annex, appendix III; ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), annex, appendix II. For a list of foreign economic interests in Angola and Mozambique see ibid., Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23A (A/7623/Rev.1/Add.1), appendix II, table II.

Relations with South Africa

110. In June 1971, Mr. Rui Patrício, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, made an official visit to South Africa for five days. During his stay, Mr. Patrício met with Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster and held talks with Dr. Hilgard Muller, South Africa's Minister for Foreign Affairs and other government officials. Discussions between the two ministers were reported to have centred on three main topics: (a) economic co-operation between Portugal and South Africa in southern Africa; oo/ (b) maintenance of security in the region south of the 10th parallel, as well as the sea route around the Cape, with special reference to the Indian Ocean and the Mozambique Canal; and (c) the political attacks both countries face, especially in the United Nations. According to the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the talks also dwelt on "terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world", and progress of the Cabora Bassa project.

111. A South African source reported that at a banquet given in honour of Mr. Patrício, Mr. Muller said that his country had great admiration for the steadfast manner in which the Portuguese were handling the problem of "terrorist" activities and subversion and paid tribute to the sacrifices of Portugal's sons "in their gallant effort to preserve peace and order and to ensure progress". In his reply, Mr. Patrício said that the strategic positions of Portugal and South Africa were "important factors for the defence of Western civilization". He added that as the two countries shared common ideals of peace and progress, they suffered the same threats and were exposed to the same perils.

112. During the year, Mr. Pieter Botha, the South African Minister for Defence, made two brief visits to Lisbon, a private visit in June, and a second visit in November. In December 1971, General W.R. van der Riet, the South African Army Chief of Staff was reported to have made a visit to Lisbon. This visit was said to concern military relations between Portugal and South Africa for action against the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO).

113. There have been a number of reports of military co-operation between Portugal and South Africa. In November 1971, Mr. Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA, repeated his charge that South African troops were stationed at Lumeje in Moxico District, in Angola, to support Portugal's war against African freedom-fighters, pp/ and, in February 1972, it was reported that South Africa had four battalions of troops in Tete District, in Mozambique, that South African police had taken part in the repression of Africans in Angola and that a unit of Portuguese troops had been sent to Namibia to assist the South African authorities in connexion with the Ovamboland disturbances. These activities have again called into question the existence of a defence pact between Portugal and South Africa in spite of repeated denials by both countries.

oo/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), annex, appendix II.

pp/ Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. II, annex, appendix II, para. 37.

114. In December 1971, Mr. Botha announced that the South African Government had provisionally decided to purchase six corvettes from Portugal. It was expected that the Portuguese share in the construction would be limited to the hulls of the ships, and investigations were being made to determine how much of the rest of the ships could be built in South Africa in co-operation with overseas organizations.

Relations with Southern Rhodesia

115. Although, as reported previously, Portugal had recalled its Consul-General in Salisbury following the adoption of resolution 277 (1970) by the Security Council, Mr. Rebelo de Andrade was subsequently appointed to the post. In December 1971, he was among the Portuguese diplomats in southern Africa who visited Mozambique where they were briefed on the war situation.

116. There have been various reports of Portugal's interest in and support for the "settlement" agreement between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesia, especially because of the prospects of an end to the Beira blockade. It has also been reported that Portugal has plans for developing closer economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and possibly a customs union or common market.

117. In March 1972, Mr. Ian Smith was reported to have asked Prime Minister Vorster for the participation of South African troops, together with Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian forces, in raids against bases of national liberation movements operating in Angola and Mozambique.

Relations with the United Kingdom

118. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, paid a two-day official visit to Portugal in June 1971. Sir Alec was quoted as saying at a banquet given in his honour, that he believed that his visit opened up new opportunities for Portugal and the United Kingdom. In the course of his speech, he noted that the two countries did not always see eye to eye, and that the United Kingdom's policy in Africa had been different from that of Portugal. The differences of opinion between the two countries had been on "the scope and pace of advance", but the historical relationship between the two countries had not been affected.

119. In a statement issued after the visit, it was stated that Sir Alec and Mr. Patrício were in agreement on a wide range of issues. It was further stated that "on African affairs the two ministers explained the aims and policies of their respective Governments and arrived at a deeper understanding of each other's viewpoints". It was agreed that there would be continuing exchanges at all levels. Other sources reported that the two ministers also discussed aspects of the "Rhodesian independence dispute", including the British naval blockade of the Mozambique port of Beira.

120. In March 1972, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs made an official visit to London, the first such visit by a Portuguese foreign minister in more than 11 years. It was expected that the question of Portugal's membership in EEC would dominate the discussions. Following these talks a British Foreign Office spokesman said that southern Africa, "with particular reference to Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories", had been among matters discussed.

121. In a long press conference in London, Mr. Patrício dwelt mainly on Portugal's policy in Africa, the constitutional changes, and developments in the fields of labour and education. He asserted that Portugal had the full support of the local African population and that the Portuguese forces in Africa would win the 10-year war "within six months" if independent African countries would stop helping the "terrorists".

Relations with the United States

122. One of Portugal's major achievements during 1971 was its improved relations with the United States. In this connexion, the significant events cited by the Portuguese press included Vice-President Agnew's visit to Lisbon in July, the signing of the Azores agreement in December and later the meeting of President Nixon with French President Pompidou and Prime Minister Caetano in the Azores. qq/ Some observers also considered the meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon in June 1971 as another sign of Portugal's success in improving its international relations.

Azores agreement

123. A Portuguese information source reported in January 1972 that "Relations between the Governments of the United States and Portugal have reached the most favourable level in recent years since the signing of the new agreement on use by the United States Air Force of the Lajes air base in the Azores."

124. Under the agreement signed with Portugal on 9 December 1971, the United States will have the use of the Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island in the Azores until 4 February 1974. In return, the United States will provide Portugal with: (a) the loan of an oceanographic vessel, the USS Kellar, valued at \$US 8 million; (b) \$US 1 million for educational reform in Portugal; (c) \$US 5 million for non-military excess equipment measured in terms of initial acquisition cost; (d) credits of \$US 15 million per year for two years for the purchase of United States surplus agricultural commodities on favourable terms under P.L. 480 programme; and (e) the financing of loans of up to \$US 400 million by the Export-Import Bank of the United States for development projects in Portugal.

125. In a television address to the nation, Mr. Caetano said that the terms of the agreement fell far short of what Portugal would have liked. Although, apart from the various grants, Portugal had been promised up to \$US 430 million in loans, the country did not intend to mortgage itself to any foreign country. He noted that Portugal had an excellent reserve position and had never had any difficulty in raising money on the foreign markets. Accordingly Portugal would only use the United States credits when suitable and when conditions were better than those obtainable elsewhere. He said that he wanted the country to understand that Portugal had not suddenly received a shower of dollars which would solve all its

qq/ The New York Times, for instance, reported that "Portugal has economic stakes in the Nixon-Pompidou meeting". Also speaking of their "summit" meeting in the Azores, Deputy Avila de Azevedo said in the National Assembly that it would result in improved understanding between people and for the Portuguese, an important position in the concert of nations, about which no one could be indifferent.

economic difficulties. As the agreement was in effect for only two years, he expressed the hope that when it was next renewed, conditions in the United States would have improved and new arrangements could be made for further co-operation between the two countries. As reported in the press, Portugal had wanted an interest-free or very low interest loan of \$US 600 million.

126. The new Azores agreement has been widely interpreted by some observers and segments of the international press as a commitment by the United States to assist Portugal in carrying on its colonial wars in Africa. Some also see it as suggestive of an increasing NATO interest in buttressing the white minority-ruled areas in Africa. Others consider the agreement as an act to bail Portugal out of war-born financial problems, and while the loans are not expected to be used on facilities in Africa, they will, nevertheless, liberate aircraft and weapons there for use in Angola and Mozambique.

127. In a statement made before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in February 1972, Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs of the Department of State, said that the use by the United States of facilities in the Azores dated back to the Second World War and that the country's current defence relationship with Portugal was based on the North Atlantic Treaty and Defense Agreement between Portugal and the United States of 6 September 1951, concluded pursuant to article 3 of the NATO Treaty. This agreement, through various extensions has continued to govern the use of the Lajes Airbase by United States forces. Mr. Johnson said that the new agreement contained no new defence commitment to Portugal and that, in fact, the grant to the United States of base rights in the Azores involved "no defence or security commitments by the United States at all". The agreement on the Azores neither added to nor subtracted from the United States commitment to Portugal under the North Atlantic Treaty. After explaining the details of the agreement he denied that it provided assistance to Portugal in its efforts "to combat the insurgency in its various African Territories". He refuted newspaper reports that the conflicts in Africa had put a strain on Portugal's foreign exchange reserves and that United States assistance would relieve that strain by pointing out that Portugal's gold and foreign exchange reserves had reached an all-time high of almost \$US 1.8 thousand million - equal to about 14 months' imports.

Relations with Brazil

128. In 1971, Luso-Brazilian relations were further strengthened with the signing of the Convention on Equal Rights and Obligations which gives Portuguese and Brazilians reciprocal citizenship.

129. During the year, the Brazilian Minister of Finance visited Lisbon to discuss various aspects of economic co-operation. Among other things, an agreement was reached in June 1971 on measures to facilitate the access of certain Portuguese goods such as wine to the Brazilian market and reciprocal considerations for Brazilian goods in Lisbon, Luanda and Lourenço Marques and an entrepôt for Portuguese goods in Brazil. Preliminary discussions also were held on the possibility of freeing Brazilian capital from taxation both in Portugal and in the overseas Territories, in order to facilitate the access of Brazilian goods to those markets.

130. There has been growing interest in Brazil to increase trade with Angola and Mozambique. In June 1971, the director of the Carteira do Comércio e Exportação do Brasil (CACEX) visited Angola and Mozambique to discuss trade matters, and, in October, a trade mission from São Paulo, representing the clothing industry, visited Angola.

131. In a statement made in November 1971, Mr. Gibson Barbosa, the Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained that his country's relations with Portugal were based on absolute respect for each other's sovereignty. Brazil considered that the question of the Portuguese Territories was a matter within the exclusive sovereignty of Portugal but it hoped that Portugal would find a peaceful solution to the problem. In the course of his statement, he denied that his country was considering aid to the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique.

132. Early in 1972, it was announced that shipping service between Brazil and the overseas Territories would begin in March 1972 and that the Brazilian airline Varig would increase its flights to Luanda to twice a week.

5. PORTUGAL'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

Economic integration and the problem of inter-territorial payments

Nature of the problem

133. Essentially, what is called the problem of inter-territorial payments arises from the fact that although constitutionally the overseas Territories together with Portugal are considered to be a "unitary State", Portugal, as well as each Territory, has its own separate escudo, and trade and financial transactions among the Territories themselves as well as with Portugal are subject to exchange controls. In other words, for the purposes of trade and financial transactions the metropolitan escudo is treated as a foreign currency in the Territories, and each Territory has a balance of payments with Portugal. Because of their special economic relationship with Portugal, Angola and Mozambique have traditionally had a balance of payments deficit with Portugal arising both from their trade deficit - since they import more from Portugal than they sell to it - and from their deficits on current account.

134. Officially, it has always been explained that the exchange controls were necessitated by the tendency of money to leave the Territories because of the difference in the stages of development in Portugal and the Territories. It is evident, however, that since Portugal and foreign interests control much of the resources and production in the Territories, and more particularly in Angola and Mozambique, a large proportion of both the income derived from exports from the Territories, as well as income from capital invested by Portuguese residents in the Territories is either retained in or repatriated to Portugal or to foreign countries. To this, of course, must be added other transfers from residents in the Territory.

Effect of the measures to create an escudo zone common market

135. It will be recalled that in 1961, legislation was enacted in Portugal to bring about closer economic integration of what is called the Espaço português (Portuguese realm), comprising Portugal and all the overseas Territories, in which there would be free circulation of goods, capital and persons. The basic law (Decree Law 44,016, 8 November) set forth a schedule of the changes to achieve complete economic integration by 1972.

136. As a first step toward the establishment of a common market, quotas and duties on imports into Portugal of "national goods" were gradually reduced. Import duties on goods from the Territories entering Portugal were finally eliminated in 1964 and import duties on Portuguese goods entering the Territories were to be gradually reduced beginning in 1967, but the schedule was to be adjusted to the economic situation in each Territory.

137. In order to facilitate the free transactions of goods, services and capital, in addition to the removal of quotas and customs duties, a multilateral clearing

system of payments within the escudo zone was set up in 1962 (Decree Law 44,703, 17 November). Under this system, normally all payment transactions either between the Territories themselves or between Portugal and the Territories were cleared through the Bank of Portugal in Lisbon which kept each Territory's exchange reserve accounts separately. In order to help the Territories, an Escudo Zone Monetary Fund rr/ was created from which a Territory could borrow when it did not have enough exchange reserves in its own account. Since all inter-territorial payments had to be made in metropolitan escudos, in effect, the gold and foreign exchange earnings of the Territories benefit the escudo zone reserves. Between 1966 and 1970, Portugal's gold and foreign exchange reserves rose from 33,725 million escudos to 45,507 million escudos, an increase of about 33 per cent. Between 1969 and 1970 alone, Portugal's rise in foreign exchange assets amounted to 2,547 million escudos.

138. Owing, however, to their continuing balance of payments deficits with Portugal, Angola and Mozambique continued to have difficulties in covering their purchases in Portugal because of the lack of foreign exchange or metropolitan escudos. As a result, funds waiting to be paid in Portugal accumulated. At the end of 1968, net debits pending payment of the two Territories amounted to 2,930 million escudos and at the end of 1969, 5,090 million escudos.

139. Further changes were introduced by creating local branches of the central control machinery in 1969 and establishing a system of priorities for transfers in settlement of external payments. In order to cover their growing transactions, Angola's share in the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund was increased from 750 million escudos (Decrees Laws, 49,304-49,306, 16 October 1969).

140. Despite these changes, by 1970 the total balances pending transfers had reached 7,157 million escudos, of which 3,415 million escudos were from Angola and 3,742 million escudos were from Mozambique. At the end of 1971, pending payments had risen to almost 9,000 million escudos, or nearly 5 per cent of Portugal's gross national product. During the period 1966-1970, Portugal's favourable balance of payments with Angola rose from 614 million escudos to 2,363 million escudos and its surplus balance with Mozambique, which averaged over 1,000 million escudos a year, dropped only to 495 million escudos in 1970, possibly owing to larger capital movements from Portugal to the Territory in connexion with the construction of the Cabora Bassa project (table 4 below).

141. Portuguese sources have freely admitted that the balance of payments difficulties of the two larger Territories with Portugal were aggravated by the measures adopted to create free trade within the escudo zone. Apart from the measures noted above, involving the gradual dismantling of quotas and tariffs against goods from any Territory, including Portugal, within the escudo zone, other measures also caused difficulties. These included measures restricting the development of industries in the Territories which would compete with goods from Portugal and high tariffs imposed against foreign goods, so that Angola and

rr/ The Fund was first established with a total capital of 1,500 million escudos in which each Territory participated as follows: Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe, 60 million escudos each; Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, 140 million escudos; Angola, 750 million escudos; Mozambique, 450 million escudos; and Macau and Timor, 20 million escudos each.

Mozambique became captive markets for Portuguese goods, including such items as textiles, wine, olive oil and other consumer goods. Traditionally also, while the Territories were prohibited from developing any shipping of their own, all movement of goods among the Territories themselves and between the Territories and Portugal was restricted to Portuguese ships.

142. The difficulties experienced in Angola and Mozambique over the payments problem were not solely the result of these measures. One of the problems in Angola, cited in many articles, has been the granting of special privileges to some of the large companies, including the Angola Diamond Company, exempting them either totally or partially from exchange controls.

New measures

143. On 6 November 1971, the Portuguese Government introduced a series of measures changing the system of inter-territorial payments within the escudo zone. In effect, the new measures reintroduced the principle, dating back to 1931, that each Territory shall be allowed to purchase only those imports for which it already has the necessary foreign exchange or metropolitan escudos; transfers will be authorized where external payments exist. Although, from the Government's point of view, this was the only way to deal with the serious situation that had been created by the delays in inter-territorial payments, to some observers, the new measures effectively put an end to any idea of economic integration.

144. The new measures have two objectives: first, to liquidate the existing debt of some 10,000 million metropolitan escudos; and, second, to prevent the accumulation of delayed payments from the Territories.

145. To achieve the first objective, the Government has raised the capital of the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund from 1,500 million escudos to 3,000 million escudos. Of the additional capital, the Portuguese Treasury will provide 500 million escudos, the Bank of Portugal another 500 million escudos and the Bank of Angola and the Banco Nacional Ultramarino, the two issuing banks for the overseas Territories, will each provide 250 million escudos.

146. Two types of public loans will be raised to pay off the delayed transfers. Three thousand million escudos are to be raised by treasury bonds drawing 4 per cent interest and another 1,000 million metropolitan escudos will be raised by bonds issued by the local exchange funds in the Territories. A third source of funds is to be derived from restricting authorized transactions to amounts less than the exchange available so as to save from 1,000 to 1,200 million escudos a year.

147. The payments are to be made in two stages. In the first stage, 25 per cent of the accumulated deferred payments will be liquidated through the 1,500 million escudos increase in capital of the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund and 1,000 million escudos worth of treasury bonds already subscribed by the Caixa Geral de Depósitos and other banks. In the second phase, 6,000 million escudos will be used from the remaining bond issues and savings by the local exchange control boards to pay off the existing debts in accordance with established priorities.

148. To prevent the future accumulation of debts by the Territories to exporters in Portugal stringent controls will henceforth be imposed on all imports. According to some estimates, Angola and Mozambique may have to reduce their imports from Portugal by as much as one third and reduce their total imports by as much as one sixth. It has also been suggested that the total effect of the new arrangements in Angola may lead to the loss of some 5,000 commercial jobs and the closing of 400 small businesses.

149. The following priorities have been established for imports: (a) essential merchandise for economic development and public use which do not compete with local products; (b) merchandise of essential importance for the well-being of the population and which does not compete with local products; (c) other goods essential to the well-being of the people; and (d) non-essential goods.

150. As regards invisible operations and capital transfers, the priorities are: (a) operations that stimulate the establishment in the Territories of productive industries and develop production for export; (b) operations considered essential to the (Portuguese) culture and well-being of the population; (c) fulfilment of administrative responsibilities of enterprises in the Territory and other transfers of recognized economic interest; and (d) other operations.

Future prospects

151. The Minister for Overseas Territories said during a speech at the Institute for Higher Studies in Lisbon early in 1972 that the new measures restricting trade and transfers of the Territories had been necessary because of the "extremely grave situation which had developed and which was affecting the economy not only of the provinces but also of the Metropole and prejudicing a great number of businesses and people". However, since the new measures were imposed there has been mounting criticism in Portugal, especially from industries which depend on the overseas Territories for their exports. There has also been considerable dissatisfaction in Angola, partly because there was also little consultation with the economic interests on the measures and partly because of the possible economic effects referred to in paragraph 148 above. However, as mineral exports from the Territory have been growing rapidly and new investments in Angola are still increasing, the Governor-General has expressed confidence that the import restrictions will not seriously affect the economy of the Territory. But since the liquidation of the arrears is expected to take more than three years, it will be some time before the full effects of the changes will be felt.

152. The introduction of the new measures restricting the trade of the overseas Territories with Portugal and, in effect, depriving them of their privileged trading position is seen by some observers as a first move by Portugal to facilitate its negotiations with the European Economic Community (EEC). Although Portuguese officials have repeatedly voiced assurances that the Government is only seeking a trade association with EEC, many observers firmly believe that Portugal eventually will have to choose between Europe and Africa. Now that the United Kingdom has become a member in EEC, the break-up of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is expected to pose serious problems for the remaining EFTA members.

153. It is pointed out that, in 1971, over one third of Portugal's exports went to EFTA members and about one fourth of its imports came from them. Since the

enlargement of EEC, nearly 40 per cent of Portugal's exports are expected to go to its members, tariffs permitting. Portugal will therefore have to negotiate some kind of a trade agreement with EEC, which would have to take into account its special economic relations with its overseas Territories.

154. Preliminary discussions between Portugal and EEC were begun in late 1971, when it was reported that Portugal's application for associate membership had run into difficulties over various problems, including the extent of the list of Portuguese products considered to be "sensitive" by EEC and the question of quotas and concessions asked by Portugal for agricultural products. Although Portugal is so far only seeking associate membership, because full membership requires that a State's constitutional and social structure correspond to democratic principles, it is not yet clear what political problems may affect the negotiations.

Table 3

International balance of payments of the escudo zone (million escudos)					
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Total current transactions					
Trade	+ 1,092	+ 3,286	+ 1,275	+ 2,034	+ 2,353
Invisibles	- 11,249	- 10,881	- 12,787	- 14,103	- 18,060
Capital transactions	+ 12,341	+ 14,167	+ 14,062	+ 16,137	+ 20,413
Errors and omissions	+ 2,934	+ 2,475	+ 2,484	- 681	+ 24
	- 114	+ 306	+ 356	+ 290	+ 154
	+ 3,912	+ 6,067	+ 4,115	+ 1,643	+ 2,531
					+ 3,252

Sources: 1966-1970. Bank of Portugal, Report of the Board of Directors, respective years.
1971. Notícias, Lourenço Marques, 16 April 1972.

Table 4

Portugal's balance of payments with the overseas Territories
(million escudos)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
All Territories					
Trade	+ 1,519	+ 2,512	+ 2,699	+ 2,424	+ 1 859
Invisibles	+ 583	+ 1,411	+ 629	+ 2,043	+ 870
Capital transactions	- 83	- 1,501	- 275	- 849	- 453
Errors and omissions	+ 17	+ 5	+ 6	- 31	+ 109
Total	+ 2,002	+ 2,417	+ 3,059	+ 3,587	+ 2,167
Angola	+ 614	+ 1,634	+ 2,084	+ 2,604	+ 2,363
Mozambique	+ 1,149	+ 1,120	+ 1,236	+ 1,020	+ 495
Other Territories	+ 239	337	261	37	691
	+ 2,002	+ 2,417	+ 3,059	+ 3,587	+ 2,167

Source: Bank of Portugal, Report of the Board of Directors, respective years.

B. ANGOLA*

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.766.

1. GENERAL

1. Angola lies on the south-west Atlantic coast of Africa between 4° 22' S and 18° 03' S in latitude and between 24° 05' E.G. and 11° 41' E.G. in longitude. Except for the Cabinda enclave, which is administered as part of it, the entire Territory lies south of the Congo River. The total area of the Territory is 1,246,700 square kilometres.

2. According to provisional 1970 census figures, the total resident population of the Territory was 5,673,046, compared with 4,830,449 in 1960. Although it had been reported that the census would record the population by ethnic groups, such data for 1970 are not yet available. In 1960, 172,529 persons were listed as "branco", 53,392 as "mestiço", 4,604,362 as "preto" and 166 as others. In 1970, the European population was estimated at 350,000 by one source and between 500,000 and 600,000 by another.

3. The provisional 1970 census figures giving the population distribution by district show that since 1960 there has been a decrease in the population in five districts (see table 1). Four of these, Zaire, Uíge, Moxico and Cuando-Cubango, continue to be affected by guerrilla activities. The population of Zaire has dropped from 103,906 to 41,766. In contrast, the population of Huambo has increased by more than 50 per cent and that of Luanda District by 60 per cent. The population of Luanda, the capital, increased from 224,540 to 475,238. The change in the ethnic distribution in Luanda is shown below:

<u>Official designation</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>Per cent increase</u>
" <u>Branco</u> "	55 567	124 352	123.72
" <u>Mestiço</u> "	13 593	36 431	168.01
" <u>Preto</u> "	155 325	301 870	94.35

4. It may be recalled that in 1955 over 60 per cent of the European population lived in the eight major cities. In contrast, over 90 per cent of the African population lived in the rural areas. Even assuming that the growth of the total urban population has paralleled that of Luanda, it seems likely that Angola has remained a Territory in which the towns and cities constitute the European centres surrounded by an almost completely African rural population. This urban-rural population pattern is specially important as it reinforces the political and economic dominance of the non-African elements.

Table 1

Angola. Distribution of population by district

	Area (square kilometres)	1960 census	1970 provisional census	Change over 10-year period	1960 population density	1970 population density
Cabinda	7 270	58 547	80 857	+ 22 310	8.05	11.12
Zaire	40 130	103 906	41 766	- 62 140	2.59	1.04
Uíge	55 818	399 412	386 037	- 13 375	7.15	6.91
Luanda	33 789	346 763	560 589	+213 826	10.26	16.59
Cuanza-North	27 106	263 051	298 062	+ 35 011	9.70	10.99
Cuanza-South	59 269	404 650	458 592	+ 53 942	6.83	7.73
Malanje	101 028	451 849	558 630	+106 781	4.47	5.52
Lunda	167 786	247 273	302 538	+ 55 265	1.47	1.80
Benguela	37 808	487 873	474 897	- 12 976	12.90	12.56
Huambo	30 667	597 332	837 627	+240 295	19.48	27.31
Bié	71 870	452 697	650 337	+197 640	6.30	9.04
Moxico	199 786	266 449	213 119	- 53 330	1.33	1.06
Cuando-Cubango	192 079	113 034	112 073	- 9 961	0.59	0.58
Moçâmedes	55 946	43 004	53 058	+ 10 054	0.77	0.94
Huíla	166 348	594 609	644 864	+ 50 255	3.57	3.87
Total	1 246 700	4 830 449	5 673 046	842 597	3.87	4.55

Sources: 1960 - Angola, III Recenseamento Geral da População first volume.

1970 - Provisional figures published in the press.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

Constitutional status of the Territory

5. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Angola is considered to be an overseas province of Portugal. The Political and Administrative Statute of Angola is contained in Decree 45,374 of 22 November 1963. As an overseas province, Angola is represented in the National Assembly, the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber. a/

6. In July 1971, amendments to the Constitution were approved by the National Assembly giving the overseas Territories a wider degree of autonomy. In January 1972, the National Assembly began consideration of a draft bill revising the Overseas Organic Law. The main provisions are described in annex II.A above, paras. 35-59. The detailed arrangements for the Territory which will be embodied in a new political and administrative statute for the Territory are not yet available.

7. Views expressed by the Angolan representatives in the National Assembly during the discussions on the constitutional reforms are reported in annex II.A above, paras. 17-26.

Opinion on the constitutional reforms

8. Most of the newspaper articles in the local press have closely echoed the views expressed by the deputies in the National Assembly in support of the Government's proposed constitutional reforms. One series of editorials suggested that the decolonization which was implicit in the constitutional amendments would result in the melding of "minorities" and "sociological majorities" b/ so that a hierarchy would emerge in the "pluri-continental and pluri-cultural Portuguese community by a natural, just and pacific process".

9. The concern in the Territory over the revision of the Overseas Organic Law was expressed by Mr. Garcia de Castilho, President of the Industrial Association of Angola, in May 1971, when it was reported that the Government in Lisbon had already

a/ For a description of the general system of government and administration, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), annex I.A, paras. 18-25.

b/ In a study published in Estudos Políticos e Sociais in 1966, the theory was put forward that in the Territories in Africa where the indigenous population constitutes a numerical majority, it is the small number of originários from Portugal who form the "sociological majority". See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (Part II) (A/6700/Rev.1), chap. V, para. 64.

prepared a draft text for consideration by the National Assembly once the Assembly had approved the constitutional reforms. He suggested that the economic interests in Angola should have been consulted in regard to the revision of the Overseas Organic Law because the current structure of the territorial Government no longer met the needs of the Territory owing to the economic development and social changes that had taken place. He recalled the petition which the economic associations had addressed to the Prime Minister in 1969 just before the elections to the National Assembly, and expressed the hope that those points had been taken into account. The extent to which the government bill reflects the demands of the economic interests is discussed in the general section (See annex II.A above, para. 56).

Relations with the central Government

10. In 1971 Mr. Silva Cunha, the Overseas Minister, visited the Territory twice. In July 1971, on his way back from an official visit to Malawi, he stopped in Angola for a few days during which he held a working session with the Governor-General and the provincial secretaries. He also met with the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Companhia de Celulose do Ultramar Português, which owns a paper factory in Angola. Their discussions concerned a 2,300 million-escudo c/ expansion plan for the factory which was to be financed by an increase in the capital and other loans and by credits from foreign suppliers of equipment goods.

11. In August 1971, during his regular annual visit to Angola, the Overseas Minister was briefed on the military situation by the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the regional military commanders of the eastern districts. He travelled by air to five district capitals (Henrique de Carvalho in Lunda, Luso in Moxico, Serpa Pinto in Cuando-Cubango, Silva Porto in Bié and Nova Lisboa in Huambo) and also visited some smaller towns and villages. In an address before a meeting of the economic associations in Luanda, he said that the future progress of Angola depended on co-operation between government and private interests to face difficulties, solve problems and control the enemy. On his return to Lisbon, he stated at a press conference that he had been able to visit the district capitals as well as some of the more distant eastern villages. The international press sometimes described that region as devastated by the war, but he had found life normal wherever he went.

12. Other visitors from Portugal during the year included the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rui Patrício, in June, and 10 deputies from the National Assembly in September. The deputies spent 17 days in Angola at the invitation of the economic associations of the Territory. They toured the northern and eastern war areas and Luso, the capital of Moxico District. They also toured industrial and agricultural projects.

13. In January and again in December 1971, Mr. Barreto Lara, one of the deputies for Angola, requested in the National Assembly that the Liga Nacional Africana (LNA) in Angola should be permitted to return to a normal administration. He recalled

c/ 27.25 escudos equals, approximately \$US 1.00.

that LNA, which is the only legally recognized African organization in Angola, had been under the jurisdiction of a government administrative committee for the past 14 years. The Government had apparently taken action under Decree Laws 39,660 of 20 May 1954, and 40,166 of 18 May 1955 (regulating the organization of non-political associations), because LNA had been suspected of political activities in the late 1950s. d/ He also pointed out that the great majority of Africans were among the most deprived persons in the Territory, and needed the assistance of LNA to defend their interests. According to Mr. Barreto Lara, the government committee had told him earlier in the year of its intention shortly to approve the new statutes of LNA. These statutes had been officially recommended and elections of officers would then follow. He asked whether the general meeting of LNA had been allowed to discuss and approve the proposed statutes.

Territorial Government

General

14. In 1971, the Governor-General of the Territory made only one visit to Lisbon. During this visit, he reportedly discussed with the Overseas Ministry questions relating to the financing of the Third National Development Plan in Angola, especially with reference to the applications for mining concessions pending approval from the Minister.

15. There were no major changes in the general situation in the Territory during the year. In several of his interviews with the foreign press, the Governor-General stressed the economic growth of the Territory since 1961 as evidence of the success of Portugal's overseas policy and expressed confidence in the future of the Territory. In his speeches in Angola, he has made a point of emphasizing that development was synonymous with security and of appealing specially for the co-operation of the economic interests.

16. The implications of this policy are quite clear. First, the development and exploitation of the Territory's resources will provide Portugal with much needed raw materials which it would otherwise have to purchase with its foreign exchange reserves. Second, through development, Angola can derive more revenue to finance government services and to pay a still larger share of the costs of the war. Third, development of roads and other infrastructure helps to extend the administrative and physical occupation and control of the Territory. Fourth, as part of the Government's counter-insurgency policy, in February 1971, the districts of Luanda, Lunda, Moxico, Cuando-Cubango, Malanje and Bié were placed under a special security régime with each district headed by a military governor, e/ and later in the year, special regional development plans were drawn up for Luanda, Bié, Moxico and Cuando-Cubango, aimed mainly at improving the economic and social conditions of the local population.

d/ See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts, The M.I.T. Press, 1969), Vol. I, The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962), pp. 22-44.

e/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. II, annex, appendix III, para. 6.

17. Towards the end of the year, however, with the introduction of the new inter-territorial payment regulations and the restrictions on imports and capital transfers to Portugal, the tone of the Governor-General's speeches appears to have become less optimistic about the near future. As described below, the economic interests in the Territory have been increasingly dissatisfied with the controls exercised by the Portuguese Government in Lisbon. Expressions of their dissatisfaction with the Territorial Government have included charges of inefficiency and even embezzlement. In his New Year speech, broadcast in the Territory, the Governor-General predicted a difficult period ahead. He said that peace was not yet in sight and that the people would have to be prepared to accept the burden of the war for as long as it was necessary.

Territorial administration

(a) New appointments

18. During 1971, new district governors were appointed to the Cabinda, Cuando-Cubango, Cuanza-North and Huambo Districts. Currently, 11 of the 16 district governors have military rank. The new Governor of Cabinda, Brigadier Pinheiro, is the highest ranking military officer among the district governors. The new district Governor of Cuanza-North District is also a military officer. He is reported to have been responsible for the organization and training of the élite commando company created in 1965. f/

(b) Administrative division

19. In September 1971, the territorial Government published a long list of administrative changes. Apart from several boundary revisions, 33 new administrative posts, 6 new concelhos and 9 circunscrições were created (Diploma Legislativo 4,153, 1 September 1971). g/ These changes will increase the number of government personnel, thus intensifying what is called the "administrative occupation" of the Territory.

20. The new administrative units created are shown below:

f/ Ibid., Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. IV, annex, appendix II, para. 21.

g/ For details on the administrative division and the corresponding administrative bodies, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 41-46 and 78-82, and annex I.B, paras. 17-25.

	<u>Concelhos</u>	<u>Circunscrições</u>	<u>Administrative posts</u>
Benguela	1	1	2
Bié	-	-	3
Cuando-Cubango	-	2	1
Cuanza-North	2	-	6
Cuanza-South	-	-	6
Cunene	-	2	2
Huambo	-	-	2
Huíla	1	-	4
Lunda	-	1	1
Malanje	1	1	4
Moçâmedes	-	1	1
Moxico	-	-	1
Uíge	1	1	1

21. The legislation provides that until the administrative bodies of the new concelhos and circunscrições have been elected, they are to have administrative committees appointed by the Governor-General. The boundaries of these new units were defined in special legislation in December 1971. The text of the legislation is not yet available, but, according to a press report the borders of the 16 existing districts have been maintained with modifications in some concelhos and circunscrições.

Activities of the Legislative Council

22. As established in 1963, the Angola Legislative Council comprised 36 representatives, with 15 members elected by direct vote by each of the administrative districts. Following the division of Huíla into two districts, namely Huíla and Cunene ^{h/} (Decree 260/71 of 16 June 1971), the number of members elected by direct vote was increased to 16, bringing the total membership of the Council to 37. However, no election to the new seat was held and, in September 1971, the general elections to the Legislative Council, which normally take place every four years and which had been originally scheduled for December 1971, were postponed pending the publication of the new political and administrative statutes in accordance with the constitutional reforms. The term of office of all incumbent members has been extended (Decree Law 372/71 of 2 September 1971).

23. During 1971, the Angola Legislative Council held only 10 meetings, five during the first session in April and May, and five during the second session in November and December. Very little information is available on the bills approved by the Council. In addition to the bill containing the territorial budget estimates for 1972, the Council is known to have approved two other bills. One of these established a new customs post in Cuando Cubango District and the other laid down regulations regarding customs storage facilities at the Territory's international airports at Luanda and Nova Lisboa.

^{h/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.B, para. 30.

24. Most of the general discussions i/ in the Council centred on the Territory's balance of payments, exchange controls and the new tax regulations. The Government was criticized both for inefficiency and for excessive bureaucracy.

25. Mr. Guimarães Sobrinho, speaking as the representative of the economic associations, j/ expressed disappointment at the failure of the Portuguese Government to consult them prior to introducing the new system of foreign exchange involving restrictions on transfers and imports (see annex II.A above, paras. 133-154). Although Angola had been promised wider autonomy over economic matters, it had been treated as if it were under tutelage and did not know how to manage its own affairs. In fact, however, Angola was not responsible for the balance of payments and the exchange difficulties. Portugal was responsible for the system under which Angola's diamonds and iron ore were processed in metropolitan Portugal while Angola was compelled to sell its exports cheaply to Portugal in return for Portuguese goods at inflated prices.

26. At a subsequent meeting, Mr. Guimarães Sobrinho read a letter from the central organization of the economic associations (Gabinete de Estudo, Coordenação e Informação dos Associações Económicas de Angola - GECIA) supporting his statement. He felt that this was necessary because his previous statement had raised doubts in both Lisbon and Angola as to whether he had really represented the views of the economic associations, and the Government had even tried to suppress their publication. It was important that the position of the economic associations was clearly understood.

27. The Council was later given a detailed briefing by government officials on various aspects of the new regulations on inter-territorial payments. This briefing was also given wide publicity over the radio.

28. The territorial Government was again criticized for having submitted to the Economic and Social Council, but not to the Legislative Council, the revised regulations increasing the industrial tax, the tax on capital use, and the income tax, as well as proposed changes in the extraordinary tax for the defence of Angola. In this connexion, Mr. Sors Lagrifa, a Council member, reminded the Governor-General that, following a similar occasion in 1968, he had promised to

i/ Under the existing system, members may raise any issue before the Council takes up its order of business.

j/ The economic associations are considered by some as the "the most powerful pressure groups in Portuguese Africa". Traditionally, these economic groups have competed with and challenged the administrative services. See Norman A. Bailey "The Political Process and Interest Groups" in David M. Abshire and Michael A. Samuels, ed., Portuguese Africa - A Handbook (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969), pp. 150-152.

consult the Council on fiscal matters. k/ As a result, the Council later received for its information the texts of the Government's proposed changes, together with a study that had been made on the extraordinary defence tax. Mr Lagrifa then criticized the Government's proposed changes in the tax regulations. He maintained that they would only benefit the large companies in Angola, such as the Angola Diamond Company and the Benguela Railway, which would be relieved of paying the extraordinary tax for the defence of Angola. The Governor-General maintained that the new draft legislation had not been submitted to the Legislative Council for discussion. It is not known whether the new legislation has since been enacted.

k/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/7623/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex II, paras. 6 and 7.

3. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY MEASURES

War in Angola

29. In February 1972, there were reports in the international press of possible guerrilla activities along the southern border of Angola with Namibia. These new developments have been confirmed by rather guarded reports in the Angola newspapers. The area not affected by guerrilla warfare in Angola has thus been reduced to the four central and coastal districts of Cuanza-South, Benguela, Huambo and Moçâmedes, which, apart from Luanda, have the greatest European population density.

30. According to newspaper reports in Angola, the Governor-General spent four days touring the newly created Cunene District which up to that time had been quiet. From Pereira de Eça, the district capital, the Governor-General visited Chiede, Namacunde and Cafima in the Cuanhama concelho, and Evale, Cuvelai and Roçadas in the Cuamato concelho. At each stop he discussed problems with the local people who are cattle-raisers. He explained the Government's plans to develop the Cunene River Valley l/ and to make water available on a year-round basis for irrigation and cattle raising. In Chiede and Namacunde, he warned the local population not to be taken in by the language of "false prophets". The newspapers emphasized the warm reception he received and also reported speeches by the "traditional authorities" expressing faith in and support for the Portuguese way of life and including an expression of thanks for the creation of the Cahama circunscrição. m/ Following the visit of the Governor-General, it was reported that an official radio station would be installed without delay at Pereira de Eça.

31. Initial reports⁴ in the international press speculated that guerrillas from the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) had entered the area from across the southern border. Subsequently, in a cable to the Chairman of the Special Committee, MPLA drew attention to the fact that the people in Cunene District had joined the war against Portuguese colonization and for freedom and independence in the implementation of the "watchword launched by MPLA for generalizing armed struggle throughout the Territory". It is also possible that the Portuguese plans for regrouping these traditionally pastoral people have created hardships and resentment, especially among the Cuanhamas, a subgroup of the Ovambo, who are reported to have long resisted Portuguese colonization. n/

l/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1) annex, appendix II.A, paras. 112-125.

m/ One of the two new circunscrições recently created in Cunene District. See para. 20 above.

n/ Marcum, op. cit., p. 114.

32. The Portuguese Government's concern over these recent events has possibly been heightened by the fact that during most of 1971 the war had continued without any spectacular developments. In a year-end review, General Costa Gomes, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Angola, had recently reported a reduction in guerrilla-held areas and a general decline in guerrilla activities. According to the Chief of Staff of the armed forces in Angola, there had been a 28 per cent decline in guerrilla activities in 1971, compared with the previous year. Nevertheless, according to various reports, at least 60,000 regular troops remain tied down in Angola, and, as a matter of policy, an ever-increasing number of Africans are being drafted into the regular army as well as for service in the paramilitary units.

33. The Portuguese military communiqués, which were issued on a monthly basis in 1971, reported a big increase in the use of helicopters on the two main fronts in the north and in the east. In northern Angola, the Dembos region remained the main centre of guerrilla activities, despite Portuguese clean-up operations in 1970. o/ In the first half of the year, Portuguese communiqués reported several guerrilla attacks on villages in the Dembos region as well as the "kidnapping" of workers by the guerrillas. In September and October, Portuguese communiqués reported four code-named operations in the Dembos region. As a result of these operations, several guerrilla camps were destroyed and 55 persons were "freed". In November, guerrillas raided the village of Dambi-Angola near Quitexe in the Dembos region. In December, Portuguese communiqués claimed that, as a result of two special operations in the Dembos region, two guerrilla camps were destroyed, 38 guerrillas were killed and 19 persons were taken prisoners. Guerrilla activities in the Dembos region were attributed to both the Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and MPLA.

34. As the military communiqués seldom mention place names, it is difficult to ascertain all the areas of military activity. During 1971, the Portuguese communiqués reported a total of 16 code-named operations in the north. In February, April, May, July and September the military communiqués reported FNLA activities in the north-eastern region of Uíge and Malanje districts. In Uíge, guerrilla activities were reported around Bembe and Santa Cruz, and Portuguese troops were twice ambushed at Massau on the Cuango River. In Malanje, there was one attack on the village of Marimba.

35. More intense guerrilla activity was reported in the east. Each month, the communiqués mentioned at least three or four code-named operations and reported the destruction of a number of guerrilla camps. There was no mention of the location of the camps destroyed.

36. As in the previous year, most of the military activities in the east were in Cuando-Cubango and Moxico and in the southern part of Lunda District. Portuguese communiqués mentioned guerrilla attacks at a number of areas, many of which lie south of the Benguela Railway. These included Léua and Cassai Gare on the railway,

o/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.B, paras. 42-46.

Lumbala and Caripande on the road to Lusaka and Jimbe on the road to N'Dola in the eastern enclave, Gago Coutinho and Ninda in the south-eastern part of Moxico District, and the Rivungo, Mavinga and Alto Cuito areas in Cuando-Cubango District. One guerrilla attack was reported on a militia post at Samugino in the Cazage area of southern Lunda, north of the Benguela Railway. Most of the guerrilla activities in this region were attributed to MPLA. References have also been made to the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in areas close to the Benguela Railway, for instance, around Lumeje in Moxico District.

37. During the year, there were two train derailments on the Benguela Railway, attributed to guerrilla sabotage which took place on 29 July and 2 September, but no halt of traffic was reported. An African stoker was killed and eight passengers were wounded in the first derailment.

38. In 1971, MPLA reported that it was waging an armed struggle on two fronts: the northern front, which encompassed the first military region extending to within some hundreds of kilometres of Luanda, the capital; and the eastern front which included the third, fourth, fifth and sixth military regions. p/ Describing MPLA activities, a MPLA member said in an interview that in October 1971 each front comprised controlled and liberated areas. Controlled areas were those in which MPLA had armed forces but had not yet established any administrative organization and where it had not yet achieved complete control of the population. Liberated areas were free of Portuguese troops, which had to be transported by air to enclaves of barracks within the area. Generally, the liberated areas were protected by controlled areas. The liberated part of the fourth military region was described as a square area approximately 200 kilometres in length on each side, comprising "thousands of small villages". The Portuguese were said to have no barracks in that region and all roads had been blocked, with the exception of the Luso-Henrique de Carvalho highway.

39. In May 1971, Mr. Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA, said that his organization had already started guerrilla activities in Bié District and that MPLA forces had already reached the left bank of the Cuanza River. As a reaction to this new offensive, Portuguese forces were said to be carrying out more violent attacks against MPLA positions with continuous aerial bombardments. Special Portuguese commandos had been sent into the area to regroup the population under MPLA control into strategic villages. In addition, Portuguese forces were using defoliants to destroy the crops so as to starve the people. Two-thirds of the maize and manioc crops had been destroyed in Moxico and Cuando-Cubango, particularly in the areas along the Lueña and Cassai Rivers in Moxico. At a press conference held in Lusaka, Zambia, in June 1971, Mr. Neto showed cassava roots and leaves withered by chemicals sprayed by the Portuguese forces from helicopters.

p/ The MPLA divides Angola into six military regions: Luanda, Cuanza-North, Uíge and Zaire districts are the first region; Cabinda, the second; Moxico and Cuando-Cubango, the third; Malanje and Lunda, the fourth; Bié, the fifth; and the remaining districts - Huambo, Cunene, Moçâmedes, Benguela and Cuanza-South - the sixth. Previously, MPLA had referred to five politico-administrative regions. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.B, para. 50, foot-note o.

40. There has been no information from MPLA on its activities in the north of Angola. In Moxico and Cuando-Cubango in the east, MPLA claimed that its guerrillas had attacked 12 Portuguese bases, shot down two helicopters, destroyed 12 military vehicles and sunk two river crafts in the first half of 1971. They had also freed 655 persons from strategic hamlets.

41. In a communiqué for the period August to November 1971, MPLA reported that it had mounted a number of operations against the Portuguese forces in Moxico, Cuando-Cubango and Bié. As a result of these operations, MPLA had killed 91 Portuguese soldiers and seized a large amount of war equipment. Early in December, MPLA reported an attack on Jimbe which resulted in the destruction of the military barracks nearby. Jimbe was described as located some 400 kilometres from Luanda, which places it in Malanje District. The Portuguese military communiqué for November reported an attack on Jimbe in the eastern enclave of Moxico District bordering Zaire and Zambia. In February 1972, MPLA reported heavy fighting in Moxico District.

42. The Executive Committee of MPLA reportedly held a plenary session inside Angola from 27 September to 3 October 1971, at which it was decided: (a) to increase the size of the Executive Committee and of its Commission for Political and Military Co-ordination; (b) to hold a national congress to revise the party statutes; and (c) to set up an institute for economic and social studies. The meeting also stressed the need to step up the activities of underground groups throughout the Territory.

43. In 1971, there were several accounts of visitors taken by MPLA on tours of eastern Angola. Messrs. Mikko Lohikoski and Borje J. Mattson, Finnish journalists who had spent part of November and December 1970 with MPLA inside Angola, reported that MPLA guerrillas had changed their previous tactics of working in small units and were now able to use larger units of up to 150 men, because Portuguese forces could no longer move on the ground. A crew of journalists and cameramen from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who spent 44 days with an MPLA guerrilla group, reported an attack on the Portuguese barracks at Kayanda (probably Caianda which is located on the road to N'Dola near the border with Zaire and some 50 kilometres from the border with Zambia). The film, entitled "Partisan Paths in Angola", had been shown in Moscow. In 1971, Mmes. Cécile Hugel and Danielle Jeammet of the Women's International Democratic Federation spent four weeks in an area controlled by MPLA some 200 kilometres inside Angola in Moxico District.

44. Early in 1972, MPLA announced that, taking into account the strategic success achieved, it had decided to step up the armed struggle and establish new organizations in the liberated areas. It had also decided to hold a congress soon to examine matters relating to the creation of a regular army.

45. In 1971, the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) lost its seat in the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Since 1964, GRAE had been entitled to attend OAU meetings and participate in the debates, without the right to vote. The OAU continues, however, to recognize FNLA, which established GRAE, as a nationalist movement on the same footing with MPLA.

46. The FNLA communiqués for 1971 reported activities of its Armée de libération nationale de l'Angola (ALNA) in four different regions of the Territory: the Dembos region in the north, including the areas of Quibaxe, Nambuagongo, Quiculungo and Songo; the Santa Cruz region near the Cuango River, where it marks the borderline with Zaire; a region in the north-east in Lunda District along the border with Zaire, extending from Camaxilo near Caungula to Portugália; and a region in the east including the areas of Dala, Buçaco and Luso on the Luso - Henrique de Carvalho road and several areas of Lunda District, including the Alto Chicapa area near the Cuango River, the Nova Chaves area in the south-eastern part of Lunda, and the area of Henrique de Carvalho, the district capital. ALNA activities included clashes with Portuguese forces and several attacks on coffee plantations in northern Angola. According to a communiqué summing up its activities in 1971, ALNA killed 1,684 Portuguese soldiers, seized 719 arms, shot down 9 planes and 11 helicopters, destroyed 113 military vehicles and raided 63 military posts. ALNA casualties included 217 killed.

47. A communiqué from UNITA reported three clashes between its fighters, known as the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA), and Portuguese troops in March, two clashes in April and four clashes in May. These clashes occurred mainly in the Alto Cuito region and the Cassai River and Luangarico areas near Luso in Moxico District, and in the Cuanza-General Machado area on the Benguela Railway in the eastern part of Bié District.

48. At the end of 1971, a spokesman for UNITA claimed control of areas in five districts, namely Malanje, Bié, Lunda, Moxico, and Cuando-Cubango. In these areas, UNITA is reported to have established training camps, hospitals, primary schools, women's brigades and agricultural co-operatives.

49. In 1971, UNITA reported that it had held its annual conference in a liberated area of Angola to commemorate its fifth anniversary. The conference had concluded that unity between the liberation movements of Angola was imperative for the success of their struggle.

Security and counter-subversion measures

50. In 1971, there were indications of increasing concern among government authorities in regard to the internal security of the Territory. As already mentioned (see para. 16 above), several districts were placed under a special security régime. Legislation, originally introduced as an emergency measure in 1961 (Diploma Legislativo Ministerial No. 20, 8 May) empowers the Overseas Minister, with the approval of the Minister for Defence, to appoint a member of the armed forces as district governor. An assistant to the military district governor is appointed by the Governor-General from the civil service. Under this legislation, the following security measures apply: (a) all movements of persons and vehicles are subject to the authorization of the district governor; (b) "dangerous" or suspected individuals may be detained without warrant or charges; (c) all persons authorized to carry arms immediately form part of the volunteer corps (OPVDC) and become subject to its orders and regulations; (d) all public meetings have to be authorized; (e) all forms of correspondence, notices and public information are

subject to prior censorship; and (f) all public service personnel become subject to military discipline.

51. Later, in June 1971, the Portuguese intelligence police, the Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS), closed down the Centro Esperança in Luanda and arrested its members on charges of pro-MPLA activities. The Centro Esperança, according to a Portuguese press report, had been collecting funds and recruiting people for the MPLA. Its members, who were allegedly in touch with MPLA in its first military region (see para. 38 above), were arrested while they were distributing "subversive" literature.

52. Early in 1972, the head of DGS, Major Silva Pais, visited the Territory and toured the "affected areas" of eastern Angola. He also presided over a graduation ceremony of 200 flechas and other members of DGS. q/

53. In October 1971, a new district command of the Public Security Police (PSP) was set up in Pereira de Eça, the capital of Cunene District. During the year, the territorial Government upgraded several police posts into squadrons in the districts of Uíge, Benguela, Huambo and Bié. Towards the end of 1971, the Portuguese Government approved special credits totalling 52 million escudos for "unexpected security expenditures" in Angola.


Military expenditures

54. The estimated military budget for 1971 was 1,918 million escudos which represents an increase of almost 10 per cent over the previous year. Of the total, 1,533 million escudos was for the army, 266 million escudos for the air force and 119 million escudos for the navy. Sources of financing of the Angola military budget were as follows:

<u>Source of financing</u>	<u>Million escudos</u>
Territory's ordinary budget	580.0
Autonomous bodies	249.2
Extraordinary tax for the defence of Angola	350.0
Special credit to be authorized during 1971	270.8
Overseas Military Defence Fund	67.0
Contribution from Portugal's extraordinary budget	250.0
Other	<u>151.0</u>
Total	1,918.0

55. In addition, the territorial budget estimates for 1971 included 618.0 million escudos for other military and security expenditures comprising 463.5 million escudos for the PSP, 72.6 million escudos for "national security", 49.4 million escudos for the Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defence (OPVDC) and 32.5 million escudos for the territorial naval services. These expenditures were almost 30 per cent higher than those in the previous year.

q/ Flechas were originally the name for African assistants recruited to work with the Portuguese intelligence police, now known as DGS. In recent years flechas have been organized as an auxiliary of DGS.



C. MOZAMBIQUE*

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.767.

1. GENERAL

1. The Territory of Mozambique, comprising an area of 771,125 square kilometres, lies south of the Equator between latitude 10° 30' and 27°. It is bound on the north by the United Republic of Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyassa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by Swaziland and South Africa and on the east by the Indian Ocean.
2. According to the provisional 1970 census, the total resident population of the Territory was 8,233,034, compared with 6,578,604 in 1960. Although it had been reported that the 1970 census would record the population by ethnic groups, data of this nature are not yet available. In 1960, of the total population, 97,245 were listed as "branco", 31,455 as "mestiço", and 6,455,614 as "preto".
3. The provisional results of the 1970 census reported the non-African population in Mozambique as 220,000. In 1971 an official Portuguese source estimated the European population at 150,000. Other estimates of the European population vary between 180,000 and 200,000. According to a Portuguese source, about 80 per cent of the "European civilized population" is concentrated in those administrative units whose centre is served by a sea port or a railway station. However, probably close to one half of the entire European population (with the exception of Portuguese troops) lives in Lourenço Marques.
4. An article in the local press reported in January 1972 that over the period 1960 to 1970, the Mozambique population had increased by 24.67 per cent, compared with a 15.06 per cent increase for the period 1950 to 1960. Not all districts showed the same patterns; population growth was high in many districts while, in others, it remained static because of "well-known reasons". Lourenço Marques District showed the highest population growth, with an increase of 60 per cent. In the Manica e Sofala District a/ the increase was 27.93 per cent, but this was attributed mainly to an error in the 1960 census estimates. Inhambane District had an increase of 39.17 per cent, reported to be due largely to the return of thousands of Mozambican workers from Southern Rhodesia (in 1960, Inhambane had a population of 583,059). In other districts where the population growth was described as "normal", the increases ranged around 2 per cent per annum. These included Gaza, where the 10-year population increase was 21.67 per cent; Moçambique, 19.47 per cent; and Zambézia, 28.35 per cent. No data were given for Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete.

a/ In 1970, Manica e Sofala was divided into two districts: Vila Pery and Beira. See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.C, para. 21.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

Constitutional status of the Territory

5. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Mozambique is considered to be an overseas province of Portugal. The Political and Administrative Statute of Mozambique is contained in Decree 45,375 of 22 November 1963. As an overseas province, Mozambique is represented in the National Assembly by seven elected representatives. It is also represented in the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber. b/

6. In July 1971, amendments to the Constitution were approved by the National Assembly giving the overseas Territories a wider degree of autonomy. In January 1972, the National Assembly began consideration of a draft bill revising the Overseas Organic Law. The main provisions are described in annex II.A above, paras. 35-59. Detailed arrangements for Mozambique will be embodied in a new political and administrative statute which is not yet available.

7. Views expressed by the Mozambique representatives in the National Assembly during the discussions on the constitutional reforms are reported in annex II.A above, paras. 17-26.

Relations with the Central Government

8. In June 1971, Mr. Silva Cunha, the Overseas Minister, made his annual visit to Mozambique. During his stay in the Territory, he met with representatives of the economic interests to discuss the question of inter-territorial payments. Later, in September, a delegation representing the economic interests in Mozambique went to Lisbon to discuss the matter further with the Overseas Minister. They were also received by the Prime Minister.

9. Other visitors from Portugal included Mr. Rui Patrício, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in June, and 19 deputies from the National Assembly in September 1971.

10. Reporting to the National Assembly on the visit, Mr. Ávila de Azevedo, one of the deputies, said that everywhere they went, there was a feeling of confidence in the destiny of the Territory - that it would always be in the hands of "the Portuguese". He shared the view that there was need for greater decentralization and, in this connexion, was of the opinion that the Territory's capital should be transferred from Lourenço Marques to the interior. c/

b/ For a description of the general system of government and administration, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 18-25.

c/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.A, para. 67.

Territorial Government

Governor-General

11. In October 1971, Mr. Manuel Pimentel dos Santos was appointed Governor-General of Mozambique, replacing Mr. Arantes e Oliveira who had resigned for reasons of health. Mr. dos Santos is the sixth Governor-General of Mozambique in less than 12 years and the third in the past three and a half years. He has a long history of public service in Lisbon, Angola and Mozambique, and was a member of the Corporative Chamber before his appointment. He has also been President of the Administrative Council of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito which holds the Cassinga mining concession in Angola.

12. There has been some dissatisfaction in Mozambique with the frequent changes of the Governor-General. Mr. Satúrio Pires, Vice-President of the Legislative Council, pointed out that every time a new Governor-General was appointed, the provincial secretaries were also changed. Since each change brought new concepts and the need for adjustments which caused delays in decisions, the whole rhythm of administration was affected. In a welcoming address to the Governor-General, a member of the Economic and Social Council, speaking on behalf of all the members, expressed the hope that Mr. dos Santos had come to stay for a longer period, thereby bringing to an end the indifference of Lisbon towards the need for a continuous and stable government in the Territory. These criticisms were also reflected in an editorial in the Lisbon evening paper O Século.

13. At the swearing-in ceremony, the Overseas Minister emphasized the need for the continued defence of the Territory, whatever the cost. The new Governor-General pledged himself to uphold and strengthen the unity and understanding between the civil authorities and the armed forces. He said that, despite the need for economy in public expenditures, the Government would guarantee "bread and justice" to the populations seeking protection under the Portuguese flag. Among the specific problems he intended to deal with, he mentioned the need to promote settlement from Portugal, including that of ex-soldiers; the revision and expansion of the educational system; and the mobilization of funds both in the internal and external markets to promote development.

14. In his statements since his arrival in the Territory, the new Governor-General has singled out defence and development as the top priorities for government action. He has also repeatedly emphasized Portugal's determination to remain in Mozambique, as "a master of its own destiny". In this connexion he said that Portugal should be satisfied only with a victory over its enemy, fighting for 100 years if necessary, and that it would accept nothing short of a "Paz Portuguesa".

15. In a speech to the Legislative Council on assuming office as Governor-General, he noted that, under the constitutional reforms, the Territory would soon enjoy wider autonomy. The political autonomy envisaged would be greater and more diversified than that of many federations, and the important question was how this autonomy would be used within the context of the Nation as a whole. It would no longer be enough to leave all decisions to the central Government, and decentralization, which should not stop at the capital of the Territory, had to

be extended even to the autarquias locais. d/ It was necessary also to increase "collective participation" e/ in government and administration at all levels, from "the small communities lost in the bush to the fast-growing cities and in the higher organs of territorial administration."

Territorial administration

(a) New appointments

16. Since the Governor-General took office in December 1971, new provincial secretaries have been appointed to the following departments: (i) health and welfare; (ii) public works and planning; (iii) economic integration; and (iv) treasury and accounts. The provincial secretaries for education, land and settlement, communications and labour and social security and social action were reappointed.

17. Two new district governors were appointed during the year. In May 1971, Mr. António Henriques de Oliveira was appointed Governor of Vila Pery District, which had been under the temporary jurisdiction of the Governor of Beira District. f/ In June, Brigadier Rocha Simões was appointed Governor of Tete District, which had recently been made a special area under military jurisdiction. g/

(b) Changes in the administrative division

18. During 1971, three new circunscrições were created in Mozambique and seven towns were raised to the status of cities, in recognition of their socio-economic growth.

19. Two of the new circunscrições are in the district of Niassa and were both formerly part of the concelho of Amaramba. These are Mandimba, with a population of 11,867, and Mecanhelas, with a population of 36,126. The third circunscrição has been created in Cabo Delgado District through the up-grading of a former administrative post, Ancuabe, and the creation of a new administrative post, Mogabo. As a result of these changes, the number of government personnel will be increased, thereby intensifying what is called the "administrative occupation" of the Territory (see also annex II.B above, paras. 19-21).

d/ In the Portuguese concept, the autarquia local is an autonomous unit governing certain matters of local interests. The two basic units are the freguesia and the concelho. See ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 41-46.

e/ In accordance with the principles of the corporative state, the Portuguese Constitution provides for the participation of "all the constituent forces of the nation" in its administrative life. The composition of the Corporative Chamber illustrates this principle. Ibid., paras. 60-62.

f/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.C., para. 21.

g/ Ibid., Supplement No. 23 A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), annex, appendix II.B, para. 135.

20. It will be recalled that Mecanhelas lies in one of the zones originally designated for agricultural development schemes under the Third National Development Plan, and that a strategic aldeamento has since been established there. h/ The new circunscrição of Ancuabe is located within one of the priority zones established by the Third National Development Plan for settlement of European farmers. i/

21. The seven towns that were raised to cities are as follows:

<u>City</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>District</u>
António Enes	33 609	Moçambique
Chibuto	122 639	Gaza
Mocuba	44 220	Zambézia
Montepuez	49 741	Cabo Delgado
Nacala	87 523	Moçambique
Nova Freixo	49 741	Niassa
Trigo de Morais	33 974	Gaza

(c) Decentralization of authority

22. In January 1972, the territorial Government enacted legislation reorganizing the structure of the provincial secretariats and extending the functions of the higher officials. j/ Various departments which had been previously under the direct authority of the Governor-General were placed under the authority of the provincial secretariats. For instance, the Provincial Directorates of Health and Welfare Services and of Education Services which had previously been under the direct responsibility of the Governor-General were made part of the Provincial Secretariats of Health and Welfare and of Education. The provincial secretaries have been given direct responsibility for all matters within the scope of their secretariats which previously had to be approved by the Governor-General, and the administrative authority of department heads under the provincial secretaries has also been expanded. Parallel to this the responsibility of the Secretary-General for administrative matters concerning the territorial branch of the intelligence police, the Direcção-Geral de Segurança (DGS) has been delegated to its own director.

Activities of the Legislative Council

23. As provided in the political administrative statute for 1963, the Mozambique Legislative Council comprised 29 representatives, with nine members elected by direct vote by each of the administrative districts. Following the division of

h/ See *ibid.*, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.C, para. 67.

i/ *Ibid.*, para. 63.

j/ *Ibid.*, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, paras. 32-36, and annex I.C, paras. 32-36, and annex I.C, paras. 6 and 7.

Manica and Sofala into two districts, namely Beira and Vila Pery, k/ in June 1971 (Decree 260/71, 16 June 1971), the number of members elected by direct vote was increased to 10, bringing the total membership of the Council to 30. l/

24. Elections to the Legislative Council, which normally take place every four years, had been originally scheduled for early 1972. Because of the constitutional reforms, however, the elections have been postponed and the term of office of the incumbent members has been extended (Decree Law 372/71, 2 September 1971).

25. In 1971, the Mozambique Legislative Council held two sessions with a total of 15 meetings. In November, the new Governor-General requested the provincial secretaries and other government officials to attend the meetings of the Council whenever subjects discussed were within their responsibilities. It will be recalled that a similar procedure had already been introduced in Angola since 1970. m/

26. As in 1970, press coverage of the discussions in the Legislative Council was limited mainly to speeches made in the general discussion period, the replies of the Governor-General, and the list of bills approved at each meeting. There were no reports on the voting.

27. The reported speeches show that there has been some dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Legislative Council. In May, for instance, the Vice-President criticized the absenteeism of the elected members representing the outlying districts. In October, he suggested that the members of the Council should adopt a more responsible attitude rather than simply agreeing with the Government. On the other hand, he urged the Government to place before the Council draft legislation of importance to the Territory instead of the more routine matters just to fill up the time of the Council.

28. As in the past, most of the reported speeches drew attention to various local economic problems such as the progress of the road programme in Vila Pery, Beira and Tete; the impact of the construction of the Massingir River dam on the economy of Gaza; and the plight of Zambézia District as a result of the damage caused by a hurricane in 1970. Only four speakers touched upon issues affecting the African population in the discussions on labour conditions, education and settlement.

29. During the year, the Legislative Council approved 19 bills, which, with the exception of the bill establishing guidelines for the 1972 territorial budget, dealt largely with administrative matters. One of the more important of these established the extent of government assistance to be provided under the Third

k/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23, (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.C, para. 21.

l/ For the composition of the Council, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.C, paras. 8-9.

m/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.B, para. 15.

National Development Plan to local bodies for public works such as electric power, water supplies (75 per cent in cities and povoações and 100 per cent in rural areas), roads and urbanization. Other regulations approved included those relating to: (a) the establishment and operation of certain industries, particularly home industries; (b) agricultural co-operatives; (c) relations between syndicated workers and employers organizations; (d) maritime fishing; (e) civil registry procedures; (f) part-time employment of students in the public service; and (g) the provision of specially trained staff to the courts. Several bills created new services, including an air-borne medical service, a special office to stimulate exports, and auxiliary social centres for all the services coming under the Secretariat of Communications. One bill created a new National Park in Bazaruto Island.

Municipal councils^{n/}

30. Press coverage of the activities of the various municipal councils during 1971 seems to have been more extensive than in previous years. More publicity was given to urban problems such as water and sewage systems, distribution of electric power and water supplies, sanitation and urbanization projects.

31. Problems discussed in the Lourenço Marques Municipal Council during the year included: a 72 million escudo loan o/ from the National Development Bank for a sewage system and road paving; a housing project valued at 80 million escudos; allocation of 4.5 million escudos to provide electric power for the suburbs; the need for more parking facilities; and renovation of a market. The Council also approved the budgets of the municipal transportation services (102.4 million escudos) and of the water and electricity services (264.5 million escudos).

32. Major bills approved by the Beira Municipal Council included two loans of 30 million escudos each from the National Development Bank for sanitation works and road paving; a 30 per cent wage increase for workers contracted under the Rural Labour Code; and revision of minimum wage rates for unskilled workers, in accordance with the provisions of Decree 28/71 of 27 March 1971. p/ The Council also discussed parking facilities, urban transportation and appointments of lower echelon personnel.

33. The Porto Amélia Municipal Council discussed matters concerning the municipal water supply and considered bids from Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos de Moçambique (SONAP), Moçacor Distribuidora de Combustíveis, S.A.R.L., Caltex (Africa) Lda., Shell and Niassa Comercial for the supply of fuel and lubricants. q/ The Tete Municipal Council approved an allocation of 6 million escudos for the first phase of a contract for sanitation works and the Quelimane Council approved the purchase of real estate for housing less-favoured classes within the programme of reordenamento habitacional.

^{n/} For a description of the functions of the municipal councils, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.B, paras. 31-32.

^{o/} 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

^{p/} Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 A (A/8423/Rev.1/Add.1), annex, appendix II.B, paras. 3-5.

^{q/} The outcome of the bidding is not yet known.

34. As shown in table 1 below, most of the municipal councils have limited budgets averaging about 200-300 escudos per capita per year, except for Lourenço Marques where it was about 1,000 escudos per capita in 1971.

35. During the year a number of articles in the local press drew attention to the inadequacy of the municipal council budgets and called for an urgent review of all legislation concerning the municipalities. In January 1972, the Matola Municipal Council, for instance, had to send a special delegation to see the Governor-General to ask for financial assistance in order to meet the estimated 30 million escudos needed to pay for its water supply during the current year.

36. The problem of the municipal councils appears to have begun to receive attention. The guidelines for the Territory's 1972 budget put assistance to the local government bodies as the fourth priority after defence and security, public investment under the Development Plan and other economic and social investments.

Table 1

Mozambique: District and municipal council budgets,
in selected areas, 1971

(million escudos)

<u>District and concelho</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Budget</u>	
		<u>District</u>	<u>Municipal council</u>
Lourenço Marques	436 916	7.7	
Lourenço Marques	178 565		206.0
Beira	...	8.1	
Beira	59 970		135.0
Vila Pery	...	7.6	
Chimoio	62 510		14.9
Moçambique	1 452 395	10.4	
Nacala	87 523		45.4
Nampula	103 985		30.0
Cabo Delgado	548 597	11.8	
Porto Amélia	55 166		14.2

Sources: Mozambique, Anuário Estatístico, 1968, and press reports..

3. MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND SECURITY MEASURES

War in Mozambique

37. During most of 1971, the war in Mozambique continued with no spectacular claims by either side. Then, in September, even as General Kaulza de Arriaga, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in Mozambique, began telling the press that finally the war was being won, the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) launched a new offensive in Tete District.

38. Between September and December 1971, FRELIMO forces twice attacked the main railway line from Beira to Moatize r/ and one report published in October said that FRELIMO land mines had made "just about every road in Tete District unsafe". After several Southern Rhodesian commercial vehicles travelling on the road linking Salisbury and Blantyre had been wrecked by land mines, the Portuguese Army introduced daily military convoys from each frontier. Soon after, however, one convoy was attacked. According to independent reports, FRELIMO ambushes were expected to increase.

39. In a Portuguese military communiqué covering November and December 1971, it was admitted that guerrillas had had some success in infiltrating the geographically open frontier with Zambia. It was said that the Portuguese military operations had encountered considerable difficulties at first because of the mobility of the guerrillas, the fact that they "blended almost perfectly with the population" and because mine-laying operations took place at night. According to the communiqué, a Portuguese operation, involving three units air-lifted by helicopters, had successfully destroyed an important FRELIMO base a few kilometres north of the road from the town of Tete to Zobuè, on the frontier with Malawi.

40. As reported previously, s/ since FRELIMO's re-entry into Tete District in 1970, Portugal has steadily increased its military forces in this area. In May 1971, Tete was made a special military region, similar to Cabinda in Angola, under Law 182/70 of 28 April 1970, and in June 1971, Brigadier Rocha Simões was appointed military governor with full powers over all civil and military matters (see para. 17 above). Security measures were tightened during the year, particularly around the area of the Cabora Bassa dam site, and access routes on both sides of the Zambezi River were placed under military guard.

41. As part of the plan to prevent the guerrillas from gaining local support, efforts were made to speed up resettlement of the population in aldeamentos, many of which have been provided with arms for self-defence against what Portuguese sources have termed "increased acts of terrorism" against the local

r/ In January 1972 it was reported that about a dozen trains had been derailed in the preceding eight months.

s/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.C, paras. 46-49.

population. By the end of the year, articles in the international press estimated that there were between 10,000 and 20,000 Portuguese troops massed in the district. Despite these security measures, however, and although Portuguese sources have claimed that FRELIMO forces were nowhere near the site of the Cabora Bassa dam, early in February 1972 a FRELIMO mine blew up a truck travelling between the town of Tete and the dam site.

42. In the period before Tete became the centre of attention, Portuguese armed forces had concentrated on two phases of operations. First there was a pre-dry season offensive during April and May 1971, carried out mainly in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. This was followed in June, July and August with a full-scale offensive.

43. During the first phase, Portuguese forces engaged in an all-out offensive in Cabo Delgado to seal off the frontier with the United Republic of Tanzania in an effort to cut off infiltration routes and dissociate the local population from the guerrillas. Although FRELIMO forces supposedly had been disorganized and weakened after the 1970 offensive, t/ and all of its major strategic bases destroyed, official sources reported ambushes and mines laid by the guerrillas along the roads from Nangade and Mueda to Mocímboa do Rovuma.

44. During the second part of the year, the Portuguese forces claimed success in destroying two FRELIMO bases, one, code-named "Nova Beira", located between Mueda and Nangade, and the other in Mocímboa do Rovuma, near the frontier with the United Republic of Tanzania. According to an official communiqué, the attack on "Nova Beira" was preceded by aerial bombardment, followed by the use of paratroops who were dropped on the target.

45. In an article published in the Revista de Angola in October 1971, General Arriaga said that, compared with 1970, the results obtained in 1971 in Cabo Delgado were necessarily less spectacular. He admitted that, owing to an exceptionally long rainy season, FRELIMO had recovered some initiative. In that district, Portuguese military activity had aimed mainly at closing the border as much as possible and keeping the insurgents constantly on the run.

46. The second phase of activities included what has been code-named "Operation Frontier" with a view to reinforcing the strategic occupation of the area and sealing off the border with the United Republic of Tanzania. This operation involved the asphalt surfacing of hundreds of kilometres of roads, the construction of runways for heavy aircraft, the erection of permanent villages and the improvement of the conditions of the local inhabitants. A new town is to be built at Nangade and three villages at Tartibo, Pundanhar and Nhica do Rovuma. Among others, Nangade, Nangololo, Mocímboa da Praia and Negomano are to be provided with asphalted runways and the Mueda runway is to be enlarged. These facilities will make it possible to use combat aircraft and chartered airplanes for transport of troops and logistic support to the area.

47. In mid-1971, the Portuguese military bulletins reported that the southern part of Niassa District had been "completely pacified", with the populations

t/ Ibid., paras. 35 et seq.

largely organized on a self-defence basis, and the Portuguese armed forces serving as mobile reserves. Official sources admitted, however, that in the northern part of Niassa, small guerrilla bands existed in three or four inaccessible areas where they continued to mine roads and attack the population. By the end of the year, the Portuguese forces were said to have launched successful heavy attacks on the mountain hideouts.

48. All three branches of the Portuguese armed forces were engaged in the military operations during the past year. According to a special communiqué issued in December 1971, the navy had engaged in 650 operations and spent 17,000 hours patrolling rivers and lakes; the air force in 6,173 operations and 14,280 sorties; the Army in 3,300 combined land and air operations, 1,950 attacks (golpes de mão), 39,015 patrols, 3,926 ambushes, 5,205 raids; and 34,115 sorties to protect road works and the movement of the troops. One hundred and eighty-one guerrilla bases were reportedly destroyed, 544 guerrilla fighters were killed and 6,465 persons surrendered.

FRELIMO activities

49. During 1971, communiqués issued by FRELIMO reported military successes in Cabo Delgado, Tete, Niassa and large areas both north and south of the Zambezi River. FRELIMO claimed that, contrary to official reports, the Portuguese forces were suffering serious defeats at the hands of its guerrillas. FRELIMO communiqués reported killing 1,820 Portuguese soldiers and the destruction of 309 vehicles, 2 aircraft, 22 bridges, 3 important military posts and 2 patrol boats, as well as the derailment of 4 trains. In addition, members of the organization attacked the Portuguese general headquarters at Vila Cabral, the administrative capital of Niassa, and also reported attacks on the Cabora Bassa project.

50. By mid-year, FRELIMO reportedly had gained military control of both banks of the Zambezi River. FRELIMO also reported that, as a result of its operations on the south bank of the Zambezi, Portuguese forces had been forced to retreat to new lines of defence and had increased their troop strength to 20,000 men. In September, Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Vice-President of FRELIMO, claimed "control over the whole Cabora Bassa region, as well as over traffic across the Zambezi". Later, Mr. Samora Machel, President of the FRELIMO Central Committee, stated that a quarter of the Territory had been liberated and that over 1 million Mozambicans were living in freedom. FRELIMO forces were reported to have increased to 20,000 men, from an initial core of 200 in 1964.

51. There were no references in the communiqués issued by the Portuguese authorities to any activities by the Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), nor by other liberation movements in Mozambique, such as ULIPAMO and the Movimento de Libertação de Moçambique (MOLIMO). u/ In mid-1971, the press in Lisbon and in Mozambique mentioned another movement, the Frente Unida de Moçambique (FUMO), said to have been formed by dissident members of FRELIMO. There is no other information available on this movement.

u/ Ibid., annex II.C, paras. 51-52.

Security and counter-insurgency measures

52. As reported previously, over the past few years, an increasing number of Africans have been rounded up and settled into the new aldeamentos (strategic villages). In the period from the end of 1969 to the end of 1970, the total number of aldeamentos in the three northern districts increased from 354 to 382, and the number of people "resettled" rose from 386,606 to 446,476. As shown below, most of the new settlements were in Tete.

	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Niassa	113	115
Cabo Delgado	216	222
Tete	25	45

53. In Niassa, at the end of 1970, some 60 per cent of the population of 281,083 (1960 census), had been organized into aldeamentos; the corresponding figures for Cabo Delgado were 45 per cent and for Tete just under 6 per cent. Portuguese sources reported that initially there had been difficulties in resettling the population in Tete, but that during the year resettlement had been speeded up although no recent figures are available. The distribution of the aldeamentos by location are shown in table 2 below.

54. An article published in the local press in 1971 revealed for the first time the extensive role played by the DGS in the reeducation of guerrillas and political prisoners. Since 1967, the DGS has run a special rehabilitation centre at Machava prison which offers primary education through the fifth year as well as vocational training in carpentry, upholstery, tailoring, shoemaking and craftsmanship. In July 1971, and again in January 1972, the local press carried articles reporting that inmates at the DGS rehabilitation centre had sat for various school examinations. It was reported that from 1967 to the end of 1970, 303 inmates had taken the third and fourth year final examinations for the preparatory cycle and one had taken the secondary cycle. There was no information on how the inmates had subsequently been reintegrated into the community.

55. In April 1971, the Portuguese tanker Angoche was found adrift off the coast of northern Mozambique. It had been ripped by an explosion and no trace of the crew was found. An investigation made by the maritime police and the DGS led to the conclusion that a bomb had been planted aboard when the ship had been in Nacala. Subsequently, strict security precautions were imposed at all ports in the Territory. The cargo and personnel of all Portuguese merchant ships in port have been placed under constant watch and close control.

56. In November 1971, a train accident on the Nacala railway killed eight persons, including seven Portuguese soldiers, and injured 100 others, among them 14 soldiers. Although the Portuguese press attributed the accident to a "violation of normal security regulations", an international source attributed it to a "terrorist attack".

57. In May 1971, the General Council of the Congregation in Africa of Missionaries, known as the White Fathers, ordered its 39 missionaries in Mozambique to leave the Territory as a protest against the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church in Mozambique. It was stated in the announcement that the Roman Catholic

Church in Mozambique had become identified with the Portuguese rule and would not take a stand over "ambiguities in regard to injustice and police brutality". The White Fathers therefore felt that their continued presence in Mozambique would make them accomplices and bring confusion to the minds of the ordinary African people. They also felt that Africanization of missionary activities was almost impossible in Mozambique. As a result of this announcement, the Portuguese Government ordered the White Fathers to leave the Territory not later than 30 May.

58. In June 1971, the prelates of Mozambique met to consider the action taken by the White Fathers. v/ In the communiqué, issued after the episcopal conference, they expressed regret at the departure of the missionaries, because of the "serious gap" it left in the two dioceses where they had worked. The prelates stated, however, that they could not accept the reasons the White Fathers had given; they did not consider that the decision to leave Mozambique had been dictated by "genuine evangelical spirit". In their view, the decision had been "due to the influence of pressure groups, against the express desire of the majority of the members of the two dioceses".

59. At a press conference in Lisbon in July 1971, the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs defended the expulsion order on the grounds of security. He said that one of the White Fathers had encouraged the local population to join FRELIMO and another had committed acts of disrespect to the Portuguese flag and the national anthem, by offensive words and acts.

60. In January 1972, the Portuguese security police arrested two Catholic priests in Beira, who had previously refused to allow the Portuguese flag into the Makuti Church for a boy-scout ceremony. According to news reports, the priests had objected to the flag's presence in their "house of God" because they would have to answer for the gesture when Mozambique became independent under African rule. Angry crowds were reported to have tried to wreck the church residence and drag the priests out. The Makuti Church has been considered as a subversion centre since one resident priest was expelled in 1971. It was also reported that one of the two priests arrested had earlier made an attack against Portuguese armed forces fighting "terrorism" in Mozambique.

v/ The statement was signed by the Archbishop of Lourenço Marques, the bishops of Quelimane, Porto Amélia, Inhambane, Tete, Vila Cabral and Nampula and by the Vicar-General of Beira.

Table 2

Mozambique: Number and location of aldeamentos in Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete, 1970

<u>Niassa</u> <u>District</u>	<u>Aldeamentos</u> ^{a/}	<u>Cabo Delgado</u> <u>District</u>	<u>Aldeamentos</u> ^{b/}	<u>Tete</u> <u>District</u>	<u>Aldeamentos</u> ^{c/}
Vila Cabral	27	Porto Amélia	15	Macanga	17
Amaramba	1	Macomia	32	Bene	7
Lago	10	Mocímboa da Praia	10	Marávia	18
Mandimba	9	Montepuez	53	Zumbo	3
Marupa	25	Macondes	14		
Maúa	25	Namuno	44		
Mecuba	9	Palma	14		
Sanga	5	Quissanga	40		
Valadim	4				
Total	<u>115</u>	Total	<u>222</u>	Total	<u>45</u>

Source: Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 18 August 1971.

a/ With a population of 169,891.

b/ With a population of 250,520.

c/ With a population of 26,059. A more recent report estimates that there were 52 aldeamentos and 34,000 people "resettled" in Tete.


Military expenditure

61. The Territory's estimated military budget for 1971 was 1,145.2 million escudos. Of that total, 829.2 million escudos was for the army, 230.0 million escudos for the air force, and 86.0 million escudos for the navy, financed as follows:

<u>Source of financing</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>(million escudos)</u>
Territory's ordinary budget	435.8
Autonomous bodies	378.6
Defence stamp	120.6
Special credit	50.0
Complement paid by Portugal	67.1
Overseas Military Defence Fund	93.1
	<u>1,145.2</u>

Sources: Portugal, Diário do Governo, Portarias 133-135/71 of 12 March 1971.

62. Additional budgetary estimates for military and related activities in 1971 amounted to 442.5 million escudos, as follows: the ordinary budget allocated 143.9 million escudos for the navy; 109.4 million escudos for public security; and 61.4 million escudos for the DGS. The extraordinary budget included 118.8 million escudos for public security and 9 million escudos for the Volunteers Corps.



D. GUINEA, CALLED PORTUGUESE GUINEA*

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* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.768.

I. GENERAL

1. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, lies on the west coast of Africa between 12° 40' N and 10° 52' N in latitude and between 13° 38' WG and 16° 43' WG in longitude. Besides the mainland, it comprises the Bijagós Archipelago and a string of islands. The total area of the Territory is 36,125 square kilometres, of which approximately one tenth is periodically submerged by tidal waters and largely covered with mangrove. The revised provisional results of the 1960 census showed a total resident population of 521,336, compared with 510,777 at the previous census in 1950, when there were reported to be 2,263 Europeans, 4,568 mestiços, 11 Indians, 1,478 assimilated Africans and 502,457 non-assimilated Africans. According to the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1970, the estimated population at mid-1970 was 560,000. In 1970, a newspaper source estimated the population at 800,000 of whom 3,000 were Europeans.

2. The general population census, which is taken every 10 years, was scheduled to start in August 1971 in the Bissau area but no further information is available.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL^{a/}

Relations with the central Government

3. Since July 1970, when Mr. Pinto Bull, a deputy, was killed in a helicopter accident during a visit to the Territory, b/ the Territory has had no representative in the National Assembly.

4. Following amendment of the regulations governing elections to the National Assembly to provide for separate elections to fill vacancies (Decree Law 556/71), early in 1972, Mr. Nicolau Martins Nunes, the candidate of the Popular National Action (ANP) was elected to the National Assembly. c/ The ANP is the government political organization, a local branch of which had been set up in the Territory for the first time in 1971.

5. Prior to the elections Dr. António Baticã Ferreira, a member of the Manjaco ethnic group, had announced his intention to run as an independent candidate. Dr. Baticã Ferreira, who is a physician in Lisbon, was born in the Territory. He is said to be a member of one of the 20 most important families of the Manjaco group and his brother one of the most powerful Manjaco régulos (chiefs). According to a

^{a/} For a description of the general system of government and administration, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.D, paras. 2-7.

^{b/} Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), annex I.D, para. 3.

^{c/} For details on ANP, see ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A, para. 145.

Portuguese source, he was not able to take part in the elections because his candidacy had not been registered in time. As far as is known, there have been no reports of the actual elections.

6. In March 1971, Mr. Rui Martins dos Santos, the Under-Secretary of Overseas Development, visited the Territory to discuss the development plan. He held a meeting with the territorial Technical Commission for Planning and Economic Integration and visited various towns and villages and rural regrouping projects. He also attended the inaugural meeting of an agricultural fair which had as its theme "For a Better Guinea". Mr. Martins dos Santos said in his speech that it was the Government's policy to give priority to improving the lot of those who lived off the land because only through increased productivity in that sector would the necessary resources become available for the effective participation of the population in the further development of the Territory.

Territorial Government

The Better Guinea policy d/

7. During 1971, Governor Spínola continued to develop his policy of a "better Guinea" with special emphasis on the need for the participation of the people in the development of the Territory. For instance, in May he told the Second Congress of the People of Guinea, e/ which was attended by some 600 representatives of various ethnic groups, that the "better future" everyone hoped for depended on the work of all the people, and without their work to create wealth no progress would be possible. He said that the Government would never fail to provide the financial and technical assistance needed, but this assistance alone could not solve the problems of development. He pointed out that the Territory's wealth was its campos (land), and everyone had to be aware that the economic and social objectives could not be achieved by "candidates" seeking civil service jobs. The future lay in the hands of the camponêses (farmers) who had to love their land, to believe in the land and their own efforts and that these were the keys to a better life for their children.

8. Because of the scarcity of resources, it was necessary for the people to work together. The Government hoped that the Second Congress would serve to launch a co-operative movement as a step forward in providing the Territory with a form of association and organization which would bring about the development that could not be achieved individually.

9. The Government's plan to build a lasting community was based on regrouping the rural population into new villages and encouraging the ethnic groups to participate in the development of their own lands. He referred to this as "política de chãos".

d/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.D, para. 6-7.

e/ As in the case of the First Congress, this one was also preceded by regional congresses of various ethnic groups. For information on the First Congress, see ibid., para. 8.

The Government believed that it was necessary to keep up a 'permanent dialogue' with the people. The Territory was already on the way to a new society based on respect for the will of the people arising from a cultural synthesis of all the ethnic groups in the Territory.

10. In an effort to bring about closer co-operation between the civil service personnel and the population, the Governor issued a special administrative directive early in 1971 outlining the Government's social policy for the Territory. Commenting on this directive, he said that Portugal's policy aimed at improving the conditions of the people and creating greater respect for human dignity with a view to achieving peace and social well-being and at the same time ensuring justice, civil liberties and participation of the people in the administration of their own affairs. Although there was no single way to bring this about, in his own view, in the particular case of Africa, it was necessary to recognize the human worth of the African and to respect his dignity, allowing him to realize himself as an African, who would as an African participate in the political and social life of the multicultural society from which he benefited and with which he identified. In this way, social progress would come about as an improvement that the people desired and the benefits to which they had access would become a natural enrichment of their traditional culture.

11. The directive declared that the three essential bases for Portugal's social policy were: (a) that it had to be eminently African; (b) that it had to be based on social realities; and (c) that it lay within the framework of the Portuguese nation. These requirements arose from the relationship of the Territory to Portugal and to Africa. These basic requirements made it necessary to revise Portugal's concept of its conceito de civilizar (civilizing work) so as to adjust it to the pluricultural societies of Portuguese Africa, whose people had the legitimate right to wish to progress within their own culture. This meant developing their own values and giving them new ones but not imposing on them patterns of life considered to be superior. It was necessary to develop a concept of progress through the interpenetration of cultures which would assimilate from each other.

12. As noted previously, the "better Guinea" policy goes further than the declared policy in any other Territory in accepting the legitimate aspirations of the people to retain their African identity and their own culture. General Spínola has always maintained that this policy was conceived and was being implemented in the "context of the Portuguese nation". Moreover, his view, as he explained it in one of his speeches in 1971, is that self-determination of a people can perfectly well result in their free choice of integration within a nation politically independent, in which they would have complete and genuine self-expression. In such a case, however, the people should have the right to determine the terms of their integration.

Administrative division

13. In March 1972, Bula which had been part of the Cacheu concelho became the seat of a new concelho. Governor Spínola said that the creation of the new concelho was part of his policy of encouraging the various ethnic groups to participate in the development of their own region. Originally the Cacheu

concelho included the chãos Mancanho, Balante and Manjaco. f/ The creation of the Bula concelho provides the Mancannos and Balantes with their own area and leaves the Cacheu concelho entirely a Manjaco area. According to the Government, this change fulfils three of the five principles of the 'better Guinea' policy, g/ namely: (a) social justice; (b) respect for traditional institutions of different ethnic groups and (c) an increase in African participation in public administration. The new régulo of the Bula concelho was reported to have been "freely" chosen by the population of the new administrative division.

Legislative Council

14. As established in 1963, the Legislative Council comprises 14 members, three of whom are ex officio, eight are elected by various interest groups and only three are elected by direct vote. Of the eight representing special interests, three are elected by the traditional (indigenous) authorities, two by tax payers paying a minimum tax of 1,000 escudos h/ a year, one by cultural and religious interests and two by administrative bodies. i/ In April 1971, Governor Spínola said that the membership of the Legislative Council would be increased to provide for better representation of the more important ethnic groups and related ethnic minorities of the Territory. Details of the new composition would be set out in the administrative and political statute of the Territory once the revised Organic Law had been approved by the National Assembly (see annex II.A above, paras. 35-59).

15. It was reported that at the Council session in April, the régulo of Pronama in the Gabu concelho took his seat for the first time as a representative of the traditional authorities. On that occasion, Governor Spínola said that the presence of a "notable personality of the traditional hierarchy" in the Council was an indication of the authenticity of Portugal's policy of integrating Africans of the Territory in administrative and political activities.

16. In November, Governor Spínola reported to the Legislative Council on his visit to Lisbon. He said that among other things he had discussed with the Government a programme of accelerated professional training to provide the Territory with the qualified personnel needed for its economic development. He said that he had also discussed with the Government the need for expanding economic activities in the Territory, and particularly the participation of Portuguese and foreign groups in new investments. As a further measure of assistance the Government in Lisbon had granted the Territory a supplementary allocation of 50 million escudos for the implementation of projects under the Third National Development Plan.

f/ Chão usually designates an area where an ethnic group is concentrated.

g/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.D, para. 7

h/ 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

i/ For further details, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.A table 1.

17. Governor Spínola also reported to the Legislative Council on various projects that had been started or completed during 1971 by the territorial Government. Among these projects were the construction of 2,944 housing units for 18,000 people in various villages, including Bissássema and Contabane in the southern part of the Territory, and the construction of new markets at Bambadinea, Galomaro, Contuboel, Sonaco and Pirada. Further details on government projects implemented during 1971 are reported under the respective sections below.

18. The legislation approved by the Legislative Council during 1971 included regulations for the Transport and Public Works Department, regulations on the licencing of commercial operations and changes in the regulations of the territorial Caixa de Crédito (Credit Bank).

3. MILITARY ACTIVITIES

War in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

19. Portuguese military communiqués for 1971 reported throughout the year the shelling of various towns and villages along the borders, frequent clashes of Portuguese troops with the guerrillas and attacks by the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) on the populations of villages and on rural workers engaged in farming. At least 46 towns and villages were attacked by PAIGC artillery during the year. Most of the places attacked lie along, or within 15 kilometres of, the frontier. With few exceptions, there were artillery attacks on every place named on the attached map located on the road between Susana and Farim in the north, including Susana, São Domingos, Sedengal, Ingoré, Bigene and Farim, as well as several border posts. Many of these towns, as well as Cameconde, Aldeia Formosa and Guilege along the southern border were hit by artillery more than once. Further in from the frontier, there were attacks in the east on Piche and Nova Lamego, which is one of the more important towns in the area, Mandina Mandinga, Olossato, Mansabá and Mansoa which lie between Bissau and the frontier, Xitole and Empada in the south, and on Bissau, the capital. Some of the communiqués repeatedly reported that PAIGC was using heavy artillery with the assistance of foreign experts.

20. The Portuguese military communiqués reported more than 50 "clashes" with PAIGC guerrillas. Although it has not been possible to identify all the locations mentioned, most of the encounters or ambushes were in the same regions attacked by guerrilla artillery from time to time. Portuguese sources have also emphasized the increase in guerrilla attacks on the local population. Such attacks were reported in more than 20 locations, including the area of Teixeira Pinto, Búla, Bissorã, Tete, Porto Gole, Catió, Cabedu and Bedanda. Most of these places lie more than 30 kilometres from the frontier. In general, it appears from the reports that the two areas of most intensive PAIGC activities were, in the north, the roughly triangular area bounded by São Domingos, Bissau, Mansabá and Farim, and, in the south, the area bounded by Empada, Xitole, and Aldeia Formosa to the border.

21. Throughout the first part of the year the weekly military communiqués contained more or less continuing reports of clashes between Portuguese forces and PAIGC. In March, heavy fighting was reported in the Boé region in the south-east at Balandugo, Burquelem and Quissem. After the clashes, Governor Spínola visited the

military garrisons in the area which is part of the regions claimed to be liberated by PAIGC where the Portuguese forces maintain only fortified camps. Towards the end of March, Portuguese forces were reported to have intercepted some PAIGC guerrillas south of Aldeia Formosa. During this period, a number of villages in the south, which are considered to be among the main targets of PAIGC propaganda, continued to ask the Government for arms for self-defence in order to organize their own militia.

22. From April through June there was frequent shelling of towns and villages including São Domingos and Sedengal in the north-western region, Barro, Bigene, Guidage, Ingoré, Mansabá and Mansoa in the north, Buruntuma in the east, and Aldeia Formosa, Bedanda, Gadamael and Guilege in the south-west.

23. The two most serious artillery attacks were those on the towns of Farim in March and Bissau in June. The attack on Farim resulted in 15 deaths and 35 persons wounded. Governor Spínola and Mr. Martins dos Santos, who was then visiting the Territory, toured the town of Farim to examine the damage caused by the PAIGC attack and to contact African authorities.

24. The attack on Bissau by PAIGC forces was made with five 122 mm rockets. Following this attack, the Governor addressed the people of Bissau in a broadcast over the official radio station to reassure them that life would proceed normally in the town. He acknowledged that there was a climate of apprehension in Bissau, but that there was no real reason for it. He warned that any attack against individual or collective security would be considered an act of high treason and punished as such. Soon after, General Venâncio Deslandes, Chief of Staff of the armed forces, visited the Territory to review the situation.

25. A third artillery attack, also in June, was made on the central town of Bafatá, the second largest in the Territory, and the guerrillas also set fire to a score of huts in the village of Bambadinca in the east. Governor Spínola toured the village and talked to the local population.

26. Starting in June 1971, the military communiqués became bi-monthly. During the second half of the year there were increased attacks by PAIGC and several specially organized operations by the Portuguese armed forces against the guerrillas. In the period July-September, intense guerrilla activity was reported in various parts of the Territory, with attacks on towns and villages in more than 20 different places. The most frequently shelled towns were São Domingos in the north-west and Guilege in the south. There were armed clashes between the Portuguese forces and the guerrillas in some 15 different locations. Around this period, it was reported in the international press that PAIGC was changing its tactics as evidenced by the unprecedented large-scale attacks with heavy equipment and larger formations. In October, the Portuguese communiqués reported particularly intense guerrilla activity against Portuguese military posts in the north-eastern region.

27. The Portuguese forces responded with their own attacks. First, early in August, Portuguese sources reported a major airborne operation on the Tombali peninsula in the Catió region in the south. Portuguese troops were ferried to Tombali by helicopter, reportedly in response to a request by the Balante population to dislodge a large guerrilla group which had arrived in the area. This operation was covered by radio broadcast directly from the field.

28. In October, November and December there were several more special operations against the guerrillas. In October, in a five-day operation, African commandos were reported to have dislodged a large group of guerrillas who had infiltrated from Senegal through the so-called Lamel Corridor to disrupt work on the Mansoa Bissorã road. In November, Portuguese forces launched an attack on guerrilla bases in the Insumeti forest region in the north, and another in the Oiô region in which 30 guerrillas were reported to have been killed. During December, Portuguese troops mounted two special operations, one to prevent guerrilla infiltration in the Farim-Jumbembem-Olossato-Morés area in the north, and one in the Morés region south-west of Mansabá where some 500-600 guerrillas had concentrated. Portuguese sources reported that the Morés operation lasted seven days and that it was carried out by African units.

29. In a round-up of military activities in 1971, the Portuguese communiqués claimed that 1,257 guerrillas were killed (compared with 895 in 1970 and 614 in 1969) and 58 were captured (compared to 86 in 1970 and 165 in 1969), and 6,348 persons returned from the neighbouring countries. Governor Spínola said that since he had taken office in May 1968, the vast majority of the population had been won over to the Portuguese side. However, according to an article in the foreign press, Portuguese sources were said to admit that some 10 per cent of the population was still under PAIGC control in mid-1971. A spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Senegal said that, during 1971, a total of 14,000 new refugees from Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, had arrived in Senegal and that with this new influx the total number of refugees from the Territory in Senegal had reached 80,000.

30. Governor Spínola reported that in 1971 a General Command of Militia had been set up and new regulations had been approved governing the activities of the Volunteer Corps. During the year, 720 militia troops had been trained and 880 more were being trained; a new detachment of fusiliers and a commando company had been added to the African armed forces; and over 2,360 persons had been armed and trained for self-defence.

31. No figures were reported for Portuguese casualties in 1971. According to the periodical military communiqués, the Portuguese death toll was small, seldom more than two or three deaths per week. Many of the official communiqués stressed that Portuguese military action had been based on information supplied by the local population. According to these sources, in January and February 1971, for instance, on the basis of such information, Portuguese forces undertook mopping up operations in areas around the northern town of Farim where there had been guerrilla attacks on villages and agricultural workers.

32. In January 1972, the military communiqués continued to report intense guerrilla activity. Portuguese troops were still engaging guerrilla fighters in the Morés region. In February 1972, Portuguese sources reported that two bombs set by the PAIGC went off in Bissau, one in a gas station and another in a public building. Also in February, Portuguese and PAIGC forces clashed in the Sara region north-east of Bafatá, and the PAIGC forces, using heavy artillery, shelled one village on the border with Senegal and three villages on the border with the Republic of Guinea. In March 1972, a dispatch from Lisbon reported that a group of 140 PAIGC guerrillas had destroyed the village of Sumbundo in the north-east some four miles south of the border with Senegal.

PAIGC activities

33. In October 1971, Mr. Amílcar Cabral, the Secretary-General of PAIGC, said that his movement had liberated about three quarters of the Territory. Even before August 1971, a PAIGC report had asserted that Portuguese forces were no longer safe in any part of the Territory. It was said that civilians in urban centres lived in a permanent state of alertness, and most Portuguese officials had sent their families back to Portugal.

34. In an account of the war during 1971, PAIGC reported that Portuguese forces had continued their frequent bombings of the liberated areas, particularly with napalm, and helicopter operations. It said that the main objectives of Portuguese military activities were to destroy villages, burn crops and kill cattle in the liberated areas. The regions most affected had been those in which the PAIGC organization was more developed and which were densely populated. During 1971, the PAIGC National Armed Forces (FARP) together with its Local Armed Forces (FAL) carried out 779 major operations which included 545 attacks on fortified camps, 12 attacks on airports and ports, 178 ambushes and other clashes with Portuguese forces, 20 operations against rivercraft and 15 commando operations in urban centres. PAIGC claimed that as a result of its activities, the Portuguese forces suffered at least 1,495 casualties, including 912 killed. It was further claimed that PAIGC forces destroyed 137 military vehicles, sank 35 rivercraft, shot down four airplanes and three helicopters, expelled Portuguese forces from five fortified camps and seized a large quantity of arms and ammunition. For example, in April 1971, PAIGC forces carried out 86 attacks against Portuguese positions. Between April and June 1971, PAIGC forces attacked the town of Nova Lamego in the east and twice attacked the town of Catió in the south.

35. According to a PAIGC communiqué, its artillery unit with infantry support managed to break through the Portuguese defences of Bissau in June and attacked military positions in town. As logistic support for the attack on Bissau, PAIGC forces carried out simultaneous attacks on Portuguese garrisons between Mansoa and Bissau Island, especially those at Mansoa, Nhacra, Cumere and Bissau itself. The PAIGC communiqué claimed that the assault caused considerable damage and that the Portuguese forces had lost several dead. Because the attack took the Portuguese authorities by surprise they were unable to react promptly, but later imposed a state of siege on the capital. The civilian population, particularly the Africans, had been forced to stay at home for 24 hours. PAIGC considered that although the material damage resulting from the attack on Bissau was not great, the psychological and political implications were very important. The attack on Bissau was followed up with an intensification of underground activities in the capital.

36. PAIGC also reported its attack on Bafatá where it claims to have spent some time before the Portuguese forces reacted. The PAIGC communiqué said that its forces destroyed four military barracks, the meteorological station, the control station at the airport and several military and certain administrative facilities.

37. In September-October 1971, PAIGC forces engaged Portuguese troops on the Nova Lamego-Piche road and on the Jumbembem-Farim road, and attacked a score of Portuguese garrisons, including those at Olossato, São Domingos, Jumbembem, Cuntima, Mansabá and Bigene in the north; Bedanda, Cabedu, Cameconde and Quebo in the south;

and Camquelifá, Cabuca, Buruntuma, Piche and Pirada in the east. In November 1971, the PAIGC communiqué reported 44 attacks against Portuguese military garrisons and towns including the towns of Farim in the north, Bolama in the west, Nova Lamago in the east and Catió in the south. As a result of an attack on an air strip at Cabedu in the south a T-6 airplane was destroyed. PAIGC also destroyed Portuguese military installations in an attack on Pirada in the north-east.

38. In December 1971, a PAIGC communiqué said that with the beginning of the dry season the Portuguese forces had intensified the bombing of the liberated areas with napalm and that a dozen villages in the northern part of the Territory had been destroyed, including Gambadju, Djendo, Dumbal and Casa Nova in the Sara region. During December, PAIGC reportedly carried out another attack on Bafatá and attacks on the towns of Farim, Mansoa and Catió. It also claimed to have shot down two Portuguese airplanes.

39. In a special communiqué, issued in January 1972, PAIGC contested Portuguese claims of success in a special operation carried out by Portuguese forces in the Morés region from 20 to 26 December (see para. 28 above). The PAIGC claimed that the Morés region, which is located in the northern-central part of the Territory, some 50 kilometres from Bissau, had been under its control since 1964, and that it had been visited by a number of writers, journalists and cameramen. According to the PAIGC communiqué, some 800 Portuguese troops entered the Morés region after intense aerial bombing, but PAIGC forces resisted the attack and drove them back, in the course of which they lost 102 men.

40. It is reported that in the liberated area the local political organization is based on small units, each under the administration of a group of five people, three men and two women elected by the local population. The chairman of the group is the political commissar, the vice-chairman is responsible for the militia, and the other three members are respectively responsible for civil and social affairs, the supply of goods and production. Five neighbouring villages may have a regional council.

41. In the liberated areas, trade at people's stores is transacted on a barter basis, and Portuguese currency is no longer used. The PAIGC brings in manufactured goods which are exchanged for raw materials such as palm or cola, nuts, rice and animal hides.

42. PAIGC is reported to have 150 small village schools and two large schools - one in the north and one in the south. From those schools the students go to Conakry where PAIGC has a pilot school with classes up to high school level. Further studies were made possible by scholarships abroad. According to one source, PAIGC had over 200 schools in operation with an enrolment of over 20,000 pupils. PAIGC is also reported to have seven hospitals and two dozen sick bays inside the Territory.

43. At the end of 1971, Mr. Amilcar Cabral said that, despite the scarcity of rainfall in 1971, agricultural output had been enough to meet the needs of the population and PAIGC forces. Agricultural techniques were being improved with the assistance of agricultural experts who had returned to the Territory upon completion of studies abroad.

44. PAIGC troops are reported to include 5,000 regular troops and a militia of 5,000 men and women. Under the PAIGC military organization, the Territory is divided into three fronts, namely the northern, eastern and southern fronts. Each front is subdivided into sectors under the joint direction of a commander and a political commissar. Within the sectors there are infantry groups of 38 men each. The PAIGC armed forces are organized into a guerrilla army, the FARP, which is locally supported by the FAL. The FAL groups were set up as the result of a reorganization of the former militia. The main responsibilities of the FAL groups are to defend the villages and to protect the FARP rear-guard. Each FAL group is under a chief and a military commander. The FARP army is subdivided into several units which operate in specific areas. Each regional unit has its command and its political chiefs.

45. Early in 1972, speaking before the Security Council during its meetings in Africa, j/ Mr. Cabral said that in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the people of the Territory had already achieved self-determination through nine years of armed struggle imposed by Portuguese colonialism, and, as a result of that self-determination, already had sovereignty over more than two thirds of the Territory. Thus, the situation in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, was comparable to that of an independent State which had certain portions of its national territory occupied by foreign armed forces. He said that they already had all the component parts of a state in development in the Territory, and that they would shortly elect the regional councillors and the first popular assembly of the people of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.

46. Mr. Cabral also restated that PAIGC was not opposed to Portugal but was against Portuguese colonialism. He was in favour of having the best possible relations with Portugal after the Territory had achieved independence. PAIGC was for dialogue with Portugal and wanted the help of the Security Council for this purpose. He proposed that the permanent members of the Security Council demand that Portugal should proceed to decolonization. He asked that a time-limit should be set to end Portuguese colonialism. He also requested that a delegation of the Security Council visit Prime Minister Caetano and ask him to agree to negotiations with the nationalist movements of the Portuguese Territories. He said that if Mr. Caetano gave a negative reply, PAIGC should be given all assistance necessary to develop the struggle.

International reports

47. During the year, an article in the international press drew attention to the contrasting claims by PAIGC and the Portuguese forces as to the area "controlled" in the Territory. It was said that according to PAIGC it controlled over 68 per cent of the Territory, Portugal's forces 7 per cent, and the remainder was under "joint control". Portuguese sources were said to claim control over 50 per cent of the Territory and to admit that 10 per cent in the forest area was under PAIGC control and that the remaining 40 per cent was deserted or empty territory.

48. There were also a number of reports on the Territory by foreign visitors in 1971. After a visit to Bissau, Nhacra and Mansoa in August 1971 (see annex II.A above, para. 108), two United States congressmen reported to the House of Representatives that the Territory was an armed camp and that the

Portuguese authorities were indeed beleaguered. The PAIGC had forced the Portuguese to leave the countryside and to retreat to the urban areas and a few scattered military bases. He suggested that the housing, health and educational programmes undertaken by the Portuguese authorities in the Portuguese-held areas should be considered as an effect of PAIGC activities.

49. Chinese correspondents who visited the liberated areas in 1971 reported that the southern region had become a comparatively consolidated liberated area, and that the liberated areas in the south-eastern part of the Territory had been linked together into one contiguous area. In the north-east, PAIGC forces were reducing the number of Portuguese strongholds, and in the north-west PAIGC forces had already extended their area of operation to the surrounding areas of Bissau.

50. A correspondent of The New York Times who visited the liberated areas in November 1971 reported that PAIGC controlled at least half of the Territory. According to his report, Portuguese forces controlled the air, dropping bombs and napalm on guerrilla targets, including villages. Sometimes the Portuguese forces landed a helicopter-borne patrol in a PAIGC stronghold. Most of the Portuguese forces were concentrated in the urban centres or in fortified outposts. The correspondent went on to say that a rough estimate based on observations and discussions with impartial observers indicated that the PAIGC controlled more than half the country with somewhat less than half the population, and that, during 1971, no important area had changed hands.

51. An article in The Economist of London disputed some of the PAIGC claims. The author said that during his visit he had travelled without restriction, by asphalt and dirt roads and extensively by river as well as by air, and covered regions which PAIGC claimed it had liberated. He said that the PAIGC rocket attack on Bissau had only created three holes in a field on the outskirts of Bissau, and the attack on Bafatá had only left nine thatched African houses burned down and five Africans wounded. The main effect of PAIGC attacks was that they had created a mass movement from the countryside to the towns or to centres in the rural areas protected by the Portuguese army.

52. However, according to another journalist who visited the Portuguese-held areas of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the roads in the Territory were not considered safe by the Portuguese authorities. Despite a government programme of massive road-tarring to prevent the laying of mines by guerrillas, evacuations of wounded Portuguese troops by helicopter were a regular feature of the war. He said that helicopters were also extensively used to supply outposts and the Portuguese air force was usually called in when contact had been made by the land forces with the guerrillas. Once the area was pinpointed, strikes followed within minutes. The fact that any point in the Territory could be reached from Bissau in less than 45 minutes by air facilitated the air strikes. This source also reported that some Portuguese aircraft had been destroyed by PAIGC forces and predicted that the war in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, might become more intense if PAIGC acquired assistance in the air war.

4. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

53. According to a statement made by Governor Spínola in 1971, the principal areas requiring government action were: (a) global planning of agricultural and industrial development; (b) establishment of a system of land ownership and land use; (c) legislation regulating co-operatives; (d) accelerated professional training

of agricultural technicians; (e) development of storage facilities and improved marketing conditions; (f) establishment of experimental farms and pilot-projects; (g) reorganization of the organização do enquadramento rural (rural structure); (h) establishment of a system of loans and subsidies; (i) an effort to obtain satisfactory prices for the Territory's products on the national and international markets; and (j) regulation of the fiscal system.

54. There is little information on the economic conditions in the Territory except for statements made by the Governor. Reporting on the progress achieved during the year, the Governor told the Legislative Council in November 1971 that in the agricultural sector 770 hectares had been reclaimed for rice cultivation, 35 hectares had been planted with selected palm trees, 70,000 fruit trees had also been planted and some 300 tons of selected seeds had been distributed to farmers. In the mining sector, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc., a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, United States of America, had continued prospecting for oil in the areas of its concession. k/

55. He said that the Government's main activities had been concerned, however, with the development of transport and communications facilities which it considered a priority in its war effort. During 1971, over 100 kilometres of roads had been completed at a cost of 80 million escudos; 124 helicopter landing areas had been built; the wharves of Buba, Teixeira Pinto and Gadamael had been rebuilt and the wharves of Bolama and Enxudé had been repaired; a new motor boat for the transport of up to 50 persons had been added to the Territory's fleet; facilities had been built for the repair of airplanes of the territorial airline Transportes Aéreos da Guiné Portuguesa - TAGP and negotiations were under way for the purchase of new planes. Telecommunications with Portugal had been improved with the acquisition of new equipment and work was under way to improve telecommunication and telephone services in the Territory, including the establishment of an "administrative radio network" linking the various towns and villages.

56. In November 1971, it was reported that a study defining the short-term, medium-term and long-term economic objectives to be sought had been completed by an organization specialized in economic planning. On the basis of this study, the Government was preparing a new economic development plan for the Territory.


57. As already noted above, the Governor has been concerned with attracting new investments to the Territory. By the end of 1971, two companies had announced their intention to establish new plants there. One is the Companhia de Pescas e Conservas, S.A.R.L., established with an initial programme of investment amounting to 105 million escudos. The other company is reported to be planning to establish a beer and beverage factory in the Territory.

k/ For details on this concession, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (part II) A/6700/Rev.1), chap. V, paras. 342-352.

58. In January 1972, Governor Spínola presented a work programme for the year to the Legislative Council. This programme provides for the modernization of agriculture, development and establishment of co-operatives, expansion of medical services, introduction of closed circuit television in schools, the paving of 1,000 kilometres of roads, and the construction of the strongest radio transmitter in West Africa.

59. In January 1972, special legislation was approved (Decree 14/72, 11 January) as a matter of urgency to regulate the concession of land occupied by holders without legal title. 1/

1/ For details on the legislation regulating the occupation and concession of land in the overseas Territories, see ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II.



E.. CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

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1. GENERAL

1. The Cape Verde Islands lie off the west coast of Africa, the nearest point being about 600 kilometres from Dakar (Senegal). They form a crescent-shaped archipelago facing west and extending between 14°48'N and 17°12'N latitude and between 22°41'W and 25°22'W longitude. There are 10 islands and five islets divided into two groups: the Barlavento (Windward) and Sotavento (Leeward) islands. The Barlavento group, which lies to the north-west, comprises six islands: Santo Antão, Boa Vista, Sal, São Nicolau and São Vicente and one uninhabited island. The Sotavento group, which lies to the south, comprises the islands of Brava, Fogo, Maio and Santiago, on which Praia, the capital, is located. The total land area of the islands is 4,033.3 square kilometres.

2. According to the provisional results of the 1970 census, the total population of the Territory was 272,000, compared with 201,579 in 1960. Of the total some 128,000 persons live on Santiago Island. The average population density of the Territory rose from 49.5 in 1960 to 68 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1970. However, the population density varies from island to island.

3. There is no recent information on the distribution of the population by ethnic groups. In 1950, the ethnic composition of the population was as follows: 69.0 per cent mestiço; 28.84 per cent African; and 2.06 per cent European.

4. The population growth in the islands over the decade 1960-1970 shows sharp fluctuations from year to year; whereas, from 1960 to 1963, the population increased by 19,000, the increase between 1963 and 1964 was only 3,500. During the period 1966-1968, there was an increase of about 7,000 per year, which has since declined to an increase of 5,500 in 1969 and only 2,000 in 1970. Although some of the fluctuation is attributed to inadequate registration of births and deaths, the "irregularity" of the population changes is due largely to migrations. The figures suggest that there was a considerable exodus from the Territory in 1970. For instance, the island of Brava, which once had 12,500 inhabitants was reported to have only 8,500 in November 1971 due to emigration.

5. Government authorities have generally expressed concern over the "population explosion" as shown by the 1970 census. It has been pointed out that if the rate of population increase over the past decade continues, the Territory will have 330,000 inhabitants by 1980, 440,000 by 1990 and 600,000 by the year 2000. This points to the necessity for economic development to be accelerated at least to keep pace with the population growth, or, alternatively, to increase immigration from the islands.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Constitutional and political relations with the Central Government

6. Pending the coming into force of the new Overseas Organic Law and the new political and administrative statute of the Territory, there have been no changes affecting the territorial Government and its relations with Portugal.

7. In an interview with the press in August 1971, the Governor expressed the view that although Cape Verde was commonly referred to as an integral part of Africa, this was not true. He said that Cape Verde inhabitants should not be considered as Africans any more than Brazilians, or any other people, could be considered Africans. Cape Verde, he said, was just like the Azores and Madeira Islands, an integral part of "Médio Ocidente Euro-Africano", and this not only geographically. The fact that a greater part of the population was descended from Africa could not justify its identification with Africa; it also had descendants from Europe. What characterized Cape Verde at the present time were its customs and usage, language, religion and the traditions of its people. In these, there was nothing specifically African. In fact, their customs and religion, as well as the language, were more European.

8 In September, the Diario de Noticias of Lisbon, published a long article describing Cape Verde as a typically successful example of "Luso tropicalism" resulting from inter-marriage of Portuguese with the islanders.

9. In this connexion, it should be recalled that from time to time there have been proposals in Portugal that Cape Verde should be related to Portugal in the same way as are Madeira and the Azores, but heretofore the Government's position on integration of the Territory had been ambiguous. The Governor's statement may therefore be an indication that the Government in Lisbon is probably more in favour of integration. The relationship of Cape Verde to Portugal is expected to be more clearly established in the political and administrative statute which is being revised.

10. Because of the drought situation, the Governor made two visits to Lisbon to consult on measures to alleviate conditions in the Territory and to stimulate development. The President of Portugal, Admiral Américo Thomaz made two stopovers in São Vicente on his way to and from Brazil. On the latter occasion, he visited the new desalination plant, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rear Admiral Pereira Crespo and other officials. There are no indications that he examined the effects of the drought.

Territorial Government

11. There is little information on the activities of the territorial Government, except from information provided by the Governor in his address to the Legislative Council in November 1971 and from official statements broadcast over the Cape Verde radio.

12. Legislation enacted during 1971 included the creation of a Departamento para o Melhoramento do Milho (Department for the Improvement of Maize) (see section on agriculture).

National liberation movement and Portuguese counter-insurgency measures

Activities of the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)

13. In April 1972 Mr. Amílcar Cabral, the Secretary-General of PAIGC, told the Special Committee during its visit to Africa that his movement was active in the

Territory. He said that the United States of America and Portugal were together seeking a solution for the autonomy of Guinea (Bissau) while retaining Cape Verde where military bases were being established.

14. Another member of PAIGC said that the growing political awareness among the local population was evidenced by the government measures to strengthen the Public Security Police and of the secret police in the Territory. He said that in 1971, 105 secret police officials had been sent to the Territory to launch a campaign to recruit local agents, and that the economic and social conditions prevailing in the Territory had led to an almost constant rebellion which had been cruelly repressed by the Government. Nevertheless, he said, a growing number of persons were joining PAIGC, and despite the fact that many young people had been arrested, the liberation movement was continuing to grow.

Portuguese measures

15. According to PAIGC, to maintain its control over the Territory, Portugal has established a new naval base at Ribeira Julião, on São Vicente; the Sal and Boa Vista airports are being expanded and there has been an increase in the number of visits of warships from countries friendly to Portugal. a/ Portuguese warships are also constantly patrolling the territorial waters of Cape Verde.

16. In January 1972, General Spínola, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, spent seven days in the Territory on what was described in the local press as a private visit. Accompanied by Governor Lopes dos Santos, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Navy of Cape Verde and by the Military Commander of the Territory, among others, General Spínola toured the various islands, by air, sea and land. At the Tarrafal concelho, he visited the work camp of Chão Bom which was formerly known as the Tarrafal prison b/ where African political prisoners are held. The local press, however, described Chão Bom as "a 'colonato' where valuable socio-economic work is being undertaken". General Spínola's trip appears to be connected with Portuguese security measures.

17. It may be pointed out that the 1971 budget estimates of the Territory included an allocation of 0.5 million escudos c/ for the maintenance of the "Presídio de Chão Bom" (Chão Bom Prison). Of this amount, 29,600 escudos were for the salaries of the administrator, another officer and eight guards.

Military and security budgets

18. The Territory's estimated military budget for 1972 was 37.7 million escudos, of which 23.6 million escudos were for the army, 11.7 million escudos for the navy and 2.3 million escudos for the air force. The entire amount was financed by Portugal. The increase of over 1 million escudos over 1969, was mainly for the army, the allocation for which increased from 22.5 million escudos in 1971 to 23.6 million in 1972.

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1) chap. VII, annex I.E, para. 17.

b/ Ibid., Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex V, paras. 6-8.

c/ 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

19. The Portuguese Government also authorized an allocation of 1.4 million escudos in 1971 for the Public Security Police and Fiscal Guard from Portugal serving in the Territory.

3. DROUGHT SITUATION

20. In 1971, Cape Verde entered its fourth year of drought which has seriously affected the economy of the Territory and become the major concern of the Government. As already described in previous studies d/ Cape Verde has always suffered from chronic poverty, and even under favourable weather conditions it has been dependent on financial assistance from Portugal. This is because most of the islands have poor soils and few natural resources and while agriculture constitutes the principal economic activity of the majority of the population, the Territory has never been able to produce enough food or to provide employment for all the inhabitants.

21. In a statement on the drought situation in Cape Verde, issued in April 1971, Mr. Amílcar Cabral the Secretary-General of PAIGC said that "the Portuguese colonialists had never been able - nor had tried - to take adequate measures to promote economic development, or even to prevent the famine which, at each crucial period, killed tens of thousands of human beings". He added that the Portuguese authorities recognized the seriousness of the situation but were trying to conceal the facts of the famine from the knowledge of the world. Unless effective measures were taken against the famine, it could reduce the population by 30 to 50 per cent. In his view, the visit of the Prime Minister to the islands, which was unprecedented, demonstrated how the drought situation was being exploited by the Portuguese colonialists in order to block the path of the liberation movement, which under the direction of the PAIGC had made considerable progress in the archipelago.

22. For a brief period in August 1971 when heavy rains fell, there had been hopes for a better agricultural year, but after a dry spell in September and October, accompanied by a heat wave, it became clear that the Territory faced a fourth year of drought as all agricultural crops were lost.

23. During the Special Committee's visit to Africa in 1972, Mr. Amílcar Cabral and other petitioners from PAIGC reported that the inhabitants of Cape Verde were facing serious famine, and that many had been forced to emigrate to Portugal, and other overseas Territories, including São Tomé and Príncipe and Angola. Members of PAIGC told the Committee that those workers who stayed in Cape Verde had to accept state provided work, such as road building and repairs during the drought periods. Urban workers, who lacked any form of trade union protection were under-employed, and even in years when the harvest was good the peasants, who owned no land, lived in misery.

24. Portuguese information sources have concentrated on refuting the charges that the Territory was suffering a serious famine and that inhabitants were being forced to emigrate. In a number of radio broadcasts and interviews published in the local press, government sources have stressed the measures being taken to help the people,

d/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, part II (A/6700/Rev.1), chap. V, paras. 366 et seq; ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E.

under the Plano Geral de Apoio às Populações (General Plan) established in 1970 after the Prime Minister's visit to the Territory. It is claimed that in November 1970 there were already 37,600 persons in the public works programme and that by April 1971 the number had risen to 40,300. Although the total population of the Territory was close to 270,000, only 234,000 persons needed assistance. The Government contends that by taking into account the family groupings and the large number of young children, the 40,300 jobs in effect provided assistance to some 85 per cent of the population.

25. In his speech to the Legislative Council in November 1971, for instance, the Governor emphasized at length that there was no famine, that the people of the islands were being fully assisted by the Government and that "rumors" that the people would die from famine or neglect were lies circulated by the "enemies of Portugal". He asserted that the "rhythm of life" was almost normal and that the chief of the Territory's Health Services, in his inspection tours of the islands, had found that the nutritional level of the population was under control. He said that such charges were unfair to the people of the Territory; although the assistance programmes had been financed by the Government, the people had helped to make these programmes successful.

26. He also denied that the Government was forcing workers "to move by the thousands" to work in Portugal and Angola. He said that the departure of all persons who possessed proper documentation was entirely free without restriction, but that during the years of drought most of the emigration had been to Portugal and was still continuing. The exodus would probably have been even greater had it not been for the lack of transport facilities.

27. He admitted however that officials of the Secretariado Nacional de Emigração (National Secretariat of Emigration) had visited the islands to recruit farmers for settlement in Mozambique e/ and that a group of 30 persons were to leave soon. These farmers will each receive approximately 100 hectares of land for agricultural development. They will also receive 30 hectares of land already cleared, plus 10 hectares which they will clear with help to be provided, so that the initial agricultural development will begin with 40 hectares. In addition, they will be granted a state loan of 250,000 escudos, at 5 per cent a year, payable in eight years. In addition, during the first year the farmers would receive a monthly grant for food, as well as an installation grant on arrival, free transportation to the area to be settled and facilities to borrow machinery from the Mozambique Provincial Settlement Board. They will also receive technical assistance.

28. Independent visitors to Portugal have noted the large number of Cape Verdians doing road construction work and other manual labour jobs. To help the Cape Verdians find jobs, the Government had established an "accelerated professional training programme" which provides training in professional agricultural methods, electro-mechanics, irrigation works, carpentry and civil construction.

29. Portuguese sources report that financial assistance by Portugal to Cape Verde amounted to over 480 million escudos in the period 1969-1971; this included 20 million escudos in 1969; 90.5 million escudos in 1970; and over 300 million escudos in 1971. In January 1972 the Council of Ministers authorized a further non-reimbursable subsidy of 200 million escudos to the Territory. (Decree

e/ See A/8723 (Part III).

Law 46/72, 7 February 1972). In February 1972, additional subsidies, totalling 9.5 million escudos, were granted to Cape Verde. These were to be financed by Angola (5 million escudos), Mozambique (3 million escudos) and São Tomé (1.5 million escudos) (Portaria 118/72, 29 February).

4. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

30. During the past year, several rather detailed accounts of the distressing conditions in the Territory received unusual attention in the press in the islands, in Portugal and in the other Territories. Two articles, which appeared in the Diário de Lisbon f/, for instance, movingly described the pathetic situation in which people of the islands found themselves, some because they have no land and others because there were no economic opportunities, and in general the difficulties most of the population had in making a living on the islands. Although some had been able to leave the islands in search of educational opportunities or work in Portugal, many Cape Verde Islanders interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with their living and working conditions there, some longing to go home and others waiting for opportunities to emigrate to countries where wage rates were higher.

31. A Província de Angola published an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jacinto Medina, the Director of Direcção de Transportes Aéreos (DTA), Angolan domestic airlines, who was born in Cape Verde and had visited the Territory after a 40-year absence. He described the situation in the Territory as one of general decline and desolation, except in São Vicente and Praia, the capital. He said that he had found abandoned properties throughout the Territory which in most cases were in shambles. Water had become more scarce, springs had dried up, and there was almost no irrigation. g/ He found that there were no industries, that fishing was only just beginning to make a start and there was little agriculture. In their desperation, many of the men sought refuge in drinking and spent their lives trying to pass time away. In his view, the general decay the islands were experiencing was due not only to the drought and the lack of means of communication between the islands and with the outside world, but also because of the deterioration of the social and administrative structures. Although there was some progress on Sal Island, that was linked mainly to the international airport and to the presence of military forces (army and air force), but these did not contribute much to the general social and economic development. The relative prosperity of São Vicente, he said, was also linked to the army and navy harbour installations.

f/ These articles were submitted as a petition to the Special Committee (see A/AC.109/PET.1214/Add.1).

g/ Another article charged that absentee landlords and government inertia were responsible for the archaic agricultural practices and for the lack of any comprehensive plan for water conservation and utilization for irrigation where this would be possible.

Water supplies

Desalination plants

32. The desalination plant being established at Mindelo, São Vicente, began operating on an experimental basis in June 1971. So far, in addition to the 40-million escudo contract awarded to Babcock and Wilcox in collaboration with Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton of the United States ^{h/} ancillary works, prepared and executed separately, have amounted to over 13 million escudos.

33. Currently, according to the President of the Water Desalination Board, the cost of the water to the consumer is 18 escudos per cubic metre. However, during this experimental period and until the distribution system is completed, water from the desalination plant is being distributed free to the population through public fountains.

34. In May 1972, a supplementary budget of 1.4 million escudos was authorized for the Municipal Council of Sal, earmarked for the purchase of a desalinator. The desalination plant on Sal Island is expected to begin operating in August 1972.

Underground water

35. As previously reported ^{i/} in December 1970, the Minister for Overseas Territories set up a specialized task force, the Brigada de Águas Subterrâneas de Cabo Verde, to study the hydrological potential of the Territory and the development of water supplies (Portaria 691/70, 31 December 1970). The Brigade began work in October 1971 with an inventory of the water resources on the islands of Santiago and Fogo. In March 1972 it had begun work on the island of Boa Vista.

36. In connexion with this work, the Government has granted contracts to the French firms Bureau de Géologie Appliquée et d'Hydrologie Souterraine (BURGEAP) and Compagnie générale géophysique (CGG) to assist in the survey. In March 1972, the Governor of the Territory inaugurated the 300 metres sound to explore the waterbed of São Domingos rivulet (Boa Vista Island) which has been selected by the Brigade as a favourable site.

Agriculture

37. Little information is available on agricultural activities in the Territory. As reported above, agricultural production, which had already been badly affected by the drought in 1969 and 1970, reached a point of total collapse when all crops were lost by October 1971. According to official sources, in an average year, production of maize, beans, manioc, sweet potatoes, bananas, coffee and sugar cane amounts to 75 to 85 thousand tons valued between 170 to 190 million escudos. However, even when production is above average, the Territory has always imported a number of food products including sugar, wheat flour and wine. In 1966 and 1967, for instance, which were above average, these imports amounted to 43 and 42 million

^{h/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E, para. 23.

^{i/} Ibid., annex I.E, paras. 26-27.

escudos, respectively. In 1969, however, because of the drought, imports rose to 149 million escudos. In 1970, imports amounted to 140 million escudos.

38. There are no statistics available for 1970, but in February 1972 the Government authorized the import of 40,000 tons of maize and 2,500 tons of beans, duty-free, to provide for the needs of the population. In 1968, maize imports were only 3,200 tons but rose to 31,900 tons in 1969.

39. For long-term planning, the new Department for the Improvement of Maize is to study the means of improving maize production in the Territory through the use of new techniques and better seed, in order to improve the yield.

40. Since 1967, the Government has provided a new form of "supervised credit" through the Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuário (Cape Verde Agricultural Credit Bank). j/ Under this scheme, farmers can obtain long-term loans if they adopt approved farming plans. Later that year, the Government authorized a loan of 30 million escudos from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino to the Agricultural Credit Bank for this purpose. Between 1969 and 1970 the Credit Bank granted 127 loans to farmers, amounting to some 13 million escudos. In April 1972 the Portuguese Government authorized a further loan of 20 million escudos from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino to the Credit Bank. This loan is for five years at an interest rate of 3.75 per cent a year. It is to be repaid in 10 bi-annual instalments beginning in June 1978.

Mining

41. No information is available as yet on the outcome of two requests made in March 1970 k/ for petroleum concessions, as well as a request for exploitation of sulphur.

42. In August 1971, it was reported in the Portuguese press that a petroleum and gasoline company with headquarters in Lisbon had requested an exclusive concession to prospect for, develop and exploit solid, semi-solid and gaseous hydrocarbons and related substances in the islands and in the surrounding maritime zone, as well as to establish facilities for refining and industrialization of petroleum and its by-products.

Other developments

Survey by the National Development Bank

43. In October 1971, a mission from the Banco de Fomento Nacional (National Development Bank) visited Cape Verde to study the possibility of extending its activities in the Territory, and to assess the potential of the existing industries,

j/ Ibid., Twenty-third Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/7200/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex V, para. 17.

k/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E, para. 46.

the need for immediate technical assistance, and the possible development of transforming industries which could use local or imported raw materials through joint enterprises involving Portugal and other overseas Territories.

44. The mission also undertook studies of the agricultural problems, transport facilities and tourist potential of the Territory.

Tourism

45. Three groups, the Sociedade para o Desenvolvimento e Turismo da Ilha do Sal (DETOSAL), Atlântico-Interplano Empreendimentos e Investimentos Ultramarinos, SARL (AIP) and Sociedade de Turismo da Ilha de Maio, SARL (TURMAIO), are currently engaged in developing various tourist prospects in the Territory. 1/

46. DETOSAL, which was formed in 1970, had not presented its final project by October 1971 for the complex it intends to establish on Santa Maria Island. However, one of the partners, a Belgian national, has already started operating a small hotel and pre-fabricated bungalows in the area.

47. The final contract for the development of the island of Boa Vista was signed by the Minister for Overseas and Messrs. Carel Van Leeuwen and M. Joaquim Penim, representatives of AIP in September 1971. It followed the provisions laid down in Decree 49,121, 15 July 1969, m/ which required the society to build within two years at least three hotels with a total capacity of 1,200 beds, as well as to develop the surrounding areas as necessary. The society is also required to construct an airport on Boa Vista. When finished, the complex is expected to have hotels with a capacity for 6,000 beds.

48. The AIP, which was granted exclusive rights to exploit the area of the concession for a period of 25 years for tourism and related works, is expected eventually to make an investment of \$US 100 million. n/ In October 1971, the company, which is financed by German capital, gave the Government a bank guarantee for 20 million German marks.

49. There is no recent information on the activities of TURMAIO.

External trade

50. There are no trade statistics available for 1970. Traditionally the only exports of the Territory have been fish and fish products, the supply of water to navigation, pozzolanas, salt and more recently bananas. Imports consist mainly of consumer goods, especially food-stuffs, including maize, sugar, rice, flour and wine.

1/ Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.E, paras. 50-53; and ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E, paras. 48-51.

m/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.E.

n/ Ibid., para. 51.

51. In his speech to the Legislative Council in November 1971, the Governor said that, as a result of the drought, Cape Verde had almost no exports and was importing almost everything it consumed. Commenting on the existence of some speculation by unscrupulous persons, he said that although the Government could not control the basic prices of the products imported, it would limit the profits and would use all legitimate means to punish those taking advantage of the consumer. He said that the import of superfluous goods should be reduced and greater care should be made in selecting the origin of the imports in order to obtain better prices.

52. Cape Verde's principal suppliers are Portugal and Angola, which in 1969 supplied 49.5 and 22.0 per cent respectively of the total value of the Territory's imports.

Transport and communications

53. The drought situation has once again highlighted the urgent need for an improved transportation system, particularly the shipping and air services linking the islands with each other and with Lisbon.

Shipping

54. Under Portuguese law (Decree Law 39,375, 3 October 1953) all shipping between Portugal and the overseas Territories must be made on Portuguese ships. For nearly 20 years the Sociedade Geral has had the sole monopoly of the shipping between Cape Verde and Portugal, and up to the end of 1971 there were only three boats a month to the islands. Inter-island shipping has long been inadequate, many islands having only one service per week.

55. Commenting on this situation in October 1971, the Governor said that two more boats were needed to meet the needs of the islands. He said that the matter had been raised with the Overseas Ministry and that a decision was pending. At the same time, the territorial Government was also considering contracting the services of a boat belonging to a private concern. There is no further information on this matter.

Air transport

56. Air services between the islands are provided by Transportes Aéreos de Cabo Verde (TACV). Up to 1971, the company had three 9-seat Dove twin-motor planes and two Auster single motor planes providing services between Praia, the capital, on Santiago and the islands of Fogo and Maio. There were no regular air services to the other islands.

57. Between 1969 and 1971 the number of passengers carried by TACV increased from 14,315 to 17,596. Towards the end of 1971, the company purchased a twin-motor Islander type plane with eight seats which will be used for services between Santiago and Fogo.

58. In 1971, the runway at the São Felipe airport on Fogo was extended. Other projects for expansion of airports in Cape Verde are estimated at 906 million escudos which includes a 14 million escudo expansion of the international airport on Sal to enable it to receive 747 jets. The airport at Praia is also to be expanded to receive the Boeing 747.

Roads

59. There is no recent information on the road works completed in the Territory since 1969. Under the road plan for the islands which was estimated at a total cost of 145 million escudos, in 1970, 7 million escudos were spent for roads on Santo Antão; 2 million escudos for Sal Island and 7 million escudos for Santiago. An additional 21.2 million escudos were spent on road improvements from the allocations for special assistance to the Territory.

60. Under the Third National Development Plan, 20 million escudos were allocated for road construction in 1971. In addition, 3.5 million escudos a month was allocated for road building under the public works programme.

Ports and Harbours

61. Only four of the islands have major ports: Vale dos Cavaleiros on Fogo Island; Porto Novo on Santo Antão; Praia on Santiago Island and Porto Grande, the principal port in the Territory, on São Vicente.

62. A contract is reported to have been awarded to Construcções Técnicas, Lda., for the construction of a 180-metre quay at the Praia Harbour, which it is estimated will cost some 70 million escudos. Work on the project was expected to begin early in 1972. The construction of another quay to serve petroleum tankers originally to be built at São Vicente, is now to be located on Sal Island.

Telecommunications

63. By September 1971, it was reported that the telecommunications circuits between São Vicente and Santo Antão, Fogo and Brava, and Santiago and Maio were already in operation. The link between Santiago and Sal was expected to be completed in the second half of 1972 and the entire telecommunications network on the islands is expected to be completed in 1973.

64. In September 1971, it was reported that United Kingdom equipment had been received for the radio-telecommunications centre on Santiago Island.

Public finance

65. As reported in the press, the Territory's ordinary budget estimates for 1972 amount to 196.1 million escudos, compared with 171.9 in 1971. In addition, the extraordinary budget estimates amount to 123.1 million escudos, of which 43.3 million escudos were earmarked for the implementation of the Third National Development Plan 1968-1973 o/, and 3.4 million escudos were allocated for defence.

66. In 1970 and 1971, the estimated extraordinary budgets amounted to 2.2 and 2.4 million escudos, respectively, but in both cases those amounts did not include

o/ The latest information available on the implementation of the Third National Development Plan, 1968-1973, was reported in Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E, paras. 60 and 61.

allocations for the implementation of the Third National Development Plan. p/ Information is not yet available on actual revenue and expenditure for 1970 and 1971.

5. EDUCATION

67. According to a statement by the Governor, total school enrolment had been achieved in the 1971/72 academic year and it had become possible to enforce compulsory primary education, since the necessary network of schools and school posts were available in the Territory. In October 1971, the Government issued an order (Portaria 10121, 2 October) making primary school attendance compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12. Failure to comply with the law is punishable by a fine.

68. The Government has now begun to concentrate its efforts on developing technical education. In 1971 it was reported that only 57 students from among 344 who passed the examinations for the preparatory cycle, had enrolled at the Mindelo Industrial School on São Vicente Island. This was attributed to the lack of public understanding of the importance of technical education.

69. New establishments created in the Territory in 1971 included 51 new schools in 11 of the 14 concelhos of the Territory. (Diploma Legislativo 1755, of 5 June). In addition, in October 1971, one new primary school was created in the Tarrafal concelho and 10 school posts were established: one in Praia; three in Santa Catarina; two in Tarrafal; one in Santa Cruz; one in São Vicente; one in Paúl; and two in Porto Novo.

70. During 1971, two new teacher-training schools were set up in Praia, one for school post teachers who are to serve in rural areas, and one for full primary school teachers (Escola do Magistério Primário da Praia). q/ The school post teacher-training school opened with an enrolment of 207 students.

71. A number of accelerated training courses were offered during the year, including courses for school monitors r/ and summer courses for regular teachers.

72. There are no published school statistics for 1970/71. s/ According to the Governor, there were 53,000 pupils enrolled in official primary schools in the 1971/72 academic year, an increase of 10,000 over 1970/71. During the same period, the number of schools increased from 21 to 27, and the number of school posts from 260 to 326.

p/ Ibid., para. 59.

q/ For a general description of the educational system, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.B, para. 148. School posts provide the pre-primary class and the first three years of primary education. Only full primary schools provide all four years of primary education.

r/ Monitors usually teach at school posts. They must have completed four years of primary school and a special two-and-a-half month training class.

s/ For the last available school statistics, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.E.

F. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

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1. GENERAL

1. The two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe are situated in the Gulf of Biafra, west of the Republic of Gabon. Their total area is 964 square kilometres, and they lie between 1° 44' N and 0° 1' S latitude and 6° 28' EG and 7° 28' EG longitude. The area of São Tomé is 854 square kilometres; the area of Príncipe, which lies about 120 kilometres north of São Tomé, is 110 square kilometres.

2. According to provisional 1970 figures, the total resident population of the Territory was 73,811, with 69,149 on São Tomé and 4,662 on Príncipe. At the 1960 census, the two islands had a population of 64,406, of which about 60 per cent were considered to be autóctone; the remainder were from Portugal and other "national" Territories, mainly Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, including 2,655 Europeans.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. Pending the coming into force of the new Overseas Organic Law and the new political and administrative statute of the Territory, there have been no changes affecting the structure of the territorial Government and its relations with Portugal.

4. In November 1971, Colonel Cecílio Gonçalves was appointed the Governor of São Tomé and Príncipe, replacing Lieutenant Colonel Silva Sebastião who had completed two four-year terms.

5. As established in 1963, the Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of 13 members, of whom three are ex officio, three are elected by direct vote and seven are elected by various interest groups. a/ The last elections to the Legislative Council were held in December 1967. As in the other Territories the general elections to the Legislative Council, which normally take place every four years, were postponed in September 1971 pending the publication of the new political and administrative statutes which will give effect to the 1971 constitutional reforms. The term of office of all the incumbent members was extended by Decree Law 372/71 of 2 September 1971.

3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

General

6. During the period 1963-1970 the gross national product of São Tomé and Príncipe is reported to have increased at an average rate of 7.5 per cent a year.

a/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII.

However, in 1970, the Territory had a trade deficit for the first time and public revenues dropped below the estimates for the year. This was mainly due to a decline in agricultural production which in an average year accounts for more than 95 per cent of the Territory's exports.

External trade

7. In 1970, exports dropped to 237.5 million escudos b/ from 248.3 million escudos in 1969, whereas imports increased from 224.0 million to 260.5 million escudos. As a result, there was a deficit of 23.0 million escudos in contrast to a trade surplus of 24.0 million escudos in the previous year. Table 1 below shows the deterioration of the trade balance over the period 1967-1970. Table 2 shows the Territory's principal exports by value. It will be noted that, despite efforts to introduce some new crops, such as bananas and cola, in 1970, cocoa, copra and coconuts still accounted for some 94 per cent of the total value of exports.

8. Portugal and the Netherlands take more than two thirds of the Territory's exports. Exports to the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark have considerably increased in recent years (see table 3 below). In 1970, for the first time a significant amount of exports - 11.6 million escudos, corresponding to about 5 per cent of the total - went to the United States of America. The Territory's main suppliers are Portugal, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Agriculture

9. As reported previously, c/ agricultural production, which reached a peak in 1965, has made no further gains. In 1970, the production of both cocoa and copra fell short of their respective expected targets of 12,500 tons and 7,000 tons (see table 4 below). It was reported, however, that the 1971 cocoa output exceeded 11,000 tons.

Mining

10. As reported previously d/, in May 1971 the Portuguese Government authorized Hidrocarbo, Hidrocarbonetos de São Tomé e Príncipe, SARL, to enter into a joint venture with the Texas Pacific Oil Company of Portugal, Inc. to prospect for and exploit oil reserves in the area of the concession granted to Ball and Collins (Oil and Gas), Ltd., in 1970. e/ Hidrocarbo, Hidrocarbonetos was established

b/ 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

c/ For details, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.F, para. 18.

d/ Ibid., Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.F, para. 11.

e/ Ibid., Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8023/Rev.1), chap. VII, annex I.F, paras. 23-27.

by Ball and Collins under the terms of its contract with the Portuguese Government. The Texas Pacific Oil Company is a division of Joseph E. Seagram and Sons, Inc. which in 1970 ranked 222nd among the 500 largest industrial corporations in the United States. f/

11. Under the terms of the joint venture contract (Decree 219/71 of 25 May 1971) Hidrocarbo has a 62.5 per cent share in the joint venture and Texas Pacific a 37.5 per cent share. Texas Pacific is responsible as the operating company for all prospecting and exploitation activities. The company's plans for prospecting activities must be approved each year by the Portuguese Government. Texas Pacific is obligated to make an initial investment of \$US 390,670. Further investments above this amount by the two partners would be in the same proportion as the original shares. The joint venture is to be supervised by a comissão directiva (committee) comprising one representative of each company and a representative of the Portuguese Government.

Public finance

12. In 1970, actual government revenue, at 198.2 million escudos, was 5 per cent below that for 1969. As actual expenditure amounted to 180.3 million escudos, the year closed with a surplus of 17.9 million escudos (see table 5 below). The drop in revenue resulted mainly from the termination of the air lift relief operations to Biafra, which had used São Tomé as a staging point; as a consequence the item "revenue from services", which includes airport fees, declined from 40.6 million escudos in 1969 to 28.2 million escudos in 1970.

13. At 1970, the Territory's public debt amounted to 437.2 million escudos. In 1970, the servicing of the public debt amounted to 17.2 million escudos.

Development financing

14. As shown in table 6 below, actual expenditure under the Third National Development Plan, 1968-1973, fell far short of the envisaged target during the first three years. In 1968, only 40 per cent of the envisaged funds were spent, in 1969 only 48 per cent and in 1970 only 40 per cent. In effect, during the first half of the six-year period covered by the Plan, only 21 per cent of the global target was implemented.

15. Priority in the first three years was given to transport, communications and meteorology, which accounted for some 40 per cent of the total spent, and to education which accounted for 34 per cent of the total.

f/ "The Fortune Directory: The 500 largest Industrial Corporations in the United States", Fortune, June 1970.

4. EDUCATION

16. In the school year 1969/70, there were 10,619 pupils enrolled in schools in São Tomé and Príncipe, compared with 9,439 pupils in the previous year. The total enrolment in 1969/70 included 9,089 pupils in the primary schools, 1,278 in secondary schools and 43 in teacher-training schools. There were 52 schools and 383 teachers in 1969/70, compared with 46 schools and 372 teachers 1968/69.

Table 1

São Tomé and Príncipe: Balance of trade, 1967-1970
(million escudos)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Imports	156.3	182.5	224.3	260.5
Exports	<u>226.7</u>	<u>248.9</u>	<u>248.3</u>	<u>237.5</u>
Balance	<u>70.4</u>	<u>66.4</u>	<u>24.0</u>	- <u>23.0</u>

Sources: 1967 and 1968: Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral (Nos. 77/78), Lisbon, 1969. 1969 and 1970: Portugal, Assembleia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultiamar), Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

Table 2

São Tomé and Príncipe: Principal exports by value, 1967-1970
(million escudos)

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Cocoa	175.4	196.6	198.9	189.3
Copra	26.9	27.4	26.4	26.2
Coconuts	11.2	12.3	8.3	8.4
Coffee	4.7	4.9	4.8	4.0

Sources: 1967-1968: Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral (Nos. 77/78), Lisbon, 1969. 1969-1970: Portugal, Assembleia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultiamar), Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

Table 3

São Tomé and Príncipe: Export trade with selected
countries, 1966-1970
(million escudos)

	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Portugal	72.5	57.5	75.7	79.6	81.2
Netherlands	58.3	135.7	105.0	107.3	76.1
Federal Republic of Germany	7.1	10.8	20.2	9.3	27.8
Denmark	1.3	6.1	11.1	14.6	15.6
Other	37.4	16.6	36.9	37.5	36.8
Total	<u>176.6</u>	<u>226.7</u>	<u>248.9</u>	<u>248.3</u>	<u>237.5</u>

Sources: 1966-1968: Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral (Nos. 77/78), Lisbon, 1969. 1969-1970: Portugal, Assembléia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultimar), Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

Table 4

São Tomé and Príncipe: Output of principal crops, 1965-1970
(metric tons)

<u>Crops</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
Cocoa	10 577	9 529	10 406	10 232	8 979	9 491
Copra	6 314	5 510	5 415	4 735	5 232	4 540
Bananas	2 880	2 238	2 873	2 695	2 180	1 848
Coconut	1 989	1 822	1 635	1 499	1 255	982
Palm oil	1 733	1 364	1 169	997	937	952
Coffee	213	157	174	133	151	125

Source: Portugal, Assembléia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultimar), Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

Table 5

São Tomé and Príncipe: Public finance, 1969-1970
(million escudos)

A. Revenue

	<u>Estimated</u>		<u>Actual</u>	
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>Total revenue</u>	89.5	107.0	209.3	198.2
<u>Ordinary revenue</u>	89.2	105.5	148.3	140.8
Direct taxes	20.1	20.9	23.9	24.4
Indirect taxes	28.6	31.6	34.9	33.3
Industries under special régime	9.0	9.8	12.2	14.5
Revenue from services	9.4	15.1	40.6	28.2
Income from State and private industries	4.6	5.1	5.1	5.3
Earnings on capital	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Refunds	6.0	6.2	6.3	7.1
Consigned receipts	9.9	15.2	23.7	26.4
<u>Extraordinary revenue</u>	0.3 ^{a/}	1.5 ^{a/}	61.0	57.4

^{a/} Revenue allocated for the Third National Development Plan not included.

Table 5 (continued)

B. Expenditure

	Estimated		Actual	
	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>
<u>Total expenditure</u>	89.5	107.0	172.3	180.3
<u>Ordinary expenditure</u>	89.2	105.5	111.3	122.9
Public debt	10.4	12.1	14.3	17.2
General administration	35.5	43.4	40.5	48.3
Treasury	6.6	8.4	7.2	8.2
Justice Department	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.5
Development services	14.7	17.9	23.7	17.2
Military services	5.2	5.7	6.1	7.9
Naval services	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.4
General expenditure	13.4	14.1	16.0	19.9
Other	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
<u>Extraordinary expenditure</u>	0.3 ^{a/}	1.5 ^{a/}	61.0	57.4

Sources: 1969 estimated: Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral (Nos. 77/78), Lisbon 1969. 1969 actual and 1970 estimated and actual: Portugal, Assembleia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultiamar) Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

a/ Expenditures for the Third National Development Plan not included.

Table 6

São Tomé and Príncipe: Implementation of the Third National Development Plan, 1968-1973
(million escudos)

	Target		Expenditure							
	1968- 1973	Per year	Actual (revised figures)				Programmed			
			1968	1969	1970	1970	1968	1969	1970	1971
Agriculture, forestry and livestock	186.8	31.1	5.0	4.3	4.5	4.5	29.2	20.1	24.8	24.1
Fisheries	35.7	5.9	0.1	0.2	-	-	1.5	4.5	1.0	2.8
Extractive and transforming industries	123.7	20.6	-	-	-	-	18.3	-	1.5	7.5
Construction industry and public works	-	-	1.7	-	-	-	2.9	-
Rural development	9.0	1.5	1.3	4.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	2.3	2.5	3.2
Electric power	-	-	-	-	5.0	-	1.3	0.1
Marketing	5.2	0.9	-	-	-	-	2.7	-	-	0.2
Transport, communications and meteorology	179.1	29.8	17.9	19.7	16.6	16.6	30.1	30.5	25.5	12.4
Housing and urbanization	8.3	1.4	0.9	0.9	2.7	2.7	2.5	1.0	8.2	3.8
Tourism	2.4	0.4	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.2	3.3	0.1
Education and research	70.3	11.7	16.1	19.3	11.0	11.0	15.5	10.8	8.6	9.3
Health	17.0	2.8	1.2	2.0	3.1	3.1	1.7	3.2	2.8	2.8
Total	637.5	106.2	42.6	50.7	42.3	42.3	108.6	72.6	82.4	66.3

Sources: For target: Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, III Plano de Fomento para 1968-1973, vol. III.

For actual expenditure: Portugal, Assembléia Nacional, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, Contas Gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ulamar), Lisbon, 8 March 1972.

For programmed expenditure: Portugal, Presidência do Conselho, III Plano de Fomento, Programa de Execução, for respective years.

G. TIMOR

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1. GENERAL

1. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of Indonesia. It lies between 8° 17' S and 10° 22' S latitude and between 123° 25' EG and 127° 19' EG longitude. The western part of the island is part of the Republic of Indonesia. The total area under Portuguese administration is 18,899 square kilometres which includes the eastern part of the island, with 17,900 square kilometres, the enclave of Oé-Cussi Ambeno, with 850 square kilometres, the island of Ataúro off the north coast, with 144 square kilometres, and the uninhabited island of Jacó off the extreme eastern tip, with 5 square kilometres.

2. According to the provisional results of the 1970 census, the total population of the Territory was 610,541, compared with 517,079 in 1960. There is no recent information on the distribution of the population by ethnic groups. In 1950, there were 568 persons of European origin, 2,022 mestiços and 3,128 Chinese.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Constitutional and political relations with the Central Government

3. Pending the coming into force of the new Overseas Organic Law and the new political and administrative statute of the Territory, there have been no changes affecting the territorial Government and its relations with Portugal.

Territorial Government

4. In January 1972, Lieutenant-Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia was appointed Governor of Timor, replacing Brigadier Valente Pires who had completed a four-year term.

5. As established in 1963, the Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of 14 members, of whom three are ex officio, eight are elected by various interest groups and only three are elected by direct vote. There are no workers' or employers' interests represented in the Legislative Council. The last elections to the Legislative Council were held in December 1967. As in the other Territories, in September 1971, the general elections to the Legislative Council, which normally take place every four years, were postponed pending the publication of the new political and administrative statutes to give effect to the 1971 constitutional reforms. The term of office of all the incumbent members was extended by Decree Law 372/71, of 2 September 1971.

General developments

6. According to the Portuguese press, in April 1971 there had been rumours that a liberation movement had proclaimed the independence of the Portuguese-administered part of Timor. Both the Governor of Timor and the Foreign Minister of Indonesia

have denied the rumours and in a speech to the Legislative Council, the Governor emphasized Portugal's determination to maintain a climate of peace and good neighbourliness with the Republic of Indonesia. There were, however, a number of reports of border incidents at the Indonesian and Portuguese-administered frontiers of the island.

7. According to reports in the Portuguese press, there have been meetings between Indonesian and Portuguese authorities in Dili to discuss facilitating trade between the two parts of Timor.

3. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

External trade

8. Timor's major export crops are coffee, which accounts for about 80 per cent of the total value of exports, copra and rubber. (See table 1 below). In recent years exports of coffee, copra and rubber have declined while imports have risen. In 1970, the Government introduced measures to restrict imports to prevent further deterioration of the Territory's balance of payments a/.

Table 1

Timor: External trade, 1968-1970
(thousand tons and million escudos)a/

Products	Volume			Value		
	1968	1969	1970	1968	1969	1970
A. <u>Main imports</u>						
Total imports	15 641	21 633	19 070	153.3	183.5	207.1
Textiles	611	514	747	31.2	37.5	46.1
Food products, beverages, tobacco	2 452	3 453	3 136	27.2	40.7	34.0
Metals	1 174	955	2 068	13.8	9.5	23.3
Machines and electric equipment	246	289	399	12.3	12.6	21.0
Transportation equipment	191	254	425	9.0	10.1	16.5
Chemical products	371	718	521	13.4	19.4	13.9

a/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 23 (A/8423/Rev.1), chap. VIII, annex I.H, para. 7.

Table 1 (continued)

Products	Volume			Value		
	1968	1969	1970	1968	1969	1970
B. <u>Main exports</u>						
Total exports	4 611	5 469	6 519	55.4	61.5	95.8
Coffee	2 919	2 797	3 811	48.1	50.0	85.3
Copra	1 008	1 889	1 604	3.7	7.3	5.6
Rubber	140	148	123	0.8	0.9	0.8
Beeswax	40	49	34	-	1.0	0.7
Others	504	586	947	2.8	2.3	3.4

Source: Portugal, Anuário Estatístico, vol. II, 1969 and 1970.

a/ 27.25 escudos equals approximately \$US 1.00.

9. The Territory's trade deficit dropped from 122.0 million escudos in 1969 to 111.3 million escudos in 1970. As there was a slight decrease in imports and an increase in exports in 1971, the trade deficit for that year was only 82.1 million escudos.

10. Timor's principal suppliers are Portugal, Macau and Singapore, which in 1970 supplied respectively 54.8, 18.0 and 17.9 per cent of the total value of the Territory's imports. Its major customers are the Netherlands, which took 36 per cent of all its exports in 1970, followed by Denmark (19.3 per cent) and Portugal (14.2 per cent).

Agriculture

11. There is little information available on agricultural activities in the Territory. Published data for 1970 show that although coffee production rose sharply between 1968 and 1969, in 1970 the production of most of the crops again declined (see table 2 below). The only substantial increase occurred in rubber. Data are not yet available for 1971.

Table 2

Timor: Agricultural production, 1968-1970
(metric tons)

	1968	1969	1970
Beans	862	3 252	2 822
Coffee	1 023	5 025	4 906
Copra	911	2 461	2 206
Maize	13 156	15 707	16 941
Manioc	5 074	23 379	18 461
Peanuts	198	1 211	917
Rice	20 682	12 767	12 553
Rubber	44	16	1 114
Sweet potatoes	3 458	18 271	16 159
Tobacco	52	77	91

Source: Portugal, Anuário Estatístico, vol. II, 1969-1970

Mining

12. As reported previously b/ until 1971 there was only one mining concern operating in Timor, the Companhia de Petróleos de Timor, SARL (Timor Oil Corporation) with headquarters in Sydney, Australia. A number of foreign companies are reported to be interested in the mineral resources of the Territory, in particular manganese, copper, chromium, gold and zircon.

13. In January 1972, the Broken Hill Proprietary Company, Ltd. was granted a concession to prospect for all minerals, particularly iron, manganese and chromium, except radioactive minerals, hydrocarbons and diamonds (Decree 3/72 of 4 January 1972). The initial period of the concession is for four years, renewable for three more years. The concessionnaire must actively prospect the area of the concession and spend at least 1 million escudos in the first year, 1.5 million escudos in each of the second and third years, and 2 million escudos in the fourth year.

14. The company has been guaranteed mining rights for an initial period of 30 years, renewable for 20 more years.

15. The company, which must be registered under Portuguese law and have its administrative headquarters in Portuguese territory, was to commence operations

b/ Ibid., para. 9

with an initial capital of 4.8 million escudos. The territorial Government is to receive free of charge 10 per cent of all shares issued by the company until its capital reaches 50 million escudos, after which it will be entitled to purchase 10 per cent of the new shares at par.

16. The Territory is to receive from the concessionnaire 50 per cent of the net profits from the concession. The company is required to pay to the Overseas Mining Fund a sum of 200,000 escudos from the date of the signature of the contract until the year of the first demarcation of an area for exploitation; thereafter, the company will pay 300,000 escudos a year until it starts mining production, and, thereafter, a sum of 450,000 escudos annually.

17. The company is exempt from all taxes and levies (taxes, impostos e contribuições) whether national, territorial or local, in respect of immovable property and installations used for prospecting and mining operations; it is also exempted from all taxes and levies on its shares, capital or bonds already issued or to be issued, and on profits or reserves distributed or derived therefrom. Further, the company is exempt from all import duties on equipment, machinery, vehicles, airplanes and other material required for its work, except the stamp tax and an imposto estatístico (statistical tax) of one per thousand ad valorem.

18. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company, Ltd., was registered in 1885 in Victoria, Australia. The company and its subsidiaries are involved in the iron and steel industry; oil and natural gas exploration and production; iron ore and manganese mining; limestone and dolomite quarrying; shipbuilding and bulk carrier operations. Along with its subsidiaries, it constitutes the largest industrial organization in Australia and is responsible for virtually the entire iron and steel industry of that country.

19. In June 1972, it was reported that the Timor Oil Company had granted Amalgamated Petroleum NL of Australia and International Oils Exploration NL a 160-square mile block situated at Betano, on the south coast of Timor. The two companies will, by the drilling of two wells, earn a 50 per cent interest in the block, and this interest may be converted to a 5 per cent working interest in the whole of Timor's concession area.

20. Apart from the concession granted to the Broken Hill Proprietary Company, information is not yet available on the outcome of the requests for concessions for mineral prospecting in Timor made by other Australian companies and by one from the United States of America, which were mentioned by the Governor of Timor in May 1971.

Industry

21. There are few industries in Timor apart from the processing of rice for local consumption and of coffee for export. There are some small factories producing, among other things, soap, pottery and soft drinks.

22. In October 1971, the Governor announced the establishment of two industrial units: a factory for the extraction and processing of crude oils and a textile complex. Both were still under construction in 1971.

Transport and communications

23. In March 1972, the Government announced a new programme for the development of Timor's transport and communications system at a cost of 350 million escudos. The programme, which is scheduled to be completed in five years, includes the improvement and extension of the airports at Dili, Suai, Miliana, Viqueque and Lospalos, which are to be equipped with runways of 1,200 to 1,500 metres in length. The airports of Oé-Cussi and Ataúro are already being expanded.
24. Road improvement will include the construction of 405 kilometres of asphalt road linking Dili to Same, Maliana and Bacau, which is the site of the Territory's international airport.
25. In March 1972, the automatic central telephone exchange was inaugurated in Dili.

Public finance

26. Actual revenue and expenditure for 1968-1970 are shown in table 3 below. In 1970, actual expenditure, at 202.6 million escudos, was 15 per cent higher than in 1969 and 28 per cent higher than in 1968. The major sources of revenue were consigned receipts, which rose from 14.7 million escudos in 1968 to 56.8 million escudos in 1970.

Table 3.

Timor: Public finance, 1968-1970
(million escudos)

A. Revenue

	<u>Actual</u>		
	1968	1969	1970
<u>Total</u>	134.2	136.0	221.0
<u>Ordinary revenue</u>	110.9	110.5	170.0
Direct taxes	33.3	34.4	36.1
Indirect taxes	15.7	17.1	22.7
Industries under special régime	7.0	6.7	10.1
Income from services	24.9	26.3	32.2
Income from State and other industries	10.2	11.0	7.2
Income from shares	2.0	1.0	-
Refunds	3.1	3.2	4.9
Consigned receipts	14.7	10.8	56.8
<u>Extraordinary revenue</u>	23.3	25.5	51.0

Source: Portugal, Anuário Estatístico, vol. II, 1969-1970.

Table 3 (continued)

B. Expenditure

	Actual		
	1968	1969	1970
<u>Total</u>	148.6	170.4	202.6
<u>Ordinary expenditure</u>	94.6	115.3	146.2
Public debt	0.9	0.6	1.4
Government	0.9	1.1	0.9
Pensions	2.9	3.0	3.1
General administration	35.6	44.8	50.2
Treasury	4.6	5.0	5.8
Justice	0.9	1.0	1.1
Development services	17.2	27.3	41.2
Military services	5.4	5.1	5.3
Naval services	0.9	3.5	4.6
General expenditures	25.0	23.7	32.3
Other	0.3	0.2	0.3
<u>Extraordinary expenditure</u>	54.0	55.1	56.4
Third National Development Plan	46.3	44.7	45.0
Other	7.7	10.4	11.4

Source: Portugal, Anuário Estatístico, vol. II, 1969-1970.

27. At 1970, the Territory's public debt amounted to 682.9 million escudos, as follows: 26 million escudos in loans; 638.9 million escudos in subsidies from the Portuguese Government; and 18 million escudos from a bank loan to various government agencies as follows: the Caixa de Crédito Agrícola, 10 million escudos; Fundo de Habitações Económicas, 2 million escudos; and Dili's Municipal Council, 6 million escudos.

Implementation of the Third National Development Plan,
1968-1973

28. Authorized expenditure under the Third National Development Plan for 1969 and 1970 represented 77.9 per cent and 95.6 per cent, respectively, of the average annual targets over the six-year period. Actual expenditures, however, were much

lower, amounting to only 47.9 and 48.2 per cent, respectively, of the envisaged targets. For 1971, only 48.3 per cent of the target had been authorized by the end of the year.

29. As shown in table 4 below, expenditures on transport and communications, agriculture, housing and education accounted for 82 per cent of the total expenditures in 1969 and 77.9 per cent in 1970. The largest allocation was for the improvement of roads, amounting to 8.3 million escudos in 1969 and 9.2 million escudos in 1970.

30. Almost all the expenditures under the Development Plan are financed by loans from Portugal, a fact which accounts in the large part for the Territory's public debt.

Table 4
Timor: Implementation of the Third National
Development Plan, 1968-1973
(million escudos)

	<u>Actual expenditure</u>		<u>Authorized</u>		
	1969	1970	1969	1970	1971
Agriculture	8.3	5.3	10.0	8.5	1.3
Fisheries	0.4	0.4	1.6	1.5	0.2
Electric power	0.5	1.2	2.6	3.7	0.9
Industries	0.8	0.0	3.1	1.2	2.4
Marketing	0.01	-	0.7	0.2	-
Transport and communications	17.2	16.8	28.0	34.6	22.1
Tourism	1.7	1.6	1.9	1.8	0.2
Housing	5.9	6.5	7.8	10.3	3.5
Rural development	1.4	3.4	1.7	4.5	1.1
Education	5.4	6.7	9.3	14.9	8.6
Health and assistance	3.1	3.1	6.1	8.1	4.8
Total	44.7	45.0	72.8	89.3	45.1

Source: Portugal, Diário das Sessões, Suplemento ao No. 164, Contas gerais do Estado de 1970 (Ultramar); Portugal, Diário do Governo, Portaria 408/71 of 3 August 1971.

4. EDUCATION

31. Detailed school statistics are not yet available for the academic year 1969/70. The latest statistics available are for the school year 1968/69 and have already been reported c/.

32. According to a statement by the Governor, there was an increase of 60 per cent in the pupils at school in Timor in the period 1968-1971. School enrolment is reported at present to be almost 40 per cent of those of school age. The Government expects enrolment of all children of school age by 1980.

c/ Ibid., paras. 16-17.

ANNEX III*

LETTER DATED 25 MARCH 1972 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF PORTUGAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions of my Government, I have the honour to communicate to you the following:

1. Various reports have reached the Portuguese Government indicating that the Special Committee of 24 purports to dispatch from New York a mission constituted by three of its members to visit so-called "liberated areas" of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces, accepting an invitation presumed to have been extended to it by some of the petitioners which that "Ad Hoc" Committee agreed to receive and to hear.

2. Regarding this decision of the Special Committee of 24, taken on the basis of General Assembly resolution 2795 (XXVI), against which the delegation of Portugal expressed opposition at the proper time, the Portuguese Government wishes to formulate the following considerations:

3. During the sixteenth regular session of the General Assembly, the delegation of Portugal placed on record the strongest reservations concerning the setting up of the Special Committee on Decolonization, and concerning the unilateral character of its mandate, which, in the view of the Portuguese Government, constitutes a clear violation of the United Nations Charter.

4. Nothing has taken place since that time till today that could induce the Portuguese Government to alter the position taken on that occasion. That position was furthermore in consonance with the interpretation given to Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations up to then, which was for that reason the current accepted doctrine of the United Nations at the time of Portugal's admission to the membership of the Organization. There has been, in the meantime, no constitutional change in Portugal, affecting the extent and the make-up of its national territory.

5. On the other hand, the activities of the above-mentioned Special Committee, which has transformed itself into a demagogic and irresponsible forum with its constant incitements to illegality and to violence, went a long way, over the years, to reinforce the conviction of the Portuguese Government that nothing useful could result from that organ or from any contact or collaboration with it. This is also the conclusion reached by various highly responsible Governments which decided to abandon participation in its work.

* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/398.

6. The decision to visit the said "liberated areas" of the Portuguese Overseas Provinces; constitutes yet another act of sheer propaganda which can only serve to feed the illusion of certain interested political sectors which refuse to admit that the terrorist organizations do not control any part of Portuguese territory.

7. Entry into the territory of a State Member of the United Nations, without the consent of the legally constituted Government, and in answer to a pseudo "invitation" made by groups having no status or authority, cannot but be construed as an act calculated to violate all rules of international law. A move of this nature cannot be effected save in the form of an illegal entry without documentation, with its participants concealing themselves in order to evade the normal action of authorities functioning to ensure the sovereignty of that Member State, which would thus see its rights violated with the knowledge and with the consent of the world Organization to which it also belongs.

8. Furthermore, a move of this nature can result in consequences in regard to which the Portuguese Government wishes to declare forthwith and in the most formal manner, that it declines all responsibility. Only individuals deciding upon and accepting participation in illegal acts must bear responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

9. In these circumstances, the Portuguese Government cannot refrain from calling the attention of Your Excellency to the grave nature of the position taken by the Special Committee of 24, and from lodging its most vehement protest against the proposed violation of Portugal's sovereignty, and of the most rudimentary principles designed to regulate relations among nations, contained in such a decision.

10. I shall appreciate it if Your Excellency directs this letter to be circulated as an official document of the United Nations.

(Signed) António PATRICIO
Permanent Representative of Portugal
to the United Nations

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