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Proposed programme budget for 2024

Proposed programme budget for 2024

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Estimates in respect of special political missions

Second report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the proposed programme budget for 2024

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Special political missions

Thematic cluster I

Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Thematic cluster II

Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms

Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Panel of Experts on Libya

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

Panel of Experts on Yemen

Panel of Experts on South Sudan

Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#)

Implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Panel of Experts on Mali

Panel of Experts on Somalia

Panel of Experts on Haiti

Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD)

Thematic cluster III**Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions**

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)

United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA)

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH)

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/78/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#)). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 11 August 2023.

2. The Secretary-General, in addendum 1 to section 3, Political affairs, of his report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)), provides an overview of the proposed resource requirements for 2024 for 39 special political missions and related cross-cutting issues. Detailed information in respect of each special political mission is contained in five addenda to section 3 of the proposed programme budget.¹ The addenda cover the specific requirements for thematic clusters I to III, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

3. The resource requirements of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar (cluster I), whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly, are included in the report of the Secretary-General under cluster I, in order to consolidate the overall resource requirements for all special political missions, while the mandate of the Office will be brought to the attention of the Assembly, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

4. In the present report, the Advisory Committee addresses issues of a cross-cutting nature pertaining to special political missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2024, while its specific comments and recommendations relating to the budget proposals for thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI are presented in separate related reports.²

Status of mission mandates

5. The mandate status of the 39 missions for which resource requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2024 are contained in his report ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 6). Taking into account recent decisions on mandate extensions by the Security Council, the status of the mandates of the missions are as follows:

- (a) 12 missions have open-ended mandates;
- (b) 16 missions have mandates extended into 2024 or later;
- (c) 11 missions have mandates that are anticipated to be renewed or extended into 2024 or later.

Budgeting for special political missions

6. The Advisory Committee recalls that, with the change from the biennial to the annual programme budget (see [A/74/7/Add.1](#), paras. 6–10), the total resource requirements of special political missions are now derived from the actual resource estimates of the individual missions (contained in addenda 2–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2024), which are included within the overall resource level proposed for 2024 by the Secretary-General (see [A/78/6 \(Introduction\)](#)).

7. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 (see [A/78/7](#), chap. I), the Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations, including on the budget methodology, format and presentation, as well as on policy matters, which

¹ [A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#), [A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.3](#), [A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), [A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.5](#) and [A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.6](#).

² [A/78/7/Add.2](#), [A/78/7/Add.3](#), [A/78/7/Add.4](#), [A/78/7/Add.5](#) and [A/78/7/Add.6](#).

also apply to the reports of the Secretary-General on the estimates in respect of special political missions (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1–6).

II. Overview of resource requirements for 2024

A. Budget performance for 2022 and 2023

8. Total expenditure for 2022 amounted to \$728,097,800 (or 98.9 per cent) against the approved resources of \$736,542,600 for 41 special political missions (39 continuing missions and adjustments for 2 discontinued missions) (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 4). Expenditure for the 39 continuing missions amounted to \$726,287,400 (or 98.9 per cent) against the provision of \$734,722,400 for the year, with underexpenditure amounting to \$8,435,000 (or 1.1 per cent). Information on expenditure for 2022, by mission and by major component, is provided in tables 4 and 5 of the report of the Secretary-General (ibid.).

9. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee received information on the budget performance for the first six months of 2023 for the 39 special political missions. As at 30 June 2023, expenditure amounted to \$422,761,500 (or 55.2 per cent) against the appropriation of \$766,193,900 for the period. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on the actual budget performance, including information by mission and by major component, will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

B. Resource requirements for 2024

10. The Advisory Committee received, upon request, an update to table 3 of the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions (A/78/6 (Sect.3)/Add.1), including information on the appropriation for 2022, and expenditure for 2022 and as at 30 June 2023 (see table 1 below).

Table 1
Overview of financial resources by cluster

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2022		2023		2024	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation ^a	Expenditure (as at 30 June)	Requirements	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)-(3)	(7)=(6)/(3)
Cluster I	49 899.0	43 410.8	49 604.0	23 387.5	47 873.3	(1 730.7)	(3.5)
Cluster II	61 570.9	58 330.6	64 069.9	34 864.7	66 470.4	2 400.5	3.7
Cluster III	394 189.0	392 200.9	423 130.2	242 731.3	427 911.9	4 781.7	1.1
UNAMA	131 390.3	134 130.3	132 479.2	69 152.7	132 479.4	0.2	0
UNAMI	97 673.2	98 214.8	96 910.6	52 625.3	98 462.4	1 551.8	1.6
Subtotal (net of staff assessment)	734 722.4	726 287.4	766 193.9	422 761.5	773 197.4	7 003.5	0.9
Provision for the share of special political missions for the Regional Service Centre	1 820.2	1 820.2	2 141.1	2 141.1	2 128.8	(12.3)	(0.6)
Total (net of staff assessment)	736 542.6	728 107.6	768 335.0	424 902.6	775 326.2	6 991.2	0.9

^a The 2023 appropriation of \$768,335,000 includes an amount of \$766,193,900 for the 39 continuing special political missions authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, and an amount of \$2,141,100 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, for 2023, as approved by the General Assembly in resolution 77/263 A (sect. V, para. 3).

11. The overall resource requirements proposed for 39 special political missions for 2024 amount to \$775,326,200 net, including resources in an amount of \$773,197,400 for the missions and an estimated provision of \$2,128,800 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda (see para. 14 below).

12. The requirements of \$773,197,400 for the 39 continuing missions represent an increase of \$7,003,500 (or 0.9 per cent), compared with the resources of \$766,193,900 approved for those missions for 2023. The proposal reflects an increase under civilian personnel (\$8,169,600), offset in part by decreases under military and police personnel (\$1,162,000) and operational costs (\$4,100). The summary of requirements by cluster, by mission and by major component are presented in tables 3 to 5 of the report of the Secretary-General. Resource changes for 2024 by thematic cluster are explained in paragraphs 127 to 131 of the report, with an analysis of variances by mission provided in table 6 of the report.

13. In addition, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Security Council, in its resolutions [2692 \(2023\)](#) and [2694 \(2023\)](#) expanded the mandates of BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, respectively. Consequently, additional resources under a commitment authority for 2023 was requested for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and an amount not exceeding \$3,703,400 was concurred by the Committee. The Committee was informed that a report of the Secretary-General on the revised estimates for 2024 for the two missions would be submitted to the General Assembly during the main part of its seventy-eighth session. **The Advisory Committee notes that, taking into account the additional resources requested under the commitment authority for 2023 for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and revised estimates for 2024 for BINUH and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, the overall resource requirement levels for 2023 and 2024 would increase and that an analysis of variances for the approved resources for 2023 and those proposed for 2024, at this stage, is subject to change.**

14. The report of the Secretary-General contains an estimated provision of \$2,128,800 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, for the 2023/24 peacekeeping financial period, reflecting a decrease of \$12,300 (or 0.6 per cent), attributable mainly to the decrease in the share of special political missions in the cost of the Centre (from 5.1 per cent in the 2022/23 period to 4.9 per cent in the 2023/24 period), offset in part by an increase in the proposed budget for the Centre of \$0.6 million or 1.5 per cent compared with the 2022/23 period ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 132). A total of nine Africa-based special political missions will continue to receive support from the Centre in 2024 (*ibid.*, para. 54). The Secretary-General indicates that the estimated provision of \$2,128,800 is subject to a final adjustment to be made in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly in the context of the budget of the Regional Service Centre for the 2023/24 peacekeeping financial period (*ibid.*, para 55). **The Advisory Committee notes that the General Assembly, in its resolution [77/306](#) on the financing of the Centre, decided that the share of the client special political missions for 2024 amounts to \$2,128,800, which is the same amount proposed in the report of the Secretary-General.**

Staffing requirements for 2024

15. The proposed resources of \$472,419,600 for 2024 for civilian personnel represent an increase of \$8,169,600 (or 1.8 per cent), compared with the appropriation for 2023 (see para. 13 above). The number of civilian personnel proposed for 2024 reflects an overall increase of 35 positions (from 4,648 for 2023 to 4,683 for 2024), representing a total reduction of 13 positions (2 in cluster I, 3 in cluster II, 7 in

UNAMA and 1 in UNAMI), offset in part by a total increase of 48 positions (3 in cluster I, 8 in cluster II, 33 in cluster III, 2 in UNAMA and 2 in UNAMI) (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 7). In terms of changes by staff category, the abolishment of 13 positions include 11 international and 2 national, while the 48 new positions reflect 24 international, 14 national and 10 United Nations Volunteers (7 international and 3 national) (ibid., table 8).

16. A breakdown of the proposed changes in civilian positions for 2024 is provided in annex XX to the report of the Secretary-General, while information on the staffing requirements for each mission is contained in table 8 of the report. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the total number of Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General of the missions, by contract type, regional group, gender and incumbency status (see annex I to the present report). The comments and recommendations of the Committee on the proposed staffing requirements for individual missions are contained in its related reports (A/78/7/Add.2, A/78/7/Add.3, A/78/7/Add.4, A/78/7/Add.5 and A/78/7/Add.6).

Nationalization of positions

17. The Secretary-General reports that special political missions have made steady progress in the nationalization of positions in recent years, with 12 positions nationalized in 2016, 1 in 2017, 2 in 2018, 5 in 2019, 7 in 2020, 4 in 2021, 19 in 2022 and 9 in 2023. For 2024, a total of 5 positions are proposed for nationalization, as follows: 3 positions in the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria and 2 in UNITAD (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 63).

18. The Secretary-General indicates that, pursuant to the issuance of the guide on planning nationalization of the workforce, the Department of Operational Support continues to promote and encourage the nationalization of international positions through engagement with client entities. In addition, the Department is in the process of developing a campaign to improve nationalization. In addition, during the planning and budget preparation process, efforts were also made to ensure that national positions were included, to the greatest extent possible, in the staffing proposals of missions (ibid., paras. 62 and 64). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, given the diversity of demand and varying availability of local supply from one duty station to another, each mission's potential to nationalize functions differed. However, each mission set a goal to review its workforce on at least an annual basis to ensure it was aligned to the requirements of its mandate and goals. The Committee was also provided information on the criteria for conversion from international to national positions.

19. **The Advisory Committee has recognized the progress made in the nationalization of positions in special political missions and trusts that continued efforts will be made. The Committee recalls that, further to its resolutions 61/276 and 66/264, the General Assembly, in its resolution 74/263, requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to promote the nationalization of positions, whenever appropriate, as well as to build local capacity within the special political missions and to report thereon in the context of future budget submissions (A/77/7/Add.1, para. 28).** The Committee makes comments and recommendations on the nationalization of positions with respect to individual missions in its related reports (see A/78/7/Add.2, A/78/7/Add.3, A/78/7/Add.4, A/78/7/Add.5 and A/78/7/Add.6).

Vacant positions

20. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that, since the easing of recruitment restrictions in May 2021, special political missions have increased efforts to fill vacant posts as expeditiously as possible, as recommended by the Advisory

Committee and requested by the General Assembly. In addition, during the preparation of the 2024 budget proposals, the Field Operations Finance Division of the Department provided guidance to all missions to take the opportunity to critically review long-vacant positions (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 117 and 118).

21. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 30 June 2023, a total of 695 positions were vacant of all special political missions (see table 2 below), of which 120 had been vacant for two years or longer, as follows: cluster I (17), cluster III (84, including 50 at UNITAMS), UNAMA (11) and UNAMI (8). The Committee notes that, while the number of long-vacant positions decreased for some missions, compared with one year ago (from 31 to 11 for UNAMI and from 103 to 84 for cluster III overall), UNITAMS had 50 long-vacant positions, which represents 14.2 per cent of the Mission's staffing of 353 approved for 2023. Information on all posts vacant for more than two years is included in the supplementary information under each thematic cluster, which details the vacancy start dates, level and functional title, organizational unit and the current recruitment status, with justification for the retention of long-vacant posts (*ibid.*, para. 119).

Table 2
Summary of vacant positions as of 30 June 2023

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Vacant positions as of 30 June 2023</i>
Cluster I	59
Cluster II	37
Cluster III	403
UNAMA	115
UNAMI	81
Total	695

22. The Advisory Committee was also provided with information on the average recruitment days experienced by the special political missions (see table 3 below).

Table 3
Average recruitment days by position type in 2022

<i>Position type</i>	<i>Level</i>	<i>Average days for recruitment</i>
International staff	D-1	152
International staff	P-5	214
International staff	P-4	227
International staff	P-3	353
Field Service	FS	257
National Professional Officers	NPO	223
Local level staff	LL	276

23. The Advisory Committee reiterates that all vacant positions should be filled expeditiously and trusts that updated information on the recruitment status of all vacant positions will be provided to the General Assembly during the consideration of the present report and related reports on special political missions, as well as in the next budget submission (A/77/7/Add.1, para. 29). The Committee also reiterates its recommendation that the General Assembly request

the Secretary-General to ensure that more detailed justification for the retention of long-vacant posts for 24 months or longer or a proposal for their repurposing or abolishment is systematically provided in future budget submissions (see [A/77/7, para. 49](#)). The Committee discusses the matter further with respect to individual missions in its related reports ([A/78/7/Add.2](#), [A/78/7/Add.3](#), [A/78/7/Add.4](#), [A/78/7/Add.5](#) and [A/78/7/Add.6](#)) and in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#), chap. I, para. 44).

Vacancy rates

24. Information on vacancy rates by mission is provided in annex XVII to the report of the Secretary-General, including actual average rates for 2022, budgeted and actual rates as at 31 March 2023, and proposed rates for 2024. The Advisory Committee enquired and received an updated annex XVII, including information on actual vacancy rates as at 31 December 2022. It is indicated in the report that the Secretariat standardized the methodology for the proposed vacancy rates for special political missions for 2024 by taking the lower of the two rates (the 12-month average vacancy rate in 2022 and the actual vacancy rate as at 31 March 2023). **The Advisory Committee notes the standardization in the budgeting of vacancy rates for the special political missions for 2024.** The Committee discusses the matter further in chapter I of its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#), para. 48).

Special post allowance

25. Information on positions vacant and encumbered through special post allowances for more than one year is included in the supplementary information for each thematic cluster. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 (see [A/78/7](#), chap I), the Advisory Committee discusses the granting of special post allowance over extended periods, which, as a policy matter, applies to the special political missions.

Budgeting for the positions of mine action programme managers in the field and mine action activities

26. The Advisory Committee recalls that, for the four field-based special political missions (UNSOM, UNSMIL, UNMHA and UNITAMS), mine action programme managers³ who were previously under United Nations Office for Project Services contracts have been established on the staffing tables of the respective missions since 2022, in response to the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the Board of Auditors, and in order to strengthen its programme delivery and oversight (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 27).

27. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on mine action resources proposed for 2024, by staff (see table 4 below) and by resource component (see table 5 below). In addition, the Committee was also provided information on budgeted and actual resources for 2022 to 2024 for mine action.

³ 1 D-1 in UNSOM, 1 P-5 in UNSMIL, 1 P-4 in United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and 1 P-4 in UNITAMS.

Table 4
Proposed staff for mine action in 2024

Mission	General temporary assistance positions		
	Mine action		
	D-1	P-5	P-4
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia ^a	1	–	–
United Nations Support Mission in Libya ^a	–	1	–
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement ^a	–	–	1
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan ^a	–	–	1
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan ^b	–	1	–
Total	1	2	2

^a These positions were approved as general temporary assistance by the General Assembly in its resolution 76/246, section X, in which the Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee contained in A/76/7/Add.1, para. 29.

^b The P-5 position was approved as general temporary assistance by the General Assembly in its resolution 77/4, in which the Assembly endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee contained in A/76/7/Add.41, para. 21.

Table 5
Proposed resources for mine action components in 2024

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	Civilian personnel Chief mine action programme posts	Other supplies, services and equipment – mine detection and mine clearing services	Total budget
UNSOM	268.7	865.1	1 133.8
UNSMIL	191.5	1 595.4	1 786.9
UNMHA	196.5	–	196.5
UNITAMS	187.7	1 852.0	2 039.7
UNAMA	258.1	147.6	405.7
Total	1 102.5	4 460.1	5 562.6

28. With respect to the independent review of the mine action delivery model, the Advisory Committee recalls that, in its decision 77/548 C, the General Assembly decided to defer, until the second part of its resumed seventy-eighth session, consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the summary of the findings and recommendations of the independent review of the delivery model of the Mine Action Service (A/77/747) and the related report of the Committee (A/77/816).

Operational costs for 2024

29. The proposed resources under operational costs amount to \$264,899,200 for 2024, representing a decrease of \$4,100, compared with the provision for 2023 (see also para. 12 above). The Advisory Committee discusses cross-cutting issues in the present section, and its specific comments and recommendations on proposed requirements under operational costs for 2024 for individual missions are provided in its related reports (A/78/7/Add.2, A/78/7/Add.3, A/78/7/Add.4, A/78/7/Add.5 and A/78/7/Add.6).

30. The Advisory Committee received, upon request, an update to table 5 of the report of the Secretary-General, with information on the appropriation for 2022 and 2023, and on expenditures for 2022 and 2023 as at 30 June, respectively (see table 6 below).

Table 6

Operational costs

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2022		2023		2024	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	January–June expenditure	Requirement	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)-(3)	(7) = (6)/(3)
Operational costs							
1. Experts	13 450.5	11 320.2	14 240.9	10 468.5	14 790.1	549.2	3.9
2. Consultants and consulting services	2 825.3	2 580.5	3 031.9	968.0	3 035.9	4.0	0.1
3. Official travel	13 341.2	13 968.0	13 988.8	8 685.1	14 408.8	420.0	3.0
4. Facilities and infrastructure	98 933.8	98 036.7	100 140.4	64 998.8	98 868.4	(1 272.0)	(1.3)
5. Ground transportation	8 778.7	11 293.7	9 558.3	6 252.4	10 443.5	885.2	9.3
6. Air operations	58 128.8	46 751.8	55 440.0	34 839.5	58 196.5	2 756.5	5.0
7. Marine operations	382.9	165.7	298.9	85.3	111.8	(187.1)	(62.6)
8. Communications and information technology	34 128.8	38 035.8	36 126.7	17 147.7	36 030.0	(96.7)	(0.3)
9. Medical	9 311.6	6 605.0	9 381.7	2 399.9	5 933.1	(3 448.6)	(36.8)
10. Other supplies, services and equipment	23 698.5	18 725.4	22 495.7	13 094.4	22 781.1	285.4	1.3
11. Quick impact projects	–	–	200.0	–	300.0	100.0	50.0
Total, operational costs	262 980.1	247 482.8	264 903.3	158 939.5	264 899.2	(4.1)	(0.0)

Official travel and compliance with the policy for advance booking of air travel

31. The overall resources proposed for official travel for 2024 amount to \$14,408,800, representing an increase of \$420,000 (or 3 per cent), compared with the approved resources for 2023 (see also para. 13 above). The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed increases are mostly reflected under cluster III, representing an increase of \$366,100 (or 5 per cent) for 7 of the 11 missions. Information on the proposed official travel resources for 2024, with explanations of variance by mission and cluster, is contained in annex XV to the report of the Secretary-General. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its view that travel for workshops, conferences or meetings should be kept to a minimum and more use should be made of virtual meetings and online training tools (see A/77/7/Add.1, para. 37).** The Committee makes specific comments and recommendations relating to travel resources for individual missions in its related reports (A/78/7/Add.2–6).

32. Information on the annual rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy by special political mission is contained in annex XVI to the report of the Secretary-General. It is indicated therein that annex XVI has been enhanced to indicate missions whose compliance rate in 2022 improved over the prior period. In addition, the overall composite average compliance rate of all special political missions has also been included at the bottom of the table, to provide a holistic view (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 122 (g)). It is also indicated in the report that, while further efforts are still needed, there has been a noticeable improvement in 2022, as the overall compliance rate for all missions increased from 19 per cent in 2018 to 27 per cent in 2022 (ibid., para. 101). The Advisory Committee notes from annex XVI that, for 2022, 12 missions reached compliance rates of 50 per cent or higher,

compared with 6 for 2021, 9 for 2020 and 5 for 2019. The Committee also notes from the annex that 24 missions improved their compliance rates during 2022, 13 missions' compliance rates decreased and the rates for 1 mission remained the same.

33. The Advisory Committee has discussed the low rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy by special political missions over the years (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 38). **While noting the improvements made in the compliance rates during 2022 by 24 missions with their overall compliance rates and 12 missions reaching compliance rates of 50 per cent or higher, the Advisory Committee shares the view expressed in the report of the Secretary-General that further efforts are still needed to improve the compliance rates by the special political missions. The Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution 74/262, expressed concern at the low rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive and requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to further enhance the rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive across all travel categories, taking into account the patterns and nature of official travel and the reasons for non-compliance by each department, office and field mission (ibid., para. 39).**

Air operations

34. The proposed resource requirements for air operations amount to \$58,196,500 for 2024, reflecting an overall increase of \$2,756,500 (or 5 per cent), compared with the provision approved for 2023 (see also para. 13 above). The proposed increase is mainly attributable to two factors, namely, increased requirements for the cost of rental of aircraft in three mission and higher fuel costs for four missions, as explained in paragraph 92 of the report. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee also received information on budgeted and actual flight hours for the period from 2018 to 2024.

35. In annex IX to his report, the Secretary-General provides information on air operations resources and flight hours, by mission, from 2022 to 2024. Information on special flights for 2022 and 2023, with justifications, by mission, as well as estimates for 2024, are contained in annex X to the report. Of the 14 missions with air operations resources proposed for 2024, 8 missions account for 96.9 per cent of the overall resource requirements (UNOWAS, UNSOM, UNSMIL, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNMHA, UNITAMS, UNAMA and UNAMI). Of the resource proposed for 2024, five missions reflect increased requirements (UNSOM, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNMHA, UNAMA and UNAMI), while another five missions propose reduced resources (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNOWAS, the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, UNOCA and UNSMIL). The proposed resources for four missions remain unchanged for 2024 (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, UNITAD and UNITAMS).

36. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the planning process under air operations comprised two streams: logistical and military planning. The mission's mandate led to a mission concept of operations that demanded a certain tempo of the movement of cargo and passengers by air, including taking into account historical consumption patterns. That was reviewed on a periodic basis in every mission. The Department of Operational Support issued supply chain planning business guidance to enable the development of client entities' supply chain plans in support of their mandates. Such guidance was developed by category management teams, including in the business area of aviation and transportation, covering airfield and air operations support, commercial air services, military aviation and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, on the basis of leading business practices, market research and on the analysis of clients' requirements. **The Advisory**

Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to ensure that the air fleets in the missions are used in the most effective and efficient manner and that consideration is given to any possibility of inter-mission cooperation, including with peacekeeping missions, and provide an update in the next budget submission (see also [A/78/7/Add.4](#), para. 72).

Fuel costs

37. It is indicated that, with respect to fuel costs, the average price per litre for the different types of fuel in the six-month period from October 2022 to March 2023 has been used as the basis for calculating the provisions for fuel costs under the respective budget classes for 2024 ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 113). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that this was similar to the approach taken for estimating fuel costs for peacekeeping operations for 2023/24 (the weighted average prices from July to December 2022 was used in the budget proposals, and an update using the latest 6-month average price from November 2022 to April 2023 was provided to the Fifth Committee as requested). It was indicated to the Advisory Committee that the Secretariat planned to provide updated fuel costs, to be based on the 6 months up to October 2023, to the Fifth Committee at the time of its consideration of the proposed budgets for special political missions for 2024. The Advisory Committee was also provided with a consolidated table with information on petrol, oil and lubricants by mission for 2023 and 2024 (see annex II below). The Committee notes from the table that the proposed total resources under petrol, oil and lubricants amount to \$20,837,600 (for 16,627,232 litres) for 2024, compared with the amount of \$20,476,200 (for 18,640,254 litres) approved for 2023. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated fuel costs will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the present report.**

Quick-impact projects

38. A provision of \$300,000 is proposed for 2024 under quick-impact projects for UNMHA, an increase of \$100,000 compared with the provision for 2023, to engage communities on both sides of the conflict (*ibid.*, tables 5 and 6). The Advisory Committee recalls that it was informed that resources for quick-impact projects had previously been approved as part of the budgets and deliverables of special political missions, notably UNAMA and UNAMI in 2012 and 2013 ([A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 50). **The Advisory Committee trusts that special political missions will build on the most impactful projects to plan for quick impact projects in order to enhance the engagement with the local communities, as appropriate, and provide an update in the next budget submission.**

III. General observations and recommendations

Backstopping support to special political missions at Headquarters

39. Information concerning the lead departments and backstopping support positions at Headquarters funded from special political mission budgets continues to be provided in annexes II and III to the report of the Secretary-General ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)). A total of 49 backstopping positions are proposed for 2024, which is the same number approved for 2023. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the number of missions had not increased significantly over the past 10 years: there were 35 special political missions in 2013, compared with 39 in 2023. The Committee also received information on backstopping positions in an organizational chart at the unit level.

40. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs leads and provides substantive backstopping to 35 of the 39 special political missions.⁴ It is indicated that the missions also benefit from support provided by Headquarters by the Department of Operational Support (operational support and advisory services in the areas of human resources and supply chain management), the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (budgetary and financial services, asset and property management policy support and assistance with accountability systems) and the Office of Information and Communications Technology (information technology support) (*ibid.*, paras. 81 and 82).

41. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its expectation that consolidated information on backstopping positions at Headquarters will continue to be provided in future budget submissions. The Committee trusts that the existing backstopping positions at Headquarters will be reviewed annually, on the basis of workload analysis, in order to realign the capacities when changes in the mandates of the missions occur with a view to achieving more efficiency in backstopping support (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 53).** The Committee discusses workforce planning, staffing reviews and workload analysis in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 (see [A/78/7](#), chap. I).

Support services provided by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda and the Kuwait Joint Support Office

42. Information on the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the Kuwait Joint Support Office for UNAMA and UNAMI is provided in paragraphs 53 to 59 of the report of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General indicates that, as the Secretariat has taken note of the decisions and comments (see para. 44 below), no proposals are made in the 2024 budget with respect to the staffing arrangement of the Kuwait Joint Support Office ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 59). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as the Support Office was a service provider of the Department of Operational Support, the delegation of authorities for its staff with any related accountability measures was issued from the Head of the Department.

43. Advisory Committee recalls that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution [73/279 A](#), the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe has expanded its full-service coverage to all special political missions based in Africa (nine for 2023 and 2024) pending the approval and implementation of a global service delivery model (see also [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 15).

44. The Advisory Committee further recalls that, for the Kuwait Joint Support Office, it recommended against the proposed redistribution of staffing positions in the Support Office in the missions concerned for 2023 (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 58), which was endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution [77/263](#). Moreover, the Committee recalls that a similar staffing redistribution proposal for 2019 was not approved by the Assembly in resolution [73/279 A](#) (*ibid.*). It had been confirmed to the Committee that the Kuwait Joint Support Office would have been affected by the potential introduction of the global service delivery model had it been approved, since that arrangement would likely have subsumed most or all of the functions carried out by the Support Office (*ibid.*, para. 61).

45. In addition, the Advisory Committee has noted that, as a shared service centre established by the General Assembly, the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe currently has 17 client entities limited to Africa, while the Kuwait Joint Support

⁴ The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, as a Headquarters-based office, does not have a lead department, and UNITAD does not have a lead department at Headquarters given its unique mandate and orientation ([A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 52).

Office, which was established by the Secretariat initially for UNAMI and UNAMA only, has become a service provider to support a total of 18 client missions⁵ across regions covering Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Latin America and Caribbean, as designated by the Secretariat. **The Advisory Committee notes the continued lack of clear criteria in the designation of service providers to peacekeeping and special political missions by the Secretariat (see A/77/7/Add.1, para. 59).**

46. The Advisory Committee has discussed the provision of support services to the special political missions by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the Kuwait Joint Support Office over the years (see A/77/7/Add.1, paras. 54–61; A/76/7/Add.1, para. 62; A/75/7/Add.2 paras. 54 and 55; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 51; and A/73/498, paras. 49–55). **The Advisory Committee reiterates that the Kuwait Joint Support Office is not a shared service centre approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, in accordance with Assembly resolution 70/248 A, any changes to the existing and future service delivery model must be approved by the Assembly (see also A/77/7/Add.1, para. 60; A/76/7/Add.1, para. 62; A/75/7/Add.2, para. 55; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 51; A/73/498, paras. 54 and 55; A/72/7/Add.10, paras. 56 and 58; and A/71/595, para. 55).** The Committee notes that the Secretary-General intends to submit a report on an improved service delivery concept to the General Assembly at its seventy-eighth session (A/78/6 (Introduction), para. 47 (e)).

Mission support structure guiding principles for special political missions

47. The Advisory Committee recalls that it was informed that the Department of Operational Support was reviewing the mission support structure guiding principles in order to tailor them to special political missions that are smaller than peacekeeping operations (A/77/7/Add.1, para. 62). In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the Department has been drafting a note on guiding principles and is currently consulting the missions (annex I). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the development of the guiding principles for small missions was currently being finalized after in-depth consultation with relevant missions and offices. The purpose of that document was to assist small special political missions and offices that were not able to apply the standard three-pillar structure (supply chain management, service delivery and operations and resource management pillars) to determine appropriate structures, functions and resources, while maintaining the correct level of standardization and ensuring segregation of duties, specifically for procurement.

48. The Advisory Committee recalls that the delegation of authority for the 39 special political missions is as follows: (a) the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has the delegated authority for the 13 groups and panels of experts under cluster II, as well as the Office of the Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004); (b) the Office for Disarmament Affairs has the delegated authority for the support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction; and (c) for the remaining 24 missions, authority is delegated to the respective head of mission for administrative

⁵ UNAMA, UNAMI, BINUH, the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria, Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, UNITAD, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, UNMHA, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

and resource management, while the lead department continues to provide substantive support and guidance to those missions (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 52).

49. The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the development and finalization of mission support structure guiding principles for special political missions will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the present report and in the next budget submission. Moreover, the Committee trusts that the guiding principles to be finalized will ensure and improve accountability and transparency in the administrative and resource management by special political missions.

Support provided by host countries

50. Annex V to the main report of the Secretary-General contains information on support provided free of charge by host countries to special political missions, as requested by the Advisory Committee in its previous report ([A/71/595](#), para. 47). **The Advisory Committee welcomes and notes with appreciation the contributions made by the host countries to the special political missions (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 63).**

Budget formulation and presentation

Proposed budget for 2024

51. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the budget proposals for the special political missions for 2024 reflect conscious efforts for improvement by the Secretariat. In response to the comments of the Advisory Committee ([A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 74), further efforts have been made during the formulation of the proposed budget for 2024 to achieve consistency and standardization in budget methodologies and to continue to improve the presentation of budget reports with a view to enhancing clarity and providing more meaningful information ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), paras. 103 and 104).

52. A summary of the improvements made to the budget formulation and presentation of the reports is as follows:

(a) Budget formulation and methodology: (i) consistent application of the latest standard rates in the calculation of entitlements for staff, military personnel and government-provided personnel; (ii) standardized methodology for the proposed vacancy rates for 2024 (see para. 24 above); and (iii) standardized proposals for reassignment, reclassification or redeployment to avoid presenting in a combined fashion but instead presenting them as abolishment and establishment, in response to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee (see [A/77/7/Add.4](#), para. 36), as well as the provision of justification for the retention of all general temporary assistance positions ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), paras. 105–121);

(b) Presentation of the main report: expanded tables 7 and 8 related to staffing changes; new tables 9 and 10 (general temporary assistance and extrabudgetary positions); enhanced annex IV with a breakdown of extrabudgetary resources into voluntary contributions and cost-recovery revenue; new annexes VII and VIII (cost-recovery revenue and projected expenditures); and improved annex XIX on geographical representation of international civilian staff and experts, with information for every Member State (*ibid.*, para. 122);

(c) Mission budget proposals and supplementary information: new table 2 in the budget proposals on staffing; new annexes IV and V in the supplementary information on prior- and current year budget performance; the inclusion of a breakdown between the resources requested for National Professional Officers and national General Service staff, as requested by the General Assembly in paragraph 18 of its resolution [76/274](#), for peacekeeping operations starting with the 2023/24 period,

and a similar breakdown for United Nations Volunteer personnel by international and national categories (*ibid.*, paras. 123–125).

53. The Advisory Committee notes the efforts made by the Secretariat to improve the budget formulation for the special political missions for 2024 and acknowledges the further improvements, including the enhanced and new tables and annexes, to the presentation of the reports of the Secretary-General. The Committee trusts that continued efforts will be made in future budget submissions, such as the inclusion of information on all duty stations of the missions and the related resources (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 74). The Committee discusses budget formulation and presentation in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024, which, as policy matters, also apply to special political missions ([A/78/7](#), chap. I).

Overall budgetary presentation of special political missions

54. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as part of the programme budget (see para. 2 above), the financial performance of special political missions was presented as part of the financial performance report of the programme budget, and the missions closely followed the presentation and format of the programme plan and programme performance of the regular budget. In line with legislative recommendations for the special political missions to follow the presentation of peacekeeping budgets,⁶ the cost estimates were presented in a manner similar to that of the peacekeeping operations, with some adjustments that were specific to special political missions, as dictated by decisions of the General Assembly. In terms of supplementary information, the Committee was provided with a table containing a comparison of the supplementary information provided for special political and peacekeeping missions, respectively (see table 7 below).

Table 7
Supplementary information for peacekeeping and special political missions

<i>Similar supplementary information shared in the performance of peacekeeping operations and special political missions</i>	<i>Additional supplementary performance information provided just for special political missions, pursuant to General Assembly decisions/requests</i>	<i>Additional supplementary performance information provided just for peacekeeping operations, pursuant to General Assembly request/decisions on cross-cutting issues</i>
Performance on financial resources	Extrabudgetary resources	Substantive and programmatic activities
Human resource incumbency performance	Backstopping positions funded from special political missions	Detailed air operations performance
Cost-recovery		Detailed actual individual official trips undertaken
Summary of follow-up action taken to implement the decisions and requests of the General Assembly, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee endorsed by the Assembly		Major construction projects
		Mission environmental scorecard
		Informational and communications technology contractual services
		Informational and communications technology projects over \$1 million

⁶ Presented under the three groups of peacekeeping budget (military and police personnel, civilian personnel and operational costs), rather than the two groups of the regular budget (posts and non-post resources).

55. The Advisory Committee was also informed that the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) was a tool specifically developed and deployed by the Department of Peace Operations in response to a request by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. By virtue of its focus on performance indicators that were specific to peacekeeping missions, it was not transferrable or applicable to the settings of special political missions. In addition, the wide-ranging nature and sizes of special political missions furthermore required a tailored and nuanced approach to performance measurement for each individual mission. Each special political mission thus reported on its goals, results and deliverables as part of the annual programme plan. In addition, the Advisory Committee was informed that, in line with the Secretariat-wide policy on evaluation (ST/AI/2021/3), special political missions had also been developing their evaluation policies and dedicated capacities where required, which further helped measure and enhance performance. In addition, missions regularly supported assessments by external oversight bodies, including the Office of Internal Oversight Services and implemented their relevant findings and recommendations.

56. While acknowledging the diverse mandates, scopes and operational modalities of the special political missions, the Advisory Committee considers that there is a need to enhance the performance information for field-based special political missions under thematic cluster III, especially those that undertake activities similar to peacekeeping missions, such as air operations, mine actions and construction projects. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to explore ways to enhance performance reporting for field-based special political missions in line with that of peacekeeping operations, as appropriate, under thematic cluster III.

57. On a related matter, the Advisory Committee notes that, over the years, the term of positions has been used to refer to staffing requirements budgeted under post resources (not general temporary assistance positions) for civilian personnel in the budget presentation of special political missions, largely associated with the presumed temporary nature of mission activities. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that civilian personnel in missions are now reflected as posts (other than positions under general temporary assistance and United Nations Volunteers), in accordance with standard practice in the regular budget and with General Assembly resolution 77/278, in which the Assembly decided to widen the number of posts subject to the system of desirable ranges to include those in the special political missions (see A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 7 note)). Nonetheless, the term of positions is used, often intermittently with posts, in the reports on the special political missions for 2024. **The Advisory Committee sees a need to clarify the use of posts and positions for civilian personnel for special political missions going forward and trusts that further clarifications will be provided to the General Assembly during the consideration of the present report** (see also para. 89 below).

58. In chapter I of its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 (A/78/7, para. 35), the Advisory Committee also recommends a comprehensive staffing table to be included as part of the supplementary information in budget submissions, which also applies to special political missions.

Standard ratios for vehicles and information technology equipment

59. Information on the planned holdings of vehicles and information technology equipment is provided in paragraphs 85 to 90 of the report of the Secretary-General (A/78/6 (Sect.3)/Add.1). It is indicated therein that the holdings of special political missions have been reviewed and aligned, where possible, with the standard ratios promulgated in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual. The holdings are proposed on

the basis of the anticipated personnel incumbency levels planned for 2024, as opposed to the full authorized level of personnel.

60. The overall allocation of vehicles proposed for 2024 is 23.8 per cent above the standard ratio, compared with the higher-than-standard ratio of 21.5 per cent for 2023, and the lower-than-standard ratios of 2.3 per cent and 10 per cent proposed for 2022 and 2021, respectively ([A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 45). The Advisory Committee notes from table 1 of the report of the Secretary-General that, of the 19 missions with light vehicles holdings for 2024, standard ratios are applied for 8 missions (compared with the same number for 2023), higher-than-standard ratios for 8 missions (compared with 9 for 2023), and lower-than-standard ratios for 4 missions (compared with 2 for 2023). Justification for each of the 8 missions⁷ with higher-than-standard vehicle ratios is provided in paragraph 88 of the report of the Secretary-General (see paras. 62–64 below).

61. The overall allocation of information technology equipment proposed for 2024 is 10.3 per cent higher than the standard ratio, compared with higher-than-standard ratios of 1.9 per cent, 1.5 per cent and 4.6 per cent proposed for 2023, 2022 and 2021, respectively (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 47). The Advisory Committee notes from table 2 of the report of the Secretary-General that, of the 39 missions, the holdings of information technology equipment reflect the application of the standard ratio for 24 missions (compared with 31 for 2023), higher ratios for 13 missions (compared with 4 for 2023), and lower ratios for 2 missions (compared with 3 for 2023). Justification for each of the 13 missions⁸ with higher-than-standard ratios for 2024 is provided in paragraph 89 of the report of the Secretary-General. **The Advisory Committee notes that, compared with the ratios applied for 2023, the number of missions with higher ratios for computing devices increases from 4 to 13 for 2024, while those with the standard ratio decreases from 31 to 24.** The Committee notes that the Board of Auditors has discussed the related matters and concurs with the recommendations of the Board (see paras. 62–68 below).

Observations and recommendations of the Board of Auditors

Lack of clarity in asset allocation rules leading to inaccuracy of budget proposals of special political missions

62. In its financial report and audited financial statement for the year ended 31 December 2022, the Board of Auditors noted the lack of clarity in assets allocation rules leading to inaccuracy of budget proposals of special political missions ([A/78/5 \(Vol. I\)](#), Chap. II, paras. 50–64). The Board observed that the budget guidelines provided that missions shall ensure compliance with established standard ratios on the basis of planned or actual personnel deployment levels, and provide justifications for any deviations; however, missions were not required to provide information on existing personnel and vehicles or computing devices, or their status, which might be useful for the legislative bodies to evaluate the reasonableness of the budget proposal.

63. On a sample basis, comparing the existing vehicle holdings by the year end of 2020 (when the 2022 budget proposal was prepared) with relevant budget proposals of the missions for 2022, the Board of Auditors noted that, for 13 of the 19 sampled missions, the existing vehicle holdings had already exceeded their standard allocation

⁷ United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions, UNSOM, United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, UNSMIL, UNMHA, BINUH, UNAMA and UNAMI.

⁸ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNITAD, UNOWAS, UNSCOL, UNSMIL, the Verification Mission in Colombia, UNMHA, BINUH, UNITAMS, UNAMA and UNAMI.

of vehicle for 2022, with the top 5 showing significant variances (ranging from 70 per cent to 233 per cent), as shown in table II.7 of the report of the Board. Furthermore, as at 31 December 2022, the top four missions with significant variances between the actual and proposed holdings for the year reached differences from 128 per cent to a maximum of 577 per cent (UNITAMS), as shown in table II.8 of the report of the Board.

64. In the case of UNITAMS, the Board of Auditors observed the following: (a) the Mission had inherited 85 vehicles in 2021 that, according to the Mission, had already exceeded their useful life and were scheduled to be disposed of in 2023, while the Board noted that the 85 inherited vehicles had been marked as in good condition in Umoja; (b) the Mission had procured 45 new vehicles in 2022 (30 of which were physically received in February 2023 owing to customs clearance issues); and (c) 19 vehicles had been exclusively used by the Under-Secretary-General/Assistant-Secretary-General and other high-level visitors, which, according to the Mission, should not be included in the calculation of the vehicle ratio. The Board expressed the view that vehicles to be disposed of in 2023 should have been included in the proposed budget for 2022 and that all types of passenger vehicles, including those for exclusive use, should be included in the budget proposal to improve the quality and transparency of the budget proposal.

65. On a related matter, UNITAMS overspent by 34 per cent on furniture and equipment in 2022, with total expenditure of \$3.26 million, including \$1.3 million for 45 vehicles and \$0.49 million for 429 computing devices. As at 31 December 2022, UNITAMS held 149 vehicles and 594 computing devices (including 134 in idle status), with 231 staff members in position (*ibid.*, para. 83). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Umoja Extension 2 supply chain planning tool had been introduced during the fall of 2021 to June 2022 for both special political missions and peacekeeping operations. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the special political missions will strengthen its monitoring of expenditure patterns and the demand plans with the deployment of the Umoja Extension 2 supply chain planning tool.**

66. The Board of Auditors made similar observations concerning computing device holdings of the special political missions. At the year end of 2020, the existing computing device holdings of 19 of 38 missions had already exceeded their standard allocations and spares for 2022, with the top five missions showing significant variances (ranging from 67 per cent to 186 per cent) (*ibid.*, chap. II, table II.9). Furthermore, as at 31 December 2022, the top four missions with significant variances between the actual and proposed holdings for the year reached differences from 145 per cent to a maximum of 360 per cent (Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction) (*ibid.*, table II.8). It was indicated to the Board that certain computing devices were designated for common areas, such as the car log system and telephone billing, training rooms, while others were tablets, which were not included in the standard allocation calculation.

67. The Board of Auditors reviewed the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual and identified certain obscurities in the criteria that may lead to different interpretation towards the calculation of standard allocation. For instance, the Manual does not specify the vehicle allocation rules for experts and consultants, and there is a lack of clear classification for vehicles used for close protection and certain security tasks. In addition, the Manual does not provide computing devices allocation details for experts and consultants, computing devices used for common areas, and tablets. **The Advisory Committee shares the view of the Board of Auditors that clear classification of different vehicles and computing devices may facilitate the missions to provide more relevant information in their vehicle and computing**

devices budget proposals, which may also enable the legislative bodies to better evaluate the reasonableness of relevant budget proposals and avoid over-allocation of equipment, asset idleness and low asset utilization rates to the extent possible.

68. The Advisory Committee concurs with the recommendations of the Board of Auditors that: (a) the Administration ensure that the special political missions conduct a comprehensive analysis of the root causes for the significant variances between actual vehicle and computing devices holdings and standard allocations; and (b) the Administration update the vehicle holding ratio and related guidance, as well as the computing device allocation “ratio” as part of the Standard Cost Ratio Manual in order to enable the missions to improve the transparency and quality of vehicles and computing devices budget proposals in the future (A/78/5 (Vol. I), chap. II, para. 63 and 64). The Committee trusts that the recommendations of the Board will be implemented in a timely manner. As the Standard Cost Ratio Manual and its update have impact on the whole Secretariat, including peacekeeping operations, the Committee further discusses the matter in its related report on the financial report and audited financial statement for the year ended 31 December 2022 of the Board of Auditors.

Weaknesses in mobile communication services usage and cost reimbursement

69. The Board of Auditors reviewed e-billing system for mobile device usage and the related cost-recovery mechanism to monitor and recovery costs from private call usage of mobile device (*ibid.*, paras. 92–103). The review of the recovery and refund of private call cost of 18 special political missions, on a sample basis, from 2018 to 2022 revealed that, of \$2.39 million total private call cost, \$1.43 million (60 per cent) had not been recovered, and \$2.3 million (96 per cent) had not been refunded to regular budget related fund. A similar review was also made at Headquarters by the Board. The Advisory Committee further discusses the matter in its related report on the financial report and audited financial statement for the year ended 31 December 2022 of the Board of Auditors.

70. The Advisory Committee concurs with the recommendations of the Board of Auditors that: (a) the Administration update its policies to emphasize monitoring mobile device services usage for non-official purpose; and (b) the Administration inform respective entities to implement the mobile communication services recovery and refund mechanism to ensure the non-official mobile communication service costs are recovered and refunded to regular budget in a timely manner (*ibid.*, paras. 101 and 102). The Committee trusts that the recommendations of the Board will be implemented in a timely manner.

Other matters

Independent mandate assessments and reviews

71. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that there were a number of assessment and review initiatives with different methodologies and approaches. These were not always fully codified but grounded in practice, often long-standing; at times, new modalities were created. This was the case with the independent assessment mandated by Security Council resolution 2679 (2023) with respect to Afghanistan, which was not a review of UNAMA, but an independent assessment to provide forward-looking recommendations for an integrated and coherent approach among relevant political, humanitarian and development actors, within and outside the United Nations system; this appeared to be a new form of assessment of the situation and multidimensional challenges facing the country. With respect to UNAMI, the Council had mandated an independent strategic review, which was

anticipated to follow the traditional approach and would be directly relevant to the mandate and posture of the Mission.

72. The Advisory Committee was further informed that, outside the scope of special political missions, the General Assembly had requested the Secretary-General to conduct an independent strategic and civilian staffing review of the United Nations Office to the African Union by endorsing the recommendation of the Committee (A/77/7). The review of the Office would also take the form of an independent assessment, with the focus on its capacity to implement its mandate in a context of an expansion of its activities. In relation to the assessment for the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, the General Assembly, in its resolution 75/291 on the seventh review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted in 2021, had invited the Secretary-General to carefully assess the finances of the Office and to provide budgetary recommendations, if necessary and on the basis of the technical assessment, to the Assembly in 2022. The recommendations of the review were presented to the Assembly in the context of the budget proposals for 2023 and 2024 for the Office.

73. Concerning the independence of the assessments and reviews, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that in its general approach to independent assessments and reviews, the Secretariat usually relied on external expertise to undertake the leadership with a view to ensuring that the review process remained disassociated from the mission involved or the department providing strategic guidance and backstopping at Headquarters. At the same time, however, in order to be cost-effective, the Secretariat provided in-house support and services, which could take the form of providing more junior staff for assistance, or operational support such as travel and administrative issues. That assistance did not compromise the independence of the assessment, as the leadership of an assessment or a review remained independent.

74. The Advisory Committee recalls that it recommended in the proposed programme budget for 2023 that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to develop criteria and modalities for future reviews, including for the involvement of independent entities, with a view to avoiding conflict of interest and ensuring the impartiality and the credibility of such reviews and assessments (A/77/7, para. 41). The Secretary-General indicates that, within existing capacity, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance will prepare and disseminate guiding principles to encourage good practice from management. Managers would decide on the scope and modalities of reviews and would be responsible for the conduct of such reviews (A/78/6 (Introduction), annex I). **The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the development of guiding principles for independent and impartial reviews and assessments will be provided in the foreword and introduction of the proposed programme budget for 2025.**

Spending reviews of the programme budget and civilian staffing reviews of peacekeeping operations

75. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in paragraph 20 of its resolution 77/262, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to ensure that each programme of the regular budget undergoes a spending review at least once every five years, to be implemented from the proposed programme budget for 2024 onward. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that paragraph 20 of resolution 77/262 defines the scope of the spending review as programmes, and, therefore, excluded special political missions. The Committee was further informed that, in paragraph 8 of its resolution 76/274, the Assembly recalled paragraph 23 of its resolution 66/264, encouraged the Secretary-General to assure the continuous adaptation and optimization of the structures of peacekeeping operations, including through civilian

and security staffing reviews, with United Nations Headquarters participation, at least on a quadrennial basis. Both resolutions 76/274 and 66/264 were adopted by the General Assembly in the context of cross-cutting issues of peacekeeping operations and were hence not applicable to special political missions.

76. The Advisory Committee was informed that, although neither the spending review (once every five years) as requested in resolution 77/262 nor the civilian staffing review (once every four years) as encouraged in resolution 76/274 was applicable to special political missions, the Secretariat had ensured in the latest round of budget preparation that attention be given by all special political missions to review their budget performance in the prior period, as well as to review staffing needs through workforce planning with the aim of identifying opportunities for nationalization, rejuvenation, abolishment of long vacant posts and further optimizing staffing structure. It was indicated to the Committee that workforce planning was a five-step methodology to address gaps in demand and supply and the need of an entity in terms of staffing requirements, and that entities were encouraged to conduct workforce planning exercises every year to review their staffing and structures prior to budget submission. **While noting the understanding of the Secretariat that the spending reviews of the programme budget and civilian staffing reviews of peacekeeping operations are not applicable to special political missions, the Advisory Committee is of the view that regular reviews of financial and human resource requirements should be conducted for special political missions as well. The Committee trusts that more information will be provided in the next budget submission.** The Committee discusses the matter in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 (A/78/7, chap. I, paras. 84 and 85) and considers the recommendations contained therein to be pertinent to all entities under the programme budget.

Coordination and cooperation with peacekeeping operations in the same country or region

77. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the establishment of a separate special political mission where a peacekeeping operation was deployed had been designed to pursue distinct mandates owing to the specific contextual characteristics of a situation for which distinct mandates could not be pursued by the same operation. The separation of mandates was often requested by the mandating intergovernmental body itself.

78. The Advisory Committee was also informed that, given their different mandates, special political missions and peacekeeping operations could play complementary roles while addressing the same peace and security situation, when Member States deemed it necessary to delineate between the political and security tracks. For example, when the Security Council mandated the deployment of UNFICYP to Cyprus by its resolution 186 (1964), it also recommended that the Secretary-General deploy a mediator for “for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus”, which has led to the establishment of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus. In other situations, a special political mission with a regional mandate may work closely with a country-based peacekeeping operation to address regional issues that might have an impact on the area of operation of the peacekeeping mission, such as in the case of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and MONUSCO. Furthermore, in other cases, sanctions panels and monitoring groups of cluster II are mandated to support Security Council sanctions regimes that might pertain to situations in which peacekeeping operations are deployed, such as in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.

79. It was indicated to the Advisory Committee that the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs had dedicated a lessons-learned study on maximizing

complementarity between peacekeeping operations and special political missions, the findings of which are available in the 2021 annual report on evaluative exercises.⁹ **The Advisory Committee trusts that special political missions and peacekeeping operations working in the same country or region will strengthen their coordination, identify areas of complementarity and avoid duplication of resources, while carrying out their distinct mandates in addressing the same peace and security situation (see para. 84 below). The Committee trusts that information on efforts to achieve efficiencies through coordination among special political and peacekeeping missions will be provided in the report of the Secretary-General on the overview of peacekeeping operations and his main report on special political missions in the context of the next budget submission.**

Potential alternative groupings of special political missions in budget submission

80. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, while there was no intergovernmental definition, special political missions were broadly defined as United Nations civilian missions that are deployed for a limited duration to support Member States in conflict prevention and resolution, sustaining peace, elections, ceasefire monitoring, or other specific technical mandates, as requested by the Security Council or the General Assembly. As a flexible tool, the missions had, over time, been mandated to perform a wide range of functions related to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding and could be tailored and adapted to the particular needs of each situation, in accordance with the respective mandate from intergovernmental bodies.

81. The Advisory Committee was further informed that the practice of presenting the budgets of special political missions in clusters had started in 2006, following the endorsement by the General Assembly (see resolution 60/255, para. 3) of its recommendation that consideration be given to reorganizing the report on special political missions in order to present the missions or offices in clusters on the basis of thematic or regional considerations, as appropriate, and that larger missions should be treated in a manner that would be more suitable to their size and complexity (see A/60/7/Add.37, para. 11; and A/59/569/Add.1 and A/59/569/Add.1/Corr.1, paras. 6 and 7). Consequently, while UNAMA and UNAMI are thematically part of cluster III (field-based missions), the budgets for the two largest missions at that time were presented in separate addenda (A/61/525/Add.4 and A/61/525/Add.5), owing to the fact that the resources for UNAMA and UNAMI accounted for 61 per cent of the total resources for all special political missions for the proposed budget for 2007. The grouping of special political missions had remained unchanged since 2006.

82. The Advisory Committee enquired about potential alternative groupings to update and reflect the development of the special political missions over the years. The Committee was informed that the Secretariat had considered the possibility of clustering the 39 missions according to mandates; however, given the frequent changes and evolution of the mandates of missions, that would not be easy to achieve and may require frequent adjustments to the clusters, and that it was therefore not recommended. It is worth noting that, taking into account the view of the Advisory Committee that missions would be presented in clusters on the basis of thematic or regional considerations, as appropriate (A/59/569/Add.1 and A/59/569/Add.1/Corr.1, para. 7), it is possible to cluster the currently active 39 missions on the basis of regional considerations, or a regional consideration along with a thematic and cross-cutting approach. The Committee was provided with information on the option (see tables 8 and 9 below).

⁹ Available at https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/20220630_2021_evaluative_exercises_13.pdf.

Table 8
Composition of the clusters on the basis of regional considerations

<i>New cluster No.</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Number of missions</i>	<i>Financial resources in 2024</i>	<i>Page length of fascicle (using 2024 budget for simulation)</i>
1	Africa	16	298 694 600	131
2	Europe and Americas	5	103 633 500	47
3	Asia and Middle East	13	345 560 300	133
4	Thematic and cross-cutting	5	27 437 800	40
Total		39	775 326 200	

Table 9
Composition of the clusters (current system vs. a geography-based system)

<i>Current system</i>			<i>Geography-based system</i>		
<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Missions</i>	<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Number of Missions</i>
I	Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	1	Africa	Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara Panel of Experts on Libya Panel of Experts on Mali UNOWAS United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission UNSMIL Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic UNOCA Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa Panel of Experts on the Sudan Panel of Experts on South Sudan Panel of Experts on Somalia UNSOM UNITAMS
II	Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms	Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo Panel of Experts on the Sudan Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Panel of Experts on Libya Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic Panel of Experts on Yemen	2	Europe and Americas	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions Panel of Experts on Haiti United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia BINUH

<i>Current system</i>			<i>Geography-based system</i>		
<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Missions</i>	<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Number of Missions</i>
		<p>Panel of Experts on South Sudan</p> <p>Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities</p> <p>Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009)</p> <p>Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)</p> <p>Panel of Experts on Mali</p> <p>Panel of Experts on Somalia</p> <p>Panel of Experts on Haiti</p> <p>Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction</p> <p>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate</p> <p>UNITAD</p>			
III	Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions	<p>UNOWAS</p> <p>UNSOM</p> <p>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</p> <p>United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission</p> <p>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</p> <p>UNOCA</p> <p>UNSMIL</p> <p>United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia</p> <p>UNMHA</p> <p>BINUH</p> <p>UNITAMS</p> <p>UNAMA</p> <p>UNAMI</p>	3	Asia and Middle East	<p>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar</p> <p>Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea</p> <p>Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)</p> <p>United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia</p> <p>UNAMA</p> <p>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)</p> <p>Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon</p> <p>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</p> <p>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen</p> <p>Panel of Experts on Yemen</p> <p>UNMHA</p> <p>UNITAD</p> <p>UNAMI</p>

<i>Current system</i>			<i>Geography-based system</i>		
<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Missions</i>	<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Cluster name</i>	<i>Number of Missions</i>
			4	Thematic and cross-cutting	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009) Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
Total		39	Total		39

Note: A thematic and cross-cutting cluster (cluster 4) would be needed, which would contain the five special political missions whose mandates are non-regional or country specific.

83. It was further indicated to the Advisory Committee that the Secretariat would be guided by the Committee and the General Assembly as to how the budgets of special political missions should be better clustered in future periods. The Secretariat understands that the grouping and presentation of budgetary information for the special political missions do not call into question the status of the activities of the missions nor the current mode of their funding, as has been emphasized by the Committee in its report ([A/59/569/Add.1](#) and [A/59/569/Add.1/Corr.1](#), para. 6), which preceded the conceptualization of special political mission clusters in 2006.

84. The Advisory Committee notes that, for the proposed resources for the 39 special political missions for 2024, the combined resources for UNAMA (17.1 per cent) and UNAMI (12.7 per cent) account for 29.8 per cent only (compared with 61 per cent for 2007) (see para. 81 above), while the resources for UNSOM represents 13.1 per cent of the total resources requested (as the second largest mission in terms of resource requirements). Taking into account the changes over the years, including the peace and security reform of the Secretary-General, the Committee sees merits in a review to update the current grouping of the special political missions, with possible groupings, such as by region, to facilitate the consideration of the budget submissions and provide an opportunity to explore more efficiencies and economy of scale, while combining the thematic and cross-cutting missions into one cluster, including Security Council sanctions and monitoring groups of experts; and to reflect changes in the size of the missions with a potential threshold for separate budget submissions, along with an overall enhanced performance reporting (see para. 56 above), among others. The Committee trusts that more information and options on a review will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the present report for the

guidance of the Assembly, and that related information will be provided in the next budget submission.

Cost sharing

85. Information on cost-sharing arrangements among special political missions and United Nations entities is provided in annex VI to the report of the Secretary-General. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on administrative support provided to the missions and cost-sharing arrangements among the special political missions and peacekeeping operations. **The Advisory Committee notes that, in response to its recommendation, annex VI to the report of the Secretary-General has been expanded to include the information on budgeted amounts and reasons for cost sharing. The Committee trusts updated information will be provided in future budget submissions.**

Cost recovery

86. The Secretary-General indicates that two new annexes have been added to provide information on cost recovery estimates in line with recommendations by the Advisory Committee in 2022 (annex VII on cost-recovery spendable revenue estimates for 2024 and annex VIII on projected expenditures for 2024). In addition, annex IV on extrabudgetary resources has been enhanced to provide a breakdown of extrabudgetary resources into voluntary contributions and cost-recovery revenue (which is now included in the calculation of extrabudgetary resources) ([A/78/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 122 (e) and (f)). The Committee requested and received information on spendable revenue and expenditure for 2021, 2022 and 2023 of special political missions. **The Advisory Committee notes the inclusion of annexes VII and VIII, as well as the expansion of annex IV relating to cost recovery. The Committee trusts that updated information will be provided in future budget submissions.** The Committee discusses cost recovery in its report on the financial performance of the programme budget for 2022 ([A/78/330](#), paras. 75–78) and in chapter I of the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#)).

Environmental activities

87. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Secretariat recognized the potential damage that field operations could have on the environment and that the United Nations had significantly increased its focus on environmental management, establishing it as one of its top priorities. The Department of Operational Support had developed an overarching policy to manage environmental issues and was also implementing a six-year strategy on environmental management, aiming to realize its vision to support the deployment of responsible missions. Since the inception of the strategy, tailored wastewater and solid waste risk assessment methodologies had been provided by the Department to the missions so that each mission could make on-site risk assessments on a regular basis and promptly implement any needed corrective actions. The Committee was provided with information on environmental activities undertaken by special political missions, such as those under UNAMI, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNSOM, UNMHA, BINUH and the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus with UNFICYP.

88. **The Advisory Committee recalls that, in the context of peacekeeping operations (see General Assembly resolution [76/274](#), paras. 83 and 84), the General Assembly has emphasized the importance of adequate energy and waste management in order to minimize risk to people, societies and ecosystems, and requested the Secretary-General to intensify the efforts aimed at reducing the overall environmental footprint of missions, including through the**

implementation of environmentally responsible waste management and power generation systems, also working towards a potential positive legacy for host communities, in full compliance with the relevant regulations and rules. The Committee trusts that field-based special political missions, in particular those larger ones, implement environmental management activities, as appropriate, under the guidance of the Assembly resolution and related policy and strategy.

Equitable geographical representation and gender balance

89. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [77/278](#), the General Assembly decided to widen the posts subject to the desirable ranges system to all posts funded by the regular budget at the Professional and higher categories, including in special political missions and peacekeeping operations, excluding language posts, with effect from 1 January 2024. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the positive outcome of the changes to the system of desirable ranges presented a unique opportunity to renew the Secretariat's ongoing efforts to apply robust strategies for improving the geographical distribution and work towards bringing each unrepresented and underrepresented Member State within its desirable range by 2030. First and foremost, the Secretariat would conduct an assessment of the approximately 1,200 posts in the 39 special political missions and the two peacekeeping operations funded under the programme budget. Approximately 80 per cent of the posts were currently encumbered, with 967 posts encumbered as of 30 June 2023. **The Advisory Committee trusts that information on the assessment of the posts/positions in special political missions and peacekeeping operation will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the present report and in the next budget submission, along with a breakdown by mission of the positions/posts subject to geographical distribution.** The Committee discusses the matter in chapter I of its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#)).

90. The Advisory Committee was also informed that the senior managers compact for all heads of entities, including field missions, already included an indicator on geographical appointments, with the target of having 50 per cent of appointments on posts subject to geographical distribution from un- and underrepresented Member States. From 2024 onwards, this would apply to all geographical posts in special political missions. **The Advisory Committee trusts that information on the status of geographical appointments by Heads of special political missions starting from 1 January 2024 will be included in the main report of the Secretary-General on special political missions, including in a consolidated annex, by mission and cluster, in all future budget submissions.**

91. In his report, the Secretary-General includes information on gender distribution of civilian staff and experts, by mission, in annex XVIII. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also provided with information on the efforts made by special political missions to enhance gender balance.

92. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [75/253 A](#) (sect. XVIII), the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to improve geographical representation and gender balance in special political missions. Furthermore, in its resolution [76/246 A](#) (sect. X), the Assembly has also requested the Secretary-General to take measures, including through the recruitment of new staff and by strengthening the accountability framework of the managers, to improve geographical representation and gender balance in all the special political missions and provide an update in future budget submissions, including on geographical representation by nationality (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 66). In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#), chap. I), the Advisory Committee

discusses equitable geographical representation and gender balance, which, as policy matters, also apply to the special political missions.

Retirement projections and workforce planning

93. Also upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that it was anticipated that incumbents of 71 position of all missions would retire during 2024 and 2025 (see table 10 below). The Committee discusses retirement projections and workforce planning in chapter 1 of its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2024 ([A/78/7](#)).

Table 10

Summary of vacant positions as at 30 June 2023 and encumbered positions with expected retirement date in the period 2024–2025

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Encumbered positions with expected retirement 2024–2025</i>
Cluster I	2
Cluster II	4
Cluster III	30
UNAMA	16
UNAMI	19
Total	71

Cases of sexual exploitation and abuse

94. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on cases of sexual exploitation and abuse reported in all special political mission for the past years from 1 January 2008 to 30 June 2023 (see table 11 below). Of the total of 11 cases reported, 3 cases reported during 2022 and 2023 are currently under investigation.

Table 11
Cases of sexual exploitation and abuse reported in the period 2008-2023

<i>Year</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Personnel type</i>	<i>Result of the investigation</i>	<i>Final action</i>
2019	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	Civilian (international)	Substantiated (exploitative relationship)	United Nations action closed ^a
2019	UNIOGBIS	Civilian (international)	Unsubstantiated (insufficient evidence)	—
2019	UNIOGBIS	Civilian (international)	Substantiated (transactional sex)	United Nations separation from service
2019	UNIOGBIS	Civilian (international)	Unsubstantiated (insufficient evidence)	—
2019	UNIOGBIS	Civilian (international)	Unsubstantiated (insufficient evidence)	—
2019	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	Civilian (international)	Unsubstantiated (insufficient evidence)	—
2020	UNAMA	Civilian (national)	Substantiated (attempted rape)	United Nations separation from service
2021	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	Military (observers)	Substantiated (sexual assault)	United Nations repatriation
2022	UNAMA	Civilian (national)	Ongoing	Pending
2023	UNAMI	Civilian (international)	Ongoing	Pending
2023	UNITAMS	Civilian (United Nations Volunteer)	Ongoing	Pending
Total		11 cases		

Abbreviation: United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS.

^a While allegations were substantiated, the matter was closed without further action as the United Nations staff member involved passed away before the matter could be referred for disciplinary action.

Women and peace and security

95. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that, in 2022, OIOS concluded its evaluation on women and peace and security in field-based missions: elections and political transitions (A/77/83). In implementing the recommendations contained in the evaluation, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs launched a joint community of practice to enable cross-mission learning and documentation of good practices among the special political missions and peacekeeping operations. The Department also conducts quarterly meetings with the Department of Peace Operations on strategic matters related to the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda (A/78/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 37).

96. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, ensuring accountability for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in 2022, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs had revised its 2010 indicators and had agreed on a set of 22 indicators to cover a broader range of its mandate. Field-based special political missions had their systems for tracking and recording the data relevant to the 22 indicators. The Committee was also informed that the Department and field-based special political missions currently reported on a dozen indicators pertinent to the gender sensitivity of products and gender mainstreaming of activities and deliverables. **Noting that one of those indicators relates to the number of gender advisors and focal points in special political missions, disaggregated by gender, seniority and placement within a mission, the**

Advisory Committee is of the view that, rather than reporting on the number of gender advisors and focal points in special political missions, the indicator should focus on the impact of the related activities of a mission in a respective country and communities.

Mission closure, lessons learned and contingency planning

97. In his report, the Secretary-General provides information on lessons learned from the transfer of functions of closed missions (*ibid.*, paras. 40–45), including the Secretary-General's first-ever report on transitions in United Nations peace operations ([S/2022/522](#)), requested by the Security Council in resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#). The Secretary-General concludes that United Nations transitions should not be understood as linear processes focused on the handover of responsibilities by a departing peace operation (inclusive of peacekeeping and special political missions) but should rather be seen as a strategic repositioning of a United Nations presence in support of the host country and local partners. To determine the critical minimum requirements to inform the exit strategy of a mission, the Secretary-General recommended the use of benchmarks and objective assessments of the political and security conditions in the country and the capacity of national and local institutions to effectively prevent and respond to risks of recurrence of conflict or violence.

98. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in the context of peacekeeping operations, it discussed mission transitions and the lessons learned from the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID. The Committee expressed the view that preliminary transition planning should be readily available before the formal drawdown and liquidation and start at the early stages of a mission life cycle and be based, *inter alia*, on lessons learned from previous transition/drawdown experiences, as well as approved recommendations of oversight bodies ([A/77/767](#), para. 92). Furthermore, the Committee notes the fluid and volatile security and operational environment in which some special political missions operate, such as the case of UNITAMS (see [A/78/7/Add.4](#)). **The Advisory Committee is therefore of the view that field-based special political missions should also draw lessons from peacekeeping operations, as appropriate, and develop contingency planning for their operations.**

IV. Conclusion

99. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, the total resource requirements of the 39 special political missions (contained in addenda 1–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2024) are included within the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2024. **The Advisory Committee therefore notes that its recommendations pertaining to the budget proposals for 2024 for the individual missions under thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI, which are presented in separate related reports ([A/78/7/Add.2–6](#)) and subject to mandate extensions (see para. 5 (c) above), would require adjustments to the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2024 (see [A/78/6 \(Introduction\)](#)).**

Annex I

Special political missions, information on Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General positions

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Position grade</i>	<i>Position title</i>	<i>Vacancy</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Regional group</i>	<i>Contract type</i>	<i>Entry on duty</i>
Cluster I	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	USG	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	Vacant				
Cluster I	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	USG	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	27/11/2020
Cluster I	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	ASG	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect	Encumbered	Male	Africa	Home-based (\$1-a-year)	01/02/2022
Cluster I	Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	WAE	01/11/2021
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	Vacant				
Cluster I	United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	ASG	United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	Encumbered	Female	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	01/09/2018
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	06/01/2019
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	ASG	Deputy Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	01/08/2020

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Position grade</i>	<i>Position title</i>	<i>Vacancy</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Regional group</i>	<i>Contract type</i>	<i>Entry on duty</i>
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	01/10/2018
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	Encumbered	Male	Asia-Pacific	Full-time	01/04/2019
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	05/09/2021
Cluster I	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	USG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	Vacant				
Cluster II	Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	ASG	Executive Director Counter-Terrorism Committee	Encumbered	Female	Eastern Europe	Full-time	11/10/2017
Cluster II	United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	ASG	Special Adviser and Head of the Investigative Team	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	01/10/2021
Cluster III	UNOWAS	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel	Encumbered	Male	Africa	Full-time	19/05/2023
Cluster III	UNOWAS	ASG	Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for West Africa and the Sahel	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	27/03/2015
Cluster III	UNSOM	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia	Encumbered	Female	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	21/05/2023

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Position grade</i>	<i>Position title</i>	<i>Vacancy</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Regional group</i>	<i>Contract type</i>	<i>Entry on duty</i>
Cluster III	UNSOM	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	02/06/2008
Cluster III	UNSOM	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	28/05/2023
Cluster III	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	ASG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Asia	Encumbered	Male	Eastern Europe	Full-time	01/08/2023*
Cluster III	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	USG	Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General for Lebanon	Encumbered	Female	Eastern Europe	Full-time	01/06/2021
Cluster III	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	ASG	Deputy Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General for Lebanon	Encumbered	Male	Asia-Pacific	Full-time	16/09/2014
Cluster III	UNOCA	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa	Encumbered	Male	Africa	Full-time	22/08/2022
Cluster III	UNSMIL	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya	Encumbered	Male	Africa	Full-time	25/09/2022
Cluster III	UNSMIL	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya	Encumbered	Female	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	03/05/2017
Cluster III	UNSMIL	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya	Encumbered	Male	Africa	Full-time	24/08/2001
Cluster III	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia	Encumbered	Male	Latin America and the Caribbean	Full-time	01/01/2019

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Position grade</i>	<i>Position title</i>	<i>Vacancy</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Regional group</i>	<i>Contract type</i>	<i>Entry on duty</i>
Cluster III	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia	Encumbered	Male	Latin America and the Caribbean	Full-time	01/12/2010
Cluster III	UNMHA	ASG	Head of Mission and Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	19/01/2022
Cluster III	BINUH	ASG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti	Encumbered	Female	Latin America and the Caribbean	Full-time	01/04/2023
Cluster III	UNITAMS	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	01/02/2021
Cluster III	UNITAMS	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan	Encumbered	Female	Africa	Full-time	16/05/2023
UNAMA	UNAMA	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	09/06/2023
UNAMA	UNAMA	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	26/06/2022
UNAMA	UNAMA	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan	Encumbered	Female	Asia-Pacific	Full-time	25/09/2022
UNAMI	UNAMI	USG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq	Encumbered	Female	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	16/12/2018

<i>Cluster</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Position grade</i>	<i>Position title</i>	<i>Vacancy</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Regional group</i>	<i>Contract type</i>	<i>Entry on duty</i>
UNAMI	UNAMI	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq	Encumbered	Male	Western Europe and Others	Full-time	18/04/2013
UNAMI	UNAMI	ASG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq	Encumbered	Male	Asia-Pacific	Full-time	01/01/2022

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; USG, Under-Secretary-General; WAE, when actually employed.

* The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Asia has been recently appointed and is expected to join on 01/08/2023.

Annex II

Petrol, oil and lubricants by mission for 2023 and 2024

(Thousands of United States dollars)

				2023					2024				
Cluster	Mission	Class	Fuel type	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Approved	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Proposed
Cluster I	Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1 670	0.760	–	0.1	1.3	–	–	–	–	–
			Petrol/benzene	1 633	0.739	–	0.1	1.3	3 382	0.801	–	0.7	3.4
			Subtotal				–	0.1	2.6			–	0.7
	United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	8 800	1.000	–	–	8.8	6 710	1.068	–	–	7.2
	Subtotal					–	–	8.8			–	–	7.2
	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	Air operations	Aviation fuel	–	–	–	–	41.0	–	–	–	–	41.0
Ground transportation		Diesel fuel	29 006	0.708	–	2.1	22.6	27 100	0.983	–	2.7	29.3	
		Petrol/benzene	14 503	0.803	–	1.2	12.8	11 685	0.957	–	1.1	12.3	
	Subtotal					–	3.2	76.4			–	3.8	82.6
	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1 755	0.570	–	0.1	1.1	3 600	1.195	–	0.4	4.7
	Subtotal					–	0.1	1.1			–	0.4	4.7
	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	7 018	0.570	13.0	0.4	17.4	7 000	0.940	13.0	0.7	20.2
	Subtotal					13.0	0.4	17.4	7 000		13.0	0.7	20.2

Cluster	Mission	Class	Fuel type	2023					2024				
				Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Approved	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Proposed
	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	Air operations	Aviation fuel	128 993	1.200	–	–	154.8	103 191	1.305	–	–	134.7
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel (Sana’a and Aden)	69 852	1.600	–	5.6	117.4	60 000	1.890	–	5.7	119.1
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel (Amman)	14 950	1.000	–	0.7	15.7	22 500	1.194	–	1.3	28.2
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	31 000	1.600	–	5.0	54.6	31 000	1.890	–	5.9	64.4
			Petrol/benzene	42 000	1.357	–	5.7	62.7	30 000	1.400	–	4.2	46.2
Subtotal						–	17.0	405.1		–	17.1	392.6	
	Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	Ground transportation	Petrol/benzene	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.2	2.2
			Subtotal	-		–	–	–	–	–	–	0.2	2.2
Cluster II	Panel of Experts on Yemen	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	–	–	–	0.3	3.3	–	–	–	0.3	3.3
Subtotal						-	–	0.3	3.3	–	–	0.3	0.3
	Panel of Experts on Somalia	Ground transportation	Petrol/benzene	4 153	0.810	–	0.3	3.7	–	–	–	–	3.7
			Subtotal			–	0.3	3.7	–		–	–	3.7
	UNITAD	Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	–	–	–	–	–	8 251	1.067	–	–	8.8
			Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	60 004	0.478		4.3	33.0	36 611	1.040	–	3.8
		Petrol/benzene		26 432	0.526	–	2.1	16.0	30 300	0.914	–	2.8	30.5
		Subtotal				–	6.4	49.0			–	6.6	81.1
Cluster III	UNOWAS	Air operations	Aviation fuel	538 032	1.333	–	–	717.2	420 841	1.543	–	–	649.4
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	13 270	1.198	–	1.6	17.5	13 300	1.260	–	1.7	18.4
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	25 000	1.500	–	3.8	41.3	25 800	1.260	–	3.3	35.8
			Petrol/benzene	1 900	1.800	–	0.3	3.8	1 500	1.650	–	0.2	2.7
Subtotal						–	5.7	779.7		–	5.2	706.3	

Cluster	Mission	Class	Fuel type	2023					2024				
				Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Approved	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Proposed
	UNSOM	Air operations	Aviation fuel	988 528	0.946	121.2	–	1 056.4	867 521	1.099	175.0	–	1 128.4
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	3 396 685	1.073	543.4	324.7	4 512.7	2 148 514	1.139	375.0	122.4	2 944.6
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	58 000	1.073	16.3	8.5	87.1	113 581	1.139	20.0	6.5	155.8
Subtotal						680.9	333.3	5 656.2			570.0	128.9	4 228.8
	United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	3 500	0.428	–	–	1.5	10 260	0.390	–	–	4.0
		Ground transportation	Petrol/benzene	11 420	0.430	–	0.5	5.4	11 500	0.430	–	0.5	5.4
Subtotal						–	0.5	6.9			–	0.5	9.4
	United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	Air operations	Aviation fuel	37 614	1.333	–	–	50.1	36 480	1.543	–	–	56.3
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel, diesel	7 500	1.200	–	0.9	9.9	7 500	1.260	–	0.9	10.4
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel, petrol	4 000	1.000	–	0.4	4.4	4 000	1.650	–	0.7	7.3
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	18 000	1.400	–	1.3	26.4	16 500	1.260	–	2.1	22.9
Subtotal						–	2.6	90.9			–	3.7	96.9
	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	19 460	0.731	–	–	14.2	36 000	0.963	–	–	34.7
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	28 300	0.731	–	2.1	22.8	30 000	0.963	–	2.9	31.8
			Petrol/benzene	3 600	0.914	–	0.3	3.6	1 000	0.989	–	0.1	1.1
Subtotal						–	2.4	40.6			–	3.0	67.5

Cluster	Mission	Class	Fuel type	2023					2024				
				Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Approved	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Proposed
	UNOCA	Air operations	Aviation fuel	21 342	1.250	–	–	26.7	17 034	1.250	–	–	21.3
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	5 500	1.063	–	–	5.8	5 500	1.038	–	–	5.7
		Ground transportation	Petrol/benzene	16 400	1.063	–	1.7	19.2	16 400	1.038	–	1.7	18.7
	Subtotal					–	1.7	51.7			–	1.7	45.7
	UNSMIL	Air operations	Aviation fuel	943 450	0.875	–	–	825.5	928 170	1.033	–	–	958.8
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel (Tunisia)	44 083	0.612	–	2.7	29.7	22 500	0.772		1.7	19.1
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel (Libya)	527 375	0.040	–	2.1	23.2	405 000	0.026	–	1.1	11.6
	Subtotal					–	4.8	878.4			–	2.8	989.5
	United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1 050 076	0.850	–	44.6	937.2	686 112	1.250	–	42.9	900.5
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	51 000	0.650	–	1.7	34.8	35 000	0.580	–	2.0	22.3
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	170 000	0.700	–	11.9	130.9	130 000	0.578	–	11.3	86.4
	Subtotal					–	58.2	1 102.9			–	56.2	1 009.3
	UNMHA	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1 550 179	1.250	–	–	1 937.7	1 624 187	1.317	–	–	2 139.0
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	401 175	1.593	–	31.9	670.8	257 100	2.022	–	26.0	545.9
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	141 000	1.600	–	22.6	248.2	95 880	2.047	–	9.8	206.1
			Petrol/benzene	24 000	1.200	–	2.9	31.7	12 000	1.349	–	0.8	17.0
	Subtotal					–	57.4	2 888.4			–	36.6	2 908.0
	BINUH	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	95 188	1.56	–	14.8	163.1	120 384	1.31	120.0	15.8	293.9
	Subtotal					–	14.8	163.1			120.0	15.8	293.9

Cluster	Mission	Class	Fuel type	2023					2024				
				Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Approved	Litres	Average price	Maintenance fee	Oil	Proposed
	UNITAMS	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1 682 409	0.782	80.2	–	1 395.8	1 144 778	1.062	180.0	–	1 395.8
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	394 930	0.763	276.6	9.0	586.9	397 228	1.083	143.8	12.9	586.9
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	201 527	0.763	35.6	15.4	204.8	131 426	1.003	59.8	13.2	204.8
	Subtotal					392.3	24.4	2 187.5			383.6	26.1	2 187.5
UNAMA	UNAMA	Air operations	Aviation fuel	980 118	1.120	45.2	–	1 142.9	1 111 480	1.233	55.2	–	1 425.6
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	3 769 395	1.010	42.9	140.0	3 990.0	4 251 796	0.991	42.9	140.0	4 396.4
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	182 095	1.010	30.7	15.0	229.6	199 500	0.991	30.7	19.8	248.2
	Subtotal					118.8	155.0	5 362.5			128.8	159.8	6 070.2
UNAMI	UNAMI	Air operations	Aviation fuel	490 265	1.000	–	–	490.3	485 250	2.270	–	–	1 101.5
		Facilities infrastructure	Generator fuel	144 174	0.570	–	11.8	94.0	120 476	1.059	–	12.8	140.3
		Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	112 995	0.545	–	17.0	78.5	250 647	1.201	–	21.1	322.1
			Petrol/benzene	45 000	0.648	–	8.0	37.2	53 757	1.037	–	3.9	59.6
	Subtotal					–	36.8	700.0			–	37.8	1 623.5
	Total							20 476.2					20 837.6