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Proposed programme budget for 2022

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Estimates in respect of special political missions

Second report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the proposed programme budget for 2022

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Special political missions

Thematic cluster I

Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi*

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Thematic cluster II

Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms

Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Panel of Experts on Libya

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

Panel of Experts on Yemen

Panel of Experts on South Sudan

Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#)

Implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Panel of Experts on Mali

Panel of Experts on Somalia

Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD)

Thematic cluster III**Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions**

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)*

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)

United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA)

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH)

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

* Mission mandates concluded in 2020 and 2021 (see para. 7 of the present report).

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 24 September 2021.

2. The Secretary-General, in addendum 1 to section 3, Political affairs, of his report on the proposed programme budget for 2022 ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)), provides an overview of the proposed resource requirements for 2022 for 38 special political missions and related cross-cutting issues. Detailed information in respect of each special political mission is contained in five addenda to section 3 of the proposed programme budget.¹ The addenda cover the specific requirements for thematic clusters I to III, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

3. With regard to the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar (cluster I), whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly, its resource requirements are included in the report of the Secretary-General under cluster I, in order to consolidate the overall resource requirements for all special political missions, while the mandate of the Office will be brought to the attention of the Assembly, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

4. With regard to UNAMA, the Security Council, in its resolution [2596 \(2021\)](#), decided to extend the mandate of the Mission for six months until 17 March 2022. At the time of writing, the Advisory Committee was awaiting information from the Secretary-General on any implications of that resolution on the proposed budget for 2022 for UNAMA. The comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee are contained in its related report ([A/76/7/Add.5](#)).

5. In the present report, the Advisory Committee addresses issues of a cross-cutting nature pertaining to special political missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2022, while its specific comments and recommendations relating to the budget proposals for thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI are presented in separate related reports.²

Status of mission mandates and missions concluded during 2020 and 2021

6. The status of the 38 missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2022 are contained in his report ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 6). Taking into account recent decisions on mandate extensions by the Security Council,³ the status of the mandates of the missions are as follows:

- (a) 12 missions have open-ended mandates;
- (b) 19 missions have mandates renewed or extended into 2022 or later;

¹ [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#), [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.3](#), [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.5](#) and [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.6](#).

² [A/76/7/Add.2](#), [A/76/7/Add.3](#), [A/76/7/Add.4](#), [A/76/7/Add.5](#) and [A/76/7/Add.6](#).

³ Relating to UNAMI, the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UNITAMS, the Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UNMHA, the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic, the Panel of Experts on Mali, UNSOM, UNAMA, UNITAD, UNSMIL and UNOCA in resolutions [2576 \(2021\)](#), [2577 \(2021\)](#), [2579 \(2021\)](#), [2582 \(2021\)](#), [2586 \(2021\)](#), [2588 \(2021\)](#), [2590 \(2021\)](#), [2592 \(2021\)](#), [2596 \(2021\)](#), [2597 \(2021\)](#), [2599 \(2021\)](#) and letter dated 6 August 2021 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2021/720](#)).

(c) 7 missions have mandates that are anticipated to be extended into 2022 or later.

7. With respect to mission mandates concluded during 2020 and 2021, the Secretary-General reports that (*ibid.*, paras. 7 and 8):

(a) Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) concluded on 31 December 2020 and the liquidation activities were completed on 28 February 2021;

(b) For the Office of the Special Envoy for Burundi, the Security Council took note of his report on the strategic assessment mission (see [S/2020/1078](#), annex) and looked forward to the Secretary-General covering Burundi as part of his regular reporting on the Great Lakes region and Central Africa. Following bilateral discussions in early 2021, the Secretariat and the Government of Burundi agreed that the Office of the Special Envoy would be closed by 31 May 2021 and that its liquidation would be completed by 30 June 2021 (see [S/2021/323](#)). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Office of the Special Envoy for Burundi was closed on 31 May 2021 and that in-country liquidation activities were successfully completed by 30 June 2021, with the exception of some minor administrative and human resources issues that required further time to resolve. Responsibility for the finalization of those residual issues was formally transferred to the Department of Operational Support at the closure of in-mission activities.

Budgeting for special political missions

8. The Advisory Committee recalls that, with the change from the biennial to the annual programme budget on a trial basis (see [A/74/7/Add.1](#), paras. 6–10), the total resource requirements of special political missions are now derived from the actual resource estimates of the individual missions (contained in addenda 2–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2022), which are included within the overall resource level proposed for 2022 by the Secretary-General (see [A/76/6 \(Introduction\)](#)).

9. In addition, for UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (thematic cluster III), the Secretary-General indicates in his report that in its resolutions [2570 \(2021\)](#) and [2574 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council expanded the mandates of the two missions to new areas of work. Owing to the timing of the resolutions, which were adopted on 16 April and 11 May 2021, respectively, the Secretariat was still assessing the resource implications of implementing the additional mandated activities, and will present proposals at a later stage, through the established procedures, as necessary ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), paras. 248 and 281). Furthermore, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Security Council adopted resolution [2579 \(2021\)](#) on 3 June 2021, in which the Council decided that UNITAMS (cluster III) should prioritize support to ceasefire monitoring in Darfur. The Committee was informed that that would give rise to additional resource requirements. The Committee notes that if submitted by the Secretary-General, the proposals for further resources for the three missions would represent additional resource requirements over the level of the proposed programme budget for 2022. The Committee's comments and recommendations pertaining to those proposals would be contained in its separate related reports.

10. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2022 (see [A/76/7](#), chap. I), the Advisory Committee made comments and recommendations, including on the budget methodology, format and presentation, as well as on policy matters, which also apply to the reports of the Secretary-General on the estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1–6](#)).

II. Overview of resource requirements for 2022

A. Budget performance for 2020 and 2021

11. As reflected in table 7 of the main report of the Secretary-General for special political missions (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1), total expenditure for 2020 amounted to \$700,323,100 (or 98.4 per cent) against the approved resources of \$711,781,800 for the year (see A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 7). The Advisory Committee notes that underexpenditure amounted to \$11,458,700 (or 1.6 per cent). Information on expenditure for 2020 by mission and by major component is provided in tables 7 and 8 of that report.

12. The Advisory Committee requested information on expenditure incurred for danger pay by special political missions, prior to and during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic when some staff were working remotely during 2020 (see table 1 below). The Committee notes that, compared with the total number of 2,106 staff members who received danger pay prior to the pandemic, 1,759 staff members received such payment as at 31 December 2020.

Table 1
Expenditure on danger pay in 2020

(Thousands of United States dollars)

			Number of staff receiving danger pay	
	2020 appropriation for danger pay	2020 expenditure for danger pay	Prior to coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic	As at 31 December 2020
Cluster I				
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	402.3	285.8	41	40
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	22.3	25.7	2	2
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	689.0	343.2	44	40
Cluster II				
Panel of Experts on Yemen	89.3	59.7	7	5
United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	1 257.3	781.0	52	17
Cluster III				
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	2 883.4	1 639.2	251	145
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	3 765.2	1 206.2	110	84
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	1 192.7	524.6	61	61
UNAMA and UNAMI				
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	10 662.5	8 395.4	1017	888
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	5 273.9	4 335.1	521	477
Total	26 237.9	17 595.9	2 106	1 759

13. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee received information on the budget performance for the first six months of 2021 for the special political missions. As at

30 June 2021, total expenditures amounted to \$331,233,700 (or 45 per cent) against the appropriation of \$730,359,800 for the period. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on the actual budget performance, including information by mission and by major component, will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

B. Resource requirements for 2022

14. The overall resource requirements proposed for 38 special political missions for 2022 amount to \$730,666,300 net for 2022, inclusive of the provision of \$1,742,200 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, for the 2021/22 peacekeeping financial period (see paras. 16 and 17 below). Compared with the total resources approved for special political missions for 2021, the resource level proposed for 2022 represents an increase of \$306,500 (or 0.04 per cent). As shown in table 5 of the main report of the Secretary-General, excluding the discontinued missions, the proposed resources for the continuing missions for 2022 represent an increase of \$7,057,200 (or 1 per cent). The Advisory Committee requested and received a revised table 5 to show disaggregated information for the two discontinued missions (see table 2 below; see also para. 4 above).

Table 2
Summary of estimated requirements for 2022

	2021 Appropriation ^a	2022 Requirement	Variance	
			Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)=(3)/(1)
Continuing missions				
Cluster I	49 486.6	50 739.8	1 253.2	2.5
Cluster II	60 838.7	61 926.5	1 087.8	1.8
Cluster III	375 589.6	382 938.9	7 349.3	2.0
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	136 875.2	135 139.2	(1 736.0)	(1.3)
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	99 076.8	98 179.7	(897.1)	(0.9)
Subtotal (net)	721 866.9	728 924.1	7 057.2	1.0
Provision for the share of special political missions for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda	1 412.4	1 742.2	329.8	23.4
Discontinued missions				
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi	6 090.6	–	6 090.6	(100.0)
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	989.9	–	989.9	(100.0)
Subtotal (net)	7 080.5	–	(7 080.5)	(100.0)
Total (net)	730 359.8	730 666.3	306.5	0.0

^a The appropriation for 2021 of \$730,359,800 includes: an amount of \$729,624,600 approved in the context of special political missions under General Assembly resolution 75/253 A (sect. XVIII, para. 3); and an amount of \$735,200 approved in the context of the decisions and recommendations contained in the report of the International Civil Service Commission for the year 2020, under Assembly resolution 75/253 A (sect. VI).

15. The main report of the Secretary-General also contains a summary of mission-by-mission estimates for 2022 (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 7) and requirements by

major component (ibid., table 8). Information with respect to the resource changes for 2022 by thematic cluster is discussed in paragraphs 96 to 100 of the report.

16. The proposed overall resources for 2022 include a provision of \$1,742,200 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for the 2021/22 peacekeeping financial period. As reflected in table 2 above, the proposed provision reflects an increase of \$329,800 (or 23.4 per cent), owing to: (a) the transfer of the Global Procurement Support Section to the Centre as a tenant unit;⁴ and (b) the increase in the share of special political missions in the cost of the Centre, from 3.8 per cent for 2020/21 period to 4.3 per cent for the 2021/22 period, attributable mainly to the addition of UNITAMS as a new client mission, as well as the drawdown of UNAMID (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 50).

17. Given the timing of his main report, the Secretary-General indicates that the proposed amount of the share of special political missions for the Regional Service Centre would be subject to a final adjustment in accordance with the decision by the General Assembly in the context of the budget of the Centre for the 2021/22 period (ibid., para. 51). **The Advisory Committee trusts that an update will be provided to the General Assembly with respect to the final adjustment to the share of the special political missions for the Regional Service Centre based on the approved budget of the Centre at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

Staffing requirements for 2022

18. In his main report, the Secretary-General states that the number of civilian personnel proposed for 2022 reflects an overall decrease of 38 positions, from 4,482 for 2021 to 4,444 for 2022, as a result of the discontinuation of 57 positions in two closed missions, a reduction of 20 positions in cluster III and a reduction of 3 positions in UNAMI, offset by an increase of 6 positions in cluster I and an increase of 36 positions in UNAMA (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 103). The Advisory Committee notes that excluding the 57 positions of the two discontinued missions (see para. 7 above), the proposed staffing level for continuing missions represents a net increase of 19 positions for 2022 (see also para. 4 above).

19. A breakdown of the proposed changes in civilian positions in the missions for 2022 is provided in annex XVII of the main report of the Secretary-General, while information on the staffing requirements for each is contained in table 10 of the report. The comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the proposed staffing requirements for individual missions are contained in its related reports (A/76/7/Add.2–6).

Budgeting for the positions of double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and related support capacity in integrated missions

20. The Advisory Committee recalls that it made comments and recommendations concerning the budgeting for the positions of resident coordinators in the reinvigorated system and related support capacity in structurally integrated special political missions, for which the double- or triple-hatted deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General continued to serve as resident coordinators and/or humanitarian coordinators (see A/75/7/Add.2, paras. 21–23; A/74/7/Add.1, paras. 26–34). At that time, the Committee was not convinced of the continuation of the existing support capacity levels in a few missions, in particular UNAMI (see A/75/7/Add.2, para. 21). The Committee further recalls that changes in related support staff capacity had been made: (a) for 2020, the abolishment of three positions

⁴ The transfer was approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 75/294.

in UNAMA and the reclassification of one position from the P-5 level to the P-4 level in UNSOM; and (b) for 2021, abolishment of one P-4 position and the reclassification of one position from the P-5 level to the P-4 level in UNAMI.

21. The Secretary-General reports that seven special political missions, namely UNSOM, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, UNSMIL, BINUH, UNITAMS, UNAMA and UNAMI, have Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (Deputy Special Coordinator for the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon), who serve as resident coordinators and/or humanitarian coordinators. The salaries and common staff costs related to those positions are budgeted at 50 per cent of the total cost in the budgets of the respective missions, with the other 50 per cent funded from the budget of the resident coordinator system ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 107). The Secretary-General indicates that during the preparation of the proposed budget for 2022, the Secretariat reviewed the staffing and capacities in the respective offices of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the seven integrated missions. The proposals for UNAMI for 2022 are to abolish one position at the P-3 level, reclassify one position from the P-4 level to the P-3 level and convert two positions at the P-3 level to National Professional Officer. The Secretary-General also indicates that other missions have not identified further adjustments to staffing in 2022 in view of the continual needs for such capacities (*ibid.*, paras. 108–111).

22. Concerning UNSMIL, the Advisory Committee notes from the report of the Secretary-General that organizational changes proposed for 2022 include the renaming of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator) as the Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, with the concurrent reassignment of the position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Assistant Secretary-General) as Resident Coordinator (Assistant Secretary-General), in line with Security Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) (see [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), paras. 244 (d) and 245 (l)). However, the Committee further notes that irrespective of the proposed changes in the functions of the current Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, provisions continue to be proposed for 2022 in the Mission budget for the position of the Resident Coordinator who would no longer function as the Deputy Special Representative, along with four support positions (2 P-4, 1 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer) currently in the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator). **Taking into account the proposed organizational change, the Advisory Committee is of the view that the position of the Resident Coordinator should not be budgeted under the Mission in accordance with General Assembly resolution [72/279](#). Furthermore, the four support positions (2 P-4, 1 Field Service, 1 National Professional Officer) in the current Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator) should no longer continue for 2022.** The Committee discusses the matter further in its related report ([A/76/7/Add.4](#)).

23. The Advisory Committee received, upon request, information showing current support staff capacity in the Offices of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Deputy Special Coordinator) in the seven missions in which the Deputy Special Representative/Deputy Special Coordinator is double- or triple-hatted as Resident Coordinator and/or Humanitarian Coordinator, along with such information on member organizations of the country team and their international staff (see table 3 below).

Table 3

Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in integrated missions

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Special political mission resources for Office of Deputy Special Representative of Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator</i>	<i>Member organizations of United Nations country team under leadership of resident coordinator</i>	<i>Number and grade level of staff members of organizations in country team</i>
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	12 (4 P-4, 3 P-5, 1 P-3, 1 FS, 3 NPO)	DSS, FAO, IFAD, ILO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	24 representatives of UNCT organizations (6 D-2, 6 D-1, 7 P-5, 4 P-4 and 1 NPO)
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	(See note below)	DSS, ESCWA, FAO, ILO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNIC (Beirut), UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNRWA, UNSCOL, UNTSO, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO	26 representatives of UNCT organizations (1 USG, 2 ASG, 4 D-2, 5 D-1, 7 P-5, 3 P-4 and 4 NPO)
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	4 (2 P-4, 1 FS, 1 NPO)	FAO, IFAD, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	19 representatives of UNCT organizations (15 D-1, 4 P-5)
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	2 (1 P-4, 1 FS)	DSS, FAO, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, PAHO/WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP, World Bank	20 representatives of UNCT organizations (9D-1, 1 P-6, 8 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 NPO)
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	5 (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 FS, 1 NPO)	DSS, FAO, IAEA, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO	25 (4 D-2, 6 D-1, 8 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 5 NPO)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	3 (1 P-3, 1 NPO, 1 LL)	FAO, IFAD, ILO, IOM, ITC, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS,	24 representatives of UNCT organizations (5 D-2, 10 D-1, 6 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 NPO)

Mission	<i>Special political mission resources for Office of Deputy Special Representative of Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator</i>	<i>Member organizations of United Nations country team under leadership of resident coordinator</i>	<i>Number and grade level of staff members of organizations in country team</i>
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	3 (1 P-4, 1 FS, 1 LL)	UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank DSS, ESCWA, FAO, IFC, ILO, IMF, IOM, ITC, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	25 representatives of UNCT organizations (3 D-2, 11 D-1, 1 P-6, 8 P-5, 2 P-3)

Note: The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon does not have an Office of the Deputy Special Coordinator. Given that the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator is a “single pillar” mission, the Deputy Special Coordinator is integrated into the front office of the Special Coordinator insofar as her mission functions (including officer-in-charge) are concerned. In this context, the mission’s Coordination Unit, as with its other units, supports both the Special Coordinator and the Deputy Special Coordinator, according to their joint mission requirements. The coordination officers of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator focus on political files that require coordination with members of the United Nations country team and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, and with external interlocutors, such as embassies and government institutions. For non-mission resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator functions, the Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator is supported by the Resident Coordinator Office and the offices of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that are not part of the structure of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator.

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; ESCWA, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; FS, Field Service; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IFAD, International Fund for Agricultural Development; IFC, International Finance Corporation; ILO, International Labour Organization; IOM, International Organization for Migration; ITC, International Trade Centre; LL, local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights; OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; PAHO/WHO, Pan American Health Organization; UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; UNCT, United Nations country team; UNCDF, United Nations Capital Development Fund; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Programme; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund; UN-Habitat, United Nations Human Settlements Programme; UNHCR, Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees; UNIC (Beirut), United Nations information centre in Beirut; UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; UNITAR, United Nations Institute for Training and Research; UNMAS, Mine Action Service; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UNOPS, United Nations Office for Project Services; UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; USG, Under-Secretary General; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNV, United Nations Volunteers; UN-Women, United Nations Entity for Gender and the Empowerment of Women; WFP, World Food Programme; WHO, World Health Organization.

24. The Advisory Committee notes from table 3 above that UNSOM has a total of 12 support staff working in the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator), compared with a capacity ranging from 2 to 5 such staff in other integrated missions. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Mission will assess the related support staff capacity and report on it in the next budget submission.** The Committee discusses the matter further in its related report ([A/76/7/Add.4](#)).

25. **The Advisory Committee recalls that in its resolution 75/253 A (sect. XVIII), the General Assembly endorsed its recommendation and requested the Secretary-General to continue to review, and adjust as appropriate, the relevant**

organizational structures and support capacity in the offices of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the integrated special political missions. The Committee reiterates that the Secretary-General should ensure that the arrangements proposed for the double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the related support capacity in the integrated missions are consistent with the provisions of Assembly resolution 72/279 (A/75/7/Add.2, para. 23; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 34).

26. On a related matter, the Advisory Committee also sought information with respect to lessons learned from the transfer of functions of closed missions to the new resident coordinator system, including any improvements as a result of the new resident coordinator system. It was informed that the transfer of functions from UNIOGBIS to the resident coordinator system had gone smoothly, benefitting from the following factors: (a) the integrated mission setting allowed the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator to serve as the bridge between UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team; (b) the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator, as Officer-in-Charge of the mission, assumed the full leadership of the transition process, enabling mission staff to focus on the practical and technical aspects of the liquidation; and (c) the continued presence of the Resident Coordinator and his ongoing role with the United Nations country team enabled improved coordination with agencies, funds and programmes present in Guinea-Bissau throughout the liquidation process. The Committee was also informed that, while each liquidation scenario was unique, and therefore might not always require the close engagement of the resident coordinator, it was of considerable benefit during the closure of UNIOGBIS. **The Advisory Committee trusts that information, including lessons learned, on transfer of functions of closed missions to the resident coordinator system will be provided in the context of future budget submissions.**

Budgeting for the positions of mine action programme managers in the field

27. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that in response to the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of Auditors, and in order to strengthen its programme delivery and oversight, the Mine Action Service is proposing that the heads of mine action components in the four field operations (1 D-1 in UNSOM, 1 P-5 in UNSMIL, 1 P-4 in UNMHA and 1 P-4 in UNITAMS) be deployed on Secretariat contracts for 2022 (to be reflected in the staffing table of the respective missions, rather than under non-post resources through the current arrangement with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)). Resources for staff working in field mine action programmes will continue to be budgeted under non-post resources through partnership with UNOPS (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 112–115).

28. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that to address the deficiencies identified by both the Board of Auditors and OIOS in the Mine Action Service-UNOPS delivery model, the proposed establishment of the positions for mine action programme managers in the staffing tables of the missions was a much-needed correction that was long overdue, rather than a pre-emption of the independent review recommended by the Board. The Committee was also informed that, when comparing the standard costs (with 100 per cent incumbency rate), the difference would be \$147,200 higher through UNOPS contracts based on the rates of 2021 financial agreements signed between the Secretariat and UNOPS (see table 4 below). With respect to potential financial implications for 2022, the Committee was informed that if the General Assembly decided against the approval of the four new positions, there would be an increase of \$664,000 to the proposed programme budget for 2022, representing the removal of \$523,400 proposed under civilian personnel costs

(reflecting a 50 per cent incumbency rate budgeted for 2022) and the reinstatement of \$1,187,400 under operational costs (other supplies, services and equipment through UNOPS) (see table 5 below).

Table 4

Comparison of standard costs: Secretariat and United Nations Office for Project Services

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Duty station	Special political mission	Grade	Secretariat	United Nations Office for Project Services			Savings
			Annual cost ^a	Annual cost ^b	Fee ^c	Total	
Mogadishu	UNSOM	D-1	294.9	299.1	24.4	323.5	(28.6)
Tripoli	UNSMIL	P-5	256.5	250.7	20.4	271.1	(14.6)
Hudaydah	UNMHA	P-4	204.9	242.3	19.7	262.0	(57.1)
Khartoum	UNITAMS	P-4	283.9	305.8	24.9	330.7	(46.8)
Total			1 040.2	1 097.9	89.5	1 187.4	(147.2)

^a Includes net salary and common staff costs budgeted at a 100 per cent incumbency rate for the corresponding duty station and danger pay for 11 months.

^b Based on rates of 2021 financial agreements signed between the Secretariat and UNOPS.

^c Includes locally and centrally managed direct costs (3 per cent) and indirect costs (5 per cent).

Table 5

Financial implications in budget for 2022

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Duty station	Special political mission	Grade	Secretariat	United Nations Office for Project Services			Budget savings for 2022
			Budget for 2022 ^a	Annual cost ^b	Fee ^c	Total	
Mogadishu	UNSOM	D-1	148.3	299.1	24.4	323.5	(175.2)
Tripoli	UNSMIL	P-5	129.1	250.7	20.4	271.1	(142.1)
Hudaydah	UNMHA	P-4	103.3	242.3	19.7	262.0	(158.8)
Khartoum	UNITAMS	P-4	142.8	305.8	24.9	330.7	(188.0)
Total			523.4	1 097.9	89.5	1 187.4	(664.0)

^a Includes net salary, common staff costs budgeted at a 50 per cent incumbency rate for the corresponding duty station and danger pay for six months.

^b Based on rates of 2021 financial agreements signed between the Secretariat and UNOPS.

^c Includes locally and centrally managed direct costs (3 per cent) and indirect costs (5 per cent).

29. The Advisory Committee recalls that in its review of the proposed budgets for peacekeeping operations (A/75/822, para. 64), it reiterated its concerns about the management of mine action activities in missions and looked forward to the findings of the independent review of the cost-effectiveness and efficient implementation of mine action in peacekeeping operations, and emphasized that the proposed resources for mine action should be comprehensive and based on a full and transparent cost-benefit analysis and implementation plan. **The Advisory Committee therefore recommends that the General Assembly approve the four positions of mine action programme managers under general temporary assistance for 2022 and request the Secretary-General to review the mine action programmes in the four special political missions, including their respective staffing requirements and appropriate management levels, with a view to improving accountability and**

efficiency, and report the outcome in the proposed programme budget for 2023. The Committee discusses the matter further in its related report ([A/76/7/Add.4](#)).

30. In his report, the Secretary-General further indicates that the Mine Action Service will continue to serve as the Secretariat's service provider, engaging with UNOPS in accordance with the umbrella memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and UNOPS. The Mine Action Service is also intensely engaged in efforts to tighten the partnership and contribute to the revision of the memorandum of understanding, in order to ensure that it is a value-for-money proposition ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 115). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Secretariat would continue to address issues in the process of formulating a new memorandum of understanding with UNOPS. **The Advisory Committee looks forward to an update on the revision of the memorandum of understanding and findings of the independent review (see para. 29 above) in the next budget submission.**

Nationalization of positions

31. In his report, the Secretary-General proposes that a total of 19 positions be nationalized for 2022, including 1 in the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, 3 in UNMHA, 6 in UNITAMS, 3 in UNAMA and 6 in UNAMI ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 59). The Advisory Committee notes that the proposal of nationalizing 19 positions for 2022 represents an increase, compared with the nationalization of 4 positions for 2021, 7 for 2020, 5 for 2019, 2 for 2018, 1 for 2017 and 12 for 2016 ([A/75/7/Add.2](#), table 8). **The Advisory Committee recognizes the progress in the nationalization of international positions in special political missions and trusts that continued efforts will be made. The Committee recalls that, further to its resolutions 61/276 and 66/264, the General Assembly, in its resolution 74/263, requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to promote the nationalization of positions, whenever appropriate, as well as to build local capacity within the special political missions and to report thereon in the context of future budget submissions (resolution 74/263, sect. XVIII, para. 9).**

32. The Secretary-General states in his report that, in February 2020, the Department of Operational Support reissued two guidelines⁵ and that updated guidelines on nationalization are currently under review, with issuance planned for mid-2021 ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 58). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the updates were still being finalized, as the Department had tried to incorporate inputs from stakeholders to develop a richer product with more added value, but in doing so, the review process had extended beyond the original timeline foreseen. It was expected that the updated guidelines would be promulgated by the end of the third quarter. **The Advisory Committee trusts that information on the issuance and implementation of the updated guidelines will be provided in the context of the next budget submission of the special political missions.**

33. In addition, the Advisory Committee was provided information, upon enquiry, on international and national United Nations Volunteers working in special political missions (see table 6 below). The Committee notes from the table that the total number of international United Nations Volunteers would decrease from 236 for 2021 to 219 for 2022, while national United Nations Volunteers would increase from 28 for 2021 to 57 for 2022.

⁵ Previously issued by the Department of Field Support in November 2018 and July 2016, respectively, relating to (a) workforce planning guidelines on nationalization; and (b) guidelines for the selection of locally recruited staff members in United Nations peacekeeping operations and special political missions (as the staff selection system established under [ST/AI/2010/3](#) does not cover national staff in those field operations).

Table 6
United Nations Volunteers in special political missions

	Approved United Nations Volunteers, 2021		Proposed United Nations Volunteers, 2022	
	International	National	International	National
United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	8	–	8	–
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	38	–	18	–
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	6	–	6	–
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	109	22	109	22
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	7	4	7	4
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	68	–	71	29
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	–	2	–	2
Total	236	28	219	57

Vacancy rates, vacant positions and special post allowance

34. Information on vacancy rates experienced in 2020, approved for 2021 and experienced as at 31 March 2021, and proposed for 2022 by mission, is contained in annex XV to the main report of the Secretary-General (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1). The Secretary-General indicates that, in general, the proposed rates for 2022 reflect the actual average vacancy rate for the period from 1 January to December 2020. In cases in which the average vacancy rate for civilian staff positions in 2020 was nil, a rate of 5 per cent is usually proposed, taking into account the possible turnover of existing staff (*ibid.*, para. 116). **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on vacancy rates experienced during 2021 will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

35. With respect to vacant positions, the Secretary-General indicates that liquidity constraints during 2020 resulted in mitigation measures that placed on hold recruitment activities under the regular budget, which has led to a noticeable increase in the number of positions vacant for more than one year, compared with the number reported in the previous period. Recruitment activities have resumed in 2021, but in a gradual manner owing to the remaining uncertainty and cumulative arrears. The Advisory Committee notes that, for example, there were 83 vacant positions in UNAMI as at 30 June 2021, compared with 67 vacant positions a year ago, and that numbers of vacant national positions were much higher in some missions under cluster III, including UNSOM and UNMHA. **While it notes the impact of the recruitment freeze and the COVID-19 pandemic on recruitment activities, the Advisory Committee reiterates its recommendations, endorsed by the General Assembly, that vacant posts should be filled expeditiously (see A/76/7, chap. I, para. 46; A/75/7/Add.2, para. 25; and para. 65 below).** The Committee discusses the matter further in its related report (A/76/7/Add.4).

36. The Secretary-General further indicates that, in keeping with the practice of other sections of the proposed programme budget, information on positions vacant and encumbered through special post allowances for more than one year is included in the supplementary information for each thematic cluster. Specific comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on positions vacant and encumbered

through special post allowances for individual missions are reflected, as appropriate, in its related report (A/76/7/Add.2–6).

Operational costs for 2022

37. The proposed resources under operational costs amount to \$256,203,500 for 2022, representing a decrease of \$2,839,300 (or 1.1 per cent), compared with the provision for 2021 (excluding closed missions) (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, table 8). Upon request, the Advisory Committee received a revised table 8 with information on appropriation for 2020 and 2021 expenditure as at 30 June. The related information on operational costs contained therein is provided in table 7 below.

Table 7
Operational costs

Category of expenditure	2020		2021		2022	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	January–June Expenditure	Requirement	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)-(3)	(7) = (6)/(3)
Operational costs							
1. Experts	13 844.6	13 277.3	13 367.5	9 693.8	13 450.5	83.0	0.6
2. Consultants and consulting services	4 093.1	1 912.0	3 302.5	748.3	3 094.6	(207.9)	(6.3)
3. Official travel	17 986.7	4 501.4	14 524.8	3 082.9	14 309.5	(215.3)	(1.5)
4. Facilities and infrastructure	98 439.4	105 828.4	96 443.1	45 439.2	98 908.6	2 465.5	2.6
5. Ground transportation	10 696.6	11 726.1	8 943.9	3 856.5	8 585.0	(358.9)	(4.0)
6. Air operations	53 601.6	43 920.9	56 722.4	21 173.9	51 823.8	(4 898.6)	(8.6)
7. Marine operations	402.0	224.5	325.5	85.3	321.6	(3.9)	(1.2)
8. Communications and information technology	36 141.5	39 820.9	33 042.2	15 971.0	35 094.0	2 051.8	6.2
9. Medical	9 051.9	6 353.4	11 578.1	2 600.6	10 273.8	(1 304.3)	(11.3)
10. Other supplies, services and equipment	18 056.5	26 290.2	20 792.8	8 225.4	20 342.1	(450.7)	(2.2)
Total	262 313.9	253 855.1	259 042.8	110 876.8	256 203.5	(2 839.3)	(1.1)

38. The Advisory Committee discusses cross-cutting issues in the present section, and its specific comments and recommendations on proposed requirements under operational costs for 2022 for individual missions are provided in its related reports (A/76/7/Add.2–6).

Official travel and compliance with the policy for advance booking of air travel

39. The overall resources proposed for official travel for 2022 amount to \$14,309,500, representing a decrease of \$215,300 (or 1.5 per cent), compared with the approved resources for 2021. The Secretary-General indicates that the proposed level of resources under official travel for 2022 reflects a reduction of 20.5 per cent, compared to the approved budget for 2020 (pre-pandemic level) (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 78). The proposed resources for official travel for 2022 reflect: (a) decreases for 10 missions (2 under cluster I, 1 under cluster II, 7 under cluster III, including UNAMA and UNAMI); and (b) small increases for 15 missions (3 under cluster I, 7 under cluster II and 5 under cluster III). Information on the proposed

official travel resources for 2022 by mission and cluster is contained in annex XIII to the main report of the Secretary-General.

40. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that a straight-line approach towards reduction would not have been feasible, given the unique contexts and mandate delivery modalities of the missions that could be very different. The size (hence the overall level of resources available) of a mission would also have an effect on the extent to which resource reductions could be achieved without having an impact on mandate delivery effectiveness. It was therefore not a coincidence that most of the missions that had increases were smaller missions with a lower level of resources. The Committee was also informed that for 2020 expenditures amounted to \$4.5 million against the provision of \$18 million, and that for 2021 expenditures amounted to \$3.1 million as at 30 June against the provision of \$14.5 million. **The Advisory Committee trusts that, in applying lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic, travel for workshops, conferences or meetings would be kept to a minimum and more use would be made of virtual meetings and online training tools (A/76/7, chap. I, para. 67).** The Committee makes specific comments and recommendations relating to travel resources for individual missions in its related reports (A/76/7/Add.2–6).

41. Information on the annual rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy by mission is contained in annex XIV to the main report of the Secretary-General. The Advisory Committee has discussed the persistent low rates of compliance with the policy by special political missions (A/75/7/Add.2, para. 31; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 42; A/73/498, paras. 32–34; A/72/7/Add.10, para. 37; A/71/595, para. 32; and A/70/7/Add.10, para. 37). The Committee notes from annex XIV that for 2020, 9 of the 40 missions reached compliance rates of 50 per cent or higher, compared with 5 for 2019, 7 for 2018 and 5 for 2017. **While it notes the slight increase in the number of missions with higher rates of compliance for 2020, the Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution 74/262, expressed concern at the low rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive and requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to further enhance the rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive across all travel categories, taking into account the patterns and nature of official travel and the reasons for non-compliance by each department, office and field mission (see A/75/7/Add.2, para. 32).**

Air operations

42. The proposed resource requirements for air operations amount to \$51,823,800 for 2022, reflecting an overall decrease of \$4,898,600 (or 8.6 per cent), compared with the provision approved for 2021. Of the 12 missions with air operations resources proposed for 2022, 5 reflect reduced requirements (Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNSOM, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNMHA and UNAMA), while 1 (UNITAMS) reflects increased resources owing to the full-year provision for 2022 (six months for 2021) (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 73–75). Annex VII to the report of the Secretary-General provides information on air operations resources and flight hours, by mission, from 2020 to 2022.

43. In response to the request of the Advisory Committee for information on special flights in its previous report (A/75/7/Add.2, para. 34), a new annex (annex VIII) was included in the report of the Secretary-General (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1), which provides information on special flights undertaken in special political missions in the performance and current periods, as well as estimates for the 2022 budget period, along with justifications. The Committee also received additional information on special flights outside of mission areas during 2020 and 2021, with their destinations,

dates, number of passengers and crew, as well as costs. **The Advisory Committee notes the inclusion of the new annex on special flights and trusts that related information will be provided in the next budget submission.**

Communications and information technology

44. The proposed provision under communications and information technology amounts to \$35,094,000 for 2022, representing an increase of \$2,051,800 (or 6.2 per cent), compared with the resources approved for 2021 (excluding discontinued missions). As shown in annex X to the report of the Secretary-General, the proposed higher requirements for 2022 reflect proposed increases for 24 missions and proposed decreases for 8 missions, while the proposed resources for 6 missions remain unchanged. **Taking into consideration the need for a comprehensive view and approach to investment in information and communications technology (ICT) resources through the submission of a capital investment plan for ICT operations (see A/76/7, para. VIII.62; and para. 46 below), the Advisory Committee recommends a reduction of 5 per cent (\$1,754,700) to the proposed resources of \$35,094,000 under communications and information technology for 2022.**

45. As requested by the Advisory Committee in its previous report (A/75/7/Add.2, paras. 36 and 37), two new annexes are included in the report of the Secretary-General to provide for consolidated information on financial and human resources for communications and information technology (annex X), and acquisition of satellite imagery with justifications (annex IX) in special political missions. In addition, in response to the observation of the Committee on the budgeting of the acquisition of satellite imagery, the Secretary-General indicates that to ensure consistency with the practice of peacekeeping missions, those resources were now budgeted under “communications and information technology” in the proposed budget for special political missions for 2022 (rather than under “other supplies, services and equipment” as in previous years) (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, annex I). **The Advisory Committee welcomes the inclusion of the consolidated information on financial and human resources under communications and information technology, and the consistency applied in budgeting for the acquisition of satellite imagery for 2022 in the special political missions.**

46. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that while the Office of Information and Communications Technology issued the budget guidelines for field technology operations for peacekeeping operations and special political missions on an annual basis, the percentages for replacement of communications and information technology equipment had not been strictly adhered to owing to liquidity constraints in recent years, resulting in a backlog of equipment that had passed useful life. For instance, UNAMA held a total of 4,311 items of ICT equipment (in use), out of which 2,811 (in use) had exceeded their life expectancy. In view of the increasing reliance on ICT technology and infrastructure for mandate delivery, actions were being taken by many missions to replace aging ICT equipment. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2022, the Committee had discussed matters related to communications and information technology (A/76/7, chap. I, paras. 69–72). **The Advisory Committee reiterates the importance of upgrading obsolete information and communications technology equipment, and trusts that the Secretary-General will provide consolidated information on the status of the upgrading of such equipment in the context of the next proposed programme budget (ibid., para. 72). The Committee looks forward to further consideration of consolidated information on the status of upgrading obsolete ICT equipment in the capital investment plan at the seventy-seventh session (see A/76/7, para. VIII.56).**

Standard ratios for vehicles and information technology equipment

47. In his main report, the Secretary-General indicates that the vehicle and information technology equipment holdings of special political missions have been reviewed and aligned, where possible, with the standard ratios promulgated in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual. The holdings are proposed on the basis of the anticipated personnel incumbency levels planned for 2022, as opposed to the full authorized level of personnel (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 66 and 67). As reflected in table 2 of the report, the overall allocation of vehicles proposed for 2022 is 2.3 per cent lower than the standard ratio, compared with the lower-than-standard ratio of 10 per cent proposed for 2021 and higher-than-standard ratios of 5.1 per cent and 16.4 per cent for 2020 and 2019, respectively (see A/75/7/Add.2, para. 39). The Advisory Committee notes that the overall lower-than-standard ratio for 2022 reflects lower-than-standard ratios proposed for eight missions, standard ratios for six missions and higher-than-standard ratios for five missions⁶ for which justifications for each mission are provided in paragraph 68 of the main report of the Secretary-General. The Committee also received information on actual vehicle holdings by mission.

48. The overall allocation of information technology equipment proposed for 2022 is 1.5 per cent higher than the standard ratio, compared with higher-than-standard ratios of 4.6 per cent, 5.6 per cent and 4.9 per cent proposed for 2021, 2020 and 2019, respectively (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 70 and table 3). The Advisory Committee notes that the reduced overall ratio for 2022 reflects the application of standard ratio for 31 missions (compared with 27 for 2021), higher ratios for 5 missions⁷ (compared with 11 for 2021), and lower ratios for 2 missions (compared with nil). The Secretary-General indicates in his report that the 1.5 per cent higher-than-standard allocation for 2022 is attributable to factors such as the need to provide for consultants and individual contractors, training facilities, Internet cafés, information technology maintenance services, CarLog systems, programming of the radios and other fieldwork. **The Advisory Committee notes the absence of specific justifications for the five missions with the application of higher-than-standard ratios for information technology equipment for 2022.**

49. **The Advisory Committee reiterates that, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 74/263, the Secretary-General will continue to ensure that actual allocations of vehicles and information technology equipment will be regularly reviewed and aligned with the standard ratios, and that specific justification for higher allocations by missions will be provided in the context of future budget submissions (A/75/7/Add.2, para. 43).**

III. General observations and recommendations

Backstopping support to special political missions at Headquarters

50. With respect to backstopping support positions at Headquarters funded from special political mission budgets (see A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, annex III), compared with 53 such positions approved for 2021, a total of 51 positions are proposed for 2022, reflecting a decrease of two positions (1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) owing to the closure of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-

⁶ United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions, UNITAD, United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and BINUH.

⁷ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNITAD, UNOWAS, UNSMIL.

General for Burundi (UNIOGBIS had no backstopping positions). The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that following the management reform, the preparation of budgets for the special political missions was transferred, within the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, from the Programme Planning and Budget Division to the Field Operations Finance Division, which currently backstops 38 active and 2 closed special political missions (in addition to peacekeeping operations). However, there was no unequivocal one-on-one relationship, and best judgment was applied with regard to which special political missions were significantly large and complex to warrant a backstopping position. While such a position was designated to serve the mission that bore its costs first and foremost, it also provided support to other missions that did not have any backstopping positions in their budgets. In addition, the Department of Operational Support sought backstopping posts to support missions with a substantial workload in functional areas.

51. Information concerning the lead departments and substantive and administrative support provided to the missions is provided in annex II and paragraph 86 of the report of the Secretary-General. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs leads and provides substantive backstopping to 34 of the 38 special political missions. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that while the restructuring of the peace and security pillar had brought together the regional divisions of the former Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Political Affairs, hence creating an integrated regional political-operational structure, the focus of the reform was to create a more effective, integrated structure and approach, in a cost-neutral manner. The workload covering global political developments and trends and backstopping both peacekeeping operations and special political missions, had not changed, and thus resource requirements had largely remained the same. In addition, as decided by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/262 C](#), the reform should be implemented without changing established mandates, functions or funding sources of the peace and security pillar.

52. The Advisory Committee reiterates its expectation that consolidated information on backstopping positions at Headquarters will continue to be provided in future budget submissions. The Committee continues to believe that the existing backstopping positions at Headquarters should be reviewed annually in order to realign the capacities when changes in the mandates of the missions occur with a view to achieving more efficiency in backstopping support (see [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 48).

Extrabudgetary resources

53. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that extrabudgetary resources continue to be used for backstopping, surge requirements for good offices, crisis situations and other activities related to the mandates of special political missions ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 42). The resource level is projected at \$11.2 million for 2022, compared with an estimated \$21.1 million in 2021. Information by mission is provided in annex IV to the report. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that projected extrabudgetary resources were based on the known or pledged amounts of voluntary contributions for the forthcoming period. The reductions in the estimates for 2022 could be attributed to the uncertainty and fiscal pressures experienced by some donors in view of the global pandemic, or to the lack of assurances that the funding would continue to be available. However, efforts by special political missions were continuing, with the aim of securing further extrabudgetary resources to complement the implementation of mandates.

Option for full cost-recovery for transfer of assets between field operations

54. The Advisory Committee recalls that it expressed the view that an option for a full cost-recovery arrangement for the transfer of assets between missions should be evaluated (A/75/7/Add.8, para. 28). The General Assembly, in its resolution 75/251, endorsed the recommendation of the Committee that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to present such an option, along with a comparison with the current practice, including detailed analysis and financial implications, in his next main report on the special political missions (see A/75/633, para. 33).

55. The Secretary-General indicates that an option for deviation from the current practice, on a full cost-recovery basis, would entail that the net book value for the capitalized assets would be paid by the receiving mission to the releasing mission. Compared with the existing practice, this would increase the proposed budget of the receiving mission by the amount to be paid, in the financial period during which the transaction is planned to take place, and the same amount would be reflected as revenue for the releasing mission. There would be no change in practice with respect to the costs of relocation of the assets, which would still be borne by the receiving mission (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 92). **The Advisory Committee notes that the report of the Secretary-General does not provide detailed information and analysis on an option for a full cost-recovery arrangement for the transfer of assets between missions as requested by the General Assembly.**

56. The Advisory Committee requested information on the final disposition of assets of recently closed missions for which the reports on final disposition of assets have been issued (see tables 8–10 below containing related information for the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire).

Table 8

Final disposition of the assets of the United Nations Mission in Liberia as at 30 June 2018 (based on A/74/726)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Asset group</i>	<i>Acquisition value</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Residual value</i>
Group I: transferred to other peacekeeping missions or the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for temporary storage	23 580.5	32.5	15 630.4
Group II: disposed of in the mission area			
Sold	18 735.0	25.8	1 881.9
Group III: written off/lost	8 644.3	11.9	1 232.1
Assets gifted to the Government of Liberia	20 183.0	27.8	2 692.6
Assets gifted to intergovernmental and non-profit organizations	1 487.5	2.0	272.4
Total	72 630.3	100.0	21 709.4

Table 9
Final disposition of the assets of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti as at 30 June 2018 (based on A/74/729)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Asset group</i>	<i>Acquisition value</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Residual value</i>
Group I: transferred to other peacekeeping missions or the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for temporary storage	102 919.8	68.2	29 107.7
Group II: disposed of in the mission area			
Sold	17 523.5	11.6	1 422.3
Group III: written off/lost	23 572.2	15.6	3 055.5
Assets gifted to the Government of Haiti	6 907.1	4.6	997.9
Total	150 922.6	100.0	34 583.4

Table 10
Final disposition of the assets of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire as at 30 June 2017 (based on A/73/707)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Inventory value</i>	<i>Percentage</i>	<i>Residual value</i>
Group I: transferred to other peacekeeping missions or the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy, for temporary storage	23 542.5	20.4	10 932.8
Group II: disposed of in the mission area			
Sold	29 688.9	25.7	7 693.0
Group III: written off/lost	30 008.7	26.0	8 770.8
Assets gifted to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire	32 202.7	27.9	10 571.9
Total	115 442.8	100.0	37 968.5

57. The Advisory Committee sought clarification on the potential impact of a full cost-recovery arrangement on receiving missions. It was informed that in general, assets of liquidated missions had reached, or had closely reached, their standard useful lives and therefore were not in prime condition. In the event that a receiving mission was charged, the mission would be required to consider the total cost of acquiring the assets and assess such cost against the remaining useful life and functionality expected from the property, compared with the costs of acquiring new assets. The receiving missions would also be required to increase their budgets to provide for related acquisition and associated costs.

58. The Advisory Committee also requested information on the potential impact on the financial performance of closing missions with a full cost-recovery arrangement. It was indicated to the Committee that for liquidating missions, financial regulation 5.14 applied and that the transfer of property under regulation 5.14(b) was at net book value and without cost recovery. With respect to whether the option of recording the transfer of assets on a full cost-recovery basis would more fairly reflect the financial performance of closing operations, the Secretariat considered that it would not, given the fact that the current practice of recording the transfer of assets only by reflecting the value of the assets was in line with financial regulation 5.14 (b), in that both the sending and receiving entities were funded from assessed contributions from Member

States. Furthermore, with respect to whether the option of recording the transfer of assets on a full cost-recovery basis might reduce the numbers of closed missions with a cash deficit, the Secretariat considered that, taking into account the total net book value of the assets transferred from recently closed peacekeeping missions to special political missions, the approximate amount of \$1.85 million would not have a significant impact on the cash position of the closed missions. Should the General Assembly require more detailed information, the Secretariat could further study the records, determine the level of resources required to extract the data (bearing in mind that those were recorded in a system of record, Galileo, which predated the current system, Umoja), and could present the additional information at the main part of the seventy-seventh session of the General Assembly. The Secretariat would be guided by the Assembly on the matter.

59. The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to present an option for a full cost-recovery arrangement, with a detailed analysis of assets transferred between all the missions during the last 10 years, and include a cost benefit analysis for the transfer of those assets for consideration of the Assembly at the second resumed part of its seventy-sixth session in the context of peacekeeping operations overview report of the Secretary-General.

60. In addition, the Advisory Committee intends to review asset disposal plans in the context of its next review of proposed budgets for peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

Support services provided by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, the Kuwait Joint Support Office and other entities

61. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the Regional Service Centre has supported UNITAMS since its establishment in 2020, as well as the closure and liquidation of UNIOGBIS and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi during 2020 and 2021. In 2022, nine special political missions based in Africa will continue to receive support from the Regional Service Centre.⁸ He further indicates that pending a decision by the General Assembly on the global service delivery model, the Kuwait Joint Support Office remains a critical element of the support structure in the Middle East and Asia⁹ (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 46–55).

62. The Advisory Committee has discussed the provision of support services to the special political missions by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the Kuwait Joint Support Office over the years (see A/75/7/Add.2, paras. 54 and 55; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 51; and A/73/498, paras. 49–55). The Committee recalls that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 73/279 A, the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe had expanded its full-service coverage to all special political missions based in Africa pending the approval and implementation of a global service delivery model (see also A/74/7/Add.1, para. 15). **The Advisory Committee reiterates that the Kuwait Joint Support Office is not a shared service centre approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, in accordance with Assembly resolution 70/248 A, any changes to the existing and future service delivery model must be approved by the Assembly (see also A/75/7/Add.2, para. 55; A/74/7/Add.1,**

⁸ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Panel of Experts on Somalia, UNOWAS, UNSOM, Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, UNOCA, UNSMIL and UNITAMS.

⁹ The Kuwait Joint Support Office has since expanded to support the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and UNITAD.

para. 51; [A/73/498](#), paras. 54 and 55; [A/72/7/Add.10](#), paras. 56 and 58; and [A/71/595](#), para. 55).

Gender balance and geographical representation

63. The main report of the Secretary-General includes a new annex (annex XVI) on the gender distribution of civilian staff in the special political missions, which shows that female staff represented 26 per cent of the overall civilian personnel as at 31 December 2020. The Advisory Committee notes from the annex that female staff represented less than 50 per cent of personnel in all the field missions under cluster III, including UNAMA and UNAMI, compared with 4 of the 11 missions under cluster I, and 5 of the 15 missions under cluster II. The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that factors contributing to the lower numbers of women in field operations included locations, types of positions, working and living conditions, and work-life balance. The Committee requested and received information on the gender distribution of staff by grade group, which shows that, as at 31 December 2020, female staff represented 37 per cent of positions at the P-5 level and higher, 43 per cent of those from the P-1 level to the P-4 level, 27 per cent of the Field Service, 24 per cent of the National Professional Officers and 18 per cent at the Local level. **The Advisory Committee trusts that information on positions at the D-1 and D-2 levels and at the levels of Under-Secretary-General and/or Assistant Secretary-General will be included under separate groups in the gender distribution of staff in the context of future budget submissions.**

64. The Advisory Committee also requested and received information on geographical representation of civilian personnel working in special political missions, including international staff by nationality, regional group and senior positions. **The Advisory Committee notes that, inconsistent with the provision of information on gender in annexes I and XVI (see [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#) and para. 65 below), no such information on geographical representation is provided in the report and trusts that related information will be included in future budget submissions.**

65. The Advisory Committee notes the disparity among regional groups from the information received and that one regional group represents approximately 50 per cent in senior official positions and, relatively, the highest number in international staff composition. The Committee recalls that, in its resolution [75/253 A](#) (sect. XVIII), the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to improve gender balance and geographical representation in special political missions (see [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 60). The Committee reiterates that the Assembly should request the Secretary-General to take measures, including through the recruitment of new staff and by strengthening the accountability framework of the managers, to improve geographical representation and gender balance in all the special political missions and provide an update in future budget submissions, including on geographical representation by nationality. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2022 ([A/76/7](#), chap. I, paras. 53–62), the Advisory Committee made comments and recommendations related to matters on gender balance and geographical representation, which, as policy matters, also apply to the special political missions. The Committee will further discuss those matters in the context of its review of the forthcoming annual report.

Support provided by host countries

66. Annex V to the main report of the Secretary-General report contains information on support provided free of charge by the host country to special political missions, as requested by the Advisory Committee in its previous report ([A/71/595](#), para. 47).

The Advisory Committee welcomes and notes with appreciation the contributions made by the host countries to the special political missions (see [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 61).

Other matters

Impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and lessons learned

67. Information on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic for special political missions is provided in paragraphs 20 to 26 of the report of the Secretary-General (see also para. 12 above). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed of lessons learned by the missions. First, a common experience was that online settings were reasonably effective in maintaining existing relationships but posed a challenge to developing relationships with new counterparts and expanding networks. Second, virtual meetings could help to support more inclusive dialogue and bring together groups that normally might not meet, at least not in the presence of a mediator. At the same time, virtual meetings might contribute to the exclusion of some individuals/groups, for example, owing to uneven connectivity. Third, virtual meetings could sometimes act as a bridge to maintain the momentum in a process, when it was slowing down or facing political obstacles, until physical meetings could be safely resumed. Fourth, with regard to time management, the pandemic presented an opportunity to rethink formats required for meetings, such as in-person, virtual or other format, and to creatively engage new tools as a means to complement and enrich existing practices in the context of mediation. The Advisory Committee was also informed that utilizing virtual and technological means could enhance the numbers and roles for more women in processes, as well as for other groups such as youth, minorities and persons with disabilities.

Planning assumptions

68. The Advisory Committee has commented on the apparent contradiction in the description of the planning assumptions presented for two missions operational in one country since the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 62; [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 52). The Committee notes that such differences continue to be included in the planning assumptions for the two missions operational in the same country (see [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#), para. 111; [A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), para. 155). **The Advisory Committee expects that the missions will refine the formulation of the planning assumptions to ensure more consistency in the reflection of their operational environment.**

Format and presentation

69. The Advisory Committee has previously noted that continued efforts have been made over the years to improve the format and presentation of the proposed budgets of special political missions (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 51; [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 46). In the proposed programme budget for 2022, the main report of the Secretary-General includes six new annexes for more consolidated information (relating to cost-sharing arrangements; resources for special flights, for communications and information technology and for the acquisition of satellite imagery; medical services; and gender distribution), most of which were in response to the requests of the Committee in its previous report ([A/75/7/Add.2](#); see also para. 63 above). During the process of its review of the proposed budgets for 2022 for the missions, the Committee noted that a few responses to its enquiries were unclear and insufficient, such as a number of those relating to UNAMI and mine action programmes. **While noting the improvement made, the Advisory Committee trusts that efforts will be continued to further improve the format and presentation of the budget reports in respect of special political missions, such as the inclusion of an organization chart in an**

annex to a budget report (rather than in the supplementary information) with clear denotation of staffing changes proposed, as well as the quality of responses provided to the Committee (see also [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 51; [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 46).

Evaluation on the implementation of the enhanced delegation of authority

70. The Advisory Committee recalls that information was to be provided in the proposed programme budget for 2022 concerning a self-evaluation by the special political missions on the implementation of the enhanced delegation of authority of the management reform (see [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 58). In his main report, the Secretary-General indicates that in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it has not yet been possible to conclude the self-evaluation ([A/76/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), annex I). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the self-evaluation had already given preliminary indications that the implementation of the delegation of authority had so far proved successful. Furthermore, a more comprehensive assessment would be included in the next budget submission, also taking into account other management processes that had been looking at the delegation of authority (such as the Management Client Board). **The Advisory Committee looks forward to receiving information on a more comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the delegation of authority by the special political missions in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2023.**

IV. Conclusion

71. As indicated in paragraph 8 above, the total resource requirements of the 38 special political missions (contained in addenda 2–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2022) are included within the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2022. **The Advisory Committee therefore notes that its recommendation pertaining to the budget proposals for 2022 for the individual missions under thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI, which are presented in separate related reports ([A/76/7/Add.2–6](#)), would require adjustments to the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2022 (see [A/76/6 \(Introduction\)](#).**
