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Measures to eliminate international terrorism

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Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution [50/53](#), as read together with Assembly resolution [75/145](#) on measures to eliminate international terrorism. In sections II.A and II.B, the report contains information on measures taken at the national and international levels, on the basis of submissions from Governments and international organizations. Section III contains a list of relevant international legal instruments.

* [A/76/150](#).



I. Introduction

1. The present report has been prepared pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution [50/53](#), as read together with paragraph 24 of Assembly resolution [75/145](#).

2. States were requested to submit, by 1 June 2021, information on the implementation of paragraphs 10 (a) and (b) of the Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, annexed to General Assembly resolution [49/60](#), and were alerted to the fact that late submissions would be included in the next reporting cycle, as appropriate. Section II.A below contains a summary of the replies received. Previous submissions received from Member States since 2015 are referred to as appropriate; no indication is made where no submission had been received from a Member State since 2015.

3. Relevant specialized agencies and other relevant international organizations were also invited to submit, by 1 June 2021, information or other pertinent material on the implementation of paragraph 10 (a) of the Declaration. Section II.B below contains a summary of the replies received.

4. The summaries of the replies focus on the matters referred to in paragraphs 10 (a) and (b) of the Declaration, namely: (a) collection of data on the status and implementation of existing multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements relating to international terrorism, including information on incidents caused by international terrorism and criminal prosecutions and sentencing; and (b) national laws and regulations regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The full texts of the replies received, including any received after 1 June 2020, are available from the website of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.¹ Three submissions were received in 2020 during the previous reporting period.

II. Measures taken at the national and international levels regarding the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, and information on incidents caused by international terrorism

A. Information received from Member States

Algeria

5. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 5–7), Algeria reported that it had adapted its national legislation to give effect to Security Council resolutions [2178 \(2014\)](#) on foreign terrorist fighters and [2199 \(2015\)](#) on strengthening measures to cut off the sources of terrorist financing.

6. Algeria also provided detailed information on legislative changes that had been implemented to criminalize acts of terrorism and to address certain procedural aspects. For example, specialized courts competent to hear cases of terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, money-laundering, the financing of terrorism, cybercrime, the illicit transfer of capital and corruption had been established; and a law had been promulgated allowing the use of genetic fingerprints in investigations. It also had introduced a legal mechanism in the Code of Criminal Procedure allowing

¹ www.un.org/en/ga/sixth.

the Public Prosecutor to prohibit the travel of persons against whom there were valid reasons to believe that they would consider travelling to conflict zones.

Armenia

7. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/74/151](#), paras. 11–15), Armenia reported that it was party to the majority of the universal counter-terrorism instruments, as well as to several regional instruments in the framework of the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. On 23 November 2020, Armenia had acceded to the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Armenia had also signed agreements with a number of partner countries (China, Cyprus, Georgia, Greece, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America) governing bilateral cooperation in areas related to terrorism.

8. Armenia had also adopted a set of legal measures to facilitate and foster the effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions. To this end, to implement the requirements of its Law on combating money-laundering and terrorism financing and the listing rules, it had collected information on persons allegedly recruited by Turkey and transferred to the territory of Azerbaijan to participate in the hostilities against Nagorno-Karabakh since 27 September 2020. Pursuant to articles 10 (1) and 28 (2) of that Law, on 10 December 2020, a list of terrorism-related persons comprising 150 individuals and 12 entities was published.

9. On 29 September 2020, a criminal case had been initiated by the Investigative Committee of the Republic of Armenia. During the preliminary investigation of the case, Muhrab Muhammad al-Shkheri and Youssef Alabet al-Haji, nationals of the Syrian Arab Republic, were detained and both were charged with international terrorism and mercenary activities, as well as for committing serious crimes in violation of international humanitarian law, in particular attempted murder and attacking a civilian population. On 4 May 2021, a court of general jurisdiction of the Syunik region found the two guilty of international terrorism (under article 389 of the Criminal Code of Armenia), murder (under article 390-1), attacks on civilians (under article 390-3) and participation as mercenaries in armed conflict (under article 395-3) and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Moreover, further investigations led to a decision to prosecute and indict Muhammad al-Jasimi, the leader of the Suleyman Shah terrorist organization, and to seek his arrest.

10. In 2019, 19 cases of false reporting of terrorism had been registered in Armenia, and, in 2020, 13 such cases had been registered, on the basis of which criminal cases had been initiated in accordance with provisions of article 259 of the Criminal Code.

Austria

11. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/74/151](#), paras. 16–24), Austria reported that it had ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism on 28 April 2020.

12. European Union Directive 2018/843 had been implemented into Austrian federal law for the area of lawyers and notaries by the 2020 Act amending professional rules and regulations by specifying the obligations legal professionals to combat money-laundering and terrorist financing.

13. As a result of the terrorist attack in Vienna on 2 November 2020, extensive measures had been announced to combat terrorism, including measures to prevent the spread of extremist ideas, to provide for more effective investigation methods and

cooperation between the competent authorities, more effective control of dangerous persons, stricter laws to combat terrorism and extremism, de-radicalization in the penal system and stricter weapons laws. The measures had resulted in the ministerial draft of a counter-terrorism act that proposed measures under Criminal Procedure Law: to ensure that public prosecutors are informed of the initial suspicion of a terrorist offence and to create the power to bring a lawbreaker who does not comply with instructions given to him or evades probation assistance before the court for the issuance of a formal warning. The draft law also proposes the following measures in the Criminal Code and in the Penal Execution Act: judicial supervision of terrorist offenders with case conference and electronic monitoring, including the possibility of extended, also repeated, extension of the probationary period; creation of a new type of extended forfeiture; revision of the money-laundering provision, including the introduction of a new aggravating circumstance; introduction of the new offence against religiously motivated extremist movements, including the introduction of a new aggravating circumstance of religiously motivated extremist commission; creation of a basis for conferences on the release of a prisoner, especially for terrorist offenders; and an obligation of the court to request that a threat assessment be performed by the organizational units of the police State protection before a conditional release of a person convicted of terrorist offences. The draft law had been subject to public review until 2 February 2021. After reviewing and taking into account the comments made in the review process, the government bill on the draft law was about to be finalized.

14. The number of cases concerning terrorist offences in 2020, under the Criminal Code, was as follows: 149 prosecutions, 59 indictments and 21 convictions for terrorist alliances; 13 prosecutions, 9 indictments and 3 convictions for terrorist offences such as murder, assault, etc.; 30 prosecutions, 14 indictments and 5 convictions for terrorist financing; 2 prosecutions, 7 indictments and 3 convictions for training for terrorist purposes; 2 indictments for instructions for committing a terrorist offence; 1 prosecution and 1 indictment for travelling for terrorist purposes.

Cameroon²

15. Cameroon reported incidents of violent extremism in different parts of the country, in particular in the north-west and south-west regions, linked to groups such as Boko Haram, secessionist groups and radicalized armed insurgent groups. Cameroon linked the existence of violent extremism to various political, socioeconomic and cultural factors, reporting that it often had a connection to underdevelopment, youth unemployment, poverty, social exclusion and discrimination, degradation of the living conditions of certain populations and violations of human rights. Given the diverse root causes of violent extremism, Cameroon had adopted an individualized and inter-governmental approach. In accordance with Decree number 2019/030 of 23 January 2019, the Ministry of Territorial Administration was particularly engaged in the prevention of violent extremism.

16. Cameroon reported that it was taking into account gender in addressing the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism, as extremism had serious impacts on the rights of women and girls and related, for instance, to forced marriage, sexual violence and restrictions on the participation of women and girls in education and public life. Strategies employed to protect and empower women and girls in the context of terrorism and violent extremism, included, for example, the following: raising awareness on gender-based violence, child marriage and child labour; capacity-building for women's participation and income-generation, including

² Received in 2020.

through support for relevant civil society organizations; promotion of gender equality and protection of women's rights, especially their right to education, public life, freedom of speech and bodily autonomy; prevention of the recruitment of women and girls by extremist groups; and the protection of women and girls against all forms of exploitation and violence perpetrated by extremists.

Colombia

17. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 24–30), Colombia reported that it was party to 11 universal counter-terrorism instruments, as well as to several regional instruments. In 2020 a binational operational plan had been signed with Ecuador, providing for the development of operations aimed at mitigating crimes, including the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and explosives, as well as enhancing territorial checks to detect irregular migration. Progress had also been made in the development of confidence-building mechanisms with neighbouring countries, including Brazil, Ecuador, Panama and Peru. Special emphasis had been placed on mechanisms involving the exchange of intelligence information, including bilateral border commissions and coordination among regional commands, making it possible to achieve high-impact results targeting transnational criminal structures and organizations.

18. A total of 403 terrorist acts had been reported in the country in 2020, which represented a 94 per cent increase compared with 2019. Bearing in mind the role of drug trafficking as a source of revenue for terrorism, a total of 505,683 kilograms of cocaine had been seized in 2020, an 18 per cent increase compared with 2019. At least 5,563 members of organized armed groups, organized criminal groups and residual organized armed groups had been neutralized.

19. Judicial management statistics for the period January to March 2021 showed that four terrorist acts had been entered; 73 proceedings on terrorism had been entered; and 9 proceedings had been entered on the financing of terrorism and of groups involved in organized crime and the distribution of resources connected with terrorist activities and organized crime. With regard to the information reported for the offence of terrorism, one person had been convicted following a plea bargain.

20. Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities were being carried out with a view to uncovering and counteracting the actions of facilitators and members of organizations such as Da'esh and Al-Qaida, which had reportedly attempted to establish themselves in Colombia to create front commercial structures to provide financial and logistical support to their organizations. One example was the case of a French national seeking to establish business activities in Colombia who, having been identified as a facilitator for Da'esh, had been denied entry to the country in January 2020.

21. During 2019 and 2020, the Financial Intelligence and Analysis Unit had disseminated to the intelligence agencies a total of 86 items of intelligence products connected with terrorism, the financing of terrorism and money-laundering.

22. Regarding comprehensive plans to assist victims of terrorism to address their needs and those of their families, in accordance with national laws and from a gender perspective, in article 11 of Decree No. 1784 of 2019, the Presidential Advisory Council for Women's Equity was granted a number of functions and would work, from a women's perspective, towards establishing a pact for women's leadership in peacebuilding and security, as a capacity-building mechanism for peace, paying special attention to women survivors.

Cuba

23. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 31–40), Cuba reported that it had signed, on 21 October 2020, the Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. To date, Cuba had signed 27 agreements on the transfer of convicted persons and 27 agreements on extradition, including 11 bilateral agreements.

24. Cuba had been arbitrarily and unilaterally included in a list of countries that allegedly sponsored international terrorism, issued by the United States on 11 January 2021. Prior to that, Cuba reported that the United States had included Cuba in another unilateral list of countries that were allegedly not cooperating fully in the fight against terrorism published on 13 May 2020.

25. In December 2020, the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America had revised its ratings of Cuba upwards.

26. Cuba was currently updating its comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategy, as part of a biennial process. It had also updated its national risk assessment for preventing and combating the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for the period 2020–2022.

27. A programme that would provide care to victims of terrorist acts was being developed with the participation of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of the Interior, the Federation of Cuban Women and other organizations. The aim of the programme was to support individuals and families that were victims of terrorism, in order to guide them in their efforts to repair the damage caused to them and to assist them in restoring normalcy through the implementation of a comprehensive set of measures and plans.

28. In 2020, the Directorate-General for the Investigation of Financial Transactions of the Central Bank of Cuba had received 325 suspicious transaction reports and disseminated 68 financial intelligence reports in connection with predicate offences for money-laundering, of which three had been relevant. In addition, it had transmitted 133 other financial intelligence reports to the competent authorities in connection with other crimes and information of an operational nature. Of those reports, 16 had been related to suspected cases of financing of terrorism and terrorism. The Directorate-General had responded to four requests from foreign financial intelligence units through the secure Internet system of the Egmont Group. It had also made eight requests for cooperation related to ongoing investigations. At the national level, it had developed 13 parallel financial investigation records with the competent authorities and handled 456 orders from police and criminal investigation and prosecutorial authorities, involving 1,631 natural persons and 43 legal persons.

Czechia

29. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 41–47), Czechia reported that an agreement with Georgia on cooperation in combating crime had been signed in Tbilisi on 10 July 2019 and had entered into force on 1 March 2021.

30. Czechia had amended the act on selected measures against the legitimization of proceeds of crime and the financing of terrorism. The amendment entered into force on 1 August 2021 and broadened the definition of the financing of terrorism contained in the previous act to include the criminal offences of participation in a terrorist group, support and promotion of terrorism and threat of terrorism.

31. There were no incidents of international terrorism in the territory of Czechia in the reporting period.

32. Czechia provided updated information regarding the case of a Czech citizen who was convicted of participation in a terrorist group for having assisted his brother with travel to the Syrian Arab Republic in November 2016 and joining the Al-Nusra Front terrorist organization (also known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham). The Czech citizen had been convicted of committing a terrorist attack in the form of assistance and of financing terrorism, in a judgment of the Municipal Court of Prague of 20 April 2021, and sentenced to 14.5 years of imprisonment. The sentences of his brother and his brother's wife had not changed. Furthermore, a 74-year-old Iranian national permanently residing in Czechia had been convicted, in a judgment of the Regional Court in the Hradec Králové division of Pardubice of 9 July 2020, of financing terrorism and given a suspended sentence of three years of imprisonment. The individual had sent a small amount of money to his son, an active member of Da'esh. Moreover, on 9 October 2020 a Czech citizen had been convicted of the threat of terrorism in a judgment of the Regional Court in Ostrava and sentenced to 3.5 years of imprisonment. The man had impersonated a member of a terrorist organization and threatened to detonate an explosive in commercial centres in Ostrava. With regard to the criminal offence of supporting and promoting terrorism, 16 persons had been convicted and given suspended sentences for having approved on the Internet of a terrorist act committed in Christchurch, New Zealand, and one person had been convicted for having approved on the Internet of a terrorist act committed against the Czech Army in Afghanistan. In addition, other persons were being prosecuted in Czechia for similar criminal offences.

Ecuador

33. Ecuador reported that it was party to 12 universal counter-terrorism instruments. It was also party to the following regional counter-terrorism instruments: the Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance of 1971; and the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism of 2002.

34. Articles 366 and 367 of the Organic Comprehensive Criminal Code cover terrorism and its financing. According to article 366, a terrorist was defined as "any person who, individually or by creating armed groups, provokes or maintains a state of terror in a population or a segment thereof through acts that endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of persons or buildings, means of communication or transportation, through means capable of causing damage". The crime is punishable under the article by a prison term of 10 to 13 years.

35. Ecuador reported that there had been no incidents in the country directly caused by international terrorism. However, in recent years there had been significant incidents involving the use of terrorist techniques that had affected State property and institutions.

36. Ecuador also reported that the Ministry of Defence was the principal sectoral institution responsible for adopting and strengthening gender equity policies.

Egypt

37. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 48–50), Egypt reported that the Countering Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Unit had stepped up its efforts in several areas of its competence as part of the national effort to counter terrorism and its financing. The Unit had participated in the drafting of amendments to the following: the Countering Money-Laundering Act; the implementing regulations for that Act promulgated by Prime Ministerial decision; the

Counter-Terrorism Act; the Management of Lists of Terrorist Entities and Terrorists Act; the Central Bank and Banking System Act; client due diligence procedures for all banking and non-banking financial institutions, as well as non-financial businesses and professions; and the provisions concerning the actual beneficiary in the implementing regulations of the Commercial Register, in order to bring them in line with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force.

38. The Unit had also updated the targeted financial sanctions regime to implement Security Council resolutions and ensure that financial institutions and non-financial businesses and professions applied targeted financial sanctions without delay, took the measures required to freeze the funds and other assets of persons and entities on negative lists, and refrained from providing any financial or other services to designated persons and entities. In addition, the Unit had published a detailed handbook on the mechanism for implementing Security Council resolutions on targeted financial sanctions in relation to terrorism, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Unit, in collaboration with non-profit organizations, had also developed a handbook on the policy frameworks for countering the financing of terrorism. In cooperation with the Ministry of Social Solidarity, it had developed a narrative aimed at raising awareness of the fact that non-profit organizations face the threat of having their names exploited to finance terrorism.

El Salvador

39. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 51–54), El Salvador reported that a proposed special law was under consideration for the prevention, control and punishment of money-laundering that was intended to more strictly regulate the improper use of organizations, groups or associations, including those that perform charitable, social or cultural activities, by terrorists to cover up their own activities.

40. The Financial Intelligence Unit, under article 72 of the Organic Act of the Attorney General's Office, had the authority to sign agreements with the financial intelligence units of other States for the purpose of exchanging information, including information relating to the financing of terrorist activities. Between 2018 and 2020, it had signed memorandums of understanding with the financial intelligence units of Ecuador, Honduras, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and the Turks and Caicos Islands.

41. The Special Extortion and Organized Crime Unit had established an inter-agency counter-terrorism group whose purpose was to address terrorism and organized crime in a sustained and comprehensive manner through four subgroups focused on security, border and migration control, financial supervision and legal matters. Specific criminal proceedings had been initiated in respect of these offences. During the period 2015–2020, approximately 33 investigated cases had been initiated.

42. El Salvador reported that there had been successful prosecutions of criminal groups involved in terrorism that were classified under the law as terrorist associations, on the basis of article 13 of the special law against terrorism, and in some cases as illicit groups, in accordance with article 345 of the Criminal Code. For example, there had been two recent separate cases in which 95 and 275 people had been convicted.

Germany

43. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/73/125](#), paras. 24–27), Germany recalled that, on 12 June 2018, German authorities had averted a major biological attack by arresting a Tunisian national in Cologne who had reportedly

manufactured ricin, a poison found in castor beans, for a suspected attack using a biological bomb. The individual and his wife had reportedly been in contact with persons from the radical Islamist spectrum. German authorities had also arrested three Iraqi refugees on 30 January 2019 in Schleswig-Holstein on allegations that they had been planning an Islamic extremist bombing attack. A series of attacks with explosives had happened in Waldkraiburg, Bavaria, in April and May 2020. The attacker had been charged with the attempted murder of a total of 31 people. He was allegedly a supporter of the terrorist organization Da'esh. On 18 August 2020, a 30-year-old Iraqi man had rammed his car into other motorists on a highway in Berlin, injuring six people. The man had reportedly expressed support for Islamic extremist views. On 4 October 2020, a 20-year-old Syrian asylum seeker had reportedly stabbed two tourists at random, killing one and injuring another, in Dresden. The man had reportedly been known by authorities to be an Islamist extremist.

44. As at 4 May 2021, the Federal Public Prosecutor General was conducting 212 investigative procedures into 279 individuals suspected of terrorist activities committed in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic.

45. Since 2014, the Federal Public Prosecutor General had brought charges against suspected terrorists in 67 cases. A judgment had been reached in 58 of those cases to date. The public prosecution offices of the *Länder* were conducting over 100 proceedings. In addition, the Federal Public Prosecutor General was conducting 41 further investigations involving 47 individuals accused under the Code of Crimes Against International Law of offences committed in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic. On this statutory basis, the Federal Public Prosecutor General had brought charges against suspects in 12 cases. Judgment had been reached in 9 of those cases to date.

Greece

46. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 55–58), Greece reported that, in 2019, Greece had amended the provisions of its Penal Code for combating terrorism to better streamline them with the relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as provisions of universal and regional counter-terrorism instruments. Article 187A of the Penal Code, dealing with terrorism, had been amended by virtue of Law 4637/2019 to introduce the penalization, as autonomous crimes, of the following: (a) the recruitment to terrorism; (b) the provision or receipt of terrorist training; (c) the public provocation of or incitement to terrorism; and (d) travelling with the intention to commit or contribute to the commitment of a terrorist act, to participate in the activities of a terrorist group with knowledge of the fact that this participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the group or with the intention to provide or to receive terrorist training. Furthermore, the definition of a terrorist act, contained in paragraph 1 of article 187A, had been amended.

47. Greece had adopted the European Union Security Union Strategy for the period 2020–2025. In the field of law enforcement cooperation, Greece had concluded several bilateral and multilateral police cooperation agreements, the provisions of which included cooperation in the field of combating terrorism. The competent authorities of the Hellenic Police had made extensive use of the communication channels and databases of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol). Furthermore, throughout 2020, the competent police authorities had proceeded with 14 arrests of individuals for reasons associated to international terrorism, as well as arrests by virtue of European and international arrest warrants.

Islamic Republic of Iran³

48. The Islamic Republic of Iran had approved an amendment to its Countering Financing of Terrorism Act, taking into account relevant international standards and practices. According to the Iranian Criminal Code, the Islamic Republic of Iran accepted extradition based on bilateral and multilateral instruments, as well as on a reciprocal basis in the absence of any legal instrument. In a similar vein, according to bilateral security agreements, the Islamic Republic of Iran reported it had an intensive security cooperation with most of its 15 neighbouring countries.

49. The Islamic Republic of Iran reported that it played a significant role in the fight against terrorism in the region, in particular in combating, neutralizing and eliminating Da'esh and other United Nations-designated terrorist groups in affected countries. In that context, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had been at the forefront in the fight against terrorism. Upon official requests by affected Governments in the region, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had been playing a decisive role in defeating terrorist groups, such as, inter alia, Al-Qaeda, Da'esh and the Al-Nusra Front, which it reported had been financially and materially supported by certain countries in the region and beyond. The Islamic Republic of Iran reported that the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the Commander of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, who had had a pivotal role in defeating Da'esh and was in Baghdad at the request of the Government of Iraq, was an example of State terrorism and constituted a gross violation of the fundamental principles of international law, including those stipulated in the Charter of the United Nations.

50. The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that it categorically rejected all of the allegations that had been made by Bahrain ([A/75/176](#), para. 10) and called upon the latter to implement its international obligations, including international human rights, through respect for the rule of law and due process, in order to meet the legitimate demands of the Bahraini people.

Italy

51. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/71/182](#), paras. 44–46), Italy reported that it had 92 bilateral law enforcement and/or security agreements in effect with 60 countries, at least 23 of which had a specific counter-terrorism focus. Since 2018, Italy had completed the drafting phase of mutual legal assistance treaties with Kuwait, Mali, Morocco, the Niger and Uzbekistan. Four mutual legal assistance treaties had gone into effect during the same period, with the United Arab Emirates (April 2019), Kazakhstan (September 2019), Kenya (September 2019) and Nigeria (November 2020).

52. Law 153 of 2016 had amended national legislation to execute and authorize the ratification of five international and regional agreements related to terrorism. In addition, Law 153 had introduced changes to various articles of the Italian Penal Code to provide for three additional crimes that now formed part of the judicial framework against acts and conduct for terrorist purposes, including the following: the financing of certain conducts for the purpose of terrorism, under which anyone, outside of cases covered under articles 270-bis and 270-quater of the Code, who collects, provides or makes available goods or money, however made or earned, destined to be used in whole or part for the purpose of terrorist conduct, as provided for in article 270-sexies ... independent of the eventual use of those funds for the commission of the cited conducts, can be imprisoned for 7 to 15 years; the theft or embezzlement of goods or money subject to seizure (as provided for in article 270-quinquies.2 of the Code), under which anyone who steals/embezzles, destroys, disperses, removes or

³ Received in 2020.

deteriorates goods or money subject to seizure to prevent the financing of conducts for the purpose of terrorism, as provided for in article 270-sexies, can be imprisoned for two to six years or fined 3,000 to 15,000 euros; and acts of nuclear terrorism (article 280-ter), under which anyone who, with the purpose of terrorism, either procures radioactive materials for himself or others or creates a nuclear bomb or is otherwise in possession of one can be imprisoned for not less than 15 years, and also under which anyone who, with the purpose of terrorism, either uses radioactive material or a nuclear bomb or uses or damages a nuclear plant, in such a way as to release, or with the concrete danger of releasing, nuclear material, can be imprisoned for not less than 20 years.

53. Law 46 of 2017 built upon the existing counter-terrorism framework by giving the Director of the Central Directorate of the Preventive Police of the Ministry of the Interior the authority to register third-country nationals in the Schengen Information System when there was reason to believe those individuals had committed or might commit a grave crime. In doing so, he or she would consult with the Committee for Strategic Counter-terrorism Analysis.

Myanmar

54. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 69–74), Myanmar reported that it was party to 15 universal counter-terrorism instruments. It also had signed a bilateral agreement with the Russian Federation on counter-terrorism cooperation. The Home Affairs Ministry of Myanmar had signed a memorandum of understanding on counter-terrorism cooperation with the Public Security Ministry of China.

55. Myanmar was continuing to cooperate with organizations from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and partnership countries, as well as international organizations, to exchange data relating to terrorists, terrorist organizations and associations and transnational organized crime groups with possible links to terrorist organizations. Myanmar had continued to conduct coordinated border patrolling with Bangladesh.

56. Myanmar reported that some of its citizens who had connections with terrorism were being prosecuted in accordance with domestic counter-terrorism law and would face penalties commensurate with the seriousness of their offences.

57. Myanmar reported that there was no terrorist group in the country except for local insurgent groups before 2016. It also reported an attack on 15 April 2020, attributed to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, in which four police personnel had been ambushed. On 4 June 2020, a patrol unit of its border police force had engaged a group of alleged terrorists belonging to the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.

Oman

58. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/74/151](#), paras. 73–78), Oman reported that it was party to all the relevant international and regional counter-terrorism instruments. Oman had also signed several international conventions, protocols and memorandums of understanding relating to the exchange of diplomatic, judicial, police and intelligence information, as part of its ongoing cooperation in the fight against terrorism and its financing.

59. All acts of terrorism were criminalized under various Omani laws, including those concerning individuals who perpetrate, instigate, finance or facilitate the commission of such acts and those involved in the crime of terrorism. Oman had established two bodies, the National Counter-Terrorism Committee and the National

Committee to Combat Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, to follow up on, study and implement Security Council resolutions and international conventions, agreements and laws on combating terrorism and its financing, in coordination with security and civilian agencies.

60. Oman, as part of its implementation of the forty recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force, was conducting a national risk assessment related to money-laundering and financing of terrorism. It had completed the technical compliance stage and finished drafting regulations and laws to combat money-laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Panama

61. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/74/151](#), paras. 79–81), Panama reported that Law No. 23 of 27 April 2015, on measures to prevent money-laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, inter alia, as amended by Law 21 of 10 March 2017, Law 70 of 31 January 2019 and Law 124 of 7 January 2020, and regulated by Executive Decree No. 587 of 4 August 2015, had established preventive freezing. On 1 October 2019, the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Financial Analysis Unit had signed a memorandum of understanding for the exchange of financial intelligence information related to money-laundering, terrorism financing and financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to provide technical assistance to prosecutors.

62. The Public Prosecutor's Office had collaborated between 2019 and 2021 on international legal assistance with Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Samoa, Seychelles, Spain, Turkey and the British Virgin Islands.

63. The First Specialized Prosecutor's Office Against Organized Crime was tasked with investigating the crimes of terrorism and terrorism financing, as established in resolution No. 18 of 13 July 2020, and was pursuing three cases related to the crime of terrorism, including one that was in the process of being filed, and four cases related to the financing of terrorism.

Philippines

64. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 83–87), the Philippines reported that the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 had been signed by the President on 3 July 2020 and had replaced the Human Security Act of 2007 to prevent, prohibit and penalize terrorism in the country. Apart from prosecuting members of local terrorist groups, the law also penalized the following: foreign terrorists who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality; those who organize or facilitate the travel of individuals for the purpose of committing terrorist acts; and any person residing abroad who comes to the Philippines to perpetrate terrorism-related atrocities. Likewise, the law mandated the Anti-Terrorism Council automatically to adopt and designate terrorists, terrorist financiers and terrorist organizations included on Security Council sanctions lists.

65. The National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and the National Action Plan on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation, adopted in 2019, aimed to address the rise of radicalization and violent extremism and the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, respectively, through a whole-of-nation approach.

Poland

66. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/72/111](#), paras. 43–46), Poland reported that it was party to 13 universal counter-terrorism instruments and 3 regional instruments.

67. The Polish legal framework concerning terrorism encompassed, inter alia, the following: the act of 10 June 2016 on anti-terrorist activities; the act of 1 March 2018 on counteracting money-laundering and terrorist financing; and the act of 9 May 2018 on the processing of passenger name record data. Moreover, the Penal Code set forth in its article 165a an autonomous offence of terrorism financing, making it possible to hold those who finance terrorism criminally liable for such acts. The provision criminalized the funding of terrorist organizations and individual terrorists for “any purpose” and covered the financing of the specific terrorist crimes addressed by the treaties listed in the annex to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Pursuant to article 16, paragraph 1, item 12, of the act of 28 October 2002 on the liability of collective entities for acts prohibited under penalty, in the event of the commission of a terrorist financing offence by a natural person, a collective entity would be liable for such an act if a natural person acts, inter alia, in the name or on behalf of the collective entity or under its authority or duty. Criminal liability of an entity was secondary to the criminal liability of an individual acting on its behalf. The said legislative measures were in line with provisions of the Convention and Security Council resolution [2462 \(2019\)](#). On prevention, the act of 9 May 2018 on the processing of passenger name record data had transposed into national legislation the Directive of the European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2016/681 of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger name record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. Pursuant to the act, a national passenger information unit within the border guard had been established.

68. One of the tools established to provide assistance to victims of crime, including in connection with terrorism, was the State compensation for victims of certain prohibited acts. Detailed rules for granting aid and subsidies under the victims and post-release assistance fund had been set out in the regulation of the Minister for Justice of 13 September 2017 on the victims and post-release assistance fund – the justice fund.

69. There were 12 preparatory proceedings in cases of terrorist offences ongoing as at 1 January 2020; 8 preparatory proceedings in cases of terrorist offences initiated in 2020; 22 suspects of terrorist offences in all of the preparatory proceedings conducted in 2020; 9 investigations completed in 2020 in cases of offences of a terrorist nature; and 15 individuals accused of terrorist offences in 2020. In terms of terrorism financing offences, Poland reported the following: one pending preparatory proceeding in cases of terrorism financing offences, as at 1 January 2020; one preparatory proceeding in cases of terrorism financing offences initiated in 2020; two suspects in all of the preparatory proceedings in cases of terrorism financing offences conducted in 2020; two investigations concluded in 2020 with indictments in cases of terrorism financing offences; and two individuals accused in 2020 of crimes under article 165 and of the Penal Code.

Portugal

70. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 88–89), Portugal reported that, on 22 April 2021, it had deposited the instrument of ratification of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts relating to International Civil Aviation. As at 1 June 2021, when the Convention entered into force for Portugal, it was party to all 19 universal counter-terrorism instruments.

71. On 15 December 2020, two Portuguese nationals had been convicted by the Lisbon Central Court, with one sentenced to serve 9 imprisonment and the other sentenced to 8.5 years, for the crimes of providing logistical support to a terrorist organization (Da'esh). One of the convicted persons had been detained in Lisbon on June 2019 on suspicion of organizing or facilitating travel for terrorist purposes. He had previously lived in London and, in 2013, had lent his Portuguese passport to his brother to facilitate a journey to the Syrian Arab Republic. For several years, both convicted individuals had directly provided support to their respective brothers, who reportedly had been foreign terrorist fighters of Da'esh, with one having reportedly died in 2015 and the other in 2018.

72. Another case concerned a Dutch-Portuguese woman with dual citizenship, who had been recruited through social media and had flown from the Netherlands to the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2014 with the intention of joining Da'esh. Once there, she had married a Portuguese foreign terrorist fighter who had died in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2018. After the death of her first husband, she married another Portuguese foreign terrorist fighter from the same group. They had both been captured by the Syrian Democratic Forces – People's Protection Units during the fall of Baghouz in March 2019. That Portuguese foreign terrorist fighter was currently imprisoned in Iraq. She had been transferred to al-Hol camp in north-east Syrian Arab Republic but, in March 2020, had managed to escape. Because the Dutch authorities had issued, in March 2016, a European and an international arrest warrant, she had been in preventative custody since January 2021, when she returned to the Netherlands.

73. A Portuguese foreign terrorist fighter, a resident of Luxembourg, had travelled to the Syrian Arab Republic in August 2014 to join Da'esh. He featured in a well-known video released by Da'esh in January 2016 in which prisoners were executed and had reportedly threatened Portugal and Spain, claiming that "the glorious Al-Andalus caliphate" would be taken over by Da'esh. He was captured in March 2019 in Baghouz. In 2015, Luxembourg authorities issued a European arrest warrant for him, followed by an international arrest warrant in 2019. Around March or April 2019, he had been imprisoned in the Syrian Arab Republic, and in January 2021 he had been transferred to a prison camp in Iraq.

San Marino

74. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 96–99), San Marino reported that it was party to 16 universal and 10 regional counter-terrorism instruments, as well as to a number of relevant bilateral instruments. On 26 May 2021, San Marino had signed an agreement on confiscation with Italy. Negotiations for the conclusion of an asset-sharing agreement were ongoing with Albania.

75. By a decree-law dated 22 September 2020 on provisions for combating terrorism and amendments to the Criminal Code, in force since 22 September 2020, San Marino implemented Security Council resolution [2178 \(2014\)](#) and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, and the Additional Protocol thereto. The Convention and the Protocol were ratified by the San Marino Parliament on 2 September 2020. In particular, the Decree had introduced into the Criminal Code additional articles concerning terrorist purposes; terrorist offences; attacks for terrorist purposes; terrorist acts with deadly or explosive devices; acts of nuclear terrorism; kidnapping for terrorist purposes; association for the commission of terrorist offences; assistance to members of criminal associations; terrorist financing; recruitment for the commission of terrorist offences; training for the commission of terrorist offences; organization of travels for the perpetration of terrorist offences; and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which include offences perpetrated for

the purpose of terrorism, for which the punishment should be increased by one degree. Under the decree-law, a fund had also been set up to provide financial assistance to victims of terrorist acts perpetrated or attempted on the territory of San Marino, established also by the judicial authority.

Saudi Arabia

76. Saudi Arabia reported that it was party to 16 universal counter-terrorism instruments, as well as the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Saudi Arabia affirmed that it was party to the international conventions on the security and safety of civil aviation and had incorporated the provisions of those agreements into its national legislation. It also reported that it was party to regional instruments, including the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and the Arab Convention on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism; and the Arab Anti-Corruption Convention, as well as many bilateral agreements on countering terrorism and the financing of terrorism.

77. Under article 43 of the Act aimed at countering terrorism and the financing of terrorism, it is an offence to create or use a website or computer programme or any other electronic device, or disseminate any of the same, with a view to committing any offence listed in the Act, or with a view to facilitating contact with a terrorist leader, individual or entity, or propagating their ideas, or financing them, or disseminating information on the manufacture of incendiary devices, explosives or any other means of committing a terrorist offence. The Act also contains a chapter in which financial institutions, non-financial businesses and professions and non-profit organizations are required to take the measures necessary to combat the financing of terrorism. Using a club or non-profit organization to commit a terrorist offence was also considered to be an aggravating circumstance. Article 40 of the Act states that a prison sentence of no more than 30 years and no less than 10 years shall be imposed on anyone who abducts, detains or imprisons another person, or threatens to commit any of those acts, in furtherance of an offence of terrorism or financing of terrorism. Article 41 states that a prison sentence of no more than 30 years and no less than 10 years shall be imposed on anyone who hijacks a means of public transport, or threatens to commit such an act, in furtherance of a terrorist offence or a financing of terrorism offence. Under articles 37, 45 and 73 of the Act, it is an offence to provide safe haven to perpetrators of terrorist acts or any person who supports, facilitates or participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning or preparation of terrorist acts, and such persons had to be brought to justice or, where appropriate, extradited, on the basis of the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare*. Article 47 of the Act provides that anyone who wilfully provides or collects funds for the benefit of persons or entities who commit, or attempt to commit, facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts should be imprisoned for a term of up to 15 years.

78. Saudi Arabia had adopted the Riyadh document on harmonizing laws to combat information technology offences in the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.

79. Saudi Arabia had signed agreements with numerous States on information technology offences broadly considered.

80. Saudi Arabia had used legal, technical, academic and pedagogical means to combat all forms of online offences and had sought to leverage the Internet as an effective weapon against such offences, in particular where terrorism was involved. Saudi Arabia had established a national cybersecurity authority that was the competent agency and focal point for cybersecurity in the country. The Global Centre

for Combating Extremist Ideology was working to combat extremism using the most advanced intellectual, media and digital means, and to develop innovative technologies enabling it to detect, address and analyse extremist narratives swiftly and accurately.

Singapore

81. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 105–107), Singapore reported that the Payment Services Act had come into effect in Singapore in January 2020 to enhance and streamline the regulatory framework for payment services. The Act had then been amended in January 2021 to strengthen the regime applicable to virtual asset services, in line with the enhanced Financial Action Task Force standards for virtual asset service providers and to better mitigate money-laundering and terrorism financing risks. It was mandatory for payment service providers to be licensed under the Act and comply with requirements for anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism.

82. The Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act, in place since 2002, gives effect to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The following individuals had recently been added to the list of terrorists under that Act: Mohamad Shariff Zulfikar, an Australian citizen, had been added on 20 October 2020; Sheik Heikel bin Khalid Bafana, a Singaporean citizen, had been added on 15 January 2021; and Ahmed Faysal, a Bangladeshi citizen, had been added on 15 January 2021.

Switzerland

83. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 115–127), Switzerland reported that it was party to 18 universal counter-terrorism instruments. It had just submitted instruments for the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and for the Additional Protocol thereto. The two treaties entered into force for Switzerland on 1 July 2021.

84. In January 2019, Parliament had extended the period of validity of the federal act of 12 December 2014 prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations until 31 December 2022.

85. In September 2020, the Federal Council had passed a law, in connection with the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention and Protocol, strengthening the criminal provisions against terrorism and organized crime. The law provides, inter alia, for the introduction of a new article in the Criminal Code (article 260 sexies), to expressly prohibit recruitment, training and travel with a view to the commission of a terrorist act. It also provided for harsher penalties for supporting or participating in a terrorist organization and an increase in the penalty set forth in article 74 of the Intelligence Service Act, establishing a ban on organizations or groups that directly or indirectly spread, support or otherwise promote terrorist activities or violent extremism, thus threatening internal or external security. The revision had also introduced additional instruments in the law concerning legal assistance, to strengthen international cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime. The new provisions came into effect on 1 July 2021.

86. In September 2020, the Federal Council had passed the federal act relating to police counter-terrorism measures, which addresses the threat posed by potentially harmful persons. It provides, inter alia, for the possibility of imposing such measures as a summons, a geographic ban or, as a last resort, house arrest.

87. In 2019, the Federal Council had adopted the dispatch concerning the law on explosive precursors. The parliamentary deliberations on the matter had ended in

September 2020. The new federal law was aimed at preventing the misuse of substances that may be used to make explosives. It would partially restrict access by private individuals to substances of that type. It also provided for the reporting of suspicious events and for efforts to educate economic actors.

88. In the summer of 2020, a Swiss woman who had been kidnapped and held captive in Mali in January 2016 by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb was killed. On 2 November 2020, a Swiss woman was slightly injured during a terrorist attack in Vienna.

89. In 2020, financial intermediaries had made 5,334 reports to the Money-laundering Reporting Office. In total, 64 of those (1.2 per cent) had concerned suspected cases of financing of terrorism, 14 of which had been referred to prosecutors.

90. In 2020, the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office had brought about 60 cases involving terrorism. Those cases concerned such issues as terrorist attacks, recruitment, financing of terrorism, jihadist propaganda on the Internet and the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters.

91. By a judgment of 26 June 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had sentenced an individual to a suspended monetary penalty comprising a 25-day fine for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations, and for depicting violence. The investigation conducted by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office had revealed that the offender had published propaganda for Da'esh on Facebook.

92. By a judgment of 3 September 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had sentenced an individual to a suspended monetary penalty comprising a 180-day fine for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations, and for depicting violence. The Court had ruled, *inter alia*, that the offender had published propaganda for Da'esh on Facebook. The judgment had been appealed and had not yet entered into force.

93. By a judgment of 11 September 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had sentenced two individuals to four years' and two months' imprisonment, respectively, and to a suspended monetary penalty comprising a 100-day fine for supporting a criminal organization. The Court had found the principal offender guilty of joining, in 2013, Jaish al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar, a group that was part of the precursor organization to Da'esh, and for having worked for the latter organization in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Court had also found that the principal offender had recruited members for Da'esh in Switzerland for its precursor organization, as part of a project to distribute Qur'ans and set up a martial arts school. The judgment had been appealed and has not yet entered into force.

94. By a judgment of 7 October 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had given an individual a suspended sentence of five months' imprisonment for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations. The Court had found that the individual had published propaganda videos for Al-Shabaab. The judgment had been appealed and would not enter into force until the end of 2020.

95. By a judgment of 8 October 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had given an individual a suspended sentence of five years and 10 months' imprisonment for, among other things, supporting a criminal organization and depicting violence. The Court had found that the individual was a mid-level cadre of Da'esh operating from Switzerland. The individual had been found guilty of, *inter alia*, encouraging a person to carry out a suicide attack in Lebanon, transferring thousands of dollars to Da'esh through the hawala method and making efforts to smuggle other members from

Europe into combat zones. The judgment had been appealed and had not yet entered into force.

96. By a judgment of 27 October 2020, the Federal Criminal Court had given two individuals suspended sentences of 18 months' and 15 months' imprisonment, respectively, for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations. The two individuals, members of the board of directors of a Salafist organization, had been found guilty in connection with the production and dissemination of two propaganda videos for the Nusrah Front. The judgment had been appealed and had not yet entered into force. By a decision on final appeal rendered on 26 February 2020, the Federal Court had upheld the conviction of a third individual for related events.

97. By a criminal order of 7 January 2021, the Federal Prosecutor's Office had given an individual a suspended sentence of 6 months' imprisonment for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations, and for depicting violence. The individual had disseminated propaganda for Al-Qaida and Da'esh. By a criminal order of 18 February 2021, the Office had sentenced an individual to 6 months' imprisonment for violating article 2 of the federal act prohibiting Al-Qaida and Da'esh and related organizations. The individual had disseminated propaganda for Al-Qaida and Da'esh.

98. In 2020, 15 different States had submitted to Switzerland 28 requests for mutual legal assistance in connection with radical Islamic terrorism, foreign terrorist fighters and extreme right-wing terrorism. Of those requests, 15 had been executed, and execution of the remaining requests was in progress. In 2020, the Swiss authorities had submitted 11 requests for mutual legal assistance to eight different States in connection with radical Islamic terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters. Three of the requests had been executed. As of May 2021, five different States had submitted 12 requests for legal assistance to Switzerland in connection with radical Islamic terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters. Five requests had been executed, and execution of the remaining requests was in progress. As at May 2021, the Swiss authorities had submitted seven requests for mutual legal assistance to four different States in connection with radical Islamic terrorism and foreign terrorist fighters. Two requests had been executed.

99. In 2020, the Federal Office of Police had issued three expulsion orders and 144 entry bans in connection with terrorism, as well as two warnings.

100. In 2019, the Federal Office of Justice had ordered the arrest with a view to extradition of a Turkish national sought by Germany for criminal proceedings for being a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). By a decision rendered in 2020, the Office ruled that the person sought should be extradited. That decision had been upheld on final appeal by the Federal Court in a judgment dated 12 June 2020. The person sought was extradited to Germany. A Swiss national had filed a request with the Extradition Unit to be transferred to Switzerland to serve the rest of the prison sentence he had received in Bulgaria for various offences, including acts of terrorism. Switzerland and Bulgaria had reached an agreement, and the transfer might take place soon. In 2020 and 2021, two individuals convicted in France and Morocco, respectively, for terrorist acts had requested that they be transferred to Switzerland to serve their sentence there. The first request had been denied in 2021. The second request was being considered by the French authorities.

Syrian Arab Republic

101. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/70/211](#), paras. 76–77), the Syrian Arab Republic reported that it was a party to 10 universal counter-terrorism instruments.

102. The Syrian Arab Republic was taking a number of measures to combat the activities of terrorist organizations in the region and individuals suspected of affiliation with any terrorist organizations, which included representatives of any illegal armed formations. The Syrian Arab Republic had enacted numerous laws and taken a number of measures to prevent terrorists from using Syrian territory to operate against other States or their citizens, consistent with counter-terrorism agreements signed within the framework of the League of Arab States and other international organizations. The Syrian Arab Republic had enacted legislation and adopted measures and mechanisms to verify that asylum seekers had not taken part in terrorist activities prior to their being granted refugee status. As part of measures taken by the Syrian Arab Republic to suppress the financing of terrorist organizations, the Syrian banking system did not allow non-Syrian parties to make foreign transfers through Syrian banks. Syrians were allowed to finance foreign commerce, but only via legal banking instruments approved by official authorities. On 2 July 2012, Act No. 19 concerning counter-terrorism had been promulgated. In order to prevent improper use of charitable donations, all charities and social organizations operating in the Syrian Arab Republic were subject to Act 93 (1958), which imposed government control over their activities, accounts and resources. Measures had been taken, legislation enacted and punitive sanctions imposed to prevent recruitment and enlistment in terrorist organizations and the provision of weapons to terrorists. The only agency authorized by Syrian law to engage in military recruitment was the Ministry of Defence.

Turkey

103. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 131–134), Turkey reported that its Law on the Prevention of the Financing of Terrorism of 2013 had been revised on 27 December 2020 to add to article 4 a provision according to which the penalty for providing or collecting funds for a terrorist individual or a terrorist organization had been increased by up to one third of the punishment previously envisaged by that law.

United Arab Emirates⁴

104. The United Arab Emirates was party to more than 15 universal and regional counter-terrorism instruments.

105. It had passed several national counter-terrorism laws on the prosecution of terrorists, countering terrorist financing and criminalizing acts related to defamation of religions or hate speech, including Federal Decree No. 5 on combating cybercrimes; Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on combating terrorism offences; Federal Decree-Law No. 2 of 2015 on combating discrimination and hatred; Federal Decree-Law No. 14 of 2018 regarding the Central Bank and the organization of financial facilities and activities; Federal Decree-Law No. 20 of 2018 on countering money-laundering crimes and the financing of terrorism and illegal organizations and its executive regulation; and the national list of terrorist entities issued, pursuant to Federal Law No. 7 of 2014 on combating terrorism and cabinet resolution No. 20 of 2019.

106. The National Committee for Combating Terrorism had been established by Federal Law No. 14 of 2014 on combating terrorist crimes and was assigned the following tasks under cabinet resolution No. 32 of 2016: coordinating national efforts in the area of combating extremism and terrorism; exchanging counter-terrorism information with respective counterparts in other States as well as the United Nations and other international and regional organizations; and following up on the

⁴ Received in 2020.

implementation of Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism and the other relevant resolutions. The United Arab Emirates Cabinet had also issued resolution No. 20 of 2019 concerning the regulation of terrorism lists and the application of Security Council resolutions and relevant resolutions on the prevention and suppression of terrorism and its financing and stopping the proliferation of weapons and their financing. That resolution regulated listing and appealing procedures for terrorist lists and established a detailed mechanism for implementing those procedures by the concerned authorities.

107. The United Arab Emirates had made efforts to strengthen its anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism system and to criminalize terrorism financing. To that end, it had passed laws on combating terrorism financing. United Arab Emirates laws had expanded the scope of financing terrorism, to include the movement of funds belonging to a terrorist organization by transferring, wiring, depositing or exchanging funds with the intent of concealing or disguising their original source or illegal purposes.

108. The United Arab Emirates had also worked on strengthening women's participation, including in efforts to prevent extremism and terrorism. The roles played by United Arab Emirates women in counter-terrorism operations and law enforcement had increased, including in special forces, investigations, cybercrimes, drug control, peacekeeping, protection of very important persons and human trafficking investigations.

Ukraine

109. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 135–139), Ukraine reported that it was party to 17 international counter-terrorism instruments. Ukraine was working on the drafts laws on ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism and on amendments to the Criminal and Criminal Procedure Codes of Ukraine in relation to ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.

110. Ukraine reported that its special services frequently detected attempts by international terrorist organizations, such as Da'esh, Al-Qaeda and others, to establish networks of foreign terrorist fighters to transfer through the territory of Ukraine from Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia to the war zones and in the opposite direction, as well as to hide themselves from criminal responsibility, to plan and prepare terrorist acts both in Ukraine and abroad.

111. From 2014 to 2021, the Security Service of Ukraine had undertaken the following measures: suspended nine transnational logistics networks of international terrorist organizations; liquidated 20 "transfer points"; detected 69 members and followers of international terrorist organizations (2 members in 2021); monitored the extradition inspection of 38 terrorist fighters wanted by Interpol; banned 2,295 followers of international terrorist organizations from entering Ukraine (107 individuals in 2021); expelled from Ukraine or forcibly returned 98 members of international terrorist organizations; prosecuted under the general criminal articles of the Criminal Code of Ukraine 34 members of international terrorist organizations; directed to court 17 cases concerning organizers of channels of transportation of foreign terrorist fighters (under various articles of the Criminal Code); and sentenced two foreign citizens (also under various articles).

112. In 2020, 644 foreigners involved in the activities of international terrorist and religious-extremist organizations had been prohibited from entering the territory of Ukraine; seven terrorist attacks had been prevented and 10 individuals involved in their preparation had been detained; one agent of the Russian Federal Security

Service, who was allegedly planning to blow up an ammonia storage facility of the private company North Donetsk AZOT Association, had been sentenced to 10 years in prison; two individuals who, under the instruction of the so-called “centre of special operations of the temporary occupied territories in the Donetsk region”, participated in a terrorist attack in the Donetsk region had been sentenced to 12 years in prison; 74 foreign citizens involved in the activities of terrorist organizations had been forcibly returned to their countries of origin, including 3 citizens of Georgia who had provided assistance in hiding a leader of Da’esh on the territory of Ukraine; and five foreigners involved in the activities of terrorist organizations had been expelled from the territory of Ukraine, including supporters of Da’esh.

113. In 2020, prosecution agencies in Ukraine had provided procedural guidance for pretrial investigations in 1,059 criminal proceedings related to terrorist activities or terrorist financing, of which 117 criminal proceedings had been sent to court.

B. Information received from international organizations

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

114. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations reiterated the information contained in the previous report (see [A/75/176](#), para. 146).

International Atomic Energy Agency

115. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/75/176](#), paras. 147–151), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that, at its sixty-fourth regular session, in September 2020, the General Conference had adopted a resolution on nuclear security in which it, inter alia, encouraged all parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment to implement fully their obligations thereunder and also encouraged States that had not yet done so to become party to the Convention and its Amendment. In the resolution, the General Conference further encouraged IAEA to continue its efforts to promote further adherence to the Amendment with the aim of its universalization and reminded all parties to inform the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as depositary, of their laws and regulations that gave effect to the Convention. As of 21 May 2021, there were 162 parties to the Convention, of which, as at 16 June 2021, 126 were also parties to the Amendment.⁵

116. The Agency had convened two virtual meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, from 7 to 11 December 2020 and on 1 February 2021. It had also organized the sixth technical meeting of the representatives of parties to the Convention and its Amendment, which took place virtually in December 2020. It had continued in 2020 to promote universal adherence to the Amendment. The third International Conference on Nuclear Security: Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts had been held at IAEA headquarters from 10 to 14 February 2020.

117. In 2020, the Agency had continued to provide legislative assistance to its member States in a comprehensive manner, including on adherence to and effective implementation of the Convention and its Amendment. Assistance was provided to 16 member States via workshops, missions and meetings to raise awareness and give advice and training on developing and revising national legislation and on adhering to and implementing the relevant international legal instruments. Country-specific bilateral legislative assistance was provided to 12 member States through written comments and advice on drafting national nuclear legislation. Furthermore, one

⁵ See www-legacy.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_amend_status.pdf.

regional workshop on harmonizing national nuclear law with international and European law was held in person. Owing to COVID-19-related restrictions, as an online alternative to some in-person activities, virtual assistance was provided in gaining, more broadly, a better understanding of the relevant international legal instruments and the elements of comprehensive national nuclear legislation. From October to December 2020, a new series of interactive webinars on nuclear law, including on the international legal framework for nuclear security, amassed over 2,500 streams, with participation from officials from over 100 countries.

International Monetary Fund

118. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that, since crimes such as money-laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing (the provision of funds or financial services for the acquisition of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons) and related predicate crimes posed serious threats to the integrity and stability of countries' financial sectors or to external stability and could also threaten the international financial system and the broader economy, their prevention and combating were of concern to IMF.

119. IMF considered that effective anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism frameworks, and financial integrity more broadly, were key to financial stability. In that connection, it referred to its factsheet on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, made available on the IMF public website.

120. Within the IMF, the Financial Integrity Group of the Legal Department took the lead on issues concerning financial integrity, including anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. In November 2018, the IMF Executive Board had discussed the staff report "Review of the Fund's Strategy on Anti-Money-Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism".⁶

121. IMF oversaw the international monetary system and monitored the economic and financial policies of its 190 member countries, an activity known as surveillance undertaken under article IV of the IMF Articles of Agreement. As part of this process, IMF highlighted the possible risks to stability and advised on needed policy adjustments. When a country sought financial or policy support from IMF, the country took firm commitments to undertake certain policy actions, known as "conditionality" or "reform targets", which could include financial integrity-related benchmarks, including combating the financing of terrorism, when those issues were critical to financing assurances or to achieve a programme's objectives. Currently, over 30 programmes contained anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism conditionality or commitments.

122. A thematic fund gave funding to five research projects, one of which was a handbook on combating the financing of terrorism, which was expected to be published in 2021, aimed at improving the effective implementation of frameworks on combating the financing of terrorism by IMF member countries. The handbook included six chapters focusing on the following: (a) improving the understanding of terrorism financing risks; (b) enhancing the role of the private sector in detecting, sharing information and reporting suspicious activities relating to terrorism financing; (c) the use of terrorism financing financial intelligence in investigations; (d) enforcement against terrorism financing activities; (e) targeted financial sanctions; and (f) international cooperation related to combating terrorism financing. Once

⁶ Available from www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/02/04/pp101718-2018-review-of-the-funds-aml-strategy.

published, the handbook would be used to develop a technical assistance module related to combating the financing of terrorism issues.

123. Since 2007, IMF had been coordinating capacity development-related activities on combating the financing of terrorism with other relevant United Nations agencies, through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and its successor, the Office of Counter-Terrorism. In addition, IMF staff regularly coordinated work on combating the financing of terrorism with United Nations agencies and other international stakeholders. IMF also cooperated with international stakeholders on the development of policy and tools related to combating the financing of terrorism. Examples of recent and ongoing activities include the contribution to the guidance of the Financial Action Task Force, and the review of the World Bank terrorist financing national risk assessments tool. IMF staff had been actively engaged in following developments in financial technology and in bringing together key stakeholders to discuss the opportunities and risks that it presented, including the risk of misuse to promote and fund terrorism. In November 2019, the General Counsel had attended a ministerial conference in Australia on combating the financing of terrorism, entitled “No money for terror”.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

124. In addition to the information provided previously (see [A/71/182](#), paras. 85–89), the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reported that, in its decision dated 13 October 2017 on addressing the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, its Executive Council had underscored the role of OPCW with respect to preventing and responding to the threat posed by the use of chemical weapons by non-State actors, recognizing the role of assistance and cooperation in support of capacity-building to achieve full and effective national implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as in assisting States parties in investigating and prosecuting non-State actors for crimes related to the Convention, or in countering terrorism as it relates to chemical weapons. OPCW actively participated in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact, to which it had become a signatory in 2018.

125. The fact-finding mission formed in 2014 had worked to establish facts surrounding allegations of use of toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic. The findings of the mission had formed the basis of the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism. In the seven reports issued until the expiration of its mandate in November 2017, the Mechanism had assigned responsibility for use of chemical weapons in six separate incidents, in two cases doing so to a terrorist group, named as Da’esh. An investigation and identification team had been established pursuant to a decision by the OPCW Conference of the States Parties dated 27 June 2018, in which the Conference had mandated the Director-General to put in place arrangements to identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in cases where the Mechanism determined or had determined that such use likely occurred, and in cases for which the Mechanism had not issued a report.

126. The criminalization of activities prohibited under the Convention, required under article VII of the Convention, was a key element in preventing the use of a chemical weapon by a non-State actor. OPCW worked with States parties to ensure that relevant legislation was enacted and that legal gaps were closed. By 31 December 2020, 158 of 193 States parties to the Convention had adopted national implementing legislation covering all or some of the required initial measures. 119 States parties had reported the adoption of comprehensive legislation covering all required initial measures, while 39 had reported on the adoption of implementing legislation covering

some of the required initial measures. The remaining 35 States parties had yet to report on the adoption of implementing legislation. In 2020, the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board temporary working group on investigative science and technology had presented its final report, including formal recommendations of relevance to the provision of technical assistance in cases of suspected chemical terrorism.

III. International legal instruments relating to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism

127. Currently, there are 55 instruments pertaining to international terrorism. Of those, 19 are universal and 36 are regional.

A. Universal instruments

United Nations

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 1973

International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 1979

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, 1997

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005

International Atomic Energy Agency

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979

Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 2005

International Civil Aviation Organization

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970

Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 2010

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1988

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1991

Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation, 2010

Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 2014

International Maritime Organization

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988

2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 1988

2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

B. Regional instruments*African Union*

Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999

Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 2004

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations Convention on Counter-Terrorism, 2007

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

Convention on Cooperation in Combating international Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, 2009

Central African Economic and Monetary Community

Regulation No. 08/05-UEAC-057-CM-13 on the adoption of the Convention on the fight against terrorism in Central Africa, 2005

Collective Security Treaty Organization

Agreement on collective forces of rapid response of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 2009

Commonwealth of Independent States

Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, 1999

Protocol on the approval of the Regulations on the organization and conduct of joint anti-terrorist operations in the territories of States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2002

Treaty of States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Combating the Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime and the Financing of Terrorism, 2007

Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

Convention of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf on Combating Terrorism, 2004

Council of Europe

European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977

Protocol amending the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 2003

Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2005

Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism, 2005

Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 2015

European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, 2017

Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism

Agreement on the Eurasian Group on Combating Money-Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, 2011

European Union

Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, 2005

League of Arab States

Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1998

Amendment of 2008 to the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism

Arab Convention on Combating Money-Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 2010

Arab Convention on Combating Information Technology Offences, 2010

Organization of American States

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance, 1971

Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, 2002

Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation

Additional Protocol on Combating Terrorism to the Agreement among the Governments of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Participating States on Cooperation in Combating Crime, in particular in Its Organized Forms, 2004

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, 2001

Agreement on the procedure for organizing and conducting joint anti-terrorist measures in the territories of the States members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2006

Agreement on cooperation in identifying and blocking the entry routes to Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States of persons involved in terrorist, separatist and extremist activities, 2006

Agreement on the procedure for organizing and conducting joint counter-terrorism exercises by Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States, 2008

Agreement on cooperation among the Governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member States in combating the illicit traffic in weapons, ammunition and explosives, 2008

Agreement on the Training of Personnel for Anti-Terrorist Units of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2009

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Convention against Terrorism, 2009

Convention of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Combating Extremism, 2017

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 1987

Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, 2004
