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Proposed programme budget for 2021

Proposed programme budget for 2021

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Thematic cluster III: regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2021 for 11 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions.

The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$347,779,400 (net of staff assessment).

* A/75/50.



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** The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2021 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266](#) A.

*** In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266](#) A, the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

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I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster III amount to \$347,779,400 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides a comparison between the resources proposed for 2021 and the resources for 2020 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [74/263](#) A.

Table 1

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/ (decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	12 617.6	12 611.3	14 322.0	—	1 710.7
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	16 136.6	15 318.2	1 024.0	—	(14 294.2)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	97 671.9	104 878.2	104 777.3	—	(100.9)
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	2 651.2	2 901.4	2 953.0	—	51.6
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3 600.0	3 458.0	3 854.9	—	396.9
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	8 430.9	8 953.6	9 790.6	82.0	837.0
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	7 542.0	7 129.0	8 165.1	—	1 036.1
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	77 554.8	72 440.5	70 291.4	17.9	(2 149.1)
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	68 304.1	61 327.5	64 074.5	—	2 747.0
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	50 917.1	51 642.7	49 037.2	—	(2 605.5)
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	3 273.8	20 114.2	19 489.4	—	(624.8)
Total	348 700.0	360 774.6	347 779.4	99.9	(12 995.2)

II. Special political missions

1. United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(\$14,322,000)

Foreword

During 2019, the West Africa and Sahel region experienced a shocking surge in terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets. Such activities are increasingly interlinked with intercommunal violence and transnational organized crime. The cross-border region straddling Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger has increasingly been used as a base by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and other terrorist groups. In these three countries, casualties from terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2016, with more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 alone, compared with an estimated 770 deaths in 2016. The number of displaced persons has also increased ten-fold, to approximately half a million. The impunity with which violent extremists and armed groups are attacking both civilians and security and defence forces threatens to undermine the fabric of society and the foundations of these States. The exploitation of cleavages within communities, as well as of religious and sectarian differences, is accelerating the cycle of violence. Across the region, Governments, local actors, regional organizations and the international community are mobilizing to respond to and to address the root causes of insecurity and instability. In December 2019, at its Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Economic Community of West African States adopted an action plan for the period 2020–2024 for the eradication of terrorism in the subregion. On 25 February 2020, during the Group of Five for the Sahel Heads of State Summit, decisions were taken to strengthen the capacity of the Group of Five, including by increasing the administrative autonomy of the executive secretariat, creating a new Administration and Finance Directorate and four Divisions (Resilience, Security/Defence, Infrastructure and Development, and Governance) and validating a new integrated priority initiatives framework for stabilization projects in vulnerable conflict-affected regions.

Despite the worrying security trends, there were positive political developments in some countries in West Africa and the Sahel. In 2019, presidential elections were organized in Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal, and legislative elections were conducted in Benin. Dialogue with citizens and across political divides were held in several countries, including Mauritania, Senegal, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. Peaceful presidential elections were also held in Togo on 22 February 2020.

For the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, 2021 will be characterized by intensified engagement with national Governments, regional and subregional organizations, and other stakeholders in support of their efforts towards sustaining peace in the region, in line with its expanded mandate ([S/2020/85](#), annex). Providing good offices support to reduce tensions in the aftermath of high-stakes elections scheduled for the second half of 2020 in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and the Niger will remain a key priority. I will also provide support to Benin and the Gambia, which will hold presidential elections in 2021. In addition, I will step up my monitoring and good offices in Guinea-Bissau following the closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau in December 2020.

In this volatile and complex situation, I look forward to 2021 with a strong commitment to working closely with all stakeholders in the quest for peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

(Signed) Mohamed **Ibn Chambas**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

2. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) is responsible for: (a) monitoring political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carrying out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General to support conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustaining peace and mediation efforts in the subregion, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors, with specific attention to countries in which United Nations presences are undergoing reconfiguration or transition, while mindful of the sustainable development context in the region; (b) enhancing regional and subregional partnerships to address cross-border and cross-cutting threats to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, in particular with regional and subregional entities such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Development Bank (AfDB); (c) supporting, through political advocacy and convening, the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and, in line with United Nations reforms, enhancing collaboration throughout the United Nations system and promoting coherence in the international and regional response to the root causes and impact of conflict in the Sahel; and (d) promoting good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention, management and resolution initiatives in West Africa and the Sahel.
3. The mandate of UNOWAS derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2013/753](#), [S/2013/759](#), [S/2016/88](#), [S/2016/89](#), [S/2016/1128](#) and [S/2016/1129](#)), as well as Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#), with the most recent expansion of mandates deriving from an exchange of letters between them ([S/2019/1009](#) and [S/2020/85](#)).

Programme of work

Objective

4. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

Strategy

5. To contribute to the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, UNOWAS will monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and carry out good offices in partnership with regional and subregional entities, especially with regard to four presidential and two parliamentary elections to be held in 2021. This work is expected to contribute to the prevention of conflicts and human rights violations, as well as the consolidation of political stability. Particular attention will be given to countries in transition, including Guinea-Bissau, following the closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) in December 2020. Past results in this area include joint regional good offices to the Gambia in 2016 and joint mediation efforts in overcoming election-related tensions in Sierra Leone in 2018.
6. In addition, UNOWAS will enhance regional and subregional partnerships, in particular with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and AfDB. This action is expected to result in the strengthening of subregional and cross-border responses to challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized

crime, illicit trafficking, conflicts between farmers and herders, terrorism and violent extremism. In this regard, UNOWAS will intensify its analytical work, including with respect to the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, in line with its expanded mandate (see [S/2020/85](#)). Past results in this area include the deployment of two technical support missions to assist in the preparation of the first joint summit of the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS) and ECOWAS on peace, security, stability, the fight against terrorism and violent extremism, in 2018.

7. UNOWAS will also mobilize support and provide advocacy to advance the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, working closely with United Nations coordination mechanisms at the regional level. It will maintain continuous engagement, including political support to advance United Nations regional programmes in coordination with partners (European Union, World Bank and AfDB). Using its convening power, UNOWAS will continue to increase coherence and information exchange between United Nations regional entities and regional and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Mano River Union. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General will continue to co-chair Ministerial Coordination Platform for the Sahel with the African Union. He will also co-chair two meetings of the steering committee in 2021 with regional United Nations entities. UNOWAS will continue to provide political and strategic leadership to the United Nations system for the implementation of the integrated strategy and work with the United Nations development system towards ensuring a more coherent, comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the root causes of instability and conflict in the Sahel. Past results in this area include joint support for the official launch of the “G5 Sahel Women’s Platform” in 2018 and an inter-agency mission to Burkina Faso in 2019 headed by the Special Representative, which led to a scaled-up multi-sectoral United Nations response, including the establishment of integrated field offices, to address the immediate needs and structural causes of insecurity in the country.
8. Furthermore, UNOWAS will provide support to the building of local and national capacities related to good governance, mediation, the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender. This work is expected to result in strengthened social cohesion and inclusive political dialogue. Past results in this area include the organization, in 2018, of the second regional conference on impunity and access to justice and human rights in West Africa and the Sahel, in collaboration with other United Nations entities, the African Union, ECOWAS, the secretariat of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Government of the Niger. A ministerial regional platform was created to track the implementation of the recommendations of the conference, which is unprecedented in the region.

External factors for 2021

9. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Violent extremism and terrorism in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin will continue to pose challenges to peace and stability in the subregion;
 - (b) Conflicts over natural resources affecting the relation between herders and farmers and other factors related to the adverse impact of climate change will continue to increase;
 - (c) Conflicts related to the ethnicization of politics in countries such as Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea will continue;
 - (d) There will be no new major conflicts in the subregion that would bring about a shift in priorities;
 - (e) Presidential elections will be held, as scheduled, in Benin and the Gambia in 2021;
 - (f) Presidential elections will be held in Guinea in 2020 and will not be delayed to 2021;
 - (g) The demand for good offices of UNOWAS will remain high, especially in the aftermath of elections scheduled for the second half of 2020;

- (h) The demand for monitoring and good offices in countries where United Nations presences are undergoing transition will remain high, especially in Guinea-Bissau following the closure of UNIOGBIS in December 2020;
 - (i) The Heads of State and Government of West Africa, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Mano River Union, the African Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel will demonstrate a commitment to mobilizing resources to address challenges to peace and stability, as well as the political will to ensure that regional peace and security mechanisms are operationalized;
 - (j) The ECOWAS early warning and response mechanism and other regional conflict prevention instruments will be fully operationalized;
 - (k) Peacebuilding and peace consolidation efforts by partners such as regional organizations, including in post-electoral contexts, will continue;
 - (l) Strong political commitment on the part of Member States and regional organizations to work with the United Nations in the context of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel will continue;
 - (m) Countries in the region will continue to make progress in implementing their obligations under national and international human rights standards and in upholding the rule of law;
 - (n) Jointly with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), there will be continued political and technical level engagements with and in support of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea.
10. UNOWAS integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The good offices role of the Special Representative will include consultations with women's groups and young people, and UNOWAS will continue to advocate the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and subsequent resolutions on women and youth and peace and security through the formulation and implementation of national and regional action plans.
 11. With regard to cooperation with other entities, as stipulated in its expanded mandate, UNOWAS will be an active partner of the African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and AfDB in developing and harmonizing regional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding; advancing the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law, the promotion of gender and the participation of young people in democratic processes; and supporting regional responses to address cross-border threats to peace and security, including transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, conflicts between farmers and herders, terrorism and violent extremism. UNOWAS will also continue to collaborate with regional and subregional partners through joint high-level missions, as well as technical assessment and fact-finding missions. It will continue to host the secretariat and ensure coordination of the Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel.
 12. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNOWAS will promote synergies with the Regional United Nations Sustainable Development Group for West and Central Africa, the regional Development Coordination Office, resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators, United Nations country teams and other United Nations entities to address the multifaceted challenges facing the region. Coordination with United Nations entities will continue within the framework of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The engagement of UNOWAS will remain consistent with the priorities of the integrated strategy, with a focus on cross-border threats to peace and security and efforts to counter radicalization. UNOWAS will work closely with the resident coordinators in its mission area on sustaining the peace agenda, in particular in Burkina Faso and the Gambia, and other priority issues. In that context, it will strengthen its coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and leverage its relationship with the Peacebuilding Support Office in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs of the Secretariat for targeted interventions. UNOWAS will deepen its engagement with UNOCA on issues affecting West and

Central Africa, including the threats posed by Boko Haram, as well as conflicts related to pastoralism, piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

13. In addition to raising awareness of the issues affecting the Lake Chad Basin region, UNOWAS will support efforts to advance the implementation of the African Union-Lake Chad Basin Commission regional stabilization strategy through advocacy and participation in its steering committees. UNOWAS will maintain continuous links to the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the secretariat of the Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad. UNOWAS will participate in the technical and high-level meetings of the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum on stabilization and recovery in the Lake Chad Region. Jointly with UNOCA and the European Union, the Special Representative will conduct a tour of the countries affected by Boko Haram and carry out good offices in them in compliance with Security Council resolution [2349 \(2017\)](#).

Evaluation activities

14. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

15. A planned result for 2019, which was enhanced national and subregional capacities for conflict prevention, stability, peacebuilding, improved governance and respect for the rule of law in West Africa and the Sahel, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the two sustaining peace initiatives in Burkina Faso and the Gambia meeting the target for 2019. These include formulating the Burkina Faso national security strategy for the implementation of its national security plan and conducting two security sector reform technical assessment missions to the Gambia.

Programme performance in 2019: consensus-building effort leading to resumed talks

16. General elections were held in Nigeria on 23 February 2019 to elect the President and Vice President, members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as state governors and those in the state assemblies. Against the backdrop of Boko Haram expanding its operations in the north-east, rising criminality in the north-west, persistent conflicts between farmers and herders in the north-central region and militant activities in the Niger Delta, the fiercely contested elections were characterized by tensions and disputes at the federal, state and local levels. These tensions were not limited to the polling day, but also permeated the periods before, during and after the elections. On election day, there were reports of multiple explosions in Maiduguri, Borno State, with Boko Haram claiming responsibility for the explosions. Other incidents of violence were reported in several states, including in Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Ebonyi, Kogi, Lagos and Zamfara States, resulting in deaths and the diversion and destruction of voting material, including through the snatching and burning of ballot boxes. During the state-level elections on 9 March, violence and irregularities led to the cancellation of elections in some areas of Kano, Sokoto, Bauchi, Adamawa, Benue and Plateau States.
17. The Special Representative, in his capacity as the high-level representative for Nigeria of the Secretary-General, conducted four good offices missions to defuse election-related tensions in Nigeria in 2019. During his first two missions prior to the elections, he held consultations with key national stakeholders to promote an environment conducive to peaceful elections. He met all the presidential candidates and conveyed to them, alongside regional and international partners, the need

to uphold high electoral standards. He also participated in high-level dialogue forums in Abuja organized by the United Nations and the National Peace Committee to promote peaceful elections. Furthermore, he co-hosted, with the Committee, peace forums to reduce tensions in electoral hotspots, including in Benue, Kaduna, Kano and Kwara States.

18. The pre-election high-level consultations provided a platform for engagement with relevant stakeholders involved in the electoral process at the state and federal levels. This helped to ensure an integrated approach to promoting a peaceful and transparent electoral process by incorporating human rights and gender considerations into the discussions. Through the discussions, some practical solutions were found to challenges that would have limited the participation of vulnerable groups such as internally displaced persons. UNOWAS strengthened collaboration between federal and state entities such as the Independent National Electoral Commission, security services, political actors, the National Human Rights Commission and civil society organizations. The joint strategic partnership between UNOWAS and the National Peace Committee, which led to the organization of those consultations, was key to enhancing national ownership and promoting peaceful electoral processes.
19. On the day of the elections and during the post-election period, the Special Representative continued his good offices engagement at the federal and state levels to reduce tensions and to assess the organization and conduct of the elections. In addition to events in Abuja, UNOWAS co-hosted consultations in Kaduna and Benue States with the National Peace Committee and the state-level peace commissions. During those consultations, stakeholders, including representatives of the Government, the security agencies, civil society organizations, the media and traditional leaders, reviewed instances of electoral and communal violence and proposed solutions.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

20. This work contributed to the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, as demonstrated by the conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in Nigeria. Evidence includes an increased use of legal means in contesting election results and a more limited geographic spread of election-related incidents, compared with the previous election cycle in 2015. With the support of the Special Representative, the candidates attended a signing event organized by the National Peace Committee, in which they committed themselves to accepting the results of the election. It is worth noting that the continued engagement of the Special Representative, in collaboration with other actors, was instrumental in persuading candidates from the two main parties to use the courts to settle disputes arising from the process. In the social cohesion forum organized in Kaduna and Benue States after the elections, stakeholders recognized the contribution of the pre-election forums in defusing tensions, building trust among actors and finding solutions to pending issues such as voting rights for internally displaced persons in Benue State. Participants in the post-election forums collectively developed action plans on how to improve social cohesion in their states.

Table 2
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• Conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in Nigeria	• Reduced tensions during the post-election period and lessons learned with regard to the organization and conduct of the elections	• Conflict prevention mechanisms enhanced, including through the strengthening of the national peace architecture	• Revitalized peace architecture promotes an environment conducive to peaceful elections ahead of the electoral cycle in 2019	• Conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in Nigeria

Planned result for 2021: increased good offices and mediation efforts to address election-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel

21. In 2019, UNOWAS conducted eight good offices missions and mediation activities, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors, to overcome election-related tensions in several countries in West Africa and the Sahel. UNOWAS provided continuous support to resident coordinator offices, in particular those without peace and development advisers. In 2021, in the light of expected election-related tensions in several countries, UNOWAS will increase its good offices and mediation work. It will need to pay attention to the political and security situation in Guinea-Bissau, given the departure of UNIOGBIS and in line with its expanded mandate. In this regard, UNOWAS will need to ensure that it can easily deploy staff at short notice.

Internal challenges and response

22. The challenge for UNOWAS was a high number of requests to support mediation efforts and dialogue with multiple stakeholders at different locations in the relevant countries in the periods leading up to, during and in the aftermath of the elections. Addressing potential sources of conflict, such as unresolved grievances, incomplete national reconciliation processes, entrenched impunity and sentiments of manipulation of institutions and processes, required more long-term and more local-level engagement by UNOWAS. This was also coupled with increasing threats to peace and security posed by violent extremism, terrorism and other latent and active intercommunal conflicts.
23. In response, for 2021, UNOWAS will increasingly move beyond national capitals and engage with political stakeholders at the provincial/regional/local level before, on and after election day to support efforts to resolve crises that might arise on the day of the vote or thereafter. UNOWAS will support the addressing of post-election tensions following the holding of key elections scheduled for the second half of 2020, including the presidential elections in Burkina Faso (November), Côte d'Ivoire (October), Ghana (November), Guinea (October) and the Niger (December). Dealing with the after-effects of these elections, in addition to the presidential elections scheduled for 2021 in Benin (February) and the Gambia (December), will require heightened and sustained engagement by UNOWAS in 2021 to prevent escalations in election-related tensions, promote social cohesion and encourage political dialogue.
24. Building on the good practice of the elections held in Nigeria in 2019, technical missions to potential hotspot areas will assess the pre- and post-electoral environment; meet national and international stakeholders, civil society, political parties, women and young people; identify entry points for conflict prevention activities; prepare scenario plans for United Nations action; and provide feedback to the Special Representative where his good offices may be required. Some missions will include consultative meetings to bring together key actors to identify existing threats to social cohesion and explore practical options to reinforce the resilience of communities and actors to violence before and during the elections. A key element of the successful engagement of UNOWAS in the defusing of electoral tensions will be the close coordination with the Regional United Nations Sustainable Development Group, the Regional Coordination Office, resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators, United Nations country teams and other United Nations entities.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

25. This work is expected to contribute to the achievement of peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel, as demonstrated by the good offices missions carried out to prevent election-related tensions and consolidate political stability, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors. If achieved, this will demonstrate progress made in 2021 towards the collective attainment of peaceful and credible elections in West Africa and the Sahel.

Table 3
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased number of inclusive pre- and post-electoral missions at the state and federal levels Peaceful and credible elections held in, among others, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increased number of inclusive pre- and post-electoral missions at the state and federal levels Peaceful and credible elections held in, among others, Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election-related tensions addressed before, on and after election day in five countries holding presidential elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Election-related tensions prevented and political stability consolidated, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

26. Table 4 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 4
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	9	9	9	9
3. Workshops on peace and security, including violent extremism, terrorism, transnational organized crime, human rights and the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions on women's rights	9	9	9	9
Technical materials (number of materials)	4	4	4	4
4. Issue papers on peace and security, human rights, gender and young people	4	4	4	4
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices, including jointly with ECOWAS and the African Union, on conflict prevention and in consideration of human rights and gender aspects.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
<p>Consultation, advice and advocacy: monitoring missions to countries of West Africa and the Sahel to analyse developments and emerging threats and identify entry points for early warning and conflict prevention activities; monitoring missions to Burkina Faso and the Gambia to support United Nations initiatives to sustain peace; and pre- and post-electoral missions to countries conducting elections in West Africa and the Sahel to monitor tensions related to the electoral process.</p> <p>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: advocacy and support for integrated subregional and cross-border responses on cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular election-related instability and challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism; consultations on human rights during political and electoral processes; advocacy for the effective implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel in addressing the root causes of instability in the Sahel; and advocacy for enhanced strategic cooperation and coordination in the Sahel in fulfilment of the objectives of the integrated strategy.</p>				
D. Communication deliverables				
<p>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: electronic and print magazines, brochures, flyers, information kits and special events to promote the activities of UNOWAS and enhance the visibility of the mission.</p> <p>External and media relations: press conferences, press releases and media interaction on the activities of UNOWAS.</p> <p>Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information on the activities of UNOWAS through its website and social media platforms.</p>				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

27. On 31 January 2020, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNOWAS for a further period of three years, from 1 February 2020 to 31 January 2023 (S/2020/85). The new mandate directed UNOWAS to carry out its mandate in partnership with regional and subregional organizations. The Council also instructed UNOWAS to promote coherence in the international and regional response to the root causes and impact of conflict in the Sahel; conduct regional research and analysis on transnational issues relevant to peace and security; and assist Governments in the region and the United Nations system in undertaking risk assessments and risk management strategies relating to the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters.
28. In addition, the Security Council, in its resolution 2512 (2020), requested UNIOGBIS to implement its transition plan for the gradual drawing down and transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and other regional and international partners, towards its mandate completion by 31 December 2020.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 5

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	147.1	139.6	139.6	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	7 747.8	7 654.1	8 516.1	–	862.0
Operational costs	4 722.7	4 817.6	5 666.3	–	848.7
Total (net of staff assessment)	12 617.6	12 611.3	14 322.0	–	1 710.7

Table 6
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		Total inter-national	National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service		National Professional Officer	Local level			
Approved 2020	1	1	–	2	7	13	7	–	31	7	–	38	6	18	–	62	
Proposed 2021	1	1	–	2	9	14	10	1	38	6	–	44	9	21	–	74	
Regular positions, change	–	–	–	–	2	1	3	1	7	(1)	–	6	3	3	–	12	
Approved general temporary assistance 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	
Proposed general temporary assistance 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	
General temporary assistance positions, change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	
Total approved 2020	1	1	–	2	7	13	7	–	31	7	–	38	6	19	–	63	
Total proposed 2021	1	1	–	2	9	14	10	1	38	6	–	44	9	22	–	75	
Total change	–	–	–	–	2	1	3	1	7	(1)	–	6	3	3	–	12	

29. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNOWAS amount to \$14,322,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser and one police adviser (\$139,600), salaries and common staff costs (\$8,516,100) for 44 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 9 P-5, 14 P-4, 10 P-3, 1 P-2 and 6 Field Service) and 31 national positions (9 National Professional Officer and 22 Local level positions, including 1 general temporary assistance Local level position), inclusive of the proposed establishment of 6 international positions (2 P-5, 1 P-4 and 3 P-3) and 6 national positions (2 National Professional Officer and 4 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$5,666,300), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$229,100), official travel (\$1,075,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$369,200), ground transportation (\$65,200), air operations (\$2,692,800), communications and information technology (\$629,900), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$604,800).

30. The following organizational changes are proposed for 2021:

- (a) Establishment of a Gender Affairs Unit, under the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to promote the mainstreaming of gender into conflict prevention and the management and resolution initiatives, including through the implementation of Security Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#), [2250 \(2015\)](#) and subsequent resolutions in West Africa and the Sahel;
- (b) Establishment of the Abuja cell in Nigeria to enhance institutional relations and partnerships with ECOWAS; promote coordination on strategic and operational issues, in particular in countries in transition and under reconfiguration; and facilitate exchanges between the ECOWAS Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel secretariat and the Mano River Union secretariat;

- (c) Renaming the Communication and Public Information Section to the Strategic Communication and Public Information Unit, in line with the policy on communications and public information of the Department of Global Communications of the Secretariat;
 - (d) Renaming the Research and Analysis Unit the Crosscutting and Analysis Unit to better reflect its functions;
 - (e) Renaming the Coordination and Regional Partnerships Section the Regional Partnerships Section to better reflect its functions;
 - (f) Renaming the General Service Unit the Property Management Unit to better reflect its functions;
 - (g) Renaming the Communication and Information Technology Unit the Field Technology Unit in line with the Organization's standard mission support structure for field missions.
31. As part of the changes to the organizational structure, the following changes are proposed in order to streamline the reporting lines to the senior leadership and improve coherence in the engagements with external actors:
- (a) Change of the reporting line of the Political Affairs Section from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General;
 - (b) Change of the reporting lines of the Military Adviser Unit from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Political Affairs Section;
 - (c) Change of the reporting lines of the Nouakchott cell, the renamed Crosscutting and Analysis Unit and the renamed Regional Partnerships Section from the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Political Affairs Section.
32. The following staffing changes are proposed for 2021: the establishment of 12 positions, reassignment of 3 positions, reclassification of 2 positions and redeployment of 4 positions, as detailed below:

Gender Affairs Unit:

- (a) Establishment of one Gender Affairs Officer (P-3) to provide support to the design and the implementation of annual workplans of the 17 national chapters of the Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel, in line with the new women and peace and security policy of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs;
- (b) Redeployment of one Gender Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Gender Affairs Unit;

Political Affairs Section:

- (c) Establishment of two positions, comprising one Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) and one Political Affairs Officer (P-3), to strengthen the reporting on and monitoring of political developments and the carrying out of good offices with specific attention on countries that are undergoing reconfiguration or transition to consolidate and sustain peace and promote sustainable development;
- (d) Reassignment of one Public Information Officer (P-4) from the Strategic Communication and Public Information Unit as a Political Affairs Officer (P-4) in the Political Affairs Section, to support the monitoring of and reporting on the political, security and economic situation in all countries of West Africa;
- (e) Redeployment of two positions, comprising one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and one Administrative Assistant (Local level), from the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Political Affairs Section;

Crosscutting and Analysis Unit:

- (f) Establishment of two positions, comprising one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and one Political Affairs Officer (P-3), to strengthen analysis and advice and assist Governments and the United Nations system entities in the region with regard to risk assessment and management of strategies relating to the implications of climate change, intercommunal violence, social cohesion, energy poverty, ecological changes and natural disasters;

Abuja cell:

- (g) Establishment of three positions, comprising one Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5), one Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) and one Administrative Assistant (Local level), to enhance institutional relations and partnerships with ECOWAS and promote coordination on strategic and operational issues, in particular in countries in transition and under reconfiguration, by drawing from the expertise, knowledge and networks of the region;

Nouakchott cell:

- (h) Establishment of two positions, comprising one Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) and one Administrative Assistant (Local level), to provide support to one existing P-5 position in that cell, to strengthen efforts to build partnerships and synergies between the Group of Five for the Sahel and other regional organizations, and support the liaison functions undertaken with United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali on the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel;

Strategic Communication and Public Information Unit:

- (i) Establishment of one Public Information Assistant (Local level) to focus on managing the UNOWAS website and its digital media platforms.

Finance and Budget Unit:

- (j) Reclassification of one Finance and Budget Assistant (Field Service) to an Associate Finance and Budget Officer (P-2) to provide the capability required to support the complexities associated with the management of the financial resources of UNOWAS, including financial engagements with the United Nations entities in various countries in the region, support the increase in the substantive activities and lead the cost-recovery processes newly deployed in the mission;

Human Resources Unit:

- (k) Establishment of one Human Resources Assistant (Local level) to strengthen the Unit's capacity in supporting the implementation of the expanded mandates, through the provision of human resources services, including recruitment, onboarding, administration of entitlements and benefits, staff development and career support;
- (l) Reclassification of one Human Resources Assistant (Local level) to an Associate Human Resources Officer (National Professional Officer) to strengthen the capability of the Unit in response to the wider and complex scope of activities in the management of human resources, including year-round planning, analysis and execution, and to ensure that the Unit has adequate capacity to resolve issues requiring judgment and a sufficient level of independent decision-making ability;
- (m) Redeployment of one Travel Assistant (Local level) from the Property Management Unit (renamed from the former General Services Unit) to the Human Resources Unit;

Property Management Unit:

- (n) Reassignment of one Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) as a Property Management Officer (National Professional Officer) to align with the functions performed by the position, which include the physical verification of assets, updating records in Umoja and ensuring compliance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

Supply and Facilities Management Unit:

- (o) Reassignment of one Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) as a Facilities Management Officer (National Professional Officer) to align with the functions performed by the position, which include overseeing the maintenance and repair of facilities.
33. A vacancy rate of 13 per cent has been applied to the estimates for existing international positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rate in 2019, and a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the six international positions proposed for establishment in 2021. The estimates reflect the assumption of full incumbency for existing national positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rate in 2019, while for positions proposed for establishment, vacancy rates of 50 and 35 per cent have been applied to two National Professional Officer and four Local level positions, respectively. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for military and police advisers.
 34. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to the increase under civilian personnel costs owing mainly to the proposed establishment of 12 positions, and increases under operational costs owing to: (a) an increase under air operations owing to the revised cost-sharing arrangement from 75 to 95 per cent resulting from the closure of UNIOGBIS by the end of 2020; and (b) the increases under official travel, facilities and infrastructure, and other services, supplies and equipment, reflecting the additional requirements for implementing the expanded mandates, including the establishment of the Abuja cell, and the organization of workshops on gender, young people, climate change and security.

Extrabudgetary resources

35. In 2020, UNOWAS received \$1,061,800 in extrabudgetary resources to support peace consolidation in Mano River Union countries; the implementation of the regional programme for the involvement of young women and men in peace processes in West Africa and the Sahel; the impact of climate change on security in West Africa and the Sahel; regional forum of peace and development advisers; and liaison with ECOWAS to work on areas of mutual cooperation.
36. In 2021, it is projected that extrabudgetary resources of \$410,400 will support the activities in peace consolidation and the implementation of the regional programme for youth involvement in peace processes and climate change on security in West Africa and the Sahel.

2. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

(\$1,024,000)

A. Programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

37. The mandates of UNIOGBIS derive from Security Council resolution [1876 \(2009\)](#), as subsequently extended by resolutions [1949 \(2010\)](#), [2030 \(2011\)](#), [2092 \(2013\)](#), [2103 \(2013\)](#), [2157 \(2014\)](#), [2186 \(2014\)](#), [2203 \(2015\)](#), [2267 \(2016\)](#), [2343 \(2017\)](#) and [2404 \(2018\)](#). The Council, in its resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), extended the mandate of UNIOGBIS until 31 December 2020 and decided that it should start the liquidation process immediately after the mandate completion date of 31 December 2020, ending no later than 28 February 2021. UNIOGBIS is expected to have terminated its liquidation, including handing over assets and functions to the country team, by that date. As also expressed by the Council, UNOWAS will intensify, as needed, its engagement with national actors in order to sustain the gains and support the national authorities in ensuring stability and good governance in the country.
38. The Security Council, in its resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), requested the mission to focus, during its final 10 months of activities, on “the post-electoral phase” (phase 2) and continue to perform its good offices function, in coordination with international partners, including the group of five international partners represented in Guinea-Bissau, to support the Bissau-Guinean authorities in bringing the electoral dispute to a peaceful, stable and democratic conclusion. UNIOGBIS was also requested to establish the conditions conducive to the implementation of the reform agenda, in line with the Conakry Agreement on the Implementation of the ECOWAS Road Map for the Resolution of the Political Crisis in Guinea-Bissau and the ECOWAS six-point road map, through the United Nations transition plan, encapsulated in the new United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework (2021–2025), and in coordination with the Bissau-Guinean national authorities and international partners. During the “transition phase” (phase 3), UNIOGBIS will continue to implement its transition plan for the gradual drawdown and transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and other regional and international partners, towards mandate completion by 31 December 2020, bearing in mind the need for a flexible approach to ensure a seamless transfer of responsibilities and cooperating closely with the Government of Guinea-Bissau to ensure national ownership of the process. The Council, by the same resolution, requested UNIOGBIS to support the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS six-point road map, facilitate an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process and strengthen democratic governance, in particular with regard to the implementation of urgent reforms, including the reform of the Constitution, the electoral law, and the framework law on political parties. It also requested UNIOGBIS to assist, coordinate and lead international efforts in the following areas to ensure lasting peace and stability in Guinea Bissau: (a) provide support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in strengthening democratic institutions and enhancing the capacity of State organs to function effectively and constitutionally; (b) assist national authorities and stakeholders in the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as undertaking human rights monitoring and reporting activities; (c) provide strategic and technical advice and support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, in close cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; (d) provide support to the Government of Guinea-Bissau and other stakeholders in incorporating a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in accordance with Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#), [1820 \(2008\)](#), [2242 \(2015\)](#) and [2493 \(2019\)](#), and in implementing the national action plan on gender in order to ensure the involvement, representation and participation of women at all levels, including through the provision of gender advisers; and (e) support the Government of Guinea-Bissau, in close cooperation with the Peacebuilding Commission, in the

mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance for the implementation of the reforms outlined in the Conakry Agreement and the ECOWAS six-point road map.

Programme of work

Objective

39. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to consolidate peace and security in Guinea-Bissau.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

40. A planned result for 2019, which is enhanced national human rights capacity for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights and gender equality in Guinea-Bissau, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the technical support provided to the Government, civil society and the United Nations country team for submissions to the universal periodic review of Guinea-Bissau and the continuous monitoring of the situation of persons deprived of liberty, which resulted in the release of 194 detainees from prolonged/arbitrary detention in 2019. With a view to supporting the Government in the implementation of recommendations for the universal periodic review, UNIOGBIS conducted a training of trainers in August 2019 for 30 military officers, including 14 female officers, and trainers from the Ministry of Defence and the National Defence Institute Office. In addition, in November 2019, UNIOGBIS finalized a manual on human rights and elections and disseminated 300 copies to national monitors, international election observers, civil society organizations and the human rights defenders' network as a tool for monitoring and observing the election, which also contributed to enhancing national capacities in this area.

Programme performance in 2019: good offices and electoral assistance to support the political process and in respect of the electoral calendar

41. Joint international mediation efforts led by ECOWAS, in close coordination with the United Nations, were critical in keeping the electoral calendar and process on track. An ECOWAS delegation conducted a pre-electoral assessment mission from 19 to 23 August to evaluate progress and assess challenges in the organization of the election. ECOWAS was particularly concerned with the deep distrust among national actors and the objections raised regarding the exercise to correct the voter register.
42. The Government of Guinea-Bissau developed a consolidated electoral budget of \$5.19 million to cover the activities of all State entities involved in the organization of the presidential election. International donors contributed more than \$3.59 million in support of the electoral process. Between August 2019 and January 2020, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the President of the National Electoral Commission co-chaired eight meetings of the High-level Steering Committee on Elections, with the participation of the international community and electoral management bodies, to monitor progress in the electoral process. Those meetings resulted in the strengthening of national coordination and the harmonization of international partners' assistance, as well as overcoming challenges affecting the smooth conduct of the election.
43. The United Nations integrated electoral team, under UNIOGBIS leadership, provided technical assistance and strategic advice to the national electoral management bodies, focusing on operations and logistical planning, budget preparation and management, and procurement. The United Nations

regional electoral advisers supported the regional election commissions in implementing their operational activities and ensuring the effective use of donor resources.

44. UNIOGBIS provided technical assistance to the working group on women and social inclusion of the National Electoral Commission to mainstream gender into the electoral process. This resulted, for the first time, in the adoption by the Commission on 18 October of a new gender policy to integrate gender into all programmes. The policy is aimed at identifying and reducing discrimination and barriers to the participation of women in all electoral operations and increasing their participation as voters, candidates, observers, representatives of political parties and Commission staff.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

45. The work contributed to the consolidation of peace and security in Guinea-Bissau, as demonstrated by the conduct of generally peaceful and inclusive presidential elections, and by the peaceful means of resorting to legal channels to address the dispute over the election results as announced by the Electoral Commission early in January 2020 (1 January provisional results). However, the Bissau-Guinean political actors and State institutions could not resolve the protracted post-electoral crisis using the legal and constitutional framework, prompting ECOWAS to issue a decision on 22 April 2020 determining the winner of the election in accordance with the results announced by the National Electoral Commission. The completion of the electoral cycle is a benchmark in the political and peace process in Guinea-Bissau. In addition, an integrated United Nations policy framework was developed to ensure that the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework incorporated peacebuilding priorities into the planning cycle for the period 2021–2025. A programme management team was also established in mid-December 2019 under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative and resident coordinator to strengthen the integrated efforts leading to the establishment of the Cooperation Framework.

Table 7

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• Inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation supported by UNIOGBIS	• Inclusive political dialogue and reconciliation supported by UNIOGBIS	• Implementation of the Conakry Agreement • Inclusive political dialogue and elections preparations ongoing	• Conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections • Enhanced national human rights capacity for the promotion, protection and respect for human rights and gender equality

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

46. Table 8 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 8

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	–
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	–
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	15	15	15	–
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	–
3. Meetings of the Peacebuilding Commission configuration	2	2	2	–
4. Meetings of the group of five international partners represented in Guinea-Bissau (United Nations, African Union, Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, European Union)	10	10	10	–
5. National conference to validate the revised national plan to combat drug trafficking	1	1	1	–
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	11	11	11	–
6. Seminar on drug trafficking, transnational organized crime case progression and tracking, and enhanced surveillance systems and cross-border control	1	1	1	–
7. Workshops to draft and support efforts for Parliament to adopt a bill to establish a national human rights institution compliant with the Paris Principles, and to adopt a human rights action plan	4	4	4	–
8. Workshop for journalists on financing the media sector and legal framework	1	1	1	–
9. Training events on journalism, human rights, investigations into organized crime, community policing and gender	5	5	5	–
Publications (number of publications)	3	3	2	–
10. National strategy to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime in Guinea-Bissau	1	1	1	–
11. Joint thematic public human rights reports	2	2	1	–
Technical materials (number of materials)	4	4	4	–
12. Pocket edition of the annotated version of the Constitution	1	1	1	–
13. Stability pact booklet (agreement between political parties)	1	1	1	–
14. Booklet on electoral code of conduct	1	1	1	–
15. Booklet on media law compilation	1	1	1	–

C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: provision of good offices, in consultation with the group of five international partners represented in Guinea-Bissau and with national authorities and key stakeholders, on conflict prevention and mediation efforts aimed at stabilization efforts in line with the Conakry Agreement, including by facilitating an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process; good offices for the mobilization, harmonization and coordination of international assistance in support of the elections; and good offices for resource mobilization and development policy coordination through periodic Strategic Policy Group meetings and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on political dialogue and national reconciliation; strategic advice and technical assistance for the revision and implementation of urgent reform in line with the Conakry Agreement, including expediting the review of the Constitution, the electoral law and the legal framework on political parties; advice on the

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
promotion and protection of human rights; strategic advice and advocacy to effectively combat drug trafficking and organized crime; and advocacy on gender-sensitive conflict resolution and gender equality.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: monitoring missions on the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy and monitoring missions to the regions across the country on human rights.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: audiovisual archive database (photographs, videos and radio) of UNIOGBIS activities and database of civil society organizations and media outlets for effective liaison and communication.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach through community meetings to inform the public of the mission's mandate and activities; joint communiqués in support of fulfilling the implementation of the Conakry Agreement issued by the group of five international partners represented in Guinea-Bissau; public information campaign on combating impunity; and outreach programme on justice.				
External and media relations: monthly external newsletters on the work of the United Nations and press releases and promotional materials on activities of the mission.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: website and social media to disseminate information on the mission's mandate and activities.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

47. The Security Council, by its resolution [2512 \(2020\)](#), decided that, by 31 December 2020 UNIOGBIS should complete its mandated tasks and implement its transition plan for the gradual drawdown and transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team, UNOWAS and other regional and international partners.
48. The Security Council also requested, pursuant to that resolution, the Secretary-General to begin the liquidation of UNIOGBIS immediately following the mandate completion date, once all substantive staff had left the mission, and end the liquidation process no later than 28 February 2021. The Council also stressed the importance of the alignment of timelines for the liquidation of UNIOGBIS and the decision-making of the United Nations country team with regard to assets and premises.
49. UNIOGBIS has developed its mission support drawdown and closure plan, which is consistent with the overarching plans for the transition to the United Nations country team and outlines actions and timelines to be taken across various pillars of asset disposal, site handover, archiving and records management, human resources and environmental restoration. During the pre-closure phase, UNIOGBIS mission support has worked to advance implementation of this plan in collaboration with the United Nations country team, supported by the Department of Operational Support of the Secretariat, the Global Service Centre and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda.
50. During the liquidation period, the liquidation team will seek to complete all residual matters so that only a small volume of transactions that cannot be processed by the mission are transferred to Headquarters or the Regional Service Centre for conclusion. For this purpose, it is proposed that 28 personnel be retained during the liquidation period, comprising mission support staff, security staff and the mission's Legal Officer.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 9

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	94.9	84.9	–	–	(84.9)
Civilian personnel costs	12 530.3	11 058.7	507.7	–	(10 551.0)
Operational costs	3 511.4	4 174.6	516.3	–	(3 658.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	16 136.6	15 318.2	1 024.0	–	(14 294.2)

Table 10

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	1	1	1	6	12	8	–	29	27	–	56	22	39	4	121
Proposed from 1 January to 28 February 2021	–	–	–	–	1	3	1	–	5	12	–	17	–	11	–	28
Proposed from 1 March 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Change	–	(1)	(1)	(1)	(6)	(12)	(8)	–	(29)	(27)	–	(56)	(22)	(39)	(4)	(121)

51. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNIOGBIS amount to \$1,024,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$507,700) for the continuation of the 28 positions in the liquidation team during the liquidation period, comprising 17 international positions (1 P-5, 3 P-4, 1 P-3 and 12 Field Service) and 11 national positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$516,300), comprising the costs for official travel (\$45,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$107,100), ground transportation (\$18,300), air transportation (\$56,400), communications and information technology (\$113,300), medical (\$38,900), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$136,800) for the two-month liquidation period from 1 January to 28 February 2021.
52. The following staffing changes are proposed for 2021 in the context of the mandate completion and the liquidation of UNIOGBIS:
- Abolishment, effective 1 January 2021, of 93 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 5 P-5, 9 P-4, 7 P-3, 15 Field Service, 22 National Professional Officer, 28 Local level and 4 United Nations Volunteers) at the closure of UNIOGBIS;
 - Retention of a liquidation team of the remaining 28 positions until 28 February 2021 to complete the liquidation, comprising the following:
 - Mission Support Section: 19 positions (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 9 Field Service and 7 Local level), which will include 1 Chief of Mission Support (P-5), 1 Chief of Technical Services (P-4),

1 Medical Officer (P-4), 1 Human Resources Officer (Field Service), 1 Budget and Finance Assistant (Field Service), 1 Senior Nurse (Field Service), 1 Chief Information Systems Officer (Field Service), 1 Transport Officer (Field Service), 1 Transport Assistant (Field Service), 1 Supply Assistant (Field Service), 1 Property Management Assistant (Field Service), 1 Procurement Officer (Field Service), 1 Facilities Management Assistant (Local level), 1 Human Resources Assistant (Local level), 1 Budget and Finance Assistant (Local level), 1 Telecommunications Assistant (Local level), 1 Electrician (Local level), 1 Transport Assistant (Local level) and 1 Receiving and Inspection Assistant (Local level);

(ii) Integrated Safety and Security Office: 8 positions (1 P-3, 3 Field Service and 4 Local level), which will include 1 Security Coordination Officer (P-3), 3 Security Officer (Field Service) and 4 Security Assistant (Local level);

(iii) Legal Affairs Unit: 1 Legal Affairs Officer (P-4).

53. On the basis of the actual average vacancy rates in 2019, a vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the 28 positions retained until 28 February 2021.
54. The decrease in the requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable to reduced requirements under: (a) operational costs due to the provision of resources for the two-month liquidation period; and (b) civilian personnel costs, resulting from the proposed staffing changes set out in the above paragraphs in view of the closure of UNIOGBIS by 31 December 2020 and the end of the liquidation process by 28 February 2021.

Extrabudgetary resources

55. In 2020, UNIOGBIS projects extrabudgetary resources in the total amount of \$100,000 for specific activities related to human rights protection and promotion, and for the monitoring of human rights.
56. No extrabudgetary resources are projected for 2021.

3. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

(\$104,777,300)

Foreword

Somalia's steady progress in rebuilding state institutions to serve all Somalis is a testament to the determination of its people and leaders. Such endeavours take years to bear fruit and face many challenges. The country's path to peace and stability is no different. Significant progress has been made to date through the prioritization of critical national processes and a methodical approach to delivery through agreed priorities with partners and road maps, to keep delivery on track. Priorities have been agreed between the Somali authorities and international partners through the Somalia Partnership Forum and are being implemented through the mutual accountability framework of shared priorities.

This approach is starting to bear fruit. Somalia has adopted and is implementing its ninth national development plan. It is on track to achieve debt relief and access to financing that will transform its national budget. The country is undertaking a number of significant security sector reforms and has passed key pieces of legislation that will lay the foundations for its legal and regulatory framework.

In recent years, Somalia has developed a track record of peaceful transfers of power every four years. The next elections are scheduled for 2020–2021. Many challenges remain, but through the same determination shown by Somalis in previous political cycles, historic one-person, one-vote elections are achievable. Plans to conclude both parliamentary elections and the constitutional review process in 2020 will require all stakeholders to work together and for all leaders to engage in a spirit of cooperation and compromise, putting the national interest first. It will also require an inclusive approach that ensures the full participation of women and young people.

Somalia still faces the significant security threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism, with Al-Shabaab remaining the primary security threat to political and state-building processes and international presence. While Al-Shabaab's ability to control large urban areas has been diminished, the group retains the ability to launch attacks in Mogadishu and other parts of the country. To have Somalia assume the lead responsibility for security from the African Union Mission in Somalia will require further political and technical progress in building a federated security sector and continued coordinated support from the international community. Successful security operations will depend on the capability of security forces and state institutions to provide security, governance, justice and stabilization initiatives to local populations.

Somalia has faced dire humanitarian challenges in the past two decades. While responding to immediate needs, the United Nations system is also working to build resilience to future crises. This includes protection for the large number of men, women and children internally displaced as a result of natural and man-made disasters, including drought, flooding and armed conflict, which place an enormous strain on the Somali population.

In 2021, Somalia will continue to face many of the same challenges that it has encountered on its peacebuilding and state-building path to date, but under the responsibility of a new federal mandate. With the conclusion of the electoral cycle, 2021 will be an opportunity to address many of the reconciliation, resource and capacity-building priorities that will depend on state authority, the rule of law, the protection and promotion of human rights, and access to financing. The year ahead promises to be an important stage in Somalia's road to peace, stability and development.

I take this opportunity to reiterate our strong commitment to supporting Somalia on this challenging but critical journey.

(Signed) James Swan
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

57. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) is responsible for: (a) the provision of good offices to help to advance Federal Government of Somalia-led inclusive political processes; (b) the provision of strategic advice on peacebuilding and state-building; (c) assistance to the Federal Government in coordinating international donor support for Somalia's security sector in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy; and (d) the capacity-building of the Federal Government and its federal member states on human rights, women's empowerment and child protection issues, including through monitoring, reporting on and helping to prevent human rights violations. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2102 \(2013\)](#), which established UNSOM, and subsequently resolutions, namely, [2158 \(2014\)](#), [2221 \(2015\)](#), [2232 \(2015\)](#), [2275 \(2016\)](#), [2358 \(2017\)](#), [2408 \(2018\)](#), [2461 \(2019\)](#), [2472 \(2019\)](#), [2498 \(2019\)](#), [2500 \(2019\)](#) and [2516 \(2020\)](#), the latter of which extended the mandate of UNSOM until 30 June 2020.
58. The Security Council, through its resolution [2408 \(2018\)](#), requested UNSOM to support Somali efforts in countering and preventing violent extremism; to support the implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan; to encourage engagement with civil society and young people; and to provide political, technical, operational and logistical support, in collaboration with the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), in preparing for the 2020–2021 elections, as well as the system-wide implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in respect of all United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali security sector.
59. Central to the work of UNSOM for 2021 is the provision of good offices and strategic policy advice to help to advance political processes and critical peacebuilding and state-building efforts. To that end, UNSOM will sustain its support for Somali efforts in the context of the federal elections in 2020–2021 and the subsequent implementation of the results, Somalia's constitutional review exercise, the deepening of the federalization process, security sector reform and the transition plan. UNSOM will also continue to support stakeholders in the Somali justice and security sector in order to improve the corrections and judicial systems, reform the judiciary, strengthen the security service delivery capacity of the police forces, improve equitable access to justice and protect the most vulnerable. In addition, UNSOM will continue to consolidate its presence in the federal member states, including through the establishment or relocation, security conditions permitting, of its regional offices in the federal member state capitals where they do not yet exist. In addition to establishing its presence in Jawhar and Dhuusamarreeb, the Mission intends to relocate its regional office in South-West State from Baidoa to Baraawe, as requested by the state authorities in December 2019.

Programme of work

Objective

60. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to achieve peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia through the delivery of the mandate established by the Security Council as described above and in line with the priorities of Federal Government of Somalia.

Strategy

61. To contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, UNSOM will continue to support and advise authorities on the conduct of federal elections,

including the disposition of electoral disputes during the parliamentary electoral process. This action is expected to result in the transition of power to the next Federal Government of Somalia during the first quarter of 2021. The Mission will support the incoming administration in making progress in the achievement of Somalia's national priorities, through inclusive political processes and in coordination with international partners. Past results in this area include assisting the National Independent Electoral Commission and, through it, Parliament, to revise and finalize the electoral legal framework (national electoral law and amendments to the law on political parties).

62. To contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, UNSOM will continue to advocate accelerated inclusive high-level decision-making and political agreements on outstanding issues. This work is expected to result in the conclusion of the constitutional review process. If it is concluded, the Mission will closely engage with national stakeholders, including the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states and civil society, to ensure that structures and processes comply with the Constitution. The Mission, in close coordination with national and international partners, will support Somali-led initiatives, as guided by the national reconciliation framework, towards the peaceful resolution of local conflicts, including in the regions disputed between Puntland and "Somaliland". The Mission will also support talks between the Federal Government of Somalia and "Somaliland". Past results in these areas include the adoption of the national reconciliation framework at the state level and the conduct of local reconciliation efforts, to safeguard the rights of minorities and marginalized groups.
63. To contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, UNSOM will continue to provide strategic advice to national counterparts to support the implementation of the national security architecture, to facilitate the delivery of the comprehensive approach to security in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, to exercise the Mission's convening role in coordinating related international support, to explore support for enhancing the ability of Somali security forces to mitigate the threat from improvised explosive devices and to work closely with national counterparts to align stabilization initiatives with the priorities identified in the later phases of the transition plan. This work is expected to result in the successful implementation of the national security architecture with capable Somali security forces and stabilization efforts. Past results in this area include the gradual handover of responsibility from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions and the implementation of related capacity-building initiatives, in locations identified in the transition plan. In addition, international partners contributed to generating at least six battalions of the Somali National Army to deliver on the agreed transition plan priority operations. Further force generation will be required to more comprehensively prepare for the transfer of security from AMISOM to Somali security forces. UNSOM will continue to strengthen its monitoring, investigation and reporting to the Security Council on human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations, including against children and women and all forms of sexual exploitation.

External factors for 2021

64. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states is expected to resume in 2020 upon conclusion of the Galmudug and Jubaland electoral processes, but may be hampered by occasional tension between the different levels of governments;
 - (b) The new administration will support the finalized ninth national development plan and the road maps with the same priorities or with no major changes;
 - (c) Local conflicts will continue, including between "Somaliland" and Puntland;
 - (d) The formation of the Galmudug administration, inclusive of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, is successful in 2020 and will hold until 2021;

- (e) National elections will have been held in late 2020/early in 2021 and the incoming political dispensation emerges in the first quarter of 2021;
 - (f) Key constitutional and federalism questions will be negotiated and agreed among the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states;
 - (g) Somalia will progressively assume responsibility for security, with the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states remaining committed and making progress towards building security and justice institutions, as outlined in the national security architecture. The National Security Council or a new forum to facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member states will remain essential for decision-making on outstanding issues;
 - (h) Human rights violations by parties to the conflict continue to remain of concern, with young Somalis remaining particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups;
 - (i) Somalia will continue to experience widespread insecurity stemming from Al-Shabaab attacks, activities of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-affiliated groups, inter-clan tensions and climate-related shocks;
 - (j) The Security Council, the African Union and the wider international community will remain sufficiently united and coherent in their approach to Somalia, notably on the way forward in the transition of security from AMISOM to Somalis.
65. UNSOM integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, for example, through the promotion of the quota for a minimum of 30 per cent of elected officials and political appointments in Somalia to be women. These efforts will also include supporting the Somali authorities in reaching the self-adopted quota of 20 per cent of the police services comprising female officers. In addition, the Mission will support the increased participation of women in peacebuilding, including by promoting their involvement in the development of a strategy for the effective and sustainable rehabilitation of disengaged female combatants and their dependents.
66. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSOM will continue to work closely with AMISOM to ensure alignment of strategic priorities and operational efforts, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum, comprising the Heads of AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS. Furthermore, the United Nations-AMISOM joint working group on the human rights due diligence policy, as well as the United Nations human rights due diligence policy task force (comprising United Nations entities that deliver support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces), will be strengthened to guide and ensure robust implementation of the prevention and response measures in line with policy.
67. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNSOM continues its efforts to further advance integration and cooperation with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to enhance and accelerate the delivery of results in Somalia in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework. In close coordination with the United Nations country team and international partners, UNSOM will work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia in implementing the mutual accountability framework to ensure consistency and alignment of international support for the country's priorities. In addition, UNSOM will continue to implement joint programmes with United Nations country team entities to advance peacebuilding and state-building goals. Existing integrated teams will continue to collaborate in the areas of electoral support, constitutional review support, the rule of law, integrity systems, security sector reform, economic development and gender.

Evaluation activities

68. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

69. A planned result for 2019, which is consolidated government institutions and an effective and inclusive federal political system, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the reconciliation meetings held between communities in Galmudug and South-West State and the Mudug region.
70. A planned result for 2019, which is readiness for multiparty one-person, one-vote elections in Somalia, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part through the identification of potential voter registration sites in the Banaadir region and South-West State, Hirshabelle and Galmudug. Progress in the two remaining federal member states, Jubaland and Puntland, depends on the resumption of dialogue and cooperation between those two administrations and the Federal Government of Somalia.
71. A planned result for 2019, which is progress in the security transition from AMISOM to Somalia in line with the national security architecture and transition plan and through the comprehensive approach to security, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the progress in implementing phase 1 of the transition plan. A Federal Government of Somalia-driven change in priority from the clearance of the main supply route from Mogadishu to Baidoa to operations in Lower Shabelle resulted in recovering four towns in Lower Shabelle, with stabilization actors working following military-led operations to consolidate these successes.

Programme performance in 2019

Laying the foundation for the formation of a unified administration in Galmudug

72. Since 2018, Galmudug has experienced political polarization owing to different interpretations of the expiration date of its administration's term. The President of Galmudug and the leadership of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, who signed a power-sharing agreement in December 2017, claimed that their new administration should end its term in 2021, while others were of the opinion that it should have ended in July 2019. The unsettled political turmoil resulted in the paralysis of state affairs. A turning point came through the political outreach of the Prime Minister, Hassan Ali Khayre, and his engagement in Galmudug in June 2019 to build momentum for establishing a unified Galmudug. As a result, broad consensus on needing a Galmudug-wide reconciliation conference before the presidential elections emerged.
73. To support this Federal Government of Somalia-led reconciliation and electoral process, UNSOM, together with UNDP, provided political advice to the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation and the Office of the Prime Minister and supported their efforts in mobilizing resources for the reconciliation conference. In the lead-up to the conference, UNSOM underscored the importance of inclusivity and worked with the Federal Government to ensure that delegates attending a Habar Gidir clan conference in Hobyo, Mudug region, would join the conference in Dhuusamarreeb. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General led an ambassadorial delegation to Dhuusamarreeb to provide political support and encouragement to the process, in particular with regard to the integration of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a militias into national security forces. Although the reconciliation conference was successful and achieved a joint commitment to form a unified administration, new challenges emerged during the next phase of the political negotiation, resulting in a heightened risk of violence due to a disagreement between the Federal

Government and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a. UNSOM, together with key international partners, engaged both parties to commit to refraining from violence and to a single process based on dialogue. The effort led to a renegotiated agreement between the Federal Government and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, which allowed the process to move ahead. On 2 February 2020, the presidential elections were held in a peaceful environment, although more than one half of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a assembly members and prominent presidential candidates did not participate owing to unaddressed concerns. Furthermore, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a and the former Galmudug President initiated parallel processes to express their disagreement with the Federal Government-led process. UNSOM will support further post-election negotiations and dialogue to advance efforts to unify the state.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

74. This work contributed to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, as demonstrated by an avoidance of violence, with the exception of some minor incidents, during a highly sensitive political process in a spirit of key principles set out in the national reconciliation framework. The sustained engagement of key stakeholders was evidenced by the participation of all clans in the reconciliation conference, the active engagement of minorities, young people and women, interaction among participants, and the political accommodation of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a.

Table 11
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• Conduct of conflict mapping by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states	• Ad hoc conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts undertaken • Development of a national reconciliation framework by the Federal Government	• Adoption of a national reconciliation framework by the federal cabinet and its gradual roll-out to the federal member states

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Identification of potential voter registration sites

75. In 2020–2021, Somalia is expected to hold its first one-person, one-vote elections in more than 50 years. UNSOM and UNDP have been supporting the National Independent Electoral Commission in its efforts to lay the groundwork and prepare for the conduct of these elections. Since the establishment of the Commission, the Integrated Electoral Support Group, consisting of both UNSOM and UNDP electoral experts, has focused its activities on the capacity development of the Commission's Board of Commissioners, secretariat and field offices, providing technical and logistical support, as well as strategic advice. During 2019, UNSOM supported the Commission in identifying potential voter registration centres to eventually also be used as polling centres.
76. In 2019, UNSOM supported the National Independent Electoral Commission in developing a detailed plan to identify and map potential voter registration Centres in Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South-West State, as well as in the Banaadir Regional Administration. Using geographical information systems (GIS), the Integrated Electoral Support Group helped the Commission to put in place a methodology to achieve this goal. Support Group enumerators were selected, trained, equipped and supported by the Support Group field officers based in the federal member states.

Those enumerators conducted field missions to physically verify and assess the sites, gathering information by mapping and recording the required data on global positioning system devices.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

77. This work contributed to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia through the advancing of preparations for the upcoming federal parliamentary elections and the transfer of power, as demonstrated by the conduct of the voter registration site mapping operation. The sites will be vetted by the national security task force, also supported by the Integrated Electoral Support Group, to establish whether they are suitable to host voter registration and polling activities.

Table 12
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Conduct of a pilot project, supported by the Integrated Electoral Support Group, to test recruitment and training procedures, as well as hardware and software for the voter registration site mapping operation scheduled in 2019 by the National Independent Electoral Commission	• Conduct of the voter registration site mapping operation by the Commission

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Expanding national ownership, development and reforms of the Somali security sector

78. In 2018, the Federal Government of Somalia developed a transition plan to gradually assume responsibility for providing security to the Somali people. The plan provides a phased approach to extend state authority across Somalia by outlining a series of tasks to build security and rule of law institutions, transfer the responsibility for providing security in selected locations in the country and implement stabilization activities. In 2019, UNSOM continued to coordinate activities with international partners to generate force elements and mobilize resources for priority transition operations, including the operational assessment of generated units and validation of human rights due diligence policy adherence by those units.
79. Discussions between Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states officials aimed at securing a political agreement on the Federal Justice and Corrections Model continued and the contentious issues narrowed. In February 2019, the first phase of the Mogadishu prison and court complex was handed over to the Federal Government, with an agreement that no person detained or tried at the complex would be executed. The integrated United Nations rule of law team continued to support mobile courts and alternative dispute resolution centres to expand justice services beyond

major population centres, in particular for the most vulnerable groups. The team also provided support to the Office of the Attorney General, which established a fully functional sexual and gender-based violence unit in Mogadishu, staffed by four prosecutors. The unit received 48 sexual and gender-based violence-related cases from the police in the first six months of 2019.

80. The code of conduct and the organizational structure of the Somali National Army were signed into law in January 2019, and the operational readiness assessment of regional forces resulted in 19,683 individuals being registered in Jubaland, Galmudug, South-West State and Puntland. The Federal Government of Somalia conducted a biometric verification of all National Army personnel to facilitate the prompt payment of personnel, identify training gaps and provide a baseline for personnel to be demobilized under the pensions and gratuity bill, which is before Parliament. AMISOM handed over to Somali security forces the Mogadishu military academy. The Mine Action Service delivered explosive hazard awareness briefings to National Army troops and trained four Somali Police Force teams on improvised explosive device disposal and explosive hazard threat mitigation.
81. There was improvement in coordination and planning between military, police, justice and stabilization activities with respect to the Federal Government of Somalia-led operations in Lower Shabelle, Jamaame and Leego. As a result, stabilization activities were implemented in the newly recovered areas, and 400 community-oriented police officers, as well as more than 100 Darwish officers of the Somali Police Force, were deployed, as part of the broader “hold” and “build” elements of the transition plan. A community outreach programme named “Be among your people” was designed with UNSOM support and is being extended to the newly recovered areas to encourage defections from Al-Shabaab and enrolment in the national defector programme. For the first time, through funding from the Peacebuilding Fund, 150 women formerly associated with Al-Shabaab were supported to acquire livelihood skills as part of the preventing and combating violent extremism strategy. Furthermore, two women’s rehabilitation centres were constructed, in Baidoa and Kismaayo, thus providing a sustainable and dedicated defection pathway for former female Al-Shabaab members. In addition to this, a risk assessment tool for screening children associated with armed groups was finalized and is being rolled out countrywide.
82. The joint security sector governance programme supported the institutional capacity-building of executive and legislative security institutions to enhance civilian oversight and professionalization of the security sector. Parliament reviewed the 1969 law and endorsed a draft pensions and gratuities bill for members of the security services, paving the way for the rightsizing and rejuvenation of the security forces. The Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport relaunched the Somali Maritime Administration and plans to attain initial operational capability by mid-2020, with the aim of reviving the economic potential of Somali marine resources and contributing to the country’s blue economy.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

83. This work contributed to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, as demonstrated by a gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and the implementation of related capacity-building initiatives. The training of 2,900 police officers has been initiated through the joint police programme. State police are operating in each of the state capitals with a gradual expansion of their presence to other major population centres and to areas recently liberated. Somalia federal police legislation and regulations have been drafted and are being considered by the Federal Government of Somalia. A police operational readiness assessment of regional forces exercise, involving approximately 20,000 individuals, was conducted in all federal member states, except Hirshabelle. As part of the Mogadishu security plan, preparatory work commenced on constructing five checkpoints at the main entry points into Mogadishu on 12,500 m² of land verified by the Mine Action Service. A concept note to define the roles and functions of federal Darwish units, including command and control, training and sustainment processes, was developed.

Table 13
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Development of a framework/plan for the transition of security responsibilities to Somali security forces and institutions	• Gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and the implementation of related capacity-building initiatives

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned results for 2021

Defining Somalia's federal model grounded in the Provisional Constitution

84. The process for the review of the Provisional Constitution is at the core of peacebuilding and state-building in Somalia. The completion of the review process will mark a key milestone in the national road map on inclusive politics adopted by the Federal Government of Somalia in 2018, which combines constitutional review, elections, deepening federalism and reconciliation. The constitutional review provides a historic opportunity to define the fundamental architecture that will constitute the political and legal governance framework of the Federal State of Somalia, critical to enhancing unity as a country and strengthening Somalia's resilience against internal and external shocks.
85. In 2019, the mutual accountability framework endorsed by the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners at the Somali Partnership Forum on 2 October identified the constitutional review as a "must not fail" priority for 2020. In this context, UNSOM continued to provide good offices, political and strategic advice, facilitation and expertise towards an effective, inclusive and accountable constitutional review process that is Somali-owned and Somali-led at different levels. UNSOM sustained support to all the key constitutional review entities, namely, the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission and the Parliamentary Oversight Committee, in complementarity and coordination with UNDP. As a result, in 2019, the Committee and the Commission completed the technical review of all 15 chapters of the Provisional Constitution. Meanwhile, a technical working group became operational, embedded in the Ministry, consisting of legal experts in the Federal Government and international consultants, to review the Committee's draft and to prepare for an executive cabinet retreat to consider options on outstanding constitutional issues, which would lay the basis for negotiations and consultations with a broad range of stakeholders, including at the federal member state level. In the current context of Federal Government-federal member state relations, it is likely that the Federal Government consultations with the federal member states by March 2020 and the adoption of an amended Constitution by June 2020 may not be realized. At the strategic level, through good offices and coordination of international efforts, UNSOM will promote dialogue and consultations towards political agreements between the Federal Government and the federal member states on the key outstanding constitutional issues. UNSOM will also continue to provide technical support and advice to the Ministry, the Committee and the Commission to implement their joint workplan. UNSOM will also promote constructive relations between the executive and the legislative branches of the Federal Government, as well as between the two houses of Parliament. Emphasis will be placed on inclusive civic education and public outreach, given that engagement with civil society on the issues of federalism and the constitutional review process is an area that can be further strengthened.

Internal challenge and response

86. The challenge for UNSOM was the lack of a clearly defined and dedicated thematic common platform for information-sharing at the technical level among the various sections and United Nations country team entities that would ensure coordinated messaging, advice and technical support to the constitutional review process and its roll-out to the United Nations field offices. A thematic task force established by UNSOM and United Nations country team entities in 2019 provided enhanced specialized technical support to the mandated constitutional review entities on the chapters of the Constitution relating to rule of law, including justice and corrections, peace and security and human rights, but its engagement was limited to the institutions based in Mogadishu. In response, in 2021, the task force will work more closely with United Nations field offices to provide complementary support to the Federal Government of Somalia-led, field-level consultations with the federal member states and civil society and youth and women groups to shift the process from elite politics to a more broad-based inclusive process.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

87. This work is expected to contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, which would be demonstrated by the completion of the constitutional review exercise and the subsequent adoption of an amended Constitution by Parliament to advance federalism and national reconciliation, following the holding of political dialogue on federalism-related constitutional issues. The adoption of a finalized Constitution would pave the way for the subsequent harmonization with the respective constitutions of federal member states.

Table 14
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• Cooperation among Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission and Parliamentary Oversight Committee strengthened	• Technical review of 15 chapters completed	• Platform for Federal Government of Somalia-federal member state dialogue becomes functional • Key federalism questions are negotiated, agreed and reflected in the Constitution	• Completion of the constitutional review and the adoption of an amended Constitution by the Parliament

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Support for the conduct of elections

88. Somalia is expected to hold its first one-person, one-vote elections for the two houses of Parliament in late 2020/early in 2021. This would be the first one-person, one-vote elections in more than 50 years in Somalia. UNSOM has been providing technical and logistical support, as well as strategic advice, to the National Independent Electoral Commission since its establishment in 2015. As part of its conflict prevention efforts, UNSOM will intensify this work by supporting the operationalization and effective functioning of the electoral security task force, as well as the establishment of an electoral dispute resolution mechanism.

89. The objective of the electoral dispute resolution mechanism will be to ensure that electoral complaints and disputes are well understood by all relevant electoral stakeholders and handled in an appropriate manner to prevent election-related violence. The UNSOM-UNDP Integrated Electoral Support Group will assist the National Independent Electoral Commission in establishing the mechanism's structures, including the development of standard regulations and procedures. Training programmes will be developed and implemented for Commission staff, relevant judges and electoral stakeholders to ensure that electoral dispute resolution is carried out competently and efficiently during the different phases of the electoral process, from voter registration to polling, counting, tabulation and the announcement of electoral results. An extensive public awareness campaign will be conducted to ensure that the public and candidates understand the electoral dispute process.
90. As part of its support for the National Independent Electoral Commission, UNSOM will support the authorities in ensuring the representation of women and traditionally marginalized groups in the electoral process. National ownership of the process is the focus of the Mission's work to ensure that the institutional capacity of the Commission is maintained upon completion of the electoral exercise.

Internal challenge and response

91. The challenge for UNSOM was the co-location of United Nations personnel in the National Independent Electoral Commission at its premises, which are located within the presidency, thereby creating difficulties for Integrated Electoral Support Group staff to engage continuously with Commission counterparts, which is an essential aspect of their advisory role in assisting the Commission in preparing for and conducting federal elections. In response, the Mission, in collaboration with UNSOS, will support the upgrading of the new Commission compound to make it secure and accessible for United Nations technical electoral personnel. The upgraded facilities will help to strengthen public confidence in the electoral process by reinforcing the Commission's independence, increasing accessibility, including for disabled persons, and enhancing transparency.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

92. This work is expected to contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, which would be demonstrated by support for the development of a professional electoral management body that conducts a credible electoral process.

Table 15
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strategic plan 2017–2021 developed by the National Independent Electoral Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Integrated Electoral Support Group supported the conduct of a pilot project to test recruitment and training procedures, as well as provided the hardware and software for the voter registration site mapping operation scheduled in 2019 by the Commission 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support Group will support the Commission in the construction of an enhanced security infrastructure, including a secure warehouse Peacebuilding Fund to support the building of the electoral dispute resolution mechanism centre 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Data centre enables the Commission to handle the voter registration data and tallying of electoral materials Electoral complaints are handled through the mechanism

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Enhancing civilian oversight and accountability of security sector institutions

93. The objective for 2021 in the area of rule of law will be to shift the focus from building and equipping nascent federal and state police institutions towards increased oversight and accountability of the seven policing services in Somalia. By the end of 2021, all police activities at both the federal and state level shall be subject to internal and external oversight institutions, such as the parliamentary security committee, an independent human rights commission and courts. This shift in focus is part of a broader effort to elevate the police as the lead law enforcement agency in the country by 2027, as outlined in the national security architecture agreement, thereby moving away from the military being the primary domestic security provider.
94. UNSOM will support the federal member states in developing and implementing their state legislation and policy to regulate their police services. In addition, the Mission will continue its efforts to build the capacity of police leadership and management across Somalia by providing technical support and advice to existing coordination mechanisms. This work is expected to result in enhanced civilian oversight, through cooperation with legislative and human rights institutions and courts.
95. Within the defence sector, the transfer of the chairmanship of the comprehensive approach to security strand 2A from the Somali National Army to the Director-General of the Ministry of Defence will result in enhanced civilian oversight and will ensure correct control mechanisms for fiscal and resource transparency within the National Army and international support offered to it. This will also further reinforce the Ministry's institutional reforms, including the biometric registration of the National Army completed in 2019, and will add an additional layer of oversight prior to the enactment of the pensions and gratuity bill and rightsizing of the National Army. These changes are expected to contribute to greater accountability and transparency in the defence budget.
96. Through the joint security sector governance programme, engagement with legislators and the executive will be enhanced and capacity-building delivered to the civil service, with a focus on civil society engagement to increase accountability of the security sector.

Internal challenge and response

97. The challenge for UNSOM was to forge a shared vision among United Nations entities over security and justice priorities agreed in the mutual accountability framework. The shared vision was needed to coherently engage with external counterparts, including the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states. In response, the Mission will further intensify its efforts to coordinate all involved actors to jointly develop a shared vision, and will encourage the use of joint programming to streamline One United Nations support for government priorities.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

98. This work is expected to contribute to the achievement of peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia, which would be demonstrated by approved legislative, policy and institutional frameworks and the capacity to create security sector institutions that are under civilian oversight.

Table 16
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• Development of a framework/plan for the transition of security responsibilities to Somali security forces and institutions	• Gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and the implementation	• Gradual handover of security responsibilities • Legislative, policy and institutional frameworks and capacity to create security sector	• Gradual handover of security responsibilities • Implementation of approved legislation and policy and institutional

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
		of related capacity-building initiatives	institutions that are under civilian control developed and approved, and the implementation of the frameworks commenced	frameworks for accountable security sector institutions operating under civilian oversight

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

99. Table 17 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 17

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	8	7	8	8
1. Reports of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	4	3	4	4
2. Meetings of the Security Council	4	4	4	4
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	4	4	4	4
3. Joint projects on a United Nations anti-corruption programme, support for universal suffrage elections and women's political empowerment, as well as a stabilization project	4	4	4	4
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	293	223	304	314
4. Seminars to support the development of child protection laws	—	3	3	3
5. Seminar on police reform	4	4	4	6
6. Seminar on the coordination and implementation of federal political agreements on rule of law	12	—	10	—
7. Seminar on rightsizing of Somali security forces	14	4	14	4
8. Seminar on security- and justice-focused public expenditure	6	4	6	3
9. Workshops on addressing conflict-related sexual violence	7	3	7	7
10. Workshops on setting up and operationalizing the National Human Rights Commission	3	2	4	6
11. Workshops with civil society on human rights throughout Somalia	20	19	22	22
12. Thematic workshops on human rights issues, such as those dealing with minorities, people with disabilities and women and children, civil society engagement and basic human rights obligations	19	17	19	19
13. Workshops for monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security services and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities	3	2	3	9
14. Workshop for the country task force on monitoring and reporting on violations against children, including children and armed conflict (8 days)	2	2	2	6
15. Workshops to enhance the capacity and harmonize the implementation of the national defector rehabilitation programme	2	2	2	2
16. Workshop for traditional justice mechanisms on linkage to formal justice system	6	6	6	6

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
17. Workshops on the roll-out of the Federal Justice and Corrections Model	18	–	6	6
18. Workshops for the custodial corps on prison management	30	24	30	15
19. Workshops on civilian oversight of security institutions	10	10	10	6
20. Workshops on implementation of maritime priorities in accordance with the Somali maritime resource and security strategy	8	8	8	6
21. Workshops on strengthening legislation for maritime security and mainstreaming gender equity into maritime law enforcement agencies	6	6	6	6
22. Workshops to support institutional capacity-building towards the implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan	13	3	13	6
23. Workshop on integrity system to enhance anti-corruption capacities of national authorities and civil society organizations	1	1	–	1
24. Workshops on comprehensive approach to security stabilization to review implementation of and update the national stabilization strategy and to review, develop and update state stabilization plans	13	5	13	7
25. Workshops on preventing/countering violent extremism, including with international partners	12	1	12	6
26. National youth seminar, held in partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia/federal member states' Ministries of Youth and Sports, on youth priorities for Somalia	1	1	1	7
27. Workshops to enhance local authorities' and civil society organization anti-corruption capacities	4	2	1	1
28. Workshops, consultations and training on weapons marking, registration and destruction to enhance capacity at federal and federal member state levels	12	15	12	12
29. Training on protection of civilians	6	6	6	18
30. Workshops on lessons learned to assess performance and delivery of electoral processes	4	1	8	8
31. Workshops/seminars/training activities on the electoral legal framework, including regulations on the National Independent Electoral Commission civic and voter education curriculum and on action plans to strengthen the Commission's interaction with electoral stakeholders at national and subnational levels	21	32	27	27
32. Workshops on prevention of and response to electoral violence against women leaders	4	–	4	2
33. Workshops/seminars/training activities for the National Independent Electoral Commission and political parties on stakeholder consultation, voter education and conflict resolution, as well as training to the Commission on data-entry operations	14	17	17	15
34. Workshop/seminars/training activities to increase mediation and conflict resolution capacity in preparation for 2020–2021 elections	12	1	12	6
35. Workshop/seminars/training activities in journalism, social media and coverage of 2020–2021 one-person, one-vote election campaign	6	6	16	16
36. Miscellaneous workshop/seminars/training activities by Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group of UNSOM on implementation of transition plan/new policing model/comprehensive approach to security	–	16	–	14
37. Seminars in support of the national development plan inclusive politics committee	–	2	–	6
38. Workshops on peacebuilding and conflict prevention, resolution and mediation	–	1	–	5
39. Workshop on the constitutional review process, including discussions about harmonization of constitutions	–	–	–	5
40. Technical workshops to assist the Somali National Youth Council.	–	–	–	6
41. Workshops to build the capacity of civil society for monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security services and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities, including with regard to conflict-related sexual violence	–	4	–	7
42. Capacity enhancement for security forces on addressing conflict-related sexual violence	–	–	–	7
Publications (number of publications)	40	39	40	49
43. Human Right and Protection Group reports on freedom of expression, internally displaced persons and protection of civilians in Somalia and human rights in Somalia's electoral process	2	2	2	2
44. Fragility index and maturity model national summary and district-level reports	32	25	32	32

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
45. Report on joint evaluation of integrity systems	–	–	–	1
46. Reports on analysis, procedures, processes and best practices on mitigating the threat from improvised explosive devices	6	8	6	8
47. Materials on lessons learned from the 2020 electoral process	–	–	–	4
48. Factsheets on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related interventions in Somalia	–	4	–	2

C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: strategic and technical support to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General's good offices in overcoming political obstacles to the 2020–2021 electoral process, such as acceptance of election results; facilitate political dialogue for implementing the national security architecture; high-level engagement on the UNSOM mandate and activities with the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states; and high-level strategic planning workshops on reconciliation and Federal Government and federal member state consultations.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: advocacy on support for the joint electoral logistics working group, comprising National Independent Electoral Commission, UNSOM and UNSOS for logistics support for elections; support for the Somali national electoral security task force to coordinate with security forces to secure electoral operations; advice on the establishment of the National Independent Electoral Commission subnational field structures; advice to National Independent Electoral Commission, Parliament and other stakeholders on improvements to the electoral legal framework; consultation and information-sharing with international and national stakeholders; sustainable public financial management of security sector; advice on the drafting of the provisional Constitution amendment; advice to the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport on joint and human rights development regarding maritime components of the security sector; advice to Parliament, the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member states on security sector legislation and budgetary measures; advice on and support for human rights due diligence assessments; technical advice on “rightsizing” of Somali National Army and force generation; consultations on the comprehensive approach to security strands, including support for the review of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related interventions; consultations on gender equality, women's rights and representation aimed at increasing women's political participation, including with women leaders on emerging issues, electoral outcomes and Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) adoption consultations; consultations with civil society on federalization, constitutional review, local conflict management and resolution, and the national reconciliation process across the federal member states, including consultations on dialogue between Somalia and “Somaliland”; facilitating technical consultations, planning and advocacy for the establishment of functioning, independent and accountable rule of law institutions, development of a legal aid model and state-level oversight mechanisms; convening federal and state-level ministers and other officials to build consensus on a new justice and corrections architecture for Somalia at the state and federal levels as part of wider constitutional and security reform efforts; support for the formation and gradual expansion of justice services, including through the use of mobile courts and legal aid in the federal member states; advocacy activities with state authorities on addressing violations committed by international and national forces; and strategic policy and technical advice to the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member state counterparts on explosive hazard threat mitigation, along with weapons and ammunitions management initiatives.

Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: support for the 2021 electoral needs assessment mission; monitoring of human rights and conflict-related sexual violence, and human rights due diligence policy-specific follow-up activities (monitoring and investigation missions); investigative and monitoring missions in different areas (human rights violations, abuse, release and rehabilitation of children at centres for disengaged combatants, women's participation in peace and political processes, and civilian casualties); and monitoring missions of stabilization initiatives in 8 areas (4 recovered geographical areas and 4 newly recovered geographical areas of Somalia).

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: development of a national outreach strategy for the national programme for the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants and young people at risk in Somalia; community consultations; leaflet distribution; radio programme; information materials on stabilization strategy and accompanying state plans (national stabilization and each state stabilization plan in Somali and English); outreach programme to support the Federal Government of Somalia in developing and implementing anti-corruption awareness-raising strategy; newsletter on the new policing model; and commemoration of International Women's Day, National Human Rights Day, International Human Rights Day and child rights day.

External and media relations: quarterly media updates on stabilization; digital platforms and multimedia content; mission website on support for the electoral process; multimedia coverage and radio programmes on the observance of international days, visits of high-level United Nations officials to Somalia and topics of public interest relevant to the mandate of UNSOM; and Integrated Electoral Support Group support for National Independent Electoral Commission printing costs.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: update to mission webpage on United Nations support for the electoral process.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 18

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	14 386.7	16 139.0	16 095.7	—	(43.3)
Civilian personnel costs	38 003.5	40 586.6	43 854.7	—	3 268.1
Operational costs	45 281.7	48 152.6	44 826.9	—	(3 325.7)
Total (net of staff assessment)	97 671.9	104 878.2	104 777.3	—	(100.9)

Table 19

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2020	1	2	1	7	30	50	36	—	127	57	—	184	84	45	38	351
Proposed 2021	1	2	1	7	30	50	36	—	127	57	—	184	84	45	38	351
Regular positions, change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Approved general temporary assistance 2020	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	—	—	3	8	—	—	11
Proposed general temporary assistance 2021	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	3	—	—	3	8	—	—	11
General temporary assistance positions, change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total approved 2020	1	2	1	7	30	50	39	—	130	57	—	187	92	45	38	362
Total proposed 2021	1	2	1	7	30	50	39	—	130	57	—	187	92	45	38	362
Total change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

100. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNSOM amount to \$104,777,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 625 United Nations Guard Unit personnel and 14 United Nations police officers (\$16,095,700), salaries and related costs (\$43,854,700) for 184 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 7 D-1, 30 P-5, 50 P-4, 36 P-3 and 57 Field Service), 129 national positions (84 National Professional Officer and 45 Local level), 11 general temporary assistance positions (3 P-3 and 8 National Professional Officer), 38 United Nations Volunteers and 23 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$44,826,900), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$8 15,000), official

travel (\$1,587,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$19,126,200), ground transportation (\$1,568,200), air operations (\$10,371,900), communications and information technology (\$6,866,900), medical (\$1,483,800), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,007,100).

101. A vacancy rate of 13 per cent has been applied to the estimates for all international positions. Vacancy rates of 17 per cent and 11 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively. Vacancy rates of 8 and 10 per cent have been applied to the estimates for United Nations Volunteers and government-provided personnel, respectively. The estimates for the United Nations Guard Unit personnel and police officers are based on the assumption of full deployment, taking into account the actual average deployment of 2019 and the estimated deployment schedule for 2021.
102. It is proposed that the number and levels of positions remain unchanged for 2021.
103. In addition, it is proposed that 11 general temporary assistance positions (3 P-3 and 8 National Professional Officer), which were approved in 2020 to support the upcoming elections, be continued in 2021, as detailed below. The Somali elections are planned to be held towards the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021. However, the timing and modality of the elections are contingent upon the broader political process. The 11 positions will continue in 2021 to strengthen the provisions and the effective functioning of the electoral security task force, support the establishment of an electoral dispute resolution mechanism and maintain the Independent Electoral Support Group's capacity for technical support for the National Independent Electoral Commission during the ramping up of operations:
 - (a) One Electoral Officer (P-3) for the warehouse, asset management and logistics. The position will continue to build and reinforce capacity of the National Independent Electoral Commission in warehouse and asset management to ensure that the receipt, repackaging, distribution and retrieval of voter registration and polling material are carried out in an accountable and timely manner;
 - (b) One Electoral Officer (P-3) for the data-processing centre. The position will continue to build and support the National Independent Electoral Commission's capacity at the data-processing centre, to support the development of software for electoral operations (voter registration, data centralization, candidate registration, results management system) and to support the management of the data-processing centre;
 - (c) One Electoral Officer (P-3) for training. The position will continue to assist the National Independent Electoral Commission in drafting electoral procedures, training manuals and quality assurance of content, assist in the planning and coordination of Commission training programmes, and address the need to train hundreds of staff responsible for voter registration, polling and counting who most likely will have no previous experience in electoral activities;
 - (d) One Electoral Officer (National Professional Officer) for electoral security. The position will continue to assist in electoral security coordination with the Somali electoral coordination task force, which determines where voter registration and polling activities can be secured;
 - (e) One Electoral Officer (National Professional Officer) for voter education and outreach. The position will continue to reinforce the National Independent Electoral Commission's capacity in integrating social media in the voter education and outreach programmes and support the development of voter education messages, in line with the Somali context;
 - (f) Six Electoral Officers (National Professional Officer) for logistics for field office reinforcement. The positions will continue to reinforce support for the National Independent Electoral Commission field offices during operations and to facilitate interaction with field office staff, including building and reinforcing the capacity of the Commission in warehouse and asset management, to ensure that the receipt, repackaging, distribution and retrieval of voter registration and polling material are carried out in an accountable and timely manner.

104. The decrease in requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to reduced operational costs under: (a) facilities and infrastructure as a result of lower requirements for maintenance services; (b) communications and information technology due to lower contractual costs for telecommunications and network services; (c) other supplies, services and equipment due to lower freight costs owing to fewer acquisitions planned for 2021; and (d) ground transportation due to lower projected fuel consumption and no planned acquisition of vehicles. The reduced requirements are offset in part by increased requirements for civilian personnel costs owing to the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs for international and national positions, based on 2019 expenditure patterns, and lower vacancy rates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions compared with the rates applied in the approved 2020 budget.

Extrabudgetary resources

105. UNSOM manages the trust fund for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. As at 31 January 2020, the trust fund had a balance of approximately \$886,000.
106. In 2020, UNSOM projects that extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$2 million will be available.
107. For 2021, UNSOM will continue to work closely with its partners in Somalia. Additional contributions in the estimated amount of \$254,000 are projected to support elections.

4. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

(\$2,953,000)

Foreword

Cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels in Central Asia is gradually increasing and the countries of the region continue to find innovative and creative ways to address challenges that have been on the regional agenda for many years. Perhaps the most important sign of the positive trend in regional relations is the convening of the second annual consultative meeting of Central Asian Heads of State, in Tashkent in November 2019. This format is expected to help to reinforce the political will to advance regional cooperation. Member States invited the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia to provide exclusive support for the preparation process of these summits.

The increased efforts by the countries of the region to jointly present General Assembly resolutions on issues of common interest tend to support this positive trend. For example, the Assembly, in its resolution [73/338](#), adopted in September 2019, declared 2021 the “International Year of Peace and Trust” and stressed the importance of supporting the efforts of the United Nations in preventing conflict and preserving peace. The resolution had been initiated by Turkmenistan and cosponsored by all remaining Central Asian States.

The increased interest by the countries of the region to collaborate has intensified the demand for the unique platform offered by the Regional Centre.

The Regional Centre’s core functions remain the provision of good offices to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the monitoring and analysis of regional developments, and maintaining contact with relevant regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system. In 2019, the Regional Centre launched a new framework to promote agreement on transboundary water management in the region. It also continued to work on the third phase of the joint project with the Office for Counter-Terrorism to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia. In this context, the Regional Centre assisted Turkmenistan in developing its first national counter-terrorism strategy. In addition, I led the Regional Centre’s efforts to engage with young men and women in some of the region’s most marginalized areas through the Regional Centre’s “preventive diplomacy academy”, which is intended to create the first-ever regional government-youth platform for dialogue in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia is another important part of the Regional Centre’s work. Responding to the priority set by the countries of the region, the Regional Centre also involves representatives of Afghanistan in these meetings. In addition, the Regional Centre aims to create a parliamentary friendship group between the Parliaments of Central Asia and Afghanistan and is intensifying its work on the women and peace and security agenda to provide a platform for expanding the involvement of women in governmental and public affairs throughout the region. The Regional Centre also promotes and supports the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, which was launched by the Secretary-General in June 2019 and provides the foundation for sustainable and transformative progress on disability inclusion.

Despite these positive new developments and initiatives, further work is needed to ensure long-term stability. This will require the continued support by the international community. The Regional Centre, as a trusted partner of the countries of the region, will continue to foster regional cooperation and promote preventive diplomacy to the benefit of the people of the region and beyond.

(Signed) Natalia **Gherman**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

108. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is responsible for supporting national authorities in identifying and addressing existing and potential threats to regional peace and security. The open-ended mandate was defined through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#)).
109. The Regional Centre plays a central role in preventive diplomacy efforts in Central Asia and provides a platform for regional dialogue on the most pressing challenges to security and stability. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Regional Centre provides good offices in Central Asia to promote regional cooperation through meetings with authorities, civil society and other stakeholders.
110. The main function of the Regional Centre is to strengthen United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia through the implementation of its mandate, which includes liaising with the Governments of the region and, with their concurrence, with other concerned parties on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground and providing the Secretary-General with up-to-date information related to conflict prevention efforts; maintaining contact with relevant regional organizations, encouraging their peacemaking efforts and initiatives and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to their specific mandates; providing a political framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the United Nations country teams in the region and supporting the efforts of the resident coordinators and representatives of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, in promoting an integrated approach to preventive diplomacy and humanitarian assistance; and maintaining close contact with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to ensure a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the situation in the wider region.
111. The Regional Centre's work is guided by a three-year programme of action. The programme of action for the period 2021–2023 is expected to be adopted at the next annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs, in November 2020.

Programme of work

Objective

112. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to enhance regional security and stability in Central Asia.

Strategy

113. To contribute to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, the Regional Centre will continue to engage regularly with the region's capitals, regional organizations and relevant Member States. This action is expected to promote consultation and build consensus on identifying situations that could generate conflict in the region. At the same time, the Regional Centre will carry out good offices functions for preventive diplomacy to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as monitor and analyse regional developments, while maintaining contact with regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system on behalf of the Secretary-General. Using its extrabudgetary funding, the Regional Centre implements activities, such as the meetings of senior officials, expert forums, workshops and training

to support cooperation among Central Asian States and increase capacity on issues related to preventive diplomacy. Past results in this area include a new era of regional cooperation, bilateral and multilateral engagement in Central Asia and a renewed political will among the region's highest decision makers to resolve some of the most significant issues on the regional agenda. The Regional Centre has supported the progress in the political dynamics in Central Asia, working on creating new opportunities to support the countries of the region as they re-engage in the search for mutually acceptable long-term solutions.

114. To contribute to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, the Regional Centre will also continue to convene preparatory expert forums for the consultative meetings of the Central Asian Heads of State. It will continue to organize an annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia, including the participation of Afghanistan. In addition, the Regional Centre will convene meetings of Central Asian parliamentarians with the goal of creating a "Central Asian parliamentarians' friendship group". The Regional Centre is also launching a process to promote the increased political participation of women in the region, through the engagement of senior women political leaders on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy and establishing a "Central Asian women leaders' caucus". Past results in this area include cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels in Central Asia in the search for innovative and creative ways to enhance regional security and stability in Central Asia. Apart from the traditional high-level platform – the annual meetings of the deputy ministers for foreign affairs that the Regional Centre has been organizing since its establishment in 2018 – the Centre was invited to provide exclusive support for the preparatory process of the annual consultative meetings of Central Asian Heads of State.
115. To contribute to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, the Regional Centre will continue to promote agreement on transboundary water management in the region, which remains a divisive issue. Specifically, the Regional Centre will focus its work on fostering and supporting initiatives, both continuing and new. This work is expected to create an environment conducive to regional cooperation on transboundary water management in Central Asia. The new water project for 2019–2021 of the Regional Centre is aimed at meeting those objectives and will be implemented with the close involvement of representatives of Afghanistan. The work would be done along the following streams: preventive diplomacy and confidence-building, strengthening institutions and legal frameworks, and increasing transparency and promoting partnerships. Past results in this area include the work done on transboundary water management since 2010, with the aim of supporting the five Central Asian countries in their search for mutually acceptable agreements that would provide a durable legal framework for managing the region's water. Through the convening of a host of seminars and workshops, the Regional Centre has worked to increase decision makers' knowledge of international water law, best practices from around the world and options for regional agreements tailored to Central Asia's specific needs and circumstances.
116. To contribute to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, the Regional Centre will execute, in 2021, the fourth phase of the joint project with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, under the Office of Counter-Terrorism. This work is expected to result in increased capacity of the Central Asian States to address emerging challenges, such as cybersecurity and the return of foreign terrorist fighters. In addition, through the preventive diplomacy academy project, the Regional Centre will continue its efforts to engage young people in some of the region's most marginalized areas. Lastly, the Regional Centre will continue to partner with relevant United Nations entities and regional organizations on the implementation of projects to promote preventive diplomacy in the region. The threats of terrorism and extremism, the lack of an agreement on transboundary water management, the developing effects of climate change and a growing population of young people seeking new opportunities remain key challenges for stability and security in the region. Past results in this area include continued support for the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia through the joint plan of action adopted in Ashgabat in November 2011. A number of capacity-building activities related to borders, cybersecurity and financing of extremism and terrorism have been conducted by the Regional Centre. In addition, it assisted the Government of Turkmenistan in developing its own national counter-terrorism strategy. The work in the area of countering violent extremism and the efforts to combat

terrorism was done in close cooperation with the Office of Counter-Terrorism, and it is based in large part on Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate assessments and local needs.

External factors for 2021

117. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The continued commitment by the five Governments of the region and national stakeholders to preventive diplomacy and regional cooperation;
 - (b) The five countries of the region continue to engage Afghanistan in regional cooperation.
118. The Regional Centre integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. It encourages participating countries to ensure gender balance in their delegations and to include gender-related issues in the agendas of the deliverable of three regional expert-level workshops on issues related to preventive diplomacy and confidence-building for officials from the Central Asian States and Afghanistan. The Regional Centre also encourages countries to send gender-balanced delegations to participate in workshops and include gender-related issues in the agenda, whenever possible.
119. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Regional Centre maintains contact with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other relevant organizations.
120. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Regional Centre cooperates closely with the resident coordinators in the five countries and the entities represented in the United Nations country teams, including UNDP and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) on gender issues and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on water issues. The Regional Centre provides overall policy guidance to the United Nations country teams in the field of preventive diplomacy to ensure the coherence and complementarity of efforts in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It will also continue to cooperate with relevant actors, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank. With respect to Afghanistan-related issues, the Regional Centre regularly shares information and coordinates activities, where possible, with UNAMA.

Evaluation activities

121. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

122. A planned result for 2019, which is improved regional cooperation among the five Governments of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in addressing the threats of terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as regional challenges concerning water and natural resources management and joint responses to challenges related to possible insecurity spillover from Afghanistan, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as demonstrated by eight joint initiatives (compared with a target of three) of the Governments of Central Asia, with the Regional Centre's support, in addressing common security threats. The Regional Centre continued to monitor and analyse the situation in the region and provide information and analysis to enable adequate responses to threats to peace and security.

Programme performance in 2019: support for positive regional momentum

123. In 2019, the overall objectives were to promote sustainable peace and stability in Central Asia. The expected accomplishments were improved regional cooperation among the five Governments of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in addressing the threats of terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime, as well as regional challenges concerning water and natural resources management and joint responses to challenges related to possible insecurity spillover from Afghanistan.
124. In 2019, the Regional Centre convened its annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs in Tashkent, which fostered discussions between the Regional Centre and the Central Asian countries on existing and emerging challenges and threats to peace in the region. For the third year in a row, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and representatives of UNAMA joined parts of the meeting. Doing so encouraged constructive talks in a “Central Asia + Afghanistan + United Nations (C5+1+UN)” format and demonstrated the continuing expansion of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Given the positive dynamics that now exist in the region, the Regional Centre is expected to continue to contribute to traditional peace and security and provide support in the areas of returning foreign terrorist fighters and economic connectivity.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

125. This work contributed to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, as demonstrated by the second Central Asian Expert Forum with Kazakh partners in Nur-Sultan and Burabay, which the Regional Centre co-organized in preparation for the upcoming 2020 consultative meeting.

Table 20

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme of action for 2015–2017 endorsed by Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renewed political dynamics in the region with Member States 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs is held in Ashgabat and is attended by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Central Asian Expert Forum is held in Tashkent and Bukhara, in October 2018 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second Central Asian Expert Forum is held with Kazakh partners in Nur-Sultan and Burabay, in preparation for the upcoming 2020 consultative meeting

Planned result for 2021: sustaining the positive regional momentum and mobilizing the political will

126. The Regional Centre is responsible for supporting national authorities in identifying and addressing existing and potential threats to regional peace and security. The open-ended mandate of the mission was defined through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#)). Its work has been guided by a three-year programme of action, most recently covering the period 2018–2020. This document was endorsed by the five deputy ministers for foreign affairs of the region in 2017 and lays out five key priorities: (a) promoting prevention among the Governments of Central Asia; (b) monitoring and early

warning; (c) building partnerships for prevention; (d) strengthening United Nations preventive activities in the region; and (e) encouraging cooperation and interaction between Central Asia and Afghanistan. The current programme of action will be revised in 2020, and a new one, for 2021–2023, will be launched.

127. In 2021, the Regional Centre will strive to sustain the positive regional momentum through implementation of its programme of action for 2021–2023, which includes: (a) supporting implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia; (b) supporting efforts towards transboundary water management; (c) working to instil a culture of prevention among the region's young people, and organizing its annual Central Asian Expert Forum and meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in a "C5+1+UN" format involving Afghanistan; and (d) contributing to the preparation process of the consultative meeting of the Central Asian Heads of State.
128. In 2021, the Regional Centre will continue to support the development of a parliamentary friendship group between the Parliaments of Central Asia and Afghanistan. The work on the women and peace and security agenda to provide a platform for expanding the involvement of women in governmental and public affairs throughout the region will be intensified in 2021.

Internal challenge and response

129. The challenge for the Regional Centre was the growing demands of the countries of the region for intervention by the Regional Centre. In response, the mission will continue to prioritize and coordinate with all relevant United Nations entities to provide adequate and timely support to the requesting parties, including by intensifying the use of remote engagement.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

130. This work is expected to contribute to the enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia, which would be demonstrated by the further involvement of additional civil society groups to create more inclusive discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis on the new initiatives of the Regional Centre.

Table 21
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• Increased involvement of diversified key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, through the new youth initiative and water strategy	• Expansion of involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive, structured discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	• Regional Centre ensures further involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis on the new initiatives of the Centre

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

131. Table 22 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 22

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
1. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	3	3	3	3
2. Workshops on preventive diplomacy and confidence-building	3	3	3	3
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices on issues related to preventive diplomacy, such as transboundary water management, drug trafficking and counter-terrorism.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations on political and security developments in the region and to seek areas for closer cooperation; and consultations and advice on implementing the joint plan of action for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: brochures and information kits on the activities of the mission and publication of the <i>Aral Sea Basin Transboundary Water Early Warning Bulletin</i> and the annual <i>Yearbook on Water in Central Asia and the World</i> .				
External and media relations: press conferences and press releases on the activities of the mission.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: dissemination of information through the mission's website and "Matrix of activities on counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism" website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 23

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	2 127.0	2 157.1	2 197.8	—	40.7
Operational costs	524.2	744.3	755.2	—	10.9
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 651.2	2 901.4	2 953.0	—	51.6

Table 24
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2020	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30
Proposed 2021	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

132. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for the Regional Centre amount to \$2,953,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,197,800) for the continuation of 8 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 Field Service) and 22 national positions (4 National Professional Officer and 18 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$755,200), comprising the costs for consultants (\$30,800), official travel (\$230,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$86,500), ground transportation (\$33,100), communications and information technology (\$277,700), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$96,300).
133. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for all positions, taking into account the actual incumbency in 2019 and possible turnover of existing staff.
134. The increased in requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable primarily to higher costs for civilian personnel owing to the application of the revised salary scales effective 1 January 2020 for international positions, and higher requirements for operational costs under communications and information technology owing to the increase in the standard rate for centrally managed satellite transponder services.

Extrabudgetary resources

135. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$600,000 are projected for a meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs; a strategic dialogue seminar with Central Asian institutes of strategic studies; a series of capacity-building activities for the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan, with the overall goal of assisting and supporting regional Governments in building conflict prevention capacities; and the Central Asia and Afghanistan regional cooperation project on a transboundary water-sharing.
136. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$555,000 are projected for a meeting of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs, a strategic dialogue seminar with Central Asian institutes of strategic studies, and several capacity-building activities, including on youth, and Central Asia and Afghanistan regional cooperation on the transboundary water-sharing project.

5. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

(\$3,854,900)

Foreword

As Chairman of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, I have actively engaged in mediation with the parties to resolve the remaining issues in contention in physically demarcating the land boundary shared by Nigeria and Cameroon. While the work of the Mixed Commission has been referenced as a good example of a peaceful resolution of a boundary conflict, the advances made over the past few years have the potential to unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded by a final boundary statement listing the coordinates from all signed templates. Going forward, well-demarcated boundaries would greatly assist in governing relations between the two parties. The technical support of the United Nations in mapping the boundary, along with its transborder development projects and confidence-building initiatives, will deter potential disputes along the agreed-on and demarcated border. Furthermore, the peaceful resolution of the demarcation dispute between key States members of the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States will greatly contribute to enhancing stability in the subregion.

I personally witnessed the importance of the work of the Mixed Commission when we completed the demarcation of the boundary between the villages of Tipsan in Nigeria and Kontcha in Cameroon. Kontcha had always been dependent on receiving supplies from Tipsan because access to Cameroon was impeded by a large river. After the placement of pillars between the two villages, municipal officials were able to open customs posts and formalize business dealings, which has significantly increased trade between the two villages. In some cases, where communities had been divided by the border demarcation works, the United Nations support team engaged in enhanced monitoring of the situation to ensure that the rights of populations affected by the demarcation were protected and that the border functioned as a bridge and not a barrier. A boundary statement and final mapping will bring closure to the demarcation. In addition, cross-border development projects, implemented by United Nations country teams or donors, will build support for the demarcation among populations that have been affected by the process.

The work of the Mixed Commission continues to make progress. Of the 2,100 km of the countries' shared boundary, only 95 km, cumulatively, remains to be agreed upon. In 2020, I intend to continue to work with the parties towards a conclusive resolution of the remaining disagreement areas, advancement of the pillar emplacement project and drafting of a boundary statement. I will also continue to advocate the implementation of socioeconomic projects and joint economic ventures in support of populations affected by the demarcation. This will entail cross-border development projects and support for the secretariat of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to enhance confidence-building between the two largest countries in West and Central Africa.

The resources, energies and hopes invested in this process will eventually be secured by a binding agreement and the commitment and support of the populations of the two countries.

(Signed) Mohamed **Ibn Chambas**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

137. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission is responsible for the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary and territorial dispute. Those responsibilities include supporting the demarcation of the land boundary and the delineation of the maritime boundary; facilitating the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the boundary and in the Bakassi Peninsula; addressing the situation of affected populations; and making recommendations on confidence-building measures. The mandate of the United Nations support team to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (see [S/2017/78](#) and [S/2017/79](#), [S/2018/1130](#) and [S/2018/1131](#), and [S/2019/1012](#) and [S/2019/1013](#)).
138. Progress has been made in implementing the judgment of the International Court of Justice, including the complete withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area (December 2003), along the land boundary (July 2004) and in the Bakassi peninsula (June 2006). Implementation of the Court's ruling in respect of the maritime boundary was completed following the formal approval of the maritime chart in March 2008 and an acknowledgement by the two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, in April 2011, that the Working Group on the Maritime Boundary had fulfilled its mandate. With the settlement of the maritime boundary, the role of the United Nations is to ensure that the boundary statement and final mapping accurately reflect the judgment of the Court.
139. While advances have been made in the pacific settlement of the territorial and border dispute, this progress could unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded through the signing of a final boundary statement following the emplacement of all pillars.

Programme of work

Objective

140. The objective to which this mission contributes, is to achieve an orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

Strategy

141. To contribute to the orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the Mixed Commission will prioritize the physical demarcation of the land boundary. This action is expected to result in the construction and emplacement of boundary pillars. Towards that end, the United Nations support team to the Mixed Commission will continue to facilitate cooperation between the parties to resolve the remaining 13 points of disagreement that were deferred primarily as a result of divergent interpretations of certain paragraphs in the judgment of the Court by the parties. Past results in this area include the convening of bilateral meetings and technical working sessions with the parties in support of their efforts to resolve outstanding points. This work is expected to generate consensus on how the boundary will be demarcated physically. The parties have agreed upon 2,005 km of a boundary assessed at 2,100 km in its entirety, leaving 95 km, cumulatively, of the land boundary to be resolved. The support team will also facilitate cooperation between the parties to construct approximately 454 additional boundary pillars. Past

results in this area include the construction of 1,344 pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, representing 50 per cent of the boundary demarcated.

142. The United Nations support team will produce the draft maps and have them validated by experts from the parties. Approximately 132 maps at a 1:50,000 scale, 3 maps at a 1:500,000 scale and 1 map at a 1:1,500,000 scale are required to finalize the demarcation of the boundary. Past results in this area include starting work on the maps, although not all the data have been included owing to the ongoing pillar construction work and the unresolved areas of disagreement. As new information becomes available in 2021, additions and adjustments to the maps will be made, after which a boundary statement defining the border by field coordinates will be prepared.
143. In addition, the United Nations support team will promote cross-border development projects as confidence-building measures in favour of the populations affected by the demarcation. This action is expected to enhance support for the demarcation work among the affected populations. Past results in this area include socioeconomic projects developed for the benefit of the population affected by the demarcation. These projects include livelihood support, access to potable water, capacity-building, green energy and protection.
144. Furthermore, the United Nations support team will regularly monitor the situation of the populations affected by the demarcation. Past results in this area include field visits to the border area and raising the awareness of the local population.
145. Lastly, the United Nations support team will enhance subregional cooperation on good practices in management of international boundaries by disseminating lessons learned from the Mixed Commission. Past results in this area include the production of reports on best practices with respect to border management.

External factors for 2021

146. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, continue to adhere to the judgment of the International Court of Justice, as well as the workplan adopted by the Mixed Commission;
 - (b) Safe security environment for the continued work of the team;
 - (c) Extrabudgetary resources continue to be made available for pillar emplacement and confidence-building initiatives, and additional voluntary contributions are received to carry out the border demarcation project.
147. The Mixed Commission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Examples include targeting women's groups for the implementation of community development projects in the areas of potable water, capacity-building for employment and community access to the electricity network. The Mixed Commission will continue regular field visits along the land boundary to monitor respect for the legal rights and the well-being of the affected populations, with a special focus on women and young people, as well as other vulnerable groups.
148. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mixed Commission cooperates with the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria so as to jointly develop confidence-building measures in accordance with the needs of the populations living along the land boundary and to ensure the conditions for peace, security and sustainable cross-border development. The secretariat of the Mixed Commission is hosted within the UNOWAS premises in Dakar. UNOWAS provides administrative and logistical support to the Mixed Commission.

Evaluation activities

149. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

150. A planned result for 2019, which is progress towards the completion of the demarcation of the land boundary and the conclusion of a cooperation agreement on maritime boundary matters between Cameroon and Nigeria, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the increase by 50 per cent in the implementation rate of the number of pillars constructed along the land boundary.

Programme performance in 2019: only 95 km of the border between Cameroon and Nigeria remain to be assessed and agreed

151. While most of the border (2,005 km) between Cameroon and Nigeria has been assessed and agreed upon between the two States parties, efforts are under way to break the deadlock in the areas of disagreement for the 95 km that remain. The disagreements result from the parties' competing and divergent readings of several paragraphs in the judgment of the International Court of Justice.
152. During the reporting period, the Chair of the Mixed Commission, with a view to building consensus, engaged the heads of the Nigerian and Cameroonian delegations in bilateral consultations in an effort to reconcile their divergent positions concerning the 13 specific points of contention. Having proposed a solution to the deadlock for each point, the Chair is expecting a response from the parties and stands ready to engage in further mediation and discussion to build consensus around a final resolution.
153. The construction of boundary pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria is ongoing. Ultimately, the goal is to construct 2,696 boundary pillars along the land border. A total of 1,344 pillars have been built, representing 50 per cent of the demarcated boundary. The procurement process for a multi-year contract was launched in October 2019 to complete the construction of the remaining 1,352 boundary pillars (from a total of 2,696) along the land boundary. Given that the project has been broken down into phases over a three-year period, the initial phase will commence in October 2020, after the wet season, with the construction of approximately 322 pillars, depending on the easing of restrictions related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19). This will bring the total number of pillars built to 1,666 in 2020.
154. Confidence-building cross-border development projects in favour of populations affected by the demarcation have been planned for both countries. After consultations with United Nations agencies in Cameroon and the endorsement from the Ministry of Planning of Cameroon, five confidence-building initiative projects are proposed for Cameroon to improve food security, develop access to potable water and improve capacity-building for employment, access to energy and protection. It is anticipated that four projects will benefit Nigeria and have been submitted to the Ministry of Finance of Nigeria for endorsement. The proposed projects concern livelihood support, access to potable water, capacity-building and green energy. It is anticipated that fundraising efforts and implementation of the projects will extend into 2021. In addition, implementation will include monitoring of the situation of populations affected by the demarcation with human rights and gender criteria.
155. Insecurity in the northern Cameroon-Nigeria border areas, as a result of Boko Haram-related violence, continued to adversely affect the work of the Mixed Commission, delaying field assessments and demarcation work in several locations. In addition, increased tensions in the anglophone regions of Cameroon raised additional security concerns. As a result, the ongoing

demarcation and pillar emplacement activities faced additional challenges. The parties have put in place reinforced security measures for field operations to allow the demarcation work to proceed.


Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

156. This work contributed to an orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, as demonstrated by the construction of 1,344 pillars along the border, representing 50 per cent of the demarcated boundary. Evidence also includes the agreement of the States parties to ensure security for the remaining works, reflecting the cooperation between the two Governments and their commitment to finalizing the demarcation of the border.

Figure I

Performance measure: cumulative number of pillars constructed, 2015–2019

(Percentage)



Planned result for 2021: achievement of political agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria

157. The Mixed Commission will continue to cooperate with the two parties in resolving the areas of disagreement and marking the boundary along the Cameroon-Nigeria border.

Internal challenge and response

158. The challenge for the Mixed Commission was related to the difficulties faced in reaching the area of work, given the unstable security situation that prevails in the area. In response, the Mixed Commission will ensure that the necessary security protocols adopted by both parties will be put in place to allow enhanced access to work sites and will continue with efforts to support the resolution of outstanding areas of disagreement through bilateral meetings with heads of delegations. This will allow the pillar construction work to proceed safely, which, in turn, will facilitate the drafting of a legally binding boundary statement.


Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

159. This work is expected to contribute to an orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, which would be demonstrated by progress made towards the construction of 2,696 boundary pillars along the border between Cameroon and Nigeria, the production of a series of final maps of the border (approximately 132 maps at 1:50,000 scale, 3 maps at 1:500,000 scale and 1 map at 1:1,500,000 scale), and a final boundary statement formalizing the conclusive resolution of the border dispute between the two countries, in accordance with the terms and decisions of the judgement rendered by the Court.

Figure II

Performance measure: cumulative number of pillars constructed, 2017–2021

(Percentage)

**Deliverables**

160. Table 25 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 25

United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	22	22	22	22
3. Communiqué of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3	3	3	3
4. Report of the subcommission on demarcation	3	3	3	3
5. Report of the project steering committee and technical monitoring team	16	16	16	16
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices on issues related to the peaceful implementation of the relevant decision of the International Court of Justice, including on demarcation and cross-border cooperation; and good offices to build consensus on the border demarcation process.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: technical advice to facilitate resolution of areas of disagreement; advocacy for cross-border cooperation and socioeconomic projects benefiting the affected population; and raising the awareness of affected local communities.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: fact-finding and monitoring missions on the implementation of the construction of boundary pillars, field data and map validation; and monitoring missions on human rights and well-being of the affected populations along the land boundary.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: production of digital material on pillar positions depicting the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: electronic and print magazines, brochures, flyers information kits and special events to promote the activities of the mission, notably the demarcation process, as well as to enhance its visibility.				
External and media relations: press conferences, press releases and media interviews on the activities of the mission.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: social media platforms to disseminate information related to the mission.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 26

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	64.1	72.0	72.0	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	1 843.1	1 354.4	1 751.3	–	396.9
Operational costs	1 692.8	2 031.6	2 031.6	–	–
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 600.0	3 458.0	3 854.9	–	396.9

Table 27

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
Proposed 2021	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

161. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for the Mixed Commission amount to \$3,854,900 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser (\$72,000), salaries and common staff costs (\$1,751,300) for nine international positions (2 P-5, 6 P-4 and 1 Field Service) and two national positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$2,031,600), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$701,500), official travel (\$286,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$261,700), ground transportation (\$42,200), air operations (\$197,800), communications and information technology (\$319,500), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$222,700).
162. In 2021, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Mixed Commission remain unchanged. For international positions, a vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates, whereas an assumption of full incumbency has been applied to the estimates for national positions on the basis of the most recent actual incumbency.
163. The increase in requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs for international positions, based on 2019 expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

164. In the Cameroon-Nigeria land boundary region, the Mixed Commission is utilizing extrabudgetary resources for the pillar construction project. As of January 2020, the unspent balance available in the trust fund amounted to \$6.6 million to implement the project. Considering the depletion of the

trust fund and the need to continue the pillar emplacement exercise, the Government of Cameroon and the Government of Nigeria each contributed an additional amount of \$3 million.

165. In 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$6.7 million are expected to be utilized in continuing the project.
166. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$2 million are expected to be utilized to complete the demarcation work. The Government of Cameroon and the Government of Nigeria have each pledged \$1 million to fill the funding gap. The Mixed Commission aims to continue fundraising activities to implement socioeconomic projects for the benefit of populations and to facilitate the final demarcation exercise.

6. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

(\$9,790,600)

Foreword

In 2019, large-scale, peaceful national protests, which began countrywide on 17 October, united the Lebanese people across sectarian and political divides in their demand for government change, economic, political and judicial reforms, good governance, accountability for corruption, an end to sectarian patronage and early parliamentary elections. Their resounding call for change precipitated the resignation of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet just two weeks later.

As we look ahead to 2020, protests continue, amid new challenges for the security forces to protect peaceful demonstrations, while also maintaining law and order and ensuring the security and stability of Lebanon. The grave financial, economic and social crisis that underpinned the protest movement has also significantly deepened. Lebanon's currency has devalued in real terms, inflation and unemployment have soared and poverty levels have risen dramatically. All that happened while Lebanon continued to host Syrian and Palestine refugees, in an unstable and volatile region marked by crises and conflicts. The new Government of the Prime Minister, Hassan Diab, endorsed by Parliament on 11 February 2020, will have to create trust by quickly demonstrating that it can deliver results to restore the confidence of the Lebanese people, the international community and investors. Meeting this complex set of internal challenges requires all political forces, both those in the Government and in the opposition, to rally around national interests to support the timely implementation of the necessary reforms.

These challenges also bring opportunities: an opportunity to do things differently and begin to build a more just, equal and prosperous future for all in line with the legitimate aspirations and demands of the people.

In supporting preventive diplomacy in Lebanon, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), on the basis of the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and other relevant resolutions, continues to support Lebanon in implementing its obligations and disassociating itself from crises and conflicts in the region. To achieve this, UNSCOL advances confidence-building measures between the parties to resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Together with the United Nations country team, the Office also looks holistically at internal societal issues and the challenges that they pose for security and stability, including the alienation of large parts of society from, and loss of confidence in, the ruling political class and the State due to the lack of basic public services, transparency and accountability; growing poverty and inequality; and the paucity of opportunities for young people, coupled with gender inequality.

The United Nations has stood with Lebanon through difficult times before; we continue to stand with Lebanon today with the aim of making the country more stable and secure.

(Signed) Ján Kubiš

Under-Secretary-General, United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

167. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon is the most senior United Nations official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and is the representative of the Secretary-General to the Government of Lebanon, as well as all political parties and the diplomatic community based in Lebanon. The Special Coordinator is assisted by the Deputy Special Coordinator, who is also the resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator. The Deputy Special Coordinator is responsible for planning and coordinating United Nations humanitarian and development activities in Lebanon. The Special Coordinator provides political guidance to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the United Nations country team and promotes coherence across the Organization's activities.
168. Following the armed conflict between Israel and Hizbullah in July 2006 and the adoption of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#), in 2007 the Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator for Lebanon (see [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#)). The mandate of the Special Coordinator stems from that resolution and subsequent decisions by the Council, including [S/PRST/2016/10](#) and [S/PRST/2015/7](#). The Council, in its resolution [2433 \(2018\)](#), stressed the need for enhanced cooperation between the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) and UNIFIL, with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the missions. The Secretary-General outlined his recommendations in this regard in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 31 December 2018 (see [S/2018/1182](#)). The Council, in its resolution [2485 \(2019\)](#), encouraged the Secretary-General to further those efforts.
169. In 2013, in response to the call by the Security Council for strong, coordinated international support for Lebanon, given the multiple challenges to its stability and security (see [S/PRST/2013/9](#)), and to highlight the need for donor assistance in the humanitarian, development and security areas, the Secretary-General established the International Support Group for Lebanon as a platform for political support. Co-chaired by the Secretary-General and led in-country by UNSCOL, this high-level coordination and support forum has spearheaded several ministerial meetings in Berlin, New York, Paris and Rome.
170. In line with the priorities adopted by the International Support Group for Lebanon and the vision of the Secretary-General on prevention, UNSCOL structures its engagement on the basis of three strategic pillars of intervention: (a) peace and security; (b) stability; and (c) stabilization and development support. This "whole-of-Lebanon" approach is reflected in the United Nations strategic framework for the period 2017–2020 for Lebanon, which was countersigned by the Government of Lebanon in October 2016. The strategic framework includes the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan, which is the country's national plan within the framework of the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan.
171. Resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) was adopted to end the escalation in hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. Years later, key provisions of the resolution remain outstanding, which pose a threat to the stability of Lebanon and that of the region. Periodically, tensions between the parties escalate, requiring the conflict prevention efforts of UNSCOL, in close coordination with UNIFIL, to mitigate and contain them. Within the territory of Lebanon, the continued maintenance of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon continues to undermine the authority of the Lebanese State and pose a risk of reigniting conflict after more than a decade of calm. Challenges in maintaining law and order and protecting the peaceful character of the protests have stretched the capacity of the security forces, especially the Lebanese Armed Forces, to meet competing obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Meanwhile, ongoing violations by Israel of the sovereignty of Lebanon, on land and by air, also impede efforts to work towards a permanent ceasefire between the

parties. These challenges are magnified in a polarized regional context that poses further risks of escalation and spillover to Lebanon.

172. The complex political situation in Lebanon continues to call for the good offices of the Special Coordinator and political and United Nations system-wide support.

Programme of work

Objective

173. The objective, to which the mission contributes, is to prevent and mitigate conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire, and to extend and consolidate State authority in support of the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic and political stability of Lebanon.

Strategy

174. To contribute to the prevention and mitigation of conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire, UNSCOL will exercise its good offices between the parties to pursue confidence-building opportunities, defuse tensions through backchannel and shuttle diplomacy, and address violations of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) before they escalate into conflict, as well as work towards the resolution of outstanding obligations of both parties under that resolution. This work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL, in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, and in line with relevant Security Council resolutions. This action is expected to result in the upholding of commitments of the parties to the current cessation of hostilities and the creation of a conducive environment for dialogue to address outstanding obligations under resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) towards an eventual permanent ceasefire. Past results in this area include the exercise of good offices with both Lebanese and Israeli counterparts to defuse the heightened tensions in August and September 2019, which culminated in an exchange of fire across the Blue Line, as well as the exercise of good offices with both parties, as well as regional actors, to shield Lebanon from regional tensions.
175. To contribute to the extension and consolidation of State authority in support of the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic and political stability of Lebanon, UNSCOL will advocate and provide support to Lebanon in the adoption of key structural, governance and economic reforms, including in line with the commitments forged at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector in 2018, to respond to the ongoing financial and economic crisis, and the legitimate demands of the protest movement, and will work to strengthen key security institutions to assume full responsibility for the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, including through the implementation of an integrated border management strategy. This work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL and the United Nations country team, where relevant, and in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities and institutions, as well as in partnership with key donor countries, international financial institutions and members of the International Support Group for Lebanon. This work is expected to result in the extension and consolidation of State authority, territorial control by the State throughout the country and more effective governance, justice, transparency, accountability and delivery of essential services to citizens countrywide. Past results in this area include the exercise of good offices and advocacy with government officials in order to formulate an economic rescue plan, adopt reform legislation and the State budget within the constitutionally stipulated time frame, and form a Government that is responsive to the aspirations and demands of the people.

External factors for 2021

176. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The tense and volatile regional environment will continue to affect internal stability and security;
 - (b) International consensus with regard to Lebanon, while present, will continue to be challenged;
 - (c) Lebanon will have a Government in place that will facilitate the enabling conditions for the country to move forward on the implementation of its reform agenda;
 - (d) The internal economic and social situation, increasing poverty and governance challenges will continue to be sources of instability;
 - (e) The continued presence of large numbers of Palestine and Syrian refugees will continue to pose challenges;
 - (f) Demonstrations in support of the aspirations and demands of the protest movement will continue, posing challenges to the maintenance of public order and security in the face of the increased radicalization of some groups, while security forces continue to contribute to protecting peaceful demonstrations;
 - (g) The cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel will hold, potentially allowing for further progress in line with resolution 1701 (2006), with an increased extension of State authority south of the Litani River and along the borders, and the continuation of confidence-building efforts;
 - (h) Violations of resolution 1701 (2006) will continue to be perpetrated by the parties and tensions will remain, including over the prevalence and proliferation of weapons in Lebanon outside the authority of the State, as well as violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity.
177. UNSCOL integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In its good offices function and its support for strengthening State institutions, UNSCOL ensures that its political consultations include women in Government, the security forces, political parties and civil society. For example, UNSCOL advocated the inclusion of women in government-formation processes, which reached 30 per cent with six women ministers appointed in 2020. UNSCOL also worked to support the adoption on 12 September 2019 of the national action plan on women and peace and security. In the revision of the electoral law, UNSCOL is supporting the discussions among key stakeholders, including with respect to the inclusion of a gender quota. UNSCOL also participates in events highlighting opportunities and challenges facing women's political participation in Lebanese society as part of its advocacy efforts.
178. UNSCOL cooperates closely with UNIFIL in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). Pursuant to the strategic review of UNIFIL in 2017 and the request to enhance mission efficiencies and effectiveness, as mandated by the Security Council in 2018, both missions are deepening collaboration and joint engagement with national and international stakeholders to maintain the cessation of hostilities and to strengthen the security sector and the extension of State authority throughout the national territory of Lebanon, including in line with the Rome II communiqué dated 15 March 2018. In 2019, the heads of mission established a strategic forum between UNIFIL and UNSCOL to take stock of the implications of developments in Lebanon and the region for implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The forum will continue to meet on a regular basis to produce shared assessments aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of both missions. Enhanced cooperation between the missions is also addressed, among other aspects, in the UNIFIL assessment, carried out in the first half of 2020, pursuant to resolution 2485 (2019). UNSCOL also leverages the presence of other United Nations entities, bringing all United Nations political, security and development tools to bear in support of the stability of Lebanon. Under a memorandum of understanding between UNIFIL and UNSCOL, the former supports the latter in finance, procurement, engineering, communications, medical services, transport and logistics.

179. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSCOL coordinates with the League of Arab States, the European Union, the International Support Group for Lebanon and its members, and civil society, including women's groups, to sustain consensus and mobilize support for the stability, sovereignty and State institutions of Lebanon, including by convening members of the International Support Group to agree upon coordinated messaging and advocacy with the political leadership of Lebanon, including the issuance of joint statements.
180. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, to further integrate United Nations activities in Lebanon under the United Nations strategic framework, the Special Coordinator, with the Deputy Special Coordinator, interacts with other United Nations entities, the World Bank and international donors through the United Nations country team and the Lebanon Development Forum. Strengthening the United Nations partnership with international financial institutions, including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), has informed UNSCOL good offices and analysis during the current period of socioeconomic and financial crises for Lebanon. Joint collaborative efforts between UNSCOL and the United Nations country team have also been launched, including in the areas of anti-corruption and good governance, as well as in support of a Peacebuilding Fund project dedicated to post-conflict reconciliation, in line with the demands of the protest movement and current political discourse.

Evaluation activities

181. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

182. A planned result for 2019, which is sustained political dialogue among Lebanese parties on key issues, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the holding of two parliamentary by-elections (Tripoli and Tyre), which exceeded the target of zero.

Programme performance in 2019: extending and consolidating State authority through the implementation of an integrated border management strategy

183. To contribute to the extension and consolidation of State authority in support of the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic and political stability of Lebanon, UNSCOL worked to strengthen key security institutions to assume greater responsibility for the security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and advocated the adoption of key structural, governance and economic reforms, including those in line with the commitments forged at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector in 2018. UNSCOL regularly convened the International Support Group for Lebanon to encourage the Government of Lebanon to act expeditiously and accelerate the implementation of the fiscal, structural, sectoral and governance reforms necessary to facilitate economic growth, bring the debt under control and regain investor and donor confidence, and mobilize international support for Lebanon. In partnership with the European Union, UNSCOL called upon the Government to accelerate its implementation of the integrated border management strategy. It also ensured that gains made in consolidating border control and security were not reversed amid competing demands on the Lebanese Armed Forces to maintain public security.

184. In 2019, the deteriorating economic and financial situation in Lebanon reached crisis levels and underpinned the protest movement, which erupted on 17 October. Amid pressing liquidity challenges, the banking sector imposed restrictions on transfers and withdrawals from dollar accounts. Pressure on the official peg of the Lebanese pound to the dollar increased with the emergence of a parallel exchange rate system, which reached a high of 2,500 Lebanese pounds to the dollar at one point. The sovereign credit rating of Lebanon and that of its three largest banks was further downgraded to default status. Meanwhile, given liquidity shortages and the suspension of credit lines, businesses faced increasing difficulty in securing payment for imports. There were fears of fuel, medicine and wheat shortages, as well as increased frequency of electricity outages. As at 31 January 2020, a survey from InfoPro, a Lebanon-based market research firm, estimated that, since the protest movement began in October, at least 12 per cent of all companies had suspended their operations, 220,000 jobs had been cut and 50 per cent of enterprises had reduced salaries by more than 40 per cent. The Consumer Protection Association of Lebanon announced on 20 January 2020 that prices in Lebanon had increased by more than 40 per cent in the previous three months. The World Bank projected that poverty levels, currently at approximately 30 per cent, could reach more than 50 per cent if the economic situation continued to worsen and drove inflation upwards. With the economic and financial situation of Lebanon posing a serious internal threat to the country's stability, the approval of the 2020 State budget by Parliament within the constitutionally stipulated time frame was a necessary first step in the right direction, as the Government consulted with IMF and other financial experts on the formulation of a "rescue plan".
185. In the current economically fraught context, the Government of Lebanon identified that one gap that was adversely affecting the economy was the issue of illicit smuggling and customs tax evasion. Towards curbing the incidence of illicit smuggling activities and raising customs revenue, while also positively affecting Lebanon's security and territorial control, the Government initiated discussions on the adoption of an integrated border management strategy. It was identified that, through deployments of the Lebanese Armed Forces along the north-eastern border, pursuant to the decision of the High Defence Council in April 2019 to address smuggling, the Government had, to date, achieved a significant decrease in illegal crossing points. Interministerial discussions on the strategy represented a positive step towards enhancing cooperation among relevant border security and trade authorities and bolstering border management practices. The strategy was adopted on 17 October 2019 by the Council of Ministers.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

186. This work contributed to the extension and consolidation of State authority in support of the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and economic and political stability of Lebanon, as demonstrated by the adoption by Lebanon of an integrated border management strategy, the holding of by-elections on schedule to reactivate democratic institutions and concrete progress in line with the reform agenda agreed at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector, including the adoption of the 2020 State budget and key reform legislation by Parliament within the constitutionally stipulated time frame.

Table 28
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• Absence of State budget	• Absence of State budget • Passage of elections law	• Agreement by Member States with Government of Lebanon on planning of Economic Conference for	• Convening of Economic Conference • Formulation of draft 2019 budget;	• Agreement on Economic Conference follow-up mechanism to

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
		Development through Reforms with the Private Sector and reform agenda	first budget in 12 years	track implementation
		• Absence of State budget	• Holding of first elections in 10 years	• Adoption of 2019 State budget
		• Agreement on parliamentary elections to be rescheduled in 2018		• Referral of 2020 State budget by Council of Ministers to Parliament within constitutional deadlines
				• Planning of by-elections for vacancies; holding of by-elections in Tripoli and Tyre
				• Adoption of an integrated border management strategy

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: enhancing border management and control

187. With a view to extending its territorial control along the border, the Lebanese Armed Forces, tasked by the High Defence Council, launched operations in April 2019 to close illegal crossing points and curb illicit smuggling in order to increase revenues. In parallel, UNSCOL supported the adoption of the integrated border management strategy to enhance cooperation across relevant security agencies and line ministries at legal border crossing points. Towards this end, initial interministerial discussions were held in September 2019 on the draft strategy, with the Council of Ministers adopting it on 17 October 2019.
188. UNSCOL advocated with the heads of relevant security institutions and the Lebanese leadership for the adoption of the integrated border management strategy. Pending its adoption, UNSCOL, in cooperation with key Member States, explored the idea of holding an international conference to further the objectives of the strategy and garner additional international support.
189. UNSCOL promoted the implementation of the integrated border management strategy for Lebanon as a key common framework for security agencies, donors and United Nations agencies, notably through advocating the adoption of an action plan. UNSCOL coordinated with the European Union messages for its implementation with line ministries and its eventual integration into a wider defence strategy. UNSCOL supported the effectiveness of the only coordination mechanism for borders, the Lebanon Border Control Committee, an inter-security body headed by the Lebanese Armed Forces, which serves as a platform for the exchange of information on border developments and programmes supported by international partners to enhance border management and coordination among Lebanese security services. Through its political leverage with International Support Group for Lebanon members and engagement with national actors, UNSCOL supported the activities and programme proposals of the various work of the United Nations in the area of security, with intervention at land, sea and air border crossing points, as requested by the Government for Lebanon.

This entailed liaising between the Committee and United Nations agencies with programmes on borders to ensure the alignment of United Nations support for national priorities. Moving forward, the Government is expected to designate a coordination body to take decisions and oversee the implementation of the strategy.

Internal challenge and response

190. The challenge for UNSCOL was an insufficient United Nations common approach and coordination with main partners in the area of border security and management. UNSCOL will continue to advocate greater coordination among international partners and United Nations agencies and national authorities. In response, and thanks to enhanced coordination through the United Nations strategic framework's pillar structure, UNSCOL will be able to enhance internal synergies among United Nations agencies and bolster coordinated support by donors through mapping programmes and activities in support of the integrated border management strategy and ensuring the alignment of priorities with the Government of Lebanon. Capitalizing on the momentum among national and international actors towards enhanced border management, UNSCOL, as coordinator of the International Support Group for Lebanon, will intensify engagement with all partners to bring the issue of border management to the fore. This will entail supporting the Border Control Committee, or another structure, as decided by the new Government, to implement the strategy and foster joint international efforts in a coordinated approach for greater cooperation and coordination among security services.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

191. This work is expected to contribute to the prevention and mitigation of conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire. It is also expected to contribute to the extension and consolidation of State authority in support of the security, sovereignty and economic and political stability of Lebanon. This would be demonstrated by the implementation of the integrated border management strategy to promote cooperation across all relevant border security agencies and line ministries to, among other things, regulate legal crossings through the harmonization of operating procedures, increase the number of legal crossings, eliminate illegal crossing points and curb the illicit smuggling of drugs, goods, people and weapons. This would raise state revenue and consolidate security, as well as contribute directly to the prevention and mitigation of conflict between Israel and Lebanon by supporting the latter's compliance with the arms embargo and reducing the risk of weapons, assets and personnel existing outside the control of the State, as required pursuant to resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

Table 29
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adoption of integrated border management strategy • Security operations against smuggling activities and closing of illicit crossing points • Approval of the strategy by the Council of Ministers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation and launch of action plan for the implementation of the strategy • Security operations against smuggling activities and closing of illicit crossing points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implementation of strategy at legal border crossing points • Establishment of a coordination structure for the implementation of the strategy • Initial technical discussions on border demarcation

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

192. Table 30 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 30
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	–	3	–	3
1. Input to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)	–	3	–	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	3	3	3

C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: provision of good offices in support of the prevention of conflict, and the extension and consolidation of State authority; good offices on elections, peace and stability, including with respect to economic issues; and confidence-building measures between Israel and Lebanon, including with respect to the maritime boundary dispute.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations with Lebanese and Israeli interlocutors on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006); consultations with the International Support Group for Lebanon and other regional stakeholders on ensuring the stability of Lebanon; consultations on the economic and governance reform agenda and development priorities; advice on government accountability, governance policy formulation and public administration reforms; advocacy with international partners in support of the efforts of Lebanon for extension of State authority, including strengthened security service agencies; consultations on integrated border management on the Lebanon-Syrian Arab Republic border; advocacy on key human rights standards and protections that could have an impact on long-term security and stability and the strengthening of human rights institutions in Lebanon; advocacy for the political participation and representation of women and young people; and advocacy

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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with international partners in support of Lebanon for continued donor involvement and resources as Lebanon responds to the presence of Palestinian and Syrian refugees, taking into account the needs of refugees and host communities.

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach activities to support the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to strengthen the mission's working relationship with key Lebanese partners and stakeholders; outreach activities through special events such as United Nations Day and International Women's Day to help the mission's substantive sections to communicate more effectively with local stakeholders to spread broader knowledge of the work being undertaken through UNSCOL; and information materials and joint outreach activities with other United Nations entities on the promotion of United Nations system-wide priorities, such as the Sustainable Development Goals.

External and media relations: press conferences, press statements, background briefings, interviews, op-eds and other media engagements to communicate strategically on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to convey the strategic direction of the mission's senior leadership; and press statements of the International Support Group for Lebanon on safeguarding Lebanon's security, stability and sovereignty and the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

Digital platforms and multi-media content: utilization of the mission's website and Twitter account to deepen local and national understandings of and support for UNSCOL and its implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 31

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	7 413.0	7 438.3	8 275.3	—	837.0
Operational costs	1 017.9	1 515.3	1 515.3	82.0	—
Total (net of staff assessment)	8 430.9	8 953.6	9 790.6	82.0	837.0

Table 32

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officer	Local level			
Approved 2020	1	1	—	1	2	6	1	1	13	7	—	20	4	58	—	82	
Proposed 2021	1	1	—	1	2	6	1	—	12	7	—	19	5	58	—	82	
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	(1)	(1)	—	—	(1)	1	—	—	—	—

193. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNSCOL amount to \$9,790,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$8,275,300) for 19 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 6 P-4, 1 P-3 and

7 Field Service) and 63 national positions (5 National Professional Officer and 58 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,515,300), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$15,600), official travel (\$228,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$763,000), ground transportation (\$117,600), communications and information technology (\$264,000), medical (\$6,800), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$119,800).

194. In 2021, it is proposed that one position of Associate Political Affairs Officer in the Political Affairs Section be converted from the P-2 level to a National Professional Officer, in order to leverage locally available expertise and knowledge, which will further enhance the ability of UNSCOL to reach segments of society throughout Lebanon and deepen its knowledge base, networks and situational/media awareness, in support of more comprehensive mandate implementation. The position would be based in Tripoli, Lebanon, where the United Nations country team has an established presence. The incumbent would be responsible for liaising with interlocutors and monitoring and analysing political developments in the north of the country.
195. Taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2019, a vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions. Estimates for National Professional Officer positions are based on the assumption of full incumbency, while a 3 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to estimates for Local level positions on the basis of actual average vacancy rates in 2019.
196. The increase in requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable to additional requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of the revised salary scales effective 1 January 2020 for national staff following a salary survey, and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs for national staff, based on expenditure recent patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

197. In 2020, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are any projected for 2021 for UNSCOL.

7. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

(\$8,165,100)

Foreword

Throughout 2019, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) made concerted efforts to align its work with the reform of the United Nations peace and security pillar and the vision of the Secretary-General for prevention. Focusing on the primacy of political solutions and enhanced cooperation and partnerships, UNOCA placed conflict prevention action at the core of its collective engagement with international and regional partners.

The Central African subregion faces persistent political, security, human rights and socioeconomic challenges such as terrorism, weak governance and institutions and the negative impact of climate change. The region has a population of approximately 181 million people, the majority of whom are under the age of 25, with strong aspirations for a peaceful and prosperous future. Despite this complex landscape, Central Africa is a subregion with varying degrees of resilience, where the United Nations can make a significant contribution in conflict prevention and resolution.

In 2019, UNOCA worked with the United Nations system and other key partners, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), to foster stability in the subregion. In exercising my good offices function, I ramped up engagement with Cameroon to advocate inclusive dialogue as the only path towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the north-west and south-west regions. I also intensified contact with Chad and the Congo, where I stressed to the national authorities the need for dialogue as the only means to ease political tensions.

In an effort to develop synergies and strengthen cooperation with relevant partners, my Office actively sought to identify innovative approaches to institution-building and joint engagement that could deliver long-term results for the subregion. We supported the establishment of the first regional network of civil society organizations on early warning and conflict prevention in Central Africa, known as the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa. This new partnership has been set up under the ECCAS secretariat and will contribute to strengthening the regional peace and security architecture through improved visibility, accountability and consultation between civil society and ECCAS member States. UNOCA is also supporting ECCAS in implementing the institutional reforms adopted by Heads of State in December 2019, which constitute a major accomplishment for the subregion this year.

In 2021, many elections will be held in Central African countries: four presidential elections, in Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe, and two legislative elections, in the Central African Republic and Sao Tome and Principe. UNOCA will therefore face an increasing demand for good offices and mediation, as election-related violence remains a major driver of conflict in the subregion. In addition, multifaceted security challenges continue to persist, such as the presence of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, increasing piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and insecurity linked to pastoralism and transhumance throughout the subregion.

Applying a regional lens, UNOCA can play a role in leveraging the mutually reinforcing nature of the good offices of Special Envoys and Representatives and the work of the rest of the United Nations system, including country teams, in particular when it comes to supporting cross-border initiatives.

UNOCA will complete its current mandate in August 2021. Until then, I intend to intensify my good offices, in particular in the countries experiencing electoral processes. Recognizing that sustaining peace across the region cannot be achieved without integrated action, UNOCA remains committed to strengthening its partnerships with all relevant actors, including national Governments, regional and subregional bodies, political actors, civil society, among them women and young people, and international partners.

(Signed) François Louncény Fall
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

198. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is responsible for the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa. The mandate was established through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2009/697](#) and [S/2010/457](#)). Through another exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/789](#) and [S/2018/790](#)), the mandate was extended until 31 August 2021.
199. Since April 2011, UNOCA has served as the secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, which is a body mandated by the General Assembly.
200. In September 2019, the Security Council issued a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2019/10](#)), upon conclusion of the strategic review conducted from May to June 2019 ([S/2019/625](#)). While the core mandate of UNOCA was deemed to be still valid, its key priorities for the period through August 2021, on which the Office should enhance its work, were defined as follows: (a) early warning and analysis, with a gender perspective; (b) good offices in non-mission settings, in particular in the lead-up to the upcoming electoral cycle in the region; (c) support for and strengthening the capacity of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); and (d) building partnerships with civil society and supporting a subregional civil society network.
201. The subregion faces challenges, including the ongoing armed conflicts in the Central African Republic, the crisis in the north-west and south-west regions in Cameroon, political tensions in Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, as well as threats of terrorism and violent extremism, and a growing number of piracy incidents undermining maritime security. In addition, elections were a major trigger for unrest and instability in the subregion in the past, in particular when results were contested or when the space for the opposition had shrunk. Enabling factors, such as porous borders, weak national institutions, poverty, economic inequality, limited regional cooperation and mistrust, tend to have a further impact on these situations.
202. Seven elections are planned to be held during the period 2020–2025, including six presidential and legislative elections expected for 2021 alone. In accordance with its mandate, UNOCA will step up its good offices, especially in countries with non-mission settings, and provide support in addressing the political and security challenges commonly expected in the context of elections. To this end, the Office will strive to provide accurate early warning analysis in close coordination with relevant partners. It will also engage in capacity-building activities for civil society actors and ECCAS to support this endeavour.

Programme of work

Objective

203. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to prevent conflict and consolidate peace and security in the Central African subregion.

Strategy

204. To contribute to the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of peace, UNOCA will engage in good offices in the region, in particular in the electoral context. This action is expected to result in inclusive dialogues and conflicting parties taking constructive action to mitigate tensions or avoid an escalation in violence. Past results in this area include the Special Representative's engagement in Cameroon, where he consistently called for inclusive dialogue as the only means to solve the crisis. The major national dialogue convened by the Government of Cameroon resulted in key recommendations. In addition, in Sao Tome and Principe, an escalation in tensions between the parties was avoided, including because of UNOCA engagement.
205. To contribute to the prevention of conflict, UNOCA will conduct analysis to also inform early warning. This work is expected to result in the early detection of escalating violence, informing timely preventive action. Past results in this area include institutional capacity-building for governmental and civil society actors, including women and young people, on gender-sensitive conflict analysis, human rights and early warning mechanisms.
206. To contribute to the prevention of conflict, UNOCA will provide support for and strengthen the capacity of ECCAS, especially its early warning mechanism for Central Africa (MARAC). This action is expected to result in reinforcing regional and subregional capacities, enabling ECCAS to play an active role in ensuring regional peace and stability. Past results in this area include the provision of technical expertise to strengthen the ECCAS mediation structure and training for its staff and civil society groups on early warning and gender indicators.
207. To contribute to the prevention of conflict, UNOCA will strengthen partnerships with civil society and support the full operationalization of the subregional network, the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa. This work is expected to result in structured and reinforced information-sharing between civil society actors and ECCAS, and contribute to the work of the ECCAS early warning mechanism. Partnerships will also be reinforced with subregional bodies, including the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea and organizations in West Africa and the Sahel in efforts to combat terrorism, including Boko Haram, and maritime insecurity. Past results in this area include UNOCA support for setting up the Coalition and the organization of capacity-building workshops on human rights.

External factors for 2021

208. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The constitutional electoral timelines will be respected, and there will be no new election-related conflicts in the region;
 - (b) UNOCA efforts towards peace and security in the subregion will continue to gain the support of Member States;
 - (c) Member States of the region will remain committed to keeping ECCAS and other subregional peace and security mechanisms operational;
 - (d) ECCAS institutional reform will be implemented and the new structure will be fully operational;
 - (e) Natural disasters caused by extreme weather conditions, possibly resulting from climate change, will continue to bring about human and material damage and adversely affect the stability of the region.

209. UNOCA integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Gender-sensitive conflict analysis will continue to inform good offices and mediation strategies. UNOCA will provide technical assistance to ECCAS, government partners and civil society groups for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) on women and peace and security in the region. This action is expected to increase the participation of women in conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms and enhance the contribution of women in peacebuilding. UNOCA will also continue to support the participation of women and young people in democratic institutions and in elections, with the aim of increasing the representation of women in elected and nominated positions. It will further support mediation training as part of the local peace initiatives, to allow women to develop the skills required to meaningfully participate in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as in the peace process itself.
210. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNOCA will partner with the African Union, ECCAS, CEMAC, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to promote regional integration as a means of preventing and addressing threats to regional peace and stability in Central Africa. UNOCA will support the ongoing processes of ECCAS reform and rationalization of regional economic communities in Central Africa, aimed at establishing a clear distribution of responsibilities, including in the area of peace and security. The Office will also continue to provide expertise to ECCAS in the area of peace and security through the provision of training and capacity-building and the conduct of joint prevention and good offices activities.
211. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNOCA will strive to enhance coordination among United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, including UNOWAS, and maintain strong working relationships with all United Nations country teams in the subregion.

Evaluation activities

212. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

213. A planned result for 2019, which is increased engagement and cooperation by Central African States and subregional organizations on peace and security through good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as demonstrated by the effective functioning of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and an increased number of good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation interventions undertaken in key countries by the Special Representative, together with the Secretary-General of ECCAS in some instances.

Programme performance in 2019: adoption of a regional protocol on pastoralism and transhumance

214. In 2017, the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa began to address security issues related to transhumance at its forty-fourth ministerial meeting, held in Yaoundé. Since then, the Committee has regularly discussed the issue, expressing serious concern regarding the linkages between transhumance, the illicit exploitation of natural resources and armed groups. During its forty-seventh and forty-eighth meetings, held in 2018 and 2019, respectively, the Committee expressed strong concern regarding the growing security challenges arising from

pastoralism and cross-border transhumance in Central Africa, and called for the adoption of regional and national measures to promote peaceful transhumance to the benefit of the States and communities concerned.

215. UNOCA has continued to support regional efforts led by ECCAS towards the adoption of a subregional regulatory framework on pastoralism and transhumance. Early in 2019, a consultant was hired to carry out an assessment and document national responses, including existing legal instruments in the most affected countries. Thereafter, an initial draft of the regional regulatory framework was developed. UNOCA subsequently organized a regional workshop in N'Djamena from 9 to 11 April, bringing together experts and stakeholders from the 11 ECCAS member States, as well as regional organizations, to discuss the issue of transhumance, including the preliminary findings of the consultant. A follow-up workshop was organized in Kinshasa in June 2019, during which the draft regional regulation prepared by the consultant was finalized at the technical level and would be opened for further discussion and endorsement by member States during the next Ordinary Summit of the Heads of State.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

216. This work contributed to the prevention of conflict and the consolidation of peace and security in the Central African subregion, as demonstrated by the consolidation of open bilateral discussions among the affected countries and during the meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, as well as the reactivation of the joint bilateral commissions between the Central African Republic and Cameroon, Chad and the Congo.

Table 33

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• Countries in the subregion identify the need to address cross-border security concerns related to transhumance during the meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	• Member States call for the adoption of regional and national measures to address the challenges during the meeting of the Committee	• Member States engage in open discussions during the meeting of the Committee and provide additional insight into the need for a regional framework to address the threats posed by transhumance, which led to the development of a draft regulatory framework

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: defusing tensions, in particular in electoral contexts

217. In 2021, four presidential and two legislative elections are scheduled to be held in the region under the purview of UNOCA. In the past, elections in Central Africa were often accompanied by tension and violence.

218. In 2018 and 2019, the Special Representative intensified his good offices efforts in some countries in the subregion (i.e., Sao Tome and Principe and Cameroon), which were considered to have a comparatively high risk of slipping into violent conflict during their electoral cycles. He engaged a range of stakeholders and persistently called for constructive and inclusive dialogue, as well as the need to use established legitimate and legal frameworks for complaints. Those efforts were undertaken in close coordination with the relevant United Nations country teams and in close partnership with other relevant actors, in particular ECCAS.

Internal challenge and response

219. The challenge for UNOCA was the maintenance of continuous and effective coordination with United Nations presences in the region. In response, UNOCA will continue to improve coordination with the relevant United Nations country teams in the subregion by regularizing interaction and coordination mechanisms, including through remote communication.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

220. This work is expected to contribute to the prevention of conflict and the consolidation of peace and security in the Central African subregion, which would be demonstrated by a reduction in election-related incidents and an increase in the number of constructive and inclusive dialogue initiatives in the subregion.

Table 34

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• Discussions between member States on the issue of transhumance, including during meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa	• Increased commitment by States undergoing electoral and dialogue processes to reaching a workable consensus and to peacefully resolving any conflict	• Adoption of ECCAS-level legislation on pastoralism; adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of the next ECCAS-ECOWAS summit, scheduled to be held in N'Djamena in 2020	• Reduction in election-related incidents and an increase in the number of constructive and inclusive dialogue initiatives in the subregion

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

221. Table 35 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 35

Deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
1. Report to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
2. Report to the General Assembly on the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
4. Ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	4	4	4	4
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	50	50	50	60
5. Workshops on conflict prevention, mediation, human rights and empowerment of women	35	35	35	40
6. Workshop for journalists/media on their role in conflict prevention and protection of civilians	15	15	15	20
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, high-level diplomatic missions and meetings, including jointly with regional organizations (ECCAS, African Union); and regional and subregional summits, forums and high-level meetings to promote peace and stability, maritime safety and human rights.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: strategic coordination meetings and round tables with regional and subregional organizations on regional integration, peace and security, human rights and counter-terrorism (including addressing security threats from Boko Haram).				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: field visits to member States to gather information, consult stakeholders and coordinate actions on issues related to subregional peace and security, such as political and electoral crises, armed groups, illicit transfer of small arms and light weapons and human rights violations and abuses.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: print media (brochures, information kits, calendars, annual review and quarterly publications, and banners); broadcast media (cooperation with radio and television for the coverage and broadcasting of relevant activities of the mission); and cultural and sporting events and other awareness-raising activities related to United Nations observances, including an annual football tournament for peace.				
External and media relations: press conferences, press releases, statements and interviews on the activities of the mission.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: website and social media platforms to disseminate information related to the mission.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

222. The proposed budget for 2021 for UNOCA takes into consideration the Security Council's endorsement of the recommendations of the 2019 strategic review regarding the main priorities for the remainder of its mandate. In the statement by the President of the Security Council of 12 September 2019 ([S/PRST/2019/10](#)), the key priorities of UNOCA were outlined as follows: (a) early warning and analysis with a gender perspective; (b) good offices in non-mission settings, in particular in the lead-up to the upcoming electoral cycle in the region; (c) support for and strengthening the capacity of ECCAS; and (d) building partnerships with civil society and supporting subregional civil society network. To ensure adequate capacity for the effective delivery of the mandates, proposals are made to strengthen the UNOCA staffing complement.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 36

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	6 063.0	5 410.4	6 307.4	—	897.0
Operational costs	1 479.0	1 718.6	1 857.7	—	139.1
Total (net of staff assessment)	7 542.0	7 129.0	8 165.1	—	1 036.1

Table 37

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2020	1	—	—	2	4	11	4	—	22	7	—	29	3	9	—	41
Proposed 2021	1	—	—	2	5	12	6	—	26	8	—	34	3	11	—	48
Change	—	—	—	—	1	1	2	—	4	1	—	5	—	2	—	7

223. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNOCA amount to \$8,165,100 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$6,307,400) for the continuation of 29 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 4 P-5, 11 P-4, 4 P-3 and 7 Field Service) and 12 national positions (3 National Professional Officer and 9 Local level) and the proposed establishment of 5 international positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 P-3, and 1 Field Service) and 2 national positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,857,700), comprising the costs for consultants (\$34,600), official travel (\$764,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$238,800), ground transportation (\$59,900), air transportation (\$140,900), communications and information technology (\$481,200), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$138,000).
224. In 2021, the staffing complement reflects the proposed establishment of seven positions to strengthen UNOCA capacity in implementing the expanded mandates, as detailed below.

Political Affairs Section:

(a) Establishment of four positions, comprising:

- (i) One Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) to ensure the delivery of timely and accurate political analysis and early warning to better advise and support the good offices of the Special Representative;
- (ii) One Political Affairs Officer (P-4) to ensure full operationalization of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa and its capacity in early warning, mediation and conflict prevention processes, and the provision

of adequate support to ECCAS reform and its new structure, including capacity- and institution-building programmes;

- (iii) One Political Affairs Officer (P-3) to strengthen the capacity of the Section in the provision of timely and accurate early warning analysis in support of the good offices of the Special Representative;
- (iv) One Administrative Assistant (Field Service) to reinforce the existing support and assistance in the daily operations of the Section, especially with regard to the organization of workshops, capacity-building activities, field visits and meetings;

Public Information Section:

- (b) Establishment of one position of Public Information Officer (P-3) to act as a multimedia focal point and oversee the production of film, photographic and other media;

Mission Support Section:

- (c) Establishment of two positions, comprising:
 - (i) One Inventory and Supply Assistant (Local level) to strengthen the capabilities in warehousing and requisitioning functions;
 - (ii) One Driver (Local level) to meet the increasing demand for operational and logistical support.
225. A vacancy rate of 10 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing international positions, taking into account the actual average vacancy rate in 2019, and a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the five international positions proposed for establishment in 2021. An assumption of full incumbency, which is based on the most recent actual incumbency, has been applied to the estimates of continuing national positions, while a vacancy rate of 35 per cent has been applied to the estimates for 2 Local level positions proposed for establishment in 2021.
226. The increase in requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to higher civilian personnel costs owing mainly to the proposed establishment of seven positions, and higher operational costs, mainly under official travel, to strengthen UNOCA capacity to address the growing challenges in the subregional settings, in line with the priorities delineated in the statement by the President of the Security Council ([S/PRST/2019/10](#)).

Extrabudgetary resources

227. During 2020, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$550,000 are projected for supporting the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy on pastoralism and transhumance in Central Africa, strengthening women's networks in Central Africa, supporting the local appropriation of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Central African Republic and organizing meetings and related activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa.
228. For 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$600,000 are projected for supporting the reinforcement of institution-building for ECCAS following its reform, operationalization of the regional network of civil society organizations for peace and stability in Central Africa, implementation of activities related to the climate change agenda, the organization of meetings and related activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the participation of a delegation from the Central Africa subregion in a meeting of the Commission on the Status of Women.

8. United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(\$70,291,400)

Foreword

On 4 April 2019, the eve of the national conference, forces under the command of General Khalifa Haftar launched an attack on Tripoli. The conference, as the culmination of a year-long consultative process, was aimed at bringing together Libyans from across the country to chart a way forward to end the country's period of transition and usher in a new period of stability and security through elections. The attack and the intensifying hostilities that ensued crushed the hopeful steps that Libyans had taken to move the country forward through a political solution.

The violent conflict that ensued around Tripoli between forces from the east and the west has already killed and injured thousands, including hundreds of civilians, forced large numbers of civilians to leave their homes, affected migrants and refugees trapped in detention centres near the fighting, and caused significant damage and destruction of health facilities and other infrastructure. International humanitarian law has been defied. The economy has been brought to the brink owing to the prolonged blockade of the oil infrastructure, public debt has skyrocketed and services to the population have diminished significantly. The conflict has shattered livelihoods, resulted in even deeper divides between the country's communities and crushed progress made towards putting Libya on a course towards political and economic stability and reconciliation.

Through this extremely difficult period, the United Nations never left Libya. We scaled up our humanitarian efforts to assist those in need and continued to seek a political way forward. After months of fighting and having explored many avenues for bringing an end to the conflict and the parties together to speak with each other, we were able, in January 2020, together with our international partners, to convene the Berlin Conference with representatives of concerned countries and regional organizations. The agreed 55-point communiqué and accompanying United Nations Support Mission in Libya operational plan comprehensively tackle the full range of issues underpinning the Libyan problem. Critically, participants agreed not to interfere in the internal affairs of Libya and to abide by the United Nations arms embargo to provide the conditions necessary for Libyans to take ownership of their future. Work has since proceeded along intra-Libyan security, political, and economic tracks to transform the fragile truce into a ceasefire and reach an agreement on modalities for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism and long-term security arrangements; to establish the Libyan Political Forum to enable the parties to discuss transitional institutional arrangements; and to establish a Libyan expert economic commission to address revenue distribution and post-conflict reconstruction. Work on international humanitarian and human rights law complements these tracks.

Ending the conflict and agreeing on the way forward is a realistic prospect. Doing so is now more urgent than ever in view of the emergence of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which requires that the country, east, west and south, pulls together to overcome this threat and to limit the impact on a population that has already suffered so much.

The parties are known. The outlines of the agreement are known. Options for a temporary or longer-term constitutional framework exist. Electoral legislation has been produced before.

I was heartened by the civil society activists and tribal elders who courageously raised their voices to maintain social harmony among Libyans and a New Year's Day call from young activists in Benghazi for a cessation of hostilities and a return to political talks. The United Nations is in Libya, and will remain in Libya, to support the Libyan people on their journey.

(Signed) Stephanie T. Williams
Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Support Mission in Libya

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

229. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission established at the request of the Libyan authorities, on 16 September 2011 by the Security Council in its resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#), to support the country's transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. The Mission was mandated to support Libya's democratic transition based on the Libyan Political Agreement of 17 December 2015 and in accordance with the United Nations Action Plan for Libya, announced on the margins of the seventy-second session of the General Assembly in September 2017. On 6 June 2018, the Council adopted a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2018/11](#)) in which its endorsement of and full support for the Action Plan were reaffirmed and in which it underscored the importance of the role of the United Nations in facilitating a Libyan-led political solution to the challenges facing the country. The UNSMIL mandate was most recently extended until 15 September 2020 in Council resolution [2486 \(2019\)](#).
230. UNSMIL is responsible for mediation and good offices to support: (a) an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya; (b) continued implementation of the Agreement; (c) consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; (d) a possible ceasefire; and (e) subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections. In addition, within operational and security constraints, UNSMIL provides: (a) support to key Libyan institutions; (b) support, on request, for the provision of essential services and delivery of humanitarian assistance; (c) human rights monitoring and reporting; (d) support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation; and (e) the coordination of international assistance and the provision of advice and assistance to Government of National Accord-led efforts.
231. More than four years after the Libyan Political Agreement was signed in December 2015, many of its provisions remain to be fully implemented, including the unification of State institutions and the Libyan political transition to having an inclusive, stable and effective Government. At this time, the country and many of its institutions remain deeply divided between the internationally recognized, Tripoli-based Government of National Accord and those supporting General Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army under his leadership controlling the east and most of the south of the country. On 4 April 2019, Libyan National Army forces under the command of General Haftar launched an offensive to seize control of Tripoli, triggering a mobilization of Government of National Accord-affiliated forces to defend against the attack. The attack took place just days before the planned United Nations-facilitated national conference was to have been held as the culmination of a year-long country-wide consultative process intended to facilitate overcoming the political stalemate over the political future of Libya. The offensive brought that political process to a halt. Since the outbreak of fighting around Tripoli, UNSMIL has been engaging with a wide range of national, regional and international actors to reach an agreement on a cessation of hostilities and resume political dialogue.
232. On 29 July 2019, the then Special Representative, Ghassan Salamé, announced a three-part road map that included: (a) a call for a truce during the Eid al-Adha holiday; (b) a subsequent high-level international meeting to strengthen the cessation of hostilities, enforce the implementation of the arms embargo and promote adherence to international humanitarian and human rights law by Libyan parties; and (c) an intra-Libyan meeting to agree on comprehensive elements for the way forward. Throughout the remainder of the year, UNSMIL, in close coordination with the Government of Germany, facilitated a series of preparatory meetings to galvanize the international community towards uniting the international community on Libya. That process culminated in a conference held

in Berlin on 19 January 2020, attended by representatives of the States concerned and international organizations who endorsed a 55-point communiqué in which they committed themselves to refraining from interference in the armed conflict and implementing the arms embargo established by Security Council in its resolution 1970 (2011). The communiqué comprehensively addresses the full range of issues underpinning the Libyan conflict, and a detailed UNSMIL operational plan addresses the core political, economic and financial, security and military issues, as well as the arms embargo and international humanitarian and human rights law, in order to create conditions for a political process to resume. Furthermore, an international follow-up committee on Libya comprised of all countries and international organizations that participated in the Berlin Conference was tasked with assisting in the operationalization of the conclusions under United Nations auspices.

233. Parallel to and building on the Berlin process, UNSMIL is facilitating an intra-Libyan dialogue on three tracks: political, military-security and economic-financial. On 13 February 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution 2510 (2020), endorsing the conclusions of the Berlin Conference and expressing unequivocal support for the intra-Libyan dialogue, the last step of the three-step initiative.
234. In response to international calls upon the warring parties for an immediate humanitarian cessation of hostilities and a halt to the continuing transfer of military equipment and personnel into Libya, the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army, on 18 and 21 March, respectively, agreed to a humanitarian pause; however, that was short-lived and was followed by an escalation in fighting.
235. UNSMIL engaged with the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army to build on the draft ceasefire agreement presented at the 23 February 5+5 Joint Military Commission talks in Geneva and encouraged Libyan parties to advance political initiatives that were inclusive, aimed at ending the fighting and finding a peaceful solution to the conflict within the framework of the conclusions of the Berlin Conference and resolution 2510 (2020). The support and concurrence of the international community for those endeavours and its adherence to commitments made at the Berlin Conference will be crucial.

Programme of work

Objective

236. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to achieve a peaceful, orderly and democratic transition process to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united Libyan State that enjoys stability, is governed by legitimate institutions and whose officials are accountable to the Libyan people.

Strategy

237. To contribute to a peaceful, orderly and democratic transition process to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people, UNSMIL will continue to pursue the implementation of the intra-Libyan three-track initiative to address the Libyan crisis in all its aspects: political, military-security and economic-financial, by engaging with Libyan stakeholders at all levels. Within operational and security constraints, the Mission will provide good offices to facilitate the establishment of unified and functioning State institutions, as well as electoral assistance to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections. This work is expected to result in an end to violent conflict in the country, the creation of space for a Libyan-led inclusive political process that addresses the needs of all Libyan people and consensus-building towards achieving milestones set forth in the Libyan Political Agreement. Past results in this area include the adoption of the above-mentioned Berlin communiqué of January 2020, the consultative process for a national conference of close to 80 meetings involving 7,000 Libyans and a monthly economic forum and its second-track economic dialogue process among senior experts in partnership with Chatham House.

238. To contribute to a united Libyan State that enjoys stability, is governed by legitimate institutions and whose officials are accountable to the Libyan people, UNSMIL will continue to provide mediation and good offices to support Libyan parties in securing the implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire agreement. To stabilize the Libyan economy, UNSMIL will enhance efforts to unify the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya and to uphold the integrity of the National Oil Corporation, aimed at preventing the illicit import and export of crude oil and oil products, as well as to support economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions. This work is expected to result in the formation of a unity Government, reformed unified security institutions, the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels, and the promotion of the rule of law throughout the country, leading to a more resilient and responsive State. Past results in this area include the execution of 13 fact-finding missions to verify “ceasefire” violations and attacks against civilian infrastructure; 17 fact-finding missions to verify the violations of human rights and humanitarian law; progress towards the consensus for the re-establishment of government oversight and control of security actors in greater Tripoli under the Ministry of Interior, which includes the hosting of a meeting between the Ministry and the international community in Tripoli in January 2019 aimed at extending State authority over all its territory, prior to the outbreak of violence in April 2019; and a series of economic measures to stabilize the currency and liquidity situation, reduce corruption and to unify two branches of the Central Bank.

External factors for 2021

239. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The Libyan Political Agreement and the Berlin communiqué endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#) will remain the guiding frameworks for United Nations support in Libya;
 - (b) The Government of National Accord will remain the legitimate authority in Libya and momentum towards an end to the political transition will be maintained, supporting a political process, including inclusive dialogue and establishing a unified and representative Government. The Libyan authorities are invested in support for the three tracks of an intra-Libyan dialogue: economic-financial, military-security and political;
 - (c) Strategic partnerships will continue between the international community, regional organizations and the United Nations in support of a Libyan-led political process and adherence to the United Nations sanctions regime;
 - (d) The security situation in Libya will improve, with agreed mechanisms to monitor and maintain a ceasefire agreement having been implemented;
 - (e) Security sector reform will be agreed upon and steps will be taken towards the establishment of unified and professional police and armed forces to maintain the rule of law and security;
 - (f) Instability or stagnation will continue to affect the political process, including the constitutional reform process as the basis for electoral processes, providing openings for those interested in the status quo and potential spoilers to hinder the political process, requiring an increased focus on local reconciliation and support for transitional justice mechanisms.
240. UNSMIL integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. It will promote women’s participation in the political process and representation in government institutions, which will be reflected in the broad and inclusive participation of women across Libyan society in the peace process, including effective gender mainstreaming into the constitution-making and electoral processes to safeguard equal rights and opportunities for women. In addition, UNSMIL and the United Nations country team, through the Office of the Deputy Special Representative, will jointly promote equal rights and opportunities for women, including support for Government of National Accord efforts to protect women from all forms of violence and guarantee

their participation in all security processes/arrangements in the transition period, in line with human rights laws, international humanitarian law and relevant Security Council resolutions, addressing and preventing violence against women and girls in vulnerable situations, including displaced persons, migrants and refugees, as well as the identification of the gendered impacts of violent extremism on women in Libya to explore ways to improve prevention and protection efforts.

241. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSMIL is mandated by the Security Council pursuant to its resolution [2486 \(2019\)](#) to coordinate international assistance and the provision of advice and assistance to efforts led by the Government of National Accord to stabilize the country. UNSMIL will seek to maximize collective results in all contexts through partnership with relevant local and international partners, regional organizations and civil society groups, including through conducting diplomatic briefings and coordination with the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union to ensure a unified approach towards supporting Libya's political process and resolving the Libyan crisis. Furthermore, the African Union–European Union–United Nations tripartite task force will continue to work, in particular, on the situation of stranded migrants and refugees in Libya.
242. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNSMIL will work closely with the United Nations country team. This strategic partnership serves to carry forward the emphasis of the Secretary-General on the nexus between the peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian pillars, as well as efforts focused on addressing humanitarian crises, to facilitate long-term peace, security and sustainable development. In recognition that political and security interventions will have a major impact on development efforts, and vice versa, an integrated approach will strengthen the ability of UNSMIL to implement its mandate and increase the ability of the country team to carry out its role and, eventually, the United Nations to serve the Libyan people. UNSMIL works jointly with the United Nations country team on providing electoral support to the Libyan authorities, security and justice sector reform and increasing support for basic services, economic development and security in Libya's south.

Evaluation activities

243. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

244. A planned result for 2019, which is capable Libyan security sector institutions, including improved national security governance through the allocation of clear roles and responsibilities, effective coordination and democratic oversight over the security sector, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, notwithstanding the outbreak of widespread hostilities in April 2019, as evidenced by the partial adherence to the Eid al-Adha truce in August 2019 and other temporary measures by armed actors. Notwithstanding a significant impact from the conflict in Libya in 2019, results were also evidenced by the implementation of the joint UNSMIL/UNDP policing and security joint programme, as well as the model police station project. UNSMIL provided technical and strategic support to the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and police in developing a case management system. Additional support was provided to the Ministry of Interior in the development of job descriptions and the establishment of the Women's Affairs Office and the Family and Child Protection Office. In support of the model police station project, assistance was provided for the building of the Hay al-Andalus police station, the benchmark of the project, in the form of drafting job descriptions, identifying training needs and developing the structure and organization of the police station.

245. A planned result for 2019, which is the improved functioning and fairness of the Libyan justice system, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the increase in the number of detainees screened and released in 2019. A total of 1,200 detainees were screened and 500 released.

Programme performance in 2019: combating hate speech and incitement to violence

246. Traditional and social media play a crucial role in the ongoing conflict in Libya, in particular in the deep polarization between opposing political sides, damaging the already fragile social fabric in the country and posing a serious threat to further dividing it. Circulating false or distorted information, pictures or text on social media platforms has become common practice to wage psychological warfare against the “enemy”. The number of Libyan users of social media platforms has increased in past years but has skyrocketed since April 2019. In August 2019, there were approximately 5 million active accounts in Libya for a population of 6 million people. Incitement and hate speech have dominated the conversation on social media in Libya, which is increasingly being used as a weapon in the conflict.
247. In 2019, in order to implement the initiative of the Secretary-General to combat hate speech and to counter the worrying trend of increasing incitement and hate speech in Libya, UNSMIL developed a concept paper on combating hate speech, incitement and ethics of journalism, which it presented in two workshops for leading Libyan journalists, bloggers and social media influencers, as well as civil society, in Tripoli and Cairo. The workshops generated healthy debate among the 47 participants, 38 per cent of whom were women. Participants learned about the thin line between incitement and hate speech, freedom of expression and the devastating consequences of the spread of misinformation, incitement and hate speech. Representatives of one social media platform presented the most recent trends in the platform’s community standards and the introduction of artificial intelligence to combat fake accounts and inappropriate content, including hate speech, attracting more than 1,180 members comprising mainly Libyan bloggers and media representatives and civil society activists.
248. At the conclusion of the workshops, participants agreed to actively interact and foster dialogue with individuals from different ethnic and political communities or have different views instead of passively witnessing a situation that can aggravate the situation of hatred and violence. They recommended creating a national alliance to combat hate speech and the spread of misinformation and incitement, and requested imams and preachers to play a vital role in combating the incitement to violence and hate speech in favour of unity and reconciliation. From the two workshops emerged agreement on a set of governing ethical principles to counter hate speech in Libyan media, as well as a list of recommendations. These recommendations will be the basis of a unified code of conduct that media representatives will develop and agree on during the final workshop, which will be held as soon the security situation allows for bringing together heads of media outlets and top-tier social media influencers and bloggers, representing all affiliations and backgrounds in Libya.
249. As an immediate outcome of the workshops, participants created two message service groups, based in western and eastern Libya, “Together against hate speech”, and agreed on follow-up action. They also generated dozens of articles and media products, including television programmes, raised awareness of incitement and hate speech and promoted dialogue, unity and reconciliation. Prominent media and social media figures, writers and academics created the “Against hate speech” group on a social media platform. More than 100 individuals representing 21 organizations, including media representatives, writers, human rights activists and civil society groups, signed a statement against hate speech, in which they committed themselves to combating the spread of misinformation, incitement and hate speech.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

250. This work contributed to a peaceful, orderly and democratic transition process to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united Libyan State, as demonstrated by more responsible Libyan media, averting further fragmentation and division of Libyan society and establishing a fundamental basis to promote constructive dialogue. Additional evidence of the result was a series of events held towards the same objective, launched by Tripoli workshop participants, including round-tables discussions at Sabha University, located in the south of Libya, bringing together tribal and local leaders, media and civil activists in Sabha to discuss ways to combat hate speech on the basis of the Tripoli workshop set of recommendations. Notwithstanding potential concerns for the safety and security of participants in the Sabha University events, they affirmed their commitment to the Tripoli workshop's code of conduct. On the basis of that code of conduct, participants agreed on a set of recommendations to defuse tensions among communities during tribal disputes. A similar round-table discussion was held in Tripoli involving a group of journalists and civil society organization representatives. Following the UNSMIL-organized workshops, at least three local television stations aired programmes on hate speech and incitement in the country's social media sphere and on ways to combat it.

Table 38
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior managers and owners from 10 influential Libyan media outlets jointly approved the Madrid declaration, "Towards professional media: the role of Libyan media and its responsibility in times of crises", in the workshop organized by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supported by UNSMIL 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Libyan media managers and journalists met, with the aim of developing an action plan for media reform to promote national reconciliation and enhance freedom of expression towards professional media in Libya 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting with Libyan youth media groups, including the Libyan Dialogue and Debate Club, H2O and Sama, to promote solidarity in their peace and reconciliation efforts, including the promotion of tolerance and peaceful conversations across Libyan/ social media spheres, was hosted by UNSMIL and UNDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More than 30 youth activists, bloggers and social media influencers expressed support for the United Nations-led political process and the calls for a national conference in response to the UNSMIL initiative through its social media platform • UNSMIL was instrumental in the formulation and execution of a national reconciliation campaign led by Libyan non-governmental organizations, in collaboration with UNDP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Representatives of key media outlets and social media influencers in Libya attend workshops organized by UNSMIL and trigger a series of country-wide initiatives on addressing hate speech, including the creation of a dedicated social media group

Programme performance in 2019: supporting the unification of Libyan financial institutions – improving economic performance and accountability in Libya

251. Improving economic performance, wealth distribution and accountability in Libya is fundamental not only to improve governance, but also to advance the political process by reducing or blocking the vested financial interests of those who hamper the political process. In 2019, in collaboration with international financial institutions, including the World Bank and IMF, UNSMIL facilitated several economic reform processes as part of efforts to unify the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya, which had split in 2014. An intra-Libyan dialogue between the Governor of the Central Bank in Tripoli and the Governor of the parallel branch in Bayda' reached an agreement to conduct an audit. The audit process, aimed at creating fiscal clarity, will create conditions for the unification of the two branches, leading to strengthened oversight mechanisms, harmonized operating procedures and the alignment of relevant accounting systems.
252. In parallel to a bidding process to identify an audit company, a technical-level dialogue between the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya facilitated discussions for finding solutions for critically important issues facing the banking system, including a road map for unifying the two branches. In addition, preparation for establishing a Libyan expert economic commission, composed of prominent Libyan economic experts and representatives of Libyan financial institutions, set the stage for identifying priority issues for economic reform.
253. Throughout 2019, UNSMIL also supported the National Oil Corporation, which produces the source of 95 per cent of national revenue, to maintain its unity and effectiveness in ensuring that oil is not exported in violation of the embargo. Notwithstanding continued attempts to divide the Corporation, UNSMIL, together with the Government of National Accord, continued its advocacy to implement the sanctions regime adopted by the Security Council pursuant to its resolution [2362 \(2017\)](#), which expanded resolution [1970 \(2011\)](#) in combating illicit fuel exports and the sanctioning of individuals who violated the oil embargo.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

254. This work contributed to a united Libyan State that enjoys stability, is governed by legitimate institutions and whose officials are accountable to the Libyan people by improving and stabilizing the Libyan economy. Further evidence of the progress achieved is the agreement between the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya to conduct an international audit financed by the Presidential Council, for the first time since 2009, and the successful negotiation and development of terms of references, as well as the selection and funding process of an international audit company, including two members of the Board of the Central Bank.

Table 39

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Libyan Political Agreement provided for the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to reach a consensus on the nomination of the Governor of the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Temporary economic measures authorized the release of budgets without legislative oversight 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security Council resolution 2362 (2017) expanded the Libya sanctions regime, including the sanctioning of individuals who violated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduction of the foreign exchange fee (183 per cent), along with a liberalization of public access to foreign exchange (from \$500 to \$1,000) strengthened the Libyan dinar and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two branches of the Central Bank agreed on the terms of reference of an international audit Subsidies lifted on lubricants in January and on

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Central Bank of Libya		restrictions on the illicit export of oil	<p>resulted in a drop in the exchange rate in the parallel and illegal markets, reducing smuggling</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Libyan people incentivized to deposit money in banks, addressing the liquidity shortage 	<p>kerosene in October</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preparation for the establishment of a Libyan expert economic commission

Planned results for 2021

Supporting the building of resilient and unified State institutions

255. In order to deliver on the Libyan Political Agreement, which remains the guiding political road map for the country originally designed to end the process of transition and result in democratic national elections, UNSMIL has supported a number of efforts towards building consensus among Libyans and the international community, including the development and implementation of the United Nations Action Plan and, more recently, through the Berlin process and the intra-Libyan three-track initiative to address the Libyan crisis in all its aspects: economic-financial, military-security and political. Throughout these processes the credo has been and will be the same: only a Libyan-led political process will end the conflict in the country and move Libya towards stability. The primary stabilization efforts of UNSMIL in 2019 were aimed at facilitating agreement on the cessation of hostilities, resuming political, security and economic dialogue, and providing support for unified and accountable institutions. In 2021, UNSMIL will build on the gains made from the stabilization process by enhancing support for the resilience of Libyan governance, security and economic and financial institutions in parallel tracks, as outlined and agreed in the Berlin Conference conclusions.
256. In 2019, UNSMIL supported the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections in completing 25 municipal elections in the western and southern regions. In 2020, UNSMIL consultations with the Libyan parties, members of the House of Representatives and the High State Council, as well as other key constituencies, are aimed at deriving consensus on a constitutional basis and the electoral legislation necessary to end the transitional period.

Internal challenge and response

257. The challenge for UNSMIL was the need to reconfigure its approach in the light of the growing fragmentation and the establishment of parallel Libyan institutions across all sectors. The conflict, which reignited in 2019 further to the offensive to seize Tripoli on 4 April 2019 by forces under the Libyan National Army commanded by General Haftar, had a polarizing effect within the already fragmented security institutions and on executive, legislative and economic institutions. This was exhibited in the growing divide in the House of Representatives since the commencement of hostilities in April 2019, with competing membership and agendas being advanced by those in Tubruq in the east and Tripoli in the west. Similarly, while the High National Elections Commission managed to remain a cohesive national institution, authorities in eastern Libya put forward the establishment of a parallel municipal elections committee in an attempt to delegitimize the efforts of the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections as the national body for municipal elections. In response, as part of the three-point plan presented to the Security Council in 2019 by the then Special Representative, the Mission launched the intra-Libyan negotiations initiative

dealing with political, security and economic issues in January 2020 to discuss ceasefire arrangements, transitional institutional arrangements, and economic reform and unification, in order to pave the way for a political solution to the crisis in the country through the provision of technical assistance and advice. UNSMIL will continue to advance institutional capacities to support inclusive democratic national elections to ensure a legitimate and peaceful completion of the political transition process, including by enhancing the capacity of the Commission towards the conduct of a credible and inclusive general election process.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

258. This work is expected to contribute to a united Libyan State that enjoys stability, is governed by legitimate institutions and whose officials are accountable to the Libyan people, which would be demonstrated by the preparedness and readiness, as well as acceptance, of the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections to conduct national and municipal elections, respectively, across the country, with elected officials taking office and elected governments being formed.

Table 40
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launch of the United Nations Action Plan resulted in increased engagement in and commitment among Libyan political stakeholders to the process and the Libyan Political Agreement as the sole political framework to end the transitional period • Draft constitution includes provisions on the management of electoral processes, in accordance with internationally recognized standards, as well as provisions on temporary special measures for the representation of women 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High National Elections Commission completed the voter registration update in Libya, resulting in an increase in registered voters by 1 million, to 2.5 million, and a 3 per cent increase in female registered voters • House of Representatives adopted the constitutional referendum law on 29 November 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal elections held in 25 municipalities in the west and south • Government budget for Commission secured • Commission staff capacity-building and development activities conducted, including on gaining experience from the Tunisian elections 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intra-Libyan economic-financial, military-security and political tracks convene • Ceasefire arrangements agreed and road map adopted for the transitional period until elections are held 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adoption of a constitution that is in line with minimum internationally recognized standards and electoral laws in place for national elections • Electoral management body equipped to conduct (national and municipal) elections, including sufficient government budget

Developing a reconciliation road map to end the transitional period

259. The international Berlin Conference on Libya on 19 January 2020 resulted in a 55-point communiqué committing the participating Member States to refrain from foreign interference in Libya and support

the operationalization of the basket of issues therein, in tandem with a detailed operational plan developed by UNSMIL. In parallel, the Mission launched a three-track intra-Libyan process aimed at addressing the Libyan crisis in its political, military-security and economic-financial aspects. These efforts are intended to unify the international community in support of ending active hostilities in the country and enabling a return to a Libyan-led political process. A comprehensive and sustainable ceasefire and the stabilization of the security situation throughout the country are dependent on the demobilization of armed formations, adherence by all to the United Nations arms embargo and sanctions regime, and the reunification and rebuilding of the State's security, justice and financial institutions. This has to be complemented by Libyan-supported and internationally supported efforts at the local level to foster reconciliation, support transitional justice mechanism and address root causes of conflict.

260. Following the outbreak of hostilities in April 2019, UNSMIL endeavoured to facilitate a ceasefire and create the conditions necessary to resume the political process and to promote respect for international human rights and humanitarian law and accountability. On 29 July 2019, the then Special Representative presented a three-step initiative to end the conflict that involved: (a) the establishment of a truce between the parties; (b) the convening of an international meeting in preparation for a Libyan meeting in order to reach consensus on the need for the respect of the arms embargo and a commitment to non-interference in Libyan affairs; and (c) the convening of the Libyan meeting. A humanitarian truce agreed by the parties led to a temporary reduction in violence and was accompanied by UNSMIL efforts, working with partners, to negotiate prisoner exchanges and assist in other confidence-building measures. UNSMIL engaged in extensive outreach to Libyan constituencies, including in the diaspora, and with support from UNDP organized track-two events to hear views on how to end the violence and to address the root causes of the conflict.

Internal challenge and response

261. The challenges for UNSMIL were the operational and security constraints due to the hostilities triggered by the 4 April 2019 offensive to seize Tripoli, which brought the United Nations-facilitated political process to a halt. This forced UNSMIL to refocus efforts towards de-escalation and stalled activities rather than advancing the unification and reinforcement of political, security and economic matters, as well as the electoral process, envisioned for 2019. In response, the Mission will offer dialogue facilitation to peacefully settle the root causes of the conflict and resume the political process to end Libya's protracted transitional period. In parallel, UNSMIL will continue to assist Libyan authorities and civil society in conducting participatory, inclusive and nationally owned reconciliation conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

262. This work is expected to contribute to a peaceful, orderly and democratic transition process to meet the aspirations of the Libyan people, which would be demonstrated by a sustainable ceasefire into 2021 and functioning and unified institutions delivering on an agreed road map to end the transitional period to consolidate the building of Libyan-led, post-conflict, security sector foundations, including arms control, the clearance of explosive remnants of war and the removal of barriers to freedom of movement. Alongside expanding support in 2020 for a ceasefire, monitoring mechanisms and the unification of State institutions, addressing the enormous challenge of non-State and armed groups, reconciliation and community support mechanisms will be required. Complementing this are essential reintegration initiatives and economic alternatives, the consolidation of interim security arrangements, the rebuilding and strengthening of State security institutions and a transition to a State monopoly on the use of force, both operationally and through capacity-building of legitimate security actors and institutions. Underpinning these activities will be inclusion of the gender perspective and support for women to secure their meaningful participation at all levels and integrate gender equality into the given agendas within the political dialogue.

Table 41
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Justice developed a plan representing the priorities of the Government of National Accord in the justice sector, including the review of key pieces of legislation Discussion on the review of the 2013 transitional justice law initiated among the main stakeholders 3 initiatives were launched for the release of detainees in coordination with judicial authorities or local councils 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local reconciliation initiatives contributed to renewing contacts and reaching reconciliation agreements in southern and western Libya Establishment of the Women's Empowerment and Support Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4 separate bilateral meetings with influential figures convened, aimed at de-escalating intercommunal conflict in the southern city of Murzuq 122 (23 women) participants gathered in three regional meetings to establish a network of local mediators Women's Empowerment and Support Unit held consultative meetings with members of civil society organizations, women's groups, government officials and ministers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intra-Libyan economic-financial, Military-security, and political tracks convene Ceasefire arrangements agreed to 145 individuals, 30 per cent of whom were women, registered as members of UNSMIL/UNDP network of mediators 70 members of the mediator's network, including 21 women, provided 2-week conflict analysis, conflict resolution and mediation training course Universal periodic review process review of Libya's human rights record to take place under the auspices of the Human Rights Council in November 2020 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Constitutional referendum conducted, ending the political transition period Intra-Libyan dialogue outcomes respected, including adoption of a road map for the transitional period until elections held Local mediation and reconciliation processes contribute to national reconciliation

Deliverables

263. Table 42 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 42

United Nations Support Mission in Libya: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	3
1. Report to the Security Council	3	3	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	6	6
2. Meeting of the Security Council	6	6	6	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	32	17	57	22
3. Projects on policing and security joint programme	28	11	55	20
4. Projects related to arms, ammunition management, counter-proliferation and humanitarian mine action	4	6	2	2
5. Electoral regulations for the referendum process, manual on electoral logistics and standard operating procedures for security personnel	—	2	—	2
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	134	145	158	140
6. Seminars and workshops on the political process, confidence-building, constitution-making, legislative and economic reform, electoral management and campaigning, mediation and conflict resolution, prevention of and response to incitement to violence and hatred, media, unification of the army, demobilization of armed groups, and unexploded ordnance disposal training and awareness	134	145	158	140
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices on an inclusive political process, security and economic dialogue, broad support for the implementation of the United Nations Action Plan, establishment of unified and functioning State institutions, and consolidation of governance, security and economic arrangements; and good offices on ceasefire/cessation of hostilities, transition to a State monopoly on the use of force, unification of the military and addressing the problem of non-State armed groups, and strategic security policy and frameworks.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice to rebuild Libya's national polity by addressing roots of grievances; advice on advancing the constitution-making process; advocacy on the implementation of the road map document on the human rights due diligence policy framework; advice on electoral matters and coordinating international electoral assistance to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections; advocacy on the release of individuals detained without a legal basis; advice on the planning and implementing of ceasefire/cessation of hostilities, security arrangements, security frameworks, sectoral reform and development, and demobilization of non-State armed groups; and advice to the Women's Empowerment and Support Unit under the Libyan Presidential Council to put in place a national action plan on women's empowerment and support.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: monitoring missions of the human rights situation with monthly visits to prisons and detention centres.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: media campaign through national television and radio on cessation of hostilities and on reconciliation and social cohesion in Libya; special events to motivate young people and women activists and to promote their key role in peacebuilding and the political process in Libya, including through supporting the "Fasting for Peace" initiative and participating in the Libyan national forum on youth, peace and security; and production of materials for outreach campaigns, including brochures, flyers, billboards, t-shirts and caps.				
External and media relations: strategic media interviews with top-tier international and regional media outlets in Arabic, English and French; engagement with local media in western and eastern Libya, promoting conflict-sensitive reporting; troubleshooting and crisis management pertaining to polarized media campaign aimed at undermining the implementation of the mission's mandate; daily media monitoring reports; and fostering professional ties with major international and local media outlets.				
Digital platforms and multimedia content: daily update of the mission's website in both Arabic and English; and daily feed on digital media platforms in Arabic and English highlighting activities, meetings, events and the implementation of projects and programmes of UNSMIL and United Nations country team.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 43

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	7 249.9	6 196.6	6 296.8	–	100.2
Civilian personnel costs	35 407.4	32 557.9	32 229.3	–	(328.6)
Operational costs	34 897.5	33 686.0	31 765.3	17.9	(1 920.7)
Total (net of staff assessment)	77 554.8	72 440.5	70 291.4	17.9	(2 149.1)

Table 44

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff					Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2020	1	2	—	7	13	35	29	2	89	120	1	210	14	84	6	314	
Proposed 2021	1	2	—	7	13	35	29	2	89	120	1	210	14	84	6	314	
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	

264. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNSMIL amount to \$70,291,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 230 United Nations Guard Unit personnel (\$6,296,800), salaries and related costs (\$32,229,300) for 210 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 7 D-1, 13 P-5, 35 P-4, 29 P-3, 2 P-2, 120 Field Service and 1 General Service), 98 national positions (14 National Professional Officer and 84 Local level), 6 United Nations Volunteers, and 7 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$31,765,300), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$479,800), official travel (\$1,244,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$18,764,600) ground transportation (\$358,000), air operations (\$4,292,200), communications and information technology (\$2,622,600), medical (\$288,600), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,714,700).
265. In 2021, it is proposed that the following changes be made to the organizational structure in line with the findings and recommendations of a review of UNSMIL to implement the supply chain management programme, including the need to further standardize mission support structures:
- (a) Renaming of the Central Warehouse and Distribution Section to the Life Support/Logistics Section;
 - (b) Renaming of the Centralized Requisition Unit to the Centralized Warehouse and Requisition Unit.
266. In 2021, it is proposed that the following changes be made to the staffing complement:

Office of the Chief of Staff:

- (a) Reassignment of one position of Programme Officer (P-4) as a Coordination Officer (P-4) in the Office of the Chief of Staff, to provide a dedicated capacity for the effective coordination and efficient integration of activities with United Nations entities in Libya;

Centralized Warehouse and Requisition Unit:

- (b) Redeployment of three positions, comprising two Supply Assistants (1 Field Service and 1 Local level) from the Life Support/Logistics Section, and one Property Management Assistant (Field Service) from the Property Management Section, to the Centralized Warehouse and Requisition Unit.
267. A vacancy rate of 17.5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2019. Vacancy rates of 64 per cent and 31.5 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local Level staff, respectively, taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2019. Vacancy rates of 33 and 42.9 per cent have been applied to the estimates for United Nations Volunteers and government-provided personnel, respectively, based on the actual average vacancy rates. The estimates for United Nations Guard Unit personnel are based on the assumption of full deployment.
268. The decrease in requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable to the decrease in civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of higher vacancy rates for national staff and government-provided personnel, based on the actual average incumbency in 2019, compared with the rates applied in the approved 2020 budget; and lower requirements in operational costs, mainly in: (a) facilities and infrastructure, resulting from lower requirements for rental of premises; (b) communications and information technology, resulting from lower requirements for maintenance of equipment and communications support services, in line with new contractual rates; and (c) official travel, resulting from lower requirements for within-mission travel owing to the redeployment of UNSMIL personnel from Tunis to Tripoli. The reduced requirements are offset in part by increased requirements for military and police personnel costs, resulting from higher costs for emplacement, repatriation and rotation from the country of origin of the United Nations Guard Unit to Libya, based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

269. In 2020, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are any projected for 2021 for UNSMIL.

9. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

(\$64,074,500)

Foreword

Nearly four years after the signing of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, between the Government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP), Colombia continues to make progress in consolidating peace. With the support of the United Nations, more than 13,000 former combatants laid down their weapons and began their transition to civilian life in 2017. Today, commitment to the peace process and participation in reintegration programmes, including educational, employment and productive activities, remains high. FARC-EP transformed into a political party, the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC), and in October 2019, former combatants participated in local and departmental elections for the first time. The Government has made advances in implementing development programmes with a territorial focus, envisioned in the Final Agreement as a mechanism to bring development and investment to conflict-affected areas. Meanwhile, the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition has embarked on its responsibilities to ensure the rights of victims and foster reconciliation.

The implementation of the Final Agreement has laid the foundations for these and many other positive transformations. In my conversations with recently elected mayors and governors, they have reiterated their interest in seizing the opportunities presented by the implementation of the Final Agreement to bring peace and prosperity to long-neglected rural areas. Civil society organizations, social leaders and local communities have consistently expressed similar sentiments, a reflection of a widening consensus that the achievements of the Final Agreement have improved the lives of Colombians and that these gains must be preserved and – importantly – built upon.

Throughout this process, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia has provided firm support to both parties, in particular in the implementation of sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement related to reintegration and security guarantees. In addition to verifying progress in implementation, the Mission helps to facilitate dialogue between the Government and FARC, including in the framework of tripartite coordination mechanisms. Our teams deployed throughout the country act as trusted facilitators, proposing solutions to local-level implementation challenges. In my visits to the field, I am consistently moved by the words of appreciation for the work of our colleagues that I hear from communities, which have borne the brunt of the violence and have the most to gain from the consolidation of peace.

Much more remains to be done. Illegal armed groups and criminal structures continue to victimize communities and attack social leaders and former combatants, in particular in rural areas characterized by poverty, a lack of State presence and the proliferation of illicit economies. The Final Agreement provides a framework to tackle many of these issues, including illicit crop substitution programmes, an institutional architecture to combat impunity and dismantle criminal groups, and development programmes with a territorial focus to bring investment to areas ravaged by the conflict. For these reasons, I remain convinced that the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement is a solid route for Colombia to consolidate its peacebuilding efforts. The Verification Mission will continue to stand by the parties and the Colombian people as they continue to strive for peace and progress through the implementation of the historic Final Agreement.

(Signed) Carlos **Ruiz Massieu**
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

270. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia was mandated by the Security Council, at the request of the Government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) guerrilla organization, to verify two key aspects of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, adopted in 2016 by the Government and FARC-EP: (a) the reintegration of FARC-EP members into political, economic and social life (section 3.2 of the Agreement); and (b) the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures for ex-combatants and comprehensive security and protection programmes for the communities and organizations in the territories (section 3.4 of the Agreement). The mandate is defined in Council resolutions [2366 \(2017\)](#), [2377 \(2017\)](#) and [2381 \(2017\)](#), and was subsequently renewed by the Council in its resolutions [2435 \(2018\)](#) and [2487 \(2019\)](#).
271. The Verification Mission works closely with the two parties, including in the framework of the relevant verification bodies established under the Final Agreement, in particular, the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission on Security Guarantees, as well as with members of the United Nations country team, local and departmental authorities and civil society. The work of the Verification Mission will remain of significance in 2021 as the parties continue to implement the Final Agreement and rely on the Mission’s verification activities as an essential support for the reintegration process and the implementation of measures to extend security and protection to vulnerable communities, social leaders and former combatants.

Programme of work

Objective

272. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration and security guarantees.

Strategy

273. To contribute to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration, the Verification Mission will continue to apply a proactive approach to verification, which includes advocacy, good offices and close engagement, including through the coordination of and participation in dedicated tripartite mechanisms, with the Government of Colombia, the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) and key national, regional and local interlocutors, including civil society and the private sector, as well as through its support for the implementation of productive initiatives, in addition to its regular verification and reporting activities. This work is expected to result in increased trust between the parties to the Final Agreement, the overall preservation of the collective nature of the reintegration process, the resolution of concrete issues impeding successful reintegration such as pending accreditations, the promotion of gender-sensitive reintegration and the active participation of women former combatants, and the provision by the Government of more sustainable solutions for former combatants residing inside and outside of former territorial areas for training and reintegration, including through the active engagement of newly elected local and regional administrations. The Verification Mission’s engagement contributed to ensuring, among

others, the effective political participation of former FARC-EP combatants and the FARC party in the first local elections since the signing of the Final Agreement; the acceleration of the approval and disbursement of funds of collective reintegration initiatives; and the smooth transition of the former territorial areas for training and reintegration beyond August 2019, including through the adoption of legal instruments to allow for the continuation of basic services and security schemes, accompanying visits of the National Reintegration Council and relevant stakeholders to former territorial areas for training and reintegration, facilitating the development of tools and technical support to the gender working group of the National Reintegration Council, and calling for the implementation of strategies to search for permanent solutions in terms of housing and access to land for former combatants.

274. To contribute to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning security guarantees, the Verification Mission will continue to apply a proactive approach to verification, which entails advocacy, good offices, support for and the coordination of tripartite and territorial outreach mechanisms, including both government entities responsible for ensuring the security and access to justice for former combatants, FARC party members and social leaders, and technical and logistical support, in addition to its regular verification and reporting activities. This work is expected to result in enhanced State capacity and responsiveness to better prevent and investigate attacks against former combatants and social leaders, as well as increased trust and understanding between the parties regarding security and protection mechanisms, taking into consideration the specific needs of women, children and former combatants of ethnic origin, alongside those of communities at risk. Past results in this area, derived from the Mission's advocacy and good offices, include enhanced engagement by government entities in charge of prevention, protection and investigation, as well as other key stakeholders such as FARC representatives and civil society actors, to promote and implement the provisions of section 3.4 of the Final Agreement; the expansion of tripartite coordination mechanisms for strengthened follow-up and monitoring of (a) protection measures for former combatants and FARC party members, including specific measures or women, especially during local and regional elections, through the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism, and (b) access to justice and the promotion of investigations of cases against former combatants and FARC party members, through the tripartite working group on investigations; and the implementation of specific programmes regarding protection and investigation through the establishment of local FARC liaison officers tasked with strengthening confidence and trust between the parties in more sensitive areas regarding FARC security guarantees.

External factors for 2021

275. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumption:
 - (a) Continued cross-party and international support for the close engagement of the United Nations and the Verification Mission in the peace process;
 - (b) Political parties initiate new political agendas that may have an impact in favour of or against the peace process.
276. The Verification Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Its gender team will work closely with all the Mission's components, both at headquarters and in the field, to ensure an adequate implementation of the Mission's gender directive. The gender team will provide guidance and support to the verification teams to ensure that the specific needs of female former FARC-EP members are fully incorporated into programme design, implementation and monitoring, with a focus on the security guarantees for women social leaders.
277. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Verification Mission will continue to undertake engagement and liaison with international, national and subnational actors supporting the implementation of the Final Agreement. At the international level, the Mission will continue to

engage closely with the diplomatic community and regional organizations to identify synergies and areas of mutual interest and support in peace implementation and verification. At the national and subnational levels, the Mission will maintain its extensive engagement with community, religious, youth, women's and ethnic organizations, as well as with the private sector and education institutions. In Colombia, where the civil society sector is extremely developed and highly engaged in the peace process, this engagement and cooperation with other entities remains an essential and invaluable aspect of the Mission's work. The Mission will also continue to strengthen its relationships with departmental and local authorities, given that they are playing an increasingly active role in the peace process, in particular as they gain more responsibilities in the reintegration process and security guarantees for communities.

278. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Verification Mission will continue to work closely with the United Nations country team and the resident coordinator's office. The work of the United Nations country team will be guided by the recently adopted United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework. Through comprehensive coordination in joint mechanisms at different levels, the Mission will strive to encourage consistent action, messages and conflict analysis across peace and security and development pillars. These close working relationships exist not only at the national level, where the Mission participates in the regular coordination meetings of the United Nations country team, but also at the local level, where the staff work closely with the teams deployed by different agencies, funds and programmes. Moreover, in the spirit of sustaining peace and contributing to long-term stability, the Mission, leveraging its engagement and understanding of reintegration processes of former FARC-EP members, coordinated closely with the United Nations country team as the latter prepared project proposals to the Peacebuilding Fund.

Evaluation activities

279. In 2019, as part of the Verification Mission's continuous self-assessment process, an internal self-evaluation exercise was conducted aimed at identifying whether its territorial deployment was adequate, considering the changes in its operational environment, related mainly to the evolving geography of reintegration and the changes in security risk patterns concerning former combatants, communities and social leaders. Moreover, reporting lines between mission headquarters and field offices were reviewed as part of the process, as were existing analysis and reporting capacities in Bogotá.
280. The findings of the evaluation referenced above have been considered for the programme plan for 2021. One of the main findings of the internal evaluation exercise was that, while the Verification Mission is, in general, adequately deployed across the country, following a reassessment of its operational footprint undertaken in 2018, there is a need to establish a regional office in Cali and close the subregional office in Buenaventura, as well as two local team sites close to former territorial areas for training and reintegration (Charras and Filipinas). Considering the delegation of authority, regional administrative officers in field offices will now report directly to heads of office. In addition, the evaluation suggested a need to streamline the Mission's reporting and analysis capacities, which it is planning to address in 2021 by forming a newly merged reporting and analysis unit, as well as new direct reporting lines between heads of regional offices, with the Chief Field Coordination Officer as first reporting officer and the Director of Verification as second reporting officer.
281. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

282. A planned result for 2019, which is that registered former combatants of FARC-EP are receiving financial support in accordance with the provisions of the Final Agreement, as referred to in the

report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved, as evidenced by the successful disbursement of the normalization allowance to 98 per cent of the former combatants accredited and the effective provision of the monthly allowance to 89 per cent of accredited former combatants. The results in terms of former combatants who have received 8 million Colombian pesos in financial support, equivalent to approximately \$2,370, for productive projects, has been achieved in part, with 25 per cent of the targeted 80 per cent of former combatants accredited benefiting from collective and individual productive projects.

283. A planned result for 2019, which is the effective establishment of the agreed institutional arrangements for implementation of provisions related to security guarantees, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.3](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the adoption and implementation of security and protection policies for former FARC-EP combatants and FARC party candidates by the subdirectorates of the National Protection Unit, as well as the creation and expansion at a territorial level of the Special Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General. However, relevant implementation bodies such as the National Commission on Security Guarantees need to take further steps in order to achieve their full operationalization and effectively address challenges in the implementation of security guarantees.

Programme performance in 2019

Successful participation of former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army members in local and regional elections

284. In 2019, the former FARC-EP guerrilla organization took an important step in its transition to a political party, as more than 300 candidates were endorsed by FARC party, and other former combatants ran under the banner of other political parties, during the first local and regional elections since the signing of the Final Agreement. Their laying down of arms and the implementation of the peace process also had a direct positive impact on Colombian democracy, given that the country registered an all-time high voter turnout, owing mainly to the more secure conditions for citizens to vote, including in places where it was previously difficult, owing to security problems associated with the conflict.
285. Drawing on experiences and lessons learned from the 2018 presidential and legislative elections, guaranteeing solid grounds for former combatants' political participation was fundamental in obtaining these results. Therefore, the Verification Mission recommended a strengthening and expanding of timely collaboration among electoral and government authorities to overcome obstacles both regarding FARC candidates' security guarantees and former combatants' ability to vote. Through the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism, co-led by the Mission, the national police and the subdirectorates of the National Protection Unit, which is composed of former combatants, awareness-raising workshops were held in all departments with FARC candidates, to inform them of protection road maps and security measures put in place by the Government of Colombia to guarantee their security during the electoral period. In addition, the Mission supported electoral authorities in identifying challenges regarding former combatants' ability to register and vote in their current places of residence, given that many of them had moved outside the former territorial areas for training and reintegration during 2019. Special monitoring mechanisms and follow-up were given to the women FARC candidates to ensure their full access to and participation in the elections.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

286. This work contributed to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning security guarantees, as demonstrated by the timely deployment and response of State institutions to guarantee the rights of former FARC-EP combatants and the newly created political party FARC, to fully participate in the local and regional election without any significant incidents against them on election day. More than 300 FARC candidates ran for office at local and regional levels, and a more dispersed population of former combatants living outside the former 24 territorial areas for training and reintegration participated in the elections. Sufficient conditions were met to guarantee the former armed group's political participation and allow for Colombian citizens to vote freely. A total of 12 candidates, including 2 women, were elected for different offices, including 3 for mayor. Two of the candidates elected as mayors were former FARC-EP combatants endorsed by other parties.

Table 45

Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• Laying down of arms process and creation of the People's Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) party	• First-time voting for former combatants in presidential and legislative elections	• First-time participation of FARC party in local and regional elections

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Crucial role of reintegration areas for the consolidation of institutional presence in rural Colombia

287. Mid-August 2019 marked an important turning point in the implementation of the reintegration process: two years after the process had been initiated, key agreed-upon elements of the "early reintegration" phase were coming to an end. The legal status of the territorial areas for training and reintegration concluded, which meant that utilities, rent, basic services, including health and education, and the arrangements by military and police to protect more than 3,000 former combatants residing in all 24 of these areas were expiring. Those provisions were all fundamental for the overall success of the reintegration of former FARC-EP members into civilian life and for the consolidation of a sustained and integrated presence of State institutions in remote rural areas. Their impending expiration called for swift decisions by the Government of Colombia. The Verification Mission accompanied and verified the implementation of those arrangements in consultation with all parties to help to guard against the reversals of gains made in reintegration efforts and sustain and expand the presence of relevant State institutions in those areas.
288. Early in 2019, the Verification Mission advocated before the Government of Colombia and FARC to adequately prepare for the expiration. The Government assessed the conditions for the integration of all territorial areas for training and reintegration into local administrative arrangements and the Mission advised the parties on setting up a tripartite mechanism to follow-up on the process, develop an outreach strategy for former FARC-EP members and undertake a series of visits to 11 territorial areas for training and reintegration deemed to have obstacles to their consolidation in their current locations. The aim was to help to reduce uncertainty and to reassure former combatants, host communities and local authorities, all of whom had expressed fears that a discontinuation of the territorial areas for training and reintegration would have a negative impact on their security and

social and economic conditions. In preparation for the visits, the Mission also advocated the development of guidelines to ensure that a gender approach was applied to help to identify the specific needs and respect the interests of women former combatants. Mayors from all municipalities hosting territorial areas for training and reintegration expressed support for the continuation of those areas, noting that their municipalities were benefiting from the economic activities generated by their presence and the perimeter security provided by the security forces deployed in those remote locations. At the same time, the Mission advocated the adoption of a legal instrument to clarify key matters related to the extension of services beyond 15 August.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

289. This work contributed to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration, as demonstrated by the adoption of legal instruments granting the extension of the former territorial areas for training and reintegration, including services and protection schemes, and by the launch of the process to purchase land to provide permanent solutions in former territorial areas for training and reintegration. Accompanied by the Verification Mission, representatives of the Government of Colombia and FARC visited the former territorial areas for training and reintegration facing challenges. All visits were carried out in a constructive spirit and resulted in a series of agreed-upon road maps with details on how the transition of each territorial area for training and reintegration would be carried out, including the identification of housing alternatives and suitable land plots to be purchased by the Government. Meanwhile, although the “consolidation” of the former territorial areas for training and reintegration would be dealt with on a case-by-case basis, the Government had continued to make progress in finding permanent solutions for land, housing, security and services for all areas, be they relocated or in their current locations. As a result of those combined efforts, on 9 September, the Government adopted a decree granting the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization responsibility for administering the goods, services and food supplies for the reintegration of former combatants in locations and for a period to be determined by the Government. The decree also conferred on the Agency the responsibility to administer the sites in which the public security forces were located and to guarantee security around the former territorial areas for training and reintegration and the sites to which some of them would be relocated.

Table 46
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• 26 territorial areas for training and reintegration are created, for a period of 2 years	• Social services and security mechanisms available in territorial areas for training and reintegration benefit former combatants and local communities	• Government confirms extension of rent, services and security for all territorial areas for training and reintegration during transition and begins process to purchase land and identify housing alternatives to provide permanent solutions

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned results for 2021

Strengthened investigations into attacks against former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army combatants, social leaders and communities

290. Although the local and regional elections were held without any significant incidents affecting former FARC-EP combatants or the political party FARC, 2019 was the most violent year for former combatants registered since the signing of the Final Agreement. A total of 77 homicides of former combatants were reported in 2019, compared with 65 in 2018 and 31 in 2017. The majority of these killings were concentrated outside the former territorial areas for training and reintegration, in rural areas where there is a convergence of weak State presence, illegal economies and poverty. Since the laying down of arms process in 2017, these areas have also been progressively occupied by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations, causing increased insecurity and affecting communities, including former combatants and their families.
291. The Verification Mission will continue to work closely with State authorities and FARC, both at the national and regional levels, to strengthen an effective State response and investigations into the criminal organizations behind the attacks against former combatants. One important element continues to be the creation of tripartite working groups on the investigation into attacks against former combatants, co-led by the Mission, FARC and the Special Investigation Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, to reinforce trust-building capacities among the parties, including tools to strengthen access to justice for former combatants and improve risk analysis of potential threats, in response to the above challenge. Likewise, through advocacy and outreach activities with key stakeholders, the Mission will continue to encourage the National Commission on Security Guarantees to meet more regularly and develop a policy to dismantle criminal organizations and enhance the security of both former FARC-EP combatants, social leaders and rural communities. Furthermore, the Mission will continue to advocate the adequate participation of women in the Commission.

Internal challenge and response

292. The challenge for the Verification Mission was to maintain the capacity to closely follow up on and verify the increasing amount of cases reported against former combatants, in order to identify the main threats and violent patterns affecting the reintegration process and overall peace implementation. In response, the Mission has identified several actions that will improve the verification and in-depth trend analysis of the attacks against former combatants, such as strengthening the tripartite working groups on a regional level to strengthen investigations into and analysis of the criminal organizations carrying out attacks; increasing former combatants' access to justice through specific programs and capacity-building workshops in prioritized areas; constructing and implementing an internal data system to facilitate follow-up; and developing a holistic analysis of the threats and patterns behind the attacks.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

293. This work is expected to contribute to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning security guarantees, which would be demonstrated by increased investigations into and successful judicial prosecution by the Office of the Attorney General against the criminal organizations behind the attacks, including both material and intellectual authors, which are affecting both the reintegration process and overall peace implementation.

Table 47
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthened tripartite mechanisms and prioritization of investigations into the attacks against former FARC-EP combatants • Establishment of a regional peace promoters programme to encourage in-depth analysis and investigations regarding the attacks against former combatants 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expansion of investigations into and increased rates of successful judicial prosecutions of the criminal organizations behind the attacks, including both material and intellectual authors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Progress in dismantling criminal organizations affecting the reintegration process and peace implementation, through the implementation of public policies

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Consolidating support for collective reintegration

294. Two years after the finalization of the laying down of arms of FARC-EP, the vast majority of former FARC-EP members continue to make efforts to reintegrate into civilian life and remain committed to the peace process. Notwithstanding the many challenges, including the emergence of a dissident group, former FARC-EP members and the FARC party as a whole have reaffirmed their commitment to the peace agreement. Former combatants are actively engaged in their social, economic and political reintegration, both in former territorial areas for training and reintegration and in new settlements. Even if the 24 territorial areas for training and reintegration continue to play a critical role in maintaining cohesion and facilitating the provision of key services for some 3,000 former combatants and members of surrounding communities, a significant number of them have decided to carry out their reintegration in new settlements. In November 2019, the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization reported that 9,225 former combatants, roughly 70 per cent of those accredited, were residing outside territorial areas for training and reintegration, roughly one quarter of whom were residing in urban contexts and three quarters in semi-rural and rural settings.
295. The changing nature of the reintegration landscape therefore poses additional challenges. The Verification Mission will continue to work closely with both the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization and FARC, as well as with regional and local level actors, to ensure that all former combatants, regardless of their locations, continue to receive the benefits derived from the Final Agreement, including basic services, income-generating opportunities, programmes and services adapted to the specific needs of women and those with special needs, and security and protection through the agreed-upon mechanisms. This includes strong advocacy efforts before the newly elected mayors and governors to promote the inclusion of reintegration policies into their development programmes, which will be instrumental in ensuring the sustainability of the reintegration process, as they gradually take on increasing responsibilities over the former territorial areas for training and reintegration. Similarly, support will continue to be provided to increase internal FARC cohesion and stronger linkages between its leadership and former combatants in the field.

Internal challenge and response

296. The challenge for the Verification Mission was to maintain the capacity to monitor and verify the effective implementation of reintegration policies that uphold the collective nature of the process while an increasing number of former combatants is scattered across the country. In response, the Mission will strive to adapt its verification strategies at the local level, beginning with an in-depth analysis of the new geography of reintegration, prioritizing key geographic areas to verify, increasing local teams' mobility and strengthening its proactive verification to promote greater outreach and improved provision of services, security and productive opportunities for former combatants living outside the territorial areas for training and reintegration. A collective approach to reintegration is intended to generate greater opportunities to ensure the sustainability of the process in the long term. The Mission will redouble its efforts to bridge the gaps between the national and local levels through regular contact with relevant actors, government entities, FARC leadership and former FARC-EP members, including through good offices, the coordination of tripartite mechanisms and logistical support, as needed.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

297. This work is expected to contribute to the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration, which would be demonstrated by the approval and effective implementation of additional collective productive initiatives by the National Reintegration Council, with the necessary support in terms of land, access to markets, credit, technical assistance and support for former combatant cooperatives, including for former FARC-EP members residing outside the former territorial areas for training and reintegration.

Table 48
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• Increase in the number of State-sponsored collective reintegration projects for former combatants, reflecting progress in the socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants inside and outside former territorial areas of training and reintegration	• Significant increase in the number of State-sponsored collective reintegration projects for former combatants, fostering the consolidation of socioeconomic integration of former combatants throughout Colombia	• All State-sponsored collective reintegration projects take into consideration elements to ensure their sustainability, including access to markets, land and credit, technical assistance, strengthening of former combatants' productive associations and ensuring the active participation of women

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

298. Table 49 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 49

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	4	4	4	4
1. Report of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	4	4	4	4
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Publications (number of publications)	–	–	–	2
2. Thematic reports on security guarantees	–	–	–	2
Technical materials (number of materials)	1	1	1	1
3. Verification manual, including a gender-sensitive verification guide	1	1	1	1
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices to implement provisions in sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement; good offices to promote problem-solving, confidence-building and unity of effort in response to implementation challenges in the field; good offices and advocacy on the establishment and continuity of spaces and forums that bring together relevant counterparts and stakeholders for productive dialogue and decision-making; and good offices and advocacy on visits from key stakeholders to reincorporation areas and other relevant locations where former combatants are developing productive projects as part of their reintegration process.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice to identify, prevent or resolve difficulties and challenges in the conditions for increased political participation by the FARC party, reintegration of former combatants, improving security and protection measures and conditions, and increased participation in the implementation of the Final Agreement.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: fact-finding missions to verify the reintegration process and security conditions in field locations, as well as to follow up on specific cases related to sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: tripartite database of transition to legality (Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, FARC, Verification Mission); verification reporting system at local, regional and national levels (phase 1: repository, phase 2: forms automation, phase 3: text-mining tools); advance in the implementation of peace agreement follow-up tool at local, regional and national levels; databases and information system for indicators related to verification context; database of cases against former FARC-EP combatants, relatives, political party members, social leaders, and of ex-combatant detentions; and tripartite productive projects database (Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, FARC, Verification Mission).				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: information materials for former FARC-EP combatants and communities explaining the progress in the Verification Mission's mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement; outreach programme to increase the visibility of the reintegration process and security guarantees measures; workshops with local communities and former combatants on reintegration process and security guarantees progress; outreach programmes during high-level visits to Colombia (Secretary-General and Security Council); production and dissemination/broadcasting of thematic videos in support of mission engagement areas; events to promote reconciliation between ex-combatants and local communities; brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, inserts, flyers, profiles and promotional material on the Mission's mandate and developments; outreach programme through radio and television broadcasting to ensure that relevant information from the Mission is shared widely through local, regional and national media; and partnership with the United Nations country team and United Nations information centre to shared relevant information on the progress of the Mission's mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement.				
External and media relations: conferences with key media partners directors and editors at the local, regional and national levels; press conferences, press briefings and written summaries to share with external partners, as relevant; journalists' and private sector visits to reintegration areas and former combatants' productive projects; and quarterly high-level briefings on the Verification Mission report with journalists at mission headquarters in Bogotá and in the regional offices.				

Category and subcategory	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
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Digital platforms and multimedia content: create, develop and disseminate information related to the Mission's mandate and developments to local, national and international media, as well as through the social media channels available and United Nations information platforms; special reports and analysis on big data from Mission's social media channels (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) to help to improve dissemination of mission activities; and specific campaigns and products for particular social media platforms to show the impact of the Mission's work.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 50

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	4 014.4	4 063.4	4 125.1	–	61.7
Civilian personnel costs	34 910.7	32 629.5	33 223.5	–	594.0
Operational costs	29 379.0	24 634.6	26 725.9	–	2 091.3
Total (net of staff assessment)	68 304.1	61 327.5	64 074.5	–	2 747.0

Table 51

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers		
Approved 2020	1	1	1	6	22	38	46	1	116	41	1	158	77	80	131	446	
Proposed 2021	1	1	1	6	22	38	46	1	116	45	1	162	77	80	132	451	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4	–	4	–	–	1	5	

299. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for the Verification Mission amount to \$64,074,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 120 military observers (\$4,125,100), salaries and common staff costs (\$33,223,500) for the continuation of 158 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 6 D-1, 22 P-5, 38 P-4, 46 P-3, 1 P-2, 41 Field Service and 1 General Service), 157 national positions (77 National Professional Officer and 80 Local level) and 131 United Nations Volunteers, and the proposed establishment of 5 positions (4 Field Service and 1 United Nations Volunteer), as well as operational costs (\$26,725,900), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$271,700), official travel (\$1,993,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$6,672,000), ground transportation (\$2,916,400), air operations (\$7,100,800), marine operations (\$325,500), communications and information technology (\$5,460,500), medical (\$479,300), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,506,400).

300. In an effort to further enhance mandate delivery and streamline functions, it is proposed that the following changes be made to the organizational structure in 2021:
- (a) Renaming of the Verification Office to the Verification Division;
 - (b) Renaming of the Information Fusion and Analysis and Reporting Section to the Reporting and Analysis Unit;
 - (c) Merging of the Acquisition Planning and Requisition Unit and the Contracts Management Team into an Acquisition Management Unit;
 - (d) Renaming of the Movement Control Team to the Movement Control Unit;
 - (e) Renaming of the Close Protection Team to the Protection Services Unit;
 - (f) Renaming of the Operations Unit to the Logistics Operations Unit;
 - (g) Renaming of the Strategic Communications and Public Information Section to the Strategic Communications and Public Information Unit;
 - (h) Renaming of the Legal Office to the Legal Team;
 - (i) Renaming of the Training Unit to the Training Team;
 - (j) Renaming of the Conduct and Discipline Office to the Conduct and Discipline Team.
301. As part of the changes to the organizational structure, it is proposed that the following changes be made to the reporting lines in 2021:

Reporting and Analysis Unit:

- (a) It is proposed that the reporting line of this Unit be changed from the Office of the Chief of Staff to the Office of the Special Representative, in order to strengthen the Special Representative's political liaison and decision-making through the provision of constant and direct political analysis and context information. Increased coordination and information exchange between the Reporting and Analysis Unit and the Special Representative will enrich discussions and thinking in the implementation of the Verification Mission's mandate;

Conduct and Discipline Team:

- (b) It is proposed that the reporting line of this Team be changed from the Office of the Deputy Special Representative to the Office of the Special Representative, to strengthen accountability and strategic guidance;

Mission Support Division:

- (c) The Verification Mission derives its current mandate from Security Council resolution [2487 \(2019\)](#). The Deputy Special Representative in Colombia plays an essential management role in ensuring that the effective operational and managerial functioning of the Mission reflects the Special Representative's vision. The Deputy Special Representative ensures the overall coherence and coordination of mission operations and provides high-level support to the Special Representative. In discharging the managerial function, the Deputy Special Representative oversees the work of all mission operational components, including mission support, field coordination, training, mission planning and the Joint Operations Centre. The Special Representative, under his delegated authority, has decided to further delegate strategic operational issues to the Deputy Special Representative, while the day-to-day operational matters fall under the purview of the Chief of Mission Support. In an effort to ensure a more coherent approach and to adapt the reporting lines to the Delegation of Authority framework decided by the Special Representative, the Chief of Mission Support will report to the Special Representative through the Deputy Special Representative. The Deputy Special Representative

will henceforth serve as Chief of Mission Support's first reporting officer and the Special Representative will continue his supervision as the second reporting officer.

302. The Verification Mission continues to assess and adapt its field footprint to better align with the operating environment. On the basis of the evaluation of the Mission's current territorial deployment, some team sites were closed in 2020 with the related training and reintegration activities assumed by nearby existing regional and local teams or by regional and local teams planned for opening. The Mission will continue the reconfiguration of the field footprint for the effective and efficient delivery of its mandate.
303. In 2021, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement: the establishment of five positions, the reassignment of four positions, and the redeployment of eight positions, as detailed below:

Verification Division:

- (a) Redeployment of six positions, comprising 1 Liaison Officer (P-4), 2 Liaison Officer (P-3), 1 Liaison Officer (NPO), 1 Public Information Officer (National Professional Officer), 1 Administrative Assistant (Local level) in between regional offices, suboffices and local sites;

Protection Services Unit:

- (b) Establishment of four positions of Close Protection Officer (Field Service), in line with the personal security risk management plan of the Verification Mission, which requires a complement of eight Close Protection Officer positions and two Drivers in support of the Special Representative throughout the mission area, and to ensure proper coverage of shifts and rotation of Close Protection Officers;
- (c) Reassignment of one position of Team Assistant (Local level) from the Administrative, Identification and Fire Safety Team, as a Driver (Local level) in the Protection Services Unit, in line with the requirements identified in the personal security risk management plan mentioned above;

Security Section:

- (d) Redeployment of two Field Security Assistant (Local level) positions in between regional offices, suboffices and local sites;

Human Resources Unit:

- (e) Establishment of one position of Support Officer (United Nations Volunteers) to comply with the conditions of the memorandum of understanding signed between the United Nations and the United Nations Volunteers programme, which establishes that two United Nations Volunteers Support Officers are required on the basis of the total number of United Nations Volunteers. The Mission currently has only one Support Officer;
- (f) Reassignment of one position of Travel Officer (National Professional Officer) as a Human Resources Officer (National Professional Officer), to improve the response to the end clients and the effectiveness of the recruitment team;

Financial Resourcing, Performance and Risk Management Unit:

- (g) Reassignment of one position of Senior Staff Assistant (Field Service) in the Office of the Special Representative as a Finance and Budget Assistant (Field Service) in the Financial Resourcing, Performance and Risk Management Unit to strengthen the Unit's capacity in monitoring budgetary performance and ensuring the proper recording of transactions and reporting of expenditures to managers on a regular basis;

Acquisition Management Unit:

- (h) Reassignment of one position of Contracts Management Officer (P-4) as an Acquisition Planning Officer (P-4) to provide a focal point for acquisition planning and contract performance, which facilitates communications between the Verification Mission, the Global Service Centre and Headquarters.
304. A vacancy rate of 17 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing international positions, taking into account the average vacancy rates in 2019, while a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for four positions proposed for establishment in 2021. A vacancy rate of 12 per cent has been applied to the estimates for national positions, taking into account the average vacancy rates in 2019. A vacancy rate of 1 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international United Nations Volunteers and an assumption of full incumbency has been applied to the estimates for continuing national United Nations Volunteers positions based on the average vacancy rates in 2019. A vacancy rate of 3 per cent has been applied to the estimates for military observers based on the average vacancy rates in 2019.
305. The increase in requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to increased operational costs under: (a) facilities and infrastructure, due mainly to the increase of rental costs of office premises and the opening of new offices, including the establishment of durable camps to increase the ability of the Verification Mission to cover large areas of terrain; (b) air operations, due mainly to the increased requirements for rental and operation, including additional requirements related to the repositioning and painting of the aircraft because the current contract with the service provider is expiring in 2020; (c) official travel, due to the increased need to travel within the mission area to new office locations; and (d) other supplies, services and equipment, due mainly to increased requirements for freight and related costs related to increased standard rates, and other services. The increased requirements are further attributable to civilian personnel costs owing mainly to the proposed establishment of five positions (4 Field Service and 1 United Nations Volunteers) and the full application of the updated United Nations Volunteers standard costs.

Extrabudgetary resources

306. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for the Verification Mission for 2021.

10. United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

(\$49,037,200)

Foreword

The United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) brings together a variety of personnel, including military, police and civilian personnel, to support the Yemeni parties in implementing the Stockholm Agreement, in particular the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement), reached in Sweden on 13 December 2018. Since its establishment, the Mission has focused on maintaining an appropriate footprint in a challenging operational environment to ensure the effective implementation of its mandate.

UNMHA has maintained dialogue between the warring Yemeni parties and continues to explore different ways to keep the momentum towards the full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement and related Security Council resolutions. This sustained engagement with the parties over the past year has resulted in the finalization of agreements on the technical details of a phased redeployment of forces and demilitarization of the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, which provide a critical commercial and humanitarian artery sustaining the lives of millions of people in Yemen. Simultaneously, UNMHA has worked with liaison officers of both parties to bring about a real-time de-escalation in the numerous incidents that could otherwise have led to an escalation in fighting on the front lines around Hudaydah. The Mission has also supported the establishment of five joint observation posts with liaison officers of both parties, located at positions on the front lines, directly contributing to local de-escalation in areas of previous high tension. Owing to this reduction in violence since its deployment, UNMHA has been recognized as a trusted and impartial enabler for dialogue for both parties.

UNMHA continues to engage closely with United Nations entities and international non-governmental organizations operating in Hudaydah Governorate, leveraging its position to increase space to operate for humanitarian actors. In addition, the Mission collaborates with other partners that are instrumental to the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, namely, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism.

UNMHA leadership is grateful for the support that it continues to receive from the Security Council, the wide range of partners across the United Nations system and the international community. The Mission's work would not be possible without the high level of dedication and professionalism of its staff, who continue to perform their work in a challenging operational environment.

(Signed) Lieutenant General (retired) Abhijit **Guha**
Head of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement and
Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

307. The United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) is responsible for supporting the parties to the Stockholm Agreement (S/2018/1134, annex) in implementing the provisions of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement). The mandate was defined in Security Council resolution 2452 (2019) for an initial period of six months and was extended to 15 January 2020 in resolution 2481 (2019) and, most recently, to 15 July 2020 in resolution 2505 (2020).
308. The mandate of the Mission, as set out in resolution 2505 (2020), is: (a) to lead, and support the functioning of, the Redeployment Coordination Committee, assisted by a secretariat staffed with United Nations personnel, to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; (b) to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in Hudaydah Governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces from the City of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; (c) to work with the parties so that the security of the City of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa is assured by local security forces in accordance with Yemeni law; and (d) to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement.
309. Against a backdrop of persisting violence, efforts to enhance the ceasefire, build confidence between the parties and maintain dialogue on the operational aspects of the Hudaydah Agreement took on a sense of urgency, as did commitments to enlarge the space for humanitarian activities and assistance in Hudaydah Governorate. In order to discharge its mandate, UNMHA will continue to play a pivotal role in leading the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and supporting the parties in upholding their commitment to the full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, including compliance with the ceasefire, the redeployment of their forces and the transfer of responsibility for the security in Hudaydah to local security forces, in accordance with the Stockholm Agreement.
310. Support for the parties' redeployment of forces and their compliance with the ceasefire will be central to the work of UNMHA in 2021. To that end, the Mission will focus its efforts on the deployment of international monitors to support the parties' de-escalation efforts on the ground, working with them towards redeployment. Simultaneously, UNMHA will continue its role as an impartial convener and facilitator of formal and informal meetings of the Redeployment Coordination Committee, including the ceasefire enhancement and de-escalation mechanism, to maintain trust-based dialogue and cooperation. The Mission will also sustain its facilitation and coordination support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Programme of work

Objective

311. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to support the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement.

Strategy

312. To contribute to supporting the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa as set out in the Stockholm Agreement, UNMHA will continue

to lead and support the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee. This action is expected to result in maintaining a trust-based dialogue and sustained cooperation between the parties towards complying with, planning and executing the provisions of the Hudaydah Agreement. Past results in this area include the convening of seven formal sessions of the Committee, co-chaired by the UNMHA Head of Mission and the senior representatives of party 1 (Government of Yemen) and party 2 (Houthi movement). The Committee has focused on, among other things, the finalization of an agreement on all the operational modalities of the redeployment of forces, in two phases, as foreseen in the Hudaydah Agreement; the agreement by one of the parties to execute a number of steps towards the redeployment of forces; and the adoption and establishment of a set of confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing compliance of the parties with the ceasefire. This set of measures, called the ceasefire enhancement and de-escalation mechanism, consists of the establishment of a round-the-clock Joint Operations Centre operated by both parties and embedded within UNMHA, and the establishment of five joint observation posts manned by the two parties along the frontlines of Hudaydah City.

External factors for 2021

313. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) There is sufficient political will and engagement from domestic, regional and international stakeholders to enable the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement;
 - (b) Major combat operations between the parties will not recommence in Hudaydah Governorate, nor will there be sustained military impediments that would preclude the use of the main supply routes to and from the mission area;
 - (c) Political, resourcing and personnel support will continue through the provision of military and police contributions from the international community to enable the sustained deployment of UNMHA;
 - (d) A suitably safe, secure and permissive operating environment exists, and sufficient confidence is established between the parties and with other partners to generate sustained support for and participation in the activities of the Mission;
 - (e) A political environment exists that is conducive to an agreement being reached between the parties on the sequencing of redeployment operations and the activation of local security forces;
 - (f) Continued operational cooperation exists with effective command and control structures within both parties to enable compliance at all levels;
 - (g) The parties remain willing to enable access and freedom of movement to all areas required for effective observation and oversight.
314. UNMHA will continue to integrate a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. To this end, it will promote women's participation in the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and related activities and mechanisms as best possible in an effort to increase women's participation in the planning and conduct of redeployment and local security activities. In addition, UNMHA will take every opportunity to promote equal rights and opportunities for women and the full and active consideration of gender perspectives in the planning and implementation of mission activities and those undertaken by the parties during the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement.
315. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNMHA will continue to liaise and coordinate with the parties to ensure the safety and security of UNMHA personnel, movements and premises, and the unhindered and expeditious movement of mission personnel and equipment, provisions and essential supplies into and within Yemen. This requires a dedicated civilian capacity to maintain direct contact with the de facto authorities at both the national and local levels. Furthermore, UNMHA will engage, where possible, with other partners within Hudaydah Governorate and will

conduct briefings for such partners and other bodies to ensure a unified understanding and approach in supporting the Hudaydah Agreement and its implementation.

316. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNMHA will continue to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement. To this end, cooperation will continue with the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations system operating in Yemen. Specifically, UNMHA will maintain close working relationships with relevant United Nations entities related to the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, specifically the World Food Programme, UNDP and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, as well as other development and humanitarian actors operating in Hudaydah Governorate. Pending full implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, the Mission and its partners will prepare for enhanced monitoring at Hudaydah port, port rehabilitation, the establishment of local security forces and demining activities. UNMHA will also consult and coordinate, where appropriate, with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UN-Women.

Evaluation activities

317. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Programme performance in 2019 against planned result

318. A planned result for 2019, which is that the ceasefire holds and the security situation improves in the Governorate, as referred to in the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council for 2019 for thematic cluster III ([A/73/352/Add.9](#)), was achieved in part, as evidenced by the ongoing overall maintenance and sustained reduction in ceasefire violations in the Hudaydah Governorate, the implementation of the unilateral redeployment from the ports by Houthi forces and the clearance of military manifestations from related areas, as well as the return of an estimated 150,000 internally displaced persons to Hudaydah City. The achievement was further demonstrated through the systematic and sustained communication between the parties within the Joint Operations Centre, joint observation posts and during Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings, as supported by UNMHA, freedom of movement to patrol areas where the unilateral redeployment took place, along with the conduct of patrols in proximity to the confrontation lines, and enabling and sustaining access by humanitarian partners to critical humanitarian infrastructure, including the Red Sea Mills.

Programme performance in 2019: agreement on the technical aspects of redeployment

319. The ceasefire entered into force on 18 December 2018 and generally held throughout 2019, insofar as there were no reports that either party had seized new territory. There were, however, continued incidents of fighting and an exchange of fire between the parties, as well as reports of drone flights over Hudaydah Governorate. Aerial strikes also occurred during the period. Accordingly, the operational, security and political environment remained complex, requiring extensive engagement with the parties to ensure the continued functioning and support of UNMHA.
320. Over the course of the year, the Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee engaged with the parties to discuss proposals for the first phases of redeployment in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement. That engagement culminated in seven meetings of the Committee in which the modalities for monitoring the ceasefire and the mutual redeployment of forces were discussed. Those meetings

resulted in, among other things, the agreement on a concept of operations for the first phases of redeployment. On 14 May 2019, UNMHA confirmed the unilateral redeployment of Houthi forces from the three ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, effectively demilitarizing those facilities. This allowed for the commencement of demining activities and enabled the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism and UNDP to gain access to the ports, conduct needs assessment missions and deploy teams to support the Yemeni port authorities in increasing port capacities. Since then, the Mission has been able to undertake patrols to the three ports on a regular basis.

321. Over the course of subsequent Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings, UNMHA supported the parties in finalizing and agreeing on the operational plans for full redeployment. The Mission also launched the ceasefire enhancement and de-escalation mechanism to support a round-the-clock Joint Operations Centre of the parties. The Centre was composed of United Nations-flagged marine vessel co-located liaison officers of both parties, supported by UNMHA staff. The Centre focused on a real-time de-escalation in the numerous incidents that could otherwise have led to an escalation in fighting on the front lines around Hudaydah. The Mission also supported the establishment by the parties of five joint observation posts in hotspots along the front lines south of the city, staffed with representatives of both parties since October 2019.

Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

322. This work contributed to the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement, as demonstrated by the sustained decline in the number of incidents in Hudaydah, the continued functioning of the ports to receive and offload vessels, and improved humanitarian access and conditions. The agreement on the detailed concepts of operations for the redeployment of forces, along with the arrangements for the function of the parties' Joint Operations Centre and the implementation of the parties' joint observation posts established in the second half of 2019 are further evidence of the progress made towards the confirmation of the technical aspects of the Hudaydah Agreement. The conduct of the seven Redeployment Coordination Committees and more than 50 other direct engagements with the senior leadership of the parties, along with extensive patrolling of the area of operations, have directly contributed to the de-escalation of the situation and pursuit of the performance measure.

Table 52
Performance measure

2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Agreement by the parties on all the technical aspects of the redeployment, as called for in the Hudaydah Agreement

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Planned result for 2021: continued monitoring of a sustained ceasefire and the redeployment of forces

323. The work of UNMHA, including on the finalization of technical agreements and the continuation of monitoring activities on the ground, has encountered multiple challenges in 2020, notwithstanding the Mission's sustained engagement from the parties. These operational challenges have been driven in large part by factors external to Hudaydah itself, along with shifting national, regional and international dynamics and priorities. As a result, steady operational progress and agreements on

technical modalities for a full redeployment of forces under the Hudaydah Agreement were achieved at the technical level of the Redeployment Coordination Committee; however, full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement during the period has been unattainable, given the need to secure wider political agreements with the political leadership of both parties.

Internal challenge and response

324. The challenge for UNMHA was to deploy and sustain a mission to support the parties in the implementation of their obligations under the Hudaydah Agreement and support the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to a sustainable ceasefire across Hudaydah Governorate. In response, for 2021, UNMHA will engage the members of the Redeployment Coordination Committee through existing mechanisms, which include bilateral formal and informal consultations with the parties, joint Committee meetings, patrols in the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa and work with liaison officers from both parties on ceasefire enhancement and de-escalation, with a view to minimizing armed violence and casualties. UNMHA will hold 6 formal joint Committee meetings to actively strengthen the modalities for implementation, along with the understanding of the parties' obligations and activities; 50 bilateral meetings to prepare for such joint meetings; and daily meetings with liaison officers from both parties to enhance cooperation and de-escalate problems as they arise on the former frontline.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

325. This work is expected to contribute to supporting the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif, and Ra's Isa, as set out in the Stockholm Agreement, which would be demonstrated by a decline in the number of incidents and continued functioning of the ports to receive and offload vessels. The commencement of the implementation of the concepts of operations for the redeployment of forces would allow UNMHA to simultaneously deploy several monitoring teams involving the Mission and the Yemeni parties throughout the area of operations on a daily basis. UNMHA will also conduct patrols throughout Hudaydah City, the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, and key locations related to redeployment of forces.

Table 53
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• Agreement by the parties on all aspects of the redeployment, as called for in the Hudaydah Agreement	• Implementation of the concepts of operations agreed by the Redeployment Coordination Committee for phased redeployments from the ports and City of Hudaydah	• Finalization and monitoring of the redeployment of forces in accordance with the concept of operations agreed to by the Committee

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

326. Table 54 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 54

Deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	20	7	10	6
Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings	20	7	10	6
B. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices in the context of the efforts of the parties to fully implement the Stockholm Agreement as it relates to the Governorate of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, including jointly with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.				
Consultations, advice and advocacy: consultations with the relevant Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders, with a view to comprehensively understanding the challenges at hand and to providing the best advice possible to the parties in their efforts to implement the Hudaydah Agreement; and advocacy among Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders in support of the implementation of the Agreement and enhancement of the ceasefire in the Governorate.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: situation and context-driven monitoring missions to oversee the redeployment of forces and the removal of military manifestations in the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; and fact-finding with respect to establishing information pertaining to the various incidents related to the maintenance of the ceasefire, in support of the parties' efforts to maintain and enhance the ceasefire.				
Databases and substantive digital materials: situation updates, assessment reports and presentations to support the parties' negotiations on key aspects of the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement.				
C. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: outreach through meetings with local Yemeni representatives and international organizations, as well as publication of informational products to report on the Mission's mandate and activities; and joint communiqués in support of the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement.				
Media and external relations: monthly external factsheets on the work of the Mission; and press releases and promotional materials on activities of the Mission.				
Digital platforms and multi-media content: website/webpage and social media to disseminate information on the Mission's mandate and activities.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

327. During its preparation of the proposed budget for 2021, UNMHA took into full consideration the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as contained in its report (A/74/7/Add.23), as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 74/263 A.
328. During 2021, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNMHA will continue to employ an integrated mission support structure, which enables both United Nations entities to achieve economies of scale and minimize duplication.
329. With respect to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on strengthening the UNMHA national staffing complement in the context of future budget submissions, the Mission continuously reviews its staffing composition to strengthen its national staffing complement. A proposal is made for the conversion of one international position into a National Professional Officer in 2021.
330. In response to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee to expedite recruitment, UNMHA is making every effort to expedite recruitment to meet the expected vacancy rates for all personnel during 2020. The pace of deployment has been affected by significant delays in obtaining visas and access permits to the port of Hudaydah, including for national staff. Moreover, accommodation limitations still represent an obstacle to the onboarding of international staff and United Nations monitors, forcing the Mission to prioritize the onboarding of critical personnel and to keep many deployments on hold.
331. UNMHA has taken action to implement the recommendation of the Advisory Committee that the renovation work relating to villas 1 to 6 be completed without delay, that the rental of the marine

vessel be terminated no later than 31 March 2020 and that all necessary arrangements and refurbishment work relating to the remaining land-based accommodation and office facilities be completed as expeditiously as possible. The rental contract on the marine vessel was terminated on 4 May 2020. Before that date, the vessel's presence was required because there were delays with the authorities in approving the land-based office and accommodation facility. Currently, the Mission's land-based facilities are limited to the Four Villas compound, which it occupied on 7 May 2020. Connectivity has been established and the construction process of the accommodation portion has been completed. The contractor has commenced the construction of the parking lot opposite the compound, and the remaining projects are expected to be completed during the year.

332. With regard to the capacity and completion timeline of each of the land-based accommodation and office facilities, for which the Advisory Committee had expressed its expectation for more information to be provided, UNMHA achieved progress in the reporting period. The renovation works for the Four Villas compound has been completed. The compound has a capacity to cater for 20 offices and 62 accommodation slots. The rental permit authorizations at villas 5, 6, and 8 have been cancelled and the Mission is coordinating with Hudaydah authorities to identify additional premises, which could be leased and renovated. The renovation and security enhancement could be completed within five to nine months from the start of renovation work, depending on their condition. UNMHA is also evaluating options for the establishment of accommodation, office and operations space on neutral ground, including the potential for the development of portions of the Hudaydah airport, with the objective of providing a single facility for the Mission.
333. With regard to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee that the Secretary-General ensure that medical services are fully functional in Hudaydah and that a UNMHA clinic is set up inside its renovated facilities as a priority as soon as the facilities become available, medical services continue to be fully functioning in Hudaydah, albeit with a reduced medical force, split between Amman and Hudaydah. Villa 5 was initially earmarked to house the clinic and the forward surgical team, but the Hudaydah authorities informed UNMHA of their final decision to not allow the Mission to rent the facility. Cancellation of the rental permits has an impact on the availability of a fully functional clinic and the forward surgical team. As an interim measure and until suitable premises are available to UNMHA, the Four Villas compound will accommodate a level I-plus clinic with limited capacity similar to what has been available previously on the marine vessel. Owing to the temporary reduction in the number of mission personnel present in Hudaydah, the contract with the forward surgical service provider has also been amended to reflect the reduced support requirements.
334. With regard to mine detection and mine-clearing services, for which the Advisory Committee had expressed its expectation for more information to be provided, the Chief Technical Adviser from the Mine Action Service is closely engaged with the main stakeholders to ensure the safety of the United Nations and monitors their patrols to the three ports of Hudaydah, Ra's Isa and Salif. This has been achieved by verifying the existence of contaminated areas from explosive remnants of war in these areas. In addition, the Chief Technical Adviser identified and mapped additional contaminated areas, to enhance the safety and security of UNMHA personnel. The Mine Action Service has developed a course of action for UNMHA on how to survey, mark and/or clear explosive remnants of war, including landmines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices, which has been included in the UNMHA concept of operations for redeployment. In addition, the Mine Action Service has liaised and worked with UNDP on the strengthening of the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre and other relevant Yemeni parties to assess their capabilities, in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement, to carry out mine action-related activities, including to mark and clear minefields and other explosive hazards. The Mine Action Service shall continue to coordinate mine action related support activities to the Mission that are agreed by the Redeployment Coordination Committee in support of continuing the ceasefire and subsequent activities and priorities.
335. With regard to cost-sharing and cost recovery, for which the Advisory Committee had expressed its expectation for more information to be provided, a memorandum of understanding has been concluded between UNMHA and the United Nations country team for the provision of support

services, including air and ground transportation, as well as living and office space at the UNMHA land-based facilities.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 55

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2020 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Observers	654.6	2 175.0	2 648.6	–	473.6
Civilian personnel costs	4 389.4	11 735.4	12 433.6	–	698.2
Operational costs	45 873.1	37 732.3	33 955.0	–	(3 777.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	50 917.1	51 642.7	49 037.2	–	(2 605.5)

Table 56

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2020	–	1	1	1	6	10	20	1	40	34	–	74	4	80	–	158
Proposed 2021	–	1	1	1	6	10	20	1	40	33	–	73	5	80	–	158
Regular positions, change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)	1	–	–	–
Approved general temporary assistance 2020	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Proposed general temporary assistance 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
General temporary assistance positions, change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total approved 2020	–	1	1	1	6	10	21	1	41	34	–	75	4	80	–	159
Total proposed 2021	–	1	1	1	6	10	21	1	41	33	–	74	5	80	–	159
Total change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)	1	–	–	–

336. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for UNMHA amount to \$49,037,200 and would provide for the deployment of 75 United Nations monitors (\$2,648,600), salaries, common staff costs and other related costs (\$12,433,600) for 73 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 10 P-4, 20 P-3, 1 P-2 and 33 Field Service), 85 national positions (5 National Professional Officer and 80 Local level), 1 general temporary assistance position (P-3) and 5 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$33,955,000), comprising the costs for official travel (\$1,012,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$7,902,000), ground transportation

(\$831,500), air operations (\$13,378,900), communications and information technology (\$1,231,700), medical (\$7,804,500), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,794,200).

337. In 2021, it is proposed that the following changes be made to the staffing complement: redeployment of seven positions, reassignment of one position, and conversion of one other, as detailed below:

Office of the Deputy Head of Mission (Hudaydah):

- (a) Redeployment of one Administrative Assistant (Field Service) from the Liaison and Coordination Mechanism/Front Office in Hudaydah to the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission in Hudaydah, to provide administrative and secretarial support to the Deputy Head of Mission;

Office of the Deputy Head of Mission (Sana'a and Aden):

- (b) Redeployment of two positions, comprising one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Liaison and Coordination Mechanism/Front Office and one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Joint Coordination and Communication Centre in Hudaydah, to the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission in Sana'a and Aden. UNMHA does not currently have a substantive presence in Sana'a and Aden. However, it is essential to have a thorough understanding of the political dynamics in Sana'a and Aden, which are headquarters of parties to the Hudaydah Agreement. The incumbents of these two positions will act as the interlocutors with the counterpart of the parties of the Hudaydah Agreement, liaise with relevant authorities and report to the Deputy Head of Mission in Aden;

Office of the Chief of Staff:

- (c) Reassignment of one Administrative Officer (P-3) in the Office of the Chief of Staff to a Mission Planning Officer (P-3) to provide critical planning support to the Mission;

Office of the Chief of Mission Support (Sana'a):

- (d) Redeployment of one Contracts Management Officer (Field Service) from the Contracts Management Unit in Sana'a to the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Sana'a to provide adequate contract management support to the operations and resource management, supply chain management and service delivery pillars, and to provide timely reporting and advice to the Chief of Mission Support on all contractual matters;

Engineering and Facilities Management Unit:

- (e) Conversion of one position of Engineering Technician (Field Service) to an Associate Engineer (National Professional Officer) in the Engineering and Facilities Management Unit in Hudaydah to strengthen the Mission's national staffing component and to increase the utilization of local capacity;

Movement Control Unit:

- (f) Redeployment of one Movement Control Assistant (Field Service) from Djibouti to Sana'a to support the movement of United Nations-owned equipment and goods in transit;

Ground Transport Unit:

- (g) Redeployment of two Drivers (Local level) from Hudaydah to Aden to support the proposed presence of the Mission's personnel in Aden and to provide transportation services for the movement of personnel in Aden.

338. In addition, it is proposed that one general temporary assistance position of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) be continued in 2021. The Finance and Budget Officer (P-3), in the Field Operations Finance Division of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance of the Secretariat, provides financial policy and guidance to UNMHA and ensures the timely preparation of accurate budget

proposals and the submission of reports to the legislative bodies. Since January 2019, the Division has assumed the responsibility for preparing and managing the budgets of all special political missions. With the transfer of this responsibility, the Division received one Finance and Budget Officer (P-4), funded from the budget of UNSOM, and one Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service, Other level), funded from the budget of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. The Division continues to experience a significantly increased workload and, as a result, cannot absorb the additional workload required to support UNMHA appropriately. The Finance and Budget Officer performs backstopping support and continues to be essential in ensuring sufficient capacity at Headquarters for the management of financial resources, preparation of budgets and provision of services to legislative bodies during their review of the proposed budgets for special political missions. The continuation of this position is crucial, especially in view of the increased demand on the Division to monitor on an ongoing basis the expenditure and budget implementation trend of missions, in the light of the challenging liquidity situation.

339. For United Nations monitors, a vacancy rate of 15 per cent has been applied to the estimates. For civilian staff, a vacancy rate of 25 per cent has been applied to the estimates, taking into account the projected deployment. For government-provided personnel, a vacancy rate of 25 per cent has been applied to the estimates.
340. The decrease in requirements proposed for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to the discontinuation of the utilization of the marine vessel that provided office and living accommodation for UNMHA personnel and the transfer to land facilities, as well as reduced requirements for renovation costs for land-based premises; the discontinuation of temporary-duty assignments and acquisitions of armoured vehicles; and the reconfiguration of contract arrangements with respect to the rotary-wing aircraft. The reduced requirements are offset in part by additional requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of a lower vacancy rate for international positions and the additional requirement for an Aeromedical Evacuation Team in Djibouti.

Extrabudgetary resources

341. No extrabudgetary resources are available for 2020 or are any projected for 2021 for UNMHA.

11. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

(\$19,489,400)

Foreword

The establishment of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) on 16 October 2019 marked the end of 15 consecutive years of peacekeeping in a country where United Nations uniformed personnel had been deployed for 22 of the past 26 years. With an adjusted role and a tailored footprint, the special political mission provides support to State authorities and institutions as they strive to create political consensus among Haitian stakeholders to effectively enact critical reforms to address the political, security, social and economic problems facing the country. Haiti's challenges, which are the result of a deeply polarized society and weak institutional capacity of the State, also point to deeper, more fundamental structural issues and development deficits that need to be resolved.

BINUH is well placed to support the efforts of national authorities in preserving the gains of the peacekeeping era, consolidating the country's stability and ensuring progress towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. In its first months of existence, BINUH has utilized the good offices of the Secretary-General to help to foster an environment conducive to genuine, inclusive dialogue among key Haitian stakeholders and encourage a peaceful resolution to the protracted political and institutional crisis that the country faces. Through its police and corrections component, BINUH has continued to provide the Haitian National Police with the same quality of advice and technical support that has led to the institution's rapid development and professionalization since 2004. Its community violence reduction unit has collaborated with relevant State institutions to devise innovative strategies to tackle gang violence, while reducing negative impacts on at-risk communities. Lastly, the mission has worked with national authorities to finalize a national human rights action plan and to document instances of alleged human rights violations committed during the wave of civil unrest that affected the country in the fall of 2019.

The deployment of BINUH signalled the start of a new, deeper form of collaboration between Haiti and the United Nations, one that requires a seamless integration of the peace and security and development arms of the Organization. Accordingly, the mission's good offices role not only supports the efforts of the Government of Haiti, but it is also an integral part of the programmatic work undertaken by the United Nations country team to advance the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals in Haiti and help to alleviate the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the Haitian population.

In 2021, BINUH will therefore seek to build on the achievements of its first year of activity by continuing to advance political consensus, encouraging needed reforms and advocating critical improvements in governance, while supporting the efforts of the United Nations country team in advancing sustainable development, in collaboration with bilateral actors and regional institutions. I am confident that taking these steps will bring measurable benefits to the Haitian population and open new horizons for the country's young people. The United Nations will continue to support the Haitian people in achieving their aspirations.

(Signed) Helen La Lime
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and
Head of Office, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

A. Proposed programme plan for 2021 and programme performance for 2019

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

342. The mandate of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) is set out in Security Council resolution 2476 (2019), which underscored the need for the activities of the mission and the United Nations country team in Haiti to be fully integrated, with the latter assuming the programmatic and technical assistance role. The establishment of the mission's mandate on 16 October 2019 marked the end of more than two decades of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, which had been implemented through seven field missions since 1993. BINUH operates in a highly complex and volatile environment characterized by major political, security and socioeconomic challenges.
343. BINUH is responsible for advising the Government of Haiti on promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and protecting and promoting human rights. The mission is also responsible for assisting the Government in its efforts to: (a) plan and execute free, fair and transparent elections; (b) reinforce the capacity of the Haitian National Police, including through training on human rights and crowd control, to respond to gang violence and sexual and gender-based violence, and to maintain public order; (c) develop an inclusive approach with all sectors of society to reduce community violence, in particular gang violence; (d) address human rights abuses and violations and comply with international human rights obligations; (e) improve the penitentiary administration's management and oversight of prison facilities to ensure the proper treatment of detainees in accordance with international standards; and (f) strengthen the justice sector, including by adopting and implementing key legislation to promote justice sector reform, improving internal oversight and accountability, in particular with regard to corruption, addressing prolonged pretrial detention and ensuring merit-based judicial appointments and the timely renewal of judicial mandates.
344. Haiti's recurrent political crises, which reached a new level in 2019, demonstrate the country's deepening political polarization, as well as underlying systemic challenges and development deficits that, compounded with low capacity, lead to growing inequality. Persistent risks associated with civil unrest, gang violence and organized crime have a significant impact on access to basic services and human rights and render the security situation in Haiti volatile, in particular around electoral processes, especially in the absence of progress on a comprehensive dialogue among national stakeholders. Sustainable development is further undermined by the recent economic contraction resulting from continued political instability and insecurity, while the number of those in need of humanitarian assistance continues to grow, owing in part to a significant number of returnees from the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic and other countries in the region. Political and electoral violence, combined with systemic gender inequality, extensive discrimination and continued impunity for gender-based violence, risk further undermining social cohesion, including the empowerment of women in politics and economic development. The number of women in key decision-making positions in public institutions, including the national police, remains low. Electoral violence severely affects the turnout in elections, further disenfranchising women and young people. The participation of women in political and national processes remains persistently low; and the Parliament that disbanded on 13 January 2020 had less than 3 per cent representation by women, compared with 9 per cent in 2006, well below the constitutional minimum quota of 30 per cent. Dire living conditions resulting from low economic growth and entrenched poverty (59 per cent of the population under the poverty line, with 25 per cent of them living in extreme poverty) further exacerbate the situation.
345. While the capacity of national institutions remains limited, there are promising signs that institution-building is progressing. However, essential reforms to rule of law, in particular the justice sector, still need to be completed in order to build resilient and accountable institutions. Through increased

operational and institutional capacity built in recent years with United Nations and other international support, the Haitian National Police has taken full responsibility for law and order, without the support of peacekeepers. Sustaining progress towards the stronger autonomy, integrity and effectiveness of the national police will be a major test for the institution in the period ahead.

346. Three years after Hurricane Matthew and 10 years since the most destructive earthquake in the modern history of Haiti, gaps in capacity to mitigate the risk of natural hazards persist. The country is highly vulnerable to severe storms, flash floods and coastal inundations. While the longer-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the country's socioeconomic conditions and health system is likely to be serious, in the short-term the country's overall fragility is expected to be compounded by an increase in immediate humanitarian needs, the potential overstretching of the capacities of the Haitian National Police as a result of its role in securing public order during the COVID-19 response, and the postponement of key political processes and institutional reforms to later dates than originally envisaged. It is vital that the full implementation of the BINUH mandate and the mission's effective integration with the United Nations country team lay the foundation for sustained stability, security and respect for human rights in order to set Haiti on a path to sustainable development.

Programme of work

Objective

347. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to strengthen political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; advance a peaceful and stable environment; and protect and promote human rights and strengthen gender equality.

Strategy

348. To contribute to strengthening political stability, BINUH, in close consultation with international partners, will continue to use its convening power and the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to encourage constructive and inclusive political dialogue on constitutional, political, electoral, judicial and economic reforms. The Special Representative and her team will also continue to engage key national stakeholders, including political parties, civil society, economic actors, the rule of law sector and faith-based organizations, with a view to building consensus on structural reforms. This work is expected to result in increased political stability. These efforts will be closely coordinated with the United Nations country team's programmes to strengthen democratic oversight. Past results in this area include the facilitation, together with other international partners and in coordination with the national authorities, of talks that brought together key stakeholders to promote dialogue and an enabling environment to move forward with key reforms crucial to addressing the root causes of instability in Haiti.
349. To contribute to strengthening good governance, including the rule of law, and building on achievements made under previous missions and through the joint rule of law programme, in close coordination with the United Nations country team and partners, BINUH will continue to provide advice on and support for the implementation of the action plan on prolonged pretrial detention. The mission will further support the implementation of strategic planning frameworks of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, with a focus on improving accountability and oversight, including addressing and preventing corruption. Past results in this area include the passage of a national legal aid law, as well as early steps to establish infrastructure and governance structures to implement the law.
350. To contribute to advancing a peaceful and stable environment, BINUH will provide strategic advice to the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration. This action is expected to result in reinforced operational and administrative capacities for the national police and increasing compliance with human rights standards, including through the implementation of its

strategic development plan for the period 2017–2021 and support for the development of the subsequent plan. In coordination with the United Nations country team, the mission will also advise and support national stakeholders, including the Haitian National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, in implementing an inclusive national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction programme and the law on weapons and ammunition management. This work is expected to result in national ownership of these processes, heightened awareness of the impact of gang violence and enhanced political will to identify appropriate solutions. Past results in this area include the increased resolve of the national police to manage public safety across the country, notwithstanding the challenging context, as well as the strengthening of the capacity of the National Commission in developing the national strategy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction.

351. To contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights and the strengthening of gender equality, BINUH will continue to conduct thematic and contextual monitoring of human rights violations and abuses, including through public reporting; engaging with authorities on the efforts to combat impunity and the effective use of accountability mechanisms, including the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy; strengthening the capacity of national authorities to protect and promote human rights; and supporting the capacity of the national human rights institution and civil society to advocate for human rights. This work is expected to result in national authorities' increased compliance with international human rights standards, a reduced number of serious human rights abuses and violations and a more effective national human rights accountability framework. Past results in this area include increased collaboration with the Haitian National Police, resulting in an improved capacity to investigate alleged human rights violations by police officers in response to human rights reporting and advocacy.

External factors for 2021

352. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2021 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Political polarization is likely to continue, endangering political consensus and, thus, concrete initiatives to advance political, legal and economic reforms;
 - (b) The security situation remains relatively stable, and any incidents expected to affect, in particular, the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are addressed satisfactorily by national security institutions;
 - (c) The Government of Haiti continues to sustain and further develop the capacities of the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Penitentiary Administration, including through the provision of an increased budget;
 - (d) The impact of natural hazards on Haiti, including hurricanes and earthquakes, and of the spread of COVID-19 to the country in 2020, remains limited;
 - (e) Continuing shrinking of political and financial support from the international community towards the long-term development and stability of Haiti.
353. BINUH integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The mission continues to prioritize and encourage the meaningful participation of women in political processes, dialogues and negotiations, as well as their representation in decision-making positions in Haitian institutions, in line with the Constitution's mandated 30 per cent quota for participation at all levels. With regard to human rights, the mission's reporting includes disaggregated data on the impact of human rights violations and abuses on women, as well as on accountability and justice for crimes of violence against women and girls, in coordination with UN-Women. In addition, the mission has been working with civil society actors focusing on gender and rights in the context of the implementation of recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 2016 and the second cycle of the universal periodic review of Haiti, also in 2016.

354. With regard to cooperation with other entities, BINUH will continue to collaborate with regional organizations, including the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community, to leverage its technical advice and political efforts in Haiti. The mission will also engage closely with the diplomatic community in Haiti to support coordinated approaches to encouraging political consensus, including through meetings of the core group.
355. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, BINUH will continue to work to achieve full integration of activities with the United Nations country team. The mission and the country team have recently concluded an integrated strategic framework that lays out modalities for integration, including shared priorities, joint programmes and teams, collocation modalities and joint coordination mechanisms. Efforts are currently under way to develop workplans and new governance structures to ensure the implementation of the framework, notwithstanding the COVID-19 pandemic.

Evaluation activities

356. A self-evaluation of mission processes to develop the mission concept, including support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs for such processes, to identify constraints and opportunities is planned for 2021.

Planned results for 2021

Enhanced consensus-building and cooperation among State institutions to address causes of instability and inequality in Haiti

357. In 2019 and 2020, Haiti continued to face governance challenges, which undermined efforts to enable responsive, inclusive and representative decision-making to set Haiti on a path to consolidating stability and development. The deadlock that began in March 2019 over the confirmation of a new Government resulted in a wave of civil unrest and a significant deterioration in the security situation early in September 2019, which also triggered dramatic economic and humanitarian consequences and the withholding of donor support to Haiti. While the protests lost momentum in late November 2019, a constitutional crisis emerged on 13 January 2020, when the mandates of the Lower House of Parliament, part of the Senate and municipal officials expired owing to the postponement of the elections scheduled for October 2019. In the absence of a functioning legislative branch, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, has since resorted to ruling by decree, including through the formation of a new Government in March 2020, amid continuing efforts to engage actors from the political spectrum and civil society to forge national consensus over key issues for stability in the country.
358. The Special Representative and her team continue to encourage a genuine and inclusive national dialogue and coordinate coherent engagement from international actors, through, among others, the core group, which brings together key multilateral and bilateral partners, such as Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain and the United States of America, OAS and the European Union, in addition to the United Nations. BINUH also works hand in hand with the Apostolic Nunciature. The mission is engaging with key political forces, civil society, economic actors and faith-based organizations to de-escalate tensions, reduce political polarization and create an environment conducive to dialogue, key reforms and sound governance practices. The mission is also supporting the protection and promotion of human rights, including by assisting the national human rights institution, the Office of the Ombudsperson, in the implementation of its national strategy for the period 2019–2024 to strengthen its role in the implementation of public policies to consolidate stability and good governance.
359. To build on these efforts, and in coordination with the country team, in 2021, advisory expertise will be provided on relevant issues such as the electoral budget, the electoral law and the composition of the electoral council. BINUH will also advise decision makers on how to integrate gender

perspectives into their work and will engage with women interlocutors in a systematic manner to reinforce their contribution to conflict prevention and peacebuilding solutions. The mandate of the mission provides an opportunity, in keeping with Sustainable Development Goal 16, to address impediments to functioning relations between the legislature and the executive branch. Related action will include the provision of advice to national counterparts on the substance of agreed reforms, to clarify and simplify institutional frameworks and ensure stronger transparency and accountability in governance.

Internal challenge and response

360. The challenge for BINUH, given that the mission was established in October 2019 and a start-up process continued well into 2020, was the development of coordination structures to support effective good offices. Consultation and coordination mechanisms with international partners also required renewed efforts. In response, the mission has developed a coordination mechanism and will continue to refine it, with a view to increasing collaboration, coordination and information-sharing with both United Nations entities and international partners.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

361. This work is expected to contribute to strengthening political stability, which would be demonstrated by an increase in sound governance practices, including increased cooperation between the executive and legislative branches and a political environment conducive to advancing political and structural reform priorities. It will also result in the clearer responsibility, accountability and a gender perspective in decision-making and policy implementation, with the increased participation of women. Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include the adoption of a sound electoral framework, including the establishment of the permanent electoral council, an up-to-date and accurate voter registry, electoral reforms and the adoption of an electoral calendar for timely elections fulfilling constitutional provisions. The continued commitment of high-ranking police and political authorities to preserve a constitutional apolitical role for the Haitian National Police is also expected.

Table 57
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Improved governance continuity, with increased participation of women in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, leading to more responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making	• Good governance practices are adopted and a constructive and cooperative relationship between the executive-legislative and judiciary powers is restored, while the participation of women in governance institutions, including in Parliament, is increased

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Effective, inclusive and accountable institutions contribute to consolidating stability and enabling a protective environment

362. The political crisis that began in 2019 also adversely affected the police, justice and corrections systems. The end of 2019 was marked by a six-week suspension of some court hearings owing to the prevailing insecurity and the ransacking of several courts in different parts of the country, further limiting access to justice, especially for vulnerable groups. Those dynamics contributed to further increasing the already alarmingly high number of detainees in pretrial detention, a situation that has persisted for many years. The years 2019 and 2020 also saw controversies over corruption cases and the successive appointment of directors of the anti-corruption unit, which affected the implementation of anti-corruption efforts.
363. In the police sector, specialized Haitian National Police units have demonstrated their ability to conduct operations independently and with increased compliance with human rights. However, challenges remain, including the provision of adequate financial resources, proper support services, mitigation measures to alleviate the food and medical shortfalls in the Haitian prisons and the regionalization and systematization of the investigation services of the General Inspectorate.
364. In 2020, BINUH is using its good offices, advocacy and advisory role with national institutions, civil society and partners to advocate a national political consensus for the implementation of legal and judicial reforms and the continued strengthening of the Haitian National Police and the prison administration. United Nations personnel deployed in BINUH, along with international partners and the United Nations country team, continue to support the development of the national police, promoting its professionalization and further strengthening its institutional capacities. Building on the work of the joint rule of law programme carried out under the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), the mission and the United Nations country team, through an integrated justice reform team, are supporting the action plan on prolonged pretrial detention and the strategic planning frameworks for the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Superior Council of the Judiciary, including measures to combat corruption. Other efforts include support for the implementation of the 2018 legal aid law under the leadership of the National Legal Aid Council.
365. For 2021, BINUH will implement its mandate through strategic advice to national authorities to encourage the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions that lead to enhanced access to justice for all and the improved promotion and protection of human rights. Concretely, the mission will work with the Haitian National Police and the prison administration to reinforce their strategic planning capacities for law enforcement; bolster the recruitment and retention of women police officers; strengthen efforts to prevent human rights violations by police and prison officers through support from co-located United Nations police and correction advisers; enhance efforts to address electoral violence, in particular against women; and strengthen women-led early warning mechanisms with the national police. At the same time, the mission will continue to support efforts to improve detention conditions, both through medium- and long-term solutions such as the certification of prisons, the implementation of the action plan on prolonged pretrial detention, as well as short-term efforts to support Haitian authorities in addressing chronic shortages of food and supplies and poor detention conditions. It is also expected that 2021 will see the establishment of legal aid offices to assist more vulnerable segments of the population, as well as the adoption of the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code. Lastly, the mission, in close coordination with the United Nations country team and partners, will continue to provide support for the implementation of nationally owned strategic plans on the rule of law, with a focus on improving accountability and oversight, including addressing and preventing corruption.

Internal challenge and response

366. The challenge for the mission was to identify effective internal mechanisms for overcoming challenges posed by the ongoing insecurity, including a lack of access to engage with partners such as the Haitian National Police or to engage with relevant actors in documenting human rights violations and abuses. In response, BINUH will strengthen the network of focal points among national human rights non-governmental organizations in order to verify allegations of human rights violations and abuses.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

367. This work is expected to contribute to strengthening good governance, including the rule of law, and protecting and promoting human rights and strengthening gender equality, which would be demonstrated by more effective, accountable and transparent key national institutions, the strengthened capacity of the Haitian National Police to manage public safety in the country, a reduction in impunity for human rights abuses and violations and corruption, and a reduction in prolonged pretrial detention. Such progress would lead to an enhanced protective environment for the population. Evidence of the result, if achieved, will include increased rates of satisfaction among the population with service delivery by key national institutions.

Table 58

Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Improved satisfaction among the population with its experience of public services, in view of the enhanced effectiveness, accountability and transparency of national institutions, and increased access of women to decision-making positions in key institutions	• Key reforms to Haitian judicial, police, corrections and anti-corruption institutions are adopted, laying the foundation for enhanced effectiveness, accountability and transparency

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Enhanced protection of women, communities and livelihoods through reversing the surge in gang violence

368. In 2020, BINUH has continued to work with the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, as well as with the United Nations country team and partners, to establish a national strategy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction; promote the establishment of a law on arms and ammunition management as part of a comprehensive normative framework; and establish an effective monitoring and reporting mechanism on gang and community-based violence. In 2020, notwithstanding the recent challenging context, BINUH police and corrections advisors quickly embarked on co-location activities with the Haitian National Police to help to fill key operational capacity gaps and advise senior police leadership. They have sought to support national counterparts in addressing institutional, policy and procedural challenges in law enforcement, including by providing advice at the managerial level to improve deployment plans, compliance with procedures and coordination between specialized units in recent anti-gang operations. In addition, the mission's Human Rights Service has been monitoring human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of community-based violence, as well as preparing public reports with recommendations on improving accountability mechanisms, including judicial proceedings.

369. For 2021, BINUH, in partnership with the United Nations country team, will further strengthen national ownership by assisting national authorities in implementing an inclusive programme to reduce community and gang violence. Key elements of this approach will include reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police to maintain public order and to respond to gang violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and providing support to institutions in developing a national strategy and programme focused on three outcomes: (a) an operational framework for comprehensive programmes on community violence reduction, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and weapons and ammunition management; (b) effective community policing and community dialogue and outreach; and (c) strengthened analytical and operational capacity of the Haitian National Police to address threats posed by armed gangs. The mission and the United Nations country team will, through a high-level policy group, assist national authorities in implementing a sustainable fundraising strategy; facilitate synergies in implementation through the creation of joint workplans; learn from best practices from other countries, in particular, citizen security approaches developed in the region; and translate identified priorities with government, political and private sector actors and international partners into concrete action to address gang violence.
370. BINUH will also help to combat insecurity, counter the activities of gangs and promote accountability by working with United Nations partners to ensure the provision of adequate resources and equipment to the Haitian National Police to support the work of the General Inspectorate of the police. In addition, the mission will continue to support the Office of the Ombudsperson in the implementation of its national strategy, which, if supported with adequate resources, will help the State to improve accountability, including towards addressing gang violence.

Internal challenge and response

371. The challenge for BINUH was that, given the multi-layered nature of the gang phenomenon and the multitude of entry points to address it, an integrated and coherent approach was required across the numerous United Nations entities and other partners involved in the sector, including in terms of aligning disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction approaches, and to increase national ownership. In response, the mission will strengthen the work of the high-level policy group that will define the strategy of the United Nations system for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction, contribute to the development of a sustainable fundraising strategy through outreach to external partners and strengthen national ownership and leadership through its support for national counterparts.

Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure

372. This work is expected to contribute to advancing a peaceful and stable environment, which would be demonstrated by strengthening the strategic and operational capacity of national stakeholders, including the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, the Haitian National Police and the Office of the Ombudsperson to effectively prevent and address gang and gender-based violence and monitor and promote human rights, as evidenced by a drop in the number of people affected by such violence in hotspot communities.

Table 59
Performance measure

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
• N/A	• N/A	• N/A	• Comprehensive law on arms control is finalized, a national strategy to address gang violence is	• National disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/ community violence reduction programme is

2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
			adopted, the number of people affected by gang violence in hotspot communities is reduced and the Government provides the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration with adequate logistic and financial resources to be fully operational	designed and funded, the number of people affected by gang violence in hotspot communities is reduced, the national weapons and ammunition management commission is established, and a national strategy and programme are developed

Abbreviation: N/A, not applicable.

Deliverables

373. Table 60 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2019–2021 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 60

Deliverables for the period 2019–2021, by category and subcategory

Deliverables	2019 planned	2019 actual	2020 planned	2021 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	–	–	3	3
1. Reports of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	–	–	3	3
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	–	–	3	3
2. Meetings of the Security Council	–	–	3	3
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	–	–	32	32
3. Seminars, workshops and training events on four main areas of work: (a) implementation of and resource mobilization for the strategic plan to further develop and equip the Haitian National Police, sustain police service capable of maintaining public security, reduce gang violence and protect human rights; (b) implementation by national authorities and the United Nations country team of programmes on disarmament, dismantlement, reintegration, community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management; (c) management and oversight of prisons and detention centres according to international standards; and (d) promotion of human rights and participation of women as decision makers in State institutions, political parties and initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building	–	–	32	32
Publications (number of publications)	–	–	2	2

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>2019 planned</i>	<i>2019 actual</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>
4. Joint thematic public human rights reports	–	–	2	2
Technical materials (number of materials)	–	–	11	11
5. Materials conveying advisory support to national interlocutors in key areas of the mandate	–	–	11	11

C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to: (a) foster cooperation and dialogue among the main political and social actors, build consensus and strengthen political stability and good governance; (b) support the efforts of national authorities and international partners to further develop and equip the Haitian National Police, as well as to facilitate local peace initiatives, to reduce gang and community violence and preserve a peaceful and stable environment; and (c) raise awareness of human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, and strengthen institutional accountability to address them and end impunity for the perpetrators.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: advice to support inclusive initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building; advice on the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions and responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; advance political, legal and economic reforms allowing for clearer national responsibility and accountability and policy implementation; support government efforts in undertaking constitutional reforms aimed at, among others, clarifying and simplifying the institutional framework and the alignment of the electoral calendar and the terms of office for elected State officials, and promote judicial reform and access to justice and basic services; advise the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Prison Administration on strengthening the capacity and oversight of the police and corrections services and procuring equipment required to reduce gang violence and improve security conditions; advise State institutions and agencies on consolidating and implementing action plans to promote and protect human rights and gender equality; and advise on the development of a regulatory arms control framework, including effective implementation of a holistic weapons and ammunition interinstitutional mechanism.

Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: missions to assess human rights and allegations of violations; implementation of the human rights due diligence policy; and joint monitoring missions to assess gang violence.

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: information materials (brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, promotional material) explaining the mission's mandate and developments; outreach events on key priorities of the mission, in close collaboration with the United Nations Communication Group; activities to support joint United Nations work in elections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction, police, corrections, justice and human rights; campaigns that will combine the use of traditional and digital media and radio networks; word-of-mouth communication campaign targeting national and international actors to showcase, in situ, a virtual reality video about disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction in Haiti; and production of content for dissemination through national and through community radios, in collaboration with the United Nations Communication Group.

External and media relations: strategic plan to ensure coverage of key activities of the mission, press conferences, press briefings, press releases, targeted interviews and publications with media in close coordination with the United Nations Communication Group and with target audiences and networks; and daily media monitoring and strategic analysis of media trends, risks and opportunities and crisis communication management.

Digital platforms and multimedia content: create and maintain digital platforms for the mission (web and social media); produce and disseminate content for different multimedia products and campaigns (with a focus on digital radio) that promote transparency and accountability and engage key actors on the priorities of the mission; and develop campaigns and products for social media platforms to show the impact of the mission's work and to engage key actors in priority areas, in close collaboration with the United Nations Communication Group, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2021

374. During its preparation of the proposed budget for 2021, BINUH took into full consideration the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as contained in its report [A/74/7/Add.24](#), as endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution [74/263 A](#).
375. With regard to the transferred assets to BINUH and the relevant reimbursement or cost recovery, the mission remained temporarily accommodated, as of May 2020, in the former MINUJUSTH office premises at the Logistics Base within the perimeter of the Port-au-Prince international airport,

pending the procurement of more suitable premises. While the Logistics Base was designed to support a large peacekeeping mission with its own logistics capacity, BINUH does not have enough capability to sustain its presence at the site.

376. A significant number of fixed and mobile assets and equipment were transferred from MINUJUSTH to BINUH for the purpose of sustaining the latter's presence at the Logistics Base. Similarly, a number of commercial service contracts were extended to support BINUH activities. Once BINUH relocates to more suitable office premises, most of the assets and equipment transferred to the mission will be disposed of in accordance with established United Nations financial regulations and rules, while commercial contracts deemed surplus to the mission's requirements will be terminated. BINUH has also taken steps to identify the operational support services received from MINUJUSTH during its start-up phase and initial operations when the two entities co-located, to ensure that the estimated cost of those services are properly accounted for.
377. With regard to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee for a cost-benefit analysis of different options to support the selection process for the location of headquarters premises for BINUH and the full justification for the option selected, the mission has conducted a cost-benefit analysis to inform its decision in the procurement process of the office premises. An initial analysis indicated that the annual financial cost of remaining at the current Logistics Base is higher than the option of relocating to the potential alternative locations currently identified by the mission. Given that the cost-benefit analysis contains commercial information and that the procurement exercise is ongoing, the details could not be provided at this stage.
378. With regard to seeking opportunities for co-location and cost-sharing with other United Nations system entities, BINUH is at the final stage of securing suitable office premises to establish its own headquarters, and opportunities will be sought to co-locate with the United Nations country team where practical and cost-effective. At the same time, BINUH has faced challenges in identifying a suitable office building that meets operational, security and reputational parameters, while offering additional space to support co-location with the United Nations country team.
379. With regard to programmatic activities and programmatic funding, including the roles and responsibilities and the division of labour between BINUH and the United Nations country team, the mission's operational activities contribute to the implementation of its strategic advice, advocacy and good offices mandate in key areas. Its operational activities facilitate its efforts to support and advise key government and institutional counterparts, facilitate political dialogue, and monitor and report on human rights violations and abuses. BINUH does not possess funding to carry out programmatic activities. For example, its operational funding might enable a mission representative to participate in a workshop as a trainer or observer, but the facilities and amenities for the workshop would be provided through programmatic funding managed by partners such as United Nations agencies.
380. Overall coordination between BINUH and the United Nations country team regarding agency-led programmatic funding activities will be carried out by the Programme Management Group, as well as by working groups aligned with the six Haiti benchmarks, as laid out in the integrated strategic framework for the United Nations system in Haiti. For the Peacebuilding Fund projects, the Peacebuilding Fund Steering Committee will ensure overall alignment, while individual technical coordination groups will carry out project-specific coordination. The mission's role in such projects is the provision of technical advice and support for counterparts.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 61

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2019	2020	2021		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2021 vs. 2020 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	7.6	800.2	826.4	—	26.2
Civilian personnel costs	2 595.2	13 673.7	13 727.2	—	53.5
Operational costs	671.0	5 640.3	4 935.8	—	(704.5)
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 273.8	20 114.2	19 489.4	—	(624.8)

Table 62

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2 ^a	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Services	General Service ^b	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	—	1	1	4	7	19	9	1	42	18	—	60	21	28	—	109
Proposed 2021	—	1	1	4	7	18	11	1	43	17	—	60	21	28	—	109
Regular positions, change	—	—	—	—	—	(1)	2	—	1	(1)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Approved general temporary assistance 2020	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	3	—	2	5	—	—	—	5
Proposed general temporary assistance 2021	—	—	—	1	1	1	—	—	3	—	2	5	—	—	—	5
General temporary assistance positions, change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total approved 2020	—	1	1	5	8	20	9	1	45	18	2	65	21	28	—	114
Total proposed 2021	—	1	1	5	8	19	11	1	46	17	2	65	21	28	—	114
Total change	—	—	—	—	—	(1)	2	—	1	(1)	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.^b Other level, unless otherwise stated.

381. The proposed resource requirements for 2021 for BINUH amount to \$19,489,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 13 United Nations police personnel (\$826,400), salaries and common staff costs (\$13,727,200) for 60 international positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 4 D-1, 7 P-5, 18 P-4, 11 P-3, 1 P-2 and 17 Field Service), 49 national

positions (21 National Professional Officer and 28 Local level), 5 general temporary assistance positions (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 2 General Service (Other level)), and 2 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$4,935,800), comprising the costs for official travel (\$252,000), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,593,400), ground transportation (\$218,700), communications and information technology (\$1,431,100), medical (\$183,500), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$257,100).

382. In 2021, the following changes are proposed to the organizational structure:

- (a) Realignment of the functions of the Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Section under two pillars, namely, the supply chain management pillar and the service delivery pillar;
- (b) Realignment of the current Procurement Team under the supply chain management pillar;
- (c) Establishment of an Acquisition and Contract Management Team and a Property Management and Centralized Warehousing Team under the supply chain management pillar;
- (d) Realignment of the current Medical Team, Engineering Team and Transport Team under the service delivery pillar;
- (e) Establishment of a Life Support Team under the service delivery pillar. The Team will be responsible for the provision of services and the management of general supplies, rations, fuel and goods and services for staff well-being activities;
- (f) Abolishment of the former Logistics Team, with its functions and team members subsumed under three new teams: (i) the Life Support Team; (ii) the Acquisition and Contract Management Team; and (iii) the Property Management and Centralized Warehousing Team.

383. In 2021, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement:

Political affairs and judicial reform pillar:

- (a) Reclassification/reassignment of one position of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (P-4) from the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation/Community Violence Reduction Section to one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-3) in the political affairs and judicial reform pillar. BINUH has assessed that the tasks of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation Unit could be adequately discharged by the Senior Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (P-5) and the two remaining Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officers (P-4), and hence it is proposed that this position be reclassified and reassigned to strengthen the capacity in the political affairs and judicial reform pillar, to facilitate integration, exchange of information and coordination with United Nations country team partners;

Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery Section:

- (b) Reassignment of the position of Chief of Section, Logistic (P-5) to Chief of Section, Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery, to align with the name of the Section;

Supply chain management pillar:

- (c) Redeployment of one Acquisition Planning Officer (Field Service) from the former Logistics Team to the Acquisition and Contract Management Team;
- (d) Redeployment of one Property Control and Inventory Assistant (Local level) and one Property Management Assistant (Local level) from the former Logistics Team to the Property Management and Centralized Warehousing Team;

Service delivery pillar:

- (e) Reclassification of one Engineering Technician (Field Service) to an Engineer (P-3) in the Engineering Team, to provide professional capacities to undertake the sensitive and complex functions of facilities management, waste management and environmental compliance;
 - (f) Redeployment of one Supply Assistant (Field Service) from the former Logistics Team to the Life Support Team;
 - (g) Redeployment of one Supply Assistant (Local level) from the immediate Office of the Chief of Section, Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery, to the Life Support Team.
384. In addition, it is proposed that five positions (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 General Service (Other level)), which were approved by the General Assembly in 2020 as general temporary assistance, be continued in 2021. The position of Principal Human Rights Officer (D-1) performs a substantive role in BINUH and the remaining four positions perform backstopping support from the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, which continue to be essential in ensuring sufficient capacities in the mission and at Headquarters for substantive guidance and administrative support, specifically in the light of the following:
- (a) Principal Human Rights Officer (D-1): The position is responsible for the issuance of public reports in consultation with the Special Representative and OHCHR in a timely and regular manner in accordance with the policy directives and guidance on public reporting by the missions. Accountability for human rights and abuses is one of the three priorities of the mission (along with police and good governance). Because the human rights situation remains of concern, the Principal Human Rights Officer will continue to assist the Government in improving compliance with human rights standards, given that the implementation of the human rights action plan, approved by the national human rights institution in December 2019, is pending the endorsement of the Council of Ministers. The Principal Human Rights Officer will advocate to move forward this important policy development on human rights and advise the national human rights institution on delivering its functions;
 - (b) Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5): The Senior Political Affairs Officer, as team leader of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations of the Secretariat Haiti team, will oversee the coordination process at Headquarters bringing together Haiti focal points from numerous Secretariat departments, services and offices, as well as from 19 agencies, funds and programmes. The team leader is responsible for coordinating Headquarters backstopping support in technical areas of the mandate of BINUH, including police, corrections, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, community violence reduction, human rights and electoral assistance support. The team leader oversees the monitoring and analysis of developments and emerging issues of concern in Haiti while maintaining up-to-date knowledge and providing guidance and advice on policy, operations and political aspects to senior management at Headquarters and to the leadership of BINUH and the United Nations country team. The year 2021 will be a critical year because the key political and reform processes supported by BINUH are expected to culminate then, hence the need for strong backstopping support from Headquarters;
 - (c) Political Affairs Officer (P-4): The Political Affairs Officer assists the Senior Political Affairs Officer (team leader) in all matters described above. To strengthen the integration of activities of BINUH and the United Nations country team and support the implementation of their integrated strategic framework, the Political Affairs Officer maintains close relationships with the headquarters of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and Secretariat offices leading the development and human rights pillars. With reports to the Security Council every four months since 2020, instead of every three, there has been an increased demand from Member States for information about Haiti and the work of BINUH. The Political Affairs Officer reviews available information in situation reports, cables, correspondence and media and identify matters for follow-up and the need for action. The incumbent prepares timely

responses to issues and questions raised in the field and at Headquarters and follows up on outstanding issues;

- (d) Team Assistant (General Service (Other level)): This backstopping position, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations Haiti team, continues to provide needed administrative support to the Haiti team in the Americas Division;
 - (e) Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)): The Finance and Budget Assistant, in the Field Operations Finance Division, is one of only two Finance and Budget Assistant positions made available from the budget of special political missions. This position remains essential to the Division in 2021, with the requirements remaining high for administrative and clerical support to Finance and Budget Officers for the cost estimates, budget proposals, budget administration and performance monitoring of all 39 special political missions, including BINUH, as well as the provision of requested written responses and materials in a timely manner to legislative and expert bodies during their review of budget proposals. The Finance and Budget Assistant assists in the development of resource requirements for budget submissions and in the preparation of budget performance submissions through data compilation and reconciliation. The incumbent researches data and other information required in the review and analysis of relevant proposals, consolidates data and provides support to the Finance and Budget Officers with respect to the provision of supplementary and other supporting information necessary for the budget review by the relevant intergovernmental and expert bodies.
385. A vacancy rate of 20 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, taking into account the most recent actual vacancy rates. Vacancy rates of 5 and 7 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, taking into account the most recent actual vacancy rates. The cost estimates for United Nations police and government-provided personnel for 2021 are based on the assumption of full deployment.
386. The decrease in requirements for 2021 compared with the appropriation for 2020 is attributable mainly to lower requirements under operational costs for: (a) consultants and consulting services owing to the BINUH initiative to transfer knowledge and expertise from the consulting services in 2020 to the staff members, with a view to gaining in-house efficiency; (b) official travel owing to the mission's initiative to achieve efficiency and maximum use of the alternative method of communications, such as videoconferencing; (c) ground transportation owing to the absence of the provision for acquisition of one armoured vehicle approved in 2020 budget; (d) communications and information technology owing to lower requirements for telecommunications and network services and the maintenance of communications and information technology equipment and support services; and (e) medical owing to fewer acquisition of vaccines, drugs and consumables, as well as fewer blood tests. The overall reduced requirements are offset in part by increased requirements for civilian personnel costs due mainly to higher requirements for national staff owing to the application of lower vacancy rates and the application of the revised salary scales, which was offset in part by the decreased requirements for international staff owing to the application of a higher vacancy rate.

Extrabudgetary resources

387. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2020 or are projected for BINUH for 2021.

Annex

Summary of follow-up action taken to implement decisions and requests made by the General Assembly in its resolution [74/263 A](#), including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly

Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ([A/74/7/Add.4](#))

The Advisory Committee regrets the persistent non-compliance with the advance purchase policy. While recognizing that, depending on the nature of the official business involved, the predictability of certain types of trips can vary, the Committee expects that the missions will give the matter priority attention and reiterates that more efforts are required, in particular in areas where travel can be better planned, including through the development of concrete plans and strategies to improve adherence to the advance purchase policy. The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will include information on such plans in his next budget submission (see [A/74/7/Add.2](#), para. 21) (para. 38).

The missions continue to improve adherence to the advance booking requirements, through the following actions:

- (a) Regular issuance of broadcast reminders is sent to raise the awareness of all staff to submit all official travel requests sufficiently in advance of departure;
- (b) Travel approvers are instructed not to approve late travel requests that are not submitted without satisfactory justification;
- (c) All non-substantive and training travel must adhere to the advance booking policy. For substantive travel, efforts are made to ensure compliance as much as possible, keeping in mind the volatile nature of the fields and political exigencies in the operating environment;
- (d) For consultations with national, regional and international stakeholders, measures are taken to strengthen coordination with event organizers to ensure timely identification of meeting dates and confirmation of participants to allow sufficient time for travel booking in advance.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ([A/74/7/Add.23](#))

The Advisory Committee recalls that it has previously welcomed the single integrated mission support structure of the two missions (see [A/73/498/Add.9](#), para. 16). The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the single integrated mission support structure, with a view to achieving maximum economies of scale and minimizing duplications (para. 16).

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 328 of the present report.

The Advisory Committee notes that, following the management reform, functions and resources relating to budget preparation and financial management, including for special political missions, have been redistributed between the relevant departments and offices, involving redeployments of resources in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2020. However, the

Since January 2019, the Field Operations Finance Division has assumed the responsibility for preparing and managing the budgets of all special political missions. With the transfer of this responsibility from the Programme Planning and Budget Division, the Field Operations Finance Division received one Finance and Budget Officer (P-4), funded from the

Brief description of the recommendation
Action taken to implement the recommendation

Committee further notes that there is a need for greater clarity with respect to ongoing functions, workload, related resources and capacity, including the posts and positions of the respective offices concerned. The Committee recommends that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide comprehensive information, with detailed rationale, in the context of his proposed budget for peacekeeping support account for 2020/21 and the proposed programme budget for 2021, including the main report on the special political missions (see also [A/74/7/Add.24](#), para. 27) (para. 21).

The Advisory Committee encourages the Secretary-General to continue to strengthen the Mission's national staffing complement, as appropriate, in the context of future budget submissions ([A/73/498/Add.9](#)) (para. 23).

The Advisory Committee notes the efforts undertaken to recruit staff and encourages the Secretary-General to continue to expedite recruitment during 2020 (see [A/73/498/Add.9](#), para. 18) (para. 24).

The Advisory Committee therefore recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to ensure that renovation work relating to villas 1 to 6 are completed without further delay and that the rental of the marine vessel is terminated no later than 31 March 2020. Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to ensure that all necessary arrangements and refurbishment work relating to the remaining land-based accommodation and office facilities are completed as expeditiously as possible, within the approved resources and estimated timelines ([A/73/498/Add.9](#), para. 23) (para. 28).

The Advisory Committee trusts that information regarding the capacity and completion timeline of each of the land-based accommodation and office facilities will be provided in the context of the proposed budget for 2021 (para. 29).

The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will ensure that medical services are fully functional in Hudaydah and that a Mission clinic will be set up inside its renovated facilities as a priority as soon as the facilities become available (para. 35).

budget of UNSOM and one Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)), funded from the budget of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.

To provide capacity for the preparation of the UNMHA and BINUH budgets, as well as the efficient servicing of legislative review, two positions were approved in the context of the proposed budget for 2020, both as general temporary assistance, comprising one Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) funded from the budget of UNMHA and one Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)) funded from the budget of BINUH.

Additional information has been included in the relevant proposed post and non-post resources under UNMHA and BINUH regarding the functions and responsibilities of these positions and the continued needs for such capacities.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 329 of the present report.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 330 of the present report.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 331 of the present report.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 332 of the present report.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 333 of the present report.

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

The Advisory Committee trusts that information on progress made in mine detection and mine-clearing services will be provided in the context of the proposed budget for 2021 (para. 36).

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 334 of the present report.

The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the cost-sharing and cost-recovery arrangements will be provided in the context of the proposed budget for 2021 for the Mission (para. 39).

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 335 of the present report.

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/74/7/Add.24)

While recognizing the fluid nature of planning and uncertainty during the startup phase of a special political mission, and taking into account also the above-mentioned changes resulting from the transition to the annual programme budget (see para. 10 above), the Advisory Committee nevertheless considers that the 2020 budget proposal for BINUH does not provide adequate justification for the post and non-post resource requirements of the Office in 2020. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide a fully justified proposal on resource requirements as well as on proposed staffing and organizational structures based on operational tasks and planning assumptions, particularly for new missions and offices (para. 11).

Cognizant of the Advisory Committee's recommendation, the mission has critically reviewed, during the preparation of the 2021 budget, its resource requirement, including the organizational structure and staffing complement, taking into account its planning assumptions and the operating environment to implement its mandate.

The staffing structure established in 2020 programme plan and budget provides BINUH with the adequate staffing requirement for delivering the mandated activities. In 2021, BINUH will operate on the same scale because there has been no change in its mandate and thus the total staffing requirement and organizational structure will remain largely the same, with slight adjustments being proposed to some of its organizational units to best address operational needs and increase effectiveness.

The mission has determined that its current staffing strength and organizational structure remain a valid requirement for effectively conducting its substantive activities and ensuring operational support and maintaining the appropriate level of internal control.

The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will provide comprehensive and transparent information on the transferred assets and reimbursement or cost recovery in his next reports on the liquidation of MINUJUSTH, as well as in his next budget submission for BINUH (para. 12).

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraphs 375 and 376 of the present report.

While taking note of the statement by the Secretariat that BINUH does not undertake programmatic activities and does not possess any programmatic funding, the Advisory Committee observes that the Office will be undertaking a number of operational activities. The Committee considers that in order to ensure the proper functioning of the integrated team in alignment with its mandate, there is a need to establish more precise definitions of what constitutes a programmatic activity and programmatic funding, to specify roles and responsibilities and to better clarify the division of

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraphs 379 and 380 of the present report.

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

labour between BINUH and the United Nations country team, as well as to formalize the coordination mechanisms between the two entities. Accordingly, the Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to clarify the above, as well as to establish clearer and agreed definitions in his next budget submission (para. 16).

The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to continue to seek opportunities for co-location and cost-sharing with other United Nations system entities and to report on those efforts in his next budget submission (para. 17).

The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include an update on the use of the Peacebuilding Fund in future budget submissions (para. 18).

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 378 of the present report.

To ensure the sustainability of the previous missions' activities in the areas of justice, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration/community violence reduction and electoral assistance, as well as their orderly transfer to the country team, four Peacebuilding Fund projects totalling approximately \$8.8 million have been proposed for implementation over the coming two years. The first two projects recently received their initial tranches of funding. Building on the work undertaken by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti and MINUJUSTH.

The first project focuses on strengthening access to justice and operationalizing the 2018 legal aid law, with a view to reducing pretrial detention numbers. As the lead agency for the Peacebuilding Fund's access to justice project, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has received the first tranche of the funding (\$1.75 million corresponding to 70 per cent of the total). UNDP, UN-Women and the United Nations Children's Fund, supported by BINUH, are preparing a draft joint workplan and have developed a coordination matrix determining the roles and responsibilities of each entity, including the expectations of BINUH in terms of advocacy and advice.

The second project is intended to strengthen national capacity for arms and ammunition control, with a focus on establishing national-level laws and policies while supporting operational interventions at the Dominican Republic border. This project, estimated at \$1.07 million, also builds on previous border policing work and is intended to strengthen the national-level capacities of the Haitian National Police and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Coordination meetings are being convened with police, customs and immigration officials on both sides of the border, while a coordination task force has been established.

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

The Advisory Committee welcomes the inclusion of a total of 21 National Professional Officers in the staffing complement of BINUH. The Committee has frequently called for an expanded use of National Professional Officers in field missions and encourages BINUH to continue to seek opportunities for increasing the proportion of National Professional Officer positions in its staffing complement (para. 22).

The Advisory Committee notes that following the management reform, functions and resources relating to budget preparation and financial management, including for special political missions, have been redistributed among the relevant departments and offices, involving redeployments of resources in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2020. However, the Committee further notes that there is a need for greater clarity with respect to ongoing functions, workload, related resources and capacity, including posts and positions in the respective offices concerned. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide comprehensive information, with detailed rationale, in the context of his proposed budget for the peacekeeping support account for the period 2020/21 and the proposed programme budget for 2021, including the main report on the special political missions (para. 29).

In addition, a project on building mechanisms to prevent electoral and political violence against women in Haiti was recently approved.

A fourth project, which is intended to mitigate community violence in two neighbourhoods of Port-au-Prince by addressing immediate livelihood needs and building social cohesion, may be divided into two projects: the first focused on labour-intensive activities and vocational training in the two areas and the second on implementing a citizen security approach.

A joint steering committee for the whole Peacebuilding Fund portfolio has been convened and recruitment is ongoing for staff members to serve as the Peacebuilding Fund secretariat within the Resident Coordinator's Office.

None of the funds from the Peacebuilding Fund will be transferred to BINUH because its role in the projects is the provision of good offices, technical expertise and political leverage among counterparts.

BINUH remains committed to increasing the proportion of National Professional Officer positions in its staffing complement. Depending on the requirement of specific technical expertise for the job responsibilities of the professional positions, BINUH will continue its efforts to seek opportunities to increase the percentage of National Professional Officer positions in future budget periods.

Since January 2019, the Field Operations Finance Division has assumed the responsibility for preparing and managing the budgets of all special political missions. With the transfer of this responsibility from the Programme Planning and Budget Division, the Field Operations Finance Division received one Finance and Budget Officer (P-4), funded from the budget of UNSOM, and one Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)), funded from the budget of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.

To ensure sufficient capacity for the preparation of the budgets of 39 special political missions, as well as the efficient servicing of legislative deliberation, two positions were approved in the context of the proposed budget for 2020, both as general temporary assistance, comprising one Finance and Budget Officer (P-3), funded from the budget of UNMHA, and one Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service (Other level)), funded from the budget of BINUH.

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

The Advisory Committee expects the Secretary-General to continue to closely monitor the vehicle holdings with a view to bringing the projected vehicle ratio in closer alignment with the standard allocation rate, and to report on this matter in his next budget submission for BINUH (para. 36).

The Advisory Committee considers that a comprehensive accounting of costs incurred by BINUH should be maintained, regardless of their reimbursement to MINUJUSTH, and trusts that the Secretary-General will provide an update on this matter in his next budget submission (para. 38).

The Advisory Committee notes that the expected costs of the eventual BINUH headquarters in Port-au-Prince may be considerably higher than those at the current location which also served as the headquarters for MINUJUSTH. The Committee is of the view that the selection of a headquarters for BINUH should be subject to a cost-benefit analysis that allows comparisons between different options, one of which should be to maintain the headquarters in the current premises. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of different options to support the selection process for the location of headquarters premises for BINUH and to provide full justification for the option selected in his next budget submission (para. 39).

Additional information has been included in the current report, under the proposed post and non-post resources under UNMHA and BINUH, regarding the functions and responsibilities of these positions, and the continued need for such capacities.

The vehicle holdings at BINUH are 48.1 per cent higher than the standard allocation, which is attributable to: (a) the requirement for teams to travel to remote regions in support of mandate delivery; (b) the higher-than-normal wear and tear owing to road conditions, as well as the age and mechanical condition of vehicles; (c) the operational requirement for a pool of vehicles to support dispatch services in the light of the high mobility of mission personnel, and the frequent maintenance and repair caused by the poor conditions of the vehicles, affecting the time that they can be used. The mission will continue to monitor the vehicle holdings with a view to bringing the ratio in closer alignment with the standard allocation rate.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 376 of the present report.

Response to this recommendation is provided in paragraph 377 of the present report.