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General and complete disarmament

Nuclear disarmament; follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; reducing nuclear danger

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present annual report refers to the efforts undertaken to facilitate the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and contains a compilation of views submitted by Member States.

* [A/75/50](#).



Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction	3
II. Observations	3
III. Information received from Governments	6
Brazil	6
Cuba	7
Ecuador	8
Iran (Islamic Republic of).....	9
Mexico	10
Ukraine.....	11

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in General Assembly resolutions [74/44](#), [74/45](#) and [74/59](#).
2. In paragraph 3 of resolution [74/59](#), the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures which they have taken with respect to the implementation of that resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the Assembly of that information at its seventy-fifth session.
3. In paragraph 22 of resolution [74/45](#), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session a report on the implementation of that resolution.
4. In paragraph 5 of resolution [74/44](#), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute to the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war ([A/56/400](#), para. 3), and also to continue to encourage Member States to consider the convening of an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (resolution [55/2](#)), to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session.
5. By note verbale dated 29 January 2020, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issue. A revised note verbale was sent to Member States on 4 May 2020 extending the deadline for submission of reports until 31 May 2020. Replies received from Member States are included in section III below; any replies received after the deadline will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs,¹ in the language of submission only. No addenda will be issued.

II. Observations

6. Since the previous report ([A/74/158](#)), States have undertaken various efforts to facilitate the implementation of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. In particular:
 - (a) A high-level plenary meeting of the General Assembly to commemorate and promote the International Day against Nuclear Tests was held on 9 September 2019 at United Nations Headquarters. Opening statements were made by the President of the seventy-third session of the Assembly, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) and by the Secretary-General. The Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Ambassador of Sweden to Mexico and former Spokesperson of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Annika Thunborg, also delivered statements. Following those statements, a plenary debate was held to highlight the importance of achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to put a legal and verifiable end to the testing of nuclear weapons and other nuclear devices;
 - (b) Pursuant to the declaration, by the General Assembly, of 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (resolution [68/32](#)), the meeting to commemorate that day was held on 26 September 2019. It was chaired by the President of the seventy-fourth session of the Assembly, Tijjani Muhammad-Bande (Nigeria). The Secretary-General marked the occasion with a

¹ www.un.org/disarmament.

message in which he highlighted that the only way to eliminate the threat posed by nuclear weapons was to eliminate the weapons themselves. As was the case in 2018, civil society also made an important contribution to the commemoration and promotion of the International Day;

(c) Owing to the situation concerning the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the General Assembly decided on 2 April 2020 to postpone the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission to a period in 2021 to be decided by the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session (decision 74/546). An organizational meeting held previously had ended inconclusively;

(d) Successive Presidents of the Conference on Disarmament worked strenuously on several versions of a draft programme of work for the 2020 session, which did not achieve consensus among the States members of the Conference. The lockdown measures imposed under the COVID-19 pandemic effectively impeded the holding of meetings from mid-March until the end of June 2020, when a first plenary meeting of the Conference was held with delegates physically present in the room and a limited number connected remotely through a multilingual digital platform;

(e) The two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals continued to implement the reductions agreed to in the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. According to information provided by the parties, the United States and the Russian Federation met the central limits on strategic arms of the Treaty. As at 1 March 2020, according to the data provided by the parties on their aggregate holdings of strategic offensive arms, the Russian Federation possessed 485 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and 1,326 warheads on those systems, and the United States possessed 655 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and 1,372 warheads on those systems. The Treaty will remain in force until 5 February 2021 unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms or the parties decide to extend it by no more than five years.

7. In addition to the efforts discussed above, the following other multilateral initiatives have been pursued that could contribute to the achievement of a world without nuclear weapons:

(a) At the eleventh Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York on 25 September 2019, ministers for foreign affairs and other high-level representatives of States adopted a Final Declaration and Measures to Promote the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. In the declaration, they reaffirmed the vital importance and urgency of the entry into force of the Treaty and urged the remaining eight annex 2 States, whose ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty, to sign and ratify it without further delay;

(b) On 27 March 2020, owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons decided to postpone the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, originally scheduled to be held from 27 April to 22 May 2020, to a later date, as soon as circumstances permit, but no later than April 2021. In 2019, the Office for Disarmament Affairs commenced a project financed by the European Union pursuant to Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/615 of 15 April 2019, which supported preparations for the Review Conference with regional meetings in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, as well as thematic seminars on disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Regional meetings in Latin America and the Caribbean and the Middle East will be held as soon as circumstances permit;

(c) The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will enter into force 90 days following the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification. As at 1 July 2020, 81 States had signed the Treaty, 37 had ratified it and 1 had acceded to it;

(d) Since 2018, the Office for Disarmament Affairs has been implementing a multi-year project financed by the European Union, pursuant to Council Decision (EU) 2017/2284 to provide support to States in the African, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and Caribbean regions to participate in the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group consultative process. As part of the project, in 2019, regional workshops were held for Member States from Central and West Africa, East and Southern Africa and Latin America. Two expert round tables were also convened in 2019 for Latin American and Caribbean experts and for African and Asian experts. In addition, a national round table was held for the Peruvian national authorities. Project activities were aimed at facilitating dialogue at the regional and subregional levels among Member States, regional organizations and representatives of academia and civil society on the implications of a future treaty and its relationship with existing regional and global disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. Participants were encouraged to share knowledge and information across regions on issues relevant to banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; exchange views and discuss challenges and ways ahead in relation to a future treaty; and build their knowledge on the structure and functions of relevant negotiation forums and procedures. In 2020, project activities were significantly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and project implementation was adjusted accordingly;

(e) The first session of the Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 18 to 22 November 2019 in accordance with General Assembly decision 73/546. Jordan was elected President of the Conference. Following a general debate and a thematic debate, the Conference adopted a political declaration in which the participating States, inter alia, declared their intent and solemn commitment to pursue, in an open and inclusive manner with all invited States, the elaboration of a legally binding treaty to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by consensus by the States of the region, expressing their belief that the establishment of a verifiable Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would greatly enhance regional and international peace and security. The Conference decided that its second session would be held from 16 to 20 November 2020 at United Nations Headquarters in New York;

(f) At its seventy-fourth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution [74/50](#), in which it requested the Secretary-General to seek the substantive views of Member States on the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification that met in 2018 and 2019 ([A/74/90](#)) and to report back to the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session. Accordingly, the report of the Secretary-General on nuclear disarmament verification is before the Assembly ([A/75/126](#)). The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to establish a new group of governmental experts, chosen on the basis of equitable geographical representation and equitable representation of women and men, to meet in Geneva in 2021 and 2022 to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues, including, inter alia, the concept of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts, building on the report of the previous Group of Governmental Experts and the views of Member States on that report as contained in the report of the Secretary-General.

8. Despite some progress in implementing nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and pursuing new initiatives to support those goals,

setbacks and growing impatience with the slow pace of progress have persisted. In particular:

(a) Despite substantive discussions at the 2020 session, the Conference on Disarmament has not resumed negotiations;

(b) While efforts towards reducing existing stockpiles are acknowledged, the estimated total number of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, still amounts to several thousand. Moreover, States continue to rely on nuclear weapons in defence and security policies, and those possessing nuclear weapons are undertaking programmes to modernize their weapons, delivery systems and related infrastructure;

(c) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea announced that it would no longer uphold moratoriums on nuclear explosive tests and launches of long-range ballistic missiles, although it took no reported steps to resume such activities. Over the course of 2019, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea launched 20 ballistic missiles and artillery rockets on 13 separate occasions, prompting the Security Council to convene consultations in response. The diplomatic efforts that began in 2018 continued to be stuck at an impasse; no further steps towards the realization of the objectives of complete and verifiable denuclearization and sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula were taken;

(d) The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ceased to be in force on 2 August 2019, following the withdrawal of the United States. Under the Treaty, which had been in force since 1987, the Russian Federation (before 1991, the Soviet Union) and the United States had eliminated their nuclear and conventionally armed ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres.

9. Pursuant to the Secretary-General's agenda for disarmament, entitled "Securing our Common Future", launched on 24 May 2018 in Geneva, the Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs will continue strengthening their efforts to facilitate dialogue among Member States, through engagement in formal and informal settings, in order to help Member States to return to a common vision and path leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

III. Information received from Governments

Brazil

[Original: English]
[31 May 2020]

The Brazilian Government is firmly committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The 1988 Federal Constitution bans the use of nuclear energy for non-peaceful purposes and makes nuclear activities subject to the approval of the National Congress (article 21). Since 1998, Brazil has been a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and actively participates in its review conferences, calling for the fulfilment of commitments on nuclear disarmament. Brazil is also actively engaged on the topic in other relevant multilateral forums, such as the First Committee of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament.

In addition to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Brazil is a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), concluded in 1967, which pioneered the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region, in addition to establishing an international organization responsible for ensuring compliance with the Treaty, the

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL).

In 2017, Brazil also signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

Since 1991, the Brazilian nuclear programme has been subject to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials, a unique model for the reciprocal application of verification measures.

Brazil also has a legal framework and agencies responsible for the safety and security of its nuclear installations, in line with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and the best practices promoted by IAEA. In the field of export control, it has a robust regulatory framework and policies designed to ensure that transfers of sensitive goods and technologies and dual-use goods are not diverted to proliferation activities.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[20 April 2020]

Cuba reaffirms the importance of the conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. In this regard, Cuba has participated actively in the main multilateral forums at which the topic is considered, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission, the conferences to negotiate the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the meetings of States parties, the review conferences and the preparatory committees for the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the high-level meetings to commemorate and promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

It is troubling that nuclear-weapon States and others protected by the so-called nuclear umbrella are still failing to fulfil their legal obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, which created the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area, Cuba has called upon nuclear-weapon States to take part in multilateral negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.

At a time when unilateral and interfering policies are rife, Cuba reiterates its full support for the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace, signed at the second Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, held in Havana in 2014.

Although almost 24 years have gone by since the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, declared the use of nuclear weapons unlawful, very little progress has been made towards the total elimination of such weapons. On the contrary, nuclear deterrence continues to be a core element of the military defence and security doctrines of some States, which are even considering the use of nuclear weapons in response to attacks using non-nuclear weapons.

Cuba opposes the enhancement and modernization of nuclear arsenals and the development of new types of nuclear weapons, as these actions are inconsistent with the objectives and provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the aspiration of a

nuclear-weapon-free world. It is unfortunate that the United States decided to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed with the Soviet Union in 1987, and the nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran; both decisions threaten global stability and undermine the disarmament architecture. Cuba is deeply concerned by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, which lowers the threshold for considering the use of nuclear weapons, including in response to so-called “strategic non-nuclear threats”, in contravention of the norms and principles of international law and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Cuba reiterates its firm commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world and reaffirms its political will to strengthen and consolidate multilateralism and comply with international treaties on disarmament. To that end, the early entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and its universalization are crucial. This legally binding international agreement prohibits the use of nuclear weapons, without any exceptions or mitigating circumstances.

Cuba reiterates its defence of the inalienable right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, without discrimination, given its contribution to the socioeconomic development of countries.

Cuba maintains its principled position that the only effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, within a clearly defined time frame.

Ecuador

[Original: Spanish]
[31 May 2020]

The foreign policy of Ecuador relating to nuclear weapons has always been guided by its Constitution, which condemns the development, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as they are a threat to the survival of humankind and harmful to nature.

In line with these principles, Ecuador has ratified all the international instruments related to nuclear weapons, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the additional protocols on safeguards and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Article 1 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons expressly prohibits the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Thus, this legally binding instrument reaffirmed the decision of the International Court of Justice that if the use of a weapon is illegal, which is the case for nuclear weapons because they are contrary to the principles of international humanitarian law, the threat of their use is also illegal.

Consequently, all States should remove from their military doctrines any reference to nuclear deterrence and refrain from engaging in military preparations that entail the possibility, and therefore the threat, of the use of nuclear weapons, whether their own or in the context of broad alliances.

Ecuador has stated, in various forums and together with other countries of the region, including through the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constitutes a crime against humanity and a violation of international law, including international humanitarian law, as well as the Charter of the United Nations (fourth special declaration, on

nuclear disarmament, adopted at the fifth Summit of Heads of State and Government of CELAC).

Following the prohibition of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument, namely, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the only effective guarantee against their use or threat of use is their total elimination, in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, within a defined time frame.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

[Original: English]
[31 May 2020]

The nuclear holocaust committed by the United States of America in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 proved that nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat for the survival of humankind and that any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. The only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination and assuring that they will never be produced again.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is firmly committed to pursuing the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. Accordingly, Iran has consistently strived to promote this objective in relevant multilateral forums.

Iran has continued to support the General Assembly resolutions on nuclear disarmament.

In the context of the review conferences of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran has persistently called for the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations undertaken under article VI of the Treaty. Iran has also expressed its deep concern over the continuing non-compliance of nuclear-weapon States with their nuclear disarmament obligations.

The current lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament is largely a consequence of the aggressive nuclear posture of the United States, coupled with its clear and persistent non-compliance with bilateral and multilateral obligations on nuclear disarmament. This irresponsible United States policy stresses the utility of retaining nuclear weapons indefinitely; threatens to strike non-nuclear-weapon States and in response to non-nuclear threats; pursues the development and deployment of new low-yield nuclear weapons; and plans to spend \$1.2 trillion in 30 years on a tremendous build-up and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. This poses the gravest threat to the objective of nuclear disarmament and the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Iran has called upon the nuclear-weapon States to commit to refraining from pursuing policies that are inconsistent with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Iran has proposed that the Final Document of the 2020 Review Conference should include a clear commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to cease completely and immediately all plans aimed at upgrading and refurbishing their existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as developing new types of nuclear weapon systems.

Iran has underlined that the implementation of the obligation, under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament is absolutely unconditional.

As unanimously concluded by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, “the legal import of that obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects – by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith”.

Iran has consistently advocated in the Conference on Disarmament the top priority of immediate commencement of negotiations on and the early conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons to prohibit their possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use and to provide for their destruction.

Iran has supported the early convening of the United Nations high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament. Such a conference provides the international community of States with a valuable opportunity to review the progress made regarding nuclear disarmament. This conference can be utilized to advance the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world, including by making concrete decisions, such as identifying a deadline for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]
[27 May 2020]

Given that the United Nations emerged at the same time as the nuclear age, the interest of Member States in disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, is central to the work of the Organization.

Mexico is a non-nuclear-weapon State firmly committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as it is aware of the devastating short-, medium- and long-term effects that an intentional or accidental nuclear detonation could have at the regional and global levels. The pursuit and promotion of the total elimination of nuclear weapons have therefore been key elements of the national position of Mexico, in accordance with its foreign policy principles and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

In the light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons of 8 July 1996, by which the Court concluded that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, Mexico participates actively and vigorously in the various multilateral and regional forums for nuclear disarmament negotiations and discussions.

Evidence of this includes the active and vigorous participation of Mexico in driving and enabling the negotiation, creation and adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, adopted on 7 July 2017. This Treaty is a historic milestone, and its adoption and eventual entry into force represent an important step forward, establishing the existence of an international custom that prohibits the production, possession, use and transfer of nuclear weapons by the States that have decided to accede to it. This instrument is consistent with the recognized diplomatic tradition of support shown by Mexico for disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Mexico therefore deposited its instrument of ratification of the Treaty on 16 January 2018.

In keeping with the convictions and principles of its foreign policy, Mexico also encourages countries, in particular those of Latin America and the Caribbean, to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in order to achieve its

early entry into force. Mexico will also continue to participate actively in the various forums dealing with nuclear disarmament.

Since 2009, Mexico has proposed an amendment within the framework of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in order to characterize the use of nuclear weapons during an international armed conflict as a war crime.

At the seventy-fourth session of the General Assembly, Mexico, in its national capacity and with the support of other States, was the co-author or main sponsor of the following resolutions on disarmament issues adopted by the First Committee:

- (a) Resolution 74/27: Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco);
- (b) Resolution 74/47: Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world;
- (c) Resolution 74/41: Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;
- (d) Resolution 74/42: Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons;
- (e) Resolution 74/46: Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments;
- (f) Resolution 74/48: Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas;
- (g) Resolution 74/50: Nuclear disarmament verification;
- (h) Resolution 74/59: Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons;
- (i) Resolution 74/64: Youth, disarmament and non-proliferation;
- (j) Resolution 74/78: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Ukraine

[Original: English]
[11 May 2020]

Ukraine is fully committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Being a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, Ukraine is establishing the relevant legal basis and exercises State control over international transfers of goods that could be used for the creation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Ukraine is gradually taking measures in order to establish responsibility and introduce penalties for violations of international law in this area to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other explosive devices.

In 2004, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Decree No. 86, which sets out the procedures for international transfers of dual-use goods, including nuclear goods. The single list of dual-use goods that are subject to the above-mentioned procedures is attached to the Decree. The structure and content of the single list correspond to the control lists of the international export control regimes, such as the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group.

In order to ensure transparency in transfers, and pursuant to its national legislation, Ukraine submits reports to IAEA on international transfers of specified equipment and non-nuclear material listed in annex II to the Protocol Additional to the Agreement between Ukraine and IAEA for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Pursuant to paragraph 7.8 of the Understandings of the Zangger Committee, Ukraine submits reports annually to the Secretariat on the licenses issued for the transfer, to non-nuclear-weapon States that are not parties to the Treaty, of goods specified in the trigger list and intended for peaceful purposes.
