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General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament

Letter dated 18 April 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Further to our letters dated 16 August 2017 and 30 November 2018 ([S/2017/720](#) and [A/73/644-S/2018/1075](#)), and in connection with several communications from other Member States, I have the honour to once again reiterate the position of the Russian Federation in regard to the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a full Member of the United Nations and a State party to many multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. None of these instruments, including resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), prohibit Iran from developing missile and space programmes.

For its part, the International Atomic Energy Agency has consistently, since Implementation Day, reported on Iran's full compliance with its nuclear-related commitments under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and on the continuous provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, thus, inter alia, assuring the international community that Iran is not engaging in activities, including at the research and development level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device. There is also absolutely no evidence that Tehran is deploying any infrastructure for the storage or servicing of nuclear weapons.

Given the complete lack of evidence that Iran is developing or producing a nuclear weapon or means of its delivery, the Russian Federation continues to proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. As of yet, no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council.

We continue to view with regret the continued disregard by certain Member States of the nature and scope of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is obviously viewed by them not as an export-control arrangement but as an instrument to launch baseless speculations of alleged violations by Iran of its obligations under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). It is all the more surprising when such actions are taken by a



Member State that not only “withdrew” from this decision of the Security Council, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, but is also overtly taking steps to undermine efforts by the international community to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

In this context, we would like to once again underline that the category I parameters of the annex to the Missile Technology Control Regime are nothing but a reference tool for exporting States and were never intended to be used in the context of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to ascertain whether or not certain ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is well known that such types of missiles should include certain specific features, and up until now no evidence of their existence on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles has ever been presented in any of the communications to the Security Council in connection with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

I should be grateful for the circulation of the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 101 (b), and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vassily **Nebenzia**
