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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD
TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF
INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES

(covering its work during 1967)

Reporters: Mr. Mohsen S. ESFANDIARY (Iran)

CHAPTER VI

TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

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* This document contains chapter VI of the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly. The general introductory chapter will be issued subsequently under the symbol A/67CO (Part I). Other chapters of the report will be issued as addenda.

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I. ACTION PREVIOUSLY TAKEN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

1. In 1960, the General Assembly, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations and requested the Government of Portugal to transmit to the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI, information on the conditions prevailing in the Territories concerned.

2. Early in 1961, following the outbreak of disturbances in Angola, the General Assembly (at its resumed fifteenth session) and the Security Council became seized with the question of the situation in that Territory and a sub-committee was appointed to study and report thereon.^{1/}

3. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1742 (XVI) of 30 January 1962 concerning Angola whereby it reaffirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence and called on Portugal to cease repressive measures and undertake reforms with a view to the transfer of power to the Angola people. The General Assembly also considered as a separate item the "Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV)". In connexion with this item, the Assembly, by resolution 1699 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, established a special committee to examine the available information on Territories under Portuguese administration and to submit observations, conclusions and recommendations to the Assembly and any other body appointed by the Assembly to assist it in the implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.^{2/}

4. At its seventeenth session the General Assembly adopted resolution 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962 in which it approved the Special Committee's report and urged the Portuguese Government to give effect to the recommendations contained in that report, in particular by taking the following measures:

^{1/} General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and Security Council resolution 163 (1961). See also Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978 and Corr.2).

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54 (A/5160 and Add.1 and 2).

"(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence

"(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;

"(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;

"(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);

"(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;"

5. Between 1962 and 1965, the Territories under Portuguese administration were the subject of resolutions by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,^{3/} the General Assembly^{4/} and the Security Council,^{5/} all of which sought to obtain fulfilment by Portugal of the measures referred to above. The resolutions also contained appeals for supportive action by other States and international institutions, including the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Thus, the Security Council, in its resolution 218 (1965) requested all States:

"to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration, and take all measures to prevent the

^{3/} Ibid., addendum to item 25 (A/5238); ibid., Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chapter II, para. 251; ibid., Nineteenth Session, Annex No. 8 (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, para. 352; ibid., Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, para 415.

^{4/} General Assembly resolutions 1913 (XVIII) of 3 December 1963, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965.

^{5/} Security Council resolutions 180 (1963), 183 (1963) and 218 (1965).

sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

A similar appeal was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2107 (XX). In addition, however, the Assembly, inter alia, urged Member States to take certain coercive measures, including the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations and a boycott of trade with Portugal, and appealed to all specialized agencies of the United Nations to refrain from granting assistance to Portugal so long as the latter failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

6. During 1966, the Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at meetings held in May and June during its visit to Africa and again in October at Headquarters.

7. At the first series of meetings, the Special Committee heard petitioners from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe. It also considered the situation of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and Member States in response to various resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly.^{6/}

8. At its 455th meeting, on 22 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Add.3, part I, para. 675) whereby, in addition to reaffirming its previous decisions and recommendations, it recommended that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The Special Committee also requested all States, and in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take the following steps: (a) refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its administration; (b) take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal; (c) stop

^{6/} Special Committee resolution of 10 June 1965 (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 415) and General Assembly resolutions 2040 (XX) of 7 December 1965 and 2107 (XX).

the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition. It appealed once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It also reiterated an earlier request to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who had suffered and were still suffering from military operations.

9. On 1 July 1966, the Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of this resolution (S/7394) together with the text of another resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), in operative paragraph 3 of which it recommended to the Security Council "to make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Portugal..." (S/7395).

10. Continuing its discussion on the Territories under Portuguese administration in October, the Special Committee had before it a supplementary report, submitted by Sub-Committee I in connexion with a study initiated in 1964 on the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration. On 6 October, the Special Committee adopted the supplementary report of the Sub-Committee and included it in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, together with the background papers prepared by the Secretariat on agriculture and processing industries, foreign-owned railways and Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In doing so, the Special Committee reaffirmed all its conclusions and recommendations contained in its 1965 report on this subject (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V), and decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it inscribe on the agenda of its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and other colonial Territories".

11. In a letter dated 21 September 1966, the acting permanent representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that Portugal was allowing foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of his country and requested that the Security Council be convened. The Security Council discussed this question at four meetings held in September and October and on 14 October adopted a resolution (226 (1966)). In this resolution, the Security Council urged the Government of Portugal, in view of its statement denying the charges, "not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo"; called upon all States "to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the resolution.
12. In operative paragraph 6 of resolution 218 (1965), the Security Council had requested the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of that resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966.
13. In his report (S/7385 and Add.1-4), the Secretary-General made public the replies of Governments, including an exchange of correspondence he had had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal with a view to fulfilling his mandate from the Security Council. Although in one of his letters the Foreign Minister had indicated that while the Portuguese Government had made the most explicit reservations regarding Security Council resolution 218 (1965), without prejudice to those reservations, it was "prepared to discuss problems of regional co-operation in Africa and questions of international peace and security in that continent". "Within this context" the Foreign Minister suggested that conversations could be initiated immediately following the termination of the general debate at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly and that a date could be then fixed in view of the circumstances. However, although the general debate ended on 18 October, as at 14 November 1966 no further information had been received from the

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Portugal and no discussions had taken place with the Secretary-General.

14. The Fourth Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on the basis of the Special Committee's report (A/6300/Add.3, part I and Corr.1 and A/6300/Add.3, part II).

15. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly, on 12 December 1966, adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) on the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination to freedom and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve this right;

"2. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories under Portuguese administration and endorses the conclusions and recommendations contained therein;

"3. Condemns, as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Government of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa;

"4. Further condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources and impede the progress towards freedom and independence of the peoples of the Territories;

"5. Calls upon Portugal to apply immediately the principle of self-determination to the peoples of the Territories under its administration, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and Security Council resolutions 183 (1963) and 218 (1965);

"6. Appeals to all States to give the peoples of the Territory under Portuguese domination the moral and material support necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, especially in regard to investment in the Territories;

"7. Recommends to the Security Council that it make it obligatory for all States, directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members, to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof;

/...

"8. Requests all States, and in particular the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to take the following steps:

(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the African peoples in the Territories under its domination;

(b) To take all necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal;

(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition;

(d) To take the necessary measures to put an end to such activities as are referred to in paragraph 4 above;

"9. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order to secure its compliance with General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965 and 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965 and with the present resolution;

"11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the aid they have extended so far, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering owing to military operations;

"12. Decides to include the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration in the provisional agenda of its twenty-second session."

throwing up the logic of our position to submit to the enemy's logic; without our enemy's having accepted anything of our aims, we should have accepted everything others want to thrust on us. There can be no partial transigence, no half compromises, no possible stops halfway down a slope. We must realize once and for all that the enemy's aim is not to bring into Angola or Mozambique human rights, individual liberty and collective progress, so that the methods that would lead to such ends could be discussed. No, the aim is to dominate Angola and Mozambique, to include them in the spheres of foreign influences, to utilize their economic and strategic position for the benefit of major policies of other Powers..." 10/

21. Portugal's overseas policy and guidelines for future action were also discussed by various leaders participating in the series of lectures under the title "Praise the past and build the future" as part of the eight-month long commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of Portugal's national revolution. Speaking on Portugal's national defence, 11/ Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Secretary of State for Air (Secretário de Estado da Aeronáutica) said that from the point of view of world strategy, Portugal with its Overseas Territories was a unique nation both as regards its ethnic composition and its geographical discontinuity. The future of the Portuguese nation depended, he said, on a policy of unity and the exercise of full Portuguese sovereignty over all the Territories comprising the nation. Measures required "to strengthen the national structure" involved in order of priority: in the short term, improved inter-territorial communications; in the medium term, economic development; and in the long term, national population growth, settlement of Angola and Mozambique, raising the level of development of both Europeans and Africans (elevação do grau de evolução das populações brancas e negras) and a special effort in the field of research. In terms of strategy, Portugal's position in the western world could remain significant only if it was based on a participation in military installations and bases which kept pace with general developments.

22. In Africa, the speaker said, Portugal had to face the fact that the war against it would continue, with varying intensity, for an indefinite period. This was a prolonged war which demanded great economy in its conduct and operation. Thus Portugal's strategy in regard to its struggle in Africa must be developed

10/ Portugal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Old Debate. An address by A. Franco Nogueira, Foreign Minister of Portugal, Lisbon 1966, p. 18, English text.

11/ Diario de Noticias, 21 October 1966.

along the following lines: externally on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts; internally it must counter subversion^{12/} and be prepared for traditional large-scale military actions; and finally it must obtain wherever possible the necessary war materials.

23. Discussing the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, he said that land communications in these Territories were inadequate to allow rapid military action, and this was one of the main obstacles to "counter-subversive" action. He urged that if necessary, infantry units should be used to help build the roads urgently needed.

24. In the Overseas Territories defensive forces needed to be supplemented by highly mobile airborne striking forces. This required a better supply of aircraft and better intelligence work. Commenting on the problem of obtaining military supplies, he said that while some foreign sources had been obstructive, others had managed to furnish arms on a more or less regular basis. The real solution lay in substituting arms manufactured in Portugal. Although Portugal was self-sufficient as regards a great deal of the material used by the army, it was dependent on foreign sources for much of its naval and air material.

25. The importance of the Overseas Territories to Portugal was also stressed by other speakers. Professor Daniel Barbosa, former Minister of the Economy and at present the Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional in a long speech entitled "New directions of economic policy"^{13/} explained that the economic integration of the Portuguese realm was intended not only as a means of accelerating progress and to enable Portugal better to face the world, but also to strengthen the political unity which was the essential feature of the Portuguese nation. He also said that Portugal's survival as a nation could depend on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories. It was necessary for Portugal to try to divert to the Territories the hundreds and thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries, but he warned that large-scale settlement would be possible only if conditions of living and economic opportunities in the Territories were improved so as to attract settlers in sufficient numbers.

^{12/} See section B on Angola.

^{13/} Novos rumos de política económica, Diario de Noticias, 11 October 1966.

26. Only one speaker in the series of commemorative lectures referred to the question of the future political and administrative relationship of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. This was Admiral Lopez Alvez,^{14/} who had been Overseas Minister at the time of the Angola uprising. Any changes, he said, had to be guided by the fundamental principle of the indestructible unity of the composite parts of the Nation. Although many changes were hypothetically possible, he suggested that the two basic directions should be towards creating national services and the progressive administrative decentralization of authority by granting each Territory, in accordance with its special circumstances, wider powers of decision. Changes in both directions had to be undertaken together to ensure the best use of technical resources. While the goal of administrative decentralization was to increase the authority of the local government bodies and elected groups, two safeguards had to be kept in mind: (i) there should never be any service in any Territory which did not come under the Governor's authority, and (ii) the territorial governments should never be given authority in matters which were not under the control of the Overseas Minister. On the other hand, it could be expected that the participation of the Overseas Territories in central government matters would become more prominent as a result of their increased representation in the "higher organs of sovereignty", such as the Overseas Council, the Corporative Chamber and the National Assembly.

27. Towards the end of 1966, Portugal's continued pursuit of a military solution to the problem of its Overseas Territories appeared to be causing increased concern in Portugal as fighting in Angola extended to the eastern border and military expenditures continued to rise. First, in October 1966 in Lisbon a group of five persons asked permission from the Government to take part in the series of lectures commemorating the national revolution because they did not share the views expressed or the official conception of the New State, particularly so far as its future was concerned. Then in November, 118 Portuguese of Socialist, Christian Democratic and Liberal views, including many Catholic leaders, claiming that they represented "millions of Portuguese who are opposed to the present regime" issued a manifesto in which they accused the Government of political

^{14/} Diario de Noticias, 21 December 1966.

oppression, forced labour and racial discrimination in favour of capitalism in the Overseas Territories. They said that "the Government of Mr. Salazar has not the competence, the moral authority, the prestige, or the open intelligence to allow it to face the historical problem of decolonization of the Overseas Territories". They found the Government's choice of policy in the Overseas Territories "ill-fated", as self-determination was a principle above discussion. In a further statement addressed to the President of Portugal in March 1967, forty-six members of the Social Democratic Action group criticized the Government's overseas policy and called on it to recognize the right of the Territories to self-determination. The statement cited at length the errors which, its authors said, had been committed by the Government in India and Macao, and called for a full discussion of this subject. The statement also called on the Government urgently to take a position on the question of the sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (on Portugal's position as regards the sanctions, see the section on Mozambique). Finally, the statement protested against the censorship of the Press and "the excessive use which is made of it".

28. As if replying to the earlier criticisms, the Portuguese Overseas Minister, Mr. Silva Cunha^{15/} at the swearing in of the new Governor-General of Angola in November 1966 (see below), described Portugal's approach to the Overseas Territories as a form of decolonization. He explained that since colonization was a form of contact between peoples of different cultures and civilizations, it was inherent in the relationship established that colonization tends to replace itself because of the evolution it brings about. Decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unit", or through the separation of the colonizers and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. However, he said, real decolonization only takes place when integration or emancipation lead to a real and profound transformation of the colonized, either when there is a real union of cultures, which did not imply uniformity, or when the colonized can live autonomously and independently.

15/ Diário de Luanda, 15 November 1966.

29. Mr. Silva Cunha said that the characteristics of the present politico-juridical situation in the Overseas Territories were: (a) political unity expressed through equality in status of all Portuguese nationals irrespective of race, religion or culture; (b) economic solidarity of all the separate units comprising Portuguese Territories, expressed especially in the legislation establishing the Portuguese common market, which had already begun to come into effect; and (c) extension to all elements of the Portuguese population benefits or social legislation strictly in harmony with international conventions, especially those of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). This theme, that economic development and social integration constitute Portugal's approach to the problem of decolonization, has been echoed recently also in Angola. Thus for instance, on taking office, the Provincial Secretary for Rural Development, Mr. Vasco de Sousa Dias, expressed his satisfaction at being chosen "to return to the front line" with responsibilities for "activities which the Overseas Minister has designated as decolonization practiced by Portugal without any racial discrimination". Such decolonization, he said, had as its ultimate goal the integration of the less developed peoples through their social advancement to the full extent of their capacities.

Military activities and defence expenditure

30. For Portugal, as President Thomaz noted in his 1967 New Year's address, last year was overshadowed by the "defence of the Overseas Territories".^{16/} Owing to intensified fighting in Angola since August (see addendum), it is estimated that Portugal now has over 120,000 troops in its Overseas Territories. To meet the growing needs of the armed forces, towards the end of the year new regulations were introduced in Portugal extending the length of compulsory military service for all citizens from a previous maximum period of twenty-four months (eighteen months of active service and a maximum training period of six months) to a period of three years, extendable up to a maximum of four years.

31. Since the new regulations apply to all citizens, Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, will be subject also to military service, which, as now defined, will no longer be limited to participation

^{16/} Diário de Luanda, 2 January 1967.

in the armed forces but will include any work contributing to national defence "within the military framework". For the first time, women will be admitted into the armed forces in capacities other than nurses. To ensure the full use of national manpower, men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two will not be allowed to emigrate until they have completed their military service, and special provisions have been included to enable persons with professional training to serve in their own fields whenever possible, especially in the Overseas Territories. A further new measure is the introduction of subsidies to be paid to families of servicemen who are without adequate means of support.

32. In December 1966, Portugal took a further step (Decree 47,381, of 15 December) to accelerate the modernization and expansion of the Portuguese navy, begun in 1964, by authorizing the purchase of six additional corvettes. The fleet expansion is part of Portugal's long-term overseas defence programme with emphasis on ships for coastal defence and protection of maritime routes between Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Eleven new ships are under construction: four escort destroyers and four submarines (to be paid for entirely by Portugal) are being built in France under the agreement concluded in 1964 (Decree 45,889, of 24 August) and another three escort destroyers are being built in Portugal. For the purchase of the first four of the six new corvettes a total of 580 million escudos have been authorized to be paid for over the period 1966-74. Apart from the additions to the fleet, Portugal has also increased considerably the number of small craft of various types to be used on lakes and rivers by the defence forces in the Overseas Territories.

33. According to the 1967 budget estimates, the total revenue of the Portuguese Government is expected to reach 20,206 million escudos and expenditure 20,204.3 million escudos, leaving a surplus of 1.9 million escudos. Ordinary expenditure has been kept to a minimum, amounting to 14,962.1 million escudos so that there will be a surplus of 2,356.7 million escudos to finance part of the extraordinary expenditures totalling 7,598.9 million escudos.

34. Of the extraordinary budget, a total of 5,347.0 million escudos is allocated for national defence (5,341 million escudos) and public security (6 million escudos). This represents a 33 per cent increase over the 1966 defence allocations, which amounted to 4,011 million escudos, and is the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961. Of the total defence allocations for 1967,

3,500 million escudos, an increase of 1,000 million escudos over 1966, are for the "extraordinary military forces in the Overseas Territories". For the acquisition of the four destroyers and four submarines now being built in France, 500 million escudos are allocated, which together with an initial sum of 45 million escudos for the first four new corvettes and 85 million escudos for the construction of escort ships (navios escoltas) brings the total expenditure for the year on modernization of the navy to 630 million escudos.

35. In his commemorative lecture referred to above, Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga^{17/} pointed out that Portugal's defence expenditure was 6.6 per cent of the gross national product^{18/} and 34.3 per cent of the total public expenditure. These percentages were higher than corresponding figures for Belgium, France and Denmark. In terms of absolute value, Portugal's defence expenditure, which was below 6,000 million escudos,^{19/} was only about half of that which each of the other three countries spent. The annual contribution per person in Portugal was only about 700 escudos and this was also lower than the other European countries. In his view Portugal's low per capita income seriously affected the country's defence capacity and therefore accelerated economic development would be an essential factor affecting national strategy and defence. While it was not possible for Portugal to reach a stage of economic development in the near future which would ensure it "strategic tranquillity", such a stage was a possibility as a medium-term goal and the nation should be required to make the effort.

36. To finance the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, Portugal raised two foreign loans of \$US20 million each by bond issue in the United States in 1965 and 1966 and it has issued another series of development bonds totalling \$US18 million at 7 per cent interest, which, however, were not offered for sale in the United

17/ Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 21 October 1966.

18/ This figure of 6.6 per cent of the gross national product is close to the figure reported in a United States State Department survey of defence expenditures by NATO countries, and published in the Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 27 December 1966. It may be pointed out that the figures given in the 1966 background paper on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/6300/Add.3, part I, para. 35) were taken from the Portuguese budget report and refer to budgetary allocations for defence and not to actual expenditures.

19/ The actual amount is probably higher since it has been reported that already for 1965 defence costs were 7,705 million escudos (Financial Times, 10 August 1966).

States. An examination of the extraordinary budget^{20/} in recent years shows a growing reliance on Portuguese domestic financial sources. Whereas in 1964 almost one third of the extraordinary expenditure was financed from external loans, in 1967 almost half of the total (46 per cent) is to be raised by internal loans and bonds, over 30 per cent is from the ordinary budget surpluses, and only slightly over 3 per cent is from external loans. Since both ordinary sources of revenue and the capacity of the internal market to buy bonds depend on the economic development of the country, it is apparent that if this trend continues Portugal's capacity to afford increased defence costs in the future may depend upon an acceleration of its economic growth.

37. Since 1961, though extraordinary budgetary allocations for development have increased by 72 per cent to 2,145.4 million escudos in 1967, in the same period defence allocations increased by 220 per cent, from 1,670 million escudos to 5,347 million escudos (and actual expenditures were probably at least 50 per cent more than original estimates). Comparing the 1967 budget with that for 1966, it is seen that development allocations have been cut back by 2.5 per cent, while defence allocations rose by 33 per cent. Allocations for the item "other investments", which includes public buildings and utilities, have also been cut back, dropping from 731.6 million escudos in 1961 to 106.5 million escudos in 1967.

20/ Sources of extraordinary budget (in million escudos)

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Total extraordinary revenue	<u>5,187.0</u>	<u>6,027.2</u>	<u>6,383.8</u>	<u>7,598.9</u>
of which:				
Money coining	68.5	67.8	78.5	162.5
Overseas defence and div. tax	120.0		100.0	100.0
Internal loans	1,350.0	1,602.8	1,901.1	3,120.4
Development bonds (internal)	348.4	673.0	232.0	432.0
External loans	1,726.7	1,365.7	1,058.5	220.0
Surplus from ordinary budget	200.0	-	1,791.0	2,354.8
From ordinary budget	707.0	910.7	-	-

38. In Portugal, the burden of defence on the economy has already become noticeable in the guise of rising inflation,^{21/} shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour, mounting taxes and a growing trade deficit. Since 1961 revenue from direct taxes has increased by 72 per cent (from 2,673.5 million to 4,602 million escudos in 1967); revenue from indirect taxes, which up to last year had increased less rapidly, is expected to total 5,297 million escudos in 1967 as a result of a new sales tax which will yield around 1,000 million escudos.

39. External and internal borrowing has led to an increase in the annual cost of servicing the public debt by 128 per cent since 1961 to 2,114.5 million escudos in 1967. Because of the general slowing down of the rate of economic growth in 1966^{22/} and the shortage of capital (the total volume of credit granted by the Central Bank showed a decline of 16.6 per cent in 1966 from the previous year) some economists have expressed concern that defence efforts could compromise Portugal's development aims. According to a recent report,^{23/} Portugal's gross domestic product in 1966 compared with the preceding year showed an increase of much less than the average annual rise of 6 per cent envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, and it was also lower than the average annual increase since 1960.

Economic integration and development

40. Although Portugal is officially considered to be an integrated multi-continental nation (see para. 19 above), and in fact the politico-juridical framework has now been completed, economic integration of the Overseas Territories with Portugal is yet to be achieved. The goal of economic integration, as a

^{21/} The consumer price index (1960=100) rose from 109 in the third quarter of 1964 to 119 in the first quarter of 1966 (Diario de Noticias, 27 December 1966), and the index of food prices rose from 116 to 130 in the first four months of 1966 (Financial Times, 5 December 1966, p. 43).

^{22/} The increase in the gross national product in 1966 was less than in 1965 and 1964, and the rate of formation of fixed capital in 1965 and 1964 was less than in 1963 (Diario de Noticias, 22 November 1966).

^{23/} Report to the Annual General Meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by the Chairman of the Board of Directors, Diario de Noticias, 28 January 1967.

Portuguese author has expressed it,^{24/} is to forge together into an organic whole and for the greater benefit of each of the parts, the medium level economy of Portugal with the under-developed economies of the Overseas Territories which are characterized by the existence side by side of subsistence and market economies and social groups of disparate productivity.

41. What is called the "Portuguese realm" (o espaço português) comprises an area of 2.2 million square kilometres with a population of over 23 million. Portugal and the adjacent islands, however, account for only 4.4 per cent of the area (91,970 square kilometres) and about 40 per cent of the population. Because of the disparities existing among the different components of the realm, particularly as regards their size, the nature of their economies and their different stages of economic development, the basic economic integration law (Decree Law 44,016 of 8 November 1961^{25/}) provided that the removal of barriers to the free circulation of goods, capital and persons should be progressive over a period of ten years.

42. In setting out various steps for the establishment of the Portuguese common market and an escudo zone, the law recognized that the process of economic integration had to be closely associated with the development of the individual Territories. Thus, while economic growth is a pre-condition for the successful elimination of restrictions on movements of goods, capital and persons, the progressive freeing of such movements would in turn give a decisive impulse to accelerated economic development of each of the complementary units and stimulate a more efficient division of labour.

43. As a first step towards the establishment of a Portuguese common market in 1962, duties were abolished on imports into Portugal of all "national goods" of which the total trade with Portugal in 1960 did not exceed 50,000 escudos (less than \$US2,000). Also eliminated at the same time were duties on exports from Portugal and the adjacent islands to the Overseas Territories. Later, in 1963, import duties were abolished on goods from the Territories, the total value of which amounted to 20 per cent of the purchases by Portugal in each Territory, and in 1964, import duties on goods from the Territories entering Portugal were eliminated. The next step was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 1967

^{24/} Henrique Cabrita: "Integração económica do espaço português", Ulamar, No. 10 (October-December 1962), Lisbon, p. 59.

^{25/} Extracts of this decree-law appear in document A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, pp. 66-70.

with the removal of import duties in each Territory on goods from Portugal and the adjacent islands, the total value of which represented at least 40 per cent of their respective imports in 1960. Remaining duties on "national goods" traded within the espaço português are to be progressively eliminated according to the special circumstances of each unit.

44. As noted above, the original plan envisaged that the economic integration of Portugal with its Overseas Territories should be completed by 1972, so that half the period has now elapsed. Although no official assessment of the progress made has been published, available data on the changing pattern of trade, the movement of capital between Portugal and the Overseas Territories give some indication of the effects of the changes in stimulating economic development of the separate units and what Premier Salazar described as "the advantages of collaboration and integration of vast areas". The data on Portugal's trade with the Overseas Territories and the way in which capital movement has affected Portugal's balance of payments are reviewed in the following paragraphs. Information on the situation in the individual Territories will be given in the relevant sections on each Territory.

(a) Effects on trade between Portugal and the Territories

45. Figures published in the first quarter of 1966^{26/} show that from 1962 to 1965 Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories increased by 67 per cent from 2,122 million to 3,575 million escudos. In contrast, exports to the Overseas Territories increased from 2,391 million to 4,104 million escudos, or about 72 per cent. Over the same period, Portugal's imports from EFTA countries rose from 3,940 to 5,567 million escudos and exports to EFTA countries from 2,208 to 4,500 million escudos, representing increases of 41 per cent and about 102 per cent respectively. An article in the Portuguese Press^{27/} suggests that so far Portugal has benefited more from the reduction in tariffs than the Overseas Territories and that more effort has to be made to develop the Territories to enable them to benefit from the metropolitan market.

^{26/} Diario de Noticias, 5 April 1966.

^{27/} Ibid.

(b) Exchange transactions and balance of payments between territorial units

46. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Overseas Territories, while forming an "integral part of the Portuguese State" are nevertheless "financially independent" but are subject to the government's superintendence. Each Territory has its own budget and is responsible for its own revenues - except for revenue resulting from common property or services and those assigned to common funds (Organic Law, article LVIII). Each Territory also has its own currency which, though nominally on par with the metropolitan escudo, is subject to exchange controls.

47. In order to facilitate the free transaction of goods, services and capital, in addition to the removal of quotas and customs duties, a multilateral clearing system for payments within the escudo zone was envisaged under the original 1961 legislation (Decree Law 40,166). Details of the system were set out in legislation enacted in 1962 (Decree Law 44,703, of 17 November) and the system came into effect on 1 January 1963. The major feature of the new system of payments is the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which acts as a centralized escudo reserve fund for all the Territories by providing funds on a temporary basis to cover inter-territorial transactions that the Territories themselves are not able to meet.^{28/} However, the new system of payments has not only not eased exchange restrictions, but, as shown below, it has created new difficulties which many consider inimicable to the expansion of free trade in the escudo zone.

48. Although the escudo zone is intended to "free" capital movement between the separate units, the existing restrictions have led some observers to consider that it represents the cornerstone of Lisbon's control over the Overseas Provinces. At present, each of the Territories has its own budget, tax system, currency, issuing bank and exchange fund. Within the Portuguese realm (i.e., both between the Territories and between the Territories and Portugal) payment transactions are cleared through a central exchange which is the Bank of Portugal in Lisbon. The exchange holdings of each Territory (in metropolitan escudos, gold and foreign

^{28/} The Fund has a total capital of 1,500 million escudos in which the Territories each have a proportional share, as follows: Cape Verde, 60 million escudos; Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, 140 million escudos; São Tomé and Príncipe, 60,000; Angola, 750 million escudos; Mozambique, 450 million escudos; and Macau and Timor each 20 million escudos.

exchange) are kept in separate reserve funds in the Bank of Portugal. When a Territory has inadequate exchange reserves to pay its own accounts, it may borrow from the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which is operated by the Bank.^{29/} However, since all accounts cleared with the Bank are in metropolitan escudos, the net gold and foreign exchange earned by the Territory benefit Portugal's own account. The following table shows the important role played by the foreign exchange earnings of the Territories in the escudo zone balance of payments.

Portugal's balance of payments
 (million escudos)

<u>1964</u>	<u>Metropolitan</u>	<u>Overseas Provinces</u>	<u>Escudo zone</u>
Trade	-6,162	+ 929	-5,233
Invisibles	+2,958	+2,757	+5,715
Capital movement	+3,040	- 60	+2,980
Total	- 124	+3,626	+3,502
 <u>1965</u>			
Trade	-8,058	- 781	-8,839
Invisibles	+4,991	+3,398	+8,385
Capital movement	+2,874	- 163	+2,711
Total	- 131	+2,454	+2,323

49. Although complete figures are not yet available for 1966, according to a recent report^{30/} the foreign exchange earned by the Overseas Territories is becoming an increasingly important factor in Portugal's balance of payments with foreign countries. The report noted that during the first nine months of 1966,

^{29/} Each Territory may borrow on an "automatic" basis up to one third of the capital it has subscribed (see foot-note 28), which for Angola is therefore 250 million and for Mozambique 150 million escudos. The Territories may also obtain one or more special loans from the Fund under certain conditions negotiated beforehand between the Government of the Territory concerned and the Fund. As a general rule, the total amount a Territory can borrow may not exceed the amount of its own share in the Fund.

^{30/} Report to the annual general meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by Dr. Guilherme Moreira, Chairman of the Board of Directors, Diario de Noticias, 28 January 1967.

despite Portugal's own growing trade deficit (which amounted to 8,000 million escudos as compared to 7,100 million escudos in the corresponding period of the previous year) the surplus from foreign exchange transactions (saldo de balança de liquidações combiais) including Portugal's own invisible earnings in the Bank of Portugal amounted to 750 million escudos and this was 550 million escudos more than that of the same period of 1965.

50. The difficulties caused by the present system of exchange controls have been the subject of criticism in Portugal and in the Territories. Reference was also made to this problem in a recent order from the Ministry of the Economy on wine-growing policy.^{31/} Since wine is one of Portugal's principal exports to the Overseas Territories,^{32/} attention is being given to the expansion of their markets for wine through: (i) directly or indirectly stimulating the increased consumption of wine and other allied beverages; and (ii) reducing the intermediary charges in the marketing chain but maintaining the quality of wine reaching the consumer. The order notes that the expansion of the markets in the Overseas Territories, not only for wine but also for other non-essential consumer goods from any other "national territory", would require a larger amount of capital than people were willing to risk in the interruptions of transfers due to the inadequacies of the present system of payments. The risks involved not only prejudiced investments but also resulted in the consumer Territories going into production themselves which was not the most economical solution.^{33/}

51. As reported last year, the freeing of movement of goods without a more liberalized system of payments had already created a serious situation in Angola in 1965 (A/6300/Add.3, part I, paras. 126-130). During 1966, difficulties in securing exchange continued in Angola and became more serious in Mozambique. Towards the end of the year stiff penalties were introduced in Portugal to put a stop to an increasing number of illegal transfers of capital (Decree 47,413, of 23 December). One estimate suggests that the amount of money abroad runs into

^{31/} Ministério da Economia, Despacho, A política vitivinícola, Diário do Governo, Series I, 9 December 1966.

^{32/} In 1966 the Overseas Territories imported 35.7 million gallons of wine from Portugal, Cape Times, 6 January 1967.

^{33/} Portugal, Diário do Governo, Series I, 9 December 1966, p. 2178.

thousand millions of escudos mainly in Europe and the United States and notes that the shortage of medium- and long-term capital available from commercial banks makes the recovery of this money important.

52. Clandestine dealings in foreign exchange have also increased in Angola. Early in 1967 the Governor-General issued a statement^{34/} saying that the judicial police and PIDE were being called upon to put a stop to such activities, and that heavy penalties would be applied to all persons who violated the exchange regulations or who collaborated directly or indirectly with foreign organizations enticing the exodus of capital. The Portuguese Government is now studying how to put into effect fully the system of payments envisaged in Decree Laws 44,016 and 44,703, which, in turn, will depend on the results of a survey being made of the economic structures and current determinants of the balance of payments of the various Territories.

53. The illegal exodus of capital from Portugal is due partly to the fact that interest rates in other countries are substantially higher than in Portugal. In Portugal, although the statutory interest rate is set at 5 per cent per annum, most of the Government's borrowing has been at lower rates. Pending the revision of measures affecting the money market, and without prejudice to such future measures, the Government in January 1967^{35/} authorized a new series of 5 per cent treasury bonds (obrigações do tesouro 5 por cento 1967, fomento económico) totalling 1,000 million escudos. The Government hopes that the higher interest rate will attract savings and will reduce the exodus of capital. The proceeds from the bonds are to be used exclusively for investments in plans approved by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs.

(c) Effect on development of the Overseas Territories

(i) Planning

54. The Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, which is now in its last year, was intended to bridge the gap between plans which were drawn up for each geographical unit and the next plan which will deal with different sectors of the

^{34/} Diário de Luanda, 27 January 1967.

^{35/} Diário de Notícias, 27 January 1967.

"national economy" of the Portuguese realm. Thus, in the Territories the Transitional Plan was intended mainly to stimulate private investment, to co-ordinate and to set out the lines of orientation towards the forging of a national economy. As a means of ensuring a greater degree of consultation and co-ordination, it was decided in 1966 to provide for increased territorial representation in the working groups preparing the Third National Development Plan.

55. During the year both the Overseas Services and the statistical services in the Territories were reorganized. The new statute unifies the Overseas Services and establishes the conditions of service in the Overseas Territories. To meet the growing need for statistical data by national and international bodies and to facilitate economic planning of the Portuguese realm as a whole, the national statistical services and the statistical system have been reorganized (Decree Laws 46,925 and 46,926, of 29 March 1960). The over-all responsibility is vested in a National Council of Statistics as a policy-making and co-ordinating body. The National Institute of Statistics will be responsible for the collection, study and presentation of statistics both in Portugal and the Overseas Territories. It is intended that the present statistical services in the Territories will become branches of the Institute. Heretofore, the lack of statistical data has hampered economic and development studies.^{36/} Among all the Overseas Territories, Cape Verde is the only one for which an attempt has been made to calculate the gross national product. For Angola and Mozambique the difficulties in obtaining statistics relating to the subsistence sector and services have made such calculations impossible. Under the new system there are to be regular (every ten years) censuses of population, agriculture, extractive and transforming industries, distribution and services and housing.

56. Under the new laws (Decrees 46,925 and 46,926 of 29 March 1966) transgressions in the preparation and use of statistics are subject to fines varying from 50 to 10,000 escudos. For instance, fines range from 50 to 6,000 escudos for giving inaccurate information or failing to give the information required or in the time allowed, publication of statistics without prior approval of the Institute or publication of statistics not in accordance with the standards of the Institute.

^{36/} Mário de Oliveira. Problemas do Ultramar no Plano Intercalar de Fomento, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1964, p. 16.

Since it is officially claimed that Portugal does not maintain statistics on a racial basis, it appears likely that in future publications trying to analyze social data on such a basis could be prosecuted under these provisions.

(ii) Financing of development

57. In addition to the measures affecting trade and balance of payments referred to above, steps have been taken to accelerate the economic development of the Territories by easing the regulations on foreign investments, expanding banking and credit facilities and relaxing some of the controls over local industries (A/6300/Add.3, part I, paras. 52-68). Although conditions for foreign investments have been eased, and some new foreign investments were made in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration during 1966 (see sections on each Territory), there are indications that, in order to strengthen economic integration, preference is given to national companies and national capital in the development of certain sectors in the Overseas Territories. For instance, the selection of ANGOL to participate in petroleum exploitation in Angola was said to be guided by this policy (see section on Angola).

58. To facilitate development financing, the banking system in the Territories was revised in 1965 (A/6300/Add.3, part I, paras. 62-64). This has enabled existing banks in Angola and Mozambique to establish new branches and a number of other banks have been authorized to establish offices in these Territories; thus during 1966 the Banco Standard-Totta, controlled jointly by the Banco Totta Aliança of Portugal and the Standard Bank of South Africa, opened branches in both Angola and Mozambique as did a new credit bank, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial, which supplies credit to industries producing for home consumption.

59. In spite of the measures to stimulate development, economic growth in most sectors of Angola was at a slower rate than in 1965, while in Mozambique the effects were visible mainly in the industrial sector and in new investments in sugar production (see section on Mozambique), agricultural production remaining, in general, below the level of earlier years. Credits granted by the National Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional) to the Overseas Territories in 1965 dropped to a total of 549 million escudos, compared with 1,030 million escudos in the previous year. These credits included fifteen direct loans to Angola amounting to 126 million escudos, eleven loans to Mozambique totalling 248 million escudos and one loan each to Guinea under Portuguese administration and to Timor for

4 million and 5 million escudos respectively. Other operations of the Bank consisted of a 25 million escudos participation in the financing of a paper goods factory in Angola, investment of 40 million escudos in a soft drink factory in Mozambique and a guarantee of 71 million escudos to an industrial concern in Mozambique.^{37/}

60. So far, the most immediate effect of the 1965 legislation on the co-ordination of industrial development has been the establishment or projected establishment of several new cotton spinning mills in Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, the cotton regulations now in force in these Territories still require them to export most of their raw cotton to Portugal in order to supply the metropolitan textile industry. A similar situation also applies in respect of sugar, production of which is being increased, especially in Mozambique. Under the existing regulations, which have been extended until 1982 (Decree 47,337 of 24 November 1966), the Overseas Territories are assigned guaranteed quotas for the supply of sugar to Portugal. Recently, however, the existing sugar refineries in Portugal have been authorized to increase their refining capacity to 300,000 tons per annum^{38/} to meet the anticipated increase in Portugal's sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Since other sugar producing countries are cutting back production in order to stabilize world prices, this presumably means that in the Overseas Territories priority will still be given to the supply of sugar to Portugal in a semi-refined state.

61. A study by the National Institute of Statistics published in 1966^{39/} showed that almost half of Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories consisted of agricultural products and recent developments do not indicate any significant change in this trade pattern. On the contrary, efforts are being made to expand the primary exports of the Territories to meet Portugal's needs. Thus, in June 1966 the Junta Nacional dos Produtos Pecuários in Lisbon was authorized to set up with representatives of producers in Angola and Mozambique a scheme for

^{37/} Banco de Fomento Nacional, Relatório Anual, 1965, p. 17.

^{38/} Diário, Lourenço Marques, 16 November 1966.

^{39/} Boletim Mensal, August 1966, as reported in the Diário, Lourenço Marques, 6 November 1966.

supplying Portugal with meat.^{40/} However, instead of giving producers in the Territories a subsidy, as is paid to meat producers in Portugal and in the adjacent islands, frozen meat imported from these Territories will be guaranteed the price quoted on the international market. It is hoped thereby to encourage production to the extent that Portugal may gradually reduce its foreign imports. The difference in the price paid to producers and the sale price in Portugal (which is lower) is to be made up from the Fundo de Abastecimento as in the case of meat imported from foreign countries (see also sections on Angola and Mozambique).

62. The central Government is also taking measures to increase fruit exports from the Territories to Portugal. Early in 1966, on the recommendations of a special working group, the Minister for Overseas Territories laid down guidelines for the production and transportation of banana exports to Portugal. Several refrigerated ships have been acquired for this purpose and have begun operations. Banana production is being encouraged especially in Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe and in Cape Verde and citrus fruit production in Mozambique. In January 1967, another working group was established in the Overseas Ministry to stimulate fruit production in the Overseas Territories and to assist government and private undertakings. The working group is to collaborate with the territorial Governments in the establishment of producer associations, to co-ordinate and advise on the production of the most suitable varieties both for the national and international markets and to propose measures necessary for the marketing and transport of the fruits.

Social integration and cultural assimilation

63. Since the abolition in 1961 of the Native Statute, more emphasis is being given in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea to the problem of the progressive integration of the indigenous populations in the non-indigenous organization of these Territories.

^{40/} In order to help stimulate livestock reproduction in the Overseas Territories, the Veterinary Services were reorganized and strengthened and veterinary research institutes were set up in Angola and Mozambique.

64. From the Portuguese point of view,^{41/} the social problems in these Territories are different from those in the smaller Territories where no "cultural competition" exists (Cape Verde and São Tomé because the inhabitants are predominantly mestiço, Macau because it is "Luso-Chinese", and Timor because it is "Luso-Indonesian-Malayan"). The three Territories in Africa are characterized by the fact that, whereas the indigenous population constitute a numerical majority, they live mainly in traditional societies and it is the small number of "originários" from Portugal who are considered to form the "sociological majority" because as a group they are considered to possess "enlightenment" and education and control political power, technological and economic development.

65. In the past, because of these differences, the African population in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea were governed by the Native Statute^{42/} and their integration within the normative Portuguese pattern of local government and administration depended on their attaining the "state of development" (estado de evolução)^{43/} deemed necessary for them to be governed by Portuguese civil law. As a result of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 (Decree 43,896 of 6 September 1961), Africans may now opt to be governed by Portuguese civil law without having to meet any educational or cultural requirements. Nevertheless, though it has been suggested^{44/} that this means that an African's juridical status

^{41/} Narana Coissoró: "Os princípios fundamentais do direito Ultramarino português", Estudos Políticos e Sociais, vol. IV, No. 1, Lisbon, 1966, offprint, p. 6.

^{42/} The special status of Africans under the Native Statute is described briefly in the Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 54 (A/5160 and Add.1 and 2), paras. 99-105, and in greater detail in A/AC.108/L.6, part II.

^{43/} The requirements laid down in article 56 of the Native Statute are given in detail in A/AC.108/L.6, paras. 88-94. Among other requirements, he had to speak the Portuguese language "correctly"; be engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from which he derived sufficient income to support himself and his family or else possess adequate resources for that purpose; and he had to be of good conduct and have attained the level of education and acquired habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens.

^{44/} Coissoró, op. cit., p. 10.

no longer depends on his "state of development", in practice the administrative division of the African Territories still retains the dual pattern as before, with the predominantly African areas organized into regedorias, forming administrative posts because, as provided in the Revised Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article XLV), these are considered to be regions which have not attained the "economic and social development deemed necessary" for the normative administrative pattern of the concelho to be established.^{45/}

66. Up to 1961 when the Native Statute was repealed, most of the regions predominantly occupied by Africans were classified as circunscrições almost entirely made up of regedorias in which native custom and usage applied. In recent years there has been a progressive increase in the number of concelhos (especially in Angola) reflecting economic and social changes brought about partly by increased European settlement and, in the coffee growing areas, partly due to the changing role of the African farmer.

67. During 1966, further changes in administrative divisions were in process or under consideration in both Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, special rural reorganization committees have been established at the district level to plan and regroup the rural population (see section on Angola). In Mozambique, more particular attention is being given to the north, where the administrative division of each district is to be revised and brought in line with actual needs in order to facilitate the "stabilization of the local population" (fixação de populações) and to promote the better use of resources. However, as the Overseas Minister noted in May 1966^{46/} the actual division of the districts had to take into account as a basic consideration the "equilibrium and co-ordination" (equilíbrio e articulação) between the self-governing local bodies and the administrative units which were not self-governing. He said that it was therefore necessary to use the maximum prudence in the creation of new local government bodies because these, by their nature, were only justified when they possessed the human and material resources which enabled them to be truly self-governing as the law envisaged.

^{45/} For details on the administrative structure of the Territories under Portuguese administration see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter III.

^{46/} J.M. da Silva Cunha. Na posse do Secretário Geral de Moçambique, 26 May 1966, 'Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon 1966, pp. 12-13.

68. In practice the administrative areas which are not "self-governing" are the regedorias in which the majority of Africans live. Since, according to the explanation provided by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, self-government in the Overseas Territories is to be developed through increased number of local government bodies, it is not clear whether the statement by the Overseas Minister foreshadows a slowing down of the previously envisaged progress of transition of the African areas towards self-government or the need to provide greater safeguards for the African population coming under the control of the mainly European elected local government bodies. The new Overseas Administrative Code may be expected to provide a clearer picture of any changes in the administrative structure of the Territories.

69. In Angola, where plans for rural regrouping of the population were first formulated in 1962 (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex II, paras. 168 ff.) a few pilot projects have only recently come into operation after a complete reorientation. As will be seen in the section on Angola, rural regrouping which had been intended "to establish a natural hierarchy of classes" with zones of influence radiating from "a civilized nucleus", will now form an integral part of the general plan for social promotion and settlement with a view to improving rural communities and developing their resources. However, the regrouping is to be based on areas with geographical, economic and social unity. Particular consideration is to be given to changes necessary in agriculture and livestock raising and the incorporation (enquadramento) of traditional infra-structures in the "national complex". It appears from the orientation to be given to regrouping and delimitation of regedorias, which are to be planned with the co-operation of the inhabitants, that recognition is now being given to the importance of economic development as a basis of social change and that transformation cannot be imposed from above but requires the willing co-operation of those involved.

70. In Mozambique also there are indications that a need is felt for a new approach to rural reorganization and the economic and social progress of the African population. Speaking before the National Assembly in January 1967 (Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 14 January), one of Mozambique's representatives, Dr. Nunes Barata, said:

"Portugal cannot only affirm its presence in Africa by armed force. The great battle of peace is one of economic and social development... and of the social and cultural progress of the 'populações nativas'. It is urgently necessary to increase education in all its aspects. At the same time it is necessary to assure them work and guarantee their standard of living. These are indivisible aspects because if we declare our intentions without promoting harmonious economic development and a just division of wealth we shall only be making candidates for terrorism."

71. It may be noted that while in theory^{47/} the form of law under which an African chooses to be governed is a matter of personal juridical status, in practice his political, social and economic rights are limited so long as he is not fully governed by Portuguese civil law. In particular, as reported previously (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex II, paras. 39-57), while Africans living in regedorias and ruled by African custom and usage have a right to free and joint use by the regedoria of five times the area occupied, it is only in special circumstances that they may appropriate land on an individual use. Since under the present laws Africans living in regedorias do not have full economic rights, it seems that until further changes are made in the regulations governing the concession and occupation of land, it will not be possible to bring Africans into a really integrated modern society in these Territories.

72. According to press reports in January 1967, new measures were introduced (Decree 47,486 of 6 January)^{48/} to enable persons or local government bodies now occupying public land illegally in the Overseas Territories to obtain legal title to it.^{49/} First, persons or local government bodies who have occupied land for more than fifteen years and who can prove that they have developed it, will, on application to the authority concerned, be granted full title to the land free of charge. Second, persons who occupy land illegally but who have not improved it may obtain an aforamento (leasehold) title to it directly without the procedure of public bids.

^{47/} Mr. Adriano Moreira said on the occasion of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 "there is no connexion whatever between status in private law and political status".

^{48/} At the time of writing the Secretariat had not received the Government Gazette, Diário do Governo, containing the text of this decree.

^{49/} For details concerning the land concession regulations in the Overseas Territories see A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V; appendix, annex II, chapter III.

73. According to one speaker in the National Assembly,^{50/} the new measures are intended not only to benefit "farmers" (agricultores) but also to enable the Africans "autóctones" who have occupied land with the effective recognition of the authorities now for the first time to acquire legal title. Since land in the regedorias is reserved for the use of Africans living there, the new measures can only apply to Africans occupying land outside the regedorias. If this is the case, it does not appear from the information available so far that the new measures will substantially improve their situation since the present land concession regulations already provide that Africans may acquire rights over land outside regedorias "by bona fide, peaceful and continued possession during ten years of previously vacant or abandoned land, on which permanent trees or crops have been established"^{51/} (underlining added).

74. In Mozambique there have been litigations over land occupied by Africans. It seems that for various reasons the 1961 land concession legislation has not been effective and many Africans who could qualify for a title over the land they currently occupy and farm have not yet acquired legal rights. Thus once again the problem is not the letter of the law but its implementation on the local level in the Territories.

75. Apart from the physical regrouping of populations, special efforts are being made through the schools, youth activities and mass information media to accelerate the development among the inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration of a conscious identification with Portugal.

76. In July, at the Atlantic Conference on Education which was held in Lisbon and at which eighteen countries were represented, Portugal's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Franco Nogueira, after explaining Portugal's deep concern for the provision of education, went on to say that "education had been developed throughout the whole nation without distinction between metropolitan and Overseas Territories because all these parts make up the Portuguese Nation, and it is our fundamental policy to expand and improve educational activities in the Overseas Territories."^{52/}

^{50/} Diário, Lourenço Marques, 5 February 1967.

^{51/} Decree 43,894 of 6 September 1961, article 230, paragraph c, English translation in document A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex II, para. 52.

^{52/} Boletim Geral do Ultramar, July 1966, pp. 241-242.

77. Nevertheless, a wide disparity still exists between the opportunities for education in the Overseas Territories and those in Portugal. As noted by Professor Leite Pinto in a speech during the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the national revolution, there is not yet a unified national school system applying equally to Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Differences exist in the text-books used, the structure of classes, the period of compulsory education and the availability of training facilities at different levels.

78. In the Overseas Territories the 1964 reform of primary elementary education made school attendance compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12 living within five kilometres of a school. While considerable sums have been spent in Angola and Mozambique for school buildings, especially of rural school posts, most of these are in the more economically developed areas,^{53/} as for instance Uíge district in Angola (see section on Angola), and it may be some time before all school age children are able to attend school. In rural areas, even where schools are available, they are staffed at present, not by fully qualified primary school teachers but by "monitors", and African children who do not speak Portuguese have to go through a pre-primary adaptation class before they can enter the first grade of the primary school.

79. According to the 1964 legislation, children who are already 7 years old (or who will be 7 before the end of the calendar year in which they enter school) may be excused from attending the pre-primary class at the request of the parent or guardian if they speak Portuguese fluently "and possess the development sufficient for them to attend first grade, in accordance with the regulations governing primary education, and with the approval of the provincial school inspection service". Nevertheless, it appears that for many African children, the pre-primary class is a major hurdle, and the six years of schooling do not necessarily ensure a retaining literacy.

^{53/} Mr. Salazar said recently

"We force ourselves to act simultaneously in the economic and educational fields because education and economic development have to progress together. The economic development of the people... is not possible without education, and education not accompanied by economic expansion only succeeds in throwing the evolved persons into political agitation and subversion - i.e. persons to whom employment cannot be guaranteed in economically under-developed societies." Boletim Geral do Ultramar, April 1966.

80. Recent events in Angola suggest however than an African child who is already 7 years old, who speaks Portuguese fluently and can count in Portuguese, may not be able to enter first grade as a Portuguese child would, but may have to go through the pre-primary class, where he will be "made to acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same success as children from a European type of environment". In view of the fact that the OECD study on education and development showed that school children in Portugal are slow in completing each class, and in a sample year (1961-62) about 33 per cent of the children had to repeat the first class,^{54/} it can be expected that with the present requirements even fewer African children can complete the first four classes by the time they are 12 years old.

81. The fact that education in the Overseas Territories is separate and different from that in Portugal is also underlined by the existence of the Co-ordinating Council for Education in the Overseas Territories (Conselho Co-ordenador das Actividades Dependentes da Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ministério do Ultramar).^{55/} When it last met in September 1966, the Council recommended that future educational policy in the Overseas Territories should concentrate on measures strengthening national unity.^{56/} It recommended, in particular, intensified efforts to disseminate Portuguese language and culture in the Overseas Territories; strengthening of the relationship between the Mocidade Portuguesa (Portuguese National Youth Organization) and the schools; an extended student exchange programme including visits between the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories as well as between those of Portugal and the Territories; improved school attendance statistics; and the establishment of a uniform procedure for the final classification of primary school teachers in all national Territory.

^{54/} Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Education and Development, Country Reports, The Mediterranean Regional Project, Portugal, Paris, p. 26 (English text).

^{55/} The membership of the Council includes education inspectors, provincial educational inspectors and heads of departments in the Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ultramar.

^{56/} Diario de Noticias, Lisbon, 4 September 1966.

82. In his report to the Council, the Director-General of the Department of Overseas Education in the Ministry for Overseas Territories, Dr. Justino Mendes de Almeida referred to the approval of textbooks for use in the Overseas Territories as one of the most difficult problems facing the Council, especially since the approved texts would replace ones already in use. Although originally in 1964 it had been decided that the textbooks approved in Angola would be uniformly used in all Territories, since then the Co-ordinating Council has established a special procedure for approving textbooks. Each textbook is now reviewed by a committee comprising as wide a representation as possible from the Overseas Territories and specialists in the subject. Speaking on this procedure which inevitably involved delays, the Director-General expressed the hope that "the day would arrive when a compendium of books could be drawn up for use in Portugal and the Overseas Territories alike without infringing on the principles of national unity and affecting the economy of the nation".

83. Irrespective of the degree of literacy children attending rural schools in African Territories may expect to achieve, it is evident that much is expected of the primary school years in inculcating Portuguese values and way of life. This process of transforming the indigenous population into good Portuguese citizens will also be carried forward in the schools through obligatory extra-curricular activities for which the Portuguese National Youth Organization (Mocidade Portuguesa) was given sole responsibility after its reorganization in 1966. The Mocidade Portuguesa's activities are to stimulate and reinforce patriotism and a sense of national unity, to inculcate moral and social values and to familiarize the young people with "the realities of Portuguese life".

84. In Angola, public information media and especially radio broadcasting are also to play an important role in disseminating the Portuguese language and culture and in explaining government activities to the people (see section on Angola).

85. To strengthen the feeling of unity between the separate territorial units of the "Portuguese nation", as part of the celebration of Portugal's national revolution a number of important conferences were held in different Territories. These included the Fourth National Colloquium on Labour Corporative Organization and Social Security held in Angola in September 1966 and the National Tourism Conference held in Mozambique. The Overseas Territories are also being given more

publicity in Portugal through exhibitions and participation of the Territories in such events as agricultural and industrial fairs, for which special allocations have been made.

86. As reported previously in some detail (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex II, paras. 87-198 and 258-329) Portugal considers that increased white settlement in Angola and Mozambique is an important means of transplanting Portuguese culture to these Territories and of strengthening their ties with Portugal. Several speakers in the commemorative lecture series again stressed the need for a massive settlement of Europeans from Portugal in the African Territories as a matter of urgency. Because emigration from Portugal to other European countries and the American continent have increased in recent years, the Government last year introduced new penalties for illegal emigration. Towards the end of the year legislation was also introduced under which ex-members of the armed forces who wish to migrate to any of the Overseas Territories will be entitled to have their passage paid by the Government (Decree 47,349, of 28 November). Other measures for diverting emigration to the Overseas Territories are under consideration.

87. In Angola and Mozambique various government bodies have also been concerned with increasing settlement from Portugal both in the interest of stimulating economic development and as a means of securing Portugal's sovereignty in these areas through actual occupation. During 1966 new legislation was introduced in Mozambique (Legislative Instrument 2,671 of 4 January 1966) to encourage a wider spreading of the povoações (population centres usually of European families) along the main arteries by requiring commercial centres to be located at least five kilometres apart. In Angola also, spacing requirements have been laid down for farm houses.

88. In order to attract and retain settlers from Portugal in both Angola and Mozambique, efforts are being made to improve living conditions. A number of special allocations have been made in the past two years for "local improvements" in Angola, especially electricity and water supplies. In Benguela District alone, which in 1960 had the second largest European population after Luanda, some 56 million escudos were spent on local improvements last year. In Mozambique large sums were also spent on municipal development, including electricity and water supplies, sanitation services and low-cost housing, in the main urban centres.

International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration

(a) Participation in international and regional organizations

89. In May 1966 the Nineteenth World Health Assembly considered the recommendation (AFR/RC15/R2) adopted by its Regional Committee for Africa, and taking into account the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in regard to the African Territories under Portuguese administration, decided to: (a) suspend the right of Portugal to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in regional activities until the Government of that country has furnished proof of its willingness to conform to the injunctions of the United Nations; and (b) suspend technical assistance to Portugal in accordance with the request contained in operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). (The full text of this resolution appears in document A/AC.109/194, pp. 9-10.)

90. In November 1966, the General Conference of UNESCO, acting in accordance with the appeals contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) adopted, by 72 votes to 11, with 26 abstentions, a resolution entitled "Tasks in the light of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twentieth session on questions relating to the liquidation of colonialism and racialism". In this resolution, the Conference noted that although UNESCO had made a certain contribution to the attainment and consolidation of independence by former colonial countries and peoples by assisting them to develop education, science and culture, it had by no means made use of all the opportunities available. The General Conference therefore authorized the Director-General of UNESCO to take measures to expand the work in this area. The Director-General was also authorized, "in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, to withhold assistance from the Government of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia in matters relating to education, science and culture, and not to invite them to attend conferences or take part in other UNESCO activities, participation in which might be considered as conferring technical assistance, until such time as the Governments of these countries abandon their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination". In a further resolution, adopted by 60 votes to 38, with 4 abstentions, the General Conference of UNESCO confirmed the decision taken by the Executive Board

at its seventieth session (see A/6300/Add.3, part I, para. 41) not to invite Portugal to attend meetings of UNESCO subordinate bodies pending the conclusion of an in situ study of educational conditions in the African Territories under Portuguese administration. Accordingly, it also rejected the request of the Portuguese Government (see A/6300/Add.3, part I, para. 43) that the question be referred to the International Court of Justice. In the preamble of the resolution the General Conference stated inter alia that "the Government of Portugal continues to pursue in the African Territories under its domination a policy of colonialism and racial discrimination which deprives the peoples of those Territories of their most elementary rights to education and culture, thus violating the fundamental obligations of every member of UNESCO"; "that this behaviour on the part of Portugal violates the fundamental principles of the Convention and Recommendation against Discrimination on Education"; and that the General Conference, as the sovereign organ of UNESCO, had the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the provisions which give the Executive Board authority to carry out the programme in accordance with the decisions of the General Conference.

(b) New bilateral agreements

91. In September 1966, Portugal and Brazil signed agreements on trade, technical and cultural co-operation and a joint declaration on economic co-operation. The new trade agreement, which revokes those of 1949 and 1959, aims at encouraging the growth and diversification of trade between Brazil and Portugal as well as the Territories under its administration which are specifically included. The agreement provides that payments shall be made under a regime of free exchange, and that free trade zones for products from Portugal or Brazil may be established in either country. The agreement also provides for mutual assistance in regard to industrial investment, freer movement of capital, freer convertibility and the reciprocal application of "most favoured nation treatment" in so far as this is compatible with existing international obligations. The agreement is to remain in force for five years, and if not revoked by the end of the period, it will be automatically extended for successive periods of one year.

92. The Luso-Brazilian Economic Committee established under the provisions of the new agreement met in December to discuss problems of transport, free trade zones, customs duties, complementary industrial establishments and questions concerning

technical assistance. The terms of the new treaty will be put into effect on a provisional basis pending ratification by the Brazilian Congress.

93. The joint declaration on economic co-operation which also explicitly includes the Overseas Territories, provides for mutual treatment of Brazilian, Portuguese or Brazilian-Portuguese industrial companies established in Brazilian or Portuguese territory as if they were national companies. The basic criterion for the establishment of such companies is that they must fill the needs of the country concerned. The two Governments agree to stimulate joint companies exploiting mineral resources.

94. In January, four ships of the Brazilian Navy carrying 2,800 men visited Angola for five days.

Membership of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration in the Economic Commission for Africa.

95. At its eighth session, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) adopted a resolution (151 (VIII) of 21 February 1967) on the admission of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa as associate members.

96. In the preamble of the resolution, the ECA reaffirmed its conviction that the active participation of all African countries and territories in its work was an essential condition for the attainment of its objectives. Taking into account the decision of the Economic and Social Council in resolution 974 (XXXVI) of 1963 by which it expelled Portugal from the Commission's membership, and having ascertained that there were no valid juridical considerations against the participation of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa in its work, the Commission recommended that the Organization of African Unity designate representatives of the Territories concerned.

97. Economic and Social Council resolution 974 (XXXVI) also revised the Commission's terms of reference which provides that the following "shall be associate members of the Commission": the Non-Self-Governing Territories situated in the area of the Commission's competence and "Powers other than Portugal responsible for international relations of those Territories".

B. ANGOLA

General

98. Angola lies on the south west Atlantic coast of Africa between 4°22's and 18°03's in latitude and between 24°05'E.G. and 11°41'E.G. in longitude. Except for the Cabinda enclave which is administered as part of it, the entire Territory of Angola lies south of the Congo River. The total area of the Territory is 1,246,700 square kilometres. At the 1960 census the total resident population of the Territory was 4,830,449 of whom 172,529 were listed as "Branco"; 53,392 were listed as "Mestiço" and 4,604,362 as "Preto". (Província de Angola, Boletim Mensal, No. 10, October 1963, p. 5).

Government and administration

99. The fundamental constitutional provisions relating to all the Overseas Territories are the same and are set out in the Constitution of Portugal^{57/} and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963.^{58/} According to these instruments, which establish the structure of the Portuguese State, each of the Overseas Territories is a province of Portugal, subject to the authority of the central Government, but having its own territorial organs with limited powers and functions which are defined in a separate political and administrative statute for each Territory. In the case of Angola, this is contained in Decree 45,374 of 22 November 1963.^{59/}

100. The organs of the State and central Government of Portugal which are most directly concerned with the Overseas Territories are the Council of Ministers, the Overseas Minister, the National Assembly, the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber. The National Assembly, the Government and the Overseas Minister all have power to legislate for the Overseas Territories.

101. At the territorial level in Angola, the Governor-General as the representative of the central Government, possesses both legislative and executive powers.

57/ Portugal, Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, SNI.

58/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16, (A/4978), paras. 160-167.

59/ For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, paras. 17-73, and sub-sections on each Territory.

The power to propose legislation of purely territorial concern and not including additional expenditure is also vested in a Legislative Council which meets normally twice a year for not more than a total of three months, during which time the Governor-General is precluded from legislating on matters within the Council's competence. The Council comprises 36 members, of whom 2 are ex officio, 19 are elected by "organic groups" (such as employers' and workers' associations, cultural and religious groups, local government bodies and others) and 15 are elected by direct vote on a franchise which, in practice, includes only a minority of the population.^{60/} There is also in Angola an economic and social council comprised of representatives of high officials and representatives of special interest groups whose function is mainly to advise the Governor-General.

102. The Territory is divided into fifteen administrative districts, each under a district governor. These in turn are divided, according to circumstances, into concelhos (municipalities) or circunscrições; the concelhos in turn are divided into freguesias (parishes). Elected councils exist at the district level and in the concelhos, freguesias and circunscrições where there are sufficient qualified voters. Finally, Africans living in traditional societies are organized in regedorias which are administered under native law and custom.

103. Angola is represented in the National Assembly of Portugal by seven representatives who are elected by direct vote on a franchise different from those governing elections to territorial bodies, but which also contains qualifications which restrict the right to vote to a minority of the population.^{61/} It is also represented in the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber of Portugal by representatives chosen from the Territorial Economic and Social Council, and in the electoral college which elects the Head of State.

Appointment of new Governor-General

104. In November 1966, Lt. Col. Camilo Augusto de Miranda Rebocho Vaz was appointed Governor-General of Angola. His appointment appears to have been unexpected as he had initiated a movement earlier in the year to petition for the extension of

^{60/} Ibid., paras. 55-64.

^{61/} Ibid., Seventeenth Session, Annexes, Addendum to agenda item 54 (A/5160 and Add.1 and 2), para. 113.

Col. Silvino Silvério Marques's term as Governor-General. Lt. Col. Rebocho Vaz first earned his reputation as a military leader in the important coffee growing Uíge district where in 1960 he checked an insurrection of over 100,000 men and after 1961 successfully recovered areas occupied by guerrillas. His appointment may therefore be considered as reflecting Portugal's determination to face a long-term war in Angola.

105. In a speech delivered at his swearing in ceremony in Lisbon (in reply to the Overseas Minister, Mr. Silva Cunha, who charged him to make Angola ever more consciously Portuguese) and in various speeches made since then, the Governor-General outlined his Government's future policy and some of the immediate measures under consideration for dealing with the urgent problems with which the Territory is faced.

106. The principal goal of his Government, he said, is to build up all sectors of the Territory to secure it for all time against attempts to subvert it or to wipe out Portuguese civilization there. As there had been a feeling of expectation and uncertainty in some circles because changes in the territorial Government had not yet been completed^{62/} he wished to make it clear that his Government would follow "only the policy of the President of the Council and which was supported by the whole authentic nation". Any solution which did not lead the Overseas Territories to a closer relationship with Portugal could only result in personal ruin and loss to the national patrimony. He stressed that there would not be a policy for Europeans or a policy for Africans (não haverá política de europeus ou de africanos); there would be only one national policy, through which people are integrated on the basis of their individual merits and not for any other reason.

^{62/} Since Mr. Rebocho Vaz's nomination as Governor-General, new appointments in Angola have included those of three of the six provincial secretaries, namely those for rural development, health, welfare and labour and public works and communications.

107. More than ever before what Angola needed was to unite around the same ideas.^{63/} The truth was that the enemies who opposed Portugal's presence in the "Portuguese world" were not yet convinced of the futility of their struggle and continued to try to disrupt the life of the Territory. It was therefore necessary for all the people to be aware that in the near future many developments could be expected indicating continued subversive attempts against values that were most prized.

108. Late in December the Governor-General addressed a speech to the people of Angola warning them against rumours then current in the Territory. On this occasion he noted that there was disquiet in large and small population centres, in government offices and homes, in the streets and in the cafes where extravagant rumours were circulating. Without stating what the rumours were, he said that they were partly attributable to the holding of civil defence exercises (see below). He explained that the exercises were intended to train the population in preventive and defensive activities and did not in any way indicate that the internal situation of the Territory had deteriorated. He considered that what was needed was "a policy of truth". Anyone who helped in circulating rumours was committing a crime against the security of the Territory, and it was everybody's duty to search out rumours and destroy them. The Government would take measures to improve the information services, which had been inadequate; exchange of information between Portugal and the Territory, as well as within the Territory, would be increased and radio broadcasting would be improved with stronger transmitting stations and special programmes for certain areas and certain groups. He stressed that what was necessary was to make the reality in Angola understood externally and internally and to show both to the neighbouring countries and to the people in Angola the progress which had been made in the Territory. On the domestic front, he urged

^{63/} There are indications that Portuguese businessmen and settlers in Angola both have grievances against Lisbon. A recent newspaper article quoted the following statement as expressing the feelings of at least one section of the Portuguese residents:

"If we had economic autonomy, every White in Angola could be a millionaire! But the Government [in Lisbon] allows us no economic autonomy. Our European community falls into two groups: those who do too much for the African and then get out; and those who stay behind and keep what we have built up. Portugal's recent prosperity at home is our doing, and they owe us much in Angola."

that greater effort should be given to: (a) research into public information to isolate and put a stop to rumours which aimed at destroying Angola; (b) civil defence, so that full use would be made of people and materials; (c) permanent vigilance, so that the enemy should never be able to gain advantage by surprise attacks; and (d) increased production in order to support the defence expenditures.

Registration of voters

109. Local newspapers in Angola have recently carried notices concerning the 1967 registration of voters for elections: (a) to the National Assembly and (b) to the Legislative Council and members of parish boards. The notices set out the documentary and other evidence required as proof of, among other things, marital status and the ability to read and write Portuguese.

110. The ability to read and write Portuguese may be proven by submission of a diploma from public examination; by an official statement from a government department; by an application written and signed by the applicant and with the signature and handwriting certified by a notary; by an application written, read and signed before the appropriate authorities.

111. A Portuguese citizen who does not read and write Portuguese may also vote in the direct elections to the Legislative Council if he is a head of family, that is to say, if he has "a legitimately constituted family living with him under his authority and sharing his board", and pays taxes (contribuições) of any kind of not less than 100 escudos. Proof of status as head of family for this purpose must be certified by the administrative authority where the applicant resides. Marital status is to be proven by a certificate from the civil registry or from a Catholic parish or mission, or registered in terms of the law in force prior to the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961.

The war in Angola

112. In the latter part of 1966 the war in Angola entered a new phase when fighting flared up again with intensity in Cabinda and what has been called "a second front" was opened on the eastern border of Angola. In late December, Vila Teixeira de Sousa, near the Zambian border, was the target of a surprise attack and thus by the end of the year Portuguese military units were engaged on the eastern, northern and north-western borders of the Territory.

113. According to press reports, since the first outbreak of fighting at Cazombo, large numbers of Portuguese troops have been moved to the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and all settlements have been cleared from a strip several miles in depth along the frontier. New airfields are being completed in this region and defence measures are being strengthened. In January 1967, eastern Angola had become the main centre of military activities.

114. In the north, the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was closed by the Portuguese authorities in December following a series of events which began with an attack on the Portuguese consulate in Kinshasa. In September, the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted to the Security Council charges that Angola was being used as a military base for mercenaries planning to attack it. Portugal denied these charges and suggested an on-the-spot investigation. Following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ordered the closing of all Portuguese consulates within its borders. Then, in early December, Portugal charged that troops inside Angola had been fired on from the Congolese side of the border.

115. In their military communiqués, the Portuguese admit that they are fighting three nationalist movements: the Mouvement Populaire Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA), the Gouvernement Revolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exile (GRAE) and the newly formed União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). Early in January 1967 a Portuguese military communiqué reported that whereas there had been no incidents in Cabinda during the period reviewed, there had been fighting around Nóqui near the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a surprise attack on the Canga Lucossa road, and also continued fighting in the area north of the Uíge mountains and in the Dembos area. Moxico District, according to press reports, was the main centre of military activities, with fighting north of Lumbala, in the Nhamihia and Sacair, Lucolo and at the juncture of the Henrique de Carvalho-Luso road (near Buçaco) and the Luando River. For the week ending 21 January, Portuguese casualties were reported heavier than usual, with eleven dead, including three civilians, and eighteen wounded.

116. Although on 15 March 1967, on the sixth anniversary of the Angola uprising, the Foreign Minister of Portugal announced that the situation in Angola "has returned to normal on the political, military and economic planes", as is indicated by the Governor-General's speeches (see paras. 107 and 108 above), the war has again become the main concern overshadowing the everyday life of Angola. Reflecting this, the 1967 budget allocates 782 million escudos for national defence and the armed forces, representing a 25 per cent increase over that of 1966 and almost three times as large as the allocation in 1961. In terms of the budget estimates, allocations for defence and the armed forces have increased from 10.8 per cent in 1961 to 12.4 per cent in 1965, 16.3 per cent in 1966 and 18.4 per cent in 1967.

Civil defence and security measures

117. Apart from the armed forces, Angola has two other quasi-military organizations engaged in defence activities. One of these is the traditional militia, a military corps composed of vizinhos das regedorias (Africans living in traditional societies) (Legislative Instrument 3,252, 6 June 1962) which is under the direct command of the local administrative authority and responsible to the Governor-General. In case of war or emergency, the militia may be placed under the authority of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps as necessary.

118 In Angola, the Volunteer Corps was first created in 1961 following the uprising and was composed of Portuguese citizens resident in the Territory. Now known as the Provincial Organization of Volunteers and Civil Defence (Organização Provincial de Voluntários e Defesa Civil de Angola (OPVDC)), it has a permanent staff and organized units throughout the Territory which is divided into civil defence zones corresponding to the administrative districts.

119. The Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps has an autonomous budget supported mainly by special taxes. In 1965, estimated expenditure for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps was 58.5 million escudos. The 1966 budget provided for an estimated expenditure of 56.0 million escudos, of which 49.1 million escudos (87.7 per cent) was for salaries and allowances, 500,000 escudos for civil defence courses and 250,000 escudos for public information.

120. During 1966, civil defence courses and exercises were held in Luanda and Moçâmedes and in various towns in the border districts including Silva Porto (Bié District); São Salvador and Vila do Ambrizete (Zaire District); Cabinda, Guilherme Capelo, Dinge and Buco Zau (Cabinda District); and Luso (Moxico District). Towards the end of the year there were frequent courses for training the local population in active defence, special training courses for civil defence leaders (commanders and assistant instructors) and general orientation courses. Both men and women participate in the courses which end with a civil defence exercise.

121. To co-ordinate the various new defence and security units, a separate Provincial Security Department was established in January 1966 (Legislative Instrument 3,609, 3 January) under the head of the Services for the Co-ordination and Centralization of Information who thereby becomes the Provincial Security Authority. The Provincial Security Department is responsible to the Governor-General and is in permanent relation with the Security Department of the Overseas Ministry and, through the latter, with the National Security Authority in Portugal. There is also a Provincial Security Commission which is responsible for the planning of security policy to be adopted in the Territory in accordance with the general security policy of Portugal. The Commission is composed of the Provincial Security Authority, all the provincial secretaries and one representative from each of the following: Angola's intelligence police, the Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE), the Public Security Police and the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps.

122. As a further security measure, the Governor-General issued an order in January 1967 under which persons who serve in public buildings belonging to the State or to local governments or public bodies automatically become members of the OPVDC and must render such services as they may be called upon to give in the defence of the buildings or the area in which they are located.

123. Although there have been no recent reports of arrests for political reasons, speeches by the Governor-General (reported above) and by other government officials, including the new District Governor of Uíge, as well as newspaper editorials seem to suggest that there may be some disaffection in the Territory. The Public Security Police force is reported to have been increased to 10,000 men,

and during the year the personnel of the PIDE (intelligence police) was increased by almost 50 per cent from 355 to 567. The increase in the PIDE force in the Territory followed the trials in Lisbon of eight Angolans charged with being members of the MPLA. Of these, three men and one woman were sentenced to between 2-1/2 and 8-1/2 years' imprisonment for subversive activities in Angola and three others were acquitted but lost their civil rights for fifteen years. No information has been published on the result of the trial of the eighth person, a twenty-six-year old student.

Economic conditions

124. General. Despite the growing importance of the mining sector in recent years, the economy of Angola is still based mainly on the production and export of agricultural commodities. The most important export crop is coffee, which in 1965 accounted for almost half of the Territory's total exports by value. The other export crops are sisal, maize, sugar and cotton which in an average year account for 10 to 15 per cent of the value of exports.

125. Until 1960 diamonds were the most important mineral exported, on the average accounting for about 14 per cent of exports by value. Since then, owing to the increase in petroleum and iron ore production, the share of minerals in the total value of the exports has risen to over 20 per cent.

126. Most of the export crops are controlled by European capital. African independent farmers grow for their own account about one quarter of the coffee exported. Otherwise, Africans are mainly employed as wage earners or engaged in traditional agriculture, growing food crops, including maize, manioc, palm oil, beans and peanuts, largely for their own subsistence.

127. Although the gross value of industrial production increased by 198 per cent between 1960 and 1965, the industrial sector remains small, the most important activities being concerned with the processing for export of such primary products as petroleum, sugar and cotton (i.e., ginning). Except for a few larger units producing cement, paper, beer, textiles, soft drinks and tobacco, most of the manufacturing industries are relatively small and the total number of wage earners in industry (excluding mining) is less than one quarter of those in agriculture.

The range of consumer goods produced locally is growing, however, and now includes various items of food, fertilizers, tools, electric batteries, other electronic equipment, bicycles, tyres, shoes and some clothing. However, consumer goods, including flour, canned foods, wine and textiles, still account for a substantial part of the Territory's imports.

128. Angola's trade is characterized by a favourable balance with those foreign countries to which it exports most of its coffee, diamonds and iron ores, and a deficit with Portugal, to which it exports its lower-priced commodities such as maize, and sugar in return for manufactured goods. Under the existing trade and currency controls, this situation has enabled Portugal to benefit from Angola's foreign exchange earnings but at the same time it has affected the Territory's economic growth.

129. In 1965 there was less expansion in the main sectors of the economy than in the two previous years. This was reflected in a deteriorating balance of trade, as imports increased more rapidly than exports of both agricultural and mineral products, and by a lower rate of capital investment compared with 1964. By the middle of 1966 the Territory's exchange problems, rising cost of living and shortage of capital began to cause concern.

130. In November, the new Governor-General warned that the Territory would have to face a period of austerity and indicated that new legislation would be introduced to help solve some of the economic and financial problems which the Territory was facing. As noted above (section II A, para. 52), the Governor-General recently ordered the judicial police and the secret police to put a stop to the illicit export of capital from the Territory and heavy penalties have been imposed on transgressors. Since the new year all government departments have been ordered to reduce expenditures to a minimum compatible with the administrative needs and the interests of national defence. The departments have been placed on a monthly budget system under which any surpluses automatically revert to general revenue.^{64/}

131. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly pointed out that Angola's exchange problem and its balance of trade and payments deficits with Portugal tended to reinforce each other in a vicious circle, making it difficult for the Territory to attract the investments needed for a more rapid

^{64/} Known in Portuguese as the duo-décimo system.

growth. But so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of economic development between Portugal and the Overseas Territories, economic integration without safeguards would only make Portugal increasingly a supplier of manufactured goods with the Territories as the consumer markets. He therefore asked the Government to take measures to help bring Angola out of its economic plight and suggested that, among other steps, the Government should restrict its exports, especially of wine and textiles, to Angola as this would encourage the Territory to develop import substitutes. Subsequently the Industrial Association of Angola sent a telegram to the President of the Assembly giving its support to this request.

132. Balance of trade and payments. Preliminary reports for 1966 show a continuation of the decline in the volume of exports which began in 1964. Exports in 1966, totalling 1,700 million tons, were 200 million tons less than in 1965, though the value rose by more than 10 per cent from 5,747 million escudos to 6,361 million escudos. Imports continued the upward trend and increased from 430,000 tons in 1965 to 514,000 tons in 1966 with a corresponding increase in value from 5,601 million escudos to 6,002 million escudos. Thus, although the net trade surplus in 1966, amounting to more than 350 million escudos, was slightly higher than in 1965, it was only 55 per cent of the surplus in 1961 and only 31 per cent of that in 1964.

133. Detailed trade figures for 1966 are not yet available but it is unlikely that there was much change in the general pattern of trade and its deficit relationship with Portugal. In the period 1960-63, Angola's annual trade deficit with Portugal fluctuated around 800 million escudos, with imports from Portugal averaging 1,600 million escudos. Although in 1964 some diamonds were shipped to Portugal for the first time and as a result the trade deficit with Portugal dropped to 552 million escudos, imports from Portugal have continued to rise and in 1965 the trade deficit had again increased to 638 million escudos.

134. Although much of Angola's imports in recent years have been for production needs, in 1965 more than one third of the total imports by value (5,600 million

escudos) consisted of consumer goods, including wines, beverages and foods (about 18 per cent) and textiles (17 per cent). Metal goods, machinery, equipment and vehicles accounted for about 10 per cent and chemical products 8.2 per cent. Portugal supplied 48 per cent of the imports: goods supplied by Portugal valued at 2,661 million escudos, included wine (414 million escudos) and textiles, dyed and other fabrics (389 million escudos).

135. Continuing the pattern of recent years, in 1965 agricultural exports, led by coffee and followed by sisal, maize, sugar and raw cotton, accounted for about two thirds of the total value of exports. Next in importance were minerals, which accounted for about 20.4 per cent of the exports. Portugal's share in the Territory's exports rose from 30 per cent in 1964 to 35 per cent in 1965 (2,023 million escudos out of a total of 5,747 million escudos). In contrast, Angola's exports to its other major clients decreased slightly: exports to the United States were 23 per cent of the total (compared with 25.8 per cent in 1964); to the Netherlands 11.8 per cent (compared with 13.9 per cent in 1964) and to the Federal Republic of Germany 5.4 per cent (compared with 7.6 per cent). Exports to France increased from 2.4 per cent in 1964 to 4.3 per cent and those to South Africa increased from 0.6 per cent to about 1 per cent. South Africa in return supplied about 2 per cent of the Territory's imports in both 1964 and 1965.

136. As reported previously^{65/} in recent years Angola has suffered chronically from exchange problems because of its deficit trade with Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, and because of currency regulations which make Portugal the beneficiary of the Territory's foreign exchange earnings. Angola's visible and invisible transactions with Portugal have increased since 1960 but except for 1962, the Territory has each year had a balance-of-payments deficit with Portugal, which reached a peak of 883 million escudos in 1963.

137. In 1964, outgoing invisibles exceeded incoming by almost 1,000 million escudos but this difference was largely compensated for by a surplus balance of trade and favourable capital movements, so that the balance-of-payments deficit was only 253 million escudos. In 1965 there was an adverse balance of trade resulting in a balance-of-payments deficit of 629 million escudos at the end of the year.

65/ A/6300/Add.3 (part I), paras. 126-130.

138. Figures for 1966 are not yet available but reports indicate that there has been little improvement although export earnings are expected to be higher than in 1965. However, as reported above (section II A, para. 52), as in Portugal, the financial situation in the Territory has led to the illicit export of capital, and the Governor-General has already issued an official statement calling attention to the penalties applicable to such transgressions. He has also announced that various measures are being drawn up to help the Territory get out of its present difficulties regarding foreign exchange and to improve the economic and financial situation.

Agriculture and livestock

139. As in Mozambique, available information shows that the output of most of the important crops has remained fairly static since 1962. In fact, with the exception of coffee, the production of which continued to expand, in 1965 most of the other export crops fell below the level reached in 1962. Sisal production dropped to 60,000 tons from 68,000 tons in 1964 and 70,000 tons in 1962; maize dropped to 131,000 tons from 152,800 in 1964 and 160,000 in 1960; and though cotton production was 19,506 tons compared with 13,609 tons in 1964, it was lower than that of 1962 when the output was 22,500 tons. Wheat output was also lower, 26,305 tons compared with 34,696 tons in 1964, which was a record year. Rice, on the other hand, increased from 18,000 tons in 1964 to 22,000 tons in 1965. Statistics for 1966 are not yet available but government sources expected at the end of the year that, except for maize and sisal, the output of most crops would be equal to or exceed slightly those of 1965.

140. Although coffee production in 1965 was 4 per cent higher than in the previous year (205,000 tons, compared with 198,232 tons) and exports rose 15 per cent (from 138,700 to 159,168 tons) the value of coffee exports dropped by about 6 per cent, from 2,859 million escudos to 2,687 million escudos. As reported previously (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix II, para. 70), under the International Coffee Agreement, to which Portugal is party, Angola has an annual quota for exports to traditional markets (2.38 million sacks for 1966-67) and expansion of the Territory's exports in recent years has been due to additional

allowances and export waivers (given to members who experience special difficulties concerning production and stocks) and sales to new markets. Because of continued surpluses in world production and accumulated stocks, early in 1966 the Government introduced legislation (Decree Law 3,623, 7 February) prohibiting the planting of new areas with robusta coffee. In July 1966 (Order 14,437, 23 July) it raised the annual registration fee for green coffee exporters from 1,000 escudos to 50,000 escudos. In view of the fact that in September 1966 the International Coffee Council adopted measures to induce members to reduce coffee production, it may be expected that Angola's coffee output will gradually level off. Recently Portugal applied for a quota of another 30,000 sacks to cover coffee produced in Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor. The International Coffee Council is reported to be considering this request. In the meantime, in order to reduce the number of exporters, it was decided early in 1967 that monthly export quotas of green coffee will be given only to traders who have minimum reserves totalling 500 tons (for washed coffee, the required reserve is lower).

141. Sisal, which is Angola's second most important export crop, in 1965 accounted for only 4.8 per cent of the Territory's exports by value as compared with 8.2 per cent in 1964 and 12.4 per cent in 1963. This drop was due mainly to smaller demands from overseas markets and lower prices, but as noted above, production also dropped and about 9,000 tons were retained in the Territory. There is no information on the output of the new rope factory, COFIANG, established in 1965 (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix II, para. 90) which was expected to absorb 30 per cent of the sisal produced in the Benguela District.

142. Although cotton has always been one of the Territory's important cash crops, between 1955 and 1960 production fluctuated around 20,000 tons of seed cotton annually. Between 1961 and 1964, it oscillated between 22,500 and 13,099 tons, returning in 1965 to about the same level as in 1960. However, in 1965 more of the cotton was retained in the Territory so that cotton exports to Portugal in 1965 represented only about 25 per cent (4,175 tons) out of a total production of 19,506 tons. In 1965, it ranked tenth in value of exports. Efforts are now being made to mechanize cotton growing and in 1967 it was reported that in the Baixa do Cassange area Africans are being paid to grow cotton under the supervision

of agricultural specialists. In this region, sunflower is also to be grown on a larger scale to provide Africans with a second cash crop.

143. Unlike Mozambique, there have been no large new investments in sugar and the only new unit planned in the late 1950's has not materialized (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix II, para. 94). Since 1960 sugar production has fluctuated between 65,000 tons and 71,000 tons and in 1965 it was 67,000 tons. Like cotton, however, the proportion exported dropped from 70 per cent of the production in 1960 (46,900 tons out of 67,500 tons produced) to about 38 per cent of production (24,600 out of 65,400 tons) in 1964. In this period the share of sugar in the value of the Territory's total exports dropped from 3.5 to 1.2 per cent. In 1965 about 50 per cent of the sugar was exported and the share in the value of the total value of exports rose to 2 per cent. It is likely that this change may have been due to the higher CIF Lisbon price introduced in 1964, since most of the Territory's sugar exports go to Portugal.

144. In contrast to the rather recent levelling off in the production of European-owned or financed crops, exports of traditionally grown African crops including maize, palm oil, coconut, beans and manioc have generally declined since 1950. Exports of maize, for instance, reached a peak of 190,000 tons in 1950 which has not been surpassed since. For many years the Government has considered plans for regrouping the rural African population and for introducing modern farming techniques. However, from the information so far available, there do not seem to be any special plans to inject capital and to improve production in the subsistence sector. It appears to be still hoped that the distribution of improved seed, higher purchase prices and better marketing and storage facilities will suffice to make available larger surplus production for sale.

145. As regards maize, past experience seems to indicate that better official purchase prices do not necessarily increase African production though they may affect exports. In 1965, for instance, the Grémio for purchasing maize (see A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix II, paras. 164 ff.) acquired 131,000 tons but exports amounted to 168,200 tons, valued at 283 million escudos, which represented 4.9 per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. In both 1960 and 1964 production was considerably higher (160,000 tons and 152,800 tons respectively) though for those years exports were lower. There are no data available for 1966.

146. Before 1961 only European farmers could obtain credit from the various export boards for special crops (see A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix I). The main source of agricultural credit is now the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa) which was established in 1961 with an initial capital of 100 million escudos. Although the Caixa may grant loans up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees and it is required to give priority to small farmers, in general, loans can only be obtained by those who have a legal title to their land or can offer other acceptable security. African growers or livestock owners, who do not possess security, can only obtain loans when a government body superintends the use of the loan. In both 1963 and 1964, the loans granted by the Caixa amounted to over 100 million escudos but some 80 per cent of these were short-term loans which went mainly to coffee growers and, to a lesser extent, sisal and cotton producers. In 1964 (Ministerial Legislative Order No. 1) and 1965 (Order 13,792, 22 May) the Caixa's operations were extended to provide short-term loans for revolving expenses and medium and long-term loans to industries processing agricultural and livestock products. Further changes were made in 1966 (Decree 47,057, 25 June 1966): on the one hand conditions governing collateral for short, medium and long-term loans have been tightened and on the other the credit resources of the Caixa have been increased with a further loan of 50 million escudos from the National Development Bank in Lisbon, so that the total available credit in 1967 is expected to amount to some 180 million escudos.

147. In the interest of introducing new cash crops in the Territory and with the metropolitan market in mind, government support is being given to banana and pineapple production as plantation crops and to a lesser extent tobacco grown both by Africans and by Europeans. Recently the development of cashew has begun along the coast in northern Angola.

148. Bananas, which are grown throughout the Territory, were first exported in large quantity to Portugal in 1960 (1,273 tons, valued at 1.1 million escudos). By 1964, the amount and value of bananas exported had doubled and in 1965 rose to 3,619 tons, valued at more than 6 million escudos. In 1967 exports are expected to reach 15,000 tons and several ships have been acquired by the Overseas Ministry especially for carrying fruit. Of particular interest is the 1,200-hectare banana

project in the Cavaco valley in Benguela district which is expected eventually to produce 120,000 tons of green bananas annually, with an export value of 132 million escudos.

149. In December (Angola, Order 14,751, 29 December 1966), an export tax of 20 centavos per kilo was imposed on bananas and 25 centavos per kilo on pineapples. The banana tax is about 20 per cent of the average export price of 1.1 escudos per kilogramme.

150. Increased efforts are also being made to expand the livestock resources both for the domestic market and for export to Portugal of frozen meat (see above). According to the livestock census taken in 1962^{66/} there were over 1.5 million head of cattle in the Territory most of which are owned by the African population. The census showed that since 1935 there has been a significant decline in the cattle population in the Territory as evidenced by the drop from over 1 million head to 705,000 head in Huíla District, and from 300,000 head in Moçâmedes to 87,000 in 1962.

151. Since 1961, in addition to the establishment of the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank, new regulations have been introduced to facilitate land concessions to stockbreeders and to facilitate imports of breeding cattle. Subsequently special committees were created to draw up plans for organizing pasture land, in order to ensure its optimum use and to help stabilize the rural population.

152. According to the plans adopted in 1965 (Order 13,906, 4 September), Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts have been divided into pasturage zones in accordance with the size, character and degree of evolution of the population, the actual number of livestock and the type of livestock industry, the area of potential and developed pasturage and the water resources. Where the livestock is being bred for

^{66/} In Vasco Sousa Dias "Notas sobre a Produção de Carne", Planeamento e integração económica, July 1966.

commercial purposes or can be developed for this purpose, government services are to assist, particularly in the delimitation of the land and in the provision of water. African livestock farmers are to be given all the assistance needed, especially by the granting of land to them on a communal or individual basis. In November 1966 (Order 14,013, 20 November), guidelines were laid down for the work to be done by the Veterinary Services which is to be organized by "livestock zones", beginning with Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts. Water supplies will be developed under a co-ordinated plan for pastoral regions in southern Angola as a whole.

153. In 1966, there were reports of a sudden increase of requests for concessions of vacant land for raising livestock in Uíge and Cuanza North Districts. As these districts are fairly densely occupied and much land has already been concessioned,^{67/} this new influx has created difficulties sometimes involving African land rights. The Government has therefore issued an order that all concession boundaries in these districts are to be marked only by the official teams (brigadas de demarcação e vistorias). These teams will also be responsible for boundary marking of land in cases where a demarcation licence has already been obtained but the land has not been used for the purpose intended^{68/} or the concession has not yet been duly registered.

^{67/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, appendix, annex II, tables 3 and 4.

^{68/} Under the existing land concession legislation, much larger areas of land may be requested for livestock purposes than for agriculture. As in the case of the latter there are certain development requirements and to obtain free title, a certain number of cattle have to be raised according to the size of the concession.

154. In February 1967, boundary marking difficulties were also reported in connexion with livestock concessions under the pastoral zoning plan in Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts. In this area too, boundaries of concessions for livestock raising may henceforth only be marked by the official teams.

155. Angola's fresh meat exports, which amounted to 26 million escudos in 1961, dropped to 19 million escudos in 1962 and 1963. In 1964, 67,000 head of cattle were slaughtered, producing 9,689,000 kilogrammes of meat of which about one fourth was exported. The value of fresh meat exported was 2.3 million escudos, representing just under 0.4 per cent of the total exports. In 1965 only 60,000 cattle were slaughtered and while the quantity exported remained about the same, the value rose from 21.6 million to 30.5 million escudos. According to the study published in 1966, Angola's cattle output is estimated at present at 135,000 head per year of which 75,000 head may be expected to reach the market.^{69/}

156. Recent reports from Angola stress the important role played by government supervised rural markets in encouraging African agricultural production. The present system of officially controlled rural markets was established in 1963 (Angola, Governor-General's Order No. 12,788, 22 June 1963) to facilitate and regulate trading in African grown crops and livestock.^{70/} These markets are held at officially designated places and times for the sale by local inhabitants of their produce. The district governors may limit any market to traders, exporters

^{69/} Vasco Sousa Dias, op. cit. According to the Bank of Angola report for 1965 (p. 62), 81,710 head of cattle slaughtered and 11,913,670 kilogrammes of meat.

^{70/} As reported previously (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix I, paras. 60-63) the Native Statute made provision for the regulation and control of sales of African agricultural products. The repeal of the Native Statute made it necessary to introduce new regulations. Although Africans have to sell their produce through the rural markets, in practice, they are intended to protect the African from unscrupulous traders.

and industrialists of only the district concerned or of one locality. Official minimum prices are fixed for products according to grade and are publicly posted. All sales have to be paid for in cash and traders are free to negotiate sales above the minimum prices, which in the case of export crops are fixed in relation to the prevailing FOB prices, less costs of transportation, packaging and other expenses and profits to the middleman, which may amount to as much as 20 per cent.

157. The first rural markets were held in Uíge District in 1962. The quantity of Mabuba coffee traded in these markets increased rapidly in the first three years: 2 million kilogrammes at 4.3 million escudos in 1962; 7.7 million kilogrammes at 32 million escudos in 1963; and 12 million kilogrammes at 56.7 million escudos in 1964. In 1965, the amount traded dropped to 10 million kilogrammes (51 million escudos) but in 1966 almost 13 million kilogrammes were traded at 65 million escudos.^{71/} Although about half of the total number of market days are held in Uíge, in 1964 some markets were held in all but two (Cabinda and Moçâmedes) of the fifteen districts. In 1965, a total of 5,108 market days were held in all districts and 270 million escudos were paid for the 70 million kilogrammes of produce traded, including coffee (35.5 million kilogrammes, 170 million escudos);^{72/} tobacco (251,550 kilogrammes, 1.7 million escudos); beef cattle (6.4 million escudos); and hogs.

^{71/} The government report to which reference is made below estimated that there were in 1965 some 12,000 African coffee growers, of whom about 1,000 employed an average of four men during the period of four months in the year.

^{72/} Representing about 17 per cent of the Territory's total production in 1965.

158. In December 1965 (Legislative Order 3,593, 13 December), the legislation establishing rural markets was revised. Products which may be traded in these markets now include simple or manufactured agricultural and livestock products and handicrafts. As sales of goods in the rural markets increased in 1966, there were rumours that money paid to Africans had been illegally exported to support nationalist movements outside the Territory. In late February 1967, the Angolan Government published a detailed report on the rural markets in Uíge District,^{73/} showing how the money paid in the markets had been spent locally or deposited in banks, thus refuting the rumours.

159. Information is not yet available for all districts, but preliminary data suggest that in 1966 there were large increases especially in Huíla District where purchases in the one month of April 1966 are reported to have amounted to more than 280 million escudos.

Settlement and land utilization

160. Since the last report on land settlement (A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex II) there has been very little new information on settlement schemes in Angola. Although it remains Portugal's policy to increase settlement in both Angola and Mozambique, the emphasis in the Territory is now more on the need for a sound economy and for the development of its human and natural resources - especially in the rural areas - in order to attract and retain new settlers. Recent statements reflecting this view include one by the Governor-General who said that in principle he agreed that the increased settlement of whole families was indispensable to the Territory but that such settlement would be really viable only

^{73/} This report showed that out of 65.5 million escudos paid to African growers, the Government received 2.52 million escudos in general taxes (350 escudos per person, 7,200 taxpayers) and an additional 3.22 million in taxes and licences paid in the markets and to the Carmona Municipal Council. In addition, 2 million escudos were paid in the form of interest on loans. The report also gave figures of purchases of bicycles, radios, motorcycles and the number and value of new houses built.

if more industries were established throughout the Territory.^{74/} A similar statement was made by the District Governor of Uíge who said that it was necessary to diversify agricultural production and to introduce new industries which would improve the purchasing power of the people, a condition which in turn would attract the surplus population from Portugal.^{75/}

161. In Angola, emphasis is given to rural reorganization as part of the general plan for social promotion, settlement and improvement of rural communities. Plans first approved in 1962 were revised in 1964 and what seems to be envisaged now is the regrouping of the rural African population in units which have "geo-economic and social unity". This is also to be the criteria in establishing new regedorias or in the delimitation of existing ones. The regrouping is intended to make it easier to provide health, education and agricultural services, to improve housing and production, and to develop the private ownership of land.

162. In the first instance the Territory is to be divided into basic regrouping regions subdivided into zones, each under a zone regrouping committee comprising members appointed by the district governor and presided over by the local administrative authority. In drawing up plans for regrouping, the government departments are to seek the co-operation of the local population which is also to be consulted in the establishment of priorities. The main considerations are the need to introduce changes in farming and stock-rearing methods and the inclusion or assimilation (enquadramento) of "the traditional infra-structure in the national structure".

163. So far, complete plans for the whole Territory have not been published. There appear to be some pilot projects under way. In 1966, 25 million escudos was allocated from the extraordinary budget for rural regrouping projects as

^{74/} On the question of dispersion of industries see below.

^{75/} He also complained that there were far too many traders whose sole activity was as intermediaries and who did not contribute to the economic growth of the area.

follows: Cabinda and Huambo Districts, 2 million escudos each; Bié and Malanje and Zaire Districts, about one million escudos each; Cuanza North, Mexico and Huíla Districts, about 650,000 escudos each; Benguela and Luanda, 500,000 escudos each and Luanda, 400,000 escudos.

164. There is no information on the progress made under the rural regrouping plan, nor is there any information on whether or not there has been any increase in the number of African farmers who own land on the same basis as Europeans.

165. Government efforts to improve the rural areas have varied from district to district. Recent information suggests that more has been done in Uíge District to help African farmers than anywhere else in the Territory, but now there are also plans for developing the northern parts of Zaire District and Cabinda. In November, an Angolan newspaper, reporting on progress in Uíge District since Mr. Rebocho Vaz became District Governor in 1961, listed a large number of new "rural villages" (aldeamentos rurais) in each of which a two-room school had been built and in many of which a new house had been built for the headman (soba) and health facilities or water supplies had been provided. According to the article there is now a shortage of labour in this district since the local inhabitants do not work for others and all manual labour for European farms has to be imported. Only a few settlers have been established and in the mountain regions some of the abandoned coffee farms have been turned over to workers from the south who are now being organized into a new village.

166. Plans are being made along the border of Zaire to improve the standard of living of the rural African population and to introduce European settlement. Around Santo António do Zaire (on the south bank of the Zaire River which divides the Territory from the Democratic Republic of the Congo) it is planned to plant hundreds of hectares with cashew and oil palm for the usufruct of Africans. In Quinzau (which is about half way down the coast to Ambrizete) 80,000 State-owned cashew trees will be turned over to Africans who will be responsible for their care. Agricultural assistance stations under headmen (capatazias agrícolas) will be established at Quello (on the Lucula River) and Sumbo (on the Zaire River). Centres for European settlement are also under

study and in January the District-Governor, together with other civil and military personnel, made an aerial and land survey of possible locations. It is reported that speakers in the Legislative Council and the Press in Angola are all in favour of establishing new settlements along the frontier because the settlers are to be given special training and will help the armed forces in defending the Territory.

Industry

167. The industrial sector in Angola is still limited and plays a relatively small role in the economy of the Territory. Most of the industries are concerned with the production of consumption goods for local use or processing of primary products for export. Except for a few larger units producing sugar, beer, cement, petroleum and textiles, most of the industries are small in size. Figures for 1962 showed, for instance, that with some 2,800 million escudos invested in 3,050 establishments, eleven units alone accounted for about one third of the total capital and another 320 units (processing vegetable oil, fish and sisal) accounted for a further 20 per cent of the total, so that the average capital per unit in the remaining 88 per cent of the industries was about half a million escudos (less than \$US20,000), each.

168. Between 1958 and 1961 the rate of capital investment rose to almost 250 million escudos annually. New industries established in this period included a cement plant (established in 1958 with a capital of 150 million escudos), two beer factories (established in 1959 and 1961 with a total capital of 63 million escudos) a vegetable oil plant (established in 1960 with a capital of 70 million escudos) and a petroleum refinery (established in 1961, capital 150 million escudos). Since 1962, annual investments in transforming and manufacturing industries in Angola have been at a lower rate; although there was a slight improvement in 1964, the total for 1965 was only 103 million escudos; and the average annual rate of investment over the period 1962-65 was less than 120 million escudos.

169. Complete data are not yet available for 1966. Preliminary figures for January to May suggest an upward trend as investments during those five months already surpassed 230 million escudos, which was more than double the total

investments in the previous year. New industries established in 1966 include a cardboard packing material factory, financed by the Companhia União de Cervejas de Angola (CUCA) in association with the South African company, Amalgamated Packaging Industries Ltd. (API); a flour factory, subsidiary of CUCA in association with Sungold of South Africa; a textile factory known as Sociedade Angolana de Tecidos Estampados, S.A.R.L. (SATEC) which has contracted a 70-million escudos loan from the Interamerican Capital Corporation of New York (the Interamerican Capital Corporation has already financed various projects in Angola, including a hydro-electric installation, roads, airports and factories, as reported in A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 122); a 40-million escudo tobacco factory in Benguela owned by the Fábrica de Tabacos Ultramarina; a match factory, the Indústria Fosforeira Angolana (IFA), with an initial capital of 15 million escudos which is owned by the Borges and Irmão group (owners of the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the tyre factory Mabor Angolana); two electrical appliance factories, one in Nova Lisboa with a capital of 18 million escudos and the other in Luanda (Indústrias Electrónicas Angola, S.A.R.L.) with a capital of 2 million escudos; a new fish oil and fish meal factory in Porto Alexandre established by the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense, Limitada (SIAC) with a 12-million escudo loan from the Fisheries Assistance Fund (Fundo do Apoio às Indústrias de Pesca); a 26-million escudo tile factory known as Fábrica de Cerâmicas de Angola, a 30-million escudo pineapple juice factory in Lobito and a plant for industrial chemicals, including sulphuric acid with an investment of 500 million escudos owned by the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos. An existing metal works has been expanded to become Siderurgia Angolana, S.A.R.L with a capital of 100 million escudos.

170. During the period 1961-65, the value of the output of almost all the processing and manufacturing industries increased steadily. The major exceptions were sugar and cotton ginning (see above). Large gains were made in beer (160 per cent increase, from 127 million to 331 million escudos); petroleum (70 per cent increase, from 304 million to 516 million escudos); tobacco (64 per cent increase, from 138 million to 226 million escudos); and milling

(800 per cent increase, from 20 million to 163 million escudos). Smaller gains were registered in cement, soft drinks and sausage making. Wood pulp, which came into production for the first time in 1963, rose from 52,000 to 75,000 tons in 1965 and paper increased from less than 3,000 tons in 1961 to 33,000 tons.

171. As yet, however, local production meets only a small part of the Territory's consumption needs as evidenced by the still-growing value of such imports as the following: tobacco, which increased 46 per cent between 1964 and 1965; textiles, 10 per cent; wheat flour, 35 per cent; paper, 12.4 per cent; conserved milk products, 17 per cent.

172. As noted in a Portuguese study published in 1961,^{76/} the industrial structure of the Territory is almost entirely directed from Portugal. According to that study, of the 40 more important industrial establishments in Angola, 10 had their headquarters in Lisbon, 16 at least had their main offices there and 14 were represented there. Official information^{77/} further shows that a large share of the profits and earnings from industrial and other enterprises are transferred out of the Territory. In the period 1960-62, for instance, transfers out of the Territory exceeded 2,000 million escudos of which profits and earnings (including earnings on property) amounted to more than 600 million escudos and the remainder consisted of private transfers. The transfers of profits and earnings alone exceeded the new capital invested in industries in Angola in that period.

^{76/} L.M. Teixeira Pinto and Rui Martins dos Santos. Angola Polos e Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento, Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Financeiras, Lisbon, 1961.

^{77/} Portugal, Presidência do Concelho, Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967, Lisbon, 1964, vol. II, p. 153.

173. Another characteristic feature of the industrial sector in Angola is its high concentration in three main regions: (a) Luanda-Dondo-Malanje, which is supplied with electric power by the Cambambe station on the Cuanza River; (b) Lobito-Benguela-Nova Lisboa, supplied by power from the Catumbela River and (c) Moçâmedes-Sá da Bandeira with power supplied from the Matala station on the Cunene.^{78/} However, a greater proportion of the capitalized industries and a majority of the transforming industries are located in the Luanda region. Although the areas of concentrated industries act as "poles of development" the concentration has tended to aggravate development problems in the rural areas from which there has been considerable exodus of manpower. Recent information from Angola indicates that there is growing support in both government and business circles for a more balanced distribution in the location of industries throughout the Territory.

174. In January 1967, the Governor-General was authorized to introduce any changes he thought necessary in the collection of industrial and other taxes and he has since offered industries locating in the border districts a 50 per cent reduction in their tax rates.

175. In Angola, building was seriously affected by the uprising in 1961. The number of new constructions dropped from 761 in 1960 to 494 in 1961 and 320 in 1962, while the value dropped from 340 million escudos to 273 million escudos and to 160 million escudos. There has been a partial recovery in the last two years and in 1965, 628 units were built, with a value of 213 million escudos.

176. Electric power production and consumption have more than doubled since 1960. In 1965, production was 320,000 kwh compared with 143 kwh in 1960 and representing a 31 per cent increase over 1964 (260,000 kwh). In this period consumption increased from about 82 per cent of production to 95 per cent in 1965.

177. The present generating stations are distributed as follows: Cambambe station on the Cuanza River, 260,000 kw; Mabubas station on the Catumbela River, 15,000 kw; and a private station, 12,000 kw. A recent estimate by the Junta de Electrificação puts Angola's potential capacity at 10 million kw.^{79/}

^{78/} L.M. Teixeira and R.M. dos Santos, op. cit., pp. 35 ff.

^{79/} Diário, Lourenço Marques, 29 January 1967.

178. In December 1966 the Overseas Minister for Portugal signed contracts with three French companies for the supply of electrical equipment under the loan guaranteed by the General Trade Company. The three French companies are Ateliers de montages électriques, which will supply radio-electric parts valued at 1,440,501F,^{80/} the Société de monteurs thermiques, which will supply electric generators and parts valued at 2,407,860F; and the Société générale de constructions électriques et mécaniques Alsthom, which will supply 28 Diesel generators and replacement parts valued at 936,330F.

Mining^{81/}

179. Although in the period 1960-65 the gross value of mineral production increased at an average rate of about 14 per cent per annum to 1,458 million escudos in 1965, the share of minerals in the value of the Territory's exports dropped from a peak of 23.4 per cent in 1963 to 20.4 per cent in each of the two succeeding years.

(a) Diamonds

180. The output of diamonds rose from 1,083,571 carats in 1963 to 1,149,068 carats in 1964 and 1,155,726 carats in 1965. The number of carats exported was lower in 1965 than in 1963 but owing to price increases in 1964 the value of exports increased steadily to 904.3 million escudos in 1965, representing 15.7 per cent of the value of the total exports.

181. So far, the Angola Diamond Company remains the only diamond producer in the Territory as no finds have been reported from prospecting concessions granted

^{80/} \$US1 equals 5 francs.

^{81/} This information supplements the study on mining in Angola contained in document A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex I.

since 1964. Towards the end of 1966 it was reported that Anchor Diamonds, a South African company, had requested exclusive diamond prospecting rights over an area of 1.1 million hectares south of Luanda. No details are available, however.

(b) Petroleum

182. Owing to technical difficulties crude petroleum production dropped in 1965 to only 655,000 tons, compared with 905,000 tons in the previous year. Exports of crude petroleum to Portugal also dropped by more than 50 per cent, from 361,000 tons to 114,000 tons, valued at 39 million escudos, representing less than one per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. But exports of refined petroleum products to Portugal amounted to 214,047 tons (32 tons of butane gas, 455 tons of gasoline, 12,838 tons of airplane fuel, 4,894 tons of gas oil and 195,828 tons of fuel oil). The Angola refinery has an annual capacity of 660,000 tons and in 1964 and 1965 the amount of crude oil processed was 15 per cent higher than in 1963 (an average of 542,000 tons compared with 482,000 tons in the earlier year).

183. Angola's petroleum production is expected to rise substantially in the next few years as a result of the reorganization and refinancing of Petrangol and the extension of its concession and the new discoveries of petroleum by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in the Cabinda enclave.

184. As reported last year (A/6300/Add.3 (part I) para. 117), at the end of 1965 the Portuguese Government signed a new contract with Petrangol which is the only petroleum producer and owns the only refinery in Angola. The new contract extended Petrangol's concession area and also envisaged that the Government would select another company to participate in the exploitation of the concessions on a joint venture basis. Although several foreign companies had been included in the list from which the choice would be made (including the South African company Federale Mynbou), in July a Portuguese company, ANGOL, (Sociedade de Lubrificação e Combustíveis) was selected.

185. ANGOL is reported to be closely associated with the two principal oil companies in Portugal, SACOR (Sociedade Anónima Concessionária de Refinação de Petróleos em Portugal) and SONAP (Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos, S.A.R.L.).

186. SACOR, which owns a refinery and has distributing rights in Portugal, also holds rights to process the surplus crude oil from Angola and is currently building a new refinery which is expected to cost over 2,231 million escudos, part of which is being financed by government-guaranteed loan bonds.

187. The statement by the Government announcing the selection of ANGOL, which holds petroleum distributing rights in Angola, said that this move was in keeping with the policy of encouraging activities by national companies and national capital in the development of the Overseas Territories. At the same time the Government's participation has increased as it has a one-third share in SACOR which in 1964 held 78.4 per cent of ANGOL's registered capital.^{82/}

188. Since their association in the development of petroleum in Angola, both companies have changed their statutes. Petrangol's new statute published in October 1966 requires it to raise its present registered capital of 150 million escudos to 900 million within 90 days upon notice from the Government after consultation with the company. This is to be done by the issue of new shares, one third of which are to be given free of charge to the Government. Under its new statute approved in September 1966, ANGOL becomes Sociedade Portuguesa de Exploração de Petróleos and its capital, which was raised in April 1966 from 70 million to 120 million escudos, is to be further increased to 220 million escudos by an issue of new shares, 100 million escudos of which will be for public subscription in Angola. The company has been authorized to increase its capital further to 320 million escudos when necessary. The Government is to receive free of charge 10 per cent of the new shares issued. Participation of foreign capital is envisaged through purchase of shares, but, in accordance with the 1965 regulations governing foreign investments (Decree Law 46,312, 28 April) there is to be a Portuguese majority in the administration, direction and management.

^{82/} In November 1966, SACOR issued \$US6 million bond series at 6 3/4 per cent interest which was reported to have been underwritten by a Luxembourg bank. Previously, in 1961 and 1962, SACOR issued two other bond series in European units of account. The Portuguese Government has undertaken to guarantee a total of 580 million escudos of SACOR's loans.

189. In December 1966 ANGOL was granted a contract for petroleum mining in the Territory under which it will have a 50 per cent share in the existing Petrangol petroleum mining concession (excluding the deposits already discovered and excluding refining rights) and exclusive rights in other areas. It is required to invest an equal amount of 750 million escudos in the joint concession by the end of 1970 and an additional 300 million escudos in the areas over which it has exclusive rights. Thus ANGOL's investments in the Territory will amount to more than 1,000 million escudos during the first five years of its contract. In addition, ANGOL undertakes to contribute 1.5 million escudos annually to the Mining Development Fund when established. ANGOL is specifically authorized to co-operate with other national or foreign enterprises. If foreign capital is associated with this project, the amounts required to be spent in prospecting will be further raised. If oil is found, the company must begin exploitation as soon as feasible and must give Portuguese refineries priority of purchase.

190. At the end of 1966, Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC) found oil in Cabinda where it has had an exclusive concession since 1957 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, appendix, annex I, paras. 188-194). The original contract having expired in November 1966, a new contract has since been signed under which the company is granted until the end of 1968 an exclusive concession for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, especially petroleum, in a large part of the Cabinda district and off-shore. The contract may be extended for another two years. Reports indicate that the company has already spent 360 million escudos on prospecting in the area. Under the new contract, instead of paying the surface rent of 630 escudos per square kilometre during the period of prospecting only, the company will pay during the whole period of the concession a rent of 600 escudos a square kilometre during the first two years, 750 escudos in 1969 and 900 escudos in 1970. The company undertakes to invest a minimum of 150 million escudos before the end of December 1968 and to pay one million escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund. The Government of Angola will receive 50 per cent of the company's profits.

191. In September 1966, Texaco, Inc. filed an application for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, including raw petroleum, in the Congo district and off-shore Cabinda.

(c) Iron

192. The largest foreign and Portuguese investments since 1961 have been in iron mining in the Territory, mainly for the development of the deposits at Cassinga which are estimated to be over 120 million tons of high grade ore and many thousand million tons of lower grade deposits.

193. Average production over the period 1960-65 was around 800,000 tons a year and exports averaged around 650,000 tons. In 1964 exports reached an all-time high of 1.27 million tons (which included reserve stocks), but dropped to 693,000 tons in 1965. According to reports, production and exports have been held back pending completion of rail and port facilities for handling the ore. With the exception of 1964, the value of iron exports has averaged slightly less than 150 million escudos annually but it has not kept pace with the total value of the Territory's exports, dropping from 4.3 per cent in 1960 to 2.5 per cent in 1965. (In 1964 exports were valued at 234 million escudos and represented 4 per cent of the value of total exports.)

194. The two principal mines in production are those at Cuíma and Cassinga, both owned and operated by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito which is closely associated with the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige. Although, according to previous estimates, ore reserves total more than 10 million metric tons at Cuíma, and production from this mine has probably accounted for about half of the annual exports in the last few years, it is now reported that the mine will be closed next year when the Cassinga mine comes into production.

195. The Cassinga mine is being financed partly by foreign capital, which is being used for the purchase of rolling stock, mineral handling facilities and equipment. Up to the end of 1966, financial assistance in connexion with the project included (a) 1,300 million escudos provided by a consortium comprising Fried Krupp (Essen), Jørgaard and Schulz A/S (Copenhagen) and the Sociedade de Empreitadas e Trabalhos Hidráulicos, Lda. (of Lisbon and Luanda); (b) a loan of 300 million escudos from the Bank of Angola to the territorial Government for the development of Moçâmedes port facilities; (c) 1,500 million escudos furnished by Krupp in 1965 for locomotives and waggons and (d) a loan of 32 million escudos in 1966 by the Danish

firm. In December 1966 (Decree 47,380, 16 December), the Portuguese Government, on behalf of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige, guaranteed foreign loans totalling 2,700 million escudos (approximately \$US97 million).^{83/} Total investments in connexion with the project already exceed 3,000 million escudos, making it the most expensive current project in the Territory.

196. The guarantee by the Government has been made to enable the preparatory work to be accelerated so that the mine will start producing in 1967 and output will increase to 5 to 5.5 million tons annually in 1968, instead of at an annual rate of 1.5 million tons as previously planned. It is reported that contracts have already been signed for deliveries of ore to the Federal Republic of Germany and to Japan. In January 1967, it was reported that 75,000 tons were ready for shipment to Japan and a further 10,000 tons of scrap was waiting transportation. Total value of exports of ore are expected to reach 1,300 million escudos annually (about half the value of coffee exports in 1965) and during the period of amortization (about ten years) foreign exchange earnings are expected to amount to about 500,000 escudos annually, and after amortization to about a million escudos annually.

197. The work of the mine is currently being carried out under some sixty contracts most of which are expected to be completed by the end of this year. The mining operations will be highly mechanized so that very little manual labour will be involved. Transport facilities include sixty locomotives, twenty vans and 800 freight waggons. The Moçâmedes port is being equipped with a mineral quay capable of handling 3,000 tons per hour and a storage area for at least 1 million tons of ore.

198. Early in 1967 the registered share capital of the Lobito-Lombige companies was increased and Portuguese holdings will be increased by 500 million escudos through the subscription of shares by the Portuguese and Angolan Governments and other governmental bodies. The Government of Angola is already a shareholder in both companies.

^{83/} This guarantee is reported to cover both the initial 1,300 million escudo loan and additional loans made since then or to be made.

(d) Other

199. There have also been recent developments relating to the mining of manganese, copper and phosphate deposits. New manganese deposits have been reported and the Portuguese Government has authorized the territorial Government to subscribe to 10 million escudos in shares in the Companhia do Manganés de Angola, which has hitherto been the main producer of manganese, although production and exports have been insignificant during the last three years.

200. New deposits of copper have also been reported at Tetelo in the Mavio region. There are reports that the Nippon Mining Company plans to invest \$US25 million in the development of these deposits. A new company, Empresa Mineira de Angola, is reported to be actively prospecting for copper in the Alto-Zambezia region.

201. In January 1966, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito is reported to have filed a claim to exploit natural phosphate deposits in northern Angola. The International Mineral and Chemical Corporation (reported to be a United States company) is said to be interested in developing the phosphate deposits.

Fisheries

202. In the 1950's the fishing industry was one of the Territory's most important economic activities and was also a source of foreign exchange. Since the drop in world fish meal prices in 1959, the industry has been seriously depressed and in spite of various government measures to help reorganize and finance it, production of fish derivatives (conserves, fish meal, fish oil and dried fish) dropped from an average of about 80,000 tons a year in 1961-62 to under 60,000 tons in the two following years; thereafter production rose to 93,000 tons in 1964 but in 1965 it was again only 81,000 tons. Annual exports of fish derivatives have fluctuated around an average of 70,000 tons annually, but as a result of improved prices their value rose from an average of 250 million escudos a year in the period 1960-61 to over 300 million escudos a year in 1964-65, and in the last year, fish meal alone ranked fifth in value of the Territory's exports.

203. As in the case of several of the important export crops, government measures have aimed at the structural reorganization of the industry and the provision of technical assistance and credit facilities. Among other measures, the Government has set up a Fisheries Industries Institute and a Fishing Industry Assistance Fund which acts both as a marketing fund, producing subsidies in times of low prices and as a credit institution. Since its establishment, the Fund has helped to modernize and re-equip the fishing fleet and has added a floating factory to help process the catch at sea. In 1962 the fisheries industry was reorganized along corporative lines with fishermen and other producers engaged in this sector organized into grêmios through which the industry can co-ordinate and regulate its own activities and provide insurance and welfare assistance to its members.^{84/}

204. In March 1966, the South African company, Marine Products, which had intended to set up a R1.5 million fish processing plant in Angola, decided to withdraw. The company is reported to have made this move because "Portuguese legislation promulgated in November 1965^{85/} had the effect that foreigners are not permitted to control fishing vessels".^{85/} In addition to the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense reported above (para. 169) another, a new Portuguese fisheries company known as Sociedade dos Armadores des Pesca em Angola, S.A.R.L. (ARAN) was established with an initial capital of 7.5 million escudos. The new company, which has its counterpart in Mozambique, plans to supply fish to Portugal and the local market. A third Portuguese-owned fisheries company, the Sociedade de Pesca, has begun operations with the first of five vessels equipped to freeze the catch at sea.

^{84/} For a brief description of the Portuguese corporative system of economic organization see A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix I, paras. 6-15. In this system "Institutes have the function of co-ordinating all activities in relation to those commodities which are mainly for export, which already have fully developed corporative organized production and commerce sectors, but which because of their importance require official guarantees as to quality and type of product".

^{85/} It appears that the legislation referred to is Decree 46,666 relating to the co-ordination of industrial development in the Portuguese realm which is briefly reported in document A/6300/Add.3 (part I), paras. 65-68.

Transport and communications

205. In Angola, priority has been given to transport and communication facilities under the successive development plans since 1953, not only as a necessary part of the Territory's infra-structure but also as part of the Government's long-term plan to occupy and settle the Territory with surplus population from Portugal. The importance attached to this sector is reflected in the proportion of the total expenditure successively allocated for roads, rail transport, ports and harbours, and airport facilities and equipment: 66 per cent (1,478 million escudos) under the First National Development Plan, 1953-58; 54 per cent (2,147 million escudos) under the Second National Development Plan, 1959-64; and almost 30 per cent (1,930 million escudos) under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67.

206. As reported previously (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix IV), the railways in Angola have in the past operated continuously below their capacity and do not make an important contribution to the territorial revenue. This situation may be expected to change, however, when the Cassinga mine comes into operation later this year, as the Moçâmedes line is expected to run more than twenty trains a day, eventually carrying a daily load of more than 10,000 tons of mineral ore. The equipment of the Luanda Railway is also being modernized under a recent government guarantee for the purchase of electric engines from the United States amounting to 82 million escudos.

207. Of the three main lines, only the Benguela railway traverses the whole Territory and carries transit trade. Nevertheless, competition from other lines has in the past prevented the Benguela from carrying more traffic. Only since the early part of 1966 has the Benguela railway come into greater use for exporting copper ore from Zambia. General inbound traffic to Zambia rose 65,000 tons over the previous year and by the end of the year, with the exception of November and December, exports of copper were around 15,000 tons a month. Although the Benguela railway put forward a plan in early 1966 for doubling its capacity if it could be guaranteed a minimum of 120,000 to 140,000 tons of mineral traffic a year (A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix IV, paras. 59-60), there is no recent information on whether the plan is being implemented.

208. The three main ports are at Luanda, Lobito and Moçâmedes. Under the first two development plans more than 660 million escudos were allocated to port development, and of this about half was spent in the expansion of Lobito and the installation of ore loading facilities to serve the Cuíma mine (see above). Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, of the 278 million escudos allocated for ports and navigation, more than half (150 million escudos) is for improving the Luanda port, the main coffee port. In 1966, two new wharfs were opened and ten South African manufactured cranes were installed. A new naval dock was also opened.

209. As reported above, the improvements to the Moçâmedes port are being financed mainly by the mining companies and special allocations. However, under the contract all port and rail facilities financed and built by the companies become government property immediately upon completion. The Moçâmedes port will be able to handle ships of up to 100,000 tons even at low tide.

210. According to a recent official statement, expenditure on roads has averaged 445 million escudos a year since 1962, representing about 55 per cent of the Territory's annual expenditure on all public works. The Territory's road programme is the responsibility of the Roads Board set up in 1962 and is financed through regular and special taxes on fuel imports and exports, from the 850 million escudos allocation under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-67, and by the 1965 loan from Petrangol amounting to 250 million escudos.

211. In 1966, Angola's road system comprised some 72,000 kilometres. During the year it was expected to build about 1,000 kilometres of roads and to asphalt about 500 kilometres, bringing the total length of paved roads to to 3,500 kilometres compared with 600 kilometres in 1962. By 1970, all district capitals are expected to be linked by paved roads. One of the major projects, which is expected to cost 240 million escudos, is the extension of the highway from Sá da Bandeira to the border of South West Africa from whence it will eventually link with Mozambique through the South African highway system.

212. Next in importance to roads has been the expansion of internal airports, airfields and landing facilities, mainly for military use. In 1965 Angola had two international airports, capable of receiving DC-8's, one at Luanda and the

other at Nova Lisboa; two airports serving district capitals; twenty smaller airports and 400 landing fields (compared with 100 in 1961). In 1966, four new airfields were built in the eastern part of the Territory; a large field at Gago Coutinho in the Moxico district near the Zambian border, capable of receiving aircraft of the DC-6 type, and three other smaller ones. Another runway is to be completed at Serpa Pinto early in 1967.

213. Since 1961 also, the telephone, telegraph and radio-telephone network in the Territory has been greatly expanded. In 1966, there was a very high frequency system linking Luanda with the principal towns: Salazar, Carmona, Malanje, Nova Lisboa, Benguela, Lobito and Sá da Bandeira, with supplementary systems linking the secondary towns and especially those along the borders with Luanda. In 1967 a permanent telephone line between Portugal and Angola came into operation.

214. Radio broadcasting facilities are to be expanded under a new allocation of 47.4 million escudos to be spent within the next eight years. In 1963, the last year for which data are available, there were eighteen broadcasting stations with forty-six transmitters with a total power of 47.25 kilowatts. Under legislation enacted in 1944, business concerns may establish telecommunications for their own use between their different branches. Such installations, which have to be approved by an order of the Governor-General, have increased steadily since 1961.

Public finance

215. Under the Portuguese system, as the budget for the following year is usually published in December and the final accounts are only available six months after the closing of the financial year, there is an eighteen-month period before actual expenditures can be studied. For Angola, the final accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and although there have been brief reports of the 1967 budget, the details are not yet available.

216. The report on the final accounts for 1965 shows that the actual ordinary revenue was 4,298 million escudos which exceeded estimates by about 483 million escudos, owing mainly to increased receipts from the extraordinary defence tax introduced at the end of 1964, which amounted to 224 million escudos (174 million

escudos more than the original estimates). With one exception, expenditure by all government departments rose above the 1964 level: expenditures for development services rose by 170 million escudos to 1,608 million escudos, and defence rose by 173 million escudos (40 per cent over 1964) to 616 million escudos which was 30 per cent above the original estimates (474.4 million escudos).

217. As reported in the Press, the legislation governing the 1967 budget for Angola (Legislative Instrument 3,692) lays down the policy that there is to be stringent economy in all expenditures (excepting contractual and fixed commitments). Priority is to be given to national defence, internal security, education, health and development. Not only are government departments to be placed on the monthly budget system (see para.130) but all expenditures are to be reduced by 10 per cent below the estimates.^{86/}

218. For 1967, the estimated ordinary revenue is 4,247.5 million escudos representing an increase of 12 per cent over 1966, and estimated expenditures are also higher. The largest increase is for defence, rising by 156 million escudos to 782 million escudos.^{87/} Despite an increase of 32.5 million escudos, the 297 million escudos allocation for education, which includes 34.5 million escudos for the Estudos Gerais Universitários, represents only about 6 per cent of the budget. About 4 per cent of the budget is to be spent on public health and special services. In contrast to the sharp rise in defence allocations, the 1,204 million escudos allocation to services concerned with development is less than 5 per cent above that of the previous year.

Development financing

219. The Transitional Development Plan covering the period 1965-67 envisaged an investment target of 7,210 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 2,403 million escudos, which is more than the total investment envisaged under the First National Development Plan, 1953-58, and

^{86/} Since defence expenses usually exceed estimates, savings from other expenditures provide the necessary margin to prevent a final deficit.

^{87/} This does not include internal security for which, in 1966, the allocation was 144 million escudos which was about two thirds that for education.

almost three times the annual investment targets under the Second National Development Plan, 1959-64. As noted above, over 2,068 million escudos (about 30 per cent of the total) are to be invested in the industrial sector, and 1,930 million escudos (27 per cent) are to be invested in transport and communications. Other sectors to receive more than 5 per cent of the total investments are: education and social welfare, 820,000 escudos (11 per cent); electricity, 850,000 escudos (about 12 per cent); agriculture, 130,000 escudos (8.8 per cent); fisheries, 370,000 (5.2 per cent). Of the total investment, about 40 per cent is expected to be derived from external sources, about 33 per cent from private investment, about 14 per cent from the central Government and the remainder from territorial funds.

220. Although there have been no reports published on the progress made under the Transitional Development Plan, the preceding sections give some indication of the extent to which the targets are being met. For 1966, the investment target was 2,415.5 million escudos, or almost exactly one third of the total. External sources were expected to provide 970.5 million escudos (40.2 per cent) including 211.8 million escudos in foreign loans. The remaining 60 per cent was to be financed as follows: 320 million escudos from the central Government (13.3 per cent); 250 million escudos (10.3 per cent) from the Angolan Government; 530 million escudos (22 per cent) from private industry as "self-financing"; 200 million escudos (8.3 per cent) from development bonds, and the remaining 145 million escudos from credit institutions and private investment companies.

221. It was officially reported in July 1966 (Boletim Geral do Ultramar) that France would finance projects up to a total of 1,000 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan. The sectors in which projects were to be financed included agriculture, fisheries, communications, hydroelectric power and public health. Some of the projects were already in progress while others were awaiting authorization from the Portuguese Government.

222. Bond issues totalling 200 million escudos were authorized in April 1966 as the third and fourth series of the Obrigações do Tesouro de Angola, 5 por cento, 1965, Plano Intercalar de Fomento, 1965-1967. As reported previously (A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 56), these bonds may be used for settling both

visible and invisible accounts with escudo zone, and when used for this purpose, the payment of interest on the bonds and amortization outside the Territory of issue receive priority over other transfers to the same area.^{88/} In this connexion it may be noted that the total bond issue of 200 million escudos represents only about one fifth of the yearly total capital transfers out of the Territory in 1960 and 1961 and one third of the transfers in 1962. Thus although on the one hand the exchange control seeks to keep money in the Territory, the lack of convertibility and the difficulties in transferring funds do not encourage new investments in the Territory.

223. According to press reports, Angola's 1967 budget provides a preliminary allocation of 1,137.5 million escudos for the Transitional Development Plan. This sum is to be financed as follows: 180 million escudos from ordinary budgetary surpluses; 510 million escudos from the metropolitan loan; 115 million escudos from the loan from Petrangol; 70 million escudos from the sobrevalorização taxes; 62.5 million escudos from credit institutions; and 200 million escudos from a further issue of the development bonds.

224. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly (see para.131) renewed the plea he had made in 1965 to the Government to introduce measures to protect Angola's economy. He pointed out that so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of development of the component Territories to be integrated in the Portuguese realm, economic integration itself would only increasingly make the less developed Territories markets for the manufactured goods of the more developed part. The currency exchange restriction and Angola's balance-of-payments difficulties formed a vicious circle and until some solution was found to these problems, it was difficult for the Territory to attract capital investments needed for economic growth.

^{88/} The Jornal Português de Economia e Finanças in January 1967 noting that the Angola Inspectorate of Credit and Securities had invited persons wishing to make transfers to use the development bonds, considered that this implied that no real solution to Angola's exchange problem could be expected in the near future. (The bonds can only be amortized beginning in the sixth year after the date of issue.)

Education

225. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, for Angola, the three goals in education are: (a) total enrolment of primary school children within twenty years; (b) increased adult education; (c) raising the actual school enrolment. The Plan also established priorities for the building of a number of technical, secondary and middle-level (ensino médio) schools. In all, for the three-year period 540 million escudos (about 7.5 per cent of the total) were allocated for education.

226. Since the primary education reform of 1964, in Angola the former adaptation schools have been abolished and a uniform primary school system established. During 1965, a large number of new school-posts were established in the rural areas, especially in the more populated districts which have a greater density of European population. The rural school posts, which are often one- to two-room buildings, must now provide all of the first three primary classes with a pre-primary class for teaching oral Portuguese. Whereas previously adaptation schools were mainly the responsibility of the Catholic missions, the Government now helps to provide the necessary staff.

227. Budgetary allocations for the territorial education services which increased almost fourfold between 1963 and 1966, rising from 62 million escudos to 242 million escudos, will be increased by only 9 per cent in 1967 to 263.6 million escudos. Thus it seems that following the 1966 trend, the expansion of education services will continue at a slower rate compared with 1965 when almost 500 new school posts were added in a single year.

228. As already noted above in section II A, great importance is attached to the extension of primary education to the rural populations to raise their level of living and to make them even more consciously Portuguese. In particular, it is hoped that the spread of the use of the Portuguese language will strengthen "national unity".

229. Although there is now a "unified" school system, African children have not yet been truly "integrated" in the primary schools and there are still differences between the programmes in the school posts in rural areas and those in the primary schools in the more populated urban or semi-urban areas. This difference is

underlined by the officially defined objective of the pre-primary class, which, despite the repeal of the Native Statute and abolition of the adaptation schools, continues to be defined in the official teachers' handbook for the pre-primary class (Livro de Didáctica das Lições da Classe Pré-Primaria do Ensino Primário Elementar) in the following terms:

"The pre-primary programmes of education have to reflect distinctly the determination to give the pupils a sufficient knowledge of the spoken Portuguese language and to make them acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same chances of success as children who have a European type of living."

230. Based on this policy, in January 1967 in Luso (Moxico district) children who already could speak Portuguese were not admitted to take the pre-primary exemption examination because they came from a different environment and were therefore required to go through the pre-primary adaptation class.

231. Compared with the previous school year, during 1964-65 there was an increase of 339 schools, 439 teachers and a school enrolment of 39,000. The school statistics for 1964-65 are given below.

School statistics for 1964-65^{a/}

	<u>Number of schools</u>	<u>Number of teachers</u>	<u>Number of pupils</u>
Total 1964-65	2,036	3,259	191,693
(1963-64)	(1,697)	(2,766)	(153,088)
of which:			
Government			
Primary	197	894) 148,597
School posts	898	1,121) (111,207)
Catholic Missions			
	752		
	(663)		
Primary	...	214) 43,096
School posts	...	939) (41,881)
Adult courses	75	91	...
Adult school posts	3

a/ Comércio do Porto, 3 February 1967. Comparable figures for 1963-64 are given in parenthesis. These figures vary slightly from those reported in A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 136.

232. One of the main problems in Angola is the small number of teachers completing training each year. Because there are not enough fully qualified primary teachers available, the rural school posts are taught by "monitors". These may be persons who have completed as little as four years of primary education and one special 2 1/2-month intensive monitor training course (though to become fully qualified rural teachers, they must complete the four-year primary teachers' training courses and have three years of teaching experience). In June 1966 there were 1,685 monitors and seven monitor training schools, of which one was for male and female teachers, five for female teachers only and one for male teachers only.

233. In contrast, the regular primary schools must be taught by teachers who have had at least five years of secondary education and have completed a two-year primary teachers' training course (Escola de Magistério Oficial). In 1966, there were still only three training schools for such teachers, one of which graduated only sixty-four teachers in the period 1964-66.

234. Teachers for the academic secondary schools (liceus) have to complete a special four- to five-year university level course leading to the licenciatura. To qualify for tenure they must in addition have completed two years of teaching (estágio pedagógico) at an approved school. Although courses are given in the Estudos Gerais Universitários (EGU) for training of some technical professional teachers, complete training for secondary school teachers is only available in Portugal. As a transitional measure, however, persons who do not have the full training required may be approved to teach in academic schools.

235. The total number of students enrolled in the university level courses (Estudos Gerais Universitários) has more than doubled since 1963-64, rising from 286 to 467 in 1964-65 and to 601 in 1966-67. Of the students enrolled in the current school year, 281 are in engineering courses, 178 in medicine, 40 in agronomy and silviculture, 52 in veterinary medicine, 23 in pedagogical science (decreased from 112 in 1963-64) and 27 in special secondary teacher courses. How far these figures fall short of the Territory's needs can be seen from the fact that in January 1967 the Overseas Agricultural and Forestry Common Services (excluding Veterinary Services) had more than 93 vacancies in the professional and administrative levels; these included vacancies for 11 first class and 33 second class agronomists, 18 silviculturists, 2 agronomy engineers, 15 civil engineers and 3 entomologists.

236. The large number of vacancies in the various overseas technical services has been mainly due to the small annual output of trained personnel in Portugal, the competitive examination system and the generally higher pay offered by private industry. As a transitional measure, since October 1966 (Decree 47,261, 17 October), the conditions for appointment to the Overseas Services have been eased so that middle level and senior technical posts may now be filled by contracting qualified candidates without examination, provided that there are no other candidates available or that the number of vacancies exceeds the number of candidates.

Labour

237. According to a recently published study,^{89/} in 1964 there were 367,815 persons employed in Angola as wage earners which represented 13.7 per cent of the economically active population. Of these 45.3 per cent were engaged in the primary sector (agriculture 144,667, fisheries 16,225, livestock 5,721); 28.3 per cent in the secondary sector (including 30,249 in mining, 29,838 in industries and 40,747 in construction) and 26.4 per cent in the tertiary sector (including 31,683 in communications and transport, 25,000 in commerce, banking, etc., 40,500 in services).

238. Almost all the workers in the primary sector are engaged in rural areas and they are almost exclusively African. As "rural" workers they are governed by the Rural Labour Code for the Overseas Territories (Decree 44,309, 27 April 1962)^{90/} which replaced the Indigenous (Native) Labour Code approved by Decree 16,199, 6 December 1928.^{91/} Whereas one of the principal features of the Native Labour Code was the provision under which idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects, the Rural Labour Code of 1962 is silent on the obligation to work.

^{89/} Alfonso Mendes. O Trabalho Assalariado em Angola, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina, Lisbon 1966.

^{90/} English text contained in the ILO Legislative Series 1962, Por.1.

^{91/} Some of the main provisions contained in the Native Labour Code of 1928 have been summarized in A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, paras. 354 ff. Under the Native Labour Code idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects.

239. The study shows that the number of rural workers has decreased since the 1950's, dropping from a maximum of 393,325 in 1954 to 241,351 in 1964. It attributes the decrease to mechanization, higher productivity, more rational use of labour as well as better wages and other benefits.

240. It appears that, following the introduction of the new Rural Labour Code, minimum wage rates were not only raised but better enforced so that there was no shortage of labour. In 1966, complaints of labour shortages in agriculture began to appear in the local newspapers. In December it was suggested in the Legislative Council that the Government should introduce measures to make it obligatory for persons over 18 years of age to work if they were not students or did not have income on which they could support themselves.

241. One of the districts most affected by the recent labour shortages is Uíge, where African farmers have been able to grow coffee on their own account (see above). Although the Governor-General has not agreed to the introduction of legislation to make work obligatory, he has expressed the view that in a modern society every citizen is expected to work either for himself or for others. Subsequently he announced that the Government intended to launch an intensive campaign "to convince the great masses of the population" to work harder and to increase their productivity.

C. MOZAMBIQUE

General

242. Mozambique lies south of the Equator between latitude 10°30' and 27°. It is bounded on the north by the United Republic of Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyasa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by South Africa and Swaziland, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 771,125 square kilometres. At the 1960 census the total resident population was 6,578,604, of whom 6,430,530 were Africans. The non-African population comprised 97,268 Europeans, 31,465 "mistos" and 19,341 Asians.

Government and administration

243. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Mozambique is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,375 of 22 November 1963.

244. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Angola (see section II B). The Territory is, however, divided into nine administrative districts and the Legislative Council consists of 29 members, of whom two are ex officio, 18 are elected by "organic groups" and 9 are elected directly. Other provisions are the same as those for Angola, including the composition of the Economic and Social Council, the franchise qualifications and the number of representatives in the National Assembly, which for each Territory is seven, despite the difference in the size of their populations.

245. The election of representatives to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and information pertaining thereto is contained in the previous report of the Special Committee.^{92/} Elections to local bodies were held in 1964, the next elections being due in 1968. In January 1967, it was announced that registration of voters for the elections to the Legislative Council would be completed by 15 May.

The war in Mozambique

246. In Mozambique, as in Angola and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, Portugal is engaged in a defensive war against insurrectionary forces, directed in this case

^{92/} A/6300/Add.3 (part I), paras. 146-149.

by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO). The fighting began in September 1964 when small bands of guerrillas entered Mozambique from the north and has since grown and spread until now it includes large areas of the Territory. Owing to the nature of guerrilla warfare and the fact that both sides issue conflicting reports, it is not possible to state precisely what are the zones within which the guerrilla forces are operating but it appears that, aside from minor outbreaks of fighting near the borders of the Tete, Zambézia and Moçambique Districts, the main fighting is confined to the sparsely populated northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado which share a common border with the United Republic of Tanzania. Portuguese sources describe the fighting as being confined to two zones: first, a coastal zone in Cabo Delgado extending from the Tanzanian frontier to the Montepuez River and stretching inland for about 100 miles to include the country around Mueda and the Makonde plateau; and second, in Niassa the eastern shore of Lake Malawi from the Tanzanian frontier southwards to beyond Vila Cabral, a distance of about 140 miles, and inland for an indeterminate distance. One objective of Portuguese strategy is apparently to contain guerrilla activity within these zones and to prevent the guerrillas from infiltrating further south into economically more developed areas. In Cabo Delgado district, Portuguese forces have established a cordon sanitaire, whence the inhabitants, numbering about 250,000 have been removed to defended settlements, and in which most crops have been destroyed.

247. Within the fighting zones and along the northern frontier, the Portuguese have established a network of military bases from which ground and air patrols are sent out. These are supplemented by large-scale combined operations for the purpose of seeking out and destroying guerrilla bands and their encampments. At the same time, a programme of "psycho-social" measures, consisting of propaganda and other inducements, is employed to encourage the return and resettlement in fortified villages of refugees and others in hiding or aiding the guerrillas. The insurgents, for their part, operate principally in small, well-armed groups, engaging in raids, ambushes, mining of roads and acts of sabotage, such as the destruction of bridges. In July 1966, they severed the railway line under construction at Catur, near Vila Cabral. Since 1965, they have undertaken larger operations, including attacks by groups of 65 to 150 men on defended localities

and military bases. Thus, in mid-1966 they claimed to have made a mortar attack on the town of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado District and in October and November FRELIMO reported attacks on Vila Cabral and a Portuguese army camp at Nova Coimbra in Niassa District.

248. It is difficult to assess the progress or extent of the fighting because both sides make conflicting claims. FRELIMO sources report numerous victories, claiming that during the two years of warfare the guerrillas killed or wounded 7,000 Portuguese and destroyed 20 aircraft. According to FRELIMO most of the countryside in Niassa and Cabo Delgado Districts is under guerrilla control. The Portuguese military command describes these claims as mainly fictitious. Although it admits that raids have been made on towns near the Tanzanian frontier, it asserts that during two years of fighting it inflicted more than 4,000 enemy casualties with only relatively small losses among its own troops and that the guerrillas are able to continue their attacks only because they can operate from outside the Territory and receive foreign aid. Portuguese official communiqués enumerate repeated successes against the guerrillas and report that the local population is being won over, or "recuperated", in increasing numbers.

249. Both sides agree, however, that the guerrilla forces are now more numerous and better trained and equipped than they were in 1964. Portuguese sources estimated their number at 3,500 in November 1966 while FRELIMO recently gave a total of 7,000 guerrillas under arms supported by 3,000 cadres serving in various capacities. FRELIMO further claims that in the areas under its control it has established nuclear administrative services with schools and hospitals of its own. At the same time, the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique has nearly doubled and was believed by foreign observers to be in the region of 40,000 at the end of 1966. In addition to regular troops, the defence forces include, as in Angola, a locally recruited volunteer corps and a militia comprised of Africans recruited in the regedorias. The militia is divided into a "protection militia" which is responsible for the local defence of villages and settlements, and an "intervention militia" which participates with the volunteer corps and regular army in the pursuit and destruction of guerrilla bands. There are also two mobile companies of police, but it is not clear whether these are used in the fighting zones or whether they are solely for internal security.

250. Although the fighting is sporadic and on a limited scale, it resulted, especially in late 1964 and early 1965, in the exodus of large numbers of African refugees to the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. At the end of 1965, some 12,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania were being cared for by the Tanzanian Government with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Lutheran Church and the UN/FAO World Food Programme; a further wave of 3,000 refugees was reported to have arrived in January 1966. Similar groups of 3,000 and 2,000 were reported to be still in Malawi and Zambia respectively. By mid-1966 the warfare had also resulted in incidents involving Mozambique's northern neighbours: in November 1966, it was reported that a Portuguese patrol had penetrated three miles into Malawi territory and had taken 50 prisoners who were subsequently released; later in the month, according to a formal charge addressed to the Security Council by the Government of Tanzania on 1 December 1966 (S/7605), Portuguese troops were accused of having crossed into Tanzania and laid mines causing the death of four persons. Both charges were denied by Portugal, which replied to the Tanzanian complaint in a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7622).

251. One immediate result of the fighting can be seen in the rising cost of military and related expenditures both for Portugal (see section II A) and Mozambique. For 1966, the Territory's share in defence and security expenditures included, according to a decree of 21 January, an allocation of 724.4 million escudos for the regular expenses of the armed services, or roughly 255 million escudos more than the amount allocated in 1965 and about twice the actual expenditure of the armed services in 1963 before the fighting started. In addition, the budget estimates for 1966 contained allocations of 45.2 million for extraordinary military expenditure, including 5 million for the volunteer corps, and 111.9 million for police, "psycho-social" measures, including resettlement of refugees, and other related costs. The sum of all these allocations, including subsequent additional appropriations totalling 52 million, is equal to approximately 23 per cent of the estimated budget of Mozambique for 1966. This substantial expenditure is in part financed by special taxes (notably the defence tax introduced in 1964 and the defence stamp tax introduced a year later) which it was estimated would yield about 131 million escudos in 1966, and by a special levy on the receipts of the various autonomous bodies and economic funds, which was estimated to yield 222.7 million escudos. Nevertheless, despite this increased revenue, the rising expenditures

resulting from the guerrilla war, added to the anticipated loss of transit earnings due to the international embargo on trade with Southern Rhodesia is straining government finances (see section on public finance below).

Security measures

252. Although precise information is lacking, there appears to have been a progressive tightening of security measures in Mozambique to counter any possible subversion. In 1966, the regular budgetary appropriation for police services amounted to 93 million escudos, or more than twice the sum appropriated in 1960.^{93/} The largest increase, from 2.7 million to 23 million escudos, was for the Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado (PIDE) (intelligence police) and it may be noted that between 1965 and 1966, the numbers employed by PIDE increased from 355 to 475. In September, new legislation was enacted requiring all persons entering or leaving the Territory to possess valid passports.

253. In October, there began in Lourenço Marques the retrial before a military tribunal of nine persons accused of subversive activities against the State. The defendants were among a group, including several well-known intellectuals who had been arrested in 1965 as members of a clandestine unit of FRELIMO. The nine had previously been absolved by the tribunal but the verdict had been rejected on review by the Supreme Military Tribunal in Lisbon which had ordered a retrial with different judges. At the conclusion of the second trial, seven of the defendants were found guilty and received prison sentences ranging from two to three years with loss of political rights and restriction of movement for further periods.

Economic conditions

General

254. The structure of Mozambique's economy and the main problems connected with it have been described in detail in the previous reports of the Special Committee and, particularly in the background material accompanying the Special Committee's

^{93/} A decree enacted on 21 February 1967 authorized the Governor-General to disburse additional expenditure for the expansion of police services, including the formation of new mobile police units.

reports on the activities of foreign economic interests.^{94/} Briefly, the two dominant sectors are agriculture and transportation services. In agriculture, the emphasis is upon about eight principal export crops, of which cotton, cashew, sisal and copra are outstanding. Except for cotton, which is grown by Africans for sale at controlled prices to large ginning and export companies, production is mainly on plantations and farms owned by non-Africans. Africans produce, in addition to cotton, a certain amount of smoke-cured copra which is sold to local oil mills, about half the cashew nuts, rice and food crops which are sold to dealers and quasi-governmental agencies. For the most part, however, Africans are either subsistence farmers or wage earners.

255. Despite recent growth, transforming industries are few and the Territory imports most of its requirements of manufactured goods. It has a chronically adverse balance of trade which, in the past, was largely offset by invisible foreign exchange receipts in the form of revenue derived by its railways and ports, mainly from the highly lucrative transit trade of neighbouring land-locked areas, notably the Transvaal, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. Since 1958, however, as a result of increasing imports, the trade deficit has each year exceeded invisible earnings and resulted in a growing adverse balance of payments, mainly with metropolitan Portugal (see below). The trade deficit reached a peak in 1965 and, according to preliminary data, continued to grow until in 1966 it was announced that measures would be taken to restrict the issue of import licences.

256. The years 1965 and 1966 were also characterized by: (a) rising public expenditures, particularly for defence and for services affected by the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67; and (b) increased public and private investment, both at the infra-structural level (i.e. port installations, railways and roads) and in secondary and light transforming industries. During this period there was a marked increase in private industrial investment which coincides with the recent easing of controls over the establishment of industries and of regulations governing foreign investments in the Overseas Territories (see A/6300/Add.3 (part I), paras. 52-68). Important among these were new investments in sugar production and cashew processing which in time are expected to increase significantly the value of the Territory's exports.

^{94/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V.

257. During 1966, Mozambique's transport industry felt increasingly the effects of the international boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia. Since nearly all Southern Rhodesia's overseas trade passed through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques and much of Zambia's trade followed the same routes, the revenue derived from this source by the Territory's railways and ports constituted an important segment of its invisible earnings of foreign exchange (see below). In addition to the effects of the boycott, Mozambique may also suffer in 1967 a probable set-back in the production of some of its export crops, especially sugar, as the result of severe floods which occurred during February and March.
258. Further information on recent developments by sectors is given below.

External trade and payments

General

259. As already noted, the year 1965 saw a marked deterioration in Mozambique's balance of foreign trade. Whereas the value of exports, at 3,107 million escudos, was 7.3 per cent higher than in 1963, imports increased over the same period by 22 per cent, from 4,075 million escudos to 4,981 million escudos. This resulted in an adverse balance of trade in 1965 of 1,874 million escudos, which was 69 per cent more than in 1963. Data for the first six months of 1966 showed continued growth of imports and an actual drop in the value of exports compared with the previous year.
260. The comparatively poor performance of the export sector in 1965 and the first half of 1966 was partly due to adverse climatic conditions and a temporary drop in sugar exports, but the data also reflect a reduced rate of growth of agricultural exports generally (see below). The sharp increase in imports was attributed to several factors, among them increased public spending, especially for defence, and increased industrial and infra-structural investment, both undoubtedly contributing to an upsurge in consumer demand. Analysis of imports in 1965 by categories reveals that the largest increases were in capital and production goods, which in 1965 accounted respectively for 33.9 per cent and 23.3 per cent of total imports by value. Consumption goods accounted for 42.8 per cent.
261. To what extent the reduction of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see section II A, para. 43) may have affected the over-all balance of trade is not

immediately apparent. Between 1963 and 1965 there was, however, a significant increase in Mozambique's trade deficit with metropolitan Portugal, imports from Portugal rising by 32.8 per cent in value, whereas exports to Portugal rose by 11.8 per cent. At the end of 1965, Mozambique's adverse balance of trade with metropolitan Portugal stood at 569 million escudos, or nearly one third of its total trade deficit. At the same time, as the figures show, Portugal's share of Mozambique trade increased significantly. In 1965, nearly 40 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade took place within the escudo zone. The other principal trading partners were South Africa with 10.9 per cent, the United Kingdom with 8.2 per cent and the Federal Republic of Germany with 6.1 per cent. Despite the signing of a trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia early in 1965, (see A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 47), and a subsequent exchange of unofficial trade missions, Southern Rhodesia's share of Mozambique trade underwent little significant change, either in 1965 or the first quarter of 1966. In 1965, it amounted to only 2.2 per cent of the total.

262. Up to 1957, invisible earnings, derived mainly from the transit trade of neighbouring territories, sufficed to offset the Territory's negative trade balance. Thereafter, the combined effect of rapidly increasing trade deficits, together with a growing outflow of investment earnings, amortizations and other private transfers, resulted in a continuously adverse balance of payments, amounting to 218 million escudos at the end of 1965.^{95/} In consequence of this drain, Mozambique's exchange reserves, including foreign exchange and metropolitan escudos held by commercial banks, dropped from 1,549 million escudos in 1960 to 412 million escudos at the end of 1965, sufficient to cover about one month's imports.

^{95/} This figure represents the balance of all exchange transactions. In fact, Mozambique's balance of payments with metropolitan Portugal shows a much larger deficit, which is normally offset by favourable balances with other countries, particularly South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Hence the Territory is a net contributor of foreign exchange to Portugal. This is illustrated by the following data for 1964:

	<u>Balance (+ or -) in million escudos</u>
Metropolitan Portugal	-1,192.7
Southern Rhodesia	+1,100.7
South Africa	+ 525.0
Rest of world	- 656.4
Total	- 223.4

263. In 1965, Mozambique's balance of payments showed a net inflow of foreign exchange under the heading of transport earnings amounting to 1,151 million escudos, or nearly one fifth of its foreign exchange earnings. Most of this was attributable to the transit trade of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the latter accounting for about 700 million escudos and the former for about 311 million escudos. The difference was due in part to the fact that Southern Rhodesian trade consisted largely of high value goods for which higher transit rates are charged, and also, in part, to the fact that much of Zambia's external trade passed through Southern Rhodesia.

264. Following the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, the transit trade has been affected, first by the cessation of petroleum shipments through Beira in December 1965 and later by the application of a more general international boycott called for by the Security Council. The international measures taken against the illegal régime also resulted in partial interruption and rerouting of Zambian transit trade. Full data which would permit a detailed appraisal of the effects of these changes on Mozambique's invisible receipts, however, are not yet available in published form (see below).

Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia^{96/}

265. As stated above, for Mozambique the revenue derived from the transit trade of Southern Rhodesia which passes mainly through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, represents a major source of foreign exchange. Since much of Zambia's external trade normally follows the same routes it is difficult to determine from the published statistics precisely what proportion of the total transport receipts is directly attributable to the trade of Southern Rhodesia. However, according to the data published in Mozambique, revenue from transit trade entering from Southern Rhodesia totalled about 700 million escudos in 1965. In comparison, special trade

^{96/} A more detailed description of Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia is contained in document A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix V, paras. 42-79.

between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia is small, totalling in 1965 only 179.4 million escudos, or 2.2 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade.^{97/} 266. Portugal's own attitude on the question of Southern Rhodesia has been officially described as one of strict neutrality. While it has not accorded diplomatic recognition to the illegal régime, for several reasons it has not felt obliged to participate in international sanctions against the régime or to deny to Southern Rhodesia the right of transit for its external trade; according to a recent statement by the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Portugal considers that it is bound by international conventions which guarantee the right of transit for the trade of land-locked countries. Portugal's policy of maintaining trading relations with Southern Rhodesia has in effect meant the application of the provisions of the trade agreement signed early in 1965 whereby the parties undertook to promote increased trade and closer economic co-operation between them. Accordingly, during 1966 there was an exchange of unofficial trade missions and other contacts on a more or less unofficial basis. As yet, official trade statistics are not available to show whether or not these exchanges resulted in any significant increase in trade. Data published by the Mozambique Government for the period January to April 1966 indicate that the items and quantities traded^{98/} were much the same as in the corresponding period of 1965. Subsequent press reports to the effect that the Portuguese-owned SONAREP refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied 70 million gallons of gasoline to Southern Rhodesia were formally denied by the president of the parent company, SONAP, in a statement issued on 10 March 1967. The President said that not only was such an amount beyond

^{97/} In 1965, exports from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia were valued at 93.4 million escudos and consisted mainly of vegetable oils and husks (34 million escudos); wood products (20.8 million escudos); bananas (5.5 million escudos); and petroleum products (4.4 million escudos). Imports from Southern Rhodesia were valued at 86 million escudos, the principal items being maize (14.3 million escudos); copper (4.7 million escudos); iron and steel products (4.4 million escudos); coal (3.3 million escudos); automobiles and parts (2.3 million escudos); and agricultural machinery (3.1 million escudos).

^{98/} For instance, according to the official statistics, Mozambique's exports of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia in the first four months of 1966 consisted of only 576 tons of gas oil and diesel oil and less than one ton of gasoline.

the capacity of the refinery, but the Southern Rhodesian market had never been among its clients. A similar denial had been made by the Foreign Minister of Portugal on 28 December 1966.

267. As regards the transit trade, even less data is available for 1966^{99/} and the complexity of the situation (particularly the changes which have occurred in the transit trade of other territories) makes difficult any assessment of the effects of the boycott on the basis of partial information. According to the report of the Mozambique Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the volume of cargo handled at Beira during the period January to June 1966 decreased by 342,991 tons, or 18 per cent compared with the corresponding period of 1965^{100/} while the volume handled at Lourenço Marques increased by 184,662 tons. These figures throw very little light on the effects of the boycott, however, in view of changes in the volume of traffic from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Zambia known to have taken place during the same period.

268. On the other hand, global figures of the losses in revenue up to the end of 1966 due to the boycott were contained in a letter dated 11 February 1967 from the Foreign Minister of Portugal to the Secretary-General (S/7734/Rev.1). These figures showed a loss to the Mozambique economy of £9,796,000 (783.68 million escudos) apportioned as follows:^{101/} transit receipts and port dues, £6,705,000 (536.4 million escudos); additional losses from transit trade, £1,341,000 (107.3 million escudos); special trade, £1,750,000 (140 million escudos). In

^{99/}According to Press reports, Southern Rhodesian exports of chrome and amianto amounted to 94,000 and 7,000 tons respectively during the first six months of 1966. Tobacco exports amounted to 69,003 tons during the first seven months, compared with 190,300 tons in January to July 1965.

^{100/}Later figures obtained from Press reports indicate that for the first ten months of 1966, the decrease was in the vicinity of 24 per cent. These data relate to a period before the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) and probably reflect in large measure the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia after December 1965.

^{101/}According to the letter, the sums cited, in addition to imports and exports, losses of receipts from normal traffic, loss of compensation from the Beira oil pipeline and losses resulting from failure to fulfil contracts drawn up and signed for exports from Southern Rhodesia.

citing these losses, which he reserved the right to document at the appropriate opportunity, the Foreign Minister asked that consultations should be initiated between the Security Council and the Portuguese Government pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter "in order that the modalities for paying the compensation to which the province of Mozambique has a right, may be agreed upon".

Agriculture

269. Detailed statistics showing the production of the main cash crops are not yet available beyond 1964. In so far as exports reflect production, they show that output of several major crops has remained fairly static or has decreased over the past three years. Thus, exports of cotton lint, which in 1960, before the abolition of obligatory cultivation, exceeded 44,000 tons, decreased to 31,339 tons in 1965. Copra, owing to falling world prices, dropped from over 46,000 tons in 1963 to 28,574 tons, and sugar from 124,896 tons to 94,936 tons. Sisal exports at 31,381 tons, were above the average of the previous six years but below the high levels of over 32,000 tons attained in 1957 and 1958. The principal increases registered since 1963 were in tea (from 8,438 to 10,091 tons) and vegetable oils (from 14,963 to 20,189 tons). In the first quarter of 1966, exports of cotton dropped by nearly one half compared with the corresponding period of 1965 (from 8,018 to 4,242 tons); sisal by about 20 per cent (from 6,900 to 5,528 tons); and cashew nuts by about 7 per cent (from 33,594 to 31,209 tons). There were, however, significant increases in sugar (from 13,178 to 18,568 tons); tea (from 3,306 to 5,018 tons); and a small increase in copra (from 5,578 to 5,703 tons).

270. The increases in exports in 1965 and 1966 were partly attributable to the effects of adverse climatic conditions including a cyclone and extensive floods in January 1966 which did severe damage to crops, especially cashew and fruit.^{102/} In the case of sugar, there was a temporary drop in production during 1965 due to the installation of large-scale irrigation work by one of the leading

^{102/} Even more extensive floods occurred in February and March 1967. Heavy crop losses are reported, especially in the Limpopo and Incomati river valleys, the latter being an important sugar producing area.

producers, Sena Sugar Estates. Cotton production generally declined after 1961, due probably to the abolition of compulsory cultivation and falling world prices.^{103/} Cashew production, exports of which increased remarkably, from 82,378 tons in 1962 to 127,796 tons in 1964, appears to have reached a plateau in the vicinity of 100,000 tons annually.

271. The present trend in regard to the main cash crops is towards more capital-intensive production and the establishment of processing industries. The most important developments in 1965-66 were the introduction of mechanized processing of cashew nuts and the investment of large sums in projects which will substantially increase sugar production. At the same time new factories were established to process sisal, soap, wheat, tea, cotton, coir fibre, fruit and condensed milk (see section on industries below). The progressive mechanization of cash crop production is illustrated by the increasing number of tractors imported, from 449 in 1964 to 642 in 1965. Particular attention is being given to the development of tea growing as a medium for increasing European settlement, tobacco, fruit and meat, mainly to supply Portugal and substitute for imports in Mozambique. It is estimated that Portugal at present expends nearly 150 million escudos in foreign exchange on the purchase of tobacco which could be produced in Mozambique, and could furnish the basis for new settlement schemes. Measures instituted during 1966 to improve the productivity of agriculture included the establishment of an Institute of Agronomic Studies and reorganization of the Agricultural Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agrícola) (see below). In early 1967 it was announced that a separate water development service would be created in view of the major irrigation and river development projects now under study, notably the Zambezi river valley scheme (see section on settlement and land utilization schemes).

272. The most important development in agricultural production was the movement towards expansion of the sugar industry. As previously noted (A/6300/Add.3, (part II), annex, appendix III, paras. 73-77), Mozambique supplies about 70 per cent of Portugal's sugar consumption, most of the sugar produced

^{103/} Partly owing to reduction of export subsidies by the United States of America.

(163,969 tons in 1965-66) being exported to Portugal under a special régime whereby quotas and prices are determined annually by the Portuguese Government. In 1966, a decree law was enacted continuing this régime, with minor changes, until 1 May 1982 and the Portuguese Government also approved a reorganization and expansion of the sugar refining industry in Portugal, involving an increase in productive capacity to 300,000 tons annually in order to allow for increased sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Prior to this, plans had already been laid to increase sugar production in Mozambique. In 1965, Sena Sugar Estates, one of three existing producers, began a 360 million escudos irrigation programme aimed at nearly doubling its output by 1970, and in addition, two new companies have already been formed. The greatest progress has been made by the Mozambique Sugar Company which plans to begin production in 1969 with an initial sugar output of 30,000 tons to be increased eventually to 90,000 tons. The company is Portuguese-owned with French participation. In April 1966 the territorial Government was authorized to underwrite bank loans to the company in the amount of 280 million escudos, the money to be raised by the bank from foreign sources (thus ensuring that the majority of the capital remains Portuguese). Part of its plantations, which are located on the Púnguè River near Beira, will be allocated among 100 settlers. The other company, the Maragra-Marracuene Agrícola Açucareira, located at Manhiça near Lourenço Marques, was reported in April to have obtained additional bank loans, bringing its working capital to 130 million escudos, but it has not yet announced when it will begin production. The company, which is also Portuguese-owned, with some of its capital subscribed locally, will have an initial capacity of 40,000 tons of sugar, to be increased eventually to 60,000 tons. About 60 per cent of its sugar output will be refined (one third of it will be exported to Portugal, the remainder going to the local market), the remaining 40 per cent being exported as raw sugar for refining in Portugal. Construction of the refinery began in October 1965. There is no new information concerning plans by a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation to develop sugar production in the lower Zambezi Valley (see A/6300/Add.3 (part II), annex, appendix III, para. 89).

273. As previously mentioned (section II A, paras. 61-62), steps were taken in 1966 to develop the production of meat and fruit in the Overseas Territories in order to supply metropolitan Portugal. In Mozambique, various factors, among them the prevalence of the tsetse fly in several regions and the limitations of the local market, have been obstacles to the development of a large-scale meat industry. Although there are about 1.1 million head of cattle, most of them are owned by traditional African pastoralists or are raised by large agricultural companies to feed their own employees. Commercial cattle-ranching, as a principal activity, is mainly confined to the district of Gaza, where cattle are raised to supply Lourenço Marques, and the Angónia plateau, near the border of Malawi. In 1965, exports of meat and meat products were valued at only 5.2 million escudos. In 1966, however, steps were taken to develop this sector, namely the establishment of an Institute of Veterinary Research and the reorganization of the veterinary service which, in 1965 consisted of some fifty-four veterinary officers. The intention, in particular, is to build up extension services and foster the growth of co-operatives among the small cattle breeders in the southern districts of Lourenço Marques and Gaza. During 1966, several commercial enterprises were reported to be considering the establishment of meat factories and one meat and dairy products factory, representing an investment of 25 million escudos and owned by a producers' co-operative, was completed. In addition, during the year, refrigerated warehouses for meat and fruit were built at the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira (see below) and by the end of the year, frozen meat was for the first time exported to Portugal.

274. Fruit growing is at present mainly confined to the south of Mozambique and to the Manica highlands. The fruit consists of bananas, which are exported to South Africa and other neighbouring territories, and citrus which is marketed overseas under arrangements with the South African Citrus Marketing Board. Exports are small, valued in 1965 at only 16.8 million escudos for bananas and 17.3 million escudos for citrus. One reason for developing citrus exports is that the fruit reaches the European market during the winter season.

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275. As may be seen from the above, the principal emphasis has been placed so far on expanding the output of export crops. In 1966, however, greater attention was given to the need to develop food crops in order to eliminate imports of such products as maize,^{104/}wheat, vegetables and fruit, which together accounted for about 400 million escudos in 1964 and 1965. It appears to be the contention in Mozambique that the best way to achieve an all-round growth of the agricultural sector, excluding large-scale production, is through assistance to small, predominantly non-African, farmers and through settlement schemes which would have an impact on the surrounding African subsistence economy. Among the measures taken in 1966 to assist small farmers may be cited the grant of a 10 million escudos loan to an agricultural co-operative in the Maputo valley and the reorganization and expansion of the Agricultural Credit Bank into a governmental agency receiving regular budgetary allocations and with power to make or underwrite loans (including crop loans) against minimal guarantees (in exceptional circumstances, loans may be granted up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees). The loans may be granted either to private (i.e., non-African) farmers or to Africans engaged in "traditional" farming, but in the latter case, the recipients will be mainly collective groups. There is also to be increased public expenditure on roads serving agricultural areas, especially in the north (see below).

276. It appears that attention is still focused very largely on the development of agriculture on farms held under individual ownership, i.e., mainly owned by non-Africans. Of the major cash crops, which together account for about 80 per cent of Mozambique's agricultural exports, only cotton, about half the cashew nuts and some copra, are produced by African farmers. For the rest, Africans are mainly engaged in subsistence farming, selling their surplus produce to dealers or through government agencies. So far, apart from the work of specialized bodies such as the Cotton and Cereals Institutes, which provide supervised loans and technical assistance for specific purposes or in specified regions, comparatively little appears to have been done to raise the level of

^{104/} For the first time for many years, in 1966 Mozambique had a surplus of 20,000 tons of maize available for export.

the "traditional" farming sector. The relative stagnation of subsistence farming is revealed by comparing the data on purchases of food crops from Africans for the years 1960-63 (the latest years for which such data is available) with the same data for 1950-53. The comparison shows that whereas purchases of a few crops, such as wheat, cashew nuts and beans, increased significantly, purchases of many import crops, such as rice, groundnuts, copra and manioc, were about the same or actually less than a decade earlier.

277. During 1966, several commentators in the Territory referred to the need for a new approach to the development of the "traditional" farming sector. Thus, one speaker in the Legislative Council called for the creation of organized rural markets similar to those in Angola. Another observer, writing in a local periodical, called for a policy of agricultural credit which would help to transform subsistence farming and bring it into the cash economy. He pointed out that since its creation in 1945 until 1966 when it was absorbed into the Agricultural Credit Bank, the Rural Credit Fund, which was intended to aid "traditional" farmers, had been inactive because it lacked machinery for supervised loans. While the new bank was intended to aid "traditional" as well as organized farming, it could aid the former on a significant scale only if the extension of credit formed part of a general approach to the problem and steps were taken, either by developing co-operatives or by furnishing systematic technical assistance, to provide the machinery whereby credit could be injected into the "traditional" farming sector and used as a means to promote improved techniques.

278. The need for greater efforts to promote the economic progress of Africans in the subsistence sector was also emphasized by deputies from Mozambique in the National Assembly during January and February 1967. As noted previously (section II A, para. 70), Dr. Nunes Barata stressed that the improvement of living standards and the "harmonious economic development" of the African peoples was an essential ingredient in the struggle against subversion. Dr. Manuel Nazaré and Dr. Satúrio Pires developed this theme, urging the necessity of concerted measures to hasten the economic and social advancement of the rural African communities. Among the measures which they considered

necessary was the granting of individual land titles to farmers of proven ability. They believed that, done on a mass scale, this would help to reduce the practice of shifting cultivation and would provide incentive to the individual farmer. They also considered necessary the formation of rural farm settlements (ruralatos), agricultural education, research and extension services supplemented by agricultural credit, guaranteed markets and, finally the stimulation of rural co-operatives.

Settlement and land utilization schemes

279. Great importance is attached to the settlement in Mozambique of Europeans, both as a means of developing the economic wealth of the Territory and to promote its closer integration within the Portuguese realm. Among the main settlement schemes initiated in the past are the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valley settlements and smaller schemes in Niassa and near Guruè (see A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, annex, appendix II). Allocation of land for settlers is also a feature of several large agricultural projects (i.e. sugar and cashew). A particular concern at present is to encourage ex-soldiers to settle in the northern districts, or in border areas where their presence would contribute to defence. Recent results have not been spectacular, however, only one new settlement for ex-soldiers being established in 1966. The settlement is at Mahinga, near Vila Pery and, it is believed, will accommodate some thirty to fifty settlers on 200 hectare estates. A small group of South African farmers is also reported to be settling in the same general area.

280. Although the main emphasis has been on the settlement of Europeans, provision has been made, notably in the larger settlement schemes such as those in the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valleys, for the allocation of part of the land to Africans. In addition to these specific settlement schemes, efforts were made under the First National Development Plan to stabilize Africans on the land and to form permanent settlements (ruralatos), but since 1963 there have been few reports of progress in this direction, presumably because of the immensity of the task and lack of available funds and personnel. Recently,

however, as noted above (para. 278), two deputies in the National Assembly urged a renewed effort in this direction, calling for the grant of individual land titles to Africans, their organization into rural communities (ruralatos) and the creation of planning and executive machinery to promote and supervise this form of settlement.

281. Potentially the most important settlement and land utilization scheme, which has been under study since the early 1950's is a multipurpose project for the development of the Zambezi River valley, based on the control and utilization of the river flow. The project envisages the construction of a high dam at Cahora Bassa, north of Tete, and a series of smaller dams down river, which would permit the development for settlement and other purposes of an area of 140,000 square kilometres, or one tenth of the whole Territory. At the same time, hydroelectric power produced at Cahora Bassa would be used to develop iron and coal reserves in the Tete District, and construction of the dams would make possible navigation on the river between Tete and Chinde, at the mouth of the Zambezi, where it is proposed to construct a new port.

282. The completion of such a vast project, the ultimate cost of which is estimated at 10,000 million escudos, is necessarily dependent on several factors and must, in any case, take a number of years. One of the problems is to find suitable markets for the electricity produced, which is estimated at about 17,000 million kwh. per year; according to Press reports, the possibility of selling this electricity either to the Transvaal or to Southern Rhodesia has been considered. In August 1966, Portugal took an initial step towards carrying out the project, by appropriating 20 million escudos for expenditure on plans for the Cahora Bassa dam. Negotiations were later reported to be in progress for the creation of an international consortium to finance the dam which is expected to cost 500 million escudos, plus an additional 250 million escudos for rechanneling of the river and relocation of the local population living in the area of the future reservoir.

Industry

283. Manufacturing and transforming industries so far constitute a relatively small sector of Mozambique's economy when compared with agriculture. Although there are over 1,000 industrial enterprises, the majority are small and are concerned with the processing of agricultural products or the production of foodstuffs and consumer goods. Most manufacturing industries are light, involving only limited capital, the principal exceptions being a petroleum refinery at Lourenço Marques, cement factories, a cotton textile factory and spinning mills, a jute factory and a metal works which serves the railways, ports and construction industry. In 1961, there were only eighty-two enterprises with capital in excess of 5 million escudos, their combined capital amounting to 1,874 million escudos; these included two sugar refineries, oil and grain mills, breweries and cotton ginneries.

284. Commentators in the Territory have on a number of occasions urged an expansion of secondary industry as a remedy for Mozambique's chronic trade deficit, citing among other things, the substantial imports of consumer goods, particularly cotton textiles, which the Territory could produce itself. In the past, various factors inhibited industrial development, among them the policies pursued by Portugal in regard to the licensing of new industries in the Overseas Territories and the conditions governing foreign investment. In recent years, however, the development of this sector has received closer attention as may be seen from the fact that under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, it was allocated the second largest investment target (1,350 million escudos) after transport and communications. The development of industries has also received stimulus from a recent extension of banking and credit facilities in Mozambique and from legislation enacted in 1965 (see A/6300/Add.3 (part I), paras. 62-68) providing for a greater decentralization of controls over the establishment of new industries and the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment.

285. As a result of these measures, industrial production is now expanding more rapidly than other sectors of productive activity. According to published statistics, the value of output of transforming industry (excluding construction and electricity and most processing of agricultural products, except sugar, tea and tobacco) increased by approximately 30 per cent between 1963 and 1965,

most of the increase taking place in the latter year.^{105/} The principal increases between 1964 and 1965 were, by sub-sectors: foodstuffs, which increased from 908 million escudos to 1,024 million escudos; chemical products (including soap and vegetable oil) from 406 million to 542 million; cashew kernels from 92 million to 129 million; construction materials from 177 million to 216 million; and petroleum derivatives from 326 million to 337 million escudos. Preliminary data for the first five months of 1966 suggest further over-all increases in the region of 11 per cent.

286. In the agricultural processing sub-sectors, the most important innovations concerned sugar (see section on agriculture) and the mechanical processing of cashew. During 1965-66, several companies were authorized to establish cashew processing factories or to expand existing operations. The largest of these, MOCITA, which is financed by South African and Italian interests, was opened in August 1966 at João Belo (Gaza District) at an initial cost of 72 million escudos. When finally completed, the MOCITA operation will represent an investment of 170 million escudos and will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons annually, employing 800 workers. In December 1966, a second factory was opened, owned by Spence e Pierce, Lda., which is jointly controlled by a local private firm, Pierce and Leslie and Co. and by Gill and Duffus, of London. The factory represents an investment of 48 million escudos and will have an eventual capacity of 25,000 tons. Another company, which is expanding its operations, is the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Caju, S.A.R.L. (SOCAJU). This company was formed in 1965 with an initial capital of 120 million escudos. It is controlled by Portuguese and local interests, among them the C.U.F. group of Portugal. The company is authorized to establish three factories with a combined capacity of 80,000 tons per year, at Nacala, Porto Amélia and Nampula. The first of these, at Nacala, was to be opened in April 1967. It is estimated that the total investment will eventually be about 250 million escudos. A fourth company, Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUCA), which was formed in 1962 with Italian participation and began operations

^{105/} In 1965, 389 licences were issued for the establishment of new enterprises, involving a total capital investment of 304 million escudos. This includes, however, servicing and trading enterprises.

in the following year with three small experimental factories, commenced large-scale production in 1965 with the opening of a new factory at Lourenço Marques; this new factory represents an investment of 45 million escudos and has a yearly capacity of 15,000 tons. In April 1966, the Portuguese Government underwrote bank loans to CAJU¹ totalling 60 million escudos. This sum will be used for the construction of a larger factory at Nacala. Two other smaller enterprises were also authorized to establish factories of up to 15,000 tons capacity.

287. Other new agricultural processing industries established in 1965-66 included a sisal products factory, a soap factory costing 80 million escudos, a rice decorticating factory, grain mills, and factories for the processing of tea, fruit, milk and meat products. Among these, the factory producing rope and other sisal products, Companhia Industrial de Cordoaria de Moçambique (CICOMO), was formed in May 1965 and represents an investment of 50 million escudos. Forty-five per cent of the capital is held by subsidiary companies of the Portuguese C.U.F. group, the remainder being held by four agricultural companies in Mozambique. The factory is located at Nacala and employs 200 workers. During 1966, the first year of operation, it exported 7,000 tons of sisal products, mainly to the United States and Canada. Of the two grain mills, the larger is at Machava and is owned by the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Moagem (SCCIMIL). The mill, which is still under construction and will be completed in 1967, will process wheat and will have a yearly capacity of 30,000 tons. Costing 50 million escudos, it is entirely Portuguese-owned. The second grain mill, which is being built at Beira, will process maize. It is owned by the Moagem de Beira, S.A.R.L. (MOBEIRA) and is Portuguese-financed, the total investment of 11.84 million escudos being furnished by the Banco Nacional de Fomento. The milk and meat products factories, located near Lourenço Marques, are both owned by a local producers' co-operative, the Cooperativa de Criadores de Gado, the combined investment being 27 million escudos. The rice-processing factory, which is located at Manhiça (Lourenço Marques District), is owned by a private entrepreneur, Sr. Inácio de Sousa Mostra. Representing an investment of several million escudos, it is financed by loans from banks, including the Banco Nacional Ultramarino; the factory has a production capacity of 1,000 tons a year and uses machinery purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. Among new processing industries authorized in 1966, are a

tea factory to be built by Monteiro e Giro, a company which owns tea plantations at Sacone, a fruit preserves factory, to be built at Nampula at a cost of 10 million escudos, a mechanized bakery to be built by a Portuguese concern, SAIPAL, at a cost of 4 million escudos, and a large abattoir, to be built near Lourenço Marques, which will serve the livestock industries of Southern Mozambique and Swaziland. Also announced were two condensed milk factories, one of which will be built by Nestlé, South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. at a cost of 40 million escudos. The factory will be located at Lourenço Marques, and will have a capacity of 7,500 tons. It will employ 120 workers and will begin production in 1968. The second, which will cost 30 million escudos and will produce 1,000 cans per day, will be owned jointly by a local company, PROTAL, and by the Cooperativa Condens Fabriek Friesland of the Netherlands.

288. New manufacturing industries established in 1966 include a bicycle factory near Lourenço Marques, the Fábrica de Bicicletas de Moçambique, built at a cost of 30 million escudos. The factory is Portuguese-owned and produces about 36,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-bicycles yearly. An automobile assembly plant, the Fábrica de Automóveis de Moçambique, Lda., which began production in 1966, is also Portuguese-owned, assembling trucks and other heavy vehicles on behalf of a Japanese manufacturer, ISUZU. The company's programme aims at the production of 2,000 automobiles yearly. Both companies plan to export their products to the neighbouring territories of Malawi, Southern Rhodesia and Zambia after supplying local demand. In addition, a salt factory, costing 10 million escudos was opened in 1966 by Portuguese interests and plans were completed for the construction of an ammonia and fertilizer factory to be built at Beira. The factory, which will be completed by the end of 1967, will cost about 200 million escudos and will, according to its directors, produce sufficient fertilizer to satisfy most of the present demand in the Territory. The factory is being built by a French firm, GEXA, on behalf of the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique, and will use patents developed by the Societé Belge de l'Azote. Licences were granted during 1966 to Portuguese firms, one of them the Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, for the construction of three cotton spinning mills with a combined capacity of 12,000 tons, two of which will be established in the south (at Lourenço Marques and Chibuto, in the Gaza District) and the other either at Beira or at Monapo

(district of Manica e Sofala). Other new industries under construction or authorized in 1966 include a match factory, a cellulose fibre factory and factories for the manufacture of paper bags, electrical batteries, automobile tyres, pharmaceuticals, furniture and parquetery, glass bottles and light metal products. The automobile tyres will be produced at two factories, one of them to be built at Beira by the Companhia de Refrigerantes MacMahon, S.A.R.L., a Portuguese company presently producing beer and soft drinks in the Territory, and the other by Firestone Portuguesa; the latter plans to invest 150 million escudos in a factory which will have a productive capacity of 60,000 to 100,000 tyres yearly. Other companies which, according to press reports, have requested authorization to build factories in Mozambique include the Standard Electric Company which has asked for a licence to produce telecommunications and electronic equipment, the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique, which has asked authorization to establish an iron and steel foundry with a yearly capacity of 250,000 tons (see para. 50), and the Fábrica Colonial de Borracha, Ida. which requested authorization to establish a shoe factory at Beira. According to the local press, a private entrepreneur in the United States also made application to establish petro-chemical factories at Lourenço Marques and Beira and a foreign financial group, RHCMOC, was reported to have proposed several industrial projects, including a rope factory at Nova Sofala and a chemical industry at Dondo. Other light industries established during 1965-66 included electrodes and electronic cables, clothing, bedding, paints and varnish. In 1966 the petroleum refinery owned by SONAREP (a subsidiary of the Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos of Portugal) at Lourenço Marques was expanded to include the production of asphalt and liquid gas for domestic and industrial use. The additional investment to finance this expansion was 130 million escudos. Finally, towards the end of 1965 a request was made for authorization to build a dockyard at Lourenço Marques which would include two floating docks and other installations for ship repairs, the whole representing an investment of 600 million escudos.

289. Other sectors of industrial activity, namely construction and electricity production, have also shown marked expansion. After three years of relative inactivity, there was a sudden upsurge in the building industry during 1965 and 1966, the number of new buildings under construction rising from 750 in 1964 to

1,317 in 1965. In most of the major municipalities, important public works were undertaken or initiated to cope with a rapid expansion of the urban areas. The largest programme of urban renewal was for Lourenço Marques, where the municipality is utilizing a loan of 150 million escudos from Portugal, contracted in 1966, for, among other things, the construction of low-cost housing estates for African workers.

290. Apart from the hydro-electric project at Cahora Bassa, which is described above, two other hydro-electric projects are under construction, the first at Massingir, on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo River, from which power would be supplied to industries in Lourenço Marques and the Sul do Save, and the second at Chicamba on the Púnguè River near Vila Pery. The latter represents an expansion by the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuè of its existing facilities to meet the growing needs of industry in the area, particularly in view of the proposed construction of a large cotton-spinning mill in addition to the existing textile factory, and also to supply Beira. The estimated cost of the project is 80 million escudos, of which 20 million were obtained during 1966 in the form of a local bond issue underwritten by Portugal. A third hydro-electric project being considered is on the Umbeluzi River. The project, which would take six years to complete and require a prior agreement with Swaziland, would furnish electricity to the whole Sul do Save and permit irrigation of an extensive area. Also during 1966, thermal electricity plants were constructed to supply a number of centres, including the port town of Nacala and the Limpopo valley settlement.

Mining

291. In 1965, the output of the mining industry was valued at approximately 50 million escudos, equal to less than 2 per cent of the value of agricultural cash crops. Mineral production at present consists mainly of coal (valued at 29.7 million escudos) and smaller quantities of pegmatitic minerals, mainly beryl and colombo-tantalite, together with some bauxite and very minor quantities of gold, copper and semi-precious stones. The Territory is known to possess unused mineral deposits, especially coal and titaniferous magnetites, together with vanadium, and possibly some other minerals, including manganese and chrome in the north-west, but insufficient funds and transportation difficulties have so far

prevented their full utilization. One of the arguments for the Zambezi valley development scheme referred to above, is that it would permit the establishment of an iron and steel industry near Tete where there are proved magnetite reserves of 35 million tons. Most of these reserves are controlled by the Uranium Company of Mozambique which has held an exclusive licence to prospect for iron at Mavudzi since 1961. According to a press report, the company, in September 1966, requested authorization to establish an iron ore smelting plant with an annual production capacity of 250,000 tons. It has already expended a substantial sum on housing and other installations.

292. In 1965, the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, which has been prospecting for petroleum for the past sixteen years, discovered a major deposit of natural gas at Pande; the former, however, became ignited and over 100 million escudos were spent on efforts to extinguish the fire which was finally accomplished in March 1967. In August 1966, it was reported in the press that the South African Government had approved a project for the construction of a 220-mile pipeline to supply the gas to the Transvaal once the fire could be brought under control. The Gulf Oil Company denied the report which, however, reappeared in the press in January 1967.

Fisheries

293. Although the offshore waters of Mozambique are known to be rich in fish, especially rock lobster and shrimp, these resources are not yet fully exploited. Most of the fishing so far has been done by small private companies or individually owned boats, the total catch landed averaging only 60 million escudos yearly over the period 1963-65.

294. In the past three years, there has been increasing awareness of the extent of this unexploited wealth. This was largely due to research undertaken by a South African financed company, INOS, which in 1963 obtained extensive fishing rights as well as licences to establish a shrimp and lobster cannery and a refrigeration plant. Between 1963 and 1965 the company invested approximately 180 million escudos, mainly in studies, but for technical reasons it was not able to begin large-scale industrial activities, which it now plans to commence in 1968. In the meantime, revelation of the fisheries potential increasingly attracted ships of foreign nationality, leading to incidents which were reported in the press during 1966.

295. During the past year, the Government took several measures to stimulate Portuguese investments in and to expand this sector. Besides extending the limit of territorial waters to twelve miles, it established an official fisheries research body in Mozambique and enacted legislation providing for the corporative organization of fishing (casas de pescadores) and for the establishment of trade schools. In June 1966, a new company, ARPEN, was constituted in Lisbon by important Portuguese fishing interests to develop commercial fishing in the Overseas Territories, and other projects were also reported to be under consideration in Portugal. Later in the year, the Overseas Minister, speaking in Lourenço Marques, announced that ARPEN had formed a Mozambique Fisheries Development Company. The project involves the establishment of a commercial fishing fleet, based on a new fishing harbour, with refrigeration, storage and ship repair facilities, to be established at Lourenço Marques. At the same time, a decree was enacted in Portugal to control the transfer of fishing boats from Portugal to the Overseas Territories. It was later reported in the press that ARPEN had placed orders for the construction of two deep-sea trawlers for Mozambique. It was also reported that several foreign companies, notably South African and Japanese, were interested in obtaining licences to operate in the Territory, and that the Mitsui financial group of Japan, in collaboration with South African interests, planned to establish a fish-processing factory at Lourenço Marques, involving an investment of about 80 million escudos.

Transport and communications

296. After agricultural exports, Mozambique's second most important source of foreign exchange consists in the services provided by its railways and ports. Invisible earnings from the transit traffic of its neighbours, together with earnings derived from the sale of supplies and services to visiting ships, are equal to approximately one third of its receipts from special trade and one fifth of the total inflow of foreign exchange. Because of Mozambique's strategic location, the volume of transit traffic has increased with the economic growth of the hinterlands so that the amount of trade handled at Lourenço Marques is now only 20 per cent less than that at Durban. In 1965, before the boycott on Southern Rhodesia, the ports of Mozambique handled 14 million tons of cargo. This

combined total, the largest in Mozambique's history, was 2.5 million tons more than in 1964, the increase being partly due to new exports of mineral ores, sugar and other commodities from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia.

297. To meet the growing needs of the transit trade, as well as Mozambique's own exports, substantial sums have been recently invested in the ports and railways, part of the cost being paid by the exporting countries. According to the Mozambique Ports and Railways Administration, the total value of the improvements completed or in progress in 1965 was in the vicinity of 2,000 million escudos. Among the major port projects completed during 1965-66 at Lourenço Marques were the construction of a mechanized iron ore loading wharf for the export of Transvaal and Swaziland ore under long-term agreements with Japan, a sugar terminal to handle sugar exports from Southern Rhodesia, refrigerated warehouses for fruit and meat exports, and also a 320-metre extension of the main deep-water berth, this last costing 600 million escudos. A grain loading wharf and a petroleum wharf, costing 100 million escudos, are under construction. At Beira, about 650 million escudos were spent on the extension of berthing facilities, the construction of a dry dock, completed in September 1966, warehouses for refrigerated goods, tobacco and general merchandise, and a chrome ore loading wharf to handle exports from Southern Rhodesia. Important extensions were also made at Nacala which is being developed as a supply port for Malawi to relieve congestion at Beira, and at Quelimane which serves the district of Zambézia.

298. The expansion of harbour facilities was accompanied by substantial investment in railways. During 1965, orders for the construction of 1,020 railway wagons, amounting to 247 million escudos, were awarded to a local metal foundry which was thereby enabled to double its production capacity; other orders for railway equipment, including twenty-five diesel engines, totalling 40 million escudos, were placed in the United States. In 1966, a new main railway terminal and a goods terminal were completed at Beira at a cost of 81 million escudos, major construction work was undertaken on the line from Beira to Umtali and the British-owned Trans-Zambézia Railway announced that orders had been placed for the acquisition of five diesel engines by 1967. In the north-west of Mozambique work was continued on the extension of the Niassa railway from Catur to Nova Freixo where, under an agreement signed in 1966, it will link up with an extension of the Malawi railway

system, thus enabling the overseas trade of Malawi to pass through Nacala beginning in 1967.

299. The effects of the boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia cannot yet be fully estimated in the absence of detailed statistics on transit traffic for 1966 (see paragraphs 265-268). Whereas the volume of cargo handled at Beira decreased by 342,991 tons in the first six months of 1966, compared with the same period of 1965, the tonnage handled at Lourenço Marques increased by 184,662, any decrease in Southern Rhodesian traffic at that port presumably being offset by the growing South African and domestic trade. Rerouting of Zambian trade through Malawi contributed to a sudden upsurge in the gross receipts of the Trans-Zambézia Railway, by 37 per cent during the first half of 1966.

300. With current plans for investment in ports and railways now largely completed, particular attention is being given to the extension and improvement of roads, for reasons which are both economic and military. The need for better roads has been repeatedly and urgently stressed in newspaper articles and in statements by local bodies in many parts of the Territory, especially the districts of Manica e Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado, according to which the poor condition of roads is a serious obstacle to the development of commercial agriculture. The inadequacy of the roads in the north has also been cited as a major problem in combating guerrilla activities. In speeches delivered in October and November 1966, the Overseas Minister stated that improvement of roads, particularly in the north, would be given special attention in the Third Development Plan now in preparation. He also said that a rationally planned system of roads was needed for the expansion of agriculture and to enable the armed forces to move about freely at all seasons in areas where guerrillas were active. He stressed that the planning and construction of the road system required co-ordination between the various services, including the military engineering services. To achieve this, a decree, enacted in October, created an autonomous Road Board for Mozambique and, in the following month, the Minister appointed as Provincial Secretary of Public Works and Communications an army officer who had previously been in charge of army engineers in the Territory.

301. The current Transitional Development Plan 1965-67 envisages the expenditure of 600 million escudos on roads, of which loans of 200 million and 130 million escudos

from the National Overseas Bank were authorized in 1966. The first loan was earmarked for new roads and feeder routes in the districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Zambézia. The second was made in connexion with a major highway now under construction between Lourenço Marques and Beira, which is scheduled for completion by 1968. It is intended subsequently to extend this road to the extreme south of Mozambique and north to Quionga near the border of the United Republic of Tanzania, thus providing the Territory with a north-south artery linking all major ports. The additional cost of the road, which will involve building a bridge four kilometres in length over the Zambezi River, is estimated at 700 million escudos. Other contracts concluded in 1966 were for the construction of an all-weather road, extending 110 kilometres between Macomia and Diaco in Cabo Delgado District, to be completed within one year, and another road, of 215 kilometres, from Matema to Fingoè in Tete District, which is currently an area of European settlement. The cost of these roads will be about 17.5 million and 6.5 million escudos respectively.

Public finance

302. Although the final budget accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and only preliminary information, based on press reports, is available concerning the estimates for 1967, it is clear that government expenditure for these years was the highest on record. Excluding financing of the Transitional Development Plan, the estimated expenditure for the year 1966, which totalled 4,213 million escudos, was 272 million escudos more than in 1965, and 41 per cent more than ordinary expenditure in 1960.^{106/} Among the factors contributing to the increase were growing recurrent expenditures resulting from development and the rising cost of defence and security measures.

303. The total sum of the budget estimates is somewhat misleading since over 50 per cent consist of earmarked funds, being the revenue and expenditure of autonomous bodies such as the Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the

^{106/} According to press reports, the estimated budget for 1967 envisages a further rise in expenditure of 387 million escudos. Of the total expenditure of 4,600 million escudos envisaged for 1967, 640 million escudos is allocated for defence, an increase of 91 million escudos over the estimate for 1966.

latter amounting in 1966 to 1,340 million escudos. Apart from this, the items which showed the largest increase compared with the previous year were national defence, which increased by 80.2 million to 549.4 million escudos (supplementary appropriations brought this figure considerably higher) and public debt servicing, which increased by 34 million to 240.5 million escudos. Other items of expenditure which increased were public health, which rose by 17.8 million to 175.1 million escudos, and public education, which rose by 14.5 million to 158.2 million escudos.^{107/} As has been noted previously (A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 159), expenditure on education also includes assistance paid to Portuguese Catholic missions (69.5 million escudos) and the Estudos Gerais Universitários (19 million escudos). In 1966, allocations for education represented about 6 per cent of the budget, and for public health about 4 per cent.

304. The increase in the budget estimates for 1967 (see above) is of particular significance in view of the fact that the legislative instrument enacted in November 1966, which laid down guidelines for the forthcoming budget, called for restriction or elimination of non-essential expenditures or those not related to the Transitional Development Plan. Earlier in the year, the Governor-General, in an order to all government departments and services, had called for austerity measures during the balance of the year. He specified, among other things, that there should be no increase in the number of teachers or new schools during 1966-67. The reasons for this can only be conjectured, but it must be noted that: (a) the Territory was facing a severe loss of revenue from Southern Rhodesia's transit trade; and (b) actual defence expenditure had substantially exceeded the original estimates in 1965. Pending the availability of the budget for 1967, there is no information as to the sources from which revenue will be obtained to meet the increased expenditure.

305. Up to 1966, however, rising expenditures were made possible by substantial increases in direct and indirect taxation and by special levies on the receipts of autonomous services, such as the railways and ports. Between 1961 and 1965, revenue from direct and indirect taxes (including taxes on industries subject to

^{107/} The estimated budget for 1967 allocates 160 million escudos for public education.

special regimes, such as cotton and sugar) increased by nearly 50 per cent from 1,302 million to 1,918 million escudos. The most significant increase, in direct taxation, was mainly due to the introduction in 1964 and 1965 of new taxes, including defence taxes and a supplementary personal tax, or to the increase of rates, particularly of taxes on income and commercial and industrial activities. In 1966, decrees were enacted increasing tax rates on imports and consumption.

Development financing

306. The Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, envisaged for Mozambique an investment target of 5,400 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 1,800 million escudos, or about three times the yearly investment under the previous plan. The principal sectors chosen for investment were: transforming industries, 1,350 million; roads, 665 million; irrigation and settlement, 560 million; social services, 500 million; ports and railways, 495 million; electricity, 400 million; and fisheries, 308 million escudos. Approximately 31 per cent was to be derived from private investment, 28 per cent from external loans, 21 per cent from the Government of Portugal and the remainder from territorial funds.

307. The preceding sections have already given an indication of the extent to which the targets are being fulfilled. Actual expenditures under the Plan during 1966 amounted to 1,769.5 million escudos. This included loans from the Government of Portugal totalling 400 million escudos, external loans guaranteed by Portugal totalling 150 million escudos, and 143 million escudos from territorial funds. The remaining 1,061.5 million escudos consisted of private investment capital, of which 165.5 million escudos was non-Portuguese.

308. One of the objectives of the plan was to mobilize savings available in the Territory for revenue-producing projects. Following the enactment in 1965 of legislation relaxing restrictions on the establishment of banks in the Overseas Territories (A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 62), there was a considerable expansion of commercial banking facilities. Among the new banks were the Portuguese Banco Pinto e Sotta Mayor, which opened the first of five branches in Mozambique, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the Banco Standard-Totta, resulting from a merger of the activities in Mozambique of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Totta-Allianca of Lisbon. In 1966, a public loan of 100 million escudos was raised in Mozambique to finance the development plan.

Educational conditions

309. The latest available statistics on education published by the Government of Mozambique relate to the school year 1963-64. Data extracted from these statistics were included in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Add.3 (Part I), paras. 171-175). The statistics showed, among other things, the number of children enrolled at primary schools, as officially redefined in September 1964,^{108/} and their composition by ethnic groups. According to this data, out of a total primary enrolment of 44,725 pupils in primary schools, 23,093 were known to be Africans. Similar statistics of secondary school enrolments showed a total of 18,415, including 2,781 Africans. Compared with population figures for Africans of all ages in 1960, this represented a percentage of 0.35 per cent at the primary level and 0.04 per cent at the secondary level. These figures were cited solely in order to indicate the spread of educational facilities among Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

310. It should be noted, however, that, as previously explained, the statistics of primary school enrolments related only to children in schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes. In Mozambique many rural schools, mostly run by religious missions, furnish less than this minimum and, under the reform of primary education effected in September 1964, are not classified as primary schools strictu sensu. In 1963-64, there were 3,233 schools of this kind, known as "adaptation schools", with an enrolment of 373,587 African children, representing 5.82 per cent of the total African population in 1960. Of this number, 70,867 obtained promotion from one class to another or were successful in examination.^{109/}

311. According to the same source, the number of pupils of all races enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-64 was 18,415, of whom 7,369 were at grammar (liceal) schools, 10,388 in technical professional schools (including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the Public Service), and 405 in religious

^{108/} Decree Law 45,908 (see A/6300/Add.3 (Part I), para. 81).

^{109/} These figures do not include 16,055 adolescents and adults attending special literacy and other classes in the evenings.

seminaries. More recent information from press reports gives a figure for 1964-65 of 7,969 pupils at grammar (liceal) schools^{110/} and 11,794 at technical professional schools.

312. Criticism of the situation in regard to education was voiced in a speech delivered in the National Assembly by Dr. Satúrio Pires, a delegate from Mozambique. He pointed out that, according to the provisional audit of the territorial accounts, actual expenditure on the public education service amounted to only 183.4 million escudos in 1965, or less than 3.4 per cent of the territorial budget, and that even when the subventions paid to religious missions were added to this, it still represented only about 5 per cent of the budget.^{111/} He referred, in particular, to what he described as the "penury and the seriousness of the problem of secondary education in Mozambique", remarking that out of 214 teaching posts, 24 were unfilled and that 41 per cent of the existing teachers were only temporary.

313. Though there appears to be some increase in expenditure on education (the estimates for 1966 and 1967 showed increases of 14.5 million escudos and 4 million escudos respectively in anticipated expenditure on public education), the increases which have occurred since 1965 do not appreciably alter the situation described by Dr. Pires. Indeed, as mentioned above (see paragraph 304 above), during part of 1966, expansion in the number of schools and teachers was temporarily halted under an order of the Governor-General owing to a shortage of available funds. Nevertheless, some improvements were achieved during 1966. Among them may be cited the graduation of fifty-two new secondary teachers, of whom seventeen will teach in grammar (liceal) schools, and the remainder in vocational schools. Also, work was in progress on two new grammar schools (liceus) and land was acquired at Porto Amelia for the construction of a new elementary technical school.

^{110/} There is considerable difficulty in comparing statistics from different sources, probably because of differing methods of computation. In his statement before the National Assembly in March 1967, Dr. Satúrio Pires was reported to have said that there were only 4,495 pupils in grammar (liceal) schools in 1965-66.

^{111/} Not including the expenditure on the Estudos Gerais Universitários; see para. 315.

314. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-67, which assigned an investment target of 220 million escudos for education, priority is being given to the expansion of secondary, vocational and agricultural training. As reported previously (A/6300/Add.3 (Part I), para. 83), agricultural education in the Overseas Territories was reorganized in 1965. As a follow-up of this reorganization, decrees were enacted in Mozambique during 1966 setting out the curricula for agricultural training at both the elementary and secondary levels. In addition, a Co-ordinating Council for agricultural education was created, which will have among its functions the issuing of grants and scholarships from funds to be donated by governmental bodies and private sources. Towards the end of 1966, a new agricultural school was opened at Chimoio in the Manica highlands.

315. In his criticism of the inadequacy of funds available for education, Dr. Satúrio Pires noted that the budget of the General University Studies (Estudos Gerais Universitários) in 1965 was only 22.8 million escudos, or less than 0.5 per cent of the actual budget of Mozambique. For 1966, the original figure cited in the budget estimates was 19 million escudos, later increased by supplementary appropriations to a total not much more than that of the preceding year. Despite the limited funds available for recurrent financing, the college continued to expand, the number of students enrolled rising to 603 in 1966-67, compared with 329 in 1964-65. Of the total, 298 students were studying engineering, 144 were studying medicine, 40 veterinary science and 32 agronomy. The institution provides three-year courses in general studies, agronomy, forestry, veterinary science, biology, chemistry and teaching and, since 1966, a four-year course in medicine. During 1966, land was acquired by the Government for the construction of a permanent campus at Lourenço Marques. So far, the college, which was founded in 1963, has been housed in temporary buildings. During 1966, however, a sum of 7 million escudos was allocated for the conversion of an existing hospital into a teaching clinic to be completed by mid-1967, and projects were also approved for the construction of permanent buildings to house the schools of agronomy, chemistry and physics. Also in 1966, laboratories were opened for the study of radio-isotopes and electronic microscopology in application to medicine. It was announced that a school of economics will be created shortly.

316. In his commencement speech delivered in October 1966, the rector of the institution stressed the need to bring the college up to the status of a full university by extending the courses up to licentiate level in humanities and sciences in order to supply the urgent demand in the Territory for secondary school teachers.

D. GUINEA, CALLED PORTUGUESE GUINEA

General

317. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, lies on the west coast of Africa between 12°40'N and 10°52'N in latitude and between 13°38'WG and 16°43'WG in longitude. Situated between the Republics of Senegal and Guinea, the Territory extends 198 miles inland from the coast at its widest point. Besides the mainland, it comprises the Bijagós Archipelago and a string of islands. The total area of the Territory is 36,125 square kilometres, of which approximately one tenth is periodically submerged by tidal waters and largely covered with mangrove. As previously reported^{112/} the preliminary results of the 1960 census showed a total resident population of 544,184, compared with 510,777 at the previous census in 1950 when there were reported to be 2,263 Europeans, 4,568 mestizos, 11 Indians, 1,478 assimilated Africans, and 502,457 non-assimilated Africans. A Portuguese official source^{113/} published a revised figure for the total resident population in 1960 of 519,229. According to the United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1965, the estimated population at mid-1965 was 527,000.

Government and administration

318. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Territory is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,372).^{114/}

319. The Territory is divided into nine concelhos and three circunscrições, and for purposes of direct elections is considered to form one electoral district. As in other Territories with a governor, namely Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor, a Legislative Council was established for the first time in 1963. It is presided over by the Governor and comprises 14 members, of whom 3 are ex officio, 8 are elected by "organic groups" and 3 are elected directly. No workers' or employers' interests are represented in the Legislative Council. There is also a

^{112/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chapter I, para. 35.

^{113/} Portugal: Anuário Estatístico, Vol. II, Lisbon, 1964.

^{114/} For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I), (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V.

Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor. It is comprised of the commander-in-chief, 3 ex-officio members and 3 members elected by the Legislative Council, one of whom represents the regedorias.

320. The Territory is represented in the National Assembly by one deputy. Elections to the National Assembly last took place in 1965; elections to the Legislative and Government Councils were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in these elections are not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

Military situation

321. Fighting in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, began in 1963 and is now entering the fifth year. Since about May 1964 the fighting has gradually grown in intensity and has become more widespread. By mid-August 1966, Portuguese troops had increased to some 23,000 but were reported to be generally based on the main population centres.

322. In June 1966, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which is reported to have some 5,000 uniformed guerrillas, was already claiming that it had "liberated almost half of the Territory, including in the south, Catió, Fulacunda, half of the Xitoli and Boé regions". In the north, it claimed that it "controlled the Oio and Farim regions, about half of the S. Domingos region, approximately 30 per cent of the Cachungo region and approximately 25 per cent of the Gabú region".^{115/}

323. Portuguese official military bulletins for the period September-December 1966 reported fighting in eight out of the nine concelhos, often close to, or around, the administrative headquarters, including those of S. Domingos, Cacheu and Farim in the north, those of Batafá and Gabú in the east, and those of Mansôa, Fulacunda and Catió in the south. In mid-February 1967, fighting intensified and Portuguese casualties rose to thirteen in one week, compared with an average of about three deaths a week last year. The Defence Minister flew to the Territory to review military operations. While he was there, the Portuguese military command announced that patrols were being launched throughout the Territory. This action was interpreted by the English language press as confirming that guerrillas had in fact infiltrated the whole Territory.

324. On his return to Lisbon, the Portuguese Minister for Defence reported on the high morale of the Portuguese troops fighting in the Territory and stressed that "there was no war between Portuguese Guinea and the neighbouring countries". He described the war as one "on a higher level" involving, on the one hand, those who wanted to take over the Territories under Portuguese administration because of their wealth, and, on the other hand, those who wanted to control these Territories because of their strategic position in the East-West struggle.

Economic conditions

325. General. The economy of the Territory is exclusively based on agriculture. The main crops are ground nuts and coconut, which together account for about 90 per cent of the exports, and rice and millet, which are the main subsistence crops. As the climate is not suitable for European settlement, there are no European farmers and almost all the agriculture is in the hands of the local population. The Companhia União Fabril (CUF) is however reported to have some large estates in the Territory. Livestock and fishing supply local needs, though some hides and skins are also exported. Except for a few factories processing rice, ground nuts and vegetable oil, there are almost no industries. A concession has been granted for petroleum prospecting but so far no discoveries have been reported.

326. Trade and balance of payments. Over the past decade the Territory's external trade has been characterized by a growing deficit due to both rising imports and falling exports. Thus, while the value of imports increased by about 210 per cent, from 198 million escudos in 1956 to 417 million escudos in 1965, the value of exports, which had averaged around 200 million escudos annually up to 1961, dropped sharply thereafter to only 106 million escudos in 1965. As a result, the Territory's trade surplus, which amounted to 4.9 million escudos in 1956, has given place to annual deficits which increased by over 350 per cent between 1961 and 1965 (from 86 million escudos to 311 million escudos):

Balance of external trade (million escudos)

	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
Imports	297.2	327.3	407.2	421.4	417.2
Exports	<u>211.1</u>	<u>188.9</u>	<u>166.5</u>	<u>156.2</u>	<u>105.8</u>
Deficit balance	86.1	138.4	240.7	265.2	311.3

/...

327. The sharp deterioration in the Territory's balance of trade in the past four years appears to be due in a large measure to the effects of the war which has disrupted the already stagnant agricultural sector and increased the need for additional imports of supplies and food replacements. Available data show that, although the Territory was in the past a rice exporting country, since 1960 it has had to import rice. There has also been a severe drop in exports of unshelled ground-nuts (from 24,000 tons in 1963 to less than 2,000 tons in 1965 with a corresponding drop in value from 69 million escudos to less than 5 million escudos). The quantity of coconut exports also decreased in this period by almost 25 per cent, though due to rising prices the value of exports did not drop but rose from 24 million escudos to over 30 million escudos.

328. The Territory's imports consist mainly of consumer goods. In 1958 (the last year for which the territorial statistical yearbook is available) cotton fabrics, wine and tobacco accounted for more than one third of the total imports by value. In the period 1963-65, these three items accounted for about 20 per cent of the total imports, and automobiles, gasoline and gas oil accounted for another 20 per cent. In 1964, rice imports amounted to 30 million escudos, or 6 per cent of the total.

329. Portugal has always been the Territory's most important trading partner, taking on an average about 90 per cent of its exports and supplying over 70 per cent of its imports. In the period 1963-65, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France accounted for the remaining 10 per cent of the Territory's exports while the remaining imports were supplied mainly by the United States of America (6 per cent), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5 per cent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (2 per cent).

330. In spite of its adverse balance of trade, the Territory's balance of payments registered a surplus of 19.1 million escudos in 1965 compared with a deficit of 16.3 million escudos in 1963 and 5.2 million escudos in 1964. The 1965 surplus resulted from governmental transfers from Portugal to support defence costs. In 1965, except for the transfers from Portugal, all the other items in the balance of payments were negative.

331. Agriculture, livestock and fisheries. It is officially estimated that about 90 per cent of the economically active population of the Territory is engaged in

agriculture and that about 77 per cent of the production is consumed locally. The total arable land is estimated to be about 263,000 hectares of which in an average year 159,000 hectares are under food crops, 59,000 hectares under cash crops (mainly ground nuts), and 59,000 hectares are fallow. At the 1960 agricultural census there were 86,951 farming units (explorações) each with an average area of 3.2 hectares and four units of labour. Production that year of food crops (based on the average prices over the five previous years) was estimated at 355 million escudos and cash crops at 90 million escudos.

332. Most of the ground nuts for export are grown in the north and north-eastern part of the Territory where the main food crops are maize, manioc, rice and sweet potatoes. In the south, where rice is the main food crop, some ground-nuts are grown in the interior part of the Territory but oil palm, which grows naturally along the coastal areas, provides the main export crop. It is estimated that oil palms occupy about 90,000 hectares of which about 30,000 hectares are exploited. The Territory has good timber resources which are being opened to exploitation.

333. There are no recent data on the output of food crops except for rice, which amounted to 10,581 tons in 1961, 11,304 tons in 1962 and dropped to 5,643 tons in 1963, after which no figures are reported.

334. A survey of the economy of the Territory, published in 1965 in the quarterly bulletin of the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino), suggests that the main economic problem of the Territory is the disinterest and the lack of understanding among the population of more advanced farming techniques. Although assistance has been provided through the distribution of improved seeds and fertilizers, it is felt that little progress can be expected in increased production until the people have acquired a better basic knowledge of farming through the spread of primary education especially geared to their needs.

335. Efforts are being made to introduce new crops and to encourage livestock production. As there are already some semi-spontaneous cashew trees in the Territory, several new projects have been started for growing cashew on an organized basis. A cashew shelling factory has also been established. Some fruits, including bananas and pineapples, and vegetables, are being developed with a view to eventual canning or direct export.

336. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, projects to improve agriculture include bringing into cultivation 4,000 hectares of rice, 1,000 hectares of manioc, 5,000 hectares of oil palm and 10,000 hectares each of cashew and bananas.

337. The Territory is considered to have considerable livestock potential. In 1966 it had a cattle population density of seven head per hectare. To provide credit to farmers and livestock farmers, in April 1966 an agricultural and livestock credit bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro Pecuário), similar to the one in Angola, was established in the Territory. The bank will provide credit for agriculture, livestock raising for commercial purposes, and for real estate. The initial funds of the bank will be furnished from the territorial budget, but as in other Territories the bank may issue bonds to obtain more working capital.

338. Most of the fishing carried on in the Territory is for local consumption. The fish catch increased from some 500 tons in 1963 to 760 tons in 1964 and 853 tons in 1965. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, 18 million escudos are to be spent on developing the fisheries industry for local consumption. The plan envisaged the gradual motorization of the fishing boats and the installation of freezing, salting and drying plants, either through mixed enterprises involving government and private capital, or through private enterprises in which Portuguese and foreign capital would be associated.

339. In 1966, the Government of the Territory was authorized (Decree 47,101, 16 July) to invest 2 million escudos in a newly established Sociedade Frigorífica da Guiné (SOFRIGO) which will install freezing facilities in Bissau and plans to organize a distribution network throughout the Territory. The Government also announced plans for creating a pilot fishing co-operative on Bolama.

340. Industry. Apart from a few factories processing agricultural products, there are practically no industries in the Territory. In 1965 there were only four factories for shelling rice, three for shelling ground nuts, three vegetable oil extraction plants, a soap factory, a rubber processing factory and a petroleum refinery, owned by SACOR, at Bandim.

341. The Territory has many waterways but it does not have much hydroelectric potential. In 1965, the total electric power capacity was 3,109 KW. No provisions are made under the Transitional Development Plan for the development of

transforming industries. Of the total allocation of 16.5 million escudos under the heading "industry", 9.3 million escudos are for mining, 7 million escudos are for water supplies and 0.2 million escudos are for geological mapping.

342. Mining. Little is known of the actual mineral resources of the Territory and some geological surveys are being carried out as part of the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967. Some bauxite has been found at Boé and the Companhia Lusitana do Alumínio da Guiné e Angola, S.A.R.L. was reported to be interested in developing the deposits. An exclusive concession to prospect for, and exploit, petroleum deposits is held by Esso Exploration Guiné Inc., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

343. The company, which at that time was incorporated in Delaware, United States, and had its head offices in New York, held a previous concession from 1958 to 1961. During that period the company found no petroleum but is reported to have spent some 250 million escudos (just under \$US9 million), which exceeded the minimum of 118 million escudos it was required to spend under the contract.

344. In December 1965 (Decree 46,796, 29 December) Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. was again granted an exclusive concession for petroleum mining in the Territory and following approval of the basic terms of the contract in February 1967 (Decree 46,878, 19 February), a supplementary contract was signed in March by the Overseas Minister, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Esso Exploration Co. Inc.

345. Under the new contract Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. is to have its headquarters in Portuguese Territory and to be subject to Portuguese law. The chairman of the board of directors and the majority of its members are to be Portuguese citizens. The company is to have a minimum initial registered capital of \$US1.5 million and 20 per cent of the initial as well as of any future shares are to be given free of cost to the Government of the Territory.

346. The concession, which is estimated to cover some 50,000 square kilometres, includes all the land area of the Territory and the sea, lake and river shores. The term of the concession is for 45 years, and may be extended for another 15 years. It grants the company exclusive rights to prospect for and exploit deposits of solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including petroleum, naphtha, ozokerite, natural gas and asphalt, as well as sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances.

347. During the initial period of five years, the company undertakes to spend not less than a total of 297 million escudos (about \$US10.6 million). This amount is to be spent as follows: 24 million escudos in the first year, 59 million in the second, 78 million in the third, and 68 million escudos in each of the fourth and fifth years. Within six months of the end of this five-year period the concessionaire must request demarcation of the areas it wishes to retain. The area of the concession is to be successively reduced as follows: after the initial five years to 75 per cent of the original area granted; after eight years to 50 per cent; and after ten years to 25 per cent.

348. The surface rent for the first five years is 400 escudos per square kilometre and within three months of the signing of the contract, the company is to pay to the territorial Government a sum of 40 million escudos (in dollars) as a down payment of the first year's surface rent (20 million escudos) and 25 per cent of the rent for the next four years. The annual surface rent is to be increased to 800 escudos per square kilometre after the tenth year and to 1,500 escudos after the fifteenth year.

349. The territorial Government is to receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sale value and has the right to purchase a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. In return, the company is granted "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession". It is exempt from all taxes "whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future", with the exception of the 50 per cent income tax on profits from oil operations, the statistical tax of one mil ad valorem and the stamp tax on customs clearance documents. It is also exempt from present or future taxes on shares, capital and debentures of Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. so long as these remain in the ownership of the concessionaire, its parent companies or any foreign affiliate of its parent companies.

350. As in the case of Petrangol and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in Angola, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. has the same privileges as regards use of the public domain, duty-free import of goods and machinery, facilities of entry into and exit from Portuguese territory for its personnel. The employment of aliens as well as of nationals is subject to the legislation in force in the Territory, but there is no obligation to employ a fixed percentage of Portuguese personnel.

351. The company is subject to the exchange control measures of the Territory. It must pay to the Territorial Exchange Fund all the foreign currency it earns from sales outside the Territory after deducting the company's local taxable income less taxes paid, expenses and depreciation. The Government undertakes to facilitate the granting of foreign exchange to the company for transfers specified in the contract, including payments for goods and services, interests and loans and dividends to shareholders. However, the total amount of the foreign exchange made available to the company shall not exceed the total amount it has invested in foreign currency, plus the amount it has given to the Territorial Exchange Fund.

352. The terms of the contract are apparently comparable in benefits to those of other petroleum concessions in Africa. If at any time during the life of the contract Standard Oil of New Jersey or its subsidiaries offer better terms for petroleum concessions in Africa or the Persian Gulf area, consultations may be opened between the two parties for a revision of the terms of this contract.

353. Transport and communications. Internal transport is mainly by the network of waterways, supplemented by over 1,000 kilometres of roads. The two main ports are Bissau and Bolama. In 1965, ninety-six ships with a total of 310,000 tons entered the port of Bissau.

354. The largest allocations under both the First National Development Plan, 1953-1958 and the Second National Development Plan, 1959-1964 were for expenditures on transport and communications. Under the first plan, 87 per cent of the total of 86.2 million escudos was for improving the harbour of Bissau and transport facilities on the Geba River. The second plan allocated 52 per cent of the total of 180 million escudos mainly for road construction, improving river transport and telecommunications. The implementation of both plans was slow in starting, however, and not all the funds were committed.

355. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, 51 million escudos (representing 28 per cent of the total) are allocated for transport and communications. The major project under this heading is the establishment of an air service linking the Territory with Cape Verde at a cost of 24 million escudos for airport equipment and carriers. Other expenditures envisaged in this sector are: roads, 12 million escudos; ports and navigation, 10 million escudos; and telecommunications, 5 million escudos.

356. The new airline, Transportes Aéreos da Guiné, was established in 1965 (Decree 46,511, 2 September 1965) and has since come into service.

357. Public finance. Because of the generally low level of economic development, the Territory's ordinary revenue has risen very slowly in the last ten years; the estimated ordinary revenue for 1967 was only 20 per cent higher than the revenue collected in 1957 (156 million escudos compared with 127 million escudos). Revenue from indirect taxes has remained at almost the same level since 1962 and revenue from direct taxes has decreased, largely due to a drop in receipts from the imposto domiciliário (the personal tax which replaced the former Native tax after the abolition of the Native Statute in 1961). Actual receipts from this source dropped from 23.2 million escudos in 1962 to 19.5 million escudos in 1964^{116/} (probably because of the exodus of refugees into neighbouring territories and to difficulties in collecting the tax).^{117/} On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the revenue derived from the general consumption tax introduced in 1964 (Legislative Instrument 1,814, 29 August 1964). This tax is levied at an average rate of 10 to 20 per cent ad valorem on almost all imported goods (including matches, textiles, fruit juices, beer, wine, tobacco, firearms, tools, machinery and parts) and at a lower rate on various local products. The tax produces about 20 million escudos in revenue annually.

358. The accounts of the Territory show that in 1964 actual ordinary revenue was 153 million escudos and exceeded the estimated total by about 8 million escudos. Although receipts from general direct taxes were 6 million escudos less than estimated, the difference was more than compensated by the receipts from the new consumption tax (which yielded some 6 million escudos more than had been anticipated) as well as by larger revenues from indirect taxes and also larger revenues in the closed budget accounts. Expenditure also exceeded estimates (148.7 million escudos compared with 145 million escudos), the difference being partly due to an increase of 2 million escudos in the public debt servicing charge. In 1964, the Territory's share (12 million escudos) in the cost of the armed forces represented 8 per cent of its total expenditures. This compared with 4.2 per cent spent on education and 13.7 per cent on health services.

^{116/} The imposto domiciliário is levied on all active males between eighteen and sixty years of age. The annual rate varies from 150 escudos for a single male or with one wife, rising by 50 escudos for each additional wife, to 400 escudos for a man with six wives (Guiné, Legislative Instrument 1,771, 26 June 1962).

^{117/} At the above rates the difference of 3.7 million escudos represents the loss due to non-collection of taxes from 10,000 to 15,000 persons.

359. For 1966, the sources of budgetary revenue are as follows: direct taxes, 45.4 million escudos, of which about half is to come from the imposto domiciliário; indirect taxes, 34.7 million escudos; the special consumption tax, 20.5 million escudos; revenue from independent accounts (closed revenue), 30.2 million escudos; and other taxes and fees, 22 million escudos. Estimates of ordinary expenditure for 1966 allocated 16.4 million escudos for servicing of the Territory's public debt (an increase of 30 per cent compared with 1964)^{118/} and 12 million escudos to its share in the total cost of the Territory's armed forces, which in 1966 amounted to 67.4 million escudos (distributed as follows: army, 29.2 million escudos; navy, 17.5 million; and air force, 20.7 million). Except for the share paid by the Territory and a contribution of 2.1 million escudos from the Overseas Defence Fund, the remainder of the cost of the armed forces was charged to Portugal's extraordinary budget, as follows: 19.1 million escudos for the army; 15.5 million escudos for the navy, and 20.7 million escudos for the air force.

360. Although no details are available on the 1967 budget, it is anticipated that there may be a rise in the allocations for general administration in view of the fact that members of the public services received a salary increase of 12.7 per cent in December 1966. It may be recalled that the need for a salary increase had been raised in the National Assembly in January 1965 by Mr. Pinto Bull, the former Secretary-General of the Territory.

361. Development financing. As reported previously,^{119/} the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, contains an allocation of 180 million escudos for the Territory's development projects. The envisaged expenditures, in millions of escudos, in the different sectors are as follows: industry, 16.5; transport, 51; education, health, etc., 33.2; agriculture, 33.3; fishing, 18; housing, 10; energy, 3; and other

^{118/} In 1962, the Territory's public debt totalled 135.7 million escudos of which 76 million escudos represented the amount outstanding on two loans, one raised in 1948 and the other in 1953. The remaining amount represented loans from Portugal to the Territory at 4 per cent per annum (Decree 43,519, 28 February 1961) for the implementation of projects under the Second Development Plan, 1959-1964. At the end of 1964 the Territory's total public debt had risen to 188.3 million escudos of which 126.2 million escudos was for development.

^{119/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, paragraphs 35, 108-109.

sectors, 15. Since the Territory's budget is so limited that, according to the Governor, it cannot afford even the staff and services that it needs, the entire amount of 180 million escudos was originally to be financed by annual loans from Portugal (Decree 46,683, 3 December 1965; see A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 57).

362. In 1965, the first year of the Transitional Development Plan, the budget estimates envisaged expenditure totalling 54.2 million escudos for development, but actual expenditure amounted to only 25.6 million escudos, or slightly less than half the sum estimated. This was, moreover, 50 per cent less than the expenditure on development in 1964. Expenditure on research and surveys amounted to less than one per cent of the sum allocated for this purpose and, of the 6.2 million escudos allocated for social welfare, including education, less than 15 per cent was spent.

363. Following the conclusion of the new contract with Esso Guiné Exploration, Inc. the central Government decided to use part of the 40 million escudos down payment (see above) for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan. For 1966, financing of the development plan projects included: a loan of 12 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino) (Decree 47,132, 3 August 1966); 6.9 million escudos from loans from Portugal (Order 22,107, 7 July 1966); 4.4 million escudos from the territorial budgetary surpluses; and 32.2 million escudos from the money received for the petroleum concession^{120/} (Order 22,153, 5 August 1966). Envisaged expenditures, in escudos were: ports and navigation, 2.5 million; telecommunications, 1.9 million; development of agricultural, forestry and livestock resources, 7 million; roads, 20 million; air transport and airports, 5.2 million; the port of Bissau and telecommunications, 12 million escudos.

Educational conditions

364. The latest available education statistics are for the school year ending in 1964 (for comparison, the figures for 1963, which were reported last year, are given in parenthesis).

^{120/} Of the remaining 7.8 million escudos, 2.8 million have been allocated to the payment of the Territory's public debt charges (Order 22,226, 26 September 1966).

365. The statistics show that in 1964 there were a total of 156 (163) government primary schools, including 33 school posts, with a total of 241 (212) teachers and 13,040 (12,000) pupils. The Territory's one academic high school had 19 (20) teachers and an enrolment of 305 (272) students; the commercial industrial high school had 31 (26) teachers, 482 (308) students; the elementary professional school had 5 (4) teachers and 40 (19) students. The 79 koranic schools had 81 teachers and 758 students. There were 85 people in government training programmes of whom 55 were attending courses in agriculture and veterinary science and 30 were undergoing training in the fields of public health and welfare.

E. CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

General

366. The Cape Verde islands lie off the west coast of Africa, the nearest point being about 600 kilometres from Dakar (Senegal). They form a crescent-shaped archipelago facing west and extending between $14^{\circ}48'N$ and $17^{\circ}12'N$ latitude and between $22^{\circ}41'WG$ and $25^{\circ}22'WG$ longitude. There are ten islands and five islets divided into two groups: the Barlavento (windward) and Sotavento (leeward) islands. The Barlavento group comprises the islands of Santo Antão, São Vicente, Sao Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Santa Luzia. The Sotavento islands are Santiago, Fogo, Maio and Brava. The islands range in size from Santiago (991 km^2) to Santa Luzia (35 km^2), the total land area being 4,033.3 square kilometres.

367. The islands are of volcanic origin and most are mountainous with deep, eroded valleys and rocky shorelines. The appearance of the islands during most of the year is one of barrenness. There has been extensive deforestation and the climate, influenced by winds from the Sahara, is arid, rainfall is uncertain and the Territory suffers from prolonged droughts; the islands are also subject to severe cyclonic storms originating in the Atlantic Ocean.

368. Despite difficult conditions of life, and considerable emigration, the population is increasing rapidly, at an estimated yearly rate of about 3.5 per cent between 1950 to 1960. In 1964, the total population was unofficially estimated at 221,770. There are no recent data available concerning its composition by ethnic groups, but in 1950, according to the census of that year, 69.09 per cent of the population was mestiço, 28.84 per cent was African and 2.06 per cent was European. Except for the five islets and the small island of Santa Luzia, all the islands are inhabited, but according to the 1960 census, nearly one half of the population lives on Santiago where the capital of the Territory, Praia, is located.

Government and administration

369. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Cape Verde is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,371).^{121/}

^{121/} For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, paras. 17-73, and the sub-section on the Territory.

370. Although the governmental and administrative framework is similar in its broad outlines to that in other Territories under Portuguese administration, there are certain differences deriving from the fact that the Native Statute was never applied to Cape Verde and consequently the inhabitants all have the same legal rights and obligations as citizens living in metropolitan Portugal. Hence, there are no regedorias, the local administration consisting, as in Portugal, of concelhos (municipalities) and freguesias (parishes), each with its elected council or parish board. There are twelve concelhos and for purposes of direct elections to the National Assembly and the Legislative Council of Cape Verde the Territory comprises two districts, namely, the Barlavento and Sotavento island groups.

371. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of eighteen members, of whom three are ex officio, twelve are elected by "organic groups", and six are elected by direct franchise, three from each of the two districts. Of the twelve representatives of "organic groups", two are chosen by bodies representing interests of employers and two by bodies representing workers' interests.^{122/} There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the Secretary-General, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and two other ex officio members, as well as three members elected by the Legislative Assembly from among its members, one of whom must be a representative of the administrative bodies.

372. Elections to the Legislative Council were last held in 1964 at which time approximately 18,000 voters, or about 10 per cent of the population, participated in the election of the six representatives chosen by direct suffrage, a percentage believed to be higher than in the other Overseas Territories. In the elections to the National Assembly, held in 1965, 86.5 per cent of the registered voters were reported to have participated, though the actual number is not known. The next elections to the Legislative Council will be held in 1968.

Economic conditions

373. General. Economically, Cape Verde presents a picture of chronic poverty and heavy dependence on financial assistance from Portugal. With very few natural

^{122/} For details of the composition of the Legislative Council see ibid., paras. 187-188.

resources and a growing problem of overpopulation, its main economic importance lies at present in its function as a refueling station for shipping and aircraft travelling between Western Europe, South America and southern Africa, and as a relay point for trans-Atlantic telephonic communications.

374. As already stated, the Cape Verde islands suffer from general aridity and uncertainty of rainfall, experiencing periodic droughts which formerly decimated the population. Of the nine inhabited islands, three are almost barren of natural vegetation and on most of the others soils are poor and farming is mainly restricted to the narrow valleys and higher regions of the interior. Apart from salt, pozzolana earth and lime, which are exported, they have no known mineral resources and there is little industry other than that concerned with foodstuffs and the processing of primary products. Fishing is potentially a source of wealth and is now attracting significant investment (see below), but for many years the industry languished owing to poor techniques and insufficient capital.

375. For the most part, the inhabitants are small tenant farmers, principally engaged in growing food crops and rearing livestock (mainly goats and pigs) for local consumption. There is a limited export of bananas, coffee, purgueira (an oil-seed), peanuts and castor seeds, but exports are small and their value in 1965 was only 8 per cent of the total value of imports. Not only must the Territory import nearly all its requirements of manufactured consumer goods, but, since food production even in good years is insufficient for consumption needs, it also imports large quantities of foodstuffs, including maize and beans, which are among the main subsistence crops. In times of drought, the need to supply purchasing power for subsistence has led to the rescheduling of development expenditure, financed predominantly by loans from Portugal, as a means of providing employment. It is not surprising, therefore, that Cape Verde is traditionally a Territory of emigration with a net annual outflow of between 1,000 and 4,000 persons, most of whom go to São Tomé and Príncipe.

376. Faced with a rising population, increasing imports and almost stationary exports, the Portuguese Government is endeavouring to find ways of stimulating production and increasing foreign exchange receipts. Attention is being directed particularly to the rehabilitation and expansion of the fishing industry, the production of bananas for export to Portugal and the fostering of a tourist industry.

Measures are also being taken under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 to improve agricultural techniques, promote land reform, improve water supplies and communications and develop technical training.

377. External trade and payments. Because of its generally low production and lack of industries, Cape Verde's exports cover only a fraction of the value of its imports. In recent years, moreover, this fraction has been growing smaller owing to rapidly increasing imports. Between 1963 and 1965, for instance, whereas the value of exports rose by 16 per cent (from 24.1 million to 28.0 million escudos) the value of imports increased by 34 per cent (from 170.2 million to 228.3 million escudos). In 1965, exports covered only 8 per cent of imports by value, leaving a deficit of no less than 200.3 million escudos.

378. Despite this, however, Cape Verde's external payments showed a favourable balance of 23.2 million escudos at the end of the year. This was because the Territory derives substantial invisible receipts from the sale of services and supplies to ships in transit, mostly in the form of water and of fuel (which is imported for the purpose) and because its development expenditure (54.6 million escudos in 1965 and 72.9 million escudos in 1966) is financed by loans from metropolitan Portugal.

379. The Territory's main exports consist of fish and fish products, bananas, salt, coffee, pozzolana, and ground-nuts. Of these, only fish and bananas have shown appreciable increases in recent years. Between 1963 and 1965, exports of fish and fish products increased in value from 5.1 million to 8.0 million escudos, while bananas increased from 2.9 million to 3.4 million escudos. There are, unfortunately, no data available for 1966, but according to plans for the expansion of banana exports to Portugal, it was forecast that the quantity supplied would increase from 3,391 tons in 1965 to 4,600 tons in 1966 and 6,500 tons by 1968. Other exports have, in contrast, remained static or declined. Thus, salt declined in value from 3.4 million escudos in 1963 to 2.7 million escudos in 1965, pozzolana from 1.6 million to 1.3 million escudos and ground-nuts from 1.1 million to 0.9 million escudos. Exports of coffee are extremely small, amounting in 1965 to only 45 tons, valued at 1.5 million escudos.

380. More than half of the Territory's imports consist of consumer goods, the major items in 1965 including, in descending order, textiles, maize, sugar, wheat

flour, rice, automobiles, wines and petroleum products. It is noticeable that among the leading imports are such foodstuffs as maize, beans and sugar, all of which are grown in Cape Verde, but not in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population. Imports of foodstuffs, and of maize in particular, vary substantially from year to year, depending on whether or not the local crop has been affected by drought, but in recent years imports of all the main food crops have shown progressive increases; thus, maize imports rose from 8.7 million escudos in 1963 to 18.1 million escudos and rice from 5.5 million to 7.8 million escudos. In 1966, authorization was given for the duty-free import of 10,000 tons of maize.

381. Cape Verde's main trading partners are metropolitan Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, especially Angola. In 1965, metropolitan Portugal supplied about 50 per cent by value of all imports and purchased about 55 per cent of imports, mainly food crops. Next in importance was the United States of America, supplying 5 per cent of imports and taking about 9 per cent of exports.

382. Agriculture and livestock. Although agriculture constitutes the principal economic activity of the Cape Verde islanders, agricultural production is limited by the availability of suitable soils and water and by the uncertainty of the rainfall. Except in the case of Fogo where rainfall is more plentiful, all the larger islands have substantial areas of barren land, cultivation being mainly restricted to the valleys and higher regions of the interior. Farming is mostly by small individual farmers who use rudimentary methods and are primarily concerned with the growing of food crops. Of the total cultivated area of about 54,000 hectares, some 31,000 hectares are reportedly devoted to maize and beans. Other food crops include sweet potatoes, manioc, vegetables and fruits. Sugar cane is grown, not for export but for the production of a locally consumed alcohol. Permanent crops include purgueira, which grows in the arid coastal areas and produces an oil-seed which is exported for the manufacture of soap and fertilizer, and, in the more humid areas, bananas, coconuts and coffee. In the valleys, castor and ground-nuts are cultivated, in addition to maize and beans. There are no data available concerning production but, except for bananas, exports are small and have followed an erratic pattern in recent years. Thus, purgueira exports have varied between 666 tons in 1963 and 443 tons in 1965, castor seeds from 54 tons in 1963 to 126 tons in 1964 and 65 tons in 1965 and ground-nuts from 205 tons in 1963 to 559 tons in 1964 and 184 tons in 1965.

383. In recent years, government efforts have been directed towards the expansion of coffee and bananas for export. As concerns coffee, legislation enacted in 1959 (Decree 42,390, 15 July) made the cultivation of coffee compulsory in certain designated areas of irrigated land. Despite this, coffee exports have declined, from 132 tons in 1959 to 37 tons in 1963, and in 1965 amounted only to 45 tons (valued at 1.5 million escudos). More success has attended efforts to promote banana exports, which rose progressively from 1,125 tons in 1957 to 3,392 tons in 1965 and, it is hoped, will increase to 6,500 tons by 1968. This is partly the result of expenditure under the Transitional Development Plan on irrigation and partly because of recent measures (see para. 62) to develop a guaranteed market in Portugal. During 1966, the Government acquired a refrigerated cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit and one of the purposes of the road-building programme (see below) is to facilitate the export of produce.

384. Reference has already been made to the low productivity of agriculture in Cape Verde, which is amply illustrated by the importation of food crops, especially maize, of which 12,000 tons were imported in 1965 and 10,000 tons in 1966. This is partly due to adverse natural conditions but it is also attributable in part to outmoded agricultural methods, lack of capital and to a system of land tenure whereby most of the land is owned by hereditary landlords and is farmed by leasehold tenants or share-croppers under contracts which, hitherto, were often of short duration and subject to frequent revision by the land-owners. In November 1966, a legislative order made applicable to Cape Verde Law 2,114 of 15 June 1962. Under this law, farming contracts and deeds are henceforth subject to government regulations; they must be reviewed by the administrative service and they must have a three-year term, renewable for nine more years; the law also contained provisions for an equitable division of produce in the case of share-cropping contracts and established arbitration commissions for any litigation between proprietor and farmer.

385. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on the extension of irrigation wherever possible, improved land use and soil conservation; a total of 42 million escudos being allocated for this purpose. In 1965, a special enlarged team of experts (brigada técnica) was established to promote agricultural

co-operation, draw up plans for land use, ensure the maximum use of existing and new irrigation works and encourage reafforestation and soil conservation.

386. In addition to their crops, the Cape Verdean farmers also rear livestock, especially goats and pigs. In 1963 there were reported to be about 30,500 goats, 12,363 pigs, 13,900 cattle and about 7,000 donkeys, the latter used mainly for transportation.

387. Fisheries. Fishing is potentially an important economic activity in Cape Verde. The seas around the islands are known to be rich in tuna and lobster and fish constitute a major element of the islanders' diet, especially on the islands of Sal and Boavista where the aridity is such that there is almost no agriculture. Though fishing plays a role in the domestic economy second only to agriculture and fish and fish products are the Territory's principal export by value, the industry was for many years in a state of decline, carried on by out-dated methods, with insufficient capital and only limited access to external markets. As late as 1957, a report on the fishing industry described it as stagnant and the processing factories as lacking in adequate facilities and equipment, unhygienic and bordering on insolvency.^{123/}

388. Efforts to improve industrial fishing in the islands date principally from 1957 when scientific research into the fisheries potential was first initiated. This was followed in 1958 by the establishment of two industrial freezing units on the island of São Vicente and by the introduction of a few motorized trawlers. As at 1964 it was estimated that there were about 3,000 persons engaged in fishing, most of them still fishing from small boats by traditional methods, and five processing companies engaged in the production for export of frozen and canned fish and fish-meal. Exports of fish products increased from 4.9 million escudos in 1958 to 6.8 million escudos in 1964.

389. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, more than half of the total investment envisaged (250 million escudos) is allocated for the development of the fishing industry. Part of this is being devoted to fisheries research now being undertaken by a research unit, the Centre for Aquatic Biology, which was established in May 1966 (Order No. 21,916, 30 May). The largest part of the

^{123/} J. Gutteres and others, "Estudos das Pescas em Cabo Verde"; in Estudos, Ciências Politicas e Sociais (Vol. I, No. 47), Lisbon, 1961.

investment is, however, being used to improve the fishing fleet and to provide needed capital for the transforming industry. In May 1966 (Decree 46,990, 21 May) a government loan of 30 million escudos was granted to the largest processing company, Companhia de Pesca e Congelamento de Cabo Verde (CONGEL), raising its total investment to 50 million escudos. At the same time, foreign interests are reported to be turning their attention to Cape Verde. In April 1966, an agreement was concluded between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany permitting the latter to establish a fishing base in the islands. Under the agreement, the Federal Republic will undertake a six-month study of tuna resources and fishing methods in the neighbouring waters. Deep-sea tuna fishing is already being carried out by boats of the Japanese Mitsui Company, based on São Vicente. In November 1966, it was reported in the Press that a German financier was considering the possibility of joining with other foreign interests in a company to be established on Santiago. According to the report, the investment contemplated was between 200 and 300 million escudos.

390. Extractive and transforming industries. Apart from the processing of fish and of food-stuffs for domestic consumption, the only sizable industries established in Cape Verde are concerned with the extraction for export of salt, lime and pozzolana earth, the last being the raw material for the manufacture of cement and concrete. Salt, which at present ranks third in importance among the Territory's exports (2.7 million escudos in 1965), is produced by evaporation from salt pans on the islands of Sal, Boa Vista and Maio. Owing to loss of the traditional export market, namely Brazil, the industry suffered a setback after the Second World War, the quantity exported decreasing from 34,780 tons in 1939 to a low figure of 20,269 tons in 1959. Since then it has slowly increased, attaining 39,626 tons in 1965.

391. Pozzolana deposits were first discovered in 1948 and were initially developed mainly for export to Portugal. Although production increased rapidly until 1959, when 9,102 tons were exported, it has since oscillated between a low figure of 3,668 tons in 1960 and a high of 11,825 tons in 1963. In 1965, only 4,139 tons were exported.

392. In August 1966, plans were announced to establish a cement industry based on pozzolana on the islands of Maio and Boa Vista. According to press reports, the Companhia Pozzolana de Cabo Verde, S.A.R.L. which controls the deposits will invest

400 million escudos in two cement factories to be built with technical and financial support from European cement interests. The factories will, it is reported, employ more than 100 technicians and 450 local workers and will have a productive capacity of 300,000 tons yearly, valued at approximately 135 million escudos. Exports will be directed to African markets.

393. Transport and communications. As already stated, Cape Verde's main economic importance derives from its role as a service station for long-distance shipping, aviation and telephone communications. The main harbour for shipping is Porto Grande on the island of São Vicente. At one time São Vicente ranked in importance with such ports as Singapore, Malta, and Port Said as the chief bunkering station for ships travelling in the Atlantic. With the establishment of better and larger ports such as Dakar, São Vicente has gradually declined.

394. In 1960, the harbour area of Porto Grande had an area of about 700 hectares and several wharves accessible to large ships. In 1961, a deep-water berth was built in Porto Grande. Ninety per cent of all sea traffic stopping at Cape Verde, including nearly all large foreign steamers, were served by the port. Eight smaller ports, namely Praia, Santa Maria and Pedra de Lume (Sal); Palmeiras and Fura (Brava); Porto Novo (Santo Antão); São Felipe (Fogo); and Sal Rei (Boa Vista) generally handle smaller Portuguese ships. The number of ships stopping in Cape Verde has not increased since 1953, the yearly average being approximately 600 to 650 ships with a total tonnage of between 2.4 million to 3.9 million tons. In 1966, a new port was constructed on the island of Fogo under the Transitional Development Plan and, as noted above, the Government was reported to have purchased a new cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit.

395. The Territory has a major international airport at Espargas, on the island of Sal. The airport has increased in importance since 1961 due to the growth in Portuguese air traffic between Europe and Africa. Following the closing of several African airports to its aircraft, the Republic of South Africa is reported to have concluded an agreement with Portugal for the use of the Espargas airport and, according to press reports, is expected to contribute investment capital to expand the existing facilities.

396. São Vicente has long been a relay point for submarine telephonic cables between Europe, Brazil and South Africa. In August 1966, a press report announced that the largest submarine cable in the world would be completed by 1968 and would use Cape Verde as a relay point.

397. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, a total of 96 million escudos is allocated for expenditure on transport and communications. Approximately two thirds of this is to be used for improvement of ports and air transport facilities, and 30 million escudos for roads. Considerable importance is attached to the construction of new roads, partly to increase exports and partly as a means of promoting tourism which is, at present, in its infancy. The first organized tour to Cape Verde visited the island of Santiago in May 1966.

398. Public finance. The budget of Cape Verde shows a progressive increase in both ordinary and extraordinary expenditures during recent years. Actual expenditure under the ordinary budget rose from 68.24 million escudos in 1963 to 78.98 million escudos in 1965 and an estimated 85.84 million escudos in 1966. Extraordinary expenditure, mainly for the implementation of development plans, rose from 52.99 million escudos in 1964 to 54.63 million escudos in 1965. The allocation for 1966 was 72.95 million escudos.^{124/}

399. For 1965, Cape Verde contributed 1.7 million escudos towards a total expenditure of 23.8 million escudos on the armed services in the Territory, the remainder being paid from Portugal's budget and from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. Estimated expenditure on defence in 1967 amounts to 19.7 million escudos, of which 2 million is chargeable to the Territory (Orders 22,455; 22,460 and 22,496, 16 and 31 January 1967). Other budgetary allocations included 10.36 million (12 per cent of the ordinary budget) for education and 7.9 million (9.1 per cent) for public health.

400. Because the Territory has so few resources, extraordinary expenditure, mainly for development, is financed almost entirely by loans from metropolitan Portugal with the result that the ordinary budget must bear a growing charge for servicing of the public debt, amounting to 2.9 million escudos (3.3 per cent of the ordinary budget) in 1966.

401. Development financing. Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-58 and 1959-63, a total of 347 million escudos was allocated to Cape Verde: 137 million escudos under the first plan and 210 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated more than half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads, the second largest allocations going to agriculture including, especially, irrigation projects. With supplementary allocations, actual expenditure came to 374 million escudos.

^{124/} Due to carry-overs, there are considerable discrepancies between estimated and actual expenditures on development for any given year.

402. The pattern of investment planned under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967 shows a new orientation in the economic development of the Territory. The plan allocates a total of 500 million escudos to be invested during the three-year period, of which 258 million escudos, or more than half, is for the development of the fishing industry, other sectors receiving much smaller investment targets, viz: 70 million escudos (or 14 per cent) for transport and communications; 18 million (or 3 per cent) for education; 30 million (or 6 per cent) for public health; and 42 million (5.4 per cent) for agriculture.

403. Expenditure under the plan in 1965 amounted to 54.6 million escudos, or 18.4 million escudos less than the original appropriation. Of the original appropriation, the largest allocation was for roads (20 million), followed by ports and navigation facilities (20 million), agriculture (8 million), public health (6 million) and industries (5 million).

404. Because of the increasing burden of public debt servicing on Cape Verde's slender economy, a decree (Decree 46,683) of 3 December 1965 authorized the Portuguese Ministry of Finance to make interest-free loans, repayable over twenty-four years, for implementing the Transitional Development Plan. Accordingly, expenditure during 1967, which will amount to 70 million escudos, is being provided in the form of a "reimbursable subsidy" (Order 7,496, 19 March 1966). Of this sum, 21.5 million escudos are to be used for housing and municipal improvements, 17 million for transport and communications (including 6 million for harbours and 5 million for roads), 11.7 million for agriculture, reforestation and livestock, 4 million for electricity supplies, 6 million for public health, 5 million for education and 1.25 million for new transforming industries.

Educational condition

405. According to the most recent statistics available (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, May 1966), there were in 1964 a total of 427 primary school classrooms^{125/} of which 200 were in primary schools strictu sensu and 227 were in rural schools (postos escolares). The total number of primary teachers was reported to be 549 and the number of children enrolled 24,334, indicating an average ratio of 53 pupils per teacher and 57 children per classroom. This would seem to imply a substantial recent improvement in primary facilities since, according to a semi-official

^{125/} According to a report (Boletim Geral do Ultramar, January-February 1966) special measures were taken to expand primary school facilities because of an alarming rise in illiteracy.

study,^{126/} the ratio in 1960-61 on the island of Santiago was 325 children per class and 207 per teacher.

406. At the secondary level there were, according to the same statistics, two grammar (liceal) schools with 52 teachers and 1,103 pupils, and three technical professional schools with 454 pupils (one of the three being an agricultural school). There was also a religious seminary with 60 students. Above the secondary level, there were no institutions other than government training courses, all post-secondary education being given outside the Territory on government scholarships, of which 35 were granted in 1964.

407. If the above statistics are correct, they represent an increase of 120 primary classes and 5,741 pupils enrolled at the primary level since the previous year (these may include adult literacy classes). This increase is probably due to the introduction in 1964 of compulsory primary education. At the secondary level, there was an increase in pupil enrolments of 27 in the two grammar (liceal) schools and 39 in the three technical professional schools.

408. No statistics are available for the years after 1964, but it may be noted that of the total investment target of 18 million escudos for education contained in the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, 2.5 million escudos was allocated for expenditure in 1965 and 5 million escudos in 1966. The programme for 1966 provided for the construction of nineteen new schools, most of them rural school posts (postos escolares). A decision was also taken to establish a primary teachers' training school in the Territory, the cost of which would be shared by other overseas Territories.

Public health

409. There is very little new information concerning public health in Cape Verde. In March 1966, it was reported that, following a study of hospital facilities and needs in the Territory, plans had been completed for the construction of new central hospitals on the islands of São Vicente and Praia and of a psychiatric hospital at Pedra Badejo, which will serve the whole Territory. The plans also provide for expansion of the existing hospitals on Sal (to meet needs resulting from the existence of the Espargas airport) and at Ribeira Grande. Study is at present being given to hospital facilities needed for the treatment of tuberculosis.

^{126/} Idídio do Amaral: "Santiago de Cabo Verde", Memórias da Junta de Investigações do Ultramar (No. 48), Lisbon 1964, p. 318.

F. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

General

410. The two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe are situated in the Gulf of Biafra, west of the Republic of Gabon. Their total area is 964 square kilometres, and they lie between 1°44'N and 0°1'S latitude, and 6°28'EG and 7°28'EG longitude. São Tomé and Príncipe are volcanic islands. The area of São Tomé is 854 square kilometres; the area of Príncipe, which lies about 120 kilometres north of São Tomé, is 110 square kilometres.

411. According to the 1950 census, the population of São Tomé was 55,827 and that of Príncipe was 4,332, a total of 60,159. The provisional 1960 census figures give the total population as 63,485, of whom 58,880 were in São Tomé and 4,605 in Príncipe. In 1960, about 60 per cent of the population were considered to be "autoctone"; the remainder were from Portugal and other "national" territories, mainly Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, including 2,655 Europeans. The local (autoctone) population is of mixed origin; it includes descendents of the original settlers, elements from Gabon and other parts of the Guinea coast and "Angolares" from Angola.

Government and administration

412. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 São Tomé and Príncipe are considered to be a province of Portugal. Their Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,373).^{127/}

413. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory comprises two concelhos (São Tomé and Príncipe), which are divided into freguesias (parishes). The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of thirteen members, of whom three are ex officio, seven are elected by "organic" groups and three are elected directly.^{128/} There is also a Government Council whose main

^{127/} For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

^{128/} For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter VI, paras. 46-53.

function is to advise the Governor, which comprises the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, three ex officio members, and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the freguesias.

414. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. Electoral registers organized for the first time under the 1963 electoral law (Decree 45,408, 6 December) resulted in a 20 per cent increase in the number of people entitled to vote. However, no actual figures are available. For reference, it may be recalled that in the 1956 elections to the National Assembly only about 4,400 people voted, which was about one tenth of the population then listed as assimilated (A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 203).

415. In contrast to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Native Statute has never applied to São Tomé and Príncipe. Although since the end of the last century the local inhabitants have been considered Portuguese citizens governed by Portuguese civil law, at the 1950 census, two thirds of the population were classified as assimilated and one third as non-assimilated. Since the last census in 1960, no distinction is made between assimilated and non-assimilated persons.

Economic conditions

416. General. Plantation agriculture is the main economic activity and traditionally cocoa has been the most important export crop, followed now by coffee, copra, oil palm and coconuts. Because of the concentration on cash crops for export and because there are few industries, the Territory has to import most of its food (including wheat flour, rice, dried fish, sugar and maize) as well as manufactured goods such as textiles and tobacco.

417. In the last few years government policy has aimed at establishing the economy on a broader basis by introducing new crops and encouraging the development of fisheries and transforming industries.

418. External trade and payments. São Tomé and Príncipe have traditionally had a sizeable foreign trade surplus. In the peak years 1953 and 1954, when exports amounted to almost 250 million escudos, imports were only about half of that amount and the trade surplus exceeded 120 million escudos. However, by 1960 the surplus balance had dropped to 76 million escudos. Since then the trade balance has further

deteriorated. Over the period 1961-64, due to a continued drop in the quantity of the principal exports and to falling market prices, total exports averaged less than 160 million escudos annually. In 1965, the value of exports was 146 million escudos which left a trade surplus of only one million escudos, an all-time low.

419. The Territory's trade is now mostly within the escudo zone. Since 1961, Portugal's share in the Territory's trade has increased and in 1965 accounted for 48 per cent of its imports and 55 per cent of its exports. Angola supplied another 20 per cent of the Territory's imports, followed by the Netherlands (5 per cent), the Federal Republic of Germany (4 per cent), and the United Kingdom and the United States (3 per cent each). After Portugal, the Netherlands is the Territory's next most import client, taking 21 per cent of its exports in 1965.

420. São Tomé and Príncipe's balance of payments surplus increased from 15.8 million escudos in 1963 to 28.4 million escudos in 1964 and 34.7 million escudos in 1965. In 1965, the Territory's invisible receipts included private transfers (48.8 million escudos) and remittances to the Territory from the central Government for development (amounting to 31.3 million escudos).

421. Agriculture, forestry and livestock. Agricultural activity in São Tomé and Príncipe is concentrated in some 150 large companies which own 90 per cent of the cultivated land. Most of the export crops are grown on large plantations with paid labour which used to be recruited mainly from Angola. As a result of the changes introduced in labour recruitment in Angola and the 1962 Rural Labour Code, São Tomé and Príncipe has experienced a shortage of agricultural workers which has affected production. Part of the local population is engaged in small-scale farming but most of it is underemployed (see below).

422. In the period 1963-65, copra and coconuts accounted for an average of 92 per cent of the value of the annual exports. In 1965, cocoa accounted for 58 per cent, copra 24 per cent and coconuts about 10 per cent. Coffee exports dropped from 202 tons in 1963 to 168 tons in 1965, but the value rose from 4.8 to 5.6 million escudos. Palm oil exports, which had dropped about 12 per cent since 1963, amounted in 1965 to 871 tons, valued at 4.4 million escudos. In recent years the Territory has begun to export some quinquina and cinnamon, as well as bananas and pineapples.

423. The output of principal crops (in metric tons) for the period 1963-65 is shown in the table below:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cocoa</u>	<u>Copra</u>	<u>Bananas</u>	<u>Coconuts</u>	<u>Palm oil</u>	<u>Coffee</u>
1963	9,541	5,304	3,069	2,096	1,640	256
1964	7,995	6,001	4,926	1,813	1,371	196
1965	10,577	6,970	...	1,989	1,732	214

Source: Banco Nacional Ultramarino, S.A.R.L., Boletim Trimestral (No. 66/67), Lisbon, 1966.

424. The drop in the export price of cocoa from an average of 20,000 escudos per ton in 1955-58 to 10,000 escudos per ton in 1965 has seriously affected the economy of the Territory. Despite government measures to provide relief by reducing export duties and introducing new credit facilities, many companies were reported in 1966 to have transferred their operations to Angola.

425. In 1966, new legislation was introduced to regulate timber exploitation (Governor's Order 3,994, 28 April). Annual licences are now issued which in each case specify the quantities of timber that may be cut and exported. These regulations, however, do not apply to farmers who own less than 10 hectares of land.

426. Timber exports may be prohibited in order to assure the satisfactory supply of the local market. Minimum export prices are fixed by the Territory's Governor. A tax (taxa de exploração) varying from 20 to 50 escudos per cubic metre, is levied on timber for export.

427. Livestock are kept mainly for local consumption. In 1965 there were 4,459 hogs, 3,025 oxen, 2,652 sheep, 1,300 goats and 480 horses.

428. In 1963, it was estimated that only about 2,000 of the local population were employed on the plantations and some 20,000 were probably engaged in farming on their own account. In order to increase production and stimulate economic activity, the Government is encouraging the development of more small-scale farming by acquiring land from private owners and turning it over to individual small farmers. This scheme, which is estimated to cost about 70,000 escudos per family, is being financed out of the allocation of 30 million escudos for agriculture under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967.

429. The Government is also trying to encourage the permanent settlement of agricultural workers from other Territories. Under the labour legislation of 1948 (Decree 36,888, 28 May), the territorial Government is responsible for building

villages for workers who "in accordance with their background, appear to be able to become independent farmers". During the 1950's, the Government built two villages, Riba Santana and Neves, where workers have been provided with housing and plots for cultivation free of charge. In 1965, the Government decided to open these houses and the attached plots (terrenos) to individual ownership (Governor's Order 3,767, 6 May). The heads of family who so desire may purchase their houses and plots in monthly instalments over periods of up to ten years. Prices of houses and plots are fixed at 6,000 escudos for small properties, 7,200 escudos for medium properties, and 8,400 escudos for large properties. Those who do not want to purchase their houses and plots may stay on free of charge, provided they keep their houses in good condition and cultivate their plots.

430. Two government credit institutions have been created to provide loans for agricultural and livestock schemes: a fund for development of small agricultural and industrial undertakings (Fundo de Fomento de Pequenas Empresas Agrícolas e Industriais) and a special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito de São Tomé e Príncipe).

431. The fund for development of small enterprises was established in 1964 (Legislative Instrument 695, 24 September). The fund may itself purchase or guarantee the purchase of tools and equipment for agricultural and industrial schemes or provide loans for such activities. The maximum loan is 12,000 escudos (less than \$US500) repayable in 16 months at 2 per cent annual interest. For 1966 the fund's budgetary resources totalled 510,097 escudos (compared with 251,000 escudos in 1965). The special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito) was authorized in 1965 to provide loans for agriculture, livestock raising, industry (including mining and fishing), and building construction (including housing).^{129/}

432. In 1966 (Legislative Instrument 716), the Caixa was established on a provisional basis under the authority of the Governor, who may determine the credit policy to be adopted. Under its present regulations the Caixa grants short term loans of up to one year for the purpose of financing exports or purchase of supplies, such as fertilizers, insecticides, etc., by agricultural and industrial companies; medium term loans (up to eight years and 90 per cent of the value of the total investment) for development projects including the establishment of new plantations, purchase of equipment and cattle, irrigation, installation or remodeling of industrial units, purchase of boats and fishing equipment, and other investments, including mining; long-term loans (up to 20 years and 60 per cent of the value) for

^{129/} See A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 218.

the building of houses in São Tomé, Santo António do Príncipe and "classified" villages (vilas e povoações classificadas). The fund is to be financed from the Territory's own resources and by local savings.

433. There is also a special housing development fund for the low-income groups (Fundo de Fomento de Habitação para classes economicamente débeis). The fund may provide guarantees for the purchase of construction material, purchase directly construction material to be loaned, and it may build villages and urban housing projects. Guarantees and loans may be granted for families with a maximum annual income of 25,000 escudos. The maximum value of loans is 15,000 escudos.

434. Industry. Industrial activity in São Tomé and Príncipe is mainly limited to the processing of agricultural products. Apart from the extraction of palm oil and the processing of cocoa and coffee for export, there are a few small factories, including manufactures of soft drinks, soap, tiles and sawmills. Although no allocations were made to the industrial sector under the first and second national development plans, the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967 allocates 12 million escudos for the establishment of new industries, including three cocoa processing factories and three factories for the extraction of palm oil.

435. Mining. In February 1967 (Decree 47,549), exclusive rights were granted to a company to be formed by Mr. Manuel Rodrigues Lagos to prospect for petroleum, ozocerite, asphalt and natural gases. The terms of the concession are similar to those of the mining concessions in Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.^{130/} The concession area includes the total area of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe (except for a central area on São Tomé island) and their continental shelves. The exclusive prospecting rights are for three years and are extendable for another five years; the exploitation rights are granted for fifty years, extendable for another twenty years. The new company is to be organized under Portuguese law, and will have an initial capital of 30 million escudos which may be increased up to 100 million escudos. Ten per cent of the capital will be given to the Territory. The concessionaire will pay a surface rent of 350 escudos per square kilometre during the first three years, 500 escudos during the fourth and fifth years, 750 escudos during the sixth, seventh and eighth years, and 1,000 escudos from the ninth year on. When the exploitation of a deposit begins, the surface rent of the area

^{130/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, appendix, annex I.

demarcated for this exploitation becomes 1,000 escudos per square kilometre irrespective of how long the company has been prospecting. The company is required to invest a minimum of 30 million escudos during the initial period of the prospecting concession (three years), 30 million escudos during the first extension of this period (two years) and a minimum to be fixed by the Government (but not more than 30 million escudos) during the second extension (three years). The territorial Government will receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sales value and 50 per cent of the company's profits, and it will have the right to purchase up to 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. The company will pay 500,000 escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund when established; this amount is included in the minimum investments required. As in other similar contracts, the company is exempt from "duties, imposts or taxes, whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future". On imported equipment, the company will pay only the statistical tax of one per cent ad valorem and the stamp tax on customs clearance documents.

436. Fisheries. The development of fishing is a new trend in São Tomé and Príncipe. An industrial fishing centre is to be established in the Territory by fishing companies of Cape Verde. The first fleet of forty-three motor boats which will replace the fishing canoes, began operation in 1966. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 15 million escudos (8 per cent of the total) were allocated to fisheries development for the first time. Of this, 4 million escudos are for research and technical assistance, 2.5 million escudos for improvement of equipment and 8.5 million escudos for the organization of local supply. It is hoped that the fish available for local consumption will be sufficient to meet the needs now supplied by dried fish imports, which have to be paid for in other than local currency.

437. Transport and communications. The largest allocations under the various development plans for São Tomé and Príncipe have been for transport and communications. A total of 137 million escudos was allocated to transport and communications under the first two development plans. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 42.5 million escudos representing 24 per cent of the total is allocated to this sector. Of this total 30 million escudos are for roads, one million escudos for ports and navigation, 9 million escudos for air transport and airports, and 2.5 million escudos for telecommunications.

438. In 1964, the Territory had 323 kilometres of public roads to which there is being added a road linking the airport to the main town in Príncipe and a road around the island of São Tomé. Both roads were to have been completed in 1966.
439. The two principal harbours are Ana Chaves on São Tomé and Santo António on Príncipe. Shipping entering these harbours has averaged about one million tons annually since 1950. Up to 1964, port facilities at Ana Chaves could only handle 600 tons of cargo a day and ships drawing up to three metres, so that larger ships had to remain at sea while goods and passengers were ferried to land. In 1965, Ana Chaves facilities were being improved to accommodate larger ships.
440. There is an airport on São Tomé, an airfield at Porto Alegre (São Tomé island) and on Príncipe. The São Tomé airport is a strategic stopover between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique. It was completed in 1964 and can be used by jet planes in an emergency. It is jointly maintained and operated by funds from Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. Annual maintenance is 4 million escudos, of which Angola and Mozambique are each to pay 1.7 million escudos and São Tomé and Príncipe 600,000 escudos (see A/6300/Add.3 (part I), para. 213).
441. Public finance. São Tomé and Príncipe's annual ordinary budget increased from 57.2 million escudos in 1959 to 70 million escudos in 1963. The budget estimates for 1967 amount to 77.2 million escudos which represents a 10 per cent increase over 1963 and a 35 per cent increase over 1959. Export duties have been the main source of increased revenue. However, this increase has been partially offset by a drop in the revenues from various services. Other items have remained stable. Almost all the extraordinary budget is for financing development.
442. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide 9.4 million escudos for public debt servicing, 23.3 million escudos for general administration, including 6 million escudos (some 8 per cent of the total) for education and 8 million escudos (some 10 per cent of the total) for health.
443. Estimated expenditure on the Territory's armed services for 1967 amounts to 10.5 million escudos for the armed forces, including 7.4 million escudos for the army, 2.3 million escudos for the navy, and 846,000 escudos for the air force. The Territory's total share in these defence expenditures is 5.5 million escudos.
444. Development financing. Although between 1955 and 1964, a total of 305 million escudos was allocated to the Territory under the two national development plans, of the original 150 million escudos allocated under the first plan, only 60.8 million

escudos were actually spent. Under the second plan the original allocation of 155 million escudos was subsequently increased to 216.2 million escudos, and of this sum 213 million escudos were spent.

445. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, a total of 180 million escudos has been allocated for development projects in the Territory. As in the case of the other small Territories under Portuguese administration, the entire amount is to be financed from annual loans from Portugal at 4 per cent interest, repayable in twenty-four annual instalments after the fifth year (Decree 46,683, 3 December 1965).

446. Implementation of the Transitional Development Plan has also been slow. In 1965, for instance, an allocation of 55.4 million escudos was made for development (36 million escudos from Portugal and 19.4 million escudos brought forward from the unspent balance from the previous year) but only 33.6 million escudos were actually spent.

447. As has been noted above, the largest allocation under the Transitional Development Plan for São Tomé and Príncipe is for transport and communications, representing 42.5 per cent of the total. Allocations for agriculture, forestry and cattle raising amount to 30 million escudos (17 per cent); education and public welfare, 15 million escudos (8 per cent); and housing, 3 million escudos (1.6 per cent).

Educational conditions

448. The latest education statistics show that the total primary school enrolment in government and private schools rose by 15 per cent, from 4,992 in 1963 to 5,738 in 1964. These figures appear to indicate a new trend in the Government's education policy because, although the Territory has had compulsory primary education for many years, between 1950 and 1960, school enrolment increased only slightly more than 20 per cent, from 2,202 to 2,864. Further evidence of the Government's interest was the creation in 1965 of a territorial Department of Education.

449. According to the Government, in 1966 almost all the children of school age were enrolled in school and as a result it had become necessary to employ as teachers persons who did not have adequate training. In order to remedy this situation the Government has established special courses for training school monitors and teachers for school posts (Legislative Instrument 727, 3 February 1966). It was reported subsequently that enrolment in government primary schools alone was 6,000 at the beginning of the 1966-67 school year.

450. There are no recent school statistics. In 1964, the latest year for which such data are available, there were a total of 30 primary schools, of which 14 were government schools with 103 teachers and 4,370 pupils, and 16 were private schools with 30 teachers and 1,368 pupils. In addition there was one academic secondary school (liceu) with 35 teachers and 601 students, and an elementary vocational school with 7 teachers and 93 students. In 1965, a new technical elementary school was established and the Territory received from Portugal 250,000 escudos towards the building and equipment of an elementary agricultural school.

451. The Territory provides scholarships for university studies in Portugal. For the school year 1966-67, the budgetary allocation for various scholarships amounted to 86,000 escudos, compared with 151,500 for the previous year.

G. MACAU AND DEPENDENCIES

General

452. Macau is located on the south coast of China, on the west side of the Canton River. It is almost directly opposite Hong Kong, which is thirty-five miles away. The total area of the Territory is about 15.5 square kilometres comprising a peninsular area and two small islands, Taipa and Colowan.

453. Most of the population is Chinese but the exact number is not known. At the time of the 1960 census the resident population was 169,299 of whom about 8,000 were Portuguese. In 1966 the population was estimated to be between 250,000 and 300,000.

Government and administration

454. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Macau is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,377 of 22 November 1963.^{131/}

455. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Cape Verde (see paras. 369-370). The Territory comprises two concelhos; for the purpose of elections to the National Assembly, which last took place in 1965, the Territory constitutes one electoral district.

456. The Legislative Council, which was established for the first time under the 1963 Political and Administrative Statute, consists of twelve members, of whom three are ex officio, one is nominated by the Governor to represent the Chinese community, and eight are elected (three by direct suffrage and the other five by special interest groups). Macau is the only Territory in which there is a nominated member in the Legislative Council, probably because most of the Chinese would be excluded from standing for elections to the Council, since candidates must be "original" Portuguese citizens (cidadão português originário). There is also a Government Council similar to that in Cape Verde with the exception that one of the members has to be the president of the municipal council of Macau.

^{131/} For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

457. There is a municipal council in each of the two concelhos. The members of these councils are elected according to law with due representation of Chinese interests. The Governor may also nominate two members of the Chinese community to each council. There is no information on the last elections.

Status of the Territory

458. Portugal has always recognized and accepted the Chinese character of Macau and the role of the Portuguese administration has been mainly one of maintaining law and order. The Chinese population own and operate most of the businesses, schools and hospitals in the Territory. Even though the Portuguese Government claims that "the existence of Macau as a land subject to Portuguese sovereignty" is based on past treaties, the Portuguese realize, as Prime Minister Salazar said in 1961, that "if we leave the sphere of legality and take into account other factors, it is true that whatever resistance we might make, Macau would finally be absorbed by China, on which it depends in its daily life".^{132/}

459. The reality of this situation was underlined by developments since December 1966. The trouble began in November when Portuguese police used force to disband a group of Chinese who were purportedly attempting to build a school on Taipa without authorization. Early in December, when organized demonstrations were held to protest the official action, police opened fire, with the result that eight persons were killed and over 100 persons were wounded. Subsequently, the Macau Government imposed a curfew and called out troops (total strength estimated at some 3,000) armed with automatic weapons, who joined in patrolling the streets with squads of police similarly armed.

460. The riots were followed by further demonstrations and demands by local Chinese leaders. Among other conditions, the Portuguese authorities in Macau were asked to: apologize to the Chinese residents and the families of the victims; punish the four officials (the army commander, the police commandant and his deputy, and the acting administrator of Taipa Island) who were held responsible for the deaths which had occurred; pay compensation to the families of the victims; suppress the activities of groups supporting the Republic of China; and hand over seven Chinese held in the Territory who were accused of intelligence activities.

^{132/} Salazar, Oliveira. The Portuguese Overseas Territories and the United Nations Organization, speech delivered on 3 June 1961, Lisbon, 1961, page 7, quoted in A/AC.108/L.12, para. 8.

461. As the Portuguese authorities in Macau did not agree immediately to all the conditions, further demonstrations and unrest continued through December 1966 and part of January 1967. One of the main difficulties was reported to be the wording of a statement the Governor was asked to sign. Late in January some Macau residents began to take economic measures against the Portuguese, refusing to sell them food, boycotting Portuguese-run buses and refusing to pay taxes to the local government. It was also announced that water and electricity supplies to Portuguese residents would be cut off, but before this happened an agreement was reached at the end of January on the settlement of the incident.

462. In the agreement which was finally signed by the Governor, the Macau Government is reported to have "admitted the guilt" of the Portuguese officials in the eight deaths during the riots and it was acknowledged for the first time that the officials concerned had been sent back to Lisbon "for trial". In addition to apologizing to the eight families, the Macau Government agreed to pay hospital expenses and compensation totalling \$US360,000. It also agreed to turn back refugees entering the Territory, to put a stop to activities of groups in sympathy with the Republic of China, and to hand over the seven men who were accused of being political agents.

463. Since then various Chinese schools, trade unions and refugee centres have been given notice to close down. By the end of February several groups of refugees seeking asylum in Macau had been turned back to the authorities on the mainland of China (including one group of five persons on 10 February and a second group of nine refugees later in the same month). The Republic of China has filed several protests with the Portuguese Government over the new policy of returning mainland Chinese refugees. In February and again in April the Permanent Representative of the Republic of China to the United Nations addressed communications to the Secretary-General, with a request that they be circulated to all Member States, protesting that the return of refugees is contrary to international practice and in total disregard of human rights and specifically constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of "non-refoulement" embodied in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Portugal is a Contracting State.

464. Portugal rejects these charges. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General in March 1967, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Portugal

stated that the Portuguese Government "is certain that it has not violated any humanitarian principles nor shown any disrespect for international conventions". The communication went on to say that the measures taken were within the competence of any Government and were taken to prevent illicit activities by persons who styled themselves refugees but whose true purpose was to endanger the security of lives and property.

465. At the opening of the Legislative Council meeting in April (1967) the Governor noted that while the good understanding of the local population, both Chinese and Portuguese, had made it possible to settle the crisis, some changes would have to be introduced. He stressed that the Government's policy in Macau would continue to be a realistic one - as it had always been - based on good neighbourliness and that hostile acts against the People's Republic of China would not be permitted.

466. According to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (A/6311/Rev.1, paras. 162-165), there were 75,000 Chinese refugees in Macau at the beginning of 1965 and some 80,000 by the end of that year. In addition to assistance provided by local voluntary agencies the local government and the UNHCR also provided help to enable the refugees to become self-supporting.

467. In 1965, assistance provided by UNHCR amounted to \$US170,000. Of this sum, \$US65,000 was for building a causeway which provided employment for a large number of workers including a majority of refugees (including \$US10,000 for the extension of a refugee-rehabilitation centre); and \$US105,000 was given for the construction of housing. In 1966, UNHCR provided \$US184,000 which again included an allocation for \$US100,000 for the construction of 122 apartments. Another amount of \$US100,000 has been approved for 1967 to continue assistance to the local housing projects. In addition, \$US24,000 will be provided for the extension of a school and \$US21,000 out of a two-year allocation of \$US42,000 for vocational training, bringing the total 1967 allocation to \$US145,000.

Economic conditions

468. Because of its location, Macau's main economic asset is its harbour which in the past has made the Territory an important gateway for entrepôt trade with China. As there is little land available, agricultural activities are limited mainly to horticulture and the Territory is therefore dependent on imports from the mainland for almost all of its food. There is some fishing which is partly for local consumption.

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469. Since the early 1950's the economic structure of the Territory has gradually been undergoing a change as a result of new trends in trade movements and the growth of local manufacturing industries financed by Chinese capital. Tourism which has increased in the last few years is believed to have considerable potential. According to estimates made in 1964 of the Territory's gross national product the most important sectors were then, in order of importance, salaries and wages, small business (rendimento das empresas nao constituídas em sociedades), income from property, and government income from its private domain and enterprises (rendimento do estado proveniente do seu domínio privado e empresas).

470. Trade. As a result of the increase in the number of established industries, the value of the Territory's exports rose from about one third to approximately one half of the value of its total merchandise imports between 1960 and 1965.

Trade in gold has continued to play an important role in the economy of the Territory (it is reported that gold is taxed at the rate of \$US.04 per gram and that this source provides about one-sixth of the Territory's annual revenue); but whereas in 1960 the value of the gold traded exceeded that of the merchandise trade by about 20 per cent, in 1965 it was 20 per cent less, amounting to only 1,430 million escudos, compared with merchandise valued at 1,970 million escudos.

471. Unlike the African Territories under Portuguese administration, Macau's trade with Portugal is almost negligible, though its exports to Angola and Mozambique have substantially increased since 1961 with the gradual removal of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see paras. 40-45). In 1965, over 25 per cent of its total exports were traded within the escudo zone, of which 2.7 per cent went to Portugal and over 22 per cent went to other Territories, principally Angola and Mozambique. Macau has a particularly close trade relation with Hong Kong from which in an average year, it obtains about two thirds of its imports (776 million escudos out of a total of 1,205 million escudos in 1963) and which takes about one third of its exports (180 million escudos out of a total of 600 million escudos in 1963). However, since Hong Kong is also a transshipment point, these statistics probably conceal to some extent the true origin and destination of some of the merchandise trade.

472. Fishing. Fishing is one of the Territory's main economic activities, and a considerable number of the local population are fishermen. Most of the fishing

boats are now motorized and fuel for the boats is supplied by the port authorities at a special rate. The catch of fish increased from 7,336 tons in 1961 to 9,462 tons in 1965. About one third of the fish is consumed locally; the rest, which is exported, accounts on the average for about 13 per cent by value of the Territory's merchandise exports.

473. Industry. Macau has a wide range of light manufacturing industries, most of which, except for the manufacture of fireworks and matches, have been established since the early 1950's. In 1965, industrial production was valued at almost 500 million escudos, of which about 65 per cent was accounted for by furniture and another 15 per cent by non-metallic (mostly plastic) manufactures. Food, drink, tobacco, clothing, shoes and paper articles make up the rest of the industries. During 1965, thirty new industries were established, including two factories for the manufacture of non-alcoholic beverages (with a capital of 2.8 million escudos); one textile factory (capital, 1.1 million escudos); twenty-one clothing and footwear factories (with a combined capital of 2.1 million escudos); a leather factory (1 million escudos) and a chemical industry (550,000 escudos).

474. As in Angola, the present system of payments within the escudo zone (see paras. 46-53) has also created difficulties for traders in Macau. At the opening session of the Legislative Council in April 1967, the Governor said that the Government was aware of the situation and was trying to work out a solution which would at least make it possible for Macau to continue to trade with Angola and Mozambique.

475. Transport and communications. The Territory has two ports, an inner port located between Macau and Lapa and an outer port between Macau and the island of Taipa which has large modern wharves that serve hydroplanes and various ships. A separate harbour is used for the hydrofoil service between Hong Kong and Macau. However, large ships have to remain over one mile outside the harbour and their cargo is transported to land by barges.

476. Between 1960 and 1964 the number of ships visiting the Territory rose from 3,289 to 6,723 and the tonnage from just under 2 million tons to over 3 million tons. Slightly less than one third of the total allocations under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, will be spent on improving transport

and communications of the Territory, including dredging of the harbour, improving wharf facilities and acquiring eight hydrofoils for a new service to and from Hong Kong.

477. Public finance. During the past ten years Macau's ordinary budgetary expenditure has been rising by an average of about 20 per cent annually (from 91.5 million escudos in 1955 to 297 million escudos in 1964). Extraordinary expenditure, however, has fluctuated, dropping from 44.2 million escudos in 1955 to 12.4 million escudos in 1960 and rising to 39.6 million escudos in 1964. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide for a total ordinary and extraordinary expenditure of 257 million escudos (Macau Legislative Instrument No. 1,730, 31 December 1966). Of the total, less than 3 per cent is for education, about 7.3 per cent for public health, and about 9.3 per cent for public security police, the local PIDE force and the volunteer corps. In addition, 28.1 million escudos are allocated for the Territory's share in military expenditures including 26.9 million escudos for the Army (Order 22,453, 16 January 1967) and 1.2 million escudos for the Navy (Order 22,458, 16 January 1967). The entire military budget is to be paid out of the Territory's local resources and its contribution to the Overseas Defence Fund.^{133/}

478. Development financing. Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 300 million escudos was allocated to Macau: 120 million escudos under the first plan and 180 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated almost half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads and urbanization; town hygiene received the remaining allocations under the first plan and 12 per cent of the total under the second plan, which also allocated 30 per cent to development of resources and industries and 11 per cent to school buildings and hospitals.

479. According to official estimates from 1959 to 1962 planned investments amounted to 162.8 million escudos, but only 156.8 million escudos were authorized and, only 51.8 per cent of this amount (84.3 million escudos) was actually spent.^{134/}

^{133/} Only Angola and Mozambique are also responsible for the full share of the territorial military budgets; in all the other small Territories Portugal also bears a share of the cost.

^{134/} Portugal, Planeamento e Integração Económica, Boletim do Secretariado Técnico da Presidência do Conselho, October 1964, p. 37.

480. The pattern of investment under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, aims at: improvement of the electrical power and port facilities; improvement of health, education and housing and sanitation; creation of conditions to enable Macau to become a commercial entrepôt in the Orient for products from the escudo zone; development of tourism; and improvement of fishing, horticulture and aviculture. Of the 660 million escudos to be spent during the three-year period, about 30 per cent is for developing tourism, another 30 per cent for improvement of ports, harbours and transport and 24.5 per cent for housing and local improvement.

481. During 1966, several allocations were authorized under the Transitional Development Plan which included over 15 million escudos for housing and local improvements, 1.8 million escudos for transport and communications, about 1 million escudos for studies and surveys and 880,000 escudos for improving agriculture, irrigation and settlement.

Educational conditions

482. The Territory has two school systems, an official one similar to those in other Territories and a Chinese school system, financed and run by the Chinese community and in which more than half of the student body is enrolled. Although the primary education reform of 1964, which introduced compulsory primary education, has been extended to the Territory with modifications, school attendance is not a main problem, since already in 1962 over 90 per cent of the school-age children were enrolled in school. The greatest need has been to provide enough school buildings and teachers, but this has been met by private sources as, on the average, less than 3 per cent of the Territory's budget is for education supplemented by an approximately equal amount in subsidies to missions, while under the Transitional Development Plan 1965-1967 just over 1 per cent is allocated for this purpose.

483. The latest available school statistics (1964) show that out of a total enrolment of 56,104, 33,386 were in Chinese schools (27,890 in primary, 5,477 in secondary and 19 in special schools). Of the 22,718 pupils enrolled in the official school system, there were 3,415 in kindergarten; 13,796 in primary schools; 5,146 in secondary schools; 80 in higher secondary schools and 281 others including 133 in public service training courses. Over 90 per cent of the primary and secondary pupils were enrolled in private or missionary schools.

H. TIMOR AND DEPENDENCIES

General

484. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of Indonesia. It lies between 8°17'S and 10°22'S latitude and between 127°19'EG and 123°25'EG longitude. The western part of the island is part of the Republic of Indonesia. The eastern part, administered by Portugal, includes an area of about 18,990 square kilometres and comprises also the enclave of Oé-cussi (Ocússi) and Ambeno, the island of Atauro off the north coast and the small uninhabited island of Jacó off the extreme eastern tip.

485. According to the 1950 census, the population of Timor was 442,378 of whom 568 were persons of European origin, 2,022 mestiços, and 3,128 Chinese. There were 436,448 indigenous inhabitants, almost 98 per cent of whom (434,907) were listed as não civilizado. According to the 1960 preliminary census figures, the population was 517,079.

Government and administration

486. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Timor is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,378).^{135/}

487. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory, which in 1960 comprised one concelho (Díli) and nine circunscrições, is now divided into ten concelhos (Baucau, Bobanaro, Cova Lima, Díli, Ermera, Lautém, Manatulo, Same, Viqueque and Ainaro) and one circunscrição (Oé-cussi). Nevertheless, most of the rural areas are still organized as regadorias, implying a traditional form of administration by regedores. For purposes of elections to the National Assembly, the Territory constitutes one electoral district. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of fourteen members, of whom three are

^{135/} For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (part I) (A/5800/Rev.1), chapter V, paras. 17-73 and the subsection on the Territory.

ex officio, eight are elected by corporative groups and three are elected directly.^{136/}

There are no workers' or employees' interests represented. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, three ex officio members and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the regedorias.

488. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in the elections is not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

489. Elections to the local administrative bodies were held in November 1965. Local legislation enacted in 1965 (Order No. 3,703, 25 September) regulates elections of members to local administrative bodies, namely municipal councils in concelhos, municipal commissions in circunscrições, and local boards in administrative posts and parishes.^{137/} Elections to these bodies are henceforth to be held in November every four years. Candidates must be of age, be able to read and write in Portuguese, have lived in the electoral district over six months (the electoral district being the area under the jurisdiction of the administrative body) and in the Territory over three years, and not be an active civil servant. Aliens may be candidates if they have lived in the Territory at least five years; however, not more than one third of the membership of any administrative body may consist of aliens.

490. Legislation introduced in 1965 (Legislative Instrument 688, 8 May) fixed the salaries of regedores (chiefs of regedorias) and chefes de grupo de povoações (chiefs of group of villages). The salaries vary according to the number of taxpayers (imposto domiciliário, formerly called "native tax") under the jurisdiction of each chief. The regedores are classified into four basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 400 and 1,200 escudos. The chefes de grupo de povoações are classified into six basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 200 to 500 escudos. Those who are not included in the established echelons, as well as the chefes de povoação (village chiefs) are entitled to 3 per cent of

^{136/} For details on the composition of the Legislative Council see A/5800/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 223.

^{137/} For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see ibid., paras. 46-53.

499. Agriculture, forestry and livestock. Apart from coffee, rubber and coconuts, the Territory produces a wide range of food crops, including maize and rice, which are the two most important cereals, and sweet potatoes, beans, wheat, barley, ground nuts, cocoa, castor seeds, tobacco, bamboo, tea and tung (aleurites moluccana). There are no recent data available on the output of these crops.

500. Available information indicates that local production of food crops has not been able to meet the growing needs of domestic consumption. (The increased needs are partly due to the larger number of local troops mobilized and to the better diet provided to them.) To check rising prices, the Government in 1966 imposed fixed retail prices for locally produced food crops; however, as the prices fixed were so low, smaller amounts were offered for sale and, as noted above, the Territory had to import considerable quantities of potatoes (at a price differential of 2.4 escudos/kg.), maize (at a price differential of 4 escudos/kg.) and rice (at 3 escudos/kg.).

501. Although some export statistics are available, there is difficulty in ascertaining the actual situation due to wide discrepancies in the figures reported by the two principal government bodies concerned.^{139/} According to the customs services in 1964 and 1965 the average annual coffee exports were larger than in 1962 (2,400 tons compared with 1,860 tons); copra exports also rose slightly (1,550 tons compared with 1,401 tons); but rubber exports dropped. According to the same source, in terms of value, coffee accounted in 1965 for 83 per cent of the total visible exports, copra 9.2 per cent and rubber only 4.8 per cent.

502. There are only a few agricultural companies in Timor, which employ some 3,000 persons normally and some 6,000 persons during the coffee harvest. The traditional sector, however, accounts for most of the agricultural production.

503. Although Timor has valuable forests, most of these have not yet been exploited commercially. In the past, exports of sandalwood led to the destruction of some

^{139/} Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino, Boletim Trimestral, No. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966. According to the Commercial Banking Inspectorate, in 1964 and 1965 territorial exports amounted to 44 and 76 million escudos respectively while, according to the customs services, the corresponding figures were 53 and 55 million escudos respectively. The discrepancies are attributed in part to the use of "fiscal values" for customs purposes and possibly to different periods covered by the reports of the two agencies.

forests and further cutting was prohibited for many years. Though now permitted, exports of sandalwood are small. Since June 1966, Japanese have been surveying the forest resources and there are prospects for the establishment of a joint Portuguese-Japanese company for timber exploitation.

504. Livestock plays an important part in the economy of the Territory. In 1963 there were over 750,000 head of livestock, or about 1.3 head per inhabitant. In 1965, the livestock population comprised 226,650 goats, 225,257 hogs, 119,865 buffaloes, 94,396 horses, 47,760 sheep, and 36,213 oxen. The Government considers that the natural environment does not favour commercial cattle-raising, and assistance to improve livestock has been limited to development for local consumption and for agricultural work.

505. From 1953 to 1964, special allocations under the national development plans for the development of agriculture, livestock and forestry totalled 60 million escudos. This included 15 million escudos under the first plan and 45 million escudos under the second, but of the second allocation only about two thirds was spent. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on improving the productivity of traditional agriculture. The stated objective is to increase the production of food crops to meet the needs of the population by 1975 and at the same time to increase the production of export crops, such as coffee, copra, rubber, pepper, vanilla, fruits and green vegetables. Out of the total of 270 million escudos allocated for development expenditure during the period 1965-1967, 39 million escudos (14 per cent) are destined for these sectors.

506. In recent years, various measures have been introduced along the lines of those taken in Angola to encourage agriculture and European settlement. Early in 1965 (Timor, Order 3,521, 6 March) an Agriculture and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuário) was set up with an initial capital of 10 million escudos to provide medium and long-term loans for agriculture and livestock schemes. The Caixa is similar in structure and functions to those established in other Territories, but exceptionally it may grant loans for tax purposes. Early in 1967 the Caixa obtained a 10 million escudo loan from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino at 2.5 per cent interest per year for 10 years. This brings the total capital available for loans to 20 million escudos.

507. Land concession. In 1965, the Government extended to Timor (Ministerial Order 21,283, 11 May) the land concession legislation of 1961 (Decree 43,894) to

encourage agricultural development.^{140/} Thus, in Timor, land concessions may now be granted free of charge to settlers as well as to military personnel on indefinite leave (militares licenciados) even if they are not stationed in the Territory. In 1966, local legislation (Legislative Instrument 718, 7 May) was introduced regulating the enforcement of the land concession legislation in the Territory. The Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport is responsible for processing and regulating the land concessions. Under the 1961 legislation, the right to grant concessions is vested in the Governor, except for larger and more important concessions which are the responsibility of the Overseas Minister.^{141/}

508. Internal trade. As part of its plan to ensure that the maximum amount of local production reaches the domestic market, in 1965 the Government introduced new legislation regulating and limiting traders and trading stores. In urban areas stores are to be established in permanently constructed buildings (construção definitiva) which fulfil all legal hygiene requirements; in rural areas they may be built with local materials, but they must be torn down if and when so determined by the authorities. The itinerant purchase of agricultural crops is permitted only to traders who own a fixed trading establishment duly authorized by the Governor. All purchase of agricultural crops must be done in cash.

509. To facilitate price controls (see para. 500 above) and regulate trading of locally grown crops, in 1966 the Government established in Timor a system of local markets similar to those in Angola. There is no recent information on the results obtained.

510. Industries. Apart from the processing of rice for local consumption and of coffee for export, there are only a few small factories, which produce, among other things, soap, pottery and soft drinks. Under the Transitional Development Plan, the total planned investment in processing industries amounts to only 9.1 million escudos (3.4 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged for Timor). Priority is to be given to the following industries: pottery, rice, soft drinks, soap, alcohol,

^{140/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chapter V, annex II, paras. 10-38.

^{141/} For details of the land concession legislation see A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, annex II, paras. 58-155.

and ice, fruit juices, milling and freezing facilities for meat, vegetable oils (ground-nuts and copra), dairy products; soluble coffee and coffee roasting, hides and shoes, soda water, sausages, and caustic lime.

511. With a view to protecting local industries, especially tobacco, soft drinks, oil and soap manufactures, the Government in 1966 made it compulsory for local stores selling imported products to display equivalent local products, whenever available and to post their price and origin.

512. Mining. In September 1964, a mining concession was granted to the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho, Limitada. The company has an exclusive licence to prospect for copper, iron, manganese, magnetite and zirconium for an initial period of three years, renewable for two more years if all the terms of the contract are fulfilled (see A/6000/Rev.1, chapter V, para. 131). In 1965, the Governor of Timor authorized the company to start its prospecting activities in accordance with a plan approved by the Government. In order to make possible the appraisal of mining possibilities in the areas of the concession, the company was required to complete by August 1965 the following projects: (a) a study of the available documentation on the geological and mineral resources of the Territory; (b) establishment of administrative services at the office of the company in Díli; (c) establishment of an analysis laboratory in Díli; (d) intensive prospecting in the zones of Vemasse, Uato-Carbau and Subão Grange; (e) detailed topographical surveys of these same zones; and (f) a preliminary survey of the Ossú zone. No further information on these projects is available, but prospecting activities are continuing.

513. Although exclusive concessions for petroleum prospecting have been granted in the past (including, for instance, one in 1939 to the Companhia Ultramarina de Petróleos and one in 1947 to Carlos da Câmara Pinto Coelho), there is no information on new concessions. So far no large commercially exploitable deposits have been found, though small quantities are extracted at Suai for local use. Some petroleum also exists in the Manatuto concelho.

514. Under the Transitional Development Plan a sum of 6 million escudos (some 2 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged) was allocated to mining development.

515. Fisheries. Commercial fishing is not yet developed in the Territory. The catch is very small, and it is almost totally consumed at Díli, which has 10,753 inhabitants. The Transitional Development Plan envisages the expenditure of 10 million escudos (3.7 per cent of the total) on the development of fish culture

centres in the interior of the Territory, on improving the catch and on the provision of facilities for freezing or drying and salting fish for distribution inland.

516. Transport and communications. Timor has neither railroads nor inland water transport. In 1964 there were 1,941 kilometres of roads.

517. The only important port is at Díli, the capital of the Territory. The wharf facilities at Díli, which were built during the Second World War, were expanded under the first and second development plans. Traffic at the port of Díli declined from 158,000 tons entering the harbour in 1954 to 54,500 tons in 1960 and 22,167 tons in 1964. In 1965 a Díli Port Authority was established with responsibility for the administration, operation, maintenance and extension of the port of Díli and the development of trade with neighbouring countries, especially Macao.

518. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 100 million escudos, or 37 per cent of the total amount, is allocated to transport and communications. Of this amount, 20 million escudos are for the improvement of roads, including the construction of the roads between Díli and Suasi and between Díli and Baucau; 30 million escudos are for ports and maritime navigation, including the construction of four small ports on the south coast (Suasi, Betano, Beaco and Loré), two on the north coast (Baucau and Latém), one in the Ocússi-Ambeno enclave, and one on Ataúro Island; 45 million escudos are for airports and air transportation, including the construction of a 1,200-metre airstrip at Díli Airport, and improvements of the facilities of the airfields at Baucau, Ocússi, Ataúro and Con; and 5 million escudos are for the improvement of telecommunications, especially the connexions with Portugal and foreign countries.

519. Public finance. Although Timor ranks fourth in area among the Territories under Portuguese administration, its annual budget is among the lowest, being only a little larger than that of São Tomé and Príncipe, which have only 7 per cent of its area and one eighth of its population.

520. From 1956 to 1961 the Territory's annual ordinary budget increased less than 3 per cent, from 52.4 million escudos to 54.6 million escudos. Since 1962, when for the first time ordinary revenue and expenditure rose to 65 million escudos, the budget has continued the upward trend with actual revenue reaching 66.5 million escudos in 1963 and 75 million escudos in 1964 and actual expenditure reaching

62.5 million and 67.8 million escudos respectively. Although, in accordance with the established practice, the ordinary budget has usually provided for a surplus, exceptionally in 1966 no significant surplus was expected, ordinary revenue being estimated at 77.9 million escudos and expenditure at 77.8 million escudos.

521. On the other hand, the Territory's extraordinary budget, which mainly reflects development expenditures, rose by more than 220 per cent between 1959 and 1962 (from 19.7 million to 64.8 million escudos), but dropped to 53 million escudos in 1963 and just under 50 million escudos in 1964. Estimated extraordinary revenue and expenditure for 1966 were balanced at 51.6 million escudos.

522. For 1966, the total estimated expenditure on the armed forces for the Territory was 28.3 million escudos, of which the Territory's share was 5.1 million escudos, to be paid out of the ordinary revenue (some 6.5 per cent of the total ordinary budget), the remainder being paid by Portugal. For 1967, estimated military expenditure rose to 33.3 million escudos, but the amount to be paid by the Territory remained 5.1 million escudos. The territorial budget estimates for 1966 allocated 11.3 million escudos for public health services (14.5 per cent of the budget, compared with about 10 per cent in the early 1960's) and 3.2 million escudos for education (4.1 per cent).

523. Development financing. Under the previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 332 million escudos was allocated to Timor: 92 million escudos under the first plan and 240 million escudos under the second. Annual expenditures were, however, considerably below the allocations and by the end of 1962, for instance, only 80 per cent of the annual allocations under the second development plan had been spent (actual expenditure totalled only 154 million escudos, compared with an allocation of 190 million escudos. ^{142/}

524. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, a total investment of 270 million escudos is envisaged. The entire amount is to be financed by loans from the central Government of Portugal. The largest allocations are for transport and communications (100 million escudos or 37 per cent of the total). Allocations for education and public welfare amount to 40 million escudos (15 per cent of the

^{142/} "Análise Sintética da Execução do II Plano de Fomento no quadriénio 1959-1962 (Províncias Ultramarinas)", Planeamento e Integração Económica, October 1964.

total); agriculture, forestry and cattle-raising, 39 million escudos (14 per cent); and housing, 30 million escudos (approximately 11 per cent).

525. Although the Transitional Development Plan envisages an annual expenditure of 90 million escudos (which is more than double the allocations under the previous development plans) implementation has in fact been slow. Recent information^{143/} shows that although initial estimates for 1965 provided for a total investment of over 57 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan, actual funds committed amounted to only just over 36 million escudos. If continued at that rate, only slightly more than one third of the total investments will have been made by the end of the period of the plan.

Educational conditions

526. There are kindergartens at the religious missions and one at Díli (Portuguese Youth), but no figures are available regarding enrolment in recent years. There were 147 primary school classrooms,^{144/} which include the pre-primary classes for children whose native language is not Portuguese. Of the primary schools, 51 are government schools, 78 are Catholic mission schools, and 18 are Arabic and Chinese private schools. There were also primary classes conducted by the military units. In 1965-66, the total enrolment in primary schools was 18,488, which included 7,268 pupils in Catholic schools, 6,970 in government schools, 3,004 in schools run by the military and 1,246 in private schools. There were 450 primary teachers, of whom 155 were in Catholic schools, 120 in government schools, 100 in private schools, and 75 in military schools. The Catholic missions maintain primary boarding schools subsidized by the Government; pupils pay some tuition.

527. As of 1966 there was as yet no complementary primary school providing the 5th and 6th classes, although the elementary technical school at Díli (established under Decree 46,519, 4 September 1965) was expected to come into operation in the school year 1966-67. There is a preparatory technical school in Fuiloro which will be transferred to the new school of Díli. An agricultural elementary school is under construction at Fatu-Maca, near Baucau; this school is expected to begin its activities in October 1967.

^{143/} Portugal, Banco Nacional Ultramarino: Boletim Trimestral, Nos. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966, p. 109.

^{144/} The statistics do not show the actual number of schools, which may be full primary schools or school posts (postos escolares) with a limited number of classes.

528. There are also evening courses for illiterate adults at government schools and at those run by the military. No figures are available on these courses.

529. At the secondary level there is one government grammar school (liceu) and a private Luso-Chinese school at Díli. In 1965-66, there were a total of 671 secondary pupils: 562 pupils and 29 teachers at the government liceu and 109 pupils and 9 teachers at the Luso-Chinese school. There were also 54 students enrolled in the Catholic Seminary at Díli. In a speech delivered in 1966, the Governor of the Territory emphasized the importance of teaching the Portuguese language at the Chinese schools. The schools run by the military provide some courses at the secondary level.

530. According to official information^{145/} most of the teachers in primary schools and school posts were trained in Portugal, Angola and Mozambique, and formerly some were trained in "the Portuguese State of India". New teacher-training facilities established since 1965 include a training school for school post teachers and courses for school monitors (teachers of pre-primary classes). In the school year 1965-66, there were 60 students studying to be school post teachers in the first two classes of the four year course; there were 180 monitors in training in 1965 and 110 in 1966. Monthly salaries of school post instructors range from 1,000 escudos for those who have completed the first year of the monitor course to the maximum of 1,500 escudos for those who have been on the job for over 20 years with good reports from the inspecção (the school superintendence).

531. There are also training courses for public service personnel. The Health and Welfare Department has had training courses since 1947; by 1966 it had trained 9 nurses, 45 midwives, 281 assistant nurses, and 12 assistant pharmacists. In 1964, the Health and Welfare Department established a technical school; its initial enrolment was 58 students. In 1966, 16 public servants attended training courses at the Agriculture and Veterinary Department.

532. In 1965-66, seventeen scholarships (compared with 15 in 1964-65 and 7 in 1963-64) were granted for the completion of studies abroad. Allocations for scholarships in the local budget amounted to 65,500 escudos in 1963, 81,250 escudos in 1964 and 124,662 escudos in 1965.

533. Under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967, 21 million escudos are to be invested in the extension and improvement of school facilities.

^{145/} Portugal, Agência Geral do Ultramar: Panorama Actual e Perspectivas Futuras do Ensino na Província Portuguesa de Timor, Lisbon, 1966.

Labour

534. Although the Native Statute never applied to Timor, before 1961 the majority of the inhabitants of the Territory were designated as não-civilizados and were organized into regedorias; the local labour legislation was moreover patterned after the Native Labour Code of 1928 which applied to the African Territories under Portuguese administration. The Rural Labour Code of 1962 (Decree 44,309, 27 April) now applies also to Timor.

535. For rural labour and manual workers similarly classified, ^{146/} the local government has established minimum daily wage rates and determined conditions of employment, including the guarantee of food and lodgings on days of rest or holidays and extra pay for overtime work (Legislative Instrument 670, 28 November 1964).

536. For rural agricultural workers the established minimum daily wage rate is 6.60 escudos, of which 3.60 represent the actual wages, 3.00 escudos are for food. For agricultural workers under 18 years of age, the minimum daily wage is one escudo less, but the other entitlements are the same. For manual workers engaged in mining, industry and civil construction who are similarly classified as rural workers, the daily wage rate is 10 escudos in Dili, and 9 escudos elsewhere; if they are under 18 years of age the corresponding rates are 7 and 6 escudos respectively. A one-escudo clothing allowance is payable to workers with contracts for four months or more, and employers who do not provide officially approved lodgings have to pay an additional allowance for housing.

^{146/} Under the Rural Labour Code (for English text see: ILO Legislative Series July-August 1962) "rural worker" means any manual worker of unspecified trade engaged in activities connected with the farming of land and harvesting of produce, etc. In the absence of any special regulations, a worker "shall be placed on the same footing as a rural worker"... if his services involve no more than the performance of manual labour and the nature of such services does not place him in any class of salaried employee or specially skilled worker.

III. CONSIDERATION BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE^{147/}

Introduction

537. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 513th-518th, 524th, 526th, 532nd-534th, and 538th-541st meetings held in Africa between 30 May 1967 and 20 June 1967.

538. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (see annex I) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations in response to operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300 (part II), para. 619) and resolution 2184 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966.

539. During their stay in Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, members of the Special Committee were able, at the invitation of the organizations concerned, to visit camps and other facilities for refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In Kinshasa, they visited a reception centre, a hospital and school run by GRAE where they were enthusiastically received by several hundred refugees and met with teachers, doctors and others concerned with aid to refugees. In Dar es Salaam, members visited facilities run by FRELIMO, including a hospital and the Mozambique Institute which provides secondary and vocational (nurses aides) training at Dar es Salaam and conducts primary and other teaching programmes elsewhere. Also, during their stay in Kinshasa and in Kitwe, members of the Committee were able to examine weapons captured from the Portuguese armed forces in Angola, and to which reference was made by the petitioners in their statements.

A. Written petitions and hearings

540. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

147/ This section includes those portions of the statements made on the Territories under Portuguese administration in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the Committee's report. /...

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
<u>The Territories in general</u>	
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.695
<u>Angola</u>	
Mr. Marcus Kassanga, Minister of External Affairs, <u>Governo do Conselho do Povo Angolano no Exílio (GCPA)</u> ,	A/AC.109/PET.576
Mr. João Chisseva, Secretary-General, United States Section, <u>União Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.581
Mr. Pedro Simba Macasso, Prime Minister, <u>Gouvernement Provisoire des Révolutionnaires Fiotes en Exil (GPRFE)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.641
Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, <u>União Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.642
Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, <u>União Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.642/Add.1
Messrs. Henriques Tiago N'Zita, Secretary-General, and Henri Charles Tembo, Deputy Secretary, <u>Comité Révolutionnaire Cabindais (CRC)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.643
Messrs. François Lele, President, and François Kuta, Secretary-General, Nto-Bako-Angola Party	A/AC.109/PET.644
Messrs. François Lele, General Chairman, and François Kuta, Secretary-General, Nto-Bako-Angola Party	A/AC.109/PET.644/Add.1
Mr. Domingos da Silva, Vice-President, <u>Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.650
Mr. Luiz de Azevedo Junior, Member of the Executive Committee, <u>Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.1
Mr. Alfred Kgokong, Director of Publicity and Information, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC) on behalf of Mr. Agostinho Neto, President, <u>Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.2
Mr. A.P. Matondo, President, <u>Parti Progressiste Angolais (PPA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.651
Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, <u>Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais (UNTA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.652
Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, <u>Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.653

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
<u>Angola (continued)</u>	
Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, <u>Ligue Générale des Travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.654
Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General, <u>Ngwizani A Kongo</u>	A/AC.109/PET.655
Mr. Holden Roberto, President, <u>Gouvernement Révolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exil (GRAE)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.656
Mr. Antonio Mpululu	A/AC.109/PET.657
Mr. Noé Pedro, President, Jupa, Moerbeke Branch, Camp Beton	A/AC.109/PET.658
Mr. Tuwumo Emmanuel	A/AC.109/PET.659
Mr. Manuel Costa	A/AC.109/PET.660
Messrs. Emmanuel Tulengana, National Secretary, and Gracia Dongala, Vice-President, <u>Cartel des Nationalistes Angolais (CNA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.663
Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, <u>Centrale Nationale Angolaise, Confédération des Syndicats Libres Angolais (CSIA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.664
Mr. Pedro Raoul Malaquitas, President, <u>Union des Populations de l'Angola (UPA)</u> , Thysville	A/AC.109/PET.665
Mr. Ndonga Fernandes	A/AC.109/PET.666
Messrs. Henriques Nzita, Foreign Affairs, and Ranque Francque, President, <u>Front pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.667
Angolan People of the Makala Section of <u>Le Parti Démocratique de l'Angola (PDA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.668
Mr. Pedro Nocolas, President, Angolan Refugees of the Ozone Section, Kinshasa	A/AC.109/PET.669
Mr. Mayanda, President, Angolan Notables of the Kinshasa Section, <u>Parti Démocratique de l'Angola (PDA)</u> and <u>Union des Populations de l'Angola (UPA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.670
Mentale Section of the <u>Parti Démocratique de l'Angola (PDA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.671
Miss Therese Kisevesa, Angolan Women's Democratic Movement (MFDA)	A/AC.109/PET.672

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Document No.</u>
<u>Angola (continued)</u>	
"Angolan People of Lembart Rifflart and Májili Brasserie"	A/AC.109/PET.673
"The Assembly of Angolan Scouts and Guides"	A/AC.109/PET.674
Mr. André Kitabia	A/AC.109/PET.675
Miss Suzana Belina, President, Association of Angolan Women	A/AC.109/PET.676
Primary School Children of Angolan Refugees and other Groups	A/AC.109/PET.677
"Movement of Angolan Women Workers"	A/AC.109/PET.678
Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, <u>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.679
Mr. Jean Kiaka, President, Committee of Barumba Section, <u>Parti Démocratique de l'Angola (PDA)</u> , Kinshasa	A/AC.109/PET.683
President, <u>Union Nationale Etudiants Angolais (UNEA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.684
Secretary-General, <u>Mouvement Jeunes Ouvrières Angolaises (MJOA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.685
Mr. Lamvu Emmanuel Norman, President, <u>Comité de Bons Offices Angolais (CBOA)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.688
<u>Mozambique</u>	
Mr. P.J. Gumane, President, <u>Comité Révolutionário de Moçambique (COREMO)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.686
Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Secretary for External Affairs, <u>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.690
<u>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</u>	
Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General, <u>Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.661
Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, <u>Front de Lutte pour l'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée dite Portugaise (FLING)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.662
<u>São Tomé and Príncipe</u>	
Executive Committee, <u>Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP)</u>	A/AC.109/PET.682

541. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

<u>Petitioner</u>	<u>Meeting</u>
<u>Angola:</u>	
Mr. Holden Roberto, President, <u>Gouvernement Révolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exil (GRAE) (A/AC.109/PET.656)</u>	513th-514th
Messrs. Domingos da Silva, Vice-President, Mr. Lara Lucio, Executive Secretary, and Mr. Luís de Azevedo, Jr., member of the Executive Committee, <u>Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650 and Add.1)</u>	515th-516th
Mr. A.P. Matondo, President, <u>Parti Progressiste Angolais (PPA) (A/AC.109/PET.651)</u>	516th
Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, <u>Ligue Générale des Travailleurs Angolais (LGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.654)</u>	516th
Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, <u>Union Nationale des Travailleurs Angolais (UNTA) (A/AC.109/PET.652)</u>	517th
Mr. François Lele, President-General, <u>Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola (A/AC.109/PET.644 and Add.1)</u>	517th
Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, <u>Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.653)</u>	517th
Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector General of <u>Ngwizani a Kongo (Ngwizako) (A/AC.109/PET.655)</u>	517th
Mr. Emmanuel Tulengala, National Secretary, <u>Cartel des Nationalistes Angolais (CNA) (A/AC.109/PET.663)</u>	517th
Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, <u>Confédération des Syndicats Libres Angolais (CSLA) (A/AC.109/PET.664)</u>	518th
Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, <u>União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (A/AC.109/PET.679)</u>	524th
<u>Mozambique:</u>	
Mr. P.J. Gumane, President, Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET.686)	526th
Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Mr. Lourenço Mutaca, Secretary for Finance, and Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Organizing Secretary, FRELIMO	532nd-534th
<u>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea:</u>	
Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, <u>Front de Lutte pour l'Indépendance Nationale de la Guinée dite Portugaise (FLING) (A/AC.109/PET.662)</u>	518th

/...

Petitioners concerning Angola

542. Mr. Roberto, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement revolutionnaire de l'Angola en Exil (GRAE) said that despite the fact that the Portuguese periodically announced that it was ended and although 85,000 Portuguese troops were engaged in the tragic conflict, in reality, the armed struggle in Angola, now six years old, was still being waged and there was no longer any limit to the atrocities practised by the enemy. Napalm bombs continued to be dropped on civilians, poison gas was used and whole villages were burnt to ashes. Such was the situation which the Special Committee would have found had it visited the region controlled by the Angolan National Liberation Army (ALNA), which had an area of 250,000 square kilometres and a population of 400,000. He mentioned those few aspects of the Angolan people's daily life simply to place the tragedy in its proper context. In accepting their responsibilities, after having exhausted all peaceful means, the Angolan people had known the consequences of their decision and the immense sacrifices which they must bear.

543. Since 1966 the military operations conducted by the forces of the Angolan National Liberation Army had inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 523 Portuguese soldiers killed, 37 tanks destroyed, 2 helicopters and 1 aircraft shot down, 44 lorries destroyed, a large quantity of arms seized and 2 Portuguese soldiers captured. From the economic standpoint, the plantations and crops of the Portuguese settlers, a principal source of finance for the colonial war, continued to suffer attack by the Angolan forces and were confiscated and restored to the people. Contrary to the lies of the Portuguese, the war had never ceased in Angola and, despite the many United Nations resolutions, Portugal, calling its repressive activities a civilizing mission, had no intention of leaving Angola.

544. It was perhaps paradoxical to discuss self-determination with the Portuguese colonialists, since Salazar, who did not believe in democracy, had never taught them what it was. For Angolans, there was only one kind of self-determination, which implied the expression of the people's will, genuine freedom to manage their own affairs and freedom of choice - and they had made their choice abundantly clear by a cruel six-year fight for independence. But it implied the exact opposite for

the Portuguese. To Salazar, self-determination meant forcing the people to agree to a specific administrative system. To limit a people's choice to consenting to or accepting something already decided was tantamount to controlling that choice and thus to denying them in advance a free choice of the various possible solutions which could fundamentally affect their future. If the principle of self-determination was to be applied to the full, two essential factors must be taken into account.

First, the de facto separation of the Territories concerned from the metropolitan State - which was the case with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) - in the light of General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), and, secondly, the right of peoples to independence, as defined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

545. Those factors had emerged very clearly in all General Assembly debates, whether on the occasion when the right of peoples to self-determination had been proclaimed or in connexion with other colonial problems. The right to independence could not be divorced from the concept of self-determination, as defined during the General Assembly's thirteenth session in 1958, in the Fourth Committee's discussion of international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The idea of veiled or disguised integration which the Portuguese continued to advance had been specifically raised and condemned during that debate. It was an idea which the United Nations had categorically rejected, with the approval of all its Members - including Portugal's friends who had also had to assume responsibility for colonial Territories.

546. As to the reforms which the Portuguese Government frequently mentioned, Africans in general, and the Angolans in particular, were sufficiently on their guard not to allow themselves to be deceived by so-called reforms thought up by a colonial Power unwilling to show itself for what it was. Furthermore, the Angolan people had not taken up arms in order to reform colonialism. The Special Committee had itself stated in 1962 that it was not through Portuguese reforms that the situation in the African Territories under Portuguese domination could be improved and the problem solved, since what the people of those Territories wanted was independence, immediate and complete. The Special Committee's report on Angola in 1961 showed that the reforms announced by Portugal were basically designed to strengthen the political integration of Angola with that country, that the

Portuguese Government was maintaining its grasp on the Territory, militarily and politically, and was taking steps to increase its economic integration with Portugal, that it had undertaken no major political reforms and that, in particular, it had not created any representative political institutions composed of freely elected members in order to transfer power to the Angolan people. As far as GRAE was concerned, all possible arguments in that connexion had been finally disposed of when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and after the Security Council itself, in its resolution 180 (1963) had once again confirmed that the right of the peoples dominated by Portugal freely to decide on their own future should entail complete independence.

547. None of the provisions of the resolutions adopted, whether by the Security Council or the General Assembly, had yet been implemented by the Portuguese Government. In short, Portugal had in no way altered its position since then, in theory or in practice, and there were no grounds for believing that it was willing to do so.

548. Consequently, the colonial war was being intensified and military repression continued in Angola and other Portuguese colonies. The military forces in those Territories, most particularly in Angola, continued to be reinforced. No amnesty had been promulgated and no genuine provision had been made for political parties to operate freely in the Territories, as Security Council resolution 218 (1965) expressly demanded. Following various frontier incidents with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea and Senegal, the Portuguese colonialists had recently cut the Dilolo-Lobito railway in order to strangle the Congolese and Zambian economies. It would be recalled that in 1963 the Portuguese had also threatened to block the channel at the mouth of the Congo by sinking three boats full of cement at Santo Antonio de Zaire. That would have rendered unusable the Democratic Republic of the Congo's only outlet to the sea and established a veritable blockade of the country.

549. The situation resulting from Portugal's policy towards both the African people in its colonies and the neighbouring States thus seriously disturbed international peace and security.

550. It was impossible to avoid the conclusion that Portugal, an under-developed country with extremely slender resources, could only carry on a war through the assistance it received from NATO, which was also the reason for its obstinacy regarding the implementation of United Nations resolutions. That was not only inconsistent with the so-called free world's principles but also with any desire to maintain peace. He was forced to point out, for the benefit of all the Western countries, the NATO Powers, and particularly the United States of America, that the Angolan people would never forgive the fact that all the means of destruction employed against them came from the arsenals of the West. There were those who hoped to persuade the Angolan people that the NATO weapons delivered to the fascist Portuguese were not intended for the oppression of African peoples. It might be argued that the Atlantic Treaty, which enabled Portugal to maintain an army of 85,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozambique and 30,000 in Guinea (Bissau), was not directed against those Territories and their peoples. Unhappily, while that might be true according to the terms of the Treaty, the facts indicated otherwise. NATO weapons were actually used in Africa solely against colonized peoples. The 5 million Angolans would never agree that it was by chance that Western arms were used against them. The assurances which they had demanded must be reinforced by preventive measures. The Angolan people urged the United States of America to enforce the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, as provided for by Security Council resolution 218 (1965), and called on all concerned, including the Brazilian people whose Government had recently sent a naval squadron to visit Angola, to admit in their hearts that they were a party to the Angolan people's sufferings. He considered them accomplices to the abominable crimes perpetrated by Salazar's henchmen in Angola and elsewhere. They must alter their policy.

551. The Angolan people would not be satisfied by theoretical explanations. They called on the United Nations to condemn the odious arms traffic and the alliance harmful to peoples whose only desire was for freedom and peace. The Security Council should strengthen and supplement the measures already taken in order to make them fully effective. It was for the Council, as the body primarily responsible for international peace and security, to devise effective and efficient ways of persuading the Portuguese to adopt a sane attitude to their obligations

under the Charter, the principles contained therein and the right of peoples to self-determination and to respect the relevant United Nations resolutions as scrupulously as the situation demanded. For the time being, and while waiting for signs of understanding, the Angolan people would continue the war, which was a hard one and threatened to be long.

552. The members of the Committee had been able to visit the GRAE camps and also to see for themselves how much the Government in Exile was doing to help the refugees in regard to medical care and education for their children. They had been able to understand how great and acute were the problems facing the Service D'Assistance aux Réfugiés Angolais (SARA), which GRAE had set up to assist the ever-growing number of Angolans fleeing from Portuguese atrocities. There were more than 600,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo, who had been welcomed by their Congolese brothers from the very beginning. Land had been given to them all along the frontiers, where they had settled and started plantations. The problem did not end there, however; there were cases of sickness and refugees coming out of the bush, where they had sometimes been for two or three years, needed to be clothed. There was the additional problem of feeding those who had recently arrived and had not yet been able to settle themselves. Nor should it be forgotten that assistance was not only given on the frontiers; GRAE was trying to deal with the impoverished situation of the Angolan people in the liberated areas. As often as possible, it provided them with the means of survival, like the refugees. The same applied to the schools GRAE was operating inside Angola, which were maintained by contributions from Angolans, as were those it operated in Kinshasa.

553. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that Angola was the most valuable of all Portugal's colonies. There were almost 350,000 Portuguese settlers, working a subsoil infinitely richer than that of Mozambique or Guinea (Bissau). It was therefore only to be expected that the Portuguese Government should do everything possible, whatever the price, to retain Angola. On the other hand, to judge by its recent statements, it might agree to abandon Guinea (Bissau), where considerable investment was needed to obtain indifferent profits, and even Mozambique. The subsoil in Angola was extremely rich in iron, petroleum, diamonds, manganese, etc. These resources were extracted by companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, which were openly assisting

the Portuguese Government to maintain its grasp on Angola. He himself, while on a journey, had met a representative of the Krupp group, who, in confidence, had admitted that his cartel gave money to the Portuguese Government, ostensibly to improve the Angolan people's living standards. The following list of foreign companies and monopolies operating in Angola was the so-called list of the "300 families" who were helping to prolong the misery of the Angolan people.

Diamonds

Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa
Morgan Bank
The Oppenheimer Group
De Beers
Guggenheim
T.F. Ryan
Forminière
Guaranty Trust Bank
Société Générale de Belgique

Petroleum

Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétroles (Petrofina)
Chase National Bank
National City Bank of New York
Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

Transport

Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa
Westminster Bank
British South Africa Company
Cooper Brothers Company
The Angola Coaling Company
Tanganyike Concessions

Palm Oil

La Luinha, Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

Aluminium

Pechiney, shareholder in Alumínio Português (Angola)

Bauxite

Biliton Maatschappij

Mica

Standard Oil (represented in Angola by União Comercial de Automoveis)

Banking

Banque Belge d'Afrique (shareholder in the Banco Comercial de Angola)

Coffee

Banque Rallet et Cie (shareholder in the Companhia Agrícola de Cazengo and the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA))

Trade

Anglo-American Corporation (represented in Angola by the Sociedade Lusó-Americana)

Casa Americana

Devon Estates

Loanda Trading Company

Robert Hudson and Sons, La Luinha

Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

Sugar

Barton Mayhew and Co. (shareholder in the Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel)

Cotton

Société générale de Belgique (represented by the Companhia Geral dos Algodões)

Banque Belge d'Afrique

Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise

La Luinha

Société Agricole et Industrielle

Hydraulic Works

Hydrotechnic Corporation, New York

Marshall Aid Funds (loan of \$US25 million in 1951)

Mining Prospecting

E.J. Longyear Co., Minneapolis

Remina

Aero Service Corporation, Bethlehem Steel

Carbide

Mutual Security Agency (financed the Portuguese Government in 1952 with a loan of \$US1.3 million)

554. In 1963, a representative of one of those companies had approached him in New York to propose that GRAE should be given the money which, until then, had been paid to the Portuguese Government as a tax to support the war effort, which all firms operating in Angola were bound to pay. That approach had been motivated by the anxiety of the company's directors at the irreversible course of events, which made them doubt whether the Portuguese could remain in Angola.

555. Replying to questions about the activities of GRAE, the petitioner said that the total surface area of Angola was 1,246,700 square kilometres, and that the zone at present controlled by the National Liberation Army, 250,000 square kilometres, was therefore approximately one fifth of the whole Territory. It was not true, as Portugal claimed, that Portuguese troops were fighting on one front only, in the far north. There were at present three separate fronts. First, there was the front in the far north. A second front had later been opened on the north-east Angola-Congo frontier, with the rear base at Kasongo-Lunda (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The third front, relatively recent, was in the south, with the rear base in Katanga. It was therefore clear that, contrary to the claims of those criticizing the national liberation struggle, the fighting was spreading and would continue to spread. The area controlled by the ALNA was, and would remain, free. As the opportunity arose, the ALNA intensified its struggle with all the means at its disposal. In the other areas, the leaders of the movement had organized a system of mass mobilization led by political activists, whose task was to explain the reason for the action undertaken to the population. The political dangers were very great.

556. Regarding the organization of GRAE, he said that GRAE maintained both a military organization in Angola to assert its authority within the country and a system to enable refugees to escape. In each area there was a commander who was also in charge of the camp. He was assisted by an adjutant. There was also a political commissioner, an officer in charge of social services and population movements, and an information officer. The officer concerned with schools and hospitals worked in collaboration with the area commander.

557. In reply to a question concerning the treatment of prisoners by the Portuguese, the petitioner said that reports of the way in which the Portuguese authorities treated prisoners were extremely disturbing. Several escaped Angolan combatants reported that the Portuguese troops tortured their prisoners in an attempt to obtain information. They frequently killed them in cold blood. Prison conditions were inhuman. At GRAE headquarters, the members of the Committee could see women and men mutilated by the tortures inflicted on them. One escaped Angolan prisoner had returned to his brothers with his lips pierced and closed by a padlock.

558. Asked whether the bombings and military operations were confined to the liberated territories under GRAE control, the petitioner said that terrorist attacks were made from time to time in areas not under GRAE control and terrible repressions then followed. If those regions were accessible by land, the infantry intervened; otherwise, the Air Force conducted operations. The liberation movements were not of equal strength in all regions; but repression extended everywhere. It was mainly the forests that were bombed. It could be said that the territory as a whole was subjected to bombing, but the bombing was more intense in the areas under GRAE control. The refugees were forced to leave those areas, since they were destroyed and gutted by fire. When they could, they fled to the Congo.

559. In reply to a question, the petitioner informed the Committee that, in addition to the regular army of 85,000 men stationed in Angola, there was also a provincial civil defence organization. Weapons were distributed to everyone, including women. Further, in the Lunda area the British-run Angola Diamond Company had its own private army and employed foreign mercenaries. However, for the Portuguese, the most effective way of combatting subversion and terrorism was to populate heavily the areas inhabited by the whites, particularly with "soldier-settlers". The people received not only weapons but also directives. The prisoner in question had said that, in his area, the motto was: "A black on the road is a dead man", meaning that he would be killed instantly.

560. Asked whether there were any military experts not of Portuguese nationality at present active in Angola in any capacity, the petitioner said that he had been informed by prisoners that the head of the commandos was French and that soldiers

not of Portuguese origin were also stationed in Angola. The prisoners had been unable to say what country those soldiers had come from.

561. Replying to a question concerning the assistance Portugal received, the petitioner said the military budget was a heavy burden on a poor country like Portugal and was causing economic difficulties. Portugal, although a small Power, maintained over 150,000 soldiers in Africa. It was quite clear, however, that its Government did not have the resources to meet the needs of that army by itself. It was receiving assistance from NATO in the form of weapons, and even money. The United States had given \$20 million to the Portuguese Government for the improvement of its road network, but there was no doubt that the money had been diverted from its original purpose and used to finance the colonial war. Furthermore, Portugal had joined NATO and thus received arms, which were used to massacre those fighting in Angola. Arms had been provided by the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

562. Asked whether shipment of arms made in Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany continued, the petitioner said that only two or three weeks previously the Angolan free forces had captured a machine-gun with markings showing that it had come from Israel. Some officers had confirmed that they had seen machine-guns of the same type in the hands of the Katangese mercenaries. The weapon in question had been a very old one. It was the only weapon found which had come from Israel.

563. Elaborating on the assistance being received by Portugal, the petitioner said that he had heard of a man who had received eighteen months' military training as a parachutist in the Federal Republic of Germany, near Bonn. Funds were being supplied to Portugal, ostensibly to improve its infra-structure; in fact, however, those funds were being used for the purchase of arms and for the maintenance of the 150,000-man army stationed in Africa. Portugal's war needs were enormous, and it needed funds. Portugal was also receiving assistance from the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It was undeniable that Portugal was receiving assistance, since it was a poor, under-developed country and was only able to continue the repression because of the assistance it was receiving. He could state further that Portugal had received funds from

the United States for the alleged purpose of improving its road and highway system. That was an incontrovertible fact, because statements had been made by the Portuguese authorities on the subject.

564. Replying to a further question, the petitioner stated that much had been said about the solidarity between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories. An article entitled "The White Bastion in Southern Africa", which had been published in a semi-official Angolan newspaper, dealt with the co-operation between the NATO Powers and Portugal and the contacts existing between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. It clearly stated that the purpose of Portuguese activities in Africa was to defend the white man in southern Africa. It stated that nothing the Africans could do could destroy that fortress. There was a possibility that the Portuguese Government might seek to follow the Rhodesian example by giving "self-determination" to the white settlers of Angola. In a Portuguese newspaper the previous year he had read a statement by a Portuguese settler in Angola who was disturbed that after almost six years, the Portuguese Government, despite all its assurances, had proved unable to end a worsening conflict which was degenerating into massacres and killings. The settlers had added that if the Portuguese Government was not capable of waging war against the Angolan freedom fighters, the settlers would take things into their own hands and appeal to their Rhodesian brothers. It was by no means impossible that the Angolan settlers, following the example of the French extremists during the Algerian war, would combine with the army, organize an uprising, seize power and then secede and proclaim Angolan independence unilaterally. The gravity of the situation could not be overemphasized.

565. To the 85,000 Portuguese soldiers stationed in Angola should be added the 300,000-odd Portuguese settlers in the Territory, which meant that there were more than 400,000 white Portuguese now living in Angola. The policy of encouraging white settlement, begun in 1930, had forced the Africans to leave their land and settle 50 or 60 kilometres at least from their villages along the main roads (estradas). Thus prevented from cultivating their plantations, such "displaced persons" had been considered as unemployed and recruited by force to cultivate their own lands for the benefit of the new settlers. He had recently

seen a poster encouraging Portuguese soldiers to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government promising them plots of land in Angola after victory. The illustration showed the soldier-settler with a gun in his right hand and a machete in his left.

566. Replying to a question concerning refugees, the petitioner said that the total number of Angolan refugees was 627,350. There were two types of Angolans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: those who had emigrated, had been settled in the Congo for some time, and were now working and playing a part in the life of the country; and those who had fled after 1961 and were living in conditions of hardship. There were 45,000 refugees in Kinshasa, 500,000 in the Central Congo, 40,000 in the northernmost region, 7,000 in some other regions and 35,000 in Katanga. After the repression had begun, refugees had also come to the Congo from Cabinda. There was a general tendency to separate Cabinda from Angola, but in 1963 the United Nations had adopted a resolution including Cabinda in Angola. There were also some refugees in Zambia, but they were very few in number. The Special Committee would gain first-hand knowledge of the number of those refugees when it went to Zambia.

567. With regard to education, GRAE had received no assistance from UNESCO and that made its task more difficult. Nevertheless, that agency's failure to contribute was doubtless due to its anxiety not to take sides rather than to any deliberate intention of undermining action undertaken for the benefit of the Angolan people.

568. The schools maintained by GRAE were supported by the Angolans themselves. Since it was very difficult to obtain outside assistance, GRAE made the Angolans contribute to them. The Angolans could count on no one but themselves. Apart from the schools at Kinshasa and near the borders, there were some schools inside Angola which were supported by the Angolans.

569. With regard to aid to the Angolan refugees, GRAE was receiving assistance from some philanthropic organizations and from some Governments. For example, it was receiving medicines from the Indian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments. Some organizations like the Catholic Relief Services and the Protestant organization for aid to refugees were providing assistance independently of GRAE. Apart from a few scholarships, the Angolan refugees were receiving no direct assistance from the

United Nations. UNESCO granted scholarships to a few students. GRAE would have welcomed UNESCO co-operation. Unfortunately those students were compelled to leave the schools run by his organization and to go to subsidized schools in the Congo. In addition to UNESCO, Lovanium granted some scholarships to the refugees; GRAE would have preferred the assistance to be granted to the schools under its control and not to other schools. He had written to that effect to the official in New York responsible for granting scholarships and had been told that the students must apply directly to New York. The situation was much the same with regard to medical aid. The fact that Portugal was a member of most of the specialized agencies unquestionably meant that certain States would oppose any move conflicting with the interests of the colonial Power. To take only one example, in 1961, at the beginning of the Angolan people's fight for independence, the International Committee of the Red Cross had begun to give help to the refugees. It had withdrawn that support shortly afterwards, doubtless as a result of political pressure. At present, only philanthropic organizations were demonstrating their support for the struggling Angolan people by gifts of clothing, food, and so forth.

570. Mr. Lara Lucio, speaking on behalf of the Movimento Popular Para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA) stated that the ten-year-old movement had played a leading role in the fight of the Angolan people for their independence. Although MPLA was currently involved in a bloody war against the oppressors of the Angolan people, it was nevertheless devoted to the noble universal principles proclaimed by the United Nations. The Angolan people had been forced into war. Long before the bloody events which had started on 4 February 1961, many Angolan leaders had made dramatic appeals to the United Nations, in the hope that the Organization would intervene and bring the crimes of the Portuguese colonialists to an end. MPLA itself had sent an appeal to the States Members of the United Nations and, foreseeing the war which the colonialists had been hastily preparing, in a statement addressed to the Portuguese Government in 1960 it had laid the responsibility for the bloody consequences of its obstinacy on the shoulders of the Lisbon Government. It did not hold the Portuguese people responsible for the crimes of the régime in power and was ready to establish ties of friendship with all the peoples of the world, including the Portuguese people.

571. All the efforts of MPLA to arrive at a peaceful solution had met with blind intransigence. For over six years the colonialist army, rendered powerless by the mobility and effectiveness of the Angolan armed forces, had been committing all kinds of violence against the civilian population. The continual bombing of suspected resistance areas, the poisoning of crops, the cold-blooded liquidation of anyone suspected of nationalism, the increasing debasement of the Angolan people and the frantic exploitation of their wealth - those were the main characteristics of a doomed policy desperately aimed at surviving the radical changes of the modern world. The Portuguese régime persisted in its attempts to turn the clock back by emphasizing the myth of a "multiracial and pluri-continental community", which was completely meaningless.

572. Portugal allowed a certain measure of reform and some evolution, provided that it did not bring the myth of a pluri-continental and multiracial Portugal into question. The armed revolt of the Angolan people had forced the Portuguese administration to make a pretence of introducing reforms for the benefit of the Angolan population.

573. The features of colonialism, although they had been rendered slightly less severe for the sake of appearances, had been intensified in many respects. The Angolan people were still under foreign domination, they were still governed by Portuguese and all important matters were decided at Lisbon by the Portuguese authorities, which conveyed the decisions to the Governor-General, also a Portuguese, and to the administrative organs in Angola, headed by Portuguese. The pretence that there were local executive organs did not stand up to the most cursory scrutiny. The Angolans did not have the right to vote because voters had to know how to read and write and pay at least 200 escudos (\$7) in taxes and 95 per cent of the Angolan population was illiterate. Only three of the Legislative Council's thirty-six members could be considered Angolans. There had been no political freedom before the war but now anyone - even some settlers - who dared to criticize the Government was accused of high treason. The Angolans had even fewer fundamental freedoms than before, and recently ANANGOLA (Association des originaires de l'Angola) - which had already been under the direction of the colonial administration - had been found to be dangerous and obliged to disband. The special courts which tried those suspected of nationalism were at Lisbon, so as to avoid explosion of anger by Angolans during the trials.

The prisons of Luanda and the concentration camps at Bié and Roçadas could no longer hold all those whom the PIDE (Polícia Internacional da Defesa do Estado) considered to be a public danger. Many political prisoners were gaoled in Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands. The nationalist Angolan priests who had been deported to Portugal and the Protestant ministers who had survived the massacres of 1961 and 1962 were still not allowed to contact their congregations. 574. Although there had been some reform in the laws governing forced labour, it continued to be practised in Angola. That shameful but profitable practice was threatening the stability of the family and reducing the workers to slavery. The minimum wage laws were not observed and Angolan workers still could not form trade unions to press their claims.

575. The influx of Portuguese immigrants and particularly the authorities' campaign to encourage soldiers to settle in Angola and considerably increased the number of settlers to about 300,000. The continual increase in the number of settlers, in violation of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), was a factor in the impoverishment of the entire Angolan population, who were still being robbed of the best land and denied access to better paid employment because of competition from the poor immigrants. The competition encouraged discrimination in wages, since the African worker was often obliged to accept a quarter of the wages paid to a European for the same work.

576. An important question arose: who was paying for Portugal's war in Africa? Portugal levied a "defence tax" on companies whose profits exceeded 500,000 escudos, and the public debt now amounted to 32,000 million escudos (over \$1,000 million). However, it was foreign investors who were helping Portugal to meet its military expenses. They had been granted favourable terms in Angola by decree 46,312 of 28 April 1965 and now many financial groups - South African, West German, Spanish, Japanese, American, Dutch, Norwegian, British, Belgian, French, Italian and Swedish - were competing for licences to exploit the wealth of Angola put up for auction by the Portuguese Government. Instead of being used to raise the level of living of the Angolan people, the vast economic resources created by foreign investments in Angola served to strengthen Portugal's limited capacity to pay for the colonial war.

577. All who were contributing to that situation should therefore be roundly condemned. The United Nations General Assembly had realized that and consequently, in paragraph 4 of resolution 2184 (XXI), it condemned the activities of the financial interests which were exploiting the human and material resources of the Territories under Portuguese domination and preventing the people from exercising their legitimate right to freedom and independence. That was an important contribution by the United Nations to the Angolan people's fight for liberation. The financial interests currently involved in Angola were universally recognized to be the enemies of the independence of the people and therefore could not complain if they were the target of reprisals by the freedom fighters. The most regrettable fact was that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), like financial circles of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, was not implementing General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2107 (XX), and 2184 (XXI). The five loans totalling \$57,500,000 granted to Portuguese enterprises as at 25 November 1966 had also helped to swell the Portuguese military budget. The fact that the enterprises belonged to the private sector in no way invalidated that conclusion. The Portuguese military budget for 1967 provided for expenditure of the order of 8,000 million escudos (about \$300 million), or over 44 per cent of the State budget. For a country whose per capita income was the lowest in Europe, that represented an effort which could not be maintained for very long.

578. All aid, whether public or private, swelled the general Portuguese budget. Without aid, the Portuguese Government would be obliged to spend funds inside the country, which would prevent it from continuing the fight against the Angolan people. Thus, even if the assistance given to Portugal was not military in character, it still threatened the Angolan people's right to freedom.

579. It was common knowledge that some Powers were taking advantage of Portugal's need for aid. For instance, NATO in general and some of its members in particular were continuing to provide Portugal with the means to decimate the African peoples.

580. It was not true that weapons were being supplied to Portugal on condition that they would not be used in wars against the Africans. MPLA had salvaged several kinds of weapons made in Germany, the United States, Belgium and Israel, but none made in Portugal except, of course, ammunition and certain types of

grenade. Something must be done to make States Members of the United Nations undertake to comply with the numerous resolutions and appeals to stop supplying and selling to the Portuguese Government anything it needed to pursue the war against the colonized peoples. It was not enough to note that the Federal Republic of Germany had set up a military base in the Portuguese town of Beja, in exchange for very substantial financial and military assistance; or that the United States was also giving financial and military support in exchange for the facilities in the Azores; or that France - the same France which had understood in time the irreversible process of national independence - was supplying Portugal with helicopters and warships; it was not enough, in short, to draw up a black list of all those who were helping Portugal to prolong a war which it had already lost.

581. MPLA considered that only attitudes such as that recently adopted by Sweden - whose Minister for Foreign Affairs had unequivocally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, causing excitement in official Portuguese circles - helped to make Portugal understand that the only outcome of the war would be the victory of the patriotic forces.

582. In addition, Portugal's alliance with the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia posed a serious threat to the African peoples in southern Africa. Africa and the world could not stand aloof while the political, economic and military ties between those Powers grew steadily closer. The identical positions held by the inseparable partners in United Nations votes were well known. So were the affairs of the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd., the embryonic link between the economies of the Territories under Portuguese administration, South Africa and Rhodesia. In addition, two months previously, an official Portuguese source had announced joint manoeuvres by Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian firemen along the frontier between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Nobody had any doubt about the kind of fire which those makeshift firemen were meant to put out. The military nature of the visit to Lisbon in April 1967 by the South African Minister of Defence, Pieter Botha, his Chief of General Staff and the Commandant-General of the South African Armed Forces also aroused justifiable concern, which had been intensified by South Africa's recent defiance of the United Nations in connexion with South West Africa. MPLA hoped that the Special Committee would

work closely with the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid and not allow the United Nations to neglect that serious problem, which was indeed a threat to world peace.

583. Concern had also been aroused by the visit to Angola of four Brazilian warships - the cruisers Tamandaré and Barroso and the escort vessels Paraná and Pernambuco - with 2,000 men on board. The Brazilian Government had made such whole-hearted declarations of support for Portugal's policy that the African Ambassadors in Brazil had been constrained to protest. However, MPLA was sure that the brotherly solidarity between the Brazilian and the Angolan peoples would prevent the worst from happening.

584. MPLA had on several occasions described to the Special Committee the goals it was pursuing and the work it had done in the six years since its establishment. During 1966, MPLA had succeeded in implanting itself more firmly in some regions of the country which had not yet been able to organize resistance. For example, in May 1966 MPLA had opened the sizable eastern front, in the districts of Moxico and Cuando-Cubango. The size of that new front had alarmed the Portuguese General Staff and particularly the Minister of Defence, General Gomes de Araújo, who, on his return from an inspection tour in September 1966, had not concealed his pessimism. With the eastern front, which had rapidly been extended to the areas of Cazombo, Bundas and Sandando and along the Benguela railway, excellent prospects had been opened up for MPLA's armed struggle, particularly since there was a possibility of extending the front to the south and mid-west of Angola. On 12 December 1966, Le Monde had reported the Portuguese authorities' concern about the expansion of the war in Angola. According to that newspaper, an official Portuguese source had announced a considerable increase in the Portuguese forces in Angola. The same source had said that 50 per cent of the Portuguese troops in Africa were in Angola. In addition, during 1966 MPLA had been able considerably to strengthen the northern front, which now had a large number of better trained and better armed members, leading a population of tens of thousands in regions entirely controlled by patriots. There had been action on that front in the districts of Luanda, Kuanza Norte and Congo, particularly in the valley of the Dange and along the Luanda-Uige roadway. At the same time, on the Cabinda front, guerrilla activities had continued normally in the areas of Cacongo and Mayombe.

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585. In 1966, MPLA guerrillas had carried out over 2,000 missions. The enemy had lost at least 1,610 men, including some officers and non-commissioned officers. MPLA forces had destroyed six bridges, ten motor launches, three military aircraft, six barracks and over a hundred military vehicles. A large amount of equipment, including weapons, grenades, ammunition and medicaments, had been salvaged.

586. Very significant results had already been achieved in the first quarter of 1967 - the year in which MPLA's armed struggle would spread throughout the national territory.

587. There were very clear signs of a decline in the morale of the enemy troops. The general mobilization decree promulgated by the Portuguese Government in 1966 had already created considerable anxiety among the Portuguese population and soldiers. Compulsory military service had been fixed at a minimum of three years but could last as long as four years. Young people who were physically unfit for military service were no longer given an exemption; anyone could be called up until the age of forty-five. In addition, women had been taken on as volunteers in the Portuguese army for the first time. Following on the decree establishing provincial branches of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, the general mobilization showed how concerned the Portuguese Government was.

588. The violations of the frontiers of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also showed how much the military were on edge. The mutiny of Portuguese soldiers in some Angolan barracks, particularly at Huambo (Nova Lisboa) in December 1966, gave some idea of the disarray which, despite all appearances, reigned in the colonialists' ranks. Indeed, that disarray had been mentioned by Deputy Commander Cunha who, at a meeting of the Portuguese National Assembly in March 1967, had criticized the confusion which reigned in the various sectors of government activity. According to him, there was no co-ordination of Portuguese economic, political and military activities.

589. MPLA's activities were not only military. MPLA had embarked on an intensive political campaign to mobilize more forces in support of the sacred cause of Angolan independence. For that purpose it had participated in many international meetings, contributing to the study of a series of problems connected with Angola's fight for freedom and many other African and international

questions. At the Conférence des organisations nationalistes des colonies portugaises (CONCP), MPLA had also continued to co-ordinate its activities with progressive organizations in the other Portuguese colonies, such as PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP. MPLA welcomed the decision by the United Nations to organize an international seminar on apartheid, to be held shortly at Dar es Salaam, which MPLA would attend as an observer.

590. There was some misunderstanding about the district of Cabinda. MPLA wished first of all to emphasize Portugal's hold on certain people who were spreading confusion about that district of Angola. That was what the traitor Alexandre Taty was doing; with a handful of irresponsible men, he was copying the role played by the harkis during the Algerian war, arousing the indignation of the entire oppressed population of the district. MPLA respected the specific course taken by the history of the Kingdoms of Ngoyo and Kakongo and the Realm of Mayombe before the Conference of Berlin in 1885 which, in the arbitrary manner adopted for other regions, had integrated those territories with the others that made up Angola today. MPLA considered that, once all Africa was free, the African countries would be able to remedy the evils caused by the arbitrary demarcation of 1885, as part of their efforts to achieve African unity. In that connexion, MPLA fully endorsed the principles defended by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with regard to existing frontiers. It therefore considered that the region of Cabinda was at present part of Angola and was suffering like the rest of the country from Portuguese colonial oppression. That was why MPLA was fighting, weapons in hand, in Cabinda, as it was at Nambuangongo, Moxico and throughout Angola. That was why MPLA was fighting for true national unity against regionalism and tribalism.

591. The important problem of the Angolan refugees was a matter of serious concern to MPLA, which was continually using the material and human resources that could be spared from the war of liberation to assist the Angolan refugees. The problem was very complex and MPLA had made some suggestions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in two documents: one on the education of the Angolan refugees and one on general aspects of the Angolan refugee problem (see paragraph 596 below). The latter document had been prepared for the seventeenth session of the Executive Committee on the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, held at Geneva on 22 May 1967.

592. The attention of the Special Committee was drawn to those two documents, which reflected the opinion of a group fighting to solve the social problems of the Angolan people. They described MPLA's efforts to provide the refugees with medical and educational assistance and the difficulties which were preventing a more rapid expansion of that assistance. They showed the results of the school experiments and the reasons why the results of the training programme for the Territories under Portuguese domination outlined in General Assembly resolution 2108 (XX) were unsatisfactory, contained MPLA's suggestions for improving it and described the method used to meet the need for intermediate, secondary and vocational education. The collaboration and material assistance of agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, the ILO, UNDP and FAO would be extremely useful.

593. Generally speaking, MPLA encountered prejudice because it was a liberation movement, with which international agencies were afraid to get involved, even in purely social matters, despite the principle approved in the resolution adopted on 28 June 1966 (A/6300 (part II), para. 619.) of "co-operation with the liberation movement of all the Territories under colonial domination" in connexion with programmes of assistance to refugees.

594. That was one matter in which MPLA wanted to enlist the co-operation of the Special Committee: the specialized agencies could co-operate openly with the national liberation movements which submitted sound social welfare (cultural, medical, etc.) programmes. MPLA had every reason to believe that the Special Committee would make even greater efforts to persuade the Portuguese Government to abandon its criminal attitude and would do its utmost to make the struggle more effective until the Angolan people triumphed. The Committee should urge Angola's neighbours, who were still hesitant, to grant MPLA the freedom of action it needed to expedite the routing of supplies to its fighters, particularly those hundreds of kilometres away from the frontiers. Such backing of MPLA would be one of the strongest weapons against the aggressive scheming of the Salazar-Vorster-Smith alliance in southern Africa.

595. In conclusion, he invited the members of the Committee to go and see the military and social activities of MPLA inside Angola and at the frontier zones - in the Congo (Brazzaville) and in Zambia.

596. The two documents referred to by the petitioner in paragraph 592 above are reproduced below.

"(a) Statement of MPLA views on the education
of Angolan refugees

"(1) The peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese administration could not but be moved by the resolutions which the United Nations has adopted since 1961 with a view to inducing Portugal to comply with the United Nations Charter by respecting the legitimate aspirations of these peoples for freedom and independence. By adopting resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolutions 1807 (XVII), 1819 (XVII), 1913 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX), the United Nations established a point of departure for concerted action to accelerate the demantling of the Portuguese under colonial domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

"(2) More effective action to liberate the peoples of these Territories was not initiated until the United Nations established a special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration (resolutions 1808 (XVII), 1973 (XVIII) and 2108 (XX)). Under this programme, numerous countries offered fellowships for victims of Portuguese colonial oppression. Furthermore, in order to assist the refugees from these Territories, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees instituted measures to facilitate their adaptation to a new way of life by providing them with work or a minimum of education.

"(3) Since its establishment in 1956, the Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola (MPLA) has been very active in the field of education. Long before the armed struggle began, MPLA had established clandestine schools in the towns and villages of Angola, and despite constant persecution by the police, these were never altogether suppressed. At the present time, too, MPLA is trying to provide educational as well as medical assistance for the refugees. It therefore wishes to express its views on the matter to all the specialized agencies dealing with these questions. Indeed, it has a duty and a right to do so in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the resolution which was adopted on 22 June 1966 (A/6300 (part II), para. 619) by the Special Committee and which requests:

'... the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories...'

In any case, the views of the liberation movements of the Territories under Portuguese domination are helping the United Nations and the specialized agencies to prepare aid programmes adapted to the conditions and particular circumstances of each recipient people and of the countries of asylum.

"(4) Education programmes for our peoples are particularly important, as education is a matter which the colonial administration always treated with scorn. Everyone knows that the illiteracy rate in countries under Portuguese domination averages 98 per cent. The present state of war has obliged the administering Power to announce an increase in the number of schools, which, in fact, continue to serve the interests of the settlers. Consideration must also be given to the ever-increasing number of Angolan refugees living in neighbouring countries who are destitute. MPLA believes that the education programmes of the United Nations, voluntary agencies and liberation movements should be analysed and adapted to the actual needs of the peoples for whom they are intended, having in mind that these peoples will be reintegrated in their own countries once they become independent.

"(5) MPLA, for its part, has accepted direct offers of fellowships from relief organizations in Africa, Europe and America, and has sent more than 200 young people abroad for technical and higher training. For some years, too, it has tried to provide primary education - in Portuguese - along the frontiers with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo. More than a thousand pupils have attended these 'improvised' schools. After the prohibition of MPLA activities at Leopoldville (September 1963), educational activities were transferred to Congo (Brazzaville) where a better-organized MPLA school service has been established. Reading and writing primers have been produced and readers for the more advanced classes are now in the preparation. On the basis of the experience acquired, it is possible once again to envisage the extension of primary education to Angolan refugees in all countries bordering on Angola.

"(6) A very careful analysis should be undertaken now to ensure that future education programmes for the Angolan people (the present programmes are only for Angolan refugees) are properly oriented from the very outset. Fellowships alone cannot produce the desired results. Students receiving fellowships have to learn a foreign language; the majority of the candidates do not have an adequate basic education; the planning of courses is often ill-adapted to the real needs of the student's country of origin; and the very different conditions and standards of living in the countries of study produce an unfavourable reaction when the students return home. Furthermore, there are at present no facilities for secondary education, and the efforts being made in regard to primary education are quite inadequate, as there is no special programme to support them. Lastly, there is the difficult problem of the method to be used for launching a comprehensive programme that would make use of all the kinds of assistance which are available for educational purposes. The question here is whether refugee education should be integrated with the programmes of the host country.

"(7) MPLA does not, unfortunately, claim to have found the key to these problems, but it does feel that it should help in trying to solve them. It believes that the main effort should be concentrated on basic education at the primary, secondary and technical levels. For secondary education, there could be an accelerated programme leading to higher education. UNESCO might

be asked to prepare secondary education programmes with special emphasis on science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, biology). One foreign language (French or English) would be compulsory. After three or four years of secondary education, students could apply for admission to higher educational institutions in the various countries collaborating in the implementation of the programmes. A primary education programme could also be prepared, with the minimum periods of schooling to be determined later. All organizations dealing with primary education for refugees would be expected to follow these programmes, the preparation of which would be entrusted to UNESCO working in conjunction with the education departments of the liberation movements.

"(8) Furthermore, MPLA believes that education in these categories (secondary and primary) should be given in Portuguese. There are several reasons for this choice, including the following:

(i) As English is spoken in some of the countries bordering on Angola, and French in others, Angolans would otherwise receive their primary or secondary education in different languages, depending on the country of asylum. The programmes in each host country would also be different.

(ii) The host countries have no room in their schools owing to the increasing influx of students after independence, which put an end to the limited schooling facilities of the colonial era. They would therefore find it difficult to accommodate refugee children as well.

(iii) The situation of the refugees is still uncertain, in spite of all the measures taken to integrate them in a new society. Most refugees want to return home, and their country needs them. It would seem, therefore, that any education programme should be based on the principle that it will be continued in an independent Angola, where the official language is not likely to be French or English.

There are other problems, too, such as the choice of suitable sites for secondary schools, when these are established. This too will call for discussions with the authorities of the host countries.

"(9) The implementation of resolution 1808 (XVII) seems to be the responsibility of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, supported by the United Nations Development Programme. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for several refugee aid programmes dealing with education, particularly primary education. Up to now, UNESCO has not been involved in these programmes. However, of all the international agencies concerned, UNESCO seems to be best equipped for ensuring the success of the combined efforts which the international community is making to provide education for our peoples. Its long experience in basic education, its experts, its professors and teachers, combined with its vast network of permanent missions and first-class technical resources - all these assets could well be mobilized on behalf of the refugees from the countries under Portuguese domination.

UNESCO itself has taken a step in this direction by authorizing its Director-General to 'co-operate fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the High Commissioner for Refugees in the planning and execution of any joint programme of assistance that may be undertaken... for the benefit of refugees from southern Africa with a view to enabling them to receive the education best suited to their needs'. In addition, provision has been made for a UNESCO official to collaborate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (item 249 of the draft programme and budget).

"(10) These considerations lead MPLA to suggest that a meeting of representatives of the countries bordering on the countries under Portuguese domination, and of representatives of UNHCR, UNESCO and the liberation movements of the countries concerned, should be convened as soon as possible to undertake a detailed study of all the problems involved in the successful implementation of the education programmes, and of ways of solving them. A meeting of this kind, which could be held under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, would make it possible for all the parties concerned to co-ordinate their efforts for the voluntary funds to be distributed in an equitable manner and for an effective structure to be set up in order to provide education - without which freedom would be a mere illusion - for the peoples still under colonial domination.

"(b) Contribution of MPLA to the study of
the Angolan refugee problem

"(Prepared for the seventeenth session of the
Executive Committee of the Programme of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)

"Introduction

"No one today questions the legitimacy of the struggle for freedom by peoples who are still subject to colonial oppression. Portugal, almost alone on the African continent, still refuses, however, to comply with the universally recognized principles and has even resorted to war as a means of prolonging its shameless exploitation of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and the islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe.

"Nearly all States Members of the United Nations have repeatedly protested against Portugal's refusal to yield to the aspirations of the peoples of the Territories under its domination.

"The United Nations resolutions on the Territories under Portuguese administration have become increasingly sharp in tone. Their intention is to give the oppressed peoples, whose right to express their views has at least already been recognized, an international personality. The participation of petitioners in some of the proceedings of the United Nations has proved to be a valuable aid to the United Nations in the discharge of the functions it has assumed in the matter of decolonization.

"Furthermore, the periodic visits made by the Special Committee for the sole purpose of obtaining from the representatives of the peoples struggling for their independence the information required for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) confirm the value of the contribution which these representatives are making to the work of the United Nations.

"Also, in regard at least to the refugee aid programmes, the United Nations has already recognized the principle of 'co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination', to which reference is made in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300 (part II), para. 619).

"In the light of these principles, MPLA believes that it has a duty to contribute to the work of the international agencies whose activities directly affect the Angolan refugees in all fields.

"It has therefore decided to address this contribution to the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, and requests the officers of the Executive Committee to arrange for it to be circulated as a working paper during the session.

"The refugees

"After the Angolan people had taken up arms to challenge the Portuguese colonialist administration in February 1961 and the villages and countryside had been savagely bombed, thousands of Angolans crossed the frontiers of neighbouring countries in order to wait there until the time came to return to their country and resume their normal life.

"The main flow of refugees was into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), and particularly into the Lower Congo provinces. Other refugees went to Katanga, the Republic of Zambia, and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

"Although it has always been difficult to provide even a rough estimate of the number of refugees, information provided by non-official sources indicates that at the end of 1966 the figures were as follows:

Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	- more than	400,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of Zambia	- about	4,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville)	- about	20,000.

"Aid to refugees

"The influx of Angolan refugees soon attracted world attention. The relief organizations which tried to provide assistance for the refugees in the Congo (Kinshasa) encountered many difficulties - not least among them, the political instability in the country itself.

"MPLA was the first Angolan political organization which decided to make an active contribution to the aid operations for Angolan refugees. It set up a relief organization - the Angolan voluntary corps for assistance to refugees (CVAAR) - which succeeded in channelling to the refugees a large proportion of the international aid provided.

"Philanthropic organizations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Kingdom of Morocco, the United Kingdom, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the USSR, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Italy, as well as certain United States philanthropic organizations with offices at Kinshasa, provided CVAAR with gifts of food-stuffs, drugs, clothing and even equipment and cash.

"With this assistance, CVAAR was able to set up a vast network of dispensaries and schools along the Congo-Angola frontier. This was undoubtedly the main refugee aid network in the Congo (Kinshasa) during 1962 and 1963, and it was destined to become the backbone of aid operations which - even at that time - included the distribution of food, vaccination campaigns, disease diagnosis campaigns, education campaigns, etc.

"This network consisted of more than twenty dispensaries and school posts situated all along the frontier from the province of Kwango as far as the coast, and extending to the frontier of the Cabinda district. It was directed by a team of Angolan doctors, nurses and teachers. In addition to the central dispensary at Kinshasa, there was a dispensary and - in most cases - a school at other frontier localities such as Kimpangu, Lukala, Boma, Kimwenza, Matadi, Kipindi, Kindopolo, Tumbamani, Kahemba, Boko, Malele, Songololo, Moerbeke, Lufu, Kimongo, Luali, Mbata Manga, Nganda Binda, Iloupanga and Banga.

"CVAAR was also having some success with a programme for the distribution of agricultural requirements (hoes and seeds) so that crops would be grown to make up for the shortage of food-stuffs.

"Although CVAAR did not receive any contribution from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, this United Nations body was of course helping Angolan refugees, particularly by its contribution to certain projects undertaken by humanitarian organizations such as the Congo Protestant Relief Agency, Caritas-Congo, the Congolese Red Cross, the Baptist Missionary Society, etc.

"In September 1963, following the unilateral recognition by former Prime Minister Adoula of a self-styled Angolan government in exile, the network of dispensaries maintained by CVAAR in the Congo (Kinshasa) was paralysed, with regrettable results for the refugee population, which was thus deprived of one of its most effective sources of aid.

"In 1966, CVAAR was authorized to resume its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two dispensaries for refugees were immediately opened, one at Kinshasa and the other at Songololo (on the frontier). Unfortunately, it has been difficult to do any useful work there, owing to the acts of pillage and banditry committed by representatives of the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile with the connivance of some of the local authorities. Only a short time ago, these persons broke into the CVAAR dispensary at Songololo, looted the drugs and kidnapped the male nurses on duty there. One of these nurses is missing (believed murdered), while the other two are detained with a few dozen other Angolans in the Congolese village of Kinkuzu, in a camp which the Congolese Government made available to the head of the self-styled government in exile in 1962.

"It seems that the political motives which have obstructed CVAAR action on behalf of the Angolan refugees have also had a direct or indirect effect on UNHCR action. The UNHCR programmes have not, of course, been suspended, but they have suffered - at least to outward appearances - from a certain stagnation. This apparent stagnation may be due partly to the success of certain programmes to integrate groups of peasants into the new conditions of the country of asylum. It is well known, on the other hand, that UNHCR has had some difficulty in finding agents to carry out larger-scale aid programmes for the Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"This explains the differences between the amount of funds allocated for programmes on behalf of Angolan refugees in the Congo, and those earmarked for refugees from Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and the Angolan refugees in other countries (to mention only the refugees from countries under Portuguese colonial domination).

"According to the note by the Secretariat on the question of refugees (A/AC.109/L.293 and Add.1), the number of refugees at the end of 1965 from the Territories under Portuguese colonial domination was estimated as follows:

Angola	220,000 refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mozambique	12,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania
Guinea (under Portuguese administration . .	30,000 refugees in the Republic of Senegal.

"For Angola, at least, the figure given is certainly too small. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo put the number of Angolan refugees at 600,000, while other sources gave a figure of 379,000 for 1965. These estimates, in spite of their tentative character, give some idea of the difficulties encountered in providing extensive assistance to the great mass of Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"In 1965, UNHCR allocations for the three countries under Portuguese colonial domination were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293, annex):

for refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:	\$US15,000
for refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania:	\$US213,000
for refugees from Guinea (Bissau) in Senegal:	\$US108,170.

"In 1966 they were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293):

for refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:	\$US15,000
for refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania:	\$US192,550
for refugees from Guinea (Bissau) in Senegal:	\$US260,000.

"In October 1966, the steady increase in the number of Angolan refugees in Zambia, which was rapidly approaching the figure of 4,000, prompted UNHCR and the Zambian Government, which was also providing aid, to make a number of emergency allocations. By the end of 1966 these allocations totalled \$US115,600 (A/AC.96/INF/61, Add.1).

"Even if allowance is made for the \$US89,238 spent on certain projects for Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period 1962/65, it is quite clear that, for reasons beyond the control of UNHCR, these refugees have been prevented from receiving assistance more commensurate with their numbers and needs.

"It is also clear that the 20,000 or so Angolan refugees, most of them from the district of Cabinda, who are now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), have never received any assistance from UNHCR at all.

"It is true, of course, that the action taken by UNHCR on behalf of refugees in a given country depends largely on the programmes submitted to UNHCR by the Government of the country concerned. Many African countries, however, are so preoccupied with problems of reconstruction and the consolidation of independence that they do not have time to deal comprehensively with the difficult problem of the refugees to whom they have so generously offered asylum.

"This in itself is surely one reason why UNHCR, with the prior agreement of the Governments concerned, should try to encourage the organizations closest to refugees - that is, any liberation movements which are anxious to help - to draft aid programmes which would be implemented under the supervision of a representative of the host country and a representative of UNHCR.

"Education problems

"In October 1966, MPLA circulated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Director-General of UNESCO and the Director of the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories a statement of its views on the education of Angolan refugees. Of the various problems mentioned in that document, we should like now to revert to those which still seem to be of particular importance.

"MPLA was glad to note that at its last session the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme took a number of decisions on problems of concern to us, namely:

(a) that UNHCR should now be associated with the implementation of the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese colonial domination;

(b) that UNESCO and UNHCR should collaborate closely in the implementation of education programmes for refugees;

(c) that the Executive Committee authorized the High Commissioner to open a special fund for refugee education.

"MPLA also notes that its concern with refugee education programmes is shared by a number of organizations dealing with the same problems. For example, after the statement by MPLA of its views had been circulated, meetings of organizations and public figures dealing with refugee education were held at Wickrath (November 1966), London (March 1967) and New York (April 1967).

"The conclusions and recommendations put forward at these meetings contain a number of valuable suggestions and could very profitably be applied in the implementation of large-scale projects. Most of the participants advocated discussions - or even close co-operation - with the liberation movements of countries which are still dependent.

"In the view of MPLA, however, much better results could be achieved if these meetings were held under the auspices either of UNESCO or of UNHCR, and if they were attended by representatives both of the African countries and of the liberation movements concerned.

"In the conclusions reached at all these meetings, reference was made to the difficulties resulting from the low level of education of most of the refugees of school age, a situation which excludes any possibility of a coherent programme of higher education.

"It is therefore generally recognized that special attention should be given to primary, secondary and technical education and that the procedures to be established for solving these problems call for effective co-operation between the various groups concerned.

"There is talk of setting up pilot programmes designed to produce the maximum returns for the minimum time involved, and there is talk of finding material resources (premises, teachers, equipment, etc.) but in our view the most important thing is to make a start.

"The following is an example of one of the practical problems facing MPLA.

"About eighty Angolan children, aged from seven to eighteen years and selected from among the pupils of various MPLA schools along the frontiers, have been admitted as boarders to a school (a farm rented for the purpose not far from the Cabinda-Congo (Brazzaville) frontier), where they are receiving primary education in four classes. The plan of MPLA is that those who have completed the final class will, from the beginning of the following year, receive an accelerated secondary education lasting three or four years - depending on the performance of each pupil - to enable them to apply for admission to higher educational institutions. This would fill the existing gap at the secondary education level.

"For the moment, the special difficulties involved in providing technical education are preventing MPLA from establishing a similar programme in this field.

"The plan is very simple in outline but is not devoid of difficulties. These could be reduced considerably by collaboration with specialized bodies.

"Difficulties have been encountered, for example, in obtaining textbooks and some kinds of school equipment (laboratory equipment, maps, etc.) and, at another stage, in providing food and clothing for the school children once the improvised class-rooms are ready.

"MPLA has devised temporary solutions for some of these problems. Cyclostyled copies have been produced of readers, and of textbooks on the history and geography of Angola and Africa and on the natural sciences. Dormitories and blackboards have been improvised; notebooks and pencils have been kindly provided by certain organizations.

"Much more, however, is required.

"UNESCO should be invited to make a contribution, at least in regard to the teaching problems, and UNHCR should be invited to help in solving some of the material problems such as the provision of accommodation, food and clothing for the school children.

"In spite of all these difficulties, a small hospital with a doctor in charge has been opened on the premises of the boarding school. Apart from providing facilities for consultations and operations, the hospital serves as a school of nursing. Courses are given to ten trainees at a time, since this is the maximum number which can be accommodated.

"The teaching in these schools is given in Portuguese in accordance with the principles which MPLA advocated in paragraph 8 of the statement of its views.

"Health problems

"In this particular field there is no doubt that many voluntary organizations as well as persons devoted to the cause of the refugees have done magnificent work.

"It would obviously be over-ambitious to claim that a solution to the problem is already in sight, especially as the problem is not confined to refugees alone. In any event, the seriousness of the refugee health situation still gives ground for deep concern. Prolonged malnutrition, leading to diseases of various kinds, and a large number of infectious diseases are rife among refugees and are on the increase, but no projects have yet been launched to curb the incidence of disease.

"CVAAR, in co-operation with similar organizations, could play a very important role in this connexion if the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were to provide it with the necessary guarantees.

"A council or committee composed of representatives of all the voluntary organizations operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo might, with the co-operation of the United Nations specialized agencies (FAO, WHO and UNDP), provide lasting solutions for many of the problems involved.

"Status of the Angolan refugees

"All the independent countries bordering on Angola have received the Angolan refugees as brothers, often at great sacrifice to themselves. Even in his hour of distress, the refugee from Angola has found a welcome in neighbouring countries regardless of the difficulties which these countries have inherited from the recent colonial situation.

"The only thing marring this picture of fraternal solidarity is the apparent tolerance of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the kidnapping, detention, murder and looting practised by the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile against Angolan refugees. These crimes and activities, which may be regarded as impugning the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, violate the rights of the refugees and seriously impede the implementation of the refugee aid programmes - to mention but this one aspect of the problem.

"Conclusions

"The sole object of MPLA in preparing this document has been to contribute to the effectiveness of the United Nations effort on behalf of the Angolan refugees.

"MPLA believes that UNHCR, in the exalted task which it has assumed, needs the assistance of all persons of goodwill. In the light of this principle, MPLA is still convinced that UNHCR could improve its aid programmes for the Angolan refugees if it could find a way of discussing them with the specialized agencies, the host countries and representatives of the liberation movements concerned. Discussions of this kind would certainly lead to an intensification of aid to the Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to the establishment of an aid programme for the Angolan refugees now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); to a study - in collaboration with UNESCO - of model programmes of accelerated education to be followed by organizations providing education for the refugees; to a study of the possibilities of providing technical education to meet the requirements of an independent Angola; to a study of the problems involved in providing housing, food and clothing for school children; and to the implementation of new settlement and medical assistance programmes for the refugees.

"MPLA hopes that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme will regard this document as a response to the vast aid effort already contributed by the UNHCR, and as an expression of views by a group which is fighting for the right to assume legitimate responsibility for solving the social problems of the Angolan people."

597. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that emigration from Portugal to Angola was one of the weapons used by Portugal to prolong its domination over that Territory. In order to persuade emigrants to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government was obliged to offer them inducements. It had established settlements (colonatos) - groups of farmers who chose the best land. The occupants were evicted and their place was taken by families of settlers from Portugal, the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. The families were lent agricultural equipment and money, so that they would have everything they needed to farm the land. There were over 2,000 families in the largest settlement, which was at Cela. By evicting Africans to give the settlers the best land, the Portuguese Government was committing an act of piracy. In addition, it recruited "soldier-settlers" from the Portuguese expeditionary forces, who were persuaded to settle in Angola and send for their families. That policy, which was jeopardizing the economy of the indigenous population, had admittedly produced some results.

598. The petitioner said that Portugal was not implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. Angola had become an enormous military base. Airfields were being set up everywhere for the latest military aircraft purchased by Portugal. More and more troops were being massed in Angola. The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous for the whole of southern Africa, in view of the explosive situation in South West Africa and Rhodesia.

599. In reply to a question concerning the effects of the war in Angola on the economic, social and financial position of Portugal, the petitioner said that the current military budget had increased by 44 per cent, at the expense of public health, education and the small Portuguese taxpayers, who paid the indirect taxes levied on all imported goods in order to finance the war. Portugal was ruined. It had an enormous public debt, which showed the effort that Salazar's war in Angola represented for the Portuguese people.

600. Asked whether any reduction in Portugal's arms potential had been observed since the General Assembly had requested Member States to refrain from supplying arms to Portugal, the petitioner said that the United Nations General Assembly had repeatedly adopted resolutions aimed at preventing States from supplying arms to Portugal, in order to keep a ruthless war from continuing. The fact was, however, that nothing of that nature had been achieved. On the contrary, Portugal's arsenal of weapons was growing ever larger and more modern.

601. Portugal received weapons from NATO but it also purchased weapons abroad. The Angolan resistance fighters had captured from the enemy weapons made in Israel. Israel had been asked for an explanation. Apparently the weapons had been sold on a kind of "open market" for weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, which had in turn sold them to Portugal. The weapons included a Belgian FAL rifle bearing the mark of the Herstal arms factory, Italian grenades, etc. Some of the countries supplying arms to Portugal said that their bilateral agreements with that country stipulated that the arms should not be used against the peoples under Portuguese domination. It was obvious that Portugal was violating those agreements. The Angolan resistance fighters had defused a foreign-made bomb weighing almost 400 kg, dropped from an aircraft. They had kept it to show the Special Committee, if necessary. France was still taking orders for warships (especially submarines) and supplying Portugal with helicopters which the Portuguese Air Force used against the maquis.

602. Asked for details about the weapons made in Israel and the quantity which Portugal possessed and was employing in its struggle against the Angolan fighters, the petitioner said that so far, the Angolan guerillas had recovered only one weapon made in Israel, a UZI Lewis gun. As he had already said, the Israel authorities accounted for the presence of that weapon in Angola by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had purchased weapons made in Israel on the "free market" and resold them to Portugal. He was not in a position to give any details as to the quantity of weapons made in Israel at Portugal's disposal.

603. Asked whether he had any knowledge of special training programmes for Portuguese parachutists, either in Angola, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel or elsewhere, the petitioner replied that, with regard to Israel, no evidence

against that country had so far been found. On the other hand, the military agreements concluded between the Governments of Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany were a matter of common knowledge. The important air base at Beja, in southern Portugal, was being used as a base for German Starfighter aircraft, and German instructors were training Portuguese pilots there. The Starfighters had a very long range and were often used in Angola. The military agreements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany even made provision for Portuguese wounded in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who were transported to the Federal Republic for treatment in German hospitals.

604. Asked if there were any military experts other than those of Portuguese nationality operating with the Portuguese forces against the African patriots in Angola, the petitioner said that he thought the Portuguese forces were assisted by foreign experts. It was difficult to give proof, because the Angolans had not yet killed or captured any. Everyone knew, however, that certain foreign countries were giving Portugal military assistance. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany had given Portugal weapons and aircraft and German experts were training the Portuguese to use them. In addition, the Angolan partisans had reported that, during the fighting, they often heard shouts in a foreign language.

605. Asked whether Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany or any Western Power had given any help to the Angolan liberation movement, the petitioner explained that some of the countries which were helping Portugal in its war against the Angolan people offset that policy by certain forms of assistance, which were, moreover, the act of voluntary organizations rather than Governments. As well as material aid, those voluntary organizations sent some doctors and students to Angola, but, again, such action had no official character. For the sake of completeness, two exceptions to that rule should be mentioned: Denmark and Sweden were giving direct aid in the execution of the programme of assistance to Angolan refugees in the Congo.

606. Asked what particular difficulties were encountered by the Angolan people in their fight for national liberation, he said that MPLA was encountering tremendous difficulties. It had inherited a colonial situation which had deprived the

Angolans of all means of progress. They had no leaders. They had to be trained during the fighting, but then they were not available for fighting. The war against the Portuguese was a terrible war. It was not possible to defend villages where there were no partisans. The Portuguese savagely murdered all those suspected of being connected with the maquis. They bombed villages with napalm and poisoned crops. It was extremely difficult for the Angolan people to hold out with the scanty means at their disposal. The Angolans needed schools where they could learn about the problems of their country. They needed medical assistance and hospital beds, since there were none for the Africans in Angola. They needed to recover their dignity.

607. The national liberation movement had other difficulties to overcome. There was a shortage of equipment. The Angolan forces could not come to the assistance of their people in time, because of the lack of equipment. It was also difficult to supply the maquis. It was high time that neighbouring countries realized the gravity of the situation and gave the Angolan patriots the freedom of action which they needed to function properly.

608. MPLA was glad to have an opportunity to describe to the Special Committee the difficulties it was encountering. It hoped that the Committee would help it solve the important problem of freedom of action. Indeed, that was why it had sent its representatives to appear before the Committee.

609. Asked about the political and psychological impact of MPLA's military successes on the people living in the non-liberated areas, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained combat centres about 20 kilometres from the capital, for instance in the Lower Congo region, where it had many partisans. For many years it had not been possible to keep them regularly supplied with equipment, weapons and ammunition. However, they had held out heroically until 1966. MPLA had at last succeeded in sending relief columns with good leaders and good weapons to revive the fight in those regions.

610. MPLA had then opened the eastern front, which was spreading continually. It was very easy to mobilize people in those regions, because MPLA enjoyed a certain freedom of action in Zambia. The people were only waiting for weapons to fight. Whole villages rallied spontaneously to the MPLA forces. Unfortunately, there were not enough weapons.

611. In addition, MPLA usually prepared the ground before unleashing an armed struggle, so as not to involve the people in a hopeless revolt. Political leaders went to the area to give the people a grounding in political and military matters, so that they would be able to participate more effectively in the war of national liberation.

612. He had already referred in his statement to the declining morale of the Portuguese forces. That was one result of the MPLA's military action. A communiqué in Le Monde of 15 September 1966 had stated that, upon his return from an inspection tour in Angola, a Portuguese general had announced that the rebels had opened a new front and were using Zambia as an operational base. That had been the first official reference to fighting near Zambia. The Minister had sent huge reinforcements to the eastern front but had made no secret of his pessimism.

613. The Angolan people, for their part, welcomed the guerillas enthusiastically and gave them every support. Wherever there was one man with a rifle, forty more armed themselves with machetes. That spirit was making headway on all fronts. At Nova Lisboa, one whole barracks of Angolan soldiers dragooned into the Portuguese army had mutinied.

614. The eastern front was linked with the centre and the west of Angola by an important railway line which ran to the port of Lobito. That was the channel for transmitting MPLA's orders. The railway had been important, when the eastern front had been opened, in undermining the morale of the Portuguese troops.

615. Recently, in the Portuguese National Assembly itself, a deputy had cast doubts on the competence of his leaders and drawn attention to the complete lack of co-ordination in the military, economic and political spheres. That was a clear indication of the psychological climate created by the current situation.

616. In reply to a question about the extent of MPLA's control in Angola, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained a strong presence in Cabinda. It was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the OAU military commission, which would be able to see for itself the situation in the region. Some of the figures which had been given concerning the area of the territory liberated had perhaps not been understood aright. It would be more correct to speak of controlled territories, rather than liberated territories. MPLA control over the liberated part of Cabinda consisted of such activities as resisting the ambushes laid for its guerillas and laying its own ambushes, preventing Portugal from dropping provisions for its troops by parachute, and training guerillas as parachutists.

617. It was difficult for anyone to give figures for the controlled areas, as it was not always possible to go there and check. That was the reason why MPLA had refrained from quoting figures and had merely mentioned certain villages. For example, in one sector, in the northern region, MPLA controlled thirty villages, with a total population of about 15,000. It was in such terms that MPLA tried to assess the relative importance of the liberated areas.

618. Replying to questions about the nature of MPLA's activities in the liberated zones the petitioner said that this depended on the problems which arose. The liberated zones were encircled by Portuguese forces. Relations with the towns and villages controlled by the Portuguese were difficult. However, MPLA was trying to prepare the people for independence. Thousands of children were subjected to rigorous discipline. However, they often suffered from nervous diseases, because they were terrified of the bombing, and from malnutrition. Often, even when they went abroad to study, they could not control their panic when an aircraft passed overhead. As many of them as possible attended school but they could not buy books. Moreover, even if they could buy Portuguese books, they did not want to.

619. MPLA had opened a small hospital, which was also used as a nurses' training school. The graduates trained the others. However, the whole organization was rather rudimentary.

620. At the administrative level, MPLA had set up an action committee in each village, which administered the village in agreement with the military command in charge of the liberated zones.

621. Co-operation between the military and political leaders of MPLA was maintained with the assistance of the political commissioner, who was also the second in command of the armed forces in each region. He was usually an experienced soldier and a wise man, who was knowledgeable about the various aspects of social life and was responsible for reconciling military and civilian needs.

622. While the fight went on, MPLA was constantly working to build the future, to provide a solid basis for the independence for which it was struggling and above all to ensure the country's economic development. In the liberated zones, the maquis had only limited means of action. All it could do was provide a minimum of medical assistance while at the same time caring for the education of the people.

The latter was the essential problem and the only one towards whose solution the maquis could contribute. Without textbooks, exercise books or pencils, children of school age sat at the foot of trees and were given lessons by teachers seeking to prepare them for the future. Nothing more than that could be done for the present.

623. Asked how MPLA managed to maintain regular supplies to the garrisons operating in the regions which he had mentioned earlier, the petitioner said that the question of supplies was a very sensitive matter. The MPLA would be able to give information to the military commission of the OAU but it could not do so publicly to the Special Committee.

624. Regarding the possibility of obtaining freedom and independence for Angola through peaceful negotiations, he said that his movement was not a belligerent one. Well before the outbreak of war, it had made urgent appeals to the people and to the Portuguese Government, pointing out the threat of war which was hovering over Angola. MPLA had always hoped that the Portuguese people, unlike their Government, would give evidence of a desire to grant the peoples of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies the right to self-determination and independence. On 13 June 1960, MPLA had sent the Portuguese Government a statement in which it had analysed the situation created by the considerable reinforcements of troops and arms which the Portuguese had been sending to Angola. It had asked the Portuguese Government to accept, in particular, the following proposals: immediate official recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination; a total amnesty and the immediate release of all prisoners; recognition of political freedoms and the right to form parties; the withdrawal of Portuguese armed forces and the liquidation of military bases; a meeting with Angolan political organizations to discuss the methods by which independence should be reached. The position of MPLA had not changed. If it had been obliged to resort to armed force, the reason had been because that was the only means of combating Portugal's activities. If the Portuguese Government would accept the conditions set forth in the MPLA statement, that organization would still be prepared to discuss the situation in Angola.

625. In reply to an appeal to the various Angolan parties to form a common front and mobilize their strength against the common enemy, the petitioner said that he fully agreed about the need for a common front in the struggle against Portugal.

His movement's programme bore that point out. He read out provisions of both the minimum and the maximum programme. The minimum programme for which MPLA was fighting envisaged the speedy formation of an Angolan liberation front bringing together in a broad union all political parties, all popular organizations, all armed forces, all prominent persons in the country, all religious organizations, all national or ethnic minorities in Angola, all African classes of society and all Angolans living abroad, irrespective of their political beliefs, wealth, sex or age. The maximum programme towards which MPLA was working envisaged a common struggle waged with all patriotic Angolan forces in a vast popular movement leading to the taking of power by the Angolan people and the establishment of a democratic republican régime on a basis of total independence.

626. That position had been taken by MPLA since the beginning. It went back to the formation of a political resistance front in Angola in 1956. As the leaders of the movement had stated time and again, they had always been and continued to be prepared to meet the leaders of the other movements fighting against Portuguese domination. Thus MPLA had taken advantage of the gatherings that had taken place during 1960 in connexion with "Africa Year" to arrange such meetings, with the help of countries like Algeria, Guinea, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MPLA had done the same at the Monrovia Conference. It had taken part in the meeting of the Three-Nation Commission of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), doing its utmost to foster union among the liberation movements. Anyone would attest to MPLA's constant efforts to establish a common front of resistance to oppression. It was to be hoped that those who were doing nothing to achieve a common front would understand that the difficulties increased with the passage of time and that internal division was virtually a crime in the existing circumstances. The Angolan problem could be solved only by the dynamic process of struggle. It was essential to dispel the confusion which minor dissension among the Africans themselves might create in the minds of those who shaped world public opinion.

627. The waverings of Angolans were understandable. Far too many people, including non-Africans, had meddled with their problems. As matters were at present, it was hard to draw together the threads of African resistance. That was all the more regrettable as Angola seemed clearly to be more capable of successful resistance than any other Territory under Portuguese domination. Unity was a pre-condition of success in the struggle and it must be achieved at all costs.

628. Asked whether a specific agreement existed between the liberation movements in all Portuguese-occupied Territories and, if so, how it was implemented, the petitioner stated that the collaboration between MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP had existed for some time. It was included in the programme of the Ligue d'action unitaire pour l'Angola. In 1960, it had been decided to establish CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas). At that time, it had been, above all, a question of mobilizing the opinion of international organizations by calling their attention to the situation of the colonies under Portuguese domination. Two years had sufficed to attain that objective. CONCP had then decided to extend its programme, because the situation had now become known and the issue had been brought before the United Nations. It had decided, therefore, to go further and apply itself, on the one hand, to a joint training scheme for future cadres in the three countries and, on the other hand, to the consolidation of military collaboration, which must remain secret and which gave rise to frequent meetings between leaders from the three regions.

629. Asked which countries he had in mind when he had asked the Special Committee to help him in obtaining the assistance of certain countries, the petitioner said that he would have to give a brief historical resumé of the problem. In 1963, certain African countries had considered that the best weapon at their disposal for fighting colonialism was to recognize the existence of an Angolan Government in exile. The idea had been an excellent one, but it had been put into practice too soon and under unfavourable conditions, because unity had not yet been achieved. The choice which had been made had dealt a very serious blow to the chances of achieving unity, because it had involved a value judgement which no one had been qualified to make and of which MPLA had been the victim. Following that decision, MPLA had been obliged to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula had forbidden it to continue its activities. It had always hoped and still hoped that that unfortunate matter would be cleared up. OAU itself had been obliged to recognize that one of the most important, if not the most important, of the liberation movements had been underestimated. The investigations which it had carried out through its liberation committee had led it to the realization that MPLA was a patriotic organization which deserved to be helped. Since then, many African countries had shown their sympathy towards MPLA and had given it their support.

630. Asked what, in his judgement, the United Nations could do in addition to what it was already doing, to assist the Angolan freedom movement, the petitioner said that the United Nations field of action was undoubtedly limited. The problem must be viewed in that light. The efforts of the United Nations were useful in that they helped to inform international opinion about the activities of the liberation movements. That was in itself a great deal. Through the Security Council, the United Nations should seek, on the one hand, to make Portugal respect the United Nations Charter and, on the other hand, make other countries respect the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

631. The Angolan freedom fighters did not fear a prolongation of the war from the military viewpoint. They would lay down their arms only when Angola had achieved total independence. The United Nations should intervene in order to spare human lives on both sides, for the number of Portuguese soldiers being killed by Angolan partisans was far greater than the number of freedom fighters being killed by the Portuguese army. The issue was thus a humanitarian one. In other fields, science and culture in particular, the United Nations specialized agencies could give the Angolan people invaluable assistance in making up for the time lost under colonialism.

632. Regarding economic conditions within Angola, the petitioner said that there were two sides to the economic picture in Angola. On the one hand, there had been a definite economic upsurge due to the investment rush of the past few years, and hence a development of Angola's economic potential that could not be ignored. On the other hand, the expansion was not benefiting the indigenous Angolan population. The gains went to the big companies investing in Angola, to the Portuguese Government's budget, to senior Portuguese officials and, to a lesser extent, to junior officials and Portuguese "poor white" settlers in Angola. So far as the people were concerned, not only did they derive no benefit from the economic development in Angola but the development had produced a rise in the cost of living whose consequences were borne by the African population.

633. Asked about the current flow of refugees from Angola and whether it was increasing or decreasing, the petitioner said that it was difficult to answer the question because it was a few years since MPLA had maintained health stations

on the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and it could not therefore gather direct statistics on the rate of arrival of refugees. However, certain religious organizations, mostly Protestant and some Catholic, which received refugees, did keep a check on refugee arrivals. On that basis MPLA was able to affirm that the rate of arrivals remained high. Only Portuguese propaganda claimed that the rate had substantially declined in the past few years, but one had merely to examine the Portuguese reports critically to draw the proper conclusion.

634. Asked what efforts MPLA was making to help the refugees, how many it was doing something about and where they were, the petitioner said that it was very difficult to give any exact figures; MPLA had preferred to take an average estimate and say that there were over 400,000 refugees. In addition to its military activities, MPLA was particularly concerned with medical and educational provision for the refugees. The work it was doing in that field in the Congo was well known. At the moment, the organizations which were especially concerned with refugees were the Protestant and Catholic missions, and MPLA was grateful to them for the work they were doing to help Angolan refugees. MPLA was primarily a political organization. It was giving the refugees all the help it could, because it had not managed to persuade the international assistance agencies to aid them directly. MPLA recognized the needs of the refugees. At Kinshasa there was a clinic, which was not yet organized on a very large scale but which the members of the Special Committee had been invited to visit. The Committee might also visit a small school near the Cabinda border. The school was not intended for the children of the maquis. MPLA had set it up as a pilot school, with approximately ninety resident students, with a view to carrying out a full educational programme, particularly at the secondary level.

635. The main emphasis of the programme drawn up by MPLA to solve the Angolan refugee problem was on education. There were many children among the refugees. MPLA had tried to organize primary schooling which would enable them to go on to secondary school later. However, the primary instruction had to be given in the language of their country, or at least in Portuguese, and that naturally posed a problem. The education programmes of the international agencies and UNHCR

specified that education for refugees should be "integrated" with education in the country of asylum. However, the Angolan refugees were scattered over Zambia, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the languages spoken were different from theirs and the way of life was not what they had been accustomed to. Instruction given in Portuguese would be more useful to the Angolan refugees, who all wanted to return to Angola eventually.

636. MPLA had opened a school where instruction was given in Portuguese. The school had ninety pupils. The curriculum had been drawn up by MPLA. Excellent results had been obtained. MPLA would be glad if members of the Special Committee or representatives of specialized agencies could visit the school.

637. Later that year, MPLA was going to open a secondary school. It was at the secondary school level that there was a serious gap to be filled. The United Nations had decided to grant fellowships to refugees from Territories under Portuguese domination, but there were no qualified candidates. In their efforts to assist the Angolan refugees, the United Nations and the specialized agencies should therefore concentrate on secondary and technical education. There should be a programme of accelerated secondary or technical training. MPLA had stated its views on the subject to the specialized agencies and to UNESCO and UNHCR in particular. UNESCO should co-operate with the leaders of the political movements and help them to draw up education programmes. Unfortunately, UNESCO's financial resources were very limited. The United Nations should provide UNESCO with the means to give more effective aid in that sector.

638. The amount of assistance given by MPLA to the Angolan refugees depended on its resources, the bulk of which were obviously being used to extend the military front. War needs had absolute priority. The Movement therefore had very limited means to help the refugees. Three kinds of aid were needed. After covering several hundreds of kilometres on forced marches, the refugees arrived in a country whose laws and language of communication were different from theirs. They were naked - or almost naked - exhausted, starving and often ill. The first step was therefore to look after those uprooted and unhappy people, to feed and clothe them and often to nurse them, as they were highly vulnerable to epidemics and tuberculosis.

639. Secondly, they had to settle down and earn a living. In that connexion, he wished to pay a tribute to Angola's neighbours and particularly to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose co-operation was beyond all praise. In most cases the farmers, who asked nothing better than to work, were given a parcel of land in return for farming it. Of course, they had not been able to bring tools, seeds or live-stock with them. MPLA had tried to help, so far as its means permitted, by giving them the bare minimum. Unfortunately, it could not help the refugees who were currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but aid to them was provided for in its programme.

640. Thirdly, there was the problem of the family and particularly the children, who were the future of the country and, as such, the focus of MPLA's attention. There was one international organization which specialized in aid to children: UNICEF. Yet it had so far done nothing for the Angolan children. That was surprising, since it should be bent on helping all children, even and especially if they were children of poor and wretched refugees. He asked the Special Committee whether it could bring that problem to UNICEF's attention.

641. Asked whether the Angolan organizations which had sent petitioners had tried to establish a joint programme for aid to refugees, with a view to strengthening the assistance given to such persons, the petitioner said that the Special Committee would undoubtedly already have realized that the situation of the Angolan patriots did not allow the establishment of a joint assistance programme. That was not, however, the fault of the Angolan political organizations. MPLA considered that the international organizations which were giving aid to the refugees had every interest in refraining from meddling in Angolan political problems. A joint programme could be established only if the specialized agencies agreed to deal openly with the liberation movements and supply them with the cadres, nursing staff and medicaments which they needed. MPLA had been able to maintain aid stations in the Congo under the direction of competent nursing staff. At Kinshasa it had even obtained assistance from several bodies which were looking after refugees in that city. Those bodies did not make distinctions between one political organization and another. They were concerned, above all, with the effectiveness of the aid they were giving to the Angolan refugees in the form of food-stuffs, clothing and so forth.

642. Replying to a question about the amount of assistance MPLA was receiving from UNESCO, the petitioner said that, unfortunately, UNESCO aid to Angola - fighting Angola or Portuguese Angola - was so far virtually non-existent. Portugal did not co-operate with UNESCO and UNESCO was prejudiced against MPLA. However, UNESCO had been co-operating for the past year with UNHCR, which had set up a special education fund for refugees in November. Previously UNHCR assistance to the education programme had been given purely on an ad hoc basis. It was now organized under a complicated procedure, which was reducing the effectiveness of UNHCR's generous initiative.

643. It was encouraging to note that the UNHCR had succeeded in obtaining assistance from UNESCO and perhaps from other agencies in drawing up an education programme for the refugees. If the programme was to be implemented, however, an independent country would have to meet the needs of the refugees. The countries sheltering the refugees already had difficulty in solving their own problems. They lacked personnel and resources, especially when the refugees arrived in their thousands, as had been the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

644. Neither UNESCO nor UNHCR would talk with the representatives of the liberation movements. The Special Committee should persuade them to do so. MPLA had schools but no teacher training, no personnel qualified to draw up a sound literacy programme or a curriculum for primary or secondary studies. MPLA had prepared textbooks with the means available. They were poorly bound mimeographed textbooks, which rapidly disintegrated. Technical improvements were needed. Those concerned also wanted to know whether, from the educational viewpoint, the textbooks prepared for uprooted Angolan children in a foreign country should be altered and improved. That was where the assistance of UNESCO experts would be invaluable.

645. After members had viewed a collection of captured Portuguese arms (see paragraph 601 above), the representative of Iraq thanked the representatives of MPLA for giving the Special Committee yet another opportunity to inspect a collection of arms captured from the Portuguese forces operating against the freedom-fighters in Angola. The weapons and bombs had been manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium and Italy.

646. The representative of Italy, replying to the representative of Iraq, said that the Italian-made grenade exhibited by MPLA was of a type produced during, or even before, the Second World War and that such weapons had come into the hands of a great many people during the events in Italy in 1943-45, so that it was now impossible to trace its origin.

647. The representative of Iraq said that the important fact about the weapons was not their age but the fact that they were still being used against the people of Angola.

648. The representative of Italy added that, when Italian-made grenades had been shown at Kinshasa, he had asked the petitioners if they could tell the Special Committee not only the country of manufacture of the arms, but also how they had been supplied to Portugal. He had been told that it was impossible to find out where they had come from. He once more stressed that Italy had not supplied any arms to Portugal. The weapons in question were very old stock which could now be found almost anywhere.

649. The Chairman said that the men fighting could not be expected to trace where the arms had come from. If the freedom fighters captured weapons manufactured in a given country, the onus of proof was on the authorities of that country to establish how its arms had come into the possession of Portugal. If Italian arms were captured, the African people could only assume that the arms had been supplied from Italy, unless the Italian Government proved otherwise.

650. The representative of Iraq said that the arms shown by the MPLA included a 100-pound bomb manufactured in the United States in 1964. That bomb could demolish any building. It, and the other weapons shown, were just as deadly as those produced today.

651. The representative of the United States of America said that he supported the Italian representative's logic. The arms shown by the petitioners were very old. With regard to the 100-pound bomb, the Zambian Army expert had said that its origin was doubtful; it might have come from Belgium; it might have come from the United States; it might have come from any other country. The implication, however, was being made that the United States Government was knowingly making arms available to Portugal for the purpose of using them in its Territories in Africa. That was untrue. It had been the firm policy of his Government since 1961 to prohibit the

export of all arms to Portugal for use in its Territories in Africa from public or private sources in the United States. But there were millions of arms manufactured by all countries on the second-hand market and it was impossible for the countries of origin to trace their movements. At the end of the Second World War, large quantities of weapons had been left overseas. To say that, because the weapons had been made in a given country, they had therefore been supplied by the Government of that country was quite illogical. He hoped that no more allegations of that kind would be made unless it was known that the arms had been deliberately supplied to Portugal in violation of the embargo.

652. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that arms manufactured in 1945 still worked. United States soldiers had used such arms to defend themselves, and the Portuguese colonialists were now using them to murder and mutilate the people of Angola and to destroy their homes. When the petitioners had given verbal testimony concerning the origin of the weapons used against the freedom fighters, they had been told to produce concrete proof. Now they had produced physical evidence and some delegations were still not satisfied. But what more could they do? The freedom fighters could hardly be expected to ask the Portuguese soldiers and airmen where they had obtained those arms. It was significant that all the weapons shown had been manufactured by Portugal's NATO allies. Although the United States and other countries claimed to have enacted legislation against the provision of arms to Portugal, the weapons were still trickling through. The whole world had heard of the twenty B-26 bombers that were being flown from the United States to Portugal. In other statements, it had been admitted that arms were supplied to Portugal through the NATO system, and the people of Africa knew what Portugal did with those arms.

653. The representative of the United States of America said that the case mentioned by the Tanzanian representative was the only violation to have come to the attention of the United States Government. The B-26 aircraft were surplus stock which had been made available for private purchase for civilian use on the open market in accordance with existing legislation and within the limits of existing export regulations. Because United States law forbids unauthorized sales of military equipment to Portugal, the buyers had tried to smuggle them to Portugal, but they had been arrested and brought to trial. Two of the individuals

involved were tried in Buffalo, New York. Although they were acquitted, the jury rejected implications that the United States Government was in any way involved in the transaction.

654. The Chairman said that it had never been charged that the United States Government, as such, openly and officially supplied arms to Portugal in the knowledge that they would be used against the freedom fighters. The arms were supplied through private channels. The African public, however, was amazed to learn that in the United States private individuals could deal in bombers. Nobody ever heard of private individuals in the United States supplying arms in Cuba, for instance, but arms sent through private channels to Portugal were used to kill Africans. At the meetings of the Special Committee in 1966, a captured Portuguese pilot had confirmed that arms provided to Portugal by NATO, and which were supposed to be used exclusively for NATO purposes, were in fact being used against African freedom fighters.

655. Mr. Neto, speaking on behalf of Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), said that there was no hope that Portugal would change its attitude and accede to the demands of the peoples it had colonized. For Portugal, Angola would always be a Portuguese province and the Angolans would always be Portuguese with black skin. The Salazar Government was demanding an extraordinary effort from the Portuguese people in order to continue the war in Angola. As a result of the opening of the south-eastern front, the colonialists had been compelled to increase their total military strength from 50,000 in 1965 to 80,000 in 1967. The period of compulsory military service had been extended from two to four years. All settlers and officials of the colonial administration had to join the colonial civil defence militia. Young people between eighteen and twenty years of age were prohibited from emigrating. Portugal hoped by those means to make certain of having enough soldiers to continue the war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

656. Portugal was also reorganizing the Angolan economy so as to be able to withstand a long war. It was attempting to diversify agriculture. It was encouraging banking investments and the investment of foreign capital in order to speed industrialization. It was building the infra-structure needed for industrial development - roads, dams, railways, harbours and airfields - was

modernizing research services and was trying to develop the domestic market by creating new demands in order to replace Angola's traditional economy by a market economy. At the same time, it was intensifying its propaganda campaign for the community.

657. Angolans had no choice but to take up arms in order to force the withdrawal of the colonialists from the national territory and to attain independence.

658. Unfortunately, United Nations efforts to persuade Portugal to change its policies had not yet produced very positive results - partly because of Portugal's obstinacy and partly because of the attitude of the Western great Powers. Since the adoption of the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, petitioners and some Members of the United Nations had furnished proof of the assistance given to Portugal by the NATO countries. At the last session of the General Assembly and the present session of the Special Committee, the question of the military assistance received by Portugal from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Israel and France, not to mention Rhodesia and South Africa, had been raised repeatedly.

659. An appeal had been made to those countries to halt their aid to the Salazar Government. He hoped that that appeal would be heeded and that the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the present session would help to hasten the solution of the Angolan problem and the liberation of all the Portuguese colonies.

660. The MPLA was the principal Angolan organization and the only one which was actually fighting in the national territory. Its military activities were concentrated mainly in the Cabinda district, the Dembos and Nanbuangongo regions and the districts of Cuanza North and Luanda. It was supported by the great majority of the Angolan people. In the liberated zones, the MPLA was trying to organize education, production and medical care and to give the people political training.

661. Asked what specific and immediate support the people of Angola required to help them in their work of rehabilitating the refugees and the people in the liberated zones, the petitioner said that, under existing circumstances, military activities naturally absorbed the greatest part of the MPLA's resources, for its primary task was to supply arms and money to the combatants. Nevertheless, the

refugee problem had not been neglected. The refugees were in the Congo (Kinshasa), the Congo (Brazzaville) and Zambia. They had to be sheltered, fed and clothed; education also had to be provided, for that was one of the MPLA's first concerns. Newly arrived refugees were generally accepted by the schools in the countries adjacent to Angola; that meant, in practice, that Angolan children and adults had to start over again from the beginning the studies they had carried on in Portuguese in their own country. They had to adjust to instruction given in French in the Congo and in English in Zambia and thus lost considerable time. The MPLA should therefore be given the means to establish primary and secondary schools in which the refugees would find favourable conditions for resuming the studies interrupted by their departure. It was hoped that the United Nations specialized agencies would give substantial assistance; however, apart from the useful activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, no practical steps had yet been taken to meet that need.

662. As for primary education, the MPLA had opened a boarding school at Brazzaville for children between seven and eighteen years of age, but there was a shortage of clothing, food and books; indeed, the teachers were reduced to writing their own textbooks, particularly since the French and English textbooks proved difficult to adapt to the needs of the students. The problem of secondary education was even more serious. There was nothing to work with in that field, and technicians, teachers and educators were in short supply. Assistance from the United Nations specialized agencies and from UNESCO, in particular, would be especially desirable. The Zambian Government had assumed responsibility for the education of refugees, but it had not yet found a satisfactory solution to the problem.

663. In the liberated zones seated under trees in the middle of the forest, without schoolhouses, paper, pencils or ink, forty-five groups of children were studying from mimeographed texts. Surely the United Nations and the specialized agencies should take an interest in the problem, even if only by helping to prepare Portuguese-language textbooks for primary schools.

664. Asked for information about the difficulties encountered by the MPLA in training skilled cadres and about any assistance being provided to it by such

specialized agencies as, for example, UNESCO and the ILO, the petitioner repeated that MPLA had not yet received assistance from any specialized agency. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees was planning to deal with the problem of education in so far as the refugees were concerned. At the present time, the educational level was very low - so much so that it was necessary to begin by completing the primary education of the future cadres. One of the United Nations specialized agencies and some friendly countries had offered several dozen scholarships to Angolan students; however, they were good only for universities, so that it had not even been possible to use all of them. It was essential to establish, on a priority basis, one or more secondary schools which would provide a bridge between primary education and the opportunities for university study offered to young Angolans. Any international or national assistance for that purpose would be welcome. It was, of course, desirable that secondary education should be provided in the Portuguese language.

665. In the zones which had been free from Portuguese control life was very hard. The people had to defend themselves against constant attacks by the Portuguese, who had a formidable air force whereas the Angolan fighters had no anti-aircraft defence. The Portuguese air force was not satisfied with bombing the population. It also dropped poisonous substances in the liberated zones. In addition, there was a shortage of everything, particularly clothing and certain foods such as salt; in some regions, the children born after 1961 did not know the taste of salt and were surprised when they discovered it in exile.

666. The situation in the liberated zones could obviously be mastered only through very strict discipline. The MPLA had organized military and political training of the population, setting up two centres, one in the north and the other in the south, for that purpose. It was fully conscious of the fact that the population must be made self-sufficient, especially with regard to food. It expected little in terms of outside assistance. The continuation of the liberation war depended mainly on the efforts of the people. The situation with regard to health care was also difficult, for there were very few Angolan doctors. They trained nurses, who acted as medical assistants, but such assistants were too few

in number and lacked drugs. Many people were dying in the bush for lack of treatment. First-aid workers, trained in three-month accelerated courses, took care of the wounded and also gave preventive care to the civilian population. They were called upon to treat deficiency diseases more often than infectious diseases.

667. The MPLA had thus created a civilian organization which, through action committees, guided all the communities liberated from Portuguese control. To achieve success it was relying on its own efforts and on aid from the OAU, from the African countries, and from all friendly peoples whose assistance was enabling it to continue the fight.

668. Asked whether there were any fighting organizations other than the MPLA in Angola and, if so, what were the relations between the MPLA and the other organizations, the petitioner said that the MPLA was the principal Angolan nationalist organization and the only one actually fighting in the national territory.

669. Asked to cite facts to support the contention that the Federal Republic of Germany was supporting the Portuguese colonialists, the petitioner said that for some time past the Federal Republic of Germany had been giving Portugal substantial aid in various ways.

670. First of all, there was military aid. Portugal was forced to keep a considerable number of troops in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). At the outset, Portugal had had an army of about 120,000 men. At the present time, it was obliged to spread its troops throughout the Territories fighting to escape its control. It accordingly needed reinforcements, and that was where the Federal Republic of Germany had intervened. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had established a military base at Beja in Portugal. There German advisers and other foreigners were training fliers to handle Portuguese Starfighter aircraft, the supplier of which was not known. The Federal Republic of Germany had sent 17,000 soldiers to Portugal to replace Portuguese troops which were being used to suppress the liberation struggle of the colonized peoples.

671. Mention must also be made of economic aid. Portugal benefited from very large investments originating in the Federal Republic of Germany. Krupp was exploiting enormous iron deposits there. The Federal Republic of Germany had aided in the construction of a railway. German capital was invested in the exploitation of manganese deposits and gold mines.

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672. However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not merely give Portugal financial aid. It also supplied that country with weapons and even, through Brazil, with aircraft. That question had been raised at the last session of the General Assembly.

673. Asked whether there were any other military or para-military organizations in Angola and whether private companies operating in Angola had their own police or armed forces, the petitioner replied that until about 1955 repressive activities had been directed by the colonial administrators and heads of posts and in the towns by the police. In 1955, PIDE had been established - a political police force which was similar to the one functioning in Portugal but which operated with even greater cruelty in Angola. At the present time, repressive activities were conducted by the administration, PIDE and the militia, a para-military organization composed of men and women settlers mobilized for civil defence. All Portuguese and Angolan officials were required to belong to the militia.

674. The companies which exploited Angola's wealth were controlled by the colonial administration, with the exception of the diamond-mining company in the north of the country, whose private police and militia were not responsible to the Luanda Government. The diamond-mining company was very powerful; it was a kind of State within a State.

675. Mr. Matondo, speaking on behalf of the Parti Progressiste angolais (PPA) said that PPA, which was resolved to achieve the national liberation of Angola amid national unity and understanding, had always preached territorial integrity and had always regarded Portugal as the one common enemy. PPA wished to point out that, with a view to the implementation of the resolution adopted by the OAU at the Accra Conference in 1965, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had convened a parliamentary session for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the existence of the Angolan movement in exile. As a result, the Chamber of Deputies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had applied itself to that problem and had prepared a report calling for the unconditional unification of all the Angolan movements at Kinshasa and elsewhere. President Mobutu was so deeply concerned about the problem of unification because the Congo felt the weight of Portuguese repression very heavily.

676. He gave a historical account of Portugal's colonizing activities in Angola from the time of the Portuguese exploratory mission led by the explorer Diogo Cão in 1482 up to the time when, in 1911, Portugal, changing its feudal régime for a fascist republican régime, had repudiated all the treaties which had been concluded by common agreement between Portugal and Angola. The Lisbon Government had decided at that time that Angola was a territory which had been conquered by Portugal and that its people were to be subjected to bloody and inhuman aggression. Forced labour and slavery had then been imposed on the Angolans. In order to strengthen its colonial rule, Portugal had decided to embark upon the decisive phase of the portugalization of Angola. Numerous settlers had been established in Angola. Angolans were imprisoned without trial and paid shamefully low wages. The Supreme Chief of Angola had been reduced to just an ordinary chief and his authority no longer prevailed. Because of Portuguese colonial oppression, a great many Angolans had moved to the neighbouring colonies since 1930, in particular to the former Belgian Congo and the former French Congo.

677. Portuguese colonialism was continuing to develop. The Lisbon Government unashamedly asserted that there were no Angolans in Angola, but rather "Overseas Portuguese". Portugal had taken up arms against the innocent and unarmed Angolan people. It was supported by NATO, which provided it with the means of fighting against the Angolan people. Angolans were being burned alive by the Portuguese, while others were kept in prisons where they died for lack of medical care. By NATO's wish, Portuguese military training camps had long been established in Angola.

678. The historical facts which had been recognized by the Berlin Conference of 14 February 1885, the Brussels Convention of 25 May 1891, the Lisbon Protocol of 8 April 1892, the Brussels Declaration of 24 March 1894, the International Conference at Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 and diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Spain showed the friendly relations which had existed between Portugal and Angola before the Portuguese fascist Government had come to power. Legally speaking, those facts gave the Angolan people a very powerful weapon for the decolonization of Angola.

679. A people fighting for freedom must think about united action. If General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was to have effect, the Angolan liberation movements would have to unite their efforts to put an end to the crimes of colonialism in

Africa. Any disorganized action would benefit colonialism, and the practical steps taken by the United Nations would remain a dead letter. The United Nations should endeavour to bring about the unification of the Angolan liberation movements. It was called upon to play a great role in mediating a conference between Portugal and the representatives of the Angolan people in a neutral country. The problem of liberation must be resolved, in order to put an end to the sufferings of the Angolan people, who needed both material and moral assistance from the United Nations. PPA therefore urged freedom and peace-loving countries to turn their attention to the problem of the Angolans and to give them unconditional support.

680. Mr. Lulendo, speaking on behalf of the Ligue générale des Travailleurs angolais (LGTA) said that the growing number of Angolan workers who were refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or still in the maquis inside Angola was a major concern of the LGTA leaders. That was the reason why that organization had ventured to submit a petition to the United Nations through the intermediary of the Special Committee. Portugal's policy in Angola was a flagrant violation of the principles set forth by the United Nations in respect of dependent Territories. LGTA had spared no effort in order to draw the attention of world opinion, and more particularly that of the most competent agencies, to the seriousness of the situation in Angola and in the other Territories under Portuguese domination. To that end, LGTA had, in 1963, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a report on forced labour and Portugal's inhuman attitude towards Angolan workers and the Angolan people in general. However, the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in July 1963, condemning Portugal, had not prevented that country from pursuing its criminal activities. It would be a very serious matter if those resolutions came to nothing. The Angolan people had received proof of the material and moral support afforded to Portugal by certain Powers and must express its displeasure. It thus had a right to demand, as had been done at the ILO Conference in May 1966, that Portugal should be expelled from the United Nations. For nearly seven years, the refugee workers and those who were still in the maquis had been suffering unemployment and exploitation. The United Nations had already taken radical measures enabling certain peoples of the world to govern themselves. It was because Portugal refused to implement the decisions of the United Nations that the Special Committee had decided to meet in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to observe in all objectivity the

development of the Angolan struggle. Availing itself of that opportunity, LGTA, speaking on behalf of the Angolan working masses, called for United Nations intervention with a view to immediate and unconditional recognition by Portugal of the Angolan people's right to self-determination and independence.

681. Mr. Lele, speaking as President-General of the Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola said that his party had been set up in 1960 by Angolans belonging to different ethnic groups, all of which were, however, equally nationalistic and equally determined to liberate the soil of their ancestors. Since it still believed in the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with Portugal and avoiding bloodshed, the Nto-Bako had espoused the doctrine of non-violence and had made a number of proposals to the Portuguese authorities. A waste of effort, as it had turned out.

682. In 1960, a delegation of the Nto-Bako Party, led by its then President, Mr. Angelino Alberto, had gone to Lisbon to contact the Portuguese authorities. Its proposals had had the following results: culturally and administratively, the Portuguese Government had granted a number of scholarships to Party militants; politically, the Portuguese Government had authorized the Party to carry on its political activities freely throughout Angola. But those had been merely vain promises.

683. In February 1961, fourteen scholarship holders had gone to Lisbon to study. In June 1962, thirty-seven Angolan students had returned to Angola with the permission of the Governor-General of the country. Two months later, together with six members of Mr. Angelino Alberto's delegation, they had been arrested by the Portuguese political police (PIDE) and kept in prison without trial. Everything had been done to prevent the young students who had then been in Portugal from continuing their studies, in particular under the pretext that they did not yet have a sufficient grasp of the language to be able to follow the courses and enter the higher classes. Shortly thereafter, they had been compelled to adopt Portuguese nationality and to do their military service in the Portuguese army. Recalcitrants had had the remainder of their scholarships, their school equipment allowances and other benefits taken away from them. In 1962-63, some of them had been expelled from the educational institutions in which they had been studying. Later, they had been expelled from Portugal, without being able to take any of their possessions with them.

684. Previous petitioners had described the miserable lot of the indigenous inhabitants of Angola to the Special Committee. Angelino Alberto had turned out to be a lackey of the Portuguese colonialists and was still free, protected by PIDE, whose ideas he shared. Consequently, he himself had succeeded Mr. Alberto as chairman of the Nto-Bako Committee, which met at Kinshasa, and his petition had been heard by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York at its 1457th meeting. The Nto-Bako delegation in New York had, inter alia, demanded the following: a round-table conference similar to the one held in Brussels in 1960; recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination; the setting of a time-limit for Angola's independence; the drawing up of a detailed calendar for all interim stages during the transitional period preceding the country's independence; the proclamation of a general amnesty; and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola and their replacement by United Nations forces.

685. Unfortunately, the experience of recent years was that all efforts were in vain and the results of the negotiations begun with the Portuguese Government in an effort to obtain independence for Angola had been nil. The negotiations themselves had been demeaning. Whereas all the free and justice-loving peoples of the world had heard the voice of the Angolan people, Portugal remained entrenched in its inadmissible position as a colonial Power. It was understandable therefore why the Angolan people and the Nto-Bako Angola Party, which represented them, had no alternative but to associate themselves with the protest made by other movements and appeal to the United Nations and the OAU to help them find the right solution to that crucial problem. He wished to warn public opinion against some of the former members of the Nto-Bako Angola Party, who were trying to defame it by allegations of internal dissension in the Party. Those persons were mere lackeys of colonialism in the pay of the Portuguese, who were making use of such traitors to sow confusion in the minds of the Angolan people and to prevent them from shaking off the yoke under which they had laboured since the fifteenth century. The Nto-Bako Angola Party was a national, democratic party fighting by all available means for the independence of its country. It had moved from the era of non-violence to the era of revolution. The position of the Nto-Bako Angola Party should be clearly defined. International public opinion should know that that party was a unitary political party fighting by all means in its power, without either opportunism or sectarianism, to gain its country's sovereignty and free itself from the shameful colonial régime of Salazar.

686. In view of the problem's importance, he asked the Special Committee to draft and adopt unanimously a resolution inviting the Lisbon Government to take all necessary steps forthwith to ensure the implementation in Angola of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Any infringement of the interests of one people was ipso facto an infringement of the interests of the world as a whole, because the only sound basis for human relations was true political, economic and social interdependence. Peace could rest on a solid foundation only when colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism had become things of the past. In any case, the Nto-Bako was resolved to fight to defend the interests and rights of the Angolan people and to oppose any attempts by Salazar and his henchmen to perpetuate their domination of Angola.

687. The Special Committee was still trying to get Portugal, like other countries, to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, as everyone knew, Salazar's Portugal, Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Vorster's South Africa, whose cruel policies had been condemned by the United Nations, continued to endorse those policies, all United Nations resolutions notwithstanding, and were able to do so because of the increased assistance given by certain countries and international organizations.

688. The Nto-Bako Party was asking the Member States of the United Nations to adopt further resolutions aimed at putting an end to the increased assistance which the fascists, colonialists, neo-colonialists and imperialists were receiving from those who, while pretending to strive for world peace, were actually fomenting war. The international organizations might also be giving the enemies of peace indirect assistance by refusing to accept any responsibility in that regard, even if they were not giving them direct assistance. It was common knowledge that funds passed from some organizations through countries which took responsibility for them into the hands of bandits who were doing their utmost to worsen the international situation.

689. He urged the Special Committee to give special attention to the problems now facing the Angolan people with a view, in particular, to securing the release of all Angolan political prisoners and the convening of a round-table conference of all the leaders of the various Angolan political parties in order to achieve unity. He hoped that the conference would bear in mind the previously adopted resolutions

concerning a diplomatic boycott of Portugal and the application of economic pressure to Portugal as long as it continued to treat Africa with contempt. The solution of Angola's problems depended on the unification of hitherto scattered forces at the sacrifice of all personal ambition.

690. That was, in brief, what the Angolan people demanded if Portugal wished to maintain normal relations with them after independence.

691 Mr. Ladeira-Lumona, speaking on behalf of the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) stressed the need for Angolan patriots to adopt a new and more positive attitude and to unite in order to succeed in their common struggle and eliminate ignorance, hatred and foreign influence. The CGTA, for its part, sought a round-table conference attended by all representatives of Angolan liberation movements. It appealed to all those who could in any way affect the drama being played out in Angola to enlist themselves in Angola's just cause. Angolan workers said "No" to the domination of Portugal, which was flouting human rights and Christian principles. They were asking the United Nations to help them gain independence. The régime imposed by the Portuguese was unacceptable. Politically, it meant the oppression of the black majority by a minority of Portuguese, in violation of democratic principles. Economically, the corporate system introduced by the Portuguese was an obstacle to the modernization of agriculture, industrialization and the integration of the Angolan economy into the African economy. It made it impossible to raise the standard of living of the people. Culturally, the régime meant the virtual suppression of the culture of the Angolan people, to whom freedom of conscience, religion and speech were denied. The régime had succeeded in depersonalizing the Angolan by destroying African folk-lore, religion and languages. Lastly, the régime was equally as pernicious in social terms: the standard of living of the Angolan people was one of the lowest in the world; public health services served only the Portuguese and some assimilated blacks living in urban centres. The population was being decimated by illness, hunger and war. The educational system was designed to "disafricanize" the black man, whom it made unstable and uprooted.

692. Not only was that hypocritical and reactionary régime a brake on the Angolan people's development but it also posed a serious threat to peace in

Africa and in the world. The provocative action of Portuguese troops and aircraft in bombing frontier zones and violating the territory of neighbouring African countries might lead to violent retaliation by those countries.

693. The United Nations, in which the Angolan people whole-heartedly placed their faith, should do everything possible to hasten Angola's attainment of independence by demanding that its resolutions on decolonization should be carried out and by arraigning the oppressor before the bar of world public opinion. United Nations efforts at decolonization had so far been virtually unproductive because the world Organization lacked the legal and political means to take action and because of the hypocrisy and bad faith of the Portuguese Government. Nevertheless, the CGTA wished to thank the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories for its initiative with respect to the training of Angolan cadres. It hoped that in the future the Angolan national organizations in exile would be consulted on the choice of scholarship recipients in order to take account of Angola's current situation and future needs. The CGTA requested the United Nations to do everything in its power to persuade the Vatican to review the **Concordat** it had concluded with Portugal, which favoured the perpetuation of colonial oppression and was contrary both to the principle of religious freedom proclaimed by the United Nations and to the spirit of the Papal Encyclical "Progressio Populorum" and of the **Ecumenical Council, Vatican II**; to induce the International Monetary Fund to discontinue the financial assistance it was giving Portugal for economic purposes, which was being used to perpetuate its colonial domination; to influence the NATO Powers to discontinue their military assistance to Portugal and to urge them to take action in favour of Angola. It requested the ILO to continue its efforts to compel Portugal to respect Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 with regard to the abolition of forced labour and the colonization of Angolan lands in the economic interests of Portugal; to give material support to the educational activities of Angolan trade unions (the CGTA had a vehicle for the dissemination of its educational programmes, the Centre d'études sociales pour l'Afrique noire d'expression portugaise (Social Studies Centre for Portuguese-Speaking Black Africa) (CESANEP)); to associate Angolan trade unions with its information, training

and research activities; to preserve the spirit which had led delegates to the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference to challenge the right of Portuguese delegates to represent Angolan workers; to grant Angolan trade unions consultative status so that they could take part in ILO activities.

694. With respect to FAO, the CGTA hoped that the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign would co-operate with Angolan national organizations in giving relief to the hapless Angolan refugees, who were thought to number some 500,000 scattered over the countries adjoining Angola. The CGTA had set up a popular education institution for social betterment, the Centre - CEA, which was carrying out programmes in the fields of rural promotion, literacy, vocational and technical training, culture and health for the Angolan refugees. The Centre wished to play what part it could in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign.

695. The CGTA hoped that UNESCO, which alone among international institutions had expelled Portugal, through the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries, would grant Angolan national organizations consultative status to enable them to take part in its literacy programme. The CGTA was particularly interested in the training of teachers of functional literacy and in techniques and methods of adult education.

696. He expressed his satisfaction at Portugal's exclusion from the Economic Commission for Africa. He hoped that the Angolan nationalist movement would be admitted as Angola's representative in that body, a step which would enable the independent Angola of the future to take its proper place more easily within the African economy.

697. Lastly, the CGTA hoped that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would provide greater material assistance to Angolan refugees and would protect political refugees better, particularly so that they could travel abroad freely in order to discharge their political responsibilities. It also hoped that the High Commissioner for Refugees would use his training programme for future Angolan cadres to help any stateless Angolan without means of his own.

698. On behalf of all Angolan Christian trade unionists, he reiterated the solemn undertaking of Angolan workers and peasants to continue their struggle with even greater single-mindedness so that Angola could become a free and democratic

country able to co-operate with all men of goodwill in building a better world founded on international morality, justice and fair play. He addressed a solemn appeal to all Members of the United Nations, to all religious persons and to the Western Powers, especially the United States, to combine their efforts and help the Angolan people attain independence in a suitable manner. He requested the People's Republic of China to put an end to its opium trade with Macau.

699. The CGTA hoped that the United Nations would not disappoint the hopes which millions of human beings had placed in it.

700. Angola possessed a sufficient number of able public servants to form a government, lead the nation and make it a valuable partner for other countries.

701. Mr. Medina, speaking on behalf of Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) said that the territory now called Angola had not been established by the will of the persons living in it but had been artificially created by Portugal. In an address delivered on 12 August 1963, Salazar had declared that Angola was a Portuguese creation and that it would not exist without Portugal. That territory had been a part of the great Kingdom of the Kongo, which Portugal, Belgium and France had divided among themselves. The Portuguese had called their part "Angola" to blot out its true identity. Not content with that, the Lisbon Government now considered that there were no longer any Angolans, but only overseas Portuguese.

702. In fact, the only treaty that had been concluded since the arrival of the Diogo Cao on Congolese territory in 1482 had been the treaty of friendship between the Kingdom of the Kongo and Portugal. The establishment of the colony of Angola had been no more than a stratagem employed by the Portuguese Government to make that part of Africa Portuguese. However, the lawful heirs of the throne of the Kongo were now asking for the return of their kingdom.

703. On 24 September 1960, at São Salvador do Congo, the leaders of the Royalist Party of the Kongo had met Mr. Lopes, the delegate of the Governor-General of Luanda, and Mr. Eduard Matos de Pio, the Administrator of São Salvador, who had acknowledged the validity of Ngwizako's view on the subject of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 17 February 1961, a 280-man delegation of Ngwizako members had been about to go to São Salvador when the Administrator of Luvo, a town sixty kilometres from São Salvador, had urged them to return to the Republic of the Kongo and there await a summons by the Governor-General of Luanda. On

22 February of the same year, at the request of the Portuguese Government, Ngwizako had decided to establish its headquarters at São Salvador and had, for that purpose, sent to Abanza-Kongo Mr. José dos Santos Kasakanga, Mr. Garcia Henrique Monteiro and Mr. André Pecado, respectively President-General, Secretary and Counsellor of the Party. On 15 June 1962, a five-member delegation had been summoned by the Portuguese Government to Luanda. The Governor-General, Mr. Veñancio Deslandes, had told the members of the delegation to go to São Salvador to elect the King of the Kongo and to fix a date for his coronation. Several days later, Dom Pedro VIII had been elected King of the Kongo. He had been crowned on 9 September 1962. He had been due to address the people and the Portuguese Government on 10 September, but the Portuguese authorities had sent the members of Ngwizako to Kinshasa to fetch those who were to form the Government of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 8 February 1963, a forty-member Ngwizako delegation had met at Songololo, while another delegation had gone to Brazzaville to get the passports of the members due to go to Sao Salvador from the Portuguese Embassy. However, the passports had carried the inscription: "Delegation of Portuguese Africans wishing to resettle permanently in their countries of origin", instead of the inscription "Delegation of Ngwizako members invited by the Portuguese Government to go and set up their Government". The delegation had had to return to Songololo, where it had written to the Administrator of Luvo, who had replied that it must wait. Since that date, the Portuguese had made only empty promises.

704. Since 1960, the year of the foundation of Ngwizako, the Congolese Government had given hospitality to the members of the party. However, the members of Ngwizako regretted that their brothers in arms regarded them as enemies and that unity was impossible.

705. Ngwizako was prepared to enter into discussions with the Portuguese Government, but needed financial assistance in order to be able to send its delegates to Portugal and would prefer them to be accompanied by two or three representatives of the United Nations.

706. Mr. Tulengala, speaking on behalf of the Cartel des nationalistes angolais (CNA) said that his delegation was, of course, aware of the crimes committed by the Portuguese in Angola, but it did not intend to add to the recriminations which did not help to solve the essential problem: that of finding political and

technical means of arriving at a settlement. A settlement should be negotiated in a conciliatory spirit by the Portuguese authorities with the free and independent Angolan people. The parties and organizations affiliated to CNA were entirely independent; they had no foreign ties and had made no promises to anybody. CNA strongly protested against some of the statements made about it by the representatives of other organizations who had addressed the Special Committee; being accustomed to encountering prejudice, it was not dismayed. Its determination, like that of the Angolan people, was unshakeable. The Portuguese knew that too, and that was why they would finally realize that it was in their own interests, in order to save Portuguese as well as Angolan lives, to negotiate according to the principles of the Charter.

707. The purpose of CNA was to save lives. The population of Angola was too small for it to be able to bear the burden of a full-scale war; moreover, there were Portuguese in Angola who had no intention of returning to Portugal and who would be a useful element in the future, when peace was restored.

708. Though there were grounds for doubting the good faith of the Portuguese, new and better methods should be tried of convincing them that the institution of peace, freedom and human rights in the Territories they administered was as much in the interest of Portugal as in that of the peoples of those Territories.

709. Since Article 73 of the United Nations Charter recognized the right of colonized peoples to independence, the Angolan people wished freely to choose their country's political, administrative and social system. Portugal was one of the signatories of the United Nations Charter. A colonized country's attainment of independence did not necessarily entail the complete breaking of the age-old ties between the colonizers and the colonized; on the contrary, it should strengthen those links through friendly and fraternal co-operation.

710. The Angolan political parties and non-political organizations - including Nto-Bako (Origem do Povo do Kongo Angola), MDIA (Mouvement pour la défense des intérêts de l'Angola), Ngwizako (Association des Congolais d'expression portugaise), RCCKP (Rassemblement des chefs coutumiers du Congo Portugais), CBOA (Comité des bons offices), UGTA (Union générale des travailleurs angolais), UREA (Union révolutionnaire des étudiants angolais) and UGEA (Union générale des étudiants angolais) - considered that Angola must attain independence by peaceful means. Too much blood had already been shed by the Angolan people.

711. Foreign Powers, particularly the United States of America, should assist the parties to the dispute to find an area of agreement. The Angolan people were weary of war. They longed for peace and prosperity based on the observance of their human rights. The Cartel would do its utmost to see the situation settled by peaceful means. But to do so, it needed the support of all Angolans.

712. In short, CNA wished, within a reasonable period of time, to negotiate with the Lisbon authorities with a view to finding a compromise solution that would pave the way for the transfer of power. It hoped that in the interests of Angola, the United Nations would serve as mediator.

713. Mr. Gracia Kiala speaking on behalf of Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) said that millions of Angolan workers were dying in the struggle to free their country. Of course, CSLA hoped that the Angolan liberation movements would unite, but an effort must be made to eschew demagogy and to tell the truth.

714. CSLA's slogan was "food, shelter and freedom for all". It hoped that the Special Committee would meet with real success, and requested it to use its influence with the Angolan movements to make them understand that disunity, assassinations, kidnappings and fratricidal wars among exiles would not hasten independence. Nor would sporadic expeditions on the Angolan frontier bring Salazar to his senses. One would have to be very naive to believe in the victory of the Angolan nationalist forces when their political armies were fighting separately. CSLA condemned the short-sighted policy followed by those Angolan movements and was indignant at the lack of conscience they showed in carrying out their activities. CSLA had always maintained that a congress should be organized, in which all the active Angolan forces would take part and from which would emerge a national liberation front with a specific programme. No single Angolan movement could hope to liberate the Angolan people. Angola would be liberated by mutual understanding and unity.

715. Mr. Chata, speaking on behalf of UNIAO Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), said that UNITA felt deep concern and sympathy for its fellow freedom fighters in South West Africa, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and "Portuguese Guinea", who were the victims of the same imperialist and colonial atrocities. He condemned the racialist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which were solely interested in defending their minority rule; they were not champions of democracy, as they could not stand the challenge of the system of one man one vote.

716. The political situation in Angola was very complicated. The world was told that Angola was part of Portugal and that the Africans of that country were "Portuguese", yet they had no rights to participate in the affairs of their own country. Since 1965, however, the same African masses, labelled as "Portuguese", had risen up together under the banner of the rekindled revolution, which was spreading widely and winning the confidence of the masses.

717. Portuguese brutality against Africans was traditional, but he would confine his account to events since 1965. With the political changes taking place in neighbouring countries, Portugal had intensified its acts of provocation against the masses in Angola. The Angolans were strictly prohibited from listening to foreign radio stations and anyone found doing so was arrested, the radio was confiscated, and, during periods of particular tension, the person concerned was even killed.

718. Houses were searched for suspected political cards or letters from neighbouring countries or local papers containing political literature; for those found in possession of any such items, the punishment was normally death.

719. The movement of people from one administrative centre to another was free only in zones controlled by UNITA. Soldiers always checked the movement of villagers and made sure that none left their districts. Troops were on guard on most bridges and army units had been established in many parts of the country to ensure the execution of orders.

720. Portuguese soldiers took cattle, goats, sheep and fowl without payment; they raped African women in public and countered the husbands' opposition with bullets. Many women had been widowed in that way. For example, one Senior Chief at Lumbala had reported that a certain woman had been raped in her home by ten Portuguese soldiers while her husband had been kept outside the house at gun-point. The same woman had later been raped by the same soldiers for the second time.

721. Taxation was very high, the minimum being £2.10s.0d. It was difficult for unemployed peasants to produce such an amount, but if they did not they were sent to prison for six months. On release they had to pay the same amount or face forced labour, but even after the period of forced labour, the same amount of tax was still owing.

722. If a man was dead or sick, the Portuguese asked his relatives to pay for him. Despite all oppression, the Africans had not abandoned the idea of political reform but in view of the Portuguese provocations and brutality, the Angolans had placed their hopes of salvation in the armed struggle.

723. Since 1965, Salazar's defence budget had increased steadily and, in 1967, had amounted to £81 million, mainly for its aggressive policies overseas and over half the sum was intended for Angola. With that money it was hiring white lunatics and criminals from South Africa and Rhodesia, armed with weapons from the NATO countries and Israel, to help suppress the African masses in Angola. Defenceless villagers were bombed, their houses smashed by bazookas and hand grenades, and their property stolen or destroyed. Fields were bombed and crops completely ruined. As a result, many thousands of families had been made homeless and forced to live in the bush or flee to Zambia and the Congo. The homeless had no clothes, food or medicine. Those who fled the country were bombed, if spotted before they reached their destination and those who escaped death by bombs but fell into Portuguese hands were shot dead in public to frighten the masses. He could produce photographs to support the allegations of Portuguese atrocities and brutalities.

724. Angola was rich in natural resources, as could be seen from the number of investors interested in that country, including Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pechiney of France, Japan's Nippon Mining Company and several others, but Africans were not benefiting from such foreign investment. Most of the money was sent to Portugal to feed its starving population, and the little that remained went to the settlers.

725. The method of recruiting labour in those industries was shocking. A company in need of workers contacted the administrative officers; the Government hired labourers on contract for one year, during which time they were given nothing except food. On completion of the contract, the workers returned home where they expected to receive their full pay, but found they had first to pay the taxes for that period. The Administrative Office then decided how much they should be given so that the poor men received almost nothing, most of their earnings going to the Government.

726. The peasants who lived on subsistence farming also had to pay tax and were obliged to sell their food to do so. Unfortunately, the money paid for their crops was very little, and the Government did not help them to improve their yields. European farmers, however, were given all facilities by the Government. He drew the attention of all freedom lovers to the inhuman exploitation by the Portuguese.

727. With regard to social problems, the Portuguese had done practically nothing to promote education. In Angola, the oldest colony in Africa, 93 per cent of the African population was still illiterate, the other 7 per cent having received some education from foreign missionaries who merely taught them to read the Bible. The State-owned schools, found in towns only, were Catholic schools, the few Africans attending being children whose fathers had been assimilados. No Africans were allowed in secondary schools unless they and their parents were assimilados.

728. In rural areas or small administrative centres, no schools were built for the African population. None of the refugees who had come to Zambia in 1966 had completed their primary education, yet the Portuguese claimed to have established education on a multiracial basis.

729. Health services were scarcely known to the people of Angola. In many rural areas, modern drugs and medicine were unknown. Venereal and other diseases were still unchecked. Villagers still depended on herbs from the bush. The death-rate exceeded the birth-rate so that the area of 481,250 square miles had a total population of only 5 million. The shortage of doctors was acute and it might well be asked what became of the money collected as taxes. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should investigate the situation in Angola as a matter of top priority.

730. The Angolan masses would never flinch before NATO-supplied guns or bombs and their march to freedom would continue. Portugal should realize that Angola would eventually be free; the more it engaged in aggression, the greater African resistance would become and the sooner Portugal would be isolated. UNITA had confidence in the Special Committee and requested it to take the following action: to inform Portugal that Angola was not a province of Portugal, that the Africans of that country were not "Portuguese", and that it should quit Angola immediately as

its presence was a menace to the Africans; to put pressure on the members of NATO and other countries to stop supplying arms to Portugal and encourage the Members of the United Nations to support Angola's fight through UNITA. The United Nations should not overlook the growing problem of refugees and the Committee in particular should seriously consider the demand for freedom of the oppressed Africans, Latin Americans and Asians.

731. Asked to explain what he meant by the term "assimilado" and to provide any information on the number of assimilados, their status and their attitude towards their non-assimilated African brethren, the petitioner replied that the assimilado system was a complicated one introduced by the colonialists which UNITA was trying to suppress. The Portuguese did not consider the Africans to be human beings but had allowed some with a little education to become "assimilated" (assimilado). To retain their assimilado status and be respected by the Portuguese they had to break completely with their African friends and relations, and their complete isolation from all but Europeans were constantly checked by the secret police. Religion was another serious matter for the African assimilados for they were almost always forced to become Catholics. As mentioned in his petition only 7 per cent of the Angolan population were literate and not all of those had become assimilados. He was unable to quote an exact figure, but it probably represented a minute proportion of the population, restricted to those living in the towns.

732. Mr. Ndongala Mbidi speaking on behalf of the Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA) regretted having to inform the Special Committee that, on 29 May 1967 at 2 a.m., the Portuguese army had crossed the border and intruded into Congolese territory as far as the outskirts of Malele, killing one woman, one child and two men and leaving several wounded. The refugees in the area had gone to warn the detachment of some twenty GRAE soldiers stationed there. However, the soldiers had fled, leaving the people defenceless. The Portuguese army had inflicted many casualties.. Several of the wounded had been cared for at the hospital at Kisantu, 100 kilometres from Kinshasa. The refugees and the inhabitants of Kimbona, Kimpindi, Mpete, Kiyangila and Yoyo had abandoned their villages and fled for their lives. UNTA requested the Congolese Government to guard its frontiers. It also asked the Special Committee to make an on-the-spot

inquiry in order to establish the accuracy of the accusations made by President Mobutu, who had said that Portuguese forces frequently intruded into Congolese territory and attacked villages.

733. During the last six years, there had been daily bombings, burnings and massacres throughout Angola. The cause of that terrible war was the Portuguese Government's obstinate refusal to grant the Angolan people the right of self-determination, in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. The Portuguese Government had established a reign of terror in Angola. It perpetuated its domination with the assistance of its NATO allies, including the United States of America, which had sent into Angola hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, some of which had been manufactured in Israel, and hundreds of military aircraft. The United States had also sent men to officer the Portuguese forces. Some of the large Portuguese companies established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were also financing the military action in Angola. The Portuguese had been torturing and killing for six years. They spared neither women, nor children, nor old people. In the circumstances, UNTA saw no alternative to armed combat. The leaders of the Angolan political parties realized that they could win independence for their country only by waging a war without quarter. If the struggle was to be successful, all the popular forces must be mobilized into a broad national liberation front. Unfortunately, the Angolan political parties were divided and the Portuguese Government, supported by capitalist and imperialist forces, took advantage of their feuding. At the present time, those parties could be divided into the moderate group, composed of several inoffensive parties, and the strong group, consisting of three parties. The Lisbon Government had tried to make the moderate group accept the Community as the price of success. Secret negotiations had been held at Lisbon and Luanda, but had not led to any result. The Portuguese authorities had consistently refused to recognize the strong parties, which were taking direct action against them. The customary chiefs, for their part, had tried to negotiate at Luanda. The Portuguese authorities had hired faithful lackeys. The Portuguese Ambassador at Kinshasa, who had been replaced by the Spanish Ambassador, was co-ordinator for the Lisbon and Luanda Governments' policy of corruption.

734. The Portuguese Government was carrying on a mendacious propaganda campaign in Angola. The UNTA delegation, which had just returned to Kinshasa after a tour through Angola, had confirmed that the Portuguese were distributing leaflets extolling the advantages of the Community. They forced prisoners to make propaganda statements in favour of the Community. Portuguese soldiers went into the villages preaching peace and understanding. They claimed that henceforth all inhabitants of Angola would be equal and that the evils suffered by the Angolan people had come to an end. However, the lackeys of the Portuguese colonialists forgot that there could be no Community without the consent of the Angolan people.

735. The Angolans were determined to fight on until final victory. They were encouraged by the example of the Algerian patriots who, after seven years of fierce struggle, had thrown off the age-old chains of French imperialism. However, once again, the Angolans could not vanquish Portuguese imperialism, which was supported by international imperialist forces, except by uniting to form a solid front. Unity of action was essential for success. UNTA deplored the political squabbles dividing the Angolan parties. UPA and PDA refused to make common cause with MPLA and the trade unions. For six years UNTA had unceasingly attempted to arrange meetings between the leaders of all political and trade union groups in Angola in order to persuade them to unite. In 1961 it had set up a Consultation Commission for the purpose of welding all parties into a single front. However, it had encountered only misunderstanding. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had, for its part, appointed conciliation commissions, which had not achieved very satisfactory results because of the partisanship of some of their members. The divisions among the Angolan nationalists were kept alive by foreign capitalists. The United States, United Kingdom and German imperialists, who had made common cause with those who wished to supplant the Portuguese colonialists in Africa, like Israel, were using a handful of Angolan exiles to arrange the kidnapping and murder of patriotic Angolan fighters. The Angolan people demanded that all the national liberation movements should unite and take concerted action. It now remained to find out whether Angolan politicians were prepared to admit their mistakes and abandon their pettiness. UNTA hoped for the convocation of a national congress whose purpose would be to unify all the fighting forces into a

single front; to give the Revolution a programme based on truly revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist principles; to train a body of political leaders who would concern themselves with the education of the masses in accordance with the programme laid down by a representative front; and lastly, to analyse the historical position of the Angolan people.

736. UNTA would never cease its fight until it had attained the objective it had set itself, namely the reunification of the fighting forces and the liberation of Angola. It hoped that the Special Committee would make itself the spokesman for Angolan patriots. It also hoped that the United Nations would assist Angolan refugees, who were dying of hunger and disease. Since 1961 UNTA had done much for them: it had distributed food and medicine. But it also needed agricultural implements. The refugees were farmers; if they were confined to large towns, they would become bandits.

737. UNTA was at one with all the workers of Africa, Asia and Latin America who were fighting for the same cause, and especially its brothers in Viet-Nam, Somalia, Aden, Palestine, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the other Portuguese colonies, who were dealing death blows to imperialism and colonialism.

738. Asked what firm evidence the petitioner could advance to support the wild allegations he had made with regard to the United States support of Portugal's action, he replied that he could show the United States representative an article stating that Portuguese officers were being sent abroad for training in how to wage "a Viet-Nam type of war". In 1964, moreover, there had been fifty-four United States officers in Angola: for what purpose had they been in the country?

739. The representative of the United States of America, commenting on the petitioner's allegation that United States officers were serving in Angola and that hundreds of United States aircraft and hundreds of thousands of United States arms were being used by the Portuguese there, said that it was preposterous and incredible. His Government did not support such action by Portugal in its overseas Territories, to which not a single United States officer, aircraft or gun had been sent. No firm evidence for the allegations made had been advanced by the petitioner.

940. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, replying to the statement made by the United States representative, recalled that many resolutions had been passed by various United Nations organs calling upon Member States to

cease giving assistance to Portugal. There was, however, evidence to show that it was because of the moral, financial and military assistance which Portugal received from Western Powers, particularly the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO allies, that the dictatorial régime of Salazar was continuing to ignore the legitimate demands of the people under its domination, and to wage war against them.

741. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated the facts in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 25 November 1966. They had now been corroborated in the Special Committee by statements which vividly illustrated the magnitude of the economic assistance received by Lisbon from its Western allies, particularly the United States.

742. In 1962, Portugal had received two loans, one of \$20 million from the United States and one of DM150 million from the Federal Republic of Germany. Similar assistance had also been given by the International Bank, a specialized agency of the United Nations in which, however, the United Nations rule of one country one vote did not prevail, votes being based upon the volume of capital subscribed, which gave the United States the greatest share. The Bank had its headquarters at Washington, D.C.

743. Evidence had been given in the Special Committee that F.86 and Lockheed aircraft were being used in the Portuguese colonies, and there could be no doubt concerning the economic and moral assistance being given by the United States to the Portuguese colonialists, who were violating the Charter and waging a foul war against a heroic people.

744. The representative of Spain, commenting on the petitioner's reference to the help given to the Portuguese by the Spanish diplomatic representative at Kinshasa, explained that the help was confined to protecting Portuguese interests in consular matters and in no way implied support of Portuguese policy as a whole. Although the two nations were alike in many ways, he deprecated the tendency to confuse Spain with Portugal.

745. The representative of the United States of America, in exercise of his right of reply concerning what he referred to as certain aspersions cast on the policies of the United States and of NATO towards Territories under Portuguese administration

in Africa, said that his Government's policy was based upon its conviction that all men were entitled to live in justice and liberty under political and economic systems of their own choosing, and that the prospects for a stable peace in Africa depended largely upon steady, orderly and rapid progress towards true self-determination. It also believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should continue to be considered as non-self-governing within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and that the people of those Territories should have the right to the full and free exercise of self-determination. It did not consider that the limited measure of self-determination contemplated by the Government of Portugal took the wishes of the inhabitants fully into account.

746. United States policy concerning the shipment of arms and military material to Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa had been clear and consistent. Since 1961 the United States Government had been aware that it would be unwise and unjust to permit arms supplied to Portugal under NATO commitments to be used in its overseas Territories. United States policy thus preceded by four years Security Council resolution 218 of 23 November 1965. The United States did not supply Portugal with arms or military equipment either from public or private sources for use in those Territories and exports of those items to Portugal itself required specific assurances that the material would not be used in Africa. His Government was aware of no confirmed reports that material shipped under its present policy to Portugal was in fact reaching the overseas Territories.

747. Tendentious accounts had recently been given in the Special Committee concerning alleged NATO support for military action in the Portuguese-administered Territories. He stressed that no NATO member could dictate policy to Portugal a sovereign State, although the United States Government had not hesitated to make its views known to the Portuguese authorities. It was perhaps because of Portugal's unyielding resistance to those views that some delegations in the Committee had focused their attention on NATO. That approach was wholly unwarranted and perhaps motivated, in certain cases by considerations of foreign policy which lay outside the Committee's purview. Indeed, it sometimes brought back to mind "cold war" polemics.

748. NATO was not in fact supplying weapons or armaments to Portugal for use in the African Territories under its administration. NATO was committed to the defence of, and was operational only in, the North Atlantic area. There were no secret protocols extending that area of operations. Moreover, NATO itself did not supply arms, although some NATO countries supplied arms to others under their common defence commitments. The United States did not provide arms to Portugal under NATO arrangements for use in the Territories under Portuguese administration; the policies of the other NATO countries were matters of public record. The Portuguese Government's unyielding attitude could not be attributed to its membership in NATO; logic would indeed suggest the contrary, for the NATO countries other than Portugal which still had dependent Territories had generally accepted the principle of self-determination laid down by the United Nations, and most of them had expressed disagreement with Portuguese policy. Indeed, the NATO countries had "decolonized" extremely rapidly in the last decade or so, implementing policies that were in direct contrast with those applied by Portugal.

749. Most of the arguments advanced by certain delegations concerning his country's present policy towards Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa were very old and discredited. It had, for example, been alleged that Lockheed Harpoon, F-84 and F-86 aircraft were being used by the Portuguese military authorities in Africa. But those were old Second World War aircraft, sold as surplus to Portugal long before the present restrictions had been introduced in 1961. The sabre jets supplied to Portugal under the military assistance programme were stationed only in metropolitan Portugal; those previously stationed in Africa had been withdrawn at the request of his Government.

750. Another frequently reiterated statement was that arms and ammunition of United States manufacture were being used by the Portuguese in Africa. Such arms and ammunition had, however, been manufactured during the Second World War and were on sale throughout the world. Stocks had existed in a number of countries other than the United States for many years. His Government had not approved the export of such materiel for use in Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa since 1961, nor was it aware that any arms or equipment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes were being used in those Territories. Such use would indeed constitute an unauthorized diversion from the NATO defence area. His delegation deeply

regretted that armed warfare was being conducted in the Portuguese-administered Territories, and that some old weapons and aircraft manufactured in the United States were apparently involved, but it rejected the accusation that those facts reflected upon the integrity of United States policy or upon NATO.

751. Turning to the allegations bearing on economic policy, he recalled that claims had been made that Western economic interests somehow played a sinister role in impeding the self-determination of the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa. It was, however, surprising that no statistics had been provided on certain economic relationships that would complete the picture; nor had any attempt been made to show how such relationships benefited the Portuguese authorities more than the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Complaints about the evil influences of private investment in that part of the world often came from individuals who, because of their basic conviction, regarded all private investment and private economic activity as exploitation. That viewpoint, however, was not one which a United Nations body could afford to adopt if it wished to maintain its representative nature. In that connexion he pointed out that thirty independent African countries had signed investment guarantee agreements with the United States Government; they would hardly have done so if they had feared exploitation by the United States.

752. In his country, trade and investment were mostly privately controlled, and were not channelled and directed by government authorities on the basis of political or other considerations. United States foreign investment did not seek out colonial areas for political purposes: it sought economic opportunity. In Africa, the United States found such opportunity mainly in the independent countries north of the Zambesi, and the volume of its trade with and investments in those countries were about double that with southern Africa. Investment in Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa was less than in independent African States of comparable size and natural resources.

753. United States Government aid to the Portuguese-administered Territories was limited to supplying, through the World Food Programme, surplus food-stuffs for refugees from those Territories living in the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

754. His Government had consistently supported those provisions in United Nations resolutions that called upon Portugal to speed up the economic and social advancement of the peoples in the Territories under its administration. It had never been demonstrated to his delegation's satisfaction that the economic relationships he had mentioned influenced Portugal's policies towards those Territories, and he did not consider that their termination would improve the present situation.

755. He had been surprised to hear the representative of the USSR repeating charges concerning United States policy towards Portugal that had already been shown to be groundless. He rejected the allegations that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was controlled by the United States. The Bank was an international body whose leadership included representatives from all over the world, and its Articles of Agreement and terms of operation prevented it from being controlled by any individual member State. The charges made by the USSR representative implied disrespect for the integrity of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. In point of fact the Bank had twenty executive directors, five of whom were appointed by the five members with the largest number of shares in the Bank (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, the United Kingdom and the United States), the other fifteen being elected by the remaining members. The executive directors were responsible for the conduct of the Bank's general operations. In that connexion he referred the USSR representative to the official record of the 1645th meeting of the Fourth Committee, held on 28 November 1966.

756. The statement of the USSR representative that the United States Government had made a grant of \$US20 million to Portugal in 1965 was incorrect. Perhaps he had meant the \$US20 million loan contracted by the Portuguese Government in the New York private market to help finance projects in Portugal under a three-year economic development plan. The loan was therefore not a United States Government transaction.

757. As the United States representative in the Security Council had stated when the matter had been last discussed, the United States Government "believes strongly that Portugal should recognize the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories. We have urged Portugal in this Council and outside of

this Council to make this right a reality. We ourselves have no question, nor do we believe that in this body there can be any question, as to what that concept of self-determination ought to be." The United States considered that the self-determination that should be applied in the Territories under Portuguese administration should be that specified in Security Council resolution 183 of 11 December 1963, for which his delegation had voted: "All peoples have the right to self-determination: by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The Government and people of the United States unequivocally supported the application of that concept to the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

758. The Chairman recalled that, in his opening statement, he had appealed to the Western Powers, and in particular to the NATO countries, to cease helping Portugal. Many delegations had followed his example, and for that reason he felt that he owed the Special Committee an explanation.

759. His appeal had been made in all seriousness and was intended to draw attention to the plight of the people under Portuguese administration and to demonstrate that Portugal, a Western State, was responsible for what was happening there. Portuguese soldiers were being trained under NATO arrangements; since Portugal was carrying on no war in Europe, those soldiers were being used in the Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa.

760. In making his appeal he had only been reiterating the one already made in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), adopted by the majority of Member States which would hardly have adopted a text that was not based on facts. Moreover, in 1966 the Special Committee itself had received evidence on the subject from a Portuguese pilot. Certain principles had been laid down, as described by the United States representative; it was time that they were translated into action.

761. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercising his right of reply, said that the United States representative had not adduced any convincing argument to invalidate his previous assertions. Those statements had been repeated for some three years because the United States and other members of NATO continued to ignore United Nations decisions concerning aid to Portugal, thus violating the Charter. His delegation was not suggesting that NATO countries should

dictate policy to Portugal, but only that States Members of the United Nations should comply with the decisions of the General Assembly, which expressed the opinion of the overwhelming majority of its Members.

762. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been adopted by the General Assembly on the initiative of the USSR delegation. It had been supported by some ninety Governments; nine countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium and Spain had abstained. Some of the abstaining delegations, representing major colonial Powers, were members of NATO, thus proving that the colonizers did in fact act in concert. The United States and NATO had continued to assist Portugal, which in its turn continued to repress the freedom fighters in the Territories under its administration.

763. His delegation did not, however, wish to bring "cold war" polemics into the Special Committee, which had important work before it, and he would therefore say no more on the subject.

764. The representative of India said that the representative of the United States, while speaking about the functioning of the IBRD, had made a reference to India and, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be made clear that India condemned Portuguese rule in Africa and stood for the rights of the people in the Portuguese-administered Territories to self-determination and independence.

765. Unlike certain others, the Indian delegation had not only voted for but had also co-sponsored all resolutions on the Portuguese-administered Territories, and had stood by them. His Government had not given any assistance to Portugal to enable it to strengthen its economy and thus to continue its armed aggression against the people under its rule.

766. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation had never questioned the right of any group of States to form an alliance, whether for defensive or for economic reasons. It was for each country to determine its policy in that respect. However, the United Nations needed a guarantee that no arms would find their way, by whatever means, into the Portuguese-administered Territories of Africa for use against the people there. No such assurance had been given, even though a request had been made more than a year previously, and he therefore continued to believe that the arms given to Portugal under NATO arrangements found

their way into Africa. The members of NATO were well aware of Portugal's Constitution and her doctrine that since her Colonies were an integral part of the realm, arms could therefore be used anywhere in her Territories.

767. So far as the International Bank was concerned, the system of weighted voting ensured that the United States, with by far the largest number of shares, wielded considerable influence in that body and could determine the direction in which aid was channelled.

768. The United States representative had stated that no direct assistance was being given by his Government to Portugal and that the loan referred to by the USSR representative had been floated on the New York Stock Exchange. The United States Government had, however, been able to ban trade with and loans to other countries, including some in the western hemisphere, and it was hard to see why it could not do the same in the case of Portugal. Perhaps it did not feel that the slaughter of Africans in the Portuguese-administered Territories was a threat to international peace and security and that its economic involvement caused it to support Portuguese policy in its African colonial Territories.

769. With regard to United States help to Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the World Food Programme, he pointed out that the most important need was not to help but to prevent. It was for the United States Government to take measures to prevent a situation arising in which refugees had to leave their homes because of cruel treatment, to try to convince Portugal that its policy was entirely wrong, and to help the Portuguese-administered Territories to gain independence. As to the United States representative's reference to "self-determination", he believed that the Members of the United Nations generally agreed that the Territories under Portuguese administration should have not "self-determination" but independence.

770. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that he had stated that the assistance which the Western countries, and in particular NATO, gave to Portugal was the crux of the problem. It was for that reason that he wished to exercise his right of reply to the statement by the United States representative.

771. He noted with regret that in the four years during which he himself had been a member of the Special Committee, the tone and content of the United States representative's speeches had not changed. The United States delegation denied all

the facts reported by the delegations of countries which were not members of NATO. Furthermore, the United States representative had tried to isolate the socialist countries, particularly the USSR, but had succeeded only in isolating the United States. He associated himself fully with the Chairman's reply to the United States representative's statement.

772. The United States representative had said that criticism of the economic assistance which the monopolies gave to the Portuguese colonies was based on ideological, political and other concepts. That was not the case. The point at issue was not the financial interests or financial relations of the United States with certain independent countries, but the fact that the United States interests operating in the Portuguese colonies were impeding the struggle which the people of those colonies were waging for their freedom.

773. That problem was related to the problem of the International Bank. It had already been pointed out that in the Bank votes were proportional to the capital invested. The United States had invested the most capital in the Bank and was therefore responsible for its policy and the loans to Portugal. In 1966 the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly had invited a representative of the Bank to speak at one of its meetings, and he had not denied the existence of the loans. The Fourth Committee had also heard the views of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and at his suggestion had included in a resolution on the Portuguese colonies a paragraph requesting all States to abandon policies that assisted Portugal and to ensure that their representatives in international organizations supported United Nations policy and took no decisions that would result in Portugal's being granted assistance. Before adopting General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) the Members of the United Nations had thus examined all the facts; they had consulted the competent United Nations organs and even the Legal Counsel. The Fourth Committee's suggestions should therefore be acted upon; the peoples who were struggling for their freedom needed help. It was to be hoped that the United States representative would accept those suggestions, so that the Committee could work in satisfactory conditions and complete its task, which was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

774. The representative of Spain, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union representative had first mentioned

Spain's abstention on a General Assembly motion submitted by the USSR and had then stated that the members of NATO had abstained from voting on the said motion, he wished to put it on record that Spain was not a member of NATO.

Petitioners concerning Mozambique

775. Mr. Gumane, speaking on behalf of Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), said that his party wished to bring urgently to the Special Committee's notice the threat to peace which prevailed in Mozambique and Africa as a whole as a result of the present political turmoil in Mozambique, and to request that, through its good offices, the crucial matter should be referred to the Security Council, in order to avoid the outbreak of a racial war. A popular uprising was the only solution for the oppressed people of Mozambique if they were to regain their human dignity within the present generation.

776. In spite of Portugal's protestations to the United Nations that Mozambique was an extension of Portugal, that was not so and never would be. The simple and absurd phrase "overseas province" in itself reflected political and administrative discrimination and was geographically meaningless.

777. In the regional administration of the so-called "overseas provinces" the indigenous population, apart from the four hand-picked chiefs in the Legislative Council, had no access to any Senior administration post nor was it admitted to any higher posts of the legislative or executive systems of Portuguese public administration.

778. Because Portugal did not put into effect laws which would offer fair chances of education to the indigenous African people of Mozambique, the result was the legal chicanery being openly practised in the colony, and the inadequacy of education for the African population remained chronic.

779. In the family circle, where education supposedly began, the system of shibalo (forced labour) disunited families. The mother was forced to cultivate large cotton and rice fields and the father was arrested and sent to forced labour, leaving the children without anyone to care for or educate them and without parental love.

780. In the social sector, the majority of the population in Mozambique was not admitted to public places such as hotels, restaurants, cafes, cinemas, etc., except as servants.

781. The Portuguese claimed that Mozambique was a province, yet they always used the discriminatory adjective "overseas" and there were customs barriers between

Mozambique and Portugal and members of all races required a passport to travel from one to the other.

782. Portugal had enacted a number of laws concerning its so-called provinces; some of them were good, but had never been put into practice, especially those referring to the rights of the African population. Reverting to political and administrative discrimination, he said that Portugal had two distinct ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Overseas Ministry, the former responsible for the Portuguese European provinces, and the latter for the so-called "overseas provinces".

783. Racial discrimination was current in the medical services and, in the hospitals, white patients were allocated small double rooms, whereas Africans were put into large dormitories.

784. In the judicial sector, there were courts to try the Africans ironically called Tribunaio Privativos, while the white settlers were judged in regular courts, proving once more the inequality of treatment between the autóctone and the não-autóctones.

785. Portugal had constantly and energetically refused to permit inquiry committees from the United Nations or any other international organization, to visit its colonial Territories and examine freely the real situation. It was unbelievable that any country, proud of its internal administrations, if accused unjustly, should refuse to accept the visit of an international Press committee to enquire into the validity of the accusations. That had never been accepted by Portugal. If the Government had nothing to fear or hide, why did it not allow an international Press committee, composed of at least two members from each of the countries represented on the Special Committee, but excluding the United Kingdom and the United States, to visit Mozambique freely without being followed by the police censorship authorities, to enter whatever part of Mozambique it wished and to interview whomever it chose.

786. Equality in employment was non-existent and access to higher positions was available first to whites, then to mulattos and finally to the blacks.

787. Although the Portuguese colonial Government claimed that there was no forced labour in Mozambique, the fact remained that all government and private enterprises in Mozambique employed forced labour.

788. In the Mozambique Railways and other government enterprises under the law against forced labour, the supply of forced labourers had been interrupted for the purpose of replacing them by voluntary workers with a maximum salary of twenty escudos daily. For two months a large deficit had emerged in the government accounts. Then the law had been secretly revoked by the Governor-General who had ordered all local administrations to reintroduce the shibalo, the recruited workers thereafter being called shibalo volunteers and the six escudos they had been receiving daily was increased to eight.

789. The shibalo system would continue so long as United Kingdom colonialism and United States neo-colonialism existed in Africa. The British and Americans were responsible for that system in Africa, although they put the blame on Portugal, a small and under-developed European country, a mere pawn in the hands of larger Powers in Western Europe which supported another white brother nation in the family of colonial exploiters.

790. Those nations thrived and made Portuguese colonialism thrive with them on the sacrifices and misery of the Mozambican people through unscrupulous investments.

791. The big companies in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans who operated them through the Portuguese Government offices in Mozambique and more than 250,000 Mozambicans were sold yearly to work in the mines and farms of the exploiters in Rhodesia and South Africa.

792. The Convention of 1928 allowed agents of the mining companies of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) to recruit up to 150,000 Africans annually, and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques. That was highly profitable for the colonial Government of Portugal but it meant misery, suffering and exploitation to the indigenous African people. Not only was the port of Lourenço Marques one of the best in southern Africa but the colonial Government also collected taxes and wealth from each worker who brought back his salary to spend in Mozambique. The mortality of mine workers was sometimes as high as 456 per 1,000.

793. Until 1960 the Mozambican people had been suffering, but they had reacted intermittently against the barbaric so-called Public Security Police. When the independence of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi had been proclaimed, the Portuguese

Gestapo - PIDE (Polícia Internacional de Defesa de Estado), had started a new wave of terror. That had been followed by a wave of imprisonment. Old men, women and young people had been crowded into gaols and some were still within the PIDE's torture chambers. Innocent people committed without trial, families without bread and help all were fighting desperately for their freedom. People like Dr. Agostinho Ilunga and Tomas Nhatumba, Deniz Mondlane were expatriated to Lisbon and were still in Portugal serving indefinite sentences. Prisoners of the PIDE often had to live on bread and water for ten days at a time.

794. It should be noted that in the interrogation room, the prisoners went through indescribable tortures, being left for thirteen or more days in standing positions without sleeping, while being watched by arrogant guards who were changed every four hours. The prisoners had no communication with the outside world and were not allowed to receive visitors.

795. Since 22 October 1965 the barbaric Portuguese régime had intensified its war of genocide in the districts of Tete, Manica e Sofala and Zambezia arresting, torturing and killing people and burning the villages. Since then over 3,500 innocent and defenceless Africans had been killed by the Portuguese colonial troops, and many thousands were languishing in concentration camps in all parts of Mozambique. As a result, many Mozambicans had fled to Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi to take up refuge in those friendly African countries.

796. At that time, his organization had protested to the United Nations through its permanent representative in Zambia, pointing out the war of genocide being carried out by the Portuguese colonial Government against the oppressed African people of Mozambique. He had been surprised that no action whatsoever had subsequently been taken.

797. COREMO therefore wished to inform the Special Committee that, since it had failed to bring Portugal to its senses and to give the peoples of Mozambique the right of self-determination and self-rule, COREMO would be forced to liberate its country with the help of peace- and freedom-loving countries of Africa and elsewhere.

798. Portugal should realize that COREMO was well aware that the war would be long, but was confident of eventual victory. It would be better to fight the Portuguese for more than fifty years than remain under Portuguese domination for another

465 years. That determination should also be appreciated by the imperialist and neo-colonialist countries which were helping Portugal, materially, financially and otherwise, to perpetuate the war in Mozambique so as to safeguard their investments in southern Africa.

799. With the aid received from the NATO Powers and especially the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Portugal had been able during the past six years to construct twelve new military bases as well as maintain a force of about 46,000 troops in Mozambique.

800. Flying box-cars laden with Portuguese soldiers landed frequently at Lourenço Marques and Beira. Apart from the existing military air bases, civil airfields were being used by the Portuguese air force. Others, some with runways long enough to take jet aircraft and troop carriers, had been and were still being hastily built in the wild inland terrain throughout the country, with the use of African forced labour working from dawn to dusk under the ever-present threat of death.

801. Some 200 bush airstrips had been laid out in the territory, ready for landing troops and other security forces. All troops were armed with the latest automatic rifles, mortars, heavy and light machine-guns and other forms of military equipment supplied to Portugal by its NATO allies. Portuguese farmers working in cottage communities in rural areas could freely buy sub-machine-guns or rifles and revolvers at their local stores and ammunition, too, was readily available to white settlers. In view of Portugal's colonial policy, the aid being supplied to Portugal, mainly by NATO Powers, could only increase its determination further to enslave and exterminate the Africans.

802. In carrying out its oppressive policies, the colonial Government of Portugal was also backed by the fascist Government of South Africa and the white minority rebel Government of Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, which were also bent on the further enslavement of the African people, their principal aim being to suppress the liberation movements of Africa and entrench colonialism and imperialism.

803. Through agreements between the three colonial Governments, Mozambicans living in South Africa and Rhodesia were being kidnapped by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) with the assistance of Vorster and Smith.

804. A recent eye-witness report from the interior of Mozambique described the brutal policy of destruction and extermination of the indigenous African

population by the Portuguese colonialists and of the poisoning of food and water supplies. Other eye-witnesses had reported similar incidents. In January 1967, in the port of Lourenço Marques, a Portuguese supervisor had poisoned two casks of wine with sulphate of soda causing the death of thirty-three African dock workers. The criminal had not been brought to justice.

805. It was difficult to understand how the United Nations, which believed in peace, justice, dignity and human rights, could harbour a Member which proudly boasted that in Mozambique there were no Mozambicans, only Portuguese, and that Mozambique could not exist without Portugal.

806. Portugal had long spoken of its civilizing mission, the essence of which was to raise the moral and social levels of the African in its colonial possessions. The policy of assimilados had failed and the African people had rejected the alternatives of becoming Portuguese citizens or living as indígenas; they wished to live as free people in their own country.

807. Because of the inherent right of every human being to a government of his choice, all people had the right freely to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. COREMO, therefore, proposed that the statement that the colony of Mozambique was a province of Portugal should be rejected; that the widely circulated claim by the Portuguese Government that the African people enjoyed the same rights as any Portuguese citizens should be denounced as a deliberate falsehood; and that the economic exploitation to which the African people were subjected under Portuguese colonialism, which was marked by naked fascist repression, savage brutality and organized terrorism, should be so strongly condemned.

808. It demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees in Portuguese prisons in Mozambique, Portugal and other territories under Portuguese colonial administration, the immediate dismantling of all military bases detrimental to the interests of the African people in Mozambique and the immediate granting of complete and unconditional independence to the African people of Mozambique.

809. Asked about the settlement of immigrants from the metropolitan country in Mozambique, the petitioner explained the difficulty of obtaining exact figures, but thought that about 1,250 Portuguese immigrants arrived in Mozambique each month, in addition to the troops who, on the completion of their two to three years' service in the country, were entitled to become settlers there. The number of Portuguese settlers was increasing so rapidly that many areas which before had been traditionally African were being cleared to make room for them.

810. Asked whether the twelve military bases mentioned by him were being or had been used by forces other than Portuguese and especially those of any NATO Power, the petitioner said that they were also used by South African and Southern Rhodesian forces and that the South African Government had recently sent in troops to be trained in guerilla fighting. The air bases were primarily used by the South African and Southern Rhodesian air forces, which also used the civil air base at Lourenço Marques when training nearby. He had also heard from Portuguese deserters that, about a month previously, South African and Southern Rhodesian forces had been in action against the combatants in the Tete district. The bases could certainly also be used by the NATO Powers, because Mozambique was considered a Portuguese province and all the NATO allies had the right to overfly and use bases in each others' territory.

811. Asked whether troops of any other nationality were fighting with the Portuguese against the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that soldiers from the Federal Republic of Germany had been sent to Portugal and that some were being used in Mozambique as technicians. It had been reported that Spain also was sending technicians. Ian Smith was in contact with the Portuguese colonialists and there had been exchanges of soldiers between the Portuguese Government and South Africa.

812. Regarding COREMO's membership, the petitioner said that, while there were 152,000 official party members, since 1965 about 25,000 people had been living in the forests and mountains with the combatants and those should also be considered members of COREMO. It was difficult to give exact figures because many members had had to flee to Zambia and Malawi.

813. With regard to the methods the Portuguese used to kill the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that there had been many deaths after the Tete uprising when the villagers had been rounded up by troops. Some had been shot when crossing the Zambesi river and others kept for days in a concentration camp without food. Many members of political parties had been shot and their leaders taken in military aircraft to the Lourenço Marques concentration camp. In February 1966, thirty-five people had been shot, their bodies thrown into a pit and burnt. People were dying daily in the forests and mountains from untended bullet wounds; many refugees arrived in Zambia wounded, including a boy of fourteen who had to have a bullet removed from his leg on arrival. Men, women and children were all shot indiscriminately and the treatment of prisoners in the concentration camps was no different from that in the German camps during the Second World War; it might, if anything, be worse.

814. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), said that the petition, although it should be considered as a whole, consisted of three parts. He would present the first part, and he and his two colleagues would then each present the part with which he was concerned.

815. Portuguese colonialism denied the people the most elementary human rights. Exploitation, oppression and repression were the principles upon which Portuguese policy in Mozambique was based. Ruthless racial discrimination was the order of the day in all relations between the settlers and the majority of the Mozambican people, who wished to regain their freedom and bring to an end such exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination. They had tried to obtain independence by peaceful means, through negotiation with the Portuguese Government, which, however, had only tightened its hold over Mozambique by sending more troops and declaring, in the words of Salazar quoted in Life, that "Portugal will not abandon her overseas Territories, in spite of the demands of the United Nations". In view of that attitude, FRELIMO had decided to resort to an armed struggle for freedom and independence. It had been necessary not only because of oppression and exploitation but also because Portugal had refused to admit the people's right to

freedom and independence. That point must be stressed, because it justified all the moral and material support that could be given by those who genuinely loved freedom.

816. The Portuguese Government had put into operation an international propaganda machine aimed at convincing the world that peace, well-being and progress reigned in its so-called overseas provinces. To make certain that that image was accepted, it had enlisted the services of some unscrupulous foreign journalists and political figures willing to tell a false story for a free holiday or a few thousand dollars, who, on returning to their countries, had painted an idyllic picture of Mozambique where there was racial harmony, economic progress and peace.

817. Mr. Matsinhe, speaking as a member of FRELIMO denounced the Portuguese Government for its policy of repression, which was costing the lives of thousands of innocent and peaceful people, whose only crime had been to desire a happy life, peace and freedom, in order to call the attention of the world to the Portuguese colonial problem so that it could exert strong pressure on Portugal to renounce its inhuman colonialist activities and its criminal war of systematic genocide.

818. The atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonialists against the Mozambican people were not a new development in the history of Portuguese oppression. The chapter of suffering had started with their first arrival. At the present stage of armed struggle, the savagery of the Portuguese knew no bounds and went beyond the limits of human decency.

819. When the Portuguese suffered heavy and humiliating losses from guerilla activities and were unable to retaliate against FRELIMO's armed forces, they turned on defenceless and innocent people and indiscriminately tortured pregnant women, children and the aged to death in the vain hope of annihilating the national liberation movement.

820. Portugal, a Member of the United Nations, continued insolently, with the connivance of other Members that claimed to be staunch defenders of peace and liberty, to disregard that Organization's resolutions. FRELIMO was convinced that, without the encouragement of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other NATO members, Portugal would not dare to show its present intransigence. It was economically a very poor country and without material and moral support it would be physically impossible for it to maintain such a costly war throughout its three colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

821. Portugal had been condemned by the world for the monstrous and inhuman crimes it had committed against the African people. In order to hoodwink world opinion, it had recently instituted a military tribunal to try a number of Mozambican patriots accused of being members of the FRELIMO at the Portuguese army headquarters in Mozambique, under the chairmanship of Colonel Almor Baptista, assisted by an all-white jury of senior Portuguese army officers. The accused had not been prisoners of war, but thirteen Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO. Their only crime had been that they were members of a nationalist movement. The first three, tried on 11 March 1966, were Matias Zefanias Mboa, sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fifteen years' preventive detention, Luis Bernardo Honwane, a well-known writer and journalist, sentenced to twenty-three months' imprisonment and one year's preventive detention and José Gomes Neto, sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. Judgement on the remaining ten patriots had been pronounced on 25 March 1966, when the court had sentenced Joel Monteiro Guduane to four and a half years' imprisonment and fifteen years' deprivation of political rights. The others had been acquitted for lack of evidence.

822. Dissatisfied with the judgement of its own fascist military court, the Portuguese Government had immediately decided to institute another military tribunal to judge those who had been acquitted, had given it stricter instructions and had selected the most obedient members of the military establishment to serve as judges. That was one clear illustration of the odious machinations of the colonial authorities. Another was the fact that hundreds of Mozambican patriots had been arrested at the same time as the thirteen sent to that farcical military tribunal, and that thousands of Mozambican men and women had been sent to prisons and concentration camps in various parts of Mozambique. Why then had the court dealt with only thirteen, and where were the rest? The new military tribunal had not only meted out severe sentences to those acquitted by the first court, but had also retried and imposed stricter sentences on the others. Joel Monteiro Guduane's sentence of four and a half years' imprisonment had been changed to five years, plus an indefinite period of preventive detention. The others had been awarded sentences ranging from six months' to three years' imprisonment. In 1964 the Portuguese had announced the arrest of five other Mozambican patriots, Daniel Malhayeye, Bombarda Tembe, Jose Nkovane, Jose Lameke and Alexandre Machel,

also accused of being members of FRELIMO and of having plotted to overthrow the Portuguese colonialist Government. Soon after their arrest the Portuguese Press had been handed out sensational fabricated stories of their so-called crimes; since then nothing was known of their whereabouts. What had happened to them; and why had they not been included among the thirteen sent to court? Knowing the Portuguese sense of justice it could only be concluded that they had all been murdered.

823. FRELIMO's policy so far in connexion with Portuguese civilians and soldiers who fell into its hands had been to apply the best humanitarian standards, as laid down in international conventions. But, if the Portuguese continued to treat civilian and military patriots as they did, appropriate steps would have to be taken to force them to correct their behaviour.

824. The show of justice that the Portuguese colonialists were presenting to the world was not convincing enough to hide their true nature. They were and always had been cowardly assassins and criminals, who revelled in torturing, maiming and killing defenceless people, and had no respect for the most elementary human rights. They had publicly refused to grant permission to members of an international association of jurists to send a delegation to the trial of the thirteen patriots. Fearing that the true picture of the situation might be exposed, they had also barred foreign journalists from attending, the right to do so having been exclusively reserved to members of the Portuguese Press under the control of Salazar's fascist censorship.

825. Since the Special Committee's last appearance at Dar es Salaam, cases of atrocities involving individual Mozambicans had been reported, including the torture of old people, women and children in an attempt to extort confessions of complicity with freedom fighters or to secure information on FRELIMO guerilla movements. Thousands of innocent Mozambicans of all races and tribes had been the victims.

826. In 1966, a group of Portuguese soldiers had arrested the Paramount Chief of the district of Maniamba, in Niassa Province, and had accused him of being a member of FRELIMO and of harbouring guerillas. In an attempt to extract the information they wanted, they had beaten and tortured him, to no avail. They had then buried him alive up to the neck and had threatened to let him die of suffocation if he

did not speak, but even that had not frightened him into giving any useful information. Hours later, however, he had begun to weaken, and fearing that his end was near he had decided to talk. The Portuguese soldiers had dug him out and with his last breath he had confessed that he was a member of FRELIMO because he was convinced that it would liberate Mozambique. He had told his torturers that they could do what they liked with him, but it would not alter the fact that Mozambique would be free, for the people would fight until the Portuguese left the land. With those words, he had collapsed and died.

827. A young Mozambican girl had told of an experience she had undergone in the village of Mueda, Cabo Delgado. When asked why she had decided to join the armed struggle against the Portuguese, she had replied that in May 1967 her family had been surprised, while tilling their fields, by a group of Portuguese soldiers, who had demanded information on FRELIMO guerilla movements. Since the family had refused to betray the freedom fighters, the Portuguese had cut open the pregnant womb of the girl's sister and extracted the foetus. Cutting open the abdomen of one of her uncles, they had placed the foetus in it, laughing hilariously as if it had been a very funny joke. They had then killed as many of the villagers as they could. The girl had escaped miraculously and joined the guerillas, determined to avenge her family's death and help to free her land.

828. Those cases were only two of thousands of examples of cruelty by the Portuguese in Mozambique. They felt themselves weak and resorted to a system they had used throughout the centuries because they were unable to conquer the determined Mozambicans who wished to be free.

829. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that his people often asked what the attitude of the United Nations was, whether the people represented in it really cared, and whether it had a role to play in the revolution. He reminded the Special Committee of the position taken by the FRELIMO representatives when they had appeared before it in 1965 and had asked it to take a much more positive attitude. They had said then:

"The time of condemnations and platonic censures belongs to the past. We believe that all the future condemnations of Portugal's policies should be accompanied by a clear programme of direct action. Our people are tired of hearing that another international organization has voted on another motion of condemnation censuring Salazar's colonialist policies. For these

resolutions do not serve even to attenuate the misery in which our people live... These resolutions do not give the people any hope for even a remote possibility of a better life."

In 1966, they had repeated the request for more effective action, again without success. They had taken action themselves by proclaiming an armed struggle in September 1964, and some two years later they had achieved important successes, of which a few examples could be cited.

830. Mr. Mutaca, speaking as a member of FRELIMO, said that, at the beginning of the armed struggle in September 1964, the Mozambican people inhabiting certain areas had decided to establish alternative village settlements in order to prevent the Portuguese armed forces from destroying their property. That had been one of several defensive measures that the people had been forced to adopt as a precaution against Portuguese air bombing such as had been experienced in Angola.

831. In abandoning their homes, the people had taken with them food-stuffs, household utensils and livestock to enable them to survive under the difficult conditions that lay ahead. Settling in the forests, mountainsides and river valleys, they had begun to cultivate the land, planting as much as they could under the guidance and protection of the freedom fighters. At the end of the first year of war, they had been able to produce several times more bushels of rice, maize, beans and other agricultural products than before. At times the freedom fighters had been unable to protect the civilian population from indiscriminate and ruthless air attacks, and sometimes even direct invasion by hundreds of Portuguese soldiers, who had ravaged everything in sight. Such attacks had often resulted in mass migrations of old men, women and children seeking shelter in Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania. There were thousands of Mozambican refugees in those States, many of them being directly assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

832. Not only those taking part in FRELIMO's military programme but also hundreds of thousands of civilians who believed that the best way to hasten the destruction of the enemy was to stay and contribute by direct action and labour had chosen to remain in the country.

833. At first, the economic activities of the people living in the liberated and semi-liberated areas had continued without any visible control or guidance by FRELIMO. Nor had the Front supervised the people's efforts to provide minimum

educational, social and medical services: they had decided to organize their agricultural work so as to support such services, and in so doing had made use of whatever talents were available locally. The FRELIMO leaders, however, noting the difficulties encountered by the civilian population in producing for their own needs and for those engaged in the armed struggle, had formulated a number of agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes to meet the situation. 834. Thus, in Cabo Delgado District, they had revived the agricultural producers' co-operatives that had been deliberately discouraged or stopped by the Portuguese. In 1965, a petitioner, Mzee Lazaro Kavandame, had told the Special Committee of the difficulties he had encountered in Cabo Delgado District in trying to help the people by establishing such co-operatives among African peasant farmers. He was now back in Mozambique, not only helping the people to reorganize their economic life but also directing political and military programmes aimed at helping the people to attain immediate independence.

835. The people of Cabo Delgado were producing more cereals, beans, oil seed and small livestock than ever before. In spite of constant harassment by Portuguese bandits sent by the desperate and decadent colonial administrators of Lisbon, the people of Cabo Delgado were fighting courageously on all three vital fronts; political, military and economic. During 1966, the people had cultivated more land than ever before and had planted crops of more direct use to them than the cotton and sisal which the Portuguese colonialists had forced them to produce.

836. The people must first be organized politically and a programme of military action must then be launched in view of the Portuguese Government's refusal to discuss their demand for freedom. In the part of the country that had severed its relations with the Portuguese administration, the people were sufficiently free to remodel their economic life in accordance with their needs and wishes. Now that they cultivated the land to produce what they wanted, they worked harder and grew more. During the current agricultural year, the variety and volume would be bigger than ever before, especially in the areas of Mocimboa do Ruvuma, Macómia, Nangade, Sagal, Muidumbe, Miteda, Mutamba Dos Macondes, Chia and Negumano in Cabo Delgado District.

837. To encourage more agricultural activity in that province, various techniques had been devised in addition to the organization of co-operatives. It had been necessary to redistribute as much arable land as possible to those eager to increase the acreage under cultivation, including the areas set aside by the Portuguese colonialists for the exclusive cultivation of cotton and sisal. It had also been necessary for FRELIMO to help the people to acquire simple working tools, which could not be bought in Mozambique because Portuguese and Asian traders were not allowed to move about without the constant presence of the Portuguese army. FRELIMO had therefore had to buy thousands of hoes, hatchets and pangas and distribute them among the farming population. In 1966 it had distributed in Cabo Delgado District alone 5,000 hoes, 5,000 hatchets and 5,000 pangas, which had greatly helped to expand the acreage of cultivated land. The most common crops in Cabo Delgado were sorghum, rice, cassava, millet, maize, beans, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts, palm oil, tobacco, coffee and ground-nuts. There were many kinds of hardwood which, under normal peaceful conditions, could be converted into commercial timber for domestic use and export.

838. The cultivation of cotton and other non-consumer crops had been suspended until more territory had been liberated. But for the intensified air attacks against cultivated areas, production would have been much higher; but everything possible was being done to alleviate the effects of those bombardments, which were not only directed against crops but also intended to exterminate the civilian population.

839. The fight for liberation was as well advanced in Niassa District as in the Cabo Delgado. In the former, the population density was much lower than in Cabo Delgado, owing to the fact that the region was extensive and that a higher proportion of the population had had to flee to Tanzania and Malawi in the past two years because of the ruthlessness with which the enemy had bombarded villages and crops. The people who had remained had nevertheless intensified their agricultural activities and had produced much more than before. As in Cabo Delgado, the soil was rich and the climate favourable and practically the same kind of crops were produced. To enable the people to cultivate more land, the same kind of programme had been established. Agricultural co-operatives, bush schools, clinics and some rudimentary social services had been organized. In 1966, 4,000 hoes, 4,000 hatchets and 4,000 pangas had been imported.

840. As in Cabo Delgado, commercial activities had had to be drastically curtailed when the armed struggle had begun. The Portuguese colonial army would not allow any commercial relations between freedom fighters and Portuguese or Asian traders. Consequently, whenever the armed struggle had begun in any province or district, the Portuguese authorities had ordered the closure of business establishments except for those directly serving the military.

841. Since the people must continue to live as normal a life as possible in spite of the war, they had had to establish their own shops in which some of the most essential goods could be bought, including salt, oils, textiles and some household equipment. All other economic activity in Niassa District was the same as that in Cabo Delgado.

842. The plans for further economic development in the liberated and semi-liberated areas of Mozambique were designed, inter alia, to improve the people's cultivation techniques, intensify trade in and between the districts, export surplus produce to neighbouring African States, exploit timber, improve local textile production techniques and develop wood-carving. The people were skilful workers in iron and silver. Ways and means were being studied of improving and expanding those traditional crafts in order to produce goods for export that would earn convertible currency.

843. A start had already been made in training people to take over the management of cottage industries using local iron, silver, copper and hardwood for the production of simple household goods such as hoes, pangas, hatchets, bedstands, needles and ornamental trinkets. The section of FRELIMO dealing with industrial development and production had recently been studying the various kinds of rubber produced in Mozambique to determine which kind should be encouraged for export. It had also been experimenting with various techniques of apiculture to improve the production of honey, which was a rich source of vitamins and energy for people in the liberated areas.

844. During the past two years, FRELIMO had been preoccupied with the need to acquire convertible foreign exchange. One of the best ways of doing so was to export agricultural produce and cottage industry products. It was now in the process of reorganizing the work of the traditional carvers of black hardwood, whose goods were of world-wide renown. They had so far been exploited by

unscrupulous traders and foreign tourists, but it was hoped to organize the sale of Makonde art objects to enable the people to reap the benefits of their work.

845. During 1966, 500 tons of cashew nuts, 100 tons of sesame seed, 100 tons of ground-nuts and 10 tons of castor oil seed had been exported. It was hoped to export more, and also cereals, such as maize, rice, sorghum and millet and legumes, during 1967.

846. FRELIMO intended to continue to build up a stronger economic base in all the districts which fell under its control each year and in which the people were free to engage in agriculture, industry and commerce. The people of Mozambique were eager to work harder because they knew that the more they produced the better their lives would be, and the sooner their country would be free.

847. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that the people in the liberated areas were in great need of social services of all kinds, including medical services. When the Portuguese army had been forced to retreat, the official health services, administrative services, schools and missionary institutions had been withdrawn. Immediately after the beginning of the armed struggle in some areas, the Portuguese administrative centres and mission stations had been turned into garrisons for the Portuguese army, and any medical services which had remained had been reserved for wounded soldiers.

848. That situation had forced FRELIMO to provide some alternative services to those Mozambicans who had chosen freedom and were lucky enough to find themselves in areas controlled by the liberation forces. It had accepted the responsibility of giving as much assistance as possible to all those living in liberated and semi-liberated areas.

849. A medical system had been established to plan, organize and direct such medical services as could be afforded. The services were directed by two white Mozambican doctors of Portuguese descent, a married couple educated in Lisbon, and assisted by a team of Mozambican medical aides, nurses and nursing aides, most of them trained in Mozambique.

850. Several health centres had been established in each liberated area, to give different types of medical assistance. Some were limited to administering first-aid to casualties, or treating those with simple health problems. Those who could not be treated adequately in the first-aid centres were transferred as quickly as

possible to centres equipped with better medical facilities and given better care by more experienced medical officers. Every liberated district and circunscrição had several medical centres staffed by different types of medical officers. However, the lack of adequately trained medical staff and of funds for buying the minimum equipment necessary for even a modest bush clinic, together with the constant difficulty of finding moderately priced drugs and medical supplies, limited the medical services needed by the hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans living in the liberated and semi-liberated areas. So far, however, the only real material support had been that given to those Mozambicans who had been forced to flee to neighbouring African States. Since most Mozambicans did not want to become refugees, the population in Mozambique would continue to suffer for a long time if that policy was not changed.

851. There had been some exceptional cases of States acting on the Committee's resolutions and sending a few boxes of drugs and medical supplies. That assistance, however, had been inadequate, since the goods sent were often surplus materials and, coming from temperate climates, not always suitable for treating tropical diseases, among the most common of which were malaria, yaws, scabies, protein deficiency diseases, bilharziasis, hookworm, intestinal parasitoses and pneumonia.

852. Tanzania and Kenya had rendered valuable assistance in the speedy supply of vaccines during epidemics among the displaced population of Mozambique. During the past two years, 100,000 people had been vaccinated against smallpox.

853. As was well known, it was impossible to establish and maintain any medical services, even modest ones, without funds, and because the people were at war the lack of funds was even more acute. It was therefore imperative that the United Nations or individual States should give special attention to financing the medical services. Those responsible for their direction were constantly bombarded with requests from the various medical centres for more drugs and medical supplies, clothing, vehicles, etc., for which funds were needed, and without which the medical workers were unable to save lives.

854. In addition to the two Mozambican doctors directing the medical programme, the medical staff of 400 consisted of three kinds of officers. The first kind included medical aides, who were graduates of Mozambican medical training centres and who, after working in the Portuguese system for a number of years, had decided to join the active fight against colonialism. A few were recruited every

year, and formed a valuable addition to the medical programme. The second group was composed of those who had graduated from the ordinary schools of nursing in Mozambique and who, after working for some time within the colonial medical services, had also decided to join in the fight. That group, representing the largest number of medical staff, was extremely useful, since its members had been trained to handle almost all conceivable types of cases.

855. The third group was composed of graduates of FRELIMO's own nurses' training school within the Mozambique Institute. That group was growing more rapidly than the others because its training was under FRELIMO control. The first thirteen nurses had graduated in 1966 and had all returned to Mozambique to work among the 800,000 people living in the 75,000 square miles of liberated and semi-liberated territory. Another class of nurses was about to graduate from the Mozambique Institute, and after a short period of practical training would join the others in Mozambique.

856. There was still a limit to the number of young candidates that could be enrolled each year, due mainly to the scarcity of those with an adequate academic background to follow the course. To minimize that academic handicap, which it was believed had been created intentionally by the Portuguese for obvious reasons, a secondary school programme had been launched within the Mozambique Institute.

857. The first African Mozambican physician was about to graduate and would shortly join FRELIMO at Dar es Salaam to participate actively in the programme being promoted by his two white fellow-countrymen. He was certain to be only the first of many African doctors who would join the ranks of the freedom fighters.

858. A well-organized programme of education had been included as an essential part of the action programme, to facilitate the operation of which the Mozambique Institute had been established. FRELIMO's educational section co-ordinated all educational institutions and programmes. The idea of the Mozambique Institute had been conceived in 1962 and launched the following year. In 1963, a secondary school centre had been established; thirty-five students had been enrolled, and it had been hoped finally to increase their number to fifty-two. Within a few months, however, many more had sought places, and the residential quarters had been forced to take in more than 100. A nurses' training course had been added to the academic secondary programme. A document was annexed to the petition giving

further details concerning the Mozambique Institute, from which it would be noted that two more primary school courses had been established, both of them to cater for the needs of Mozambican refugee children in Tanzania and neighbouring independent States, and of some selected children brought out for the purpose.

859. The most important preoccupation of FRELIMO in that connexion was the planning, establishment and directing of schools in the liberated and semi-liberated areas, a task that had already begun and that was expanding every year as the fight for liberation progressed. There were more than 10,000 Mozambican primary school children attending classes in about 100 bush schools, with an average of 250 pupils per teacher. Those children were privileged in that they had someone who, although ill-equipped to teach them, was able to share with them the little he did know, when there were many more thousands in both the liberated and occupied areas with no teachers at all.

860. The people of Mozambique were in the third year of the armed struggle, and were still suffering. One third of the country was at war, while the other two thirds were preparing to join in as soon as conditions were favourable. As long as the people were convinced of their right to be free, no matter what the Portuguese might do, they would triumph.

861. Asked for more details concerning the organization in the free zones under the effective control of the freedom fighters, the steps being taken to mobilize a greater number of people and intensify the fight for national liberation, and the organization of the other aspects of the people's lives, the petitioner replied that the organization could be divided into three phases. The first, which was sometimes called "illegal" but which he preferred to call clandestine, covered the organization of the masses to prepare them for military action and applied mostly to the African population. The second phase was that of military action, which was undertaken as soon as the people were ready. There was a distinct division of the population into two groups: the administrators, army and police, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, with certain liberal Europeans and Asians remaining uncommitted. The Portuguese troops and police dropped objects resembling bombs, intending to frighten the people and make them surrender but, in fact, they merely encouraged them to go into the forests and join the freedom fighters. The

Portuguese administrative organization then broke down for lack of the money usually obtained from taxes, while the people in the free zones established their own administrative system, which represented the third phase, that of reconstructing the social and other services necessary for daily life, organizing agricultural work, etc. Sometimes the dividing line between the white community and the mass of the population was not very clearly defined. European and Asian farmers and missionaries often wished to remain in contact with members of the liberation forces. On the other hand, the Portuguese army sometimes occupied large farms and mission stations. Where the administrative organization worked successfully in the free zones, the Portuguese army was very careful not to interfere. The administrators were often the traditional leaders and chiefs, although they could not always command enough respect among the people and other leaders had to be chosen to form the administrative structure. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Portugal had never considered Africans suitable for high administrative posts, and there had not been one African District Commissioner under their régime. The line between black and white was therefore clear, the former with some fanatical farmers, constituting the army and para-military organizations and the latter forming the new administrations in the free zones.

862. Asked whether FRELIMO's military successes had had an important political impact on the non-liberated areas of Mozambique and whether it was possible that a mass resistance movement might grow up within them, the petitioners informed the Committee that the armed struggle in the northern third of Mozambique had had considerable influence on the other two thirds of the country. It was significant that, in 1964, the Portuguese Government had been forced, for the first time, to appoint a soldier as Governor-General. It had already done so in Angola in 1961 and in Guinea (Bissau) in 1963. In no case had any such military Governor-General remained in office for more than two years. In any country, the budget was the most sensitive indicator. The Portuguese budget for 1967 provided for a 25 per cent increase over 1966 for the administration of the overseas "provinces". Of a budget of £252 million £98 million had been earmarked for the colonial wars. The 120,000 men of the Portuguese armed forces in the Territories under Portuguese administration were to cost £43,750,000 in 1967, as against £31 million in 1966.

For purposes of comparison, the item covering health and education for 1967 amounted to £34 million. In addition to those items, there had been numerous special provisions for expenditure on the overseas "provinces".

863. With respect to the situation in Mozambique itself, it was notorious that, in the southern half of the country, people were constantly being harassed by the police and the army. It was estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested or had disappeared, thirteen of whom had been brought before the courts. FRELIMO had approached the International Red Cross which, in 1966, had sent a mission to Mozambique. The mission had seen many thousands of prisoners, all wearing FRELIMO uniforms. The attempt had thus been made to persuade the Red Cross that all the prisoners in Portuguese hands were "terrorists". It had not been shown any "civilian" prisoners. The Archduke of Hapsburg, after a visit to Mozambique, had stated that the Portuguese authorities had succeeded in containing the "terrorist" movement and had wiped out any support it might have had in the southern part of the Territory. That statement was incorrect; there were thousands of FRELIMO members in the, as yet, non-liberated areas. It was nevertheless, true that the Portuguese had made every attempt to annihilate them and had been prepared to destroy whole villages in order to be certain of wiping out FRELIMO leaders whom they knew to be among the general population. The police were ubiquitous in those areas. No meetings of more than five people were permitted. Those facts would be a sufficient reminder to anyone who had suffered under colonial rule.

864. Asked whether the movement had embryonic information services which could spread information in African countries on its work and on the situation in Mozambique, the petitioners said that FRELIMO had an information service that operated from three different bases: Dar es Salaam, Cairo and Algiers. The one at Dar es Salaam published weekly war dispatches indicating the problems that were being faced and the victories won. It also produced at least once a month a publication summarizing events during the month and containing political information, such as the extent to which the United Nations resolutions were being implemented, the actions of the Western Powers with regard to Portugal, etc. Radio Tanzania broadcast communiqués in English, Swahili and the languages of Mozambique.

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865. The Cairo centre published summaries in English of the material produced at Dar es Salaam, which appeared in Middle East newspapers. Radio Cairo also had a section dealing with Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

866. The Algiers centre concentrated on publications in French for circulation in Europe and maintained contact with the other French-language agencies.

867. Countries interested in FRELIMO's activities made a special effort to receive and broadcast relevant material, and cuttings of articles published by friendly countries were sent in from various parts of the world. FRELIMO was in constant contact with as many newspaper groups as possible in those Western countries which followed the Portuguese line, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Some newspapers in those countries were willing to publish the facts, but they were less enthusiastic than those in socialist countries, and most Western newspapers were pro-Portuguese.

868. Giving further details on the strengthening of the military and police apparatus in Mozambique and on the activities of the PIDE, the petitioners said that Portugal was steadily expanding military establishment in Mozambique in response to the increased activities of the liberation movement. Every three months or so, the Portuguese Government had to vote a supplementary appropriation to meet the rising cost of the war. About a year ago, the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been about 16,000; now it was approximately 65,000, although the Portuguese Government admitted to only 45,000. But besides the army, there were some 15,000 police; and there was also a so-called volunteer corps consisting of practically all adult white settlers and any Africans who could be persuaded or coerced to join them. Recently, the term of service of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been increased from two to three or four years, depending on the needs of the situation.

869. There were about 1,000 detainees in prisons or concentration camps in Mozambique. The number was not larger because, when freedom fighters were captured by the Portuguese, they were mostly killed outright. There were two types of concentration camps: regular concentration camps in areas dominated by the Portuguese, and so-called "protected villages" in areas where the liberation movement was active. Those were villages surrounded by barbed-wire and minefields, the inhabitants of which were guarded by soldiers and escorted by them to work in

the fields. The villages had practically no assistance from outside; there were no schools or medical services and villagers were not allowed to leave the villages. Most of the crops grown were used to supply the Portuguese army. In southern Mozambique there was a notorious concentration camp at Babana in which some seventy-five leaders of the liberation movement were imprisoned. FRELIMO had asked the International Red Cross to visit the camp and inspect the conditions in which prisoners were held.

870. Asked whether private firms maintained their own security forces in Mozambique, the petitioners replied that there were no such private defence forces in Mozambique, and it was unlikely that the Portuguese authorities would allow them, since there were no powerful private companies such as those in Angola. There were some United States companies exploiting oil and gas, but they were not yet sufficiently strongly established to require a defence force. FRELIMO's fight would discourage the investment of private funds for the setting up of further companies.

871. Asked which were the main factors that enabled Portugal, a small, backward European country, to continue its domination in Mozambique and its defiance of the United Nations decisions, the petitioners replied that Portugal was too weak to carry on a war in its colonies without outside support. As a member of the European community, it encouraged countries to send journalists and politicians on so-called fact-finding missions; they subsequently wrote articles and made speeches giving a biased view of the conditions there. The NATO Powers had pointed out that aid provided under the NATO system should not be used south of the Tropic of Cancer. That might technically be correct; Portugal might not be using equipment supplied by NATO in Africa, but the fact that it was able to use it in its own country freed Portuguese equipment for use elsewhere. It also received indirect aid from banks, and European-owned companies based in Portugal were manufacturing weapons which could be freely used. The NATO countries said that weapons should be examined to check the serial numbers, so that a protest could, if necessary, be made to Portugal, but that was almost impossible in guerilla warfare. Arms might also be manufactured by another country under a NATO patent. There was, in any case, no restriction on the use of NATO-trained personnel. Specialized training was being given in counter-guerilla techniques and the Portuguese officers

who completed those courses were immediately sent to serve in Africa. One of the Portuguese doctors working in the free zone's health services had originally been sent to Africa as a doctor in the Portuguese army. He had travelled on a mission to Lisbon on a NATO passport, had been transported in a NATO ship to London, and, once there, had decided against returning to Africa to fight against his brothers. The Ghana Mission in London had then helped him to return via Accra to Mozambique, where he had joined the liberation movement.

872. An official document published by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry in Lisbon, analysing Portuguese achievements in 1966, made the following reference to the vote in the United Nations:

"In the vote on the resolution, these countries voted in favour of Portugal: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the other NATO countries; with two exceptions, all the Latin American countries abstained and some of the African Asian countries absented themselves deliberately. In all, 45 did not support the resolution against Portugal. However, it is not the numerical aspect which interests us What is of special interest is to know and note which were the real forces in the world among those which voted for or against us. We must underline this fact because it is incontrovertible that in the last vote in the United Nations, an anti-Portuguese resolution was not approved by the United States, nor by England or France or Brazil, which means that it was not approved by all those countries which have major responsibilities and great weight in the politics of the West; therefore it can be affirmed that among the major Powers and especially those which hold a veto in the Security Council, only the Soviet Union supported the resolution."

With that type of support, it was understandable that Portugal continued to suppress the African people.

873. In reply to a request for additional information on the extent of the assistance provided to Portugal by its allies, the petitioners replied that the newspapers had reported that the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company was to start boring a new oil well to the south of Inhassoro. The American-owned

Firestone Portugues was to invest £1,875,000 in a new tyre factory to be built at Beira. The United Kingdom firm Gill and Duffus, in a joint venture with Peirce Leslie and Co., had opened a plant for dehusking cashew nuts on 10 December 1966. The new factory would have an initial capacity of 6,000 tons of raw cashew nuts a year, as reported in The Times of 10 December 1966. The British-owned firm Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., had produced 113,868 tons of sugar (or 70 per cent) of the 163,669 tons of Mozambique output for 1965-1966. The Swiss firm Nestle was reported in the Diário da Manhã of 18 January 1967 to be opening a plant at Lourenço Marques with an initial production of 7,500 tons of condensed milk per year and an initial investment of £500,000. Mining investments by two Japanese firms were being planned. The United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, in a joint venture with South African firms, was going to build a 359-kilometre pipeline to feed natural gas from Pande (southern Mozambique) to the industrial complex of Witwatersrand. That, it was claimed, would make South Africa a serious competitor with Western industrialized countries. A daily volume of 200 million cubic feet of gas at prices four times lower than in South Africa was contemplated. There was also a £130 million hydro-electric scheme for which a United Kingdom consortium, including English Electric and AEI, was preparing proposals. The scheme, which would be larger than Kariba, was to be built on the Zambesi in Mozambique.

874. Portugal's NATO allies were a great source of material support to it. Since NATO troops had been removed from France, a new naval base had been built in Portugal and had been inaugurated on 23 February 1967. United Kingdom, United States and Netherlands forces had attended the inaugural ceremonies. That was further evidence of Western approval of Portuguese policy in Africa.

875. Asked for details on the extensive Portuguese propaganda campaign referred to in their statement, the petitioners replied that they would mention the agencies, individuals and countries which were co-operating with the Portuguese in that campaign. In 1961, when active resistance to Portuguese rule had begun in the colonies, the Portuguese Government had retained a number of agencies in various Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Canada. The agencies were mainly public relations units and legal firms of high calibre and cost. In the United States, for example,

they had engaged Selvage and Lee, a large coast-to-coast firm which, between 1961 and 1964, had earned an average of \$2 million per year from its Portuguese Government account. That firm fed information favourable to Portugal to leaders of public opinion and mass media and lobbied United States Congressmen and representatives in the Canadian Parliament. It had published many pamphlets against FRELIMO and other nationalist organizations and had gone to the extent of supplying photographs of alleged FRELIMO atrocities which had, in fact, been perpetrated by the Portuguese armed forces. It had arranged for journalists and editors to visit the Territories under Portuguese administration to "write what they saw". Needless to say, they had seen only what the Portuguese authorities had wished them to see. By mid-1965, the Portuguese Government had decided that Selvage and Lee were too expensive. It had therefore engaged Downs and Roosevelt, a firm that concentrated on influential people rather than the population in general. The "Roosevelt" in the firm's title was a son of a former United States President, Theodore Roosevelt, which was an indication of how well-connected the firm was.

876. An example of the type of activities in which the firm engaged might prove enlightening to the Special Committee. The Mozambique Institute had originally been founded with a grant from the Ford Foundation. Early in 1966 a rumour had reached the Portuguese Government that FRELIMO was about to apply to the Foundation for a further grant. Downs and Roosevelt had engaged a very important United States lawyer - a former Under-Secretary of Defence - who had approached the trustees of the Ford Foundation saying that he had heard the Foundation intended to make a grant to FRELIMO to enable it to buy arms from China. The result was that the Ford Foundation guaranteed that it would not make any grants to organizations within Territories under Portuguese administration without the prior approval of the Portuguese Government.

877. To give another example, one of the petitioners had received a communication from an old acquaintance, a United States lawyer, asking him to come immediately to Nairobi in order to present his side of the case to a group of thirty-two lawyers, including his acquaintance, who had been sent by Downs and Roosevelt, at the Portuguese Government's expense, on a tour of Portuguese colonies in Africa. Inspired newspaper articles and statements in Switzerland, France, the

Scandinavian countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries indicated the activities of similar firms.

878. In 1966, Mr. Drew Middleton, a correspondent of The New York Times, had passed through East Africa. Attempts had been made to persuade him to meet FRELIMO. He had answered that he was interested only in visiting the newly independent countries of Africa. From Dar es Salaam he had gone to Mozambique and had written a series of articles in praise of the Portuguese régime there. As in the case of many other journalists, Mr. Middleton's expenses had been covered by Downes and Roosevelt.

879. The petitioners were asked whether certain United States aircraft reportedly delivered to Portugal during 1966 were being used in Mozambique. In reply the petitioners stated that the aircraft concerned were eight bombers delivered to the Portuguese by the United States Central Intelligence Agency early in 1966. The petitioners had given some details concerning them during the Special Committee's series of meetings in 1966. The pilot, a United Kingdom national named John Hall, had been arrested in the United States and accused of flying military aircraft without the authorization of the United States Government. The action by the United States Court, however, had been independent of the Government because of the division of power between Congress and the Judiciary. Early in 1967, the pilot had been acquitted after he had explained that he had been working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Surprise at his acquittal had been expressed by many newspapers in various parts of the world.

880. Asked whether the white settlers in Mozambique had prepared programmes and plans for the Territory and, if so, who was to carry them out and finance them, the petitioners said that the plans and programmes of the white settlers in Mozambique were part and parcel of those of the white settlers in southern Africa as a whole. They were attempting to build a laager or stockade, within which they could continue to enjoy their material and other privileges. Various countries in other parts of the world, eager to take advantage of the material resources of southern Africa, were abetting them. Many countries in Western Europe and North America were doing so and, more recently, Japan had joined them.

881. The idea was to maintain an area in southern Africa in which white men would be supreme and enjoy all possible power and advantages. With the assistance of their friends abroad, they hoped to continue the colonial economic system.

882. Until the end of the Second World War, the colonial Powers had been more frightened of one another than of the people they ruled. Portugal, which had maintained that attitude longer than most of its partners, had consistently refused to allow foreign investment in the Territories under its control. Since the liberation movements had begun, that attitude had changed and Portugal had actively encouraged such investment. For example, the railways in Mozambique were largely controlled from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which meant that ultimate control resided in the United Kingdom and the United States. All the harbour installations of Lourenço Marques and Beira were foreign-owned. More than half a million workers from Mozambique were employed under contract in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, while many others were working for foreign employers in Mozambique itself. The agricultural resources of the Territory were also being tapped, by means of plantations and large farms producing food for the white settlers or crops with a high cash value. Such plantations were owned by foreign capital and worked by forced labour. Maritime resources, e.g., the lobster fisheries, were similarly controlled by United Kingdom, United States and Japanese interests.

883. Considerable interest had recently been shown by foreign companies in exploring the mineral resources of the Territory and in assessing the volume of known resources. Surveys of gold, copper, bauxite, oil and natural gas resources were being carried out by firms from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. All profits from such resources benefited in the first place the foreign shareholders, in the second the Portuguese Government and what little remained in Mozambique was largely enjoyed by the white settlers.

884. It appeared that a large project for the development of the Zambezi valley was contemplated. It would cost several hundred million pounds and would be financed by various groups from all parts of the West. It would be about twice the size of the Aswan Dam project. He warned companies that were considering

taking part in the construction work that FRELIMO would do everything in its power to hinder it. Unless the employees of such companies were willing to act as Portuguese counter-insurgent troops also, they would find it impossible to carry out their commitments.

885. Mozambique had a population of 7 million, of whom about 100,000 were Europeans and between 15,000 and 20,000 were Asians. The Europeans were mainly Portuguese. In addition, there were between 15,000 and 16,000 soldiers who came for a minimum of two years and then returned to Portugal.

886. Portugal might well be trying to change the balance in the racial composition of the population, since it felt insecure because of the number of Africans. The Portuguese had started a project to send as many settlers as possible, but they had been poor people, sent by a poor Government to a poor land. The settlers had been attracted by the rich neighbouring lands in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and indeed in those countries there were more Portuguese than in Angola and Mozambique put together. The Portuguese had then decided to send out as many soldiers as possible in a last-minute attempt to fill the Territories with Europeans.

887. There was, however, no chance of the Europeans in Mozambique making their own unilateral declaration of independence. The free African world was in contact with that Territory and the Europeans would not dare to do such a thing. However, it was possible that the Western Powers, which had invested so much money in the Portuguese Territories, might encourage the white settlers to declare their independence and provide them with the resources to do so. FRELIMO would, however, strongly oppose such a move.

888. The Portuguese Government was encouraging private individuals and companies to acquire large tracts of land in fertile areas, including those occupied by Africans. The policy was based on the production of the crops and raw materials required by Portuguese industry, particularly cotton, rice, sisal, wheat and tobacco. If an individual or company wished to use land for growing such crops then no matter what its present use - unless it was held by European settlers - it would be taken away from the former holders and either sold to the individual or company in question or handed over to them. The criterion was always the estimated benefit to the Portuguese economy as a whole.

889. In the past, certain areas of Mozambique had been reserved for so-called indigenas, meaning Africans who lived within a tribal society. Since 1961, however, the system had been abolished and the status of indigena was no longer recognized. All land was now placed at the disposal of the Governor General and the all-European Council, which could reallocate it to anyone who could prove that he would make the land yield a given amount of income per year. It was of course difficult for Africans to provide any such proof, and very many had lost their land as a result.

890. In some areas, the Portuguese authorities were trying to compel the Africans to grow cotton or rice, which they were forced to sell to concessionary companies set up with the approval of the Portuguese Government.

891. In liberated areas, FRELIMO tried to organize co-operatives which cultivated the land in common, cared for the crops and distributed the produce to the various individuals concerned. But the system was only provisional, since FRELIMO could not be sure of retaining control of the areas until complete independence had been achieved. FRELIMO helped farmers as much as it could by providing hoes and other tools and advising on farming methods. That was why it had invited agronomists and experts from other countries, for example, the United Arab Republic, to help reorganize that part of its programme.

892. In reply to a question as to whether there had been any progress in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Territories under Portuguese Administration, the petitioners replied that the resolutions had not been applied at all by certain Member States. On the contrary, Western interests had increased their investments in Portugal and Africa during the last twelve months, particularly in Angola.

893. Asked for information on the respective implementation by the two Germanys of the Security Council's resolutions of the Portuguese colonies, the petitioners said that all their statements regarding military help to Portugal applied to the Federal Republic of Germany and not to the German Democratic Republic. FRELIMO had been in contact with the Government of the German Democratic Republic and with some private organizations in the Federal Republic. The German Democratic Republic

helped FRELIMO particularly by providing educational and laboratory equipment and had also promised to send a science teacher. The Government of the Federal Republic had shown no interest in the liberation movement since it supported Portugal. However, FRELIMO had contacted a number of private groups and student organizations in the Federal Republic, some of which had protested against their Government's policy towards Portugal. They had also sent school books for refugees from Mozambique.

894. In reply to a question concerning what action they considered the United Nations should take to break the present deadlock, the petitioners replied that FRELIMO would like more support in its efforts to build a nation. Its most radical need was for the United Nations to recognize it as the true and legal Government of Mozambique, and expel Portugal if it persisted in clinging to the Territory. The Special Committee should prepare the United Nations for the eventuality of FRELIMO's applying for membership as the legal Government.

895. On the question of what further aid was needed, the petitioners said that the principal need was for simple means of helping the people of Mozambique to help themselves: nothing elaborate was required. Such simple tools as hoes and hatchets were in very short supply. There were no longer any stores or traders in the liberated areas. Another necessity was textiles for clothing. Their people were perfectly capable of paying for such items, but they were not available. They appealed to countries with textile industries to make cloth available. Some States (particularly the socialist countries) were already supplying textiles to the liberated area but more was required. They emphasized that they were not asking for material for uniforms but for normal civilian clothes. Another simple but very important item in short supply was chemicals for making soap.

896. There was a great need also for technical assistance in education. People with a minimum technical knowledge were required, not experts. FRELIMO was short of bookkeepers and organizers. Although it had some economists, they were very young and inexperienced. They would be very thankful if the United Nations could supply assistance of that kind. FRELIMO had, for some time past, been trying to

establish a school of public administration. Assistance in carrying out that project would be of incalculable value to the people of Mozambique.

897. Asked whether graduates of the Mozambique Institute going abroad for further studies had any problems, on their return, in finding an outlet for their new skills and knowledge, the petitioners replied that before the establishment of FRELIMO in 1962, there had been fewer than fifteen Mozambicans in higher educational institutions abroad. Between 1962 and 1967, the number had risen to 150, of whom about seventy were in Eastern Europe and about sixty in the United States. There had so far been no difficulties when students returned from abroad because the Mozambique Institute always had something for them to do. The situation of Mozambican students thus differed from that of students from some other countries. The Mozambique Institute always needed teachers and administrators to replace staff temporarily on loan from other countries. All the graduates had returned to the Institute except one, and there were still hopes that he would. Of those due to graduate in 1967, again only one had said that he did not want to return, while some others would go on to post-graduate courses. They hoped to find more countries that were willing to accept Mozambican students for post-graduate courses. Recently, the Institute had applied to Canada for a special course in administrative finance for an economics graduate, but it had been told that Canada had no places in its programme for students not from independent African States.

898. Replying to a question concerning the assistance given to FRELIMO by the specialized agencies, and in particular by UNESCO, the petitioners said it was difficult to answer because FRELIMO was receiving help from many sources - United Nations agencies, Governments and private groups and individuals - some of whom might be embarrassed if their help was mentioned and others hurt if it was not. Most help to refugees, in education and other sectors, was provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the host country in which the refugees were sheltered. Help was also received from countries which were concerned at the situation in Mozambique. That help might either be channelled through the United Nations, or provided bilaterally. The countries providing educational assistance included the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. India was sending drugs and medicines, textiles and bandages. Much help was also coming

either direct or through OAU from African countries, including Algeria, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Arab Republic and many others. A great deal of assistance, however, was still needed from the United Nations. UNESCO had not yet provided any assistance, but it was expected to do so in the near future.

899. There were particular conditions attached to the special UNHCR arrangements for education which made it difficult for students in Mozambique to make the maximum use of them: one was that the funds must be used exclusively in Africa. That made it difficult to find school places, first because there were a relatively small number of places available in African countries, which tended to need all the places there were for their own people; and, second, because African educational institutions were often modelled on the United Kingdom and French systems and demanded academic qualifications which Mozambican students lacked.

900. The Mozambique Institute aimed at providing sufficiently wide background knowledge to enable students to benefit from educational facilities abroad. But before they could pass the specific qualifying examinations of other countries, they usually needed an additional half-year course. It was impossible for the Institute to prepare students specifically for, say, the Cambridge School Certificate or the French Baccalaureat. That was why FRELIMO was particularly grateful to those countries, especially the Eastern European countries and the United States, which were willing to make arrangements whereby people with no certificates could, in a short time, be accepted into their higher educational systems. He hoped that other countries would be similarly willing to adapt their academic programmes to the needs of refugee students from Mozambique or other Territories striving for their liberation.

901. Asked what they considered the specialized agencies, especially UNESCO, could do to assist in providing the refugees with educational facilities, the petitioners said that their movement and the refugees from Mozambique had received very little assistance from the specialized agencies. They were, nevertheless, very grateful for what they had received. Aid came from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in two forms: first, assistance to refugees in Tanzania and Zambia which was channelled through national organizations in those two countries. Since such aid did not involve FRELIMO, he suggested that members should apply for further information on the subject to the Tanzanian delegation.

There were, however, many thousands of other refugees from his country in Malawi and, so far as they knew, they did not receive any such assistance. They could give no reason why that should be so and suggested that the Special Committee should approach the Government of Malawi so that aid might be obtained for refugees in that country. The second form of assistance which came more directly, consisted of assistance given by specific Governments and institutions abroad which was channelled through the High Commissioner for Refugees. Although the names of such Governments and institutions were not secret, they felt that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to obtain details from the High Commissioner for Refugees.

902. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for aid to be given to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and a special fund had been set up for that purpose. Eleven students from Mozambique were being boarded and educated at the Mozambique Institute by means of grants from that fund. FRELIMO had originally requested that the United Nations should finance an additional teacher for the Institute but the request had been rejected in favour of supporting the eleven students. Since the need for teachers was still very great, they availed themselves of the opportunity of renewing that request. FRELIMO was using its own limited resources to employ teachers and support students and had also approached several Governments for assistance. A number of Governments had agreed to help, and India, for example, was financing two teachers at the Institute. They thought that the United Nations could do much more in that connexion and repeated that the need for teachers and equipment was very grave.

903. FRELIMO had been trying to contact the World Health Organization (WHO) to obtain supplies of drugs and assistance in training nurses at the Mozambique Institute. They believed that some indirect assistance had in fact been obtained. Under its regulations, WHO could assist areas not represented in the United Nations only if requested to do so by the Secretary-General. They hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to make such a request. The matter was particularly urgent because there were epidemics of various contagious diseases, particularly smallpox, in the area of Mozambique under FRELIMO control. Although FRELIMO had made every endeavour to obtain vaccine, it had been able to vaccinate only 100,000 people out of a total population of 800,000 in that area. That situation was highly dangerous for the neighbouring countries of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, all Members of the United Nations.

904. With regard to the number of refugees, the petitioners said that the estimates of those who had fled from Mozambique since 1964 were: 50,000 to Tanzania, 10,000 to Malawi, and 1,500 to Zambia. A certain number of those had since returned home; the exact figure was not known, but it was not a large proportion. The United Nations Office at Dar es Salaam had given somewhat lower figures. The reason for the discrepancy was that the United Nations figures took into account only refugees in camps or who had been identified, but many refugees had relatives or friends in the countries of asylum because the populations were largely of the same race and language on both sides of the border, and the local tradition was that anyone in need could nearly always find someone to help him. That of course became impossible when the number of refugees amounted to tens of thousands but it was still true that there were large numbers who had not been identified and were not included in the official figures.

905. Refugees in Malawi had no help because the Government of Malawi did not assume any responsibility for the refugees and encouraged them to return to Mozambique. But rather than return, or remain in Malawi where they were not welcome, many refugees came to Tanzania. That was not fair to the refugees, nor to Tanzania, nor to the refugee organizations which had to arrange for transport. Something should be done to induce Malawi, which was a Member of the United Nations, to recognize that those people were in need and should be helped.

906. The rate of flow into Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia was highly irregular: it depended on the operations of the Portuguese authorities in the Territories bordering on those countries. When the Portuguese authorities suspected the presence of the liberation movement in an area, their first reaction was to launch a campaign of terror in an attempt to frighten the local inhabitants. That usually induced a few inhabitants to flee, but most stayed. When the liberation movement had begun its operations, the Portuguese Air Force had first carried out simulated bombing which had caused an additional number to seek refuge: but the majority still stayed. Finally, the Portuguese had started real military operations, killing people and burning their huts and trying to herd the whole population into protected villages, a technique they had learnt from some of their Western allies.

That had produced a much larger flow of refugees. In every case, however, the volume of the flow depended also on how close the area affected was to the border. 907. FRELIMO did what it could to persuade the inhabitants to stay where they were and, as a result, although operations by the Portuguese Air Force had increased, the number of refugees was declining. That situation might change, however, because it had been reported that the Portuguese Government had decided to wipe out the whole population of certain areas.

908. The main problem was to define the term "refugee". There was a certain discrepancy between the definitions used by the United Nations and that used by relief organizations in other parts of the world. Of the thousands of people who had had to leave their homes, only those who had sought refuge abroad, for instance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were considered by the United Nations as refugees, and received assistance. Those who stayed in Mozambique received none. The help given to the people who went abroad was an inducement for them to do so. However, FRELIMO had set up institutions through which the United Nations could help Mozambicans, using its own definition of the term. The United Nations could also help by training Mozambicans in school and public administration, and WHO could give medical assistance.

Petitioners concerning Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea

909. Mr. Pinto-Bull speaking on behalf of the Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portugaise (FLING) said that his party considered itself exclusively a national liberation movement, i.e., its only goal was the Territory's real independence. It would then be for the people of Guinea (Bissau) to choose a political régime adapted to their ideas and economic needs. FLING eschewed all political and philosophical considerations and concentrated exclusively on strategy and tactics, in order to win the country's independence.

910. Guinea (Bissau) was of no economic or strategic interest to the Portuguese. Salazar was prompted to maintain a Portuguese presence there by his desire to avoid displeasing the army, which would have unfortunate repercussions on Portugal's domestic policy, and by senile obstinacy. In Salazar's view, any evacuation would involve a loss of prestige and above all might give the other African colonies under Portuguese domination the hope that they too might eventually be freed. That meant that as long as Salazar was in power - or, what amounted to the same thing,

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as long as power was in the hands of the army - there was absolutely no change of seeing Portugal simultaneously adopt a policy of decolonization. It cost Portugal very little to maintain its presence in Guinea (Bissau). Its troops had abandoned the bush and occupied only the important centres, where they were subjected to no serious disturbances. It should, however, be noted that boredom and inaction weighed heavily upon the Portuguese troops, particularly those who were doing their military service. Several deserters had confirmed that the war was not popular with the people and in fact benefited only the career soldiers. That situation could easily be exploited if the liberation movement possessed the necessary means of propaganda.

911. In those circumstances, FLING considered that it should orient its activities towards terrorist acts in the towns. To that end, it was applying the so-called "troika" system. Each cell consisted of three men and was completely separated from the others; each man was connected only with his immediate chief, who controlled three cells and was in turn responsible to a single individual. The aim of the cells was terrorism, and they would act only by means of terrorist attacks. In addition to easily accessible installations (transformers, water-towers, electricity lines), the main targets were Portuguese army officers and administrators. Of course, the attacks would provoke blind and bloody repression, but they were necessary in order to incite the people of Guinea (Bissau) to unite in the struggle for freedom.

912. FLING was aware of the difficulties and obstacles it would encounter. It was asking for assistance, and making a special appeal to its sister countries of Africa and Madagascar. It was not asking for money, for its members were solidly united by the privations they had suffered together. It was not asking for statements of intention. It was asking for acts, which would enable it to recognize its friends and its enemies. It called on all countries to vote for resolutions concerning Guinea (Bissau). It called for the strict implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and Security Council resolution 180 (1963) which confirmed the right of the peoples under Portuguese domination to choose their future freely. It called on the Western countries to accept and apply the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, in accordance with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). The assistance which the NATO countries were giving

Portugal encouraged the latter to continue flouting United Nations resolutions and violating the Charter, its principles and the right of peoples freely to choose their own future.

913. On the other hand, the assistance of the African countries was essential to the people of Guinea (Bissau) as far as the supply of arms and explosives was concerned. FLING wished to obtain that assistance not from individual African countries but from the Organization of African Unity as a whole. Clearly, if the OAU did not intervene in that sphere, the liberation movement would be forced to rely on non-African countries. Free foreign aid had already been offered, but it was not wholly disinterested.

914. FLING was counting on the Special Committee to give maximum publicity to the repression inflicted on the people of Guinea (Bissau) to stigmatize Portugal's attitude and behaviour in the eyes of world opinion and to isolate Portugal completely at the diplomatic level. FLING's activities, combined with those of the Committee, would force Portugal to yield.

B. General statements ^{148/}

915. The representative of Czechoslovakia said that the positive results achieved by the Special Committee during its African tour in 1966 had been duly appreciated by Czechoslovakia at the last session of the General Assembly. Czechoslovakia continued to pay close attention to the work of the Committee, which had been given the important but so far unfulfilled mandate of verifying the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and thus liberating millions of Africans and other peoples from colonial oppression and domination.

916. In Tanzania, a country lying close to the colonial and racial régimes of southern Africa, the Special Committee was once more realizing the seriousness of contemporary colonial problems. The international community, by adopting resolution 1514 (XV), had to exert every effort to liquidate colonialism in all its manifestations and forms. Colonialism had been generally condemned as one of the most negative and abusive phenomena in history created by forces of imperialist expansionism. It contradicted the concept of the dignity of man and of

^{148/} Additional statements on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration appear in chapter II of the Special Committee's report (A/6700 (Part II)).

co-operation among nations and was the principal obstacle to the creation of a society of free men with equal rights. Experience also confirmed that it caused a division of forces into those actively opposed to it and those trying to prevent its liquidation.

917. Czechoslovakia had always supported and continued to support measures leading to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The sending of an observer to the last two of the Special Committee's African missions had been proof of its interest in the speedy solution of the remaining colonial problems and also an expression of its high appreciation of the work done by the Committee.

918. The particular importance of the question of the Portuguese Territories could not be overemphasized. In the Territories under Portuguese domination lived approximately 12 million Africans, or about one quarter of the entire population suffering under colonial and racist régimes. The Special Committee had recently been given further evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese in those Territories and it had been shown that, while Salazar's régime was denying the rights of the African population to self-determination and independence, it was strengthening colonial rule and oppression. It was stimulating the influx of Portuguese and other white immigrants, increasing the number of Portuguese troops deployed there and continuing its suppression of the African population which was fighting for its elementary rights. The Portuguese colonialists were supported by a network of international monopolies furthering their interests in those Territories. In addition, the Salazar régime enjoyed considerable support from various Western countries, mainly the members of NATO. That support was in direct opposition to the implementation of the resolution and to Security Council resolution 218 (1965) and General Assembly resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI). So long as Portugal continued to receive political, economic and military assistance from its allies, it would continue its present colonial policy and the brutal oppression of large sectors of the African population in its colonies. Both the petitioners' testimony and the Committee members' statements had stressed the urgency of the request addressed by an overwhelming majority of countries to Portugal's friends and allies that they should desist without delay from helping Salazar's régime in its policy of violating the political and economic rights of the African population in the Portuguese-administered Territories.

919. Operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) drew attention to the consequences of the intensification of political and economic ties between Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority régime in Southern

Rhodesia and called upon all States to withhold any support or assistance to the unholy alliance which represented a serious threat for decolonization in Africa and the free development of the African peoples. The petitioners' testimony had shown that support of the colonial racist régimes was increasing, that their development was actively supported by large numbers of foreign monopolies in that part of Africa and that the goal pursued by the alliance was to prolong and consolidate their domination over the colonial peoples and at the same time to threaten the achievements of those African peoples which had already achieved freedom and independence. The colonial policy of Salazar's Portugal was therefore only part of a sinister plot by colonial, racist and pro-colonial forces in southern Africa. It should be pointed out that the Western Powers, which had been reluctant to support the action of the world community against the unholy alliance, were also responsible for the continuing deterioration of the situation. Among them, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for the continued existence of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

920. The petitioners' statements had shown, however, that in spite of the support Portugal was receiving from various sources, the African patriots in the national liberation movements were continuing their fight for freedom. They were not only in a position to withstand and fight colonial armies numbering tens of thousands, but were also laying the firm foundations of their eventual independence in the liberated zones and encouraging the economic, educational and social development of their inhabitants. The results achieved by the national liberation movements had been appreciated by most of the members of the Special Committee and were winning general sympathy and support everywhere in the world.

921. The Special Committee's fact-finding visit to Africa in 1967 had provided new evidence to support its endeavours to achieve the implementation of the Declaration. In the past, it had done useful work in analysing colonialism in the contemporary world and had greatly contributed to the understanding of the problem both in general terms and in its many subtle aspects. Latterly, it had thrown much-needed light on the infra-structure upon which the colonial system of the exploitation of peoples and Territories rested and on the activities of foreign monopolies in colonial countries which, according to many of the United Nations resolutions, were impeding the colonial peoples' achievement of independence. At its last few meetings, the Committee had been provided with lists of companies responsible for the preservation of the colonial system and racial oppression in southern Africa.

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922. In conclusion, he assured the Special Committee that the Czechoslovak Government would give due attention to the resolutions adopted during its meetings in Africa. Czechoslovakia would do all in its power to further the noble goals of freedom, self-determination and independence for the colonial countries and peoples laid down in the Charter and in the Declaration and wished the Committee every success in its work in the interests of freedom.

923. The representative of Tunisia expressed satisfaction at the fact that during its current session the Special Committee had been able, at Kinshasa, Kitwe and, finally, Dar es Salaam, to hear petitioners and representatives of liberation movements from the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Committee had had an opportunity to hear their statements and ask them questions. It had thus been able to acquaint itself more fully with the situation in those Territories and to obtain information at first hand concerning the exactions and repression to which the African people were subjected. In Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea the most fundamental human rights were disregarded. Human dignity was trampled under foot and the Africans were denied all justice. From the extensive and concordant testimony which the Committee had heard it was apparent that, despite the many decisions of the United Nations, Portugal was continuing its military build-up and further intensifying its repressive measures, thus obliging thousands of Africans to flee and take refuge in neighbouring countries. The latter were being threatened by Portugal because they were admitting the refugees and they were continually being subjected to violations of their frontiers and acts of aggression committed on their territory. Moreover, the statements made all confirmed that had it not been for the complicity of the great Powers and the pressures exerted by foreign economic and financial interests, Portugal, a poor country without resources, would have been unable to afford a war which had been going on for more than six years.

924. The Committee had received information concerning Portugal's war effort, the repressive measures it was applying in the Territories under its domination and the crimes it was continuing to commit against the inhabitants of those Territories. At the same time it had gathered information on the activities of the liberation movements with reference to both their struggle against the colonial Power and their programme for the reconstruction of the Territories once they were liberated.

925. The representative of India said that, despite his awareness of the grimness of the situation, he felt a sense of cautious optimism. That was not generated by any indication of a change of heart on the part of the inhuman Salazar régime, since there was overwhelming evidence to show that it was actively engaged in intensifying its war of aggression in Africa, applying new and more barbaric methods of torture. Declaration after declaration had left no doubt whatsoever of that régime's criminal design. His optimism was based on the reports submitted by the petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) which had provided evidence of the heroic fight being carried on by the nationalists and their limited but real success. More than one half of Guinea (Bissau) and one fifth of the Territory of Angola were under nationalist control and, with regard to Mozambique, the Special Committee had been informed that an area containing 800,000 inhabitants had been liberated, that one third of the country had taken up arms against Portugal and that the remaining two thirds were expected to do so in the near future. According to conservative estimates, FRELIMO had 7,000 men and 3,000 "cadres" in its guerrilla forces. Portuguese administration had been brought to a virtual standstill in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. His delegation had been very much impressed by its visit to the Mozambique Institute where it had seen what fine work the nationalist movement was carrying out among the refugees. He wished to congratulate those brave freedom fighters, whose determination to oppose the colonial Power had only become stronger with the attempts to suppress them, and he wished them every success in their fight to regain their independence and dignity.

926. The grim realities of the situation were too obvious to be ignored. Portugal, intent on maintaining its illegal hold over its African possessions, was spending more and more money on what it called defence. Expenditure on development projects had diminished by 2.5 per cent from 1966 to 1967, while defence allocations had risen by 33 per cent, the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961. The number of troops in the Territories under Portuguese domination was well over 120,000. Compulsory military service for all citizens had been extended to three years, with the possibility of a further extension of one year. Women were to be admitted into the armed forces for the first time in capacities other than as nurses. The modernization and expansion of the Portuguese Navy, which had been

begun in 1964, was being accelerated by the purchase of additional corvettes, destroyers and submarines. Attempts were being made to ensure the self-sufficiency of the country with respect to armaments. All those facts clearly proved that the Portuguese Government had no intention whatever of renouncing its policy of enslaving the African people in its colonies. It had the audacity, in fact, to tell the world that its approach to its colonies was a form of decolonization. The Portuguese Overseas Minister had explained that decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unity" or through the separation of the colonizer and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. He had stated that real decolonization only took place when integration or emancipation led to a real and profound transformation of the colonized. Salazar himself had said that his Government refused to adopt a policy that would lead to the disintegration of the nation, that the advantages of collaboration and the integration of vast areas and units were becoming increasingly evident and that the Portuguese nation, being integrated and multi-continental, satisfied fundamentally the real needs of all its peoples far better than if they were divided into impractical political units that would sooner or later become economically subject to other countries and ultimately lose their national independence.

927. In the face of such statements, and when it was realized that Portugal regarded its principles as being no less noble or honourable than those of others, it should be abundantly clear to all, including Portugal's friends and allies, that any attempts to solve the problem by appealing to that country were doomed to failure. The Governor of the National Bank of Portugal had stated that Portugal's very survival as a nation depended on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories.

928. The various economic measures announced by the colonial Power to boost the economic role of the African Territories had not significantly changed the lives of the indigenous population, as had been amply testified by the petitioners. Even the Portuguese Press had acknowledged that the economic integration plan, intended supposedly for the benefit of all parts of the Portuguese empire, had in fact benefited only metropolitan Portugal itself. He was not surprised at that

fact, since he was only too familiar with the ruthless methods of administration adopted by that country and its total lack of concern for the welfare of its dependent Territories, which were regarded primarily as suppliers of raw materials. Despite the abundant and rich mineral deposits in the colonies, the indigenous people remained primarily subsistence farmers or wage-earners.

929. As the people of India had realized, it was only after independence that a country was able to embark on a meaningful programme of economic development. The few measures which had been introduced to improve living conditions and strengthen the economy of the Territories were primarily intended to attract European settlement. Ex-soldiers were being encouraged to settle in border areas. That deliberate and consistent policy of encouraging white settlement, supposedly in order to transplant Portuguese culture, was in fact designed to increase the proportion of Europeans in the population with a view to the effective suppression of the African nationalist movements. One of the petitioners had reported that 1,250 whites were arriving in Mozambique every month for permanent settlement. That policy, with its vicious implications, had already been condemned in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) as a crime against humanity.

930. In that connexion, he warned of the possibility of another Southern Rhodesia in the Portuguese colonies. It was quite possible that the time would come when the white settlers would feel strong and audacious enough to make a unilateral declaration of independence. That might appear to be a somewhat far-fetched warning, but who would have predicted, forty years before, that a handful of whites in Southern Rhodesia would have been capable of defying the metropolitan country and the whole world? However, the successes achieved by the freedom fighters might well make it possible for the Portuguese to continue their policy of settling whites in any appreciable numbers.

931. It was notorious that Portugal, the least developed country in Europe, was able to maintain and intensify its war in Africa only because of the active assistance it received from its friends and allies. Numerous appeals had been made to those Powers to stop aiding Portugal without any result to date. Nevertheless, he renewed that appeal, reminding those Powers that their own long-term interest would be jeopardized if they persisted in their short-sighted policy.

932. He paid a most sincere tribute to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the very substantial help it had rendered to the Mozambique nationalists, both freedom fighters and refugees. That contribution was yet another practical manifestation of the Government's interest in liquidating colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. Similar tributes were due to the Governments and peoples of Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea.

933. His delegation had consistently supported the right of the people in the Portuguese dominated Territories to self-determination and independence. It condemned the inhuman policies of the Portuguese Government and the atrocities it had committed against the African people. India had made a modest contribution to the fight against Portuguese colonialism in the form of drugs, books, scholarships and teachers. His compatriots felt very strongly on that issue since they had themselves suffered under colonial rule for many years and had experienced Portuguese colonialism in a part of their country. He renewed India's pledge to support the just cause of the liberation of the Territories under Portuguese administration.

934. With regard to the future course of action to be taken, he believed that that was already well laid down in the General Assembly's resolutions. What remained to be done was to implement those resolutions. The only practical and effective way of dealing with the situation was for the United Nations to take action to frustrate the evasive tactics of the Portuguese Government and to force it to comply with the verdict of the international community. That could easily be done if all Member States, especially those in a position to exert pressure on Portugal, had the will and intention to act effectively, thus fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

935. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee for their clear and factual material which had added to the already long chronicle of the brutal suppression of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, a chronicle which had roused the indignation of freedom-loving people the world over. It was now seven years since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The Declaration remained a constructive effort on the part of freedom-loving humanity to correct the crime committed by the

aggressive forces of colonialism, to help the struggling masses in the colonized lands to regain their liberty and to restore peace.

936. The only response from the Portuguese imperialists had been increased brutality. It was thus inevitable that the patriotic forces of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) should have taken up arms for the achievement of liberation and the restoration of peace, for freedom and peace were indivisible and the fight against Portuguese colonialism was a fight for peace and liberty.

937. All the petitioners had stressed that Portugal could only continue and intensify its aggressive policy because of the support it received from its NATO allies. Those statements were corroborated by the weapons captured by the Angolan and Mozambican freedom-fighters and exhibited to the Special Committee. The weapons had been manufactured in NATO countries. It was also well known that Portugal received war material from the United Kingdom and aircraft and submarines from France.

938. Portugal's NATO allies always maintained that whatever support Portugal received under NATO was for the purposes of European security. From the standpoint of the African people, the only support that Portugal needed was the support needed to eliminate the fascist and aggressive policies of the Salazar régime. The Portuguese people had only one enemy in Europe: the reactionary Salazar régime. There could thus be only one conclusion: that the weapons and support were given to Portugal to enable the imperialists' henchmen to maintain their stranglehold on the African lands which were being exploited by the giant monopolies of finance capital.

939. Portuguese aggression was an expression of the economic exploitation of those Territories and their peoples by foreign monopolies based in the Western countries. It was necessary to point out that the African people drew a distinction between the different kinds of investments. The question of foreign investments and capital was one that should be discussed only between equals, i.e., between the sovereign peoples of the countries concerned. Where foreign investment was a factor impeding the attainment of independence by the people of a colonial Territory, and where foreign capital became an instrument, not of progress, but of suppression and exploitation, then it must be regarded as a negative factor

which should be opposed. That the activities of foreign financial interests of NATO countries in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) constituted an impediment to the liberation of the peoples of those Territories was not a matter of debate. The evidence had shown that certain foreign companies operating in Angola and Mozambique had gone to the length of maintaining private armies against the peoples of those Territories. Moreover, the activities of the foreign monopolies in all the Portuguese Territories in Africa directly contravened the decisions of the United Nations in various General Assembly resolutions. For example, the PETRANGOL Company, which exploited petroleum and other resources in Angola, had increased its output of jet fuel from 8,380 tons in 1962 to some 37,000 tons in 1965.

940. The petitioners had stressed the increasing co-operation between the members of the "unholy alliance" of Portugal, the apartheid régime of South Africa and the illegal minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. While, on the one hand, Portugal supplied the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia with what was necessary to frustrate the policy of economic sanctions, the Ian Smith régime had actively participated in the crimes being committed against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. Again, while Portugal had supplied South Africa with slave labour, South Africa had been actively participating, especially from the Caprivi Strip, in the war against the heroic people of Angola, and in the East, against the people of Mozambique.

941. Another aspect of the inhuman policies pursued by Portugal in the name of colonialism was the threat to the peace and security of southern Africa. The Portuguese colonialists had launched brazen aggression against the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Portugal had also committed acts of aggression against the United Republic of Tanzania, killing several patriots. Those crimes against humanity must be strongly condemned by all who sincerely supported the cause of peace and the freedom of all peoples and should serve as a serious reminder to Portugal's allies who continued to supply and arm it.

942. He saluted the patriotic forces of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) for their heroic struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Theirs was a just and legitimate fight which must be supported by all the forces of freedom, peace and progress. Tanzania would continue to render all the support necessary for the successful conclusion of the struggle.

943. The representative of Poland said that his delegation had listened with care to the evidence of the petitioners from the African Territories under Portuguese domination who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. It had also studied the working papers prepared by the Secretariat.

944. It was clear that, during the past year, the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had taken a turn for the worse and that the crucial problem remained unchanged. Portugal continued to deny the African peoples' right to self-determination and also refused to recognize that the Territories under its administration were colonies for which it was accountable to the United Nations. The Portuguese armed forces were waging a criminal war against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and the evidence showed that Portugal was intensifying its colonial war and had raised the numbers of its troops in the three Territories to 120,000, while 40 per cent of its budget was allocated to the colonial wars. The militarization of the Territories was illustrated by the appointment of soldiers as governors in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). In addition, the period of compulsory military service had been extended and the Portuguese Navy and police forces in the colonies were being strengthened.

945. Portugal continued to exploit the human and natural resources of its African Territories and had taken steps to transform their economic and social systems in order to make them serve a war effort which far exceeded its own possibilities. The colonial wars against the African peoples were possible only because of the assistance fascist Portugal continued to receive from its NATO allies. The weapons captured by MPLA from Portuguese forces in Angola had all been manufactured in NATO countries. All the petitioners were unanimous in denouncing the military, political and economic assistance that the Federal Republic of Germany was providing to Portugal. The Federal Republic of Germany was selling arms and equipment to Portugal and its military instructors were training the Portuguese forces under arrangements between Bonn and Lisbon. The collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal also covered trade and capital investment in Angola and Mozambique. That clearly indicated that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in the Federal Republic of Germany was consistent with the fascist colonial policy of the Portuguese Government.

946. Portugal was receiving assistance on a growing scale from the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The unholy alliance of colonialism and racism in southern Africa was steadily increasing its co-operation with the support of its Western allies interested in preserving colonial strongholds in southern Africa. The situation in all those States and Territories could have been very different if the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had complied with the many appeals and resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies.

947. The exploitation of the Portuguese colonies constituted a source of profit not only for Portugal but also for the international monopolies, a list of which had been provided by the petitioners. In return for privileges which enabled them to reap enormous profits from the human and material resources of the African Territories, the international combines helped the colonial régimes to deny the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their countries. The petitioners therefore rightly claimed that the activities of those foreign interests were a serious obstacle to the freedom and independence of the Angolan and Mozambican peoples. Another feature of Portugal's colonial policy was the influx of foreign settlers and the forcible exportation of African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

948. Poland unreservedly supported the national liberation movements and had been happy to learn of the successes already scored by the freedom fighters in liberating extensive areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was encouraging to learn that FRELIMO and MPLA had established their own administrations and social, medical and educational organizations in the liberated areas. The Polish delegation supported the demand for increased help and assistance to the liberation movements from the international community, particularly the specialized agencies.

949. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the representatives of the liberation movements for their very enlightening statements which had provided the Special Committee with new information on the situation in the Portuguese colonies and the new measures undertaken by the Salazar Government to thwart the justified wishes of the peoples for freedom and independence, and on the intensified efforts of the liberation movements to rally the inhabitants of their respective Territories

against the Portuguese colonialists. Most States Members of the United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the armed struggle of the peoples still under colonial domination. And the resolute struggle of those peoples helped the progressive States to apply themselves with greater vigour to the final liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

950. The question of the Territories under Portuguese domination had been on the agenda of the United Nations for years, so that the conditions in the Portuguese colonies were well known. The Special Committee, through its debates and reports submitted to the General Assembly, had helped to make the world aware of those conditions. The material prepared by the Secretariat had revealed the frantic efforts of the colonialists, who were resorting to the most brutal means, including massacre, to perpetuate their domination of those Territories. In addition to intensifying the war against the indigenous populations by sending out thousands of fresh troops from Portugal, the Portuguese Government was seeking to alter the relationship between the European and the African populations by attracting greater numbers of settlers and offering them better facilities. Typical of that policy was the statement by the Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional that Portugal must divert to its African Territories the hundreds of thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries. But it was obvious that in that particular respect the policy of the Lisbon Government was meeting ever greater difficulties, since Portuguese preferred to go to other countries rather than to the colonies where the African people were fighting for their liberation.

951. The problems of the Territories under Portuguese domination could not be viewed in isolation from what was happening in southern Africa and other parts of the world, where force was being used to obstruct the rights of the peoples to independence and to choose the system of government they desired. The colonial wars waged against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the support of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa and the attempt - under the cloak of independence - to impose feudal rule on the people of Aden were all part and parcel of the same policy of checking the process of decolonization and preserving the strongholds which were to be used as a springboard for interference in the domestic affairs of the newly liberated

countries. For the same purpose, military bases were being set up in the colonial Territories to exercise pressure on independent African and Asian countries.

952. It was in that context that it might well be asked how it was possible for a small and backward European country like Portugal to wage colonial wars against the people of Africa, to rule Territories and populations which far exceeded those of Portugal itself, and even to threaten aggressive acts against independent African States, including the United Republic of Tanzania. Specific proof had been provided that that situation was only possible because of the extensive economic, political and military assistance that Portugal received from its powerful NATO allies. The protests and denials of some members of NATO were not sufficient to prove the contrary. NATO weapons, in addition to arms, received on a bilateral basis, were still being used in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was irrelevant whether the Portuguese Government was doing that with or without the authorization of the NATO countries. What was important was that the Portuguese Government was actually using such weapons, and the only way to prevent it from turning NATO into its accomplice was to take practical steps to make it physically impossible for Portugal to use those weapons against the African peoples. So far, no such steps had been taken by the NATO countries. Those countries were in fact actually extending their economic commitments in the colonies under Portuguese domination, thereby helping Portugal to preserve the status quo and obstruct the people's fight for freedom.

953. The Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not draw the General Assembly's attention to the real causes of the dangerous situation in the Portuguese colonies and recommend effective measures to enable the peoples of those Territories to achieve their independence.

954. Yugoslavia fully supported the peoples and national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and wished them every success in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence.

955. The representative of Afghanistan said that six years had elapsed since the General Assembly had passed its historic resolution 1514 (XV), but many peoples - including those of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) - were still fighting for their undeniable rights to self-determination and independence and were still subject to the most ruthless forms of colonial exploitation.

956. The Portuguese colonialists still denied the most elementary human rights and tried to convince the world that Portugal's African Territories were "overseas provinces" of Portugal.

957. The atrocities perpetrated against the indigenous populations of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had aroused profound indignation throughout the world. It was quite clear that Portugal was holding those Territories by force of arms and that Portugal, being a very poor country, could not wage such a costly war without the military, political and economic support it received from its allies, especially the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The close collaboration between those three racist régimes had strengthened the determination of Portugal to maintain its supremacy in the Territories under its administration. That unholy alliance was a very dangerous development which had had an adverse effect on the situation. It was evident that the three racist and colonialist régimes had formed a sort of "common market" in African manpower which was forced to move from one country to another according to the interests of the colonizers.

958. It was encouraging to see that the atrocities committed by the colonialists had aroused the indignation of the peoples of those Territories and that the liberation movements were successfully defending their freedom. The information provided by the representatives of FRELIMO was of great significance. His delegation had learned with satisfaction that FRELIMO had succeeded in establishing agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes in the liberated and semi-liberated areas and he had been greatly impressed by his visit to the Mozambique Institute. He congratulated FRELIMO on its great achievements.

959. Afghanistan was opposed to colonialism in all shapes and forms and was therefore gravely concerned at the slow rate of progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was indeed alarming that, despite years of discussion and the many resolutions passed by United Nations bodies, the racist régime of Portugal had not taken a single step to implement the General Assembly resolutions and had refused to co-operate with the United Nations.

960. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole had a special responsibility in the matter and it was essential that rapid means should be found to end the shameful and tragic situation.

961. The representative of Ethiopia said that the numerous petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam had drawn attention once again to the atrocities, oppression and untold sorrow that Portugal had inflicted upon the defenceless peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), whose only crime was to demand their birthright - independence. The Ethiopian delegation had been deeply impressed by the fight the brave peoples of Angola and Mozambique were waging against the Salazar régime and congratulated the freedom fighters on the constructive work they were carrying out in the liberated areas of those Territories.

962. The war of extermination conducted by Portugal in the name of civilization was without parallel in recent colonial history. The archaic régime of Salazar, in flagrant violation of the Charter and many United Nations resolutions, deserved strong condemnation. But the United Nations had been considering the item for the past six years. In 1960, in resolution 1542 (XV), the General Assembly had decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter. In 1965, the Security Council, in resolution 218 had decided that the situation in the Portuguese colonies seriously disturbed international peace and security. At its twenty-first session in 1966, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) which, inter alia, condemned the policy of the Government of Portugal as a crime against humanity and as violating the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and by exporting African workers to South Africa. It had requested all States to desist from giving assistance to the Government of Portugal that enabled it to continue its repression of the African peoples under its domination.

963. The policy of suppression pursued by Portugal in Africa was of concern to the whole international community. The world had to realize that the Portuguese colonialists were able to continue their evil policy, thanks not only to the connivance of the racist régimes in the southern part of Africa, but also to the support which Portugal continued to receive from its allies in Europe and elsewhere. Between 1961 and 1965 Portugal had spent 17,000 million escudos on the war in Africa. In 1966, Portugal's total budget had been 17,410.3 million escudos, of which 4,011 million had been for overseas defence expenditure. That

amount rose every year and increasingly heavier taxes were levied on the Portuguese population. Portugal itself was an under-developed country with a high national debt, and most of its defence expenditure was financed by help from outside.

964. It was most unfortunate that, despite the many appeals by the United Nations, Portugal continued to send troops to its African Territories to counter the action of the nationalist movements. It was deplorable that a Member State continued to challenge the authority of the United Nations. That was the kind of challenge which, if not faced in time, could break the backbone of the Organization.

965. It did not require much power of prophecy to foresee that the African peoples were bound to win in the end. No power on earth could change the course of history, nor could anyone turn the tide of freedom.

966. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted that the Special Committee was completing its consideration of the situation in the Territories in Africa which were under Portuguese administration. As it concluded the session which it had been holding away from Headquarters, it now had, thanks to the statements of the representatives of the liberation movements, a complete picture of the deplorable situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), which were being cruelly oppressed by the Salazar régime. The petitioners had given the Committee further proof of the fact that if Portugal was in a position to wage war against the African peoples under its rule, that was because it had the political, military and economic assistance of its partners in the "White States" bloc. South Africa, Rhodesia, Portugal and certain States which were members of the militarist and colonialist NATO alliance were constantly violating the decisions of the United Nations concerning the Portuguese colonies.

967. The members of the Special Committee were now likewise aware that the imperialist foreign monopolies were continuing to plunder the Territories in Africa administered by Portugal. They could study the scope of the activities of the capitalist monopolies in those Territories and draw conclusions with regard to the effects of such activities on the agriculture and industry of the Portuguese colonies. Apart from the Portuguese capital invested in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, South Africa, Belgium and a number of other countries had very substantial interests there. Those Powers had to all intents and purposes taken possession of the diamonds, petroleum, iron ore, coal and bauxite of the Territories in question, as well as of their cotton, sugar, sisal, coffee and copra.

968. The fact that the foreign monopolies were giving aid and assistance to the reactionary Portuguese régime, which was continuing to defy the decisions of the United Nations, should surprise no one. The foreign capitalists ceaselessly exploited the resources which belonged by right to the African peoples. They had obtained extensive agricultural concessions and they enjoyed the advantage of cheap labour. The United Nations had denounced the activities of all those companies, which were contrary to the principles of the Charter and to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Everyone knew, however, that when major financial interests were at stake the international Powers turned a deaf ear to all appeals.

969. The representative of Italy recalled that his Government's position on the question of the African Territories under Portuguese administration had been stated on numerous occasions during the past few years, and it had repeatedly expressed to the Portuguese Government its conviction that, by refusing to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter, that Government was failing to meet its obligations under the Charter. Its concern had been intensified by recent fresh reports of discrimination and of the denial of the right of self-determination to which the people of the Territories were entitled.

970. With regard to the allegations that had been made concerning the role of members of NATO, his Government had no apology to offer. The fact that Italy had been a member of NATO since its inception had never prevented it from expressing its views freely on Portuguese colonial policies, or from strictly denying to the Portuguese Government assistance for carrying them out.

971. Rather than prolong the discussion on a point that had sometimes been raised more for petty political reasons than for real concern or conviction, he would turn to the substantive measures that the Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should adopt.

972. One of the petitioners had told the Special Committee of the satisfaction expressed by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the fact that a large number of Member States had recently either abstained from voting or voted against resolutions on the matter. The interpretation and explanation of votes could, however, be given only by the voters themselves, and, moreover, his

delegation did not share the satisfaction of the Portuguese Minister, since such a division of opinion did not enhance the Organization's effectiveness in dealing with one of its most complicated problems. The fact was that too often Member States were compelled to reserve their position on proposals that appeared too radical even when justified by the legitimate emotion aroused by the concern of the African peoples for their brothers still under colonial rule. His delegation had, during the Committee's series of meetings in Africa in 1966, stressed that point at length and had recalled how many Member States, in no way bound to Portugal by alliance or sympathy, had abstained from voting on resolutions on the subject thereby possibly creating the impression that they were supporting Portugal's policy. Since that was obviously not the case, the question must be asked again whether the right course of action had been chosen for implementing the provisions of the Charter and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

973. His delegation had advanced a reasonable answer to that question, during the Special Committee's previous series of meetings, by stating that the Committee should urge the enforcement of effective measures against the supply of arms to Portugal for colonial warlike actions, to help the people of the Territories through training for future independence and through direct assistance for their most urgent needs, to urge Portugal to heed the expressions of mounting concern by the international community, and to continue to draw the attention of world public opinion to the serious problem created by the denial of the rights of self-determination. In that connexion he recalled that the Indian representative had told a petitioner that the Committee would not be discouraged by the passing of time because it was its duty to continue to debate the problem with all the determination deriving from the conviction that it supported a just cause.

Impatience was understandable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances, but would lead nowhere if not accompanied by a sound assessment of the realities of the situation and the limitations of the Organization in its present form. That might be called a legalistic approach but, if legality meant fundamental respect for the Charter, that definition could be accepted.

974. The representative of the United States of America said that the United States believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should

be classified as Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and their peoples should be given the opportunity to exercise fully and freely their right to self-determination. The United States, in conformity with the Security Council's measures, neither supplied, nor permitted to be exported, weapons or military equipment for use in those Territories.

975. With regard to the nature and role of United States business activities on the African continent, he had earlier emphasized the relatively modest amount of United States private investment in and trade with the Territories under Portuguese administration. A FRELIMO petitioner had made certain statements concerning the operations of some United States private firms engaged in public relations activities, supposedly in support of the Portuguese cause, which called for comment by his delegation since they bore closely on relations between the United States Government and private business.

976. The petitioner had cited the case of one such firm retained by the Portuguese Government that was, he had claimed, seeking to influence United States opinion in favour of Portuguese policy in Africa. The United States placed no restrictions on the distribution of information on the various sides of any issue, domestic or foreign, the only requirement being that a firm conducting such activities on behalf of a foreign Government must register its connexion with the United States Government so that it could be known to all. The United States Constitution contained guarantees to ensure the free dissemination of information as a fundamental democratic right, but the utterances of those private firms in no way reflected government policy, and often conflicted with it.

977. The petitioner had omitted to mention that there were also in the United States private organizations that supported with considerable zeal and effectiveness the cause of self-determination and independence for the people in various areas of southern Africa, some of which were strongly supported by private United States business, academic and professional circles. Representatives assigned to United Nations Headquarters must have come into contact with officials of such organizations, one of which published a periodical on Africa that had been quoted by two petitioners in support of arguments they were expounding.

978. The representative of Australia recalled that his Government's policy on the question of the Portuguese colonies had been explained in detail on a number of occasions. Australia was firmly committed to the principle of self-determination in all colonial Territories. The fact that its views on the means of implementation might not accord with those of all other delegations should not obscure the strength of its commitment. It did not accept the premises upon which Portugal's policy towards its overseas Territories was based, and was deeply concerned at its failure to acknowledge its obligations to their peoples. Australia disagreed in particular with the failure to transmit information on the Territories in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter, and had made those views known to the Portuguese Government at the highest level, making clear its belief that the Territories should be classified as colonial and that the principle of self-determination should be applied. It was disturbed at many of the aims and practices of the Portuguese authorities.

979. It was a matter for regret that no attempt was apparently being made to prepare the people for self-determination, self-government or independence, in accordance with the wish of the majority, and it was hoped that the Portuguese Government would accept the view that, by granting those rights, it would be acting in accordance not only with political realism but with generally accepted moral standards.

980. The representative of Iran said that the question had occupied the attention of the Special Committee from the very beginning of its meetings in Africa. Petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had been heard and had given a vivid picture of the conditions in which their peoples continued to languish. The Committee had been told of the obnoxious measures adopted by the Portuguese Government in order to tighten its grip on those Territories and to frustrate the legitimate wishes of their peoples. Moreover, Portugal had sought to strengthen its links with the like-minded régimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and to form what had been well described as an "unholy alliance". Portugal was the linchpin of the alliance. By its adamant and persistent refusal to implement the relevant resolutions, it had seriously challenged the United Nations.

981. Despite that depressing picture, his delegation had been greatly encouraged by the intensified activities of the various liberation movements. In Angola, GRAE and MPLA had stepped up their military and non-military activities. GRAE's work for the rehabilitation of the refugees from Portuguese oppression was striking. In addition, he had been highly gratified to learn that MPLA had further expanded its activities and had liberated many more Angolans from Portuguese subjugation. If those two organizations were to co-ordinate their efforts and adopt a united stand against the common enemy, the dawn of Angolan independence could not be long delayed.

982. FRELIMO's activities in Mozambique were also highly impressive. The nationalists, under the able and dynamic leadership of Mr. Mondlane, had, in the course of the preceding year, liberated even more of their country and people from the Portuguese colonialists. The Special Committee had also learnt with great interest of FRELIMO's national reconstruction activities. Even in the midst of its armed struggle, the movement was devoting considerable effort to the health, education, social welfare and economic development of its people. The Mozambique Institute, in particular, was a great monument to the self-sacrifice of a group of dedicated men and women and to the heroism of the Mozambique people. He earnestly hoped that the liberation movement would receive all the aid it so richly deserved.

983. The fight waged by PAIGC appeared to be well on the way to achieving complete success, in which connexion the invitation extended by that movement to the Special Committee to visit the liberated areas was most noteworthy.

984. While fully recognizing the achievements of those liberation movements, he did not wish to discount the gravity of the problems involved. The nationalists were faced with a highly complex military and economic machine which Portugal had succeeded in building up to continue its exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territories it controlled. It hoped that, by keeping the population at large in abject poverty and ignorance and by denying it the most elementary facilities for social development, it could be able to perpetuate its ruthless domination. In view of Iran's dedication to the cause of peace through justice, he took a most serious view of the situation and firmly believed that the social and economic ills inflicted by Portugal had to be eradicated so that the people of those Territories could enjoy their freedom and independence.

985. In that connexion, he drew the Special Committee's attention to a review of the book "The White Revolution" by His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr printed in the Sunday News of the United Republic of Tanzania on 18 June 1967. The author of the review had stated that the Shah felt that the only battles still worth fighting were those against ignorance, poverty and hunger and against social, economic and racial discrimination. Those words could fittingly be applied to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration where all those ills persisted.

IV. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

A. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning the question of refugees from Territories under Portuguese Administration

986. At its 518th meeting, the Special Committee adopted, as its consensus, a statement made by the Chairman concerning refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration.

987. The text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at its 518th meeting on 1 June 1967 reads as follows:

"Since 1965 the General Assembly and the Special Committee have adopted five resolutions in which, among other things, they requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international relief organizations and the specialized agencies concerned to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered from military operations in those Territories. The first of these requests was contained in operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, and similar requests were subsequently made by the Special Committee in a resolution adopted on 22 June 1966 during its meetings in Africa (A/6300 (Part II), para. 619), and again by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.

"The Committee notes with appreciation that the High Commissioner for Refugees has responded to the above appeals by making some increases in the allocations for refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination, including provision for educational assistance.

"The Committee has nonetheless been deeply concerned by the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and particularly of their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the fields of education and health. It accordingly expresses its regret that the specialized agencies have not yet to the knowledge of the Committee responded to the repeated appeals of the Committee and the General Assembly. The Committee therefore appeals to the specialized agencies and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make every effort urgently to intensify assistance to the above-mentioned refugees in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination."

B. Adoption of resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese Administration

988. At the 538th meeting, Afghanistan. Ethiopia. India. Iran. Iraq. Ivory Coast, Madagascar. Mali. Sierra Leone. Syria. Tunisia. United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413).

989. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of Tunisia said that the text incorporated the substance of the statements and testimony which had been heard. The sponsors of the draft resolution urged Portugal to apply without delay resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. They requested all the great Powers to desist from giving the Portuguese Government any military or financial assistance whatsoever. They urgently recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures for the application of its resolutions and those of the General Assembly; finally, they appealed to all the specialized agencies to refrain, in the present circumstances, from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. Those were the main features of the draft resolution which he had been asked to submit to the Special Committee. He hoped that all members of the Committee would support it.

990. The representative of India said that he supported the draft resolution. Its text was self-explanatory and most of its provisions had been included in previous resolutions adopted either by the Special Committee or by the General Assembly. The sponsors expected and hoped that all members would agree with the reasoning which had led them to draft it in its present form. He wished to emphasize two particular provisions: the first was operative paragraph 4, concerning Portugal's policy of settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and exporting African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which was a matter of grave concern to all the sponsors, because of its harmful effects on the living conditions of the African population. The second, the tremendous responsibility borne by Portugal's powerful friends and allies, was covered by paragraph 6. If Portugal's friends and allies realized their responsibility in the matter and decided to co-operate to the full in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, it would be almost impossible for Portugal to continue its oppressive measures. He therefore appealed to all countries to respect the spirit of the resolutions and not hide

behind the legalistic argument that the General Assembly's recommendations were not mandatory. He added his own appeal to that of the Tunisian delegation that all members should take those factors into account and vote in favour of the draft resolution.

991. The representative of Chile said that, although he had not had sufficient time to examine the draft resolution in detail, it appeared at first sight to be one for which his delegation would be prepared to vote. He had, unfortunately, to leave the Special Committee very shortly and might not, therefore, be present when the vote was taken.

992. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation felt that the draft resolution was an objective summary and a step towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

993. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation believed that the draft resolution reflected the views expressed by the majority of Special Committee members and by the petitioners. It therefore hoped that the majority of delegations would give it their full support.

994. The representative of Ethiopia said that though his delegation believed that Portugal was intransigent, it was prepared to support the draft resolution which was yet another appeal to Portugal to grant to the people under its administration their inalienable right. His delegation supported every paragraph of the draft resolution.

995. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Special Committee was aware that Salazar was using the military bases and installations in the Territories under Portuguese domination to maintain his sway in those Territories, to kill Africans and to commit acts of aggression against the neighbouring free countries of Africa. The Committee should therefore include in the text of the draft resolution a provision denouncing that violation of the decisions of the United Nations concerning the establishment of bases in colonial Territories, for there was no question that Portugal was using its bases to exert pressure on neighbouring African States and to oppress the colonized peoples.

996. The draft resolution submitted by the Tunisian representative on behalf of the Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia took due account of the information gathered by the Special Committee in the course of its present session. However, some of its provisions might well be strengthened and made more complete. He was thinking in particular of operative paragraph 6, in which the Committee once again requested all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in NATO, to take certain measures. It would surely be appropriate to mention by name in that paragraph all the States which were systematically violating the resolutions of the United Nations. That would help to make the colonial Powers respect the United Nations resolutions concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Such a denunciation should certainly include Rhodesia and South Africa, which were parties to an unholy alliance and which were establishing a bloc of "White States" on the African continent with a view to perpetuating the rule of the racists over that part of the world. It was impossible to ignore the danger inherent in the actions of the colonialists not only for the peoples of Africa who were struggling for their freedom but also for the newly independent African States, which were directly threatened by those forms of aggression.

997. The wording of the draft resolution was not entirely satisfactory to his delegation. However, since the draft as a whole was in accordance with the interests of the African peoples who were fighting for their independence his delegation was ready to vote in favour of the text which had been submitted. It wished to assure the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea that it would not waver in its support of them and expressed its conviction that their struggle would lead them to victory.

998. The representative of Italy referred to the position taken by his delegation on a similar resolution adopted by the Special Committee at Algiers during its series of meetings in 1966, and on General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). It would have no great difficulty in supporting those operative paragraphs of the present draft resolution that contained well-balanced provisions, but had reservations on many other, particularly operative paragraph 4.

999. He recalled the statement he had made on a similar point before the vote had been taken at Kitwe on the resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia

(A/AC.109/248). His delegation also had serious reservations concerning operative paragraphs 6 and 8. The provisions of operative paragraph 6 would be tantamount to the imposition of sanctions, an exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. His delegation regretted therefore that it would be compelled to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

1000. The representative of Bulgaria said that the draft resolution reflected the main ideas expressed during the Special Committee's discussions of the problem. First, there had been almost unanimous condemnation of Portuguese colonial policy as a crime against humanity, a definition - using a term first employed by the Nuremberg tribunal - that correctly compared Portugal's colonial crimes with the crimes committed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Committee and the General Assembly should follow new lines of action on the basis of that condemnation, for instance, by appealing to governmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate the truth about Portuguese activity and to mobilize their members for a world-wide moral boycott.

1001. The second main feature of the draft resolution was that it reflected the almost unanimous opinion that the assistance given by NATO States, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, was the main reason for Portugal's stubborn and provocative attitude.

1002. Operative paragraph 3 condemned the activities of United States and West European monopolies and financial interests that exploited the human and material resources of the Territories and impeded progress towards independence. A complete list of those financial interests on which the petitioners had supplied valuable information should be furnished. The forthcoming discussion in the General Assembly would provide an opportunity to denounce once again the pernicious role of the international monopolies that were the backbone of Portuguese colonialism, and to reveal the hypocrisy of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Powers that took an active part in the exploitation of natural and human resources in the Portuguese colonies.

1003. The third main idea was the legitimacy of the fight for national liberation waged by the people in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The ninth preambular paragraph developed that idea further by noting with satisfaction the

progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements, both in their fight and in their reconstruction programme. The reference to the great work done by those movements in the liberated areas was significant. The same paragraph expressed the opinion of the majority of Member States that the armed struggle was the main weapon for achieving independence. The reference to the reconstruction programmes, made for the first time in a United Nations resolution, expressed appreciation of the constructive work of the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), and the paragraph expressed the willingness of the United Nations to assist them. That willingness was reflected in several paragraphs dealing with the role of the specialized agencies. The forthcoming session of the General Assembly would afford an opportunity to address further recommendations to the specialized agencies calling on them to render effective assistance to the national liberation movements. Account should be taken of the requests made by the FRELIMO and MPLA representatives for action by UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and other bodies.

1004. The draft resolution appealed to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to desist from assisting Portugal and thereby contravening United Nations decisions. They should be told that there was no legal ground that permitted them to disregard United Nations decisions. Having condemned the financial interests operating in the Territories dominated by Portugal, the United Nations could not allow those interests to assist that country through two of its agencies.

1005. The representative of Finland recalled that the question under discussion had been the subject of considerable debate in the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. In spite of numerous resolutions calling upon Portugal to co-operate with the United Nations, no progress towards self-determination for the peoples of the Territories could be discerned. Portugal had stubbornly refused to comply, and there was no indication that it intended to modify its policy.

1006. Finland was strongly opposed to all forms of colonial rule, and had strictly complied with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). It had not offered and had no intention of offering any assistance to the Portuguese Government to continue

its repression of the people of the Territories, and had taken all necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms for the purpose.

1007. His delegation had sympathized with the intention of the draft resolution, believing strongly that the people of the Territories should have the right to decide their own future. It could not, however, support all the measures proposed.

1008. In accordance with its well-known and unreserved support for the United Nations, it had the greatest respect for the Charter, which should be the principal basis for all the Special Committee's actions, and would be unable to support any recommendation inconsistent with the Charter. It firmly believed that, under the Charter, only the Security Council was competent to determine what constituted a threat to peace and security. His delegation therefore regretted that it was unable to support the draft resolution and would abstain from voting. It did not believe, however, that all possibilities for arriving at a peaceful solution that would enable the peoples of the Territories to exercise their right to self-determination had been exhausted.

1009. His delegation had been impressed by the serious approach of some of the petitioners to the problem and complimented them particularly on their humanitarian, educational and social achievements.

1010. The representative of the United States said that it should be clear from previous statements which he had made that the United States, while adhering to its basic aim of self-determination for the people of the Territories, would not be in a position to support the draft resolution. Its difficulties were largely identical with those applying to previous similar drafts, and had already been explained at length during earlier votes on the subject. Fundamentally, it believed that the Portuguese Government must accept the responsibility for its policies in Africa. The heavy emphasis placed in the draft resolution on the possible effect of foreign factors was, in his delegation's view, unwarranted, particularly in the light of the firm and effective prohibition by the United States of the export of arms for use in the Territories. His delegation's reservations applied in particular to the paragraphs relating to the supply of arms and military equipment, and also to those on the supposed activities and

influence of foreign economic and financial interests. A further objection was that the draft resolution seemed to encroach in several respects on responsibilities that properly belonged to the Security Council.

1011. Finally, the United States could not support any steps that would violate the statutory responsibilities of the IBRD and other specialized agencies, and was opposed to any infringement of their prerogatives and autonomies as set forth in the agreements for their establishment.

1012. In view of those reservations, his delegation regretted that it would be compelled to vote against the draft resolution. His Government continued, however, to support the view expressed in it that the people of the Territories were entitled to the full and free exercise of the right of self-determination and independence, and would continue to oppose by all legitimate and practical means any limitation of that right, so basic to the political and social evolution of all mankind.

1013. The representative of Australia said that his delegation, while respecting the motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution, considered that one couched in terms of reason and persuasion might have been more effective. The last four paragraphs of the preamble did not justify or sustain the operative paragraphs that followed. Operative paragraph 3 made no attempt to differentiate between those commercial interests that exploited human and material resources and those that did not. No one could deny the positive contribution of overseas investment to the exploitation, in the widest technical sense, of the natural resources of developing countries. Australia could not have reached its present stage of development without the assistance of overseas investors.

1014. Operative paragraph 4 was unacceptable on legal grounds, while operative paragraph 6 could usurp the authority of the Security Council. If the Special Committee were to adopt a resolution in terms so severe and critical not only of Portugal, but also of other unnamed States, it would be likely to defeat its own purposes.

1015. The representative of Iran said that in line with the policy laid down by his sovereign, he considered that everyone, and particularly those Governments which were propping up the Portuguese colonial régime, should make continuing and

co-ordinated efforts to bring down that economic and military structure in order that the peoples involved might be liberated. In that way the explosive situation resulting from Portugal's colonial policy could be averted. The primary objective of the draft resolution of which his delegation was a sponsor, was to liberate the peoples under Portuguese domination by precisely such collective action. He earnestly hoped that, despite their differences in approach, all members would find it possible to vote for the draft resolution and so help to end Portuguese rule in Africa. The draft resolution also called upon the specialized agencies to play their part in the collective effort. He strongly urged the agencies concerned to do their utmost to assist the liberation movements.

1016. Although the international community should do all in its power to consolidate its efforts to overthrow Portuguese rule, it should be emphasized that the peoples of the Territories themselves should play their part and redouble their efforts.

1017. Finally, he reiterated the full, unflagging and unreserved support of his country for the liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

1018. The representative of Venezuela suggested that the phrase "which is likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security" should be inserted in operative paragraph 7.

1019. His delegation had already stated the reasons why it could not accept the wording of operative paragraph 4, which reproduced the wording of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), operative paragraph 3. The same considerations applied to operative paragraphs 6, 8 and 10. He therefore requested that paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and 10 should be voted on separately.

1020. His delegation also had reservations concerning operative paragraph 7 for it considered that in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter only the Security Council was competent to determine what acts constituted "acts of aggression".

1021. The representative of Poland said that the draft resolution, especially operative paragraph 6, reflected the views of the Polish delegation. With regard to operative paragraph 12, his delegation believed that the Special Committee could be of great assistance to the Secretary-General in his efforts of publicizing the work of the United Nations concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese domination. He suggested that the words "... in consultation with the Special Committee," should be inserted after "Secretary-General", in the first line of the paragraph.

1022. The representative of Tunisia, speaking on behalf of all the sponsors of the draft resolution said that they were ready to accept the amendment proposed by the representative of Poland.

1023. At its 541st meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413) as orally revised as follows:

Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3 with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Australia, Finland, Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 4, with 1 abstention, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Finland, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Venezuela.

Operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, Italy, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Venezuela.

The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413) as a whole, as orally revised, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Against: Australia, United States of America.

Abstaining: Finland, Italy.

1024. The text of the resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251), adopted by the Special Committee at its 541st meeting on 20 June 1967, reads as follows:

"The Special Committee,

"Having examined the question of Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Recalling also all the relevant resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

"Deeply disturbed at the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,

"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening international peace and security owing to the methods of oppression which continue to be used against the African peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination,

"Noting once more with deep concern that the activities of the foreign economic and financial interests in those Territories are being pursued as intensively as ever and continue to impede the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples,

"Noting further with deep concern that Portugal continues to receive aid and weapons from its military allies which it uses against the population of these Territories,

"Noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements both by struggle and by a reconstruction programme,

"1. Reaffirms once again the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination to achieve freedom and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the enjoyment of this right;

"2. Strongly condemns the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

"3. Further condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources of the Territories and impede the progress of their people towards freedom and independence;

"4. Condemns as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Government of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa;

"5. Urges Portugal to apply without delay the principle of self-determination to the peoples of the Territories under its domination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and calls upon it in particular to take the following action:

(a) to recognize forthwith the right of the peoples under its domination to self-determination and independence;

(b) to desist forthwith from all acts of repression and to withdraw all the military and other forces which it is using for that purpose;

(c) to proclaim an unconditional political amnesty and create the conditions which will enable authority to be transferred to freely elected institutions representative of the populations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"6. Requests once again all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to take the following measures:

(a) to desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

(b) to take all necessary measures to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese Government;

(c) to stop the sale or shipment to the Portuguese Government of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;

(d) to take the necessary measures to put an end to the activities referred to in operative paragraph 3 above;

"7. Draws the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border its colonies;

"8. Urgently recommends that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning this question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965 and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966;

"9. Appeals again to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights, and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, particularly so far as investments in the Territories are concerned;

"10. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering from the military operations;

"12. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee, to promote, through the various United Nations bodies and agencies, the widespread and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, so that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination and of the continuing struggle waged by the peoples of these Territories for their liberation;

"13. Requests the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the specialized agencies referred to in operative paragraph 10 of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee;

"14. Decides to maintain the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on its agenda."

1025. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967 (S/8023).
