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Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 60/78, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, and invited them to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, of the measures taken in that regard. The Assembly further requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-first session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 20 February 2006, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken and to communicate their views on the issue. On 20 February, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to submit contributions for the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General. Organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2005 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted.

3. As at 18 July 2006, replies had been received from Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, El Salvador, Georgia, Latvia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritius, Panama, the Sudan, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Their replies are reproduced in section II of the present report. Replies were also received from 11 international organizations; their replies are summarized in section III of the present report. Any further replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Argentina

[Original: Spanish]
[15 June 2006]

Argentina continues to support a committed policy to combat non-proliferation and terrorism, and over the course of the past year has strengthened that commitment.

- In September 2005 Argentina signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
- That same month, Buenos Aires hosted a seminar entitled “Moving towards Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)” for all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, organized together with the United Kingdom with the aim of promoting implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The seminar was the first opportunity for the Committee established

pursuant to that resolution to make contact with representatives from an entire region.

- In keeping with paragraph 10 of resolution 1540 (2004), Argentina announced its decision in March 2005 to work on the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in cases where particular PSI activities required its support.
- In December 2005, Argentina submitted its second report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
- In April 2006 the Scientific and Technical Research Institute of the Armed Forces developed and launched a domestic outreach programme under which it gives presentations to universities, research laboratories, academic centres and industry in general in order to inform them of the commitments Argentina has undertaken concerning non-proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and related materials and of the scope of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in that area.
- With regard to paragraph 3 (c) of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), the Nuclear Regulatory Authority continues to give courses on the prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear radioactive material to customs officials, the security forces (Gendarmerie, Coastguard, Aeronautical Police), the intelligence community and customs officials of neighbouring countries.
- Argentina welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1673 (2006) of 27 April 2006 extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee.

Bolivia

[Original: Spanish]
[8 June 2006]

The United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 60/78, adopted on 8 December 2005, reaffirms the importance of having all Member States support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Combating terrorism has become a major priority, not only in debate in international, regional and subregional forums, but also on bilateral agendas, since the international community is well aware that it must make concerted efforts to combat the perpetrators and instigators of the new modes of terrorist violence.

Bolivia's position of condemning and combating terrorism is in keeping with its foreign policy, which rejects any act of irrational terrorist violence that attacks the fundamental human rights of individuals, undermines democracy and infringes principles and norms that govern international relations.

Protective measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction must be taken at the local, regional, hemispheric and global levels.

At the United Nations, Bolivia supports the work being done by the Counter-Terrorism Committee to institute measures to prevent and suppress terrorism.

At the regional level, Bolivia is a party to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which it signed in 2002 and which is now before Congress for approval.

Within subregional organizations such as the Andean Community or the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), Bolivia is helping to coordinate initiatives to analyse the root causes of contemporary terrorism and its links to poverty, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking and the illicit circulation of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially lethal materials, so that the States concerned can effectively and in concert provide mutual assistance in preventing terrorism in all its forms and the judicial cooperation that is so important, realizing that the international scope of terrorism has exceeded the individual capacity of any State to deal with it.

Bolivia endorses the invitation to States to consider signing and ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, in order to bring about its early entry into force.

Bolivia also supports all measures taken to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

Canada

[Original: English]
[16 May 2006]

- Canada has a comprehensive legislative and regulatory framework to help prevent non-State actors, including terrorists, from accessing weapons of mass destruction and related materials. Details can be found in Canada's reports to the United Nations Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).
- Canada has a comprehensive export control system, which ensures that transfers of controlled goods and technologies are not diverted to weapons of mass destruction programmes or delivery systems. Canada is an active member in all multilateral export control regimes.
- As Canada's national security is closely affected by events beyond our borders, Canada was a leader in launching the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, aimed at preventing terrorists and countries of proliferation concern from acquiring weapons and materials of mass destruction and related know-how. Canada has committed up to C\$ 1 billion over 10 years, and is actively engaged in nuclear submarine dismantlement, the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities, promoting nuclear and radiological security, the redirection of former weapons scientists and biological non-proliferation, through projects in the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Union. Canada is a major donor to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund, which strengthens nuclear and radiological security internationally.
- Canada is an active participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims to help prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and related material, as well as their means of delivery. The Initiative can be regarded as

an integral part of implementation of operative paragraph 10 of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

- Canada made important contributions to the successful diplomatic conferences to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in July 2005, and the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation in October 2005 (Canada is currently undertaking the necessary process for ratification of these amendments).
- Canada's *Nuclear Security Regulations*, pursuant to the Nuclear Safety and Control Act, have been amended and will be promulgated in the summer of 2006. Those amendments incorporate and reflect the principles outlined in the CPPNM amendment.
- Canada signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism when it opened in September 2005, and is working towards ratification of this Convention.
- As a Participating Government of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Canada has actively pursued amendments to strengthen the NSG Guidelines. Canada is also a member of the Zangger Committee, the role of which is to interpret States' obligations pursuant to article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- Canada has affirmed its commitment to the objectives of the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, and has indicated that it will work towards full implementation of the provisions of the Code, including the associated guidance on import and export controls of radioactive sources. As part of this commitment, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission implemented in January 2006 a sealed source tracking system as part of its National Sealed Source Registry, designed to track high risk radioactive sources from cradle to grave. In December 2005, Canada funded a successful IAEA workshop on the implementation of the IAEA code of conduct for the Russian-speaking region.
- In 2004, the Canadian Parliament passed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Act (BTWCIA). This measure will function to make it more difficult for terrorists to acquire and/or use biological weapons. The BTWCIA is framework legislation, streamlining existing laws which deal peripherally with biological weapons issues, providing a more complete legal basis for the regulation of dual-use biological agents, and establishing stricter penalties for contraventions of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
- Canada prevents acquisition by terrorists of chemicals that could be used in weapons of mass destruction by its strict licensing requirements. In this manner, licences are required for the production, use, acquisition and stockpiling of Schedule 1 chemicals. For the transfer, production and use of Schedule 2 chemicals, declarations are required.
- In 2005, the Government of Canada released its chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) strategy. The strategy focuses on prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery from CBRN terrorist

events and include provisions to keep CBRN-related materials out of the possession of terrorists.

- In January 2004, the Government of Canada established the National Risk Assessment Centre (NRAC) within the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). NRAC increases Canada's ability to detect and stop the movement of high-risk people and goods into the country.
- CBSA is implementing a radiation detection programme at Canada's busiest ports to screen all marine containers for illicit radioactive material.

Chile

[Original: Spanish]
[1 June 2006]

Chile believes that Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on weapons of mass destruction, non-State actors and terrorism has provided a sufficient incentive for the implementation and observance of the international instruments on weapons of mass destruction.

Chile continued to participate in the negotiations on the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation being conducted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization, and supported the amendments to it.

Chile has also maintained a special interest in the establishment of an international standards regime for the multilateral regulation of the transport of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes by sea.

Chile has ratified the 12 international conventions on terrorism and the existing protocols thereto. It has also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature on 14 September 2005, and has started the process for its ratification by Parliament.

The Customs Service of Chile has systems of control that are largely in compliance with international requirements, namely:

- It has goods-screening systems based on the risk-management method;
- It has a national screening centre under its Intelligence Department;
- Customs documents are generally transmitted electronically before the goods pass through the primary zones so that risk assessments can be made;
- The principles of data analysis, intelligence generation and local, national and international cooperation are respected;
- It works jointly and regularly with the national authorities and the ministries dealing with non-proliferation and disarmament, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]
[12 April 2006]

The Government of the Republic of El Salvador, aware that the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction poses a serious danger to humanity, has adopted a series of measures designed to prevent such acquisition. They are as follows:

1. *Decides* that all States shall refrain from providing any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

The provisions of the Act on Regulations and Control of Weapons, Ammunition, Explosives and Similar Articles prohibit and penalize these activities. Specifically, article 58 forbids natural or legal persons to manufacture, import, export, trade, possess or bear:

- (a) Chemical, biological or radioactive weapons or substances or materials for their production;
- (b) Devices for firing weapons covertly;
- (c) Ammunition poisoned with chemical or natural substances;
- (d) Weapons of war;
- (e) Weapons that belong to or are part of the equipment of the Armed Forces or the National Civil Police.

Article 64 of the Act forbids any natural or legal person to trade, manufacture, export, import, possess or bear military-grade explosives.

Articles 78 and 79 provide that the firearms, explosives, ammunition and accessories prohibited under the Act must be handed over to the Ministry of Defence.

3. *Decides also* that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

- (a) Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport;
- (b) Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures;
- (c) Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law;
- (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as

financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of such export control laws and regulations.

The Act on Regulation and Control of Weapons, Ammunition, Explosives and Similar Articles, in addition to providing for the controls and prohibitions established in articles 58, 64, 78 and 79, provides, in articles 65 and 66, that natural and legal persons authorized to trade in detonators, explosives, initiators or high explosives for civilian use, whether or not they contain nitroglycerine, must notify the Ministry of Defence in writing of any transactions involving these materials, specifying to whom they are sold, in what quantity, the purpose for which they will be used and the place where they will be used.

The Act also provides that any natural or legal person, in order to use any type of explosive, must request the Ministry of Defence to provide two experts in this field to verify that the explosives are used appropriately and safely and to certify the quantity of explosives and the place where they are detonated. Both the company and the experts must report this information in writing to the Ministry of Defence, with a copy to the National Civil Police.

Title VII of the Act establishes related control and regulation measures.¹

Georgia

[Original: English]
[11 May 2006]

Georgia supports international efforts and takes and strengthens national measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

In accordance with article 3, paragraph 2, of the law of Georgia on civil security service and Georgian international treaties and agreements and legislation, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia cooperates with the corresponding services of other countries in combating terrorism.

The Criminal Code of Georgia on the prevention of terrorist acts envisages a number of articles, in particular article 67, "Terrorist Act", article 68, "Terrorist act against a national of foreign State", article 90, "Non-declaration of treason", article 90 (1), "Concealment of treason", article 133, "Kidnapping or illegal deprivation of freedom", article 133 (1), "Taking hostages" and article 206, "Non-declaration of crime".

Georgian law on controls on export and import of armaments, military equipment and goods of dual-purpose use according to international and Georgian national security interests and enforcement of regimes on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction defines fundamentals and rules of control on armaments, military equipment, raw materials, tools, technologies, scientific-technical information and the import and export of services connected to their production and use.

¹ Additional information on title VII of the Act is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review, upon request.

According to the law, export and import control constitutes the complex of activities the purpose of which is the prevention, revelation and elimination by the State bodies of violations of rules of production of items under export and import control, as well as of export, import, re-export and transit, stated by this law, other laws and normative acts.

The main principles of export and import control are:

- (a) Exercise of international obligations undertaken by Georgia regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other weapons;
- (b) Prioritizing of political interests during the implementation of import and export control;
- (c) Verification of final uses of the production under import and export control in the context of non-proliferation regimes;
- (d) Accessibility of legal information on export and import control.

According to the law, the following products come under export and import control:

- (a) Conventional armaments and techniques, raw materials, materials, special equipment and technology, as well as services connected with their production;
- (b) Nuclear materials, technologies, equipment, tools, special non-nuclear materials, goods of dual use, equipment, technologies, sources of radiation and isotopic production, the list of which has been adopted by international regimes of non-proliferation;
- (c) Chemicals and technologies of dual use, which could be used for chemical weapons according to the list adopted by international regimes of non-proliferation;
- (d) Pathogens, their genetic variation, forms and fragments of genetic materials, which could be used for bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons according to the list adopted by the international regimes of non-proliferation;
- (e) Equipment, materials and technologies used for rocket weapons, according to the list adopted by the international regimes of non-proliferation;
- (f) Scientific-technical information, services and summary of intellectual properties linked to military goods;
- (g) Other products, stated by decision of the President of Georgia.

At the same time, Georgia is a party to a number of bilateral and international agreements or treaties and international conventions, the provisions of which envisage the prevention of terrorism and mutual assistance of States.²

² A list of such agreements, treaties and conventions is available in the Department for Disarmament Affairs for review, upon request.

Latvia

[Original: English]
[31 May 2006]

On 16 September 2005, during the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, Latvia signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Convention will be ratified in due time.

The amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials adopted in July 2005, are in the process of being ratified.

On 29 April 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia accepted the Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.

The Criminal law of the Republic of Latvia incorporates legal provision for the suppression of terrorism. On 8 December 2005, amendments to the Section 88 of the Criminal law, with a more precise definition of terrorism, were adopted. The criminal law defines terrorism as acts committed with the purpose of intimidating the population or to induce a country, its institutions or international organizations to undertake any action or to refrain therefrom, or to harm interests of said country, its population or international organizations. The maximum applicable sentence for terrorism, in accordance with Section 88, is life imprisonment with confiscation of property.

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

[Original: Arabic]
[2 May 2006]

- The Great Jamahiriya has for many years attached great importance to the question of combating terrorism. As early as 1992 it officially requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to hold a special session of the General Assembly to study the phenomenon of international terrorism; to reach a clear, agreed-upon definition of that phenomenon; and to learn of its causes and ways of dealing with it without interfering with the right of peoples to self-defence and their inalienable right of self-determination, guaranteed by international law and international covenants. The Great Jamahiriya has reiterated that request at every opportunity, in a variety of international venues.
- Since the adoption of the General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, the Great Jamahiriya has wholeheartedly implemented their provisions. It has acceded to all the related international and regional conventions and concluded a number of bilateral agreements with various States on the subject. It has striven to bring its national legislation into harmony with the requirements of the relevant Security Council resolutions, passing Law No. 2 of 2005 on the suppression of money-laundering and Law No. 1 of 2005 on the reorganization of the banking, monetary and credit sectors. Moreover, it has a new draft Criminal Code that criminalizes terrorist acts and imposes stiff penalties on the perpetrators of such acts, to serve as deterrents. In addition, it has issued a number of circulars and directives on the control of movements into and out of the Great Jamahiriya and tightened controls at air, sea and land entry/exit points and border controls for the

monitoring of the movement of individuals and goods across borders. In this connection, there exists effective coordination with both Egypt and Tunisia, exercised through joint administrative and security committees established on the basis of bilateral cooperation agreements with each of those neighbouring States.

- With regard to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), on the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as their means of delivery, the Great Jamahiriya has submitted its national report to the Committee established pursuant to that resolution and has also provided the Committee with a subsequent report containing replies to the queries raised by the Committee in connection with the contents of the national report. Coordination is currently taking place with countries that possess experience and advanced capabilities in the field of control of exports and heightened control of land, sea and air entry/exit points with a view to providing the Great Jamahiriya with what it needs in terms of both sophisticated equipment and training for Libyan personnel, so as to assist it in properly implementing the provisions of said resolution.
- A Libyan delegation took part in two workshops on control of exports and implementation of export controls held in London from 5 to 9 and from 12 to 16 September 2005.
- With regard to the systems of control over exports in place in Libya, it should be mentioned that Libya has begun to study and revise its laws on the control of exports by means of specialized committees representing all the relevant sectors with a view to developing and appropriately amending them and also to passing new legislation within the framework of the fulfilment of international commitments stipulated in the relevant international conventions and resolutions. For example, the national committee charged with follow-up of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is working on the preparation of a draft law on the control of exports and transit, especially with regard to dual-use materials and rocket technology, so as to ensure that such materials do not get into the hands of terrorists.

Mauritius

[Original: English]
[20 June 2006]

In compliance with General Assembly resolution 60/78, the national legal framework has been strengthened by the enactment of the “Prevention of Terrorism Act 2002”. Moreover, Mauritius law enforcement capability is being enhanced through professional training provided by friendly countries on a regular basis.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[25 May 2006]

The State of Panama supports international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

We are cognizant of the threat of terrorism and the danger of the potential acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons of mass destruction and hence have been strengthening the analytical and operational units responsible for combating terrorism in the various bodies charged with State security.

Sudan

[Original: Arabic]

[31 May 2006]

- Stepping up media awareness campaigns on all levels using a variety of techniques to elucidate the wrongness and danger of using biological weapons;
- Focusing on combating the threat of biological terrorism by developing new ways and means of biological defence, by which is meant a strategy to counter biological threats against the security of biological materials;
- Recommending the installation of early warning equipment for environmental sampling, known as biological monitoring, which makes possible early detection of a biological weapons attack and which international parties must help States acquire;
- Accelerating research and development on antidotes by global health agencies, and ensuring the availability of the financial resources necessary to defray the cost of second-generation antidotes;
- Increasing research and development on biological control and expanding the global strategic stock of drugs for treating victims of biological attacks;
- Training a number of first responders (such as firemen, medical personnel, police, the army, and security services) to recognize and treat symptoms of the impact of biological weapons;
- Developing a global centre for the study of biological weapons and antidotes, and developing forensic medicine to improve the detection of biological crimes;
- Constructive cooperation and exchange of security and scientific information between all official State agencies and all other States for the purpose of identifying biological weapons and ways of combating them;
- Encouraging States to comply fully with existing international standards for combating biological weapons;
- Working to open direct channels of communication among States on the regional and international levels for the exchange of information and experiences between the competent national agencies of those States and relevant international and regional organizations in combating biological weapons through the establishment of a global network for such information;
- Supplying new tools to improve antidotes that provide effective protection against chemical weapons attacks.

Turkey

[Original: English]
[3 April 2006]

Turkey sincerely desires to see all countries share the goals of non-proliferation and work collectively towards a safer and more stable world.

Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programmes for acquiring weapons of this kind. Turkey takes a firm stance against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The basic precept in Turkey's armament and export policies is zero tolerance for proliferation.

Turkey does not provide any form of support and/or assistance to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and fully supports all international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Since Turkey is situated close to regions posing high risks of proliferation, it monitors with vigilance the developments in this field and takes part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse this alarming trend. Turkey attaches great importance to arms control, non-proliferation treaties and export control regimes as means to prevent such proliferation.

In this context, Turkey became party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979, the Comprehensive-Test-Ban Treaty in 1999, the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the Biological Weapons Convention in 1974 and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1986. Turkey was a founding country of the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies. Turkey joined the Missile Technology Control Regime in 1997, the Zangger Committee in 1999, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australia Group in 2000.

In line with its general stance against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey has declared its support for the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Initiative builds on wider efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including through existing treaties and regimes.

Turkey has also welcomed Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and attaches great importance to its implementation, regarding the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Turkey has already provided the Committee with the relevant national implementation reports, which were published as Security Council documents on 1 November 2004 and 16 January 2006. These documents contain detailed information regarding national measures that are also related to preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

United Arab Emirates

[Original: English]
[14 June 2006]

The United Arab Emirates has taken the following measures towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 60/78:

- Strengthening the control of the national coastguard over maritime and land boundaries in collaboration with the concerned security organizations in the United Arab Emirates in order to control infiltration and smuggling
- Regular inspections of weapons, ammunitions and explosives within Armed Forces units and military shooting ranges, and during the processes of transportation and storage of such weapons
- Subjecting Armed Forces officers to careful investigations and security interrogations before and after recruitment
- Regular inspection of persons dealing with these materials, in order to ensure their integrity and the sound use of these materials
- Coordinating actions with other security organizations in the country on a regular basis, in order to ensure that prompt actions are taken whenever necessary

III. Information received from international organizations

4. The summaries in the present section, describing measures taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are based on the replies received from the respective organizations. Full versions of the inputs are available from the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the Secretariat.

A. United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency

5. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to implement its three-year nuclear security plan of activities. The overall goal of the Agency's nuclear security activities is to assist member States, upon request, in improving their nuclear security.

6. The results obtained and experiences gained during the three-year period included increased awareness in States of the importance of establishing an infrastructure, including regulatory systems, in support of nuclear security; improved preparedness in States to address the risk of malicious acts; increased legal commitments; more States joining the Illicit Trafficking Data Base; enhanced capacity of member States to address nuclear security issues through training and education activities held in all regions and reaching some 1,500 participants; and enhanced radiation monitoring established at borders.

7. Implementation of the plan of activities has involved extensive coordination within the Agency to ensure effective, consistent and coherent programme

implementation. The Technical Cooperation Programme has provided a mechanism for the delivery of some nuclear security activities within member States. While the plan of activities constitutes the programmatic context for the Agency's nuclear security activities, projects established within the Technical Cooperation Programme provide training courses and, in some cases, technical assistance.

8. In the area of international cooperation, the Agency interacts on a regular basis with those States providing financial and in-kind contributions to the implementation of the nuclear security plan. The Agency intends to further strengthen the bilateral interaction with these donor States. The Agency continued to collaborate with other regional and international organizations in the implementation of its activities under the nuclear security plan of activities.

9. Recent developments have resulted in new international instruments that are relevant for nuclear security. The Agency's current activities complement the Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Resources, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and United Nations Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1373 (2001).

10. A nuclear security plan for 2006-2009 has been developed following extensive consultations with member States. An open-ended meeting took place on 21 June 2005, at which a first draft of the plan was presented and discussed. A revised plan was prepared and an informal consultation held on 2 August 2005. The primary objective of the nuclear security plan for 2006-2009, estimated to cost \$15.5 million annually, is to provide assistance to member States, upon request, in their efforts to establish, maintain and sustain effective national nuclear security frameworks.

11. The impetus for the 2006-2009 nuclear security plan was a sustained process of consultation on the implementation of the nuclear security plan of activities that has taken place with recipient countries, donors, programme delivery partners from within and outside the Agency and international and regional organizations since 2002. The findings of the International Conference on Nuclear Security held in the United Kingdom in March 2005 and the International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources convened in France in June 2005 also provided key elements to the nuclear security plan for 2006-2009.

12. The 2006-2009 nuclear security plan will consist of a simplified structure emphasizing efficiency and flexibility in order to facilitate appropriate responses to emerging priorities and changing events. Its major activities will encompass: (a) needs assessment, analysis and coordination; (b) prevention; and (c) detection and response. Activities in the Agency's nuclear safety and safeguards programmes are also recognized for their contribution to nuclear security. Activities in the safeguards programme that support nuclear security focus on effective State systems of accounting for the control of nuclear material.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[13 June 2006]

13. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) focuses on preventing acts of unlawful interference in civil aviation, and the Organization has no specific measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. ICAO,

however, engages in various activities that relate to the fight against all acts of terrorism.

14. The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme, launched in 2002, directly contributes to efforts to prevent international terrorism. The objective of the Programme is to promote global aviation security through the auditing of Contracting States to determine the status of the implementation of ICAO standards. As of 31 May 2006, 124 audits had been conducted. Follow-up visits began in June 2005 to evaluate progress in implementing necessary improvements identified during audits. Those visits have resulted in significant improvements in global aviation security, while sensitizing States to international requirements and ICAO standards. Furthermore, ICAO is solidifying cooperation with the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) through regular involvement in CTC on-site visits to assess States' compliance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).

15. The Coordinated Assistance and Development Strategy of ICAO is aimed at improving the assistance provided to States and thus at enabling them to establish and maintain viable and sustainable aviation security systems. It entails facilitating assistance through closer coordination and cooperation with donor countries, international and regional organizations and the aviation industry; promoting the development of sustainable aviation security infrastructure through regional and subregional efforts for capacity-building; and assisting States to correct aviation security deficiencies revealed through ICAO audits.

16. On 30 November 2005, the Council of ICAO adopted amendment 11 to annex 17 of the Convention on Civil Aviation concerning security measures required to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Annex 17 provisions were thoroughly reviewed in order to further clarify the wording of existing standards and recommended practices.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

[Original: English]
[23 May 2006]

17. The Preparatory Commission shares awareness of the serious threat to world peace and security posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorist groups. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) obliges all nations to take action to ensure that non-State actors cannot develop, produce, use or trade nuclear weapons. In this regard, the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation needs to be strengthened and fully complied with. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) would be another practical step in this direction.

18. The CTBT, by securing an end to all nuclear explosions, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and contributes to the enhancement of international peace and security.

19. The CTBT, as part of the global non-proliferation regime, prohibits nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and obliges States parties to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosions at any place under their jurisdiction or control. In addition, the Treaty obliges States parties to refrain from

causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

20. The Preparatory Commission, pursuant to its mandate, is making good progress building up the verification system for the CTBT. The International Monitoring System (IMS), hosted by 89 States, is rapidly taking shape. As of today, approximately 220 IMS stations have been installed.

21. The year 2006 marks the tenth anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature, which to date has 176 signatures and 132 ratifications, including 34 of the 44 States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT, whose ratification is required for entry into force. This demonstrates significant support from the international community.

22. In this respect, the results of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in New York in September 2005, give momentum to the efforts to achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT and thus contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

B. Other international organizations

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

[Original: English]
[15 March 2006]

23. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) held an export licensing experts meeting in Singapore in November 2005. The experts exchanged information on best practices and lessons learned regarding critical elements of effective export controls, including the licensing approving authorities, the licence application process, complementary measures, inter-agency consultation and coordination process, end-user verification checks, and risk analysis. The ARF ministerial meeting, to be held in Kuala Lumpur this month, is expected to adopt an ARF compilation of best practices in export licensing which would constitute a tool available to all ARF participants. Furthermore, the ARF Unit of the ASEAN secretariat is developing the ARD contact points for export control for effective coordination and networking purposes.

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

[Original: English]
[13 March 2006]

24. At the nineteenth regular session of the General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), held in Santiago in November 2005, member States adopted resolution 487, entitled "Santiago Declaration". The resolution underscored the important role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only and reiterated support of the fundamental role of the IAEA in the full application and verification of compliance with the international nuclear safeguards regime provided for under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It also supported IAEA efforts to

strengthen the regime and to highlight the importance of the Model Additional Protocol as the ideal instrument for making the IAEA safeguards system more efficient and effective.

25. OPANAL member States also resolved to highlight the growing threat to international security posed by the possibility that non-State actors may obtain nuclear weapons, and supported the initiatives undertaken by the IAEA to this end. Member States also declared their firm conviction that the most effective way to prevent non-State actors from accessing nuclear weapons was through the total elimination of such weapons.

European Commission

[Original: English]
[10 July 2006]

26. The European Commission has a wide range of responsibilities in areas relevant to the prevention of terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These are as follows:

Nuclear safeguards

- Under the Euratom Treaty (chapter VII), the Commission has wide-ranging powers to control civil nuclear material produced in or imported into the European Union (EU) and to perform nuclear safeguards. The Commission manages a database containing information on all civilian nuclear materials in the European Community.
- The Community has adopted legislation concerning the transfer between States of high activity sealed radioactive sources and radioactive waste. The Community (Euratom) is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Trafficking in nuclear material

- The European Commission's Joint Research Centre currently has advanced tools to interdict illegal weapons of mass destruction cargoes.
- The Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen has developed a pre-operational capability in automatic intelligence gathering and risk analysis for containerized cargo itineraries worldwide.
- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), together with the Directorate-General Energy and Transport (DG-TREN), participates in the International Technical Working Group on combating nuclear smuggling.
- ITU, as part of a long-standing cooperation programme with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States, channels considerable efforts into combating trafficking in illicit nuclear materials. This includes training police and customs officers, the implementation of model border crossings and training experts in the analysis of nuclear materials.

Proliferation Security Initiative

- The European Commission supports the Proliferation Security Initiative, which aims at the interdiction of cargoes of weapons of mass destruction and related material.

Export control/dual-use goods

- Under EU Regulation 1334, the control lists of the four dual-use regimes are brought together in a single instrument, which sets out the procedures governing EU member States with regard to the export of sensitive weapons of mass destruction-related dual-use goods from the European Union.
- The Commission works with EU member States to help advocate best practice export control procedures for sensitive goods and technologies to third States in need of assistance.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

- The Commission's extensive non-proliferation capabilities are reflected in the European Union's separate report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). It, inter alia, represents the areas where a Community approach exists to respond to the issues identified in the resolution. Each EU member State report has referred to this common EU element as an integral part of their individual contribution.

Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN)

- The EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism identifies the strengthening of arrangements for the identification, control and interception of illegal trafficking in weapons of mass destruction material as one of its objectives. Work continues on ways to protect civilian populations against CBRN risks and, in this connection, the Commission is examining CBRN-related detection technologies.

Customs policy

- To reinforce the security of the international supply chain, a number of security amendments of the Community Customs Code were introduced in April 2005. The European Commission is currently working on the implementation of the security amendments for improved security checks on the flow of goods by introducing advanced cargo data requirements under the Authorized Economic Operators programme, an industry-customs partnership.

Transport security

- There have been a number of Community security initiatives — many of them in response to the terrorist threat — such as on maritime and aviation security — which set out new EU security standards in support of the EU's non-proliferation objectives.

Biosafety/Biosecurity

- The Commission currently funds biosafety and biosecurity projects in Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, in cooperation with the United States and Canada.

International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology

[Original: English]
[23 March 2006]

27. The main activity of the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology (ICGEB) relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been the preparation of a code of conduct for life scientists.

28. A working paper setting forth elements of a code of conduct for life scientists was presented at the Meeting of Experts of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), convened in Geneva in June 2005. ICGEB subsequently presented these elements in a revised working paper at the meeting of States parties to the BWC, in December 2005. Some of the major points in the revised working paper are:

- In order to be valid, a code should be short, understandable, acceptable to scientists, endorsed by scientific organizations and applicable to industrial laboratories. There is, as well, a need to engage individual scientists and institutions in self-governance measures.
- It is necessary to establish a threshold for acceptable non-acceptable research so as to avoid restrictions that would result in a limitation of research and biotechnology developments.
- The duty to avoid any possible hostile use of research must take precedence over any other commitment, including professional and military duties.

League of Arab States

[Original: Arabic]
[31 May 2006]

29. Although the Arab States do not possess weapons of mass destruction, they are involved in the efforts of the international community to prevent terrorists from gaining possession of such weapons, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

30. The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism of 1998 and the Model Arab Law for Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Hazardous Substances contain provisions that criminalize the manufacture, trafficking or possession of weapons, munitions or explosives, and other items that may be used for the commission of terrorist offences (article 2, paragraph 6, of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) and request member States to develop and strengthen systems for the detection of the movement, import, export, stockpiling and use of weapons, munitions, explosives and other means of aggression, murder and destruction as well as procedures for monitoring their passage through customs and across borders in order to prevent their transfer from one Contracting State to another or to third-

party States other than for lawful purposes and on a firm basis (article 3, paragraph 3, of the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism). These measures include all weapons, hazardous substances and means of aggression, murder and destruction, including weapons of mass destruction and their components.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: English]

[31 May 2006]

31. A number of activities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) contribute to the fight against terrorism. The OPCW Executive Council Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, established on 7 December 2001 to further examine the contribution of OPCW to global anti-terrorism efforts, has held several meetings, which have included briefings by the Group and the technical secretariat on the status of OPCW contribution to global anti-terrorism efforts, national and international presentations, and briefings by the secretariat on its contacts with relevant international bodies in the field of counter-terrorism.

32. OPCW, together with the Government of Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, conducted a major field exercise, "Joint Assistance 2005", in L'viv, Ukraine, from 9 to 13 October 2005. The exercise, requiring coordination between the secretariat, OPCW member States and international and regional organizations, was designed to test and refine international cooperation procedures to deliver emergency assistance following a simulated terrorist attack using a chemical agent.

33. The Director-General and other representatives of the secretariat, in their contacts with international organizations and bilateral consultations with senior officials from States parties, have regularly underscored the importance that OPCW attaches to counter-terrorism.

Organization of American States

[Original: English]

[17 April 2006]

34. In March 2005, Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States (OAS) approved its workplan, which included measures to prevent the acquisition of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by non-State actors, called for under OAS General Assembly resolution AG/RES. 2107 (XXXV-O/05). The resolution calls on member States to adopt, without delay, effective measures to fulfil their obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). To facilitate implementation of this resolution, the OAS plans to convene a regional meeting of key science administrators and arrange for briefings by representatives of the 1540 Committee. The OAS will organize presentations on best practices recommended by the IAEA, OPCW and organizations specializing in the biological sciences.

35. In the "Declaration of San Carlos on Hemispheric Cooperation for Comprehensive Action to Fight Terrorism", adopted by the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism in March 2006, member States of the OAS emphasized the need to become parties to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism and the 13 international conventions and protocols related to terrorism, and to

effectively implement the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1566 (2004), 1617 (2005) and 1624 (2005).

36. Member States declared their commitment to identifying and fighting emerging terrorist threats such as cybercrime, bioterrorism, threats to tourism security and critical infrastructure. They also declared their commitment to preventing terrorist access to and use of weapons of mass destruction and related materials.

World Customs Organization

[Original: English]

[20 March 2006]

37. The terrorist events in the United States on 11 September 2001 called for an agreed strategy to prevent, among other things, terrorist abuse of the global trading system without jeopardizing the flow of trade. This realization provided the impetus for the World Customs Organization (WCO) to establish the SAFE Framework of Standards Programme in June 2005.

38. The Customs-to-Customs network arrangements and the Custom-to-Business Partnership will allow the WCO SAFE Framework to provide supply chain security and facilitation to international trade and enable integrated supply chain management for all modes of transport. The application of risk management and risk assessment techniques to make the best use of available resources, the harmonization of advance electronic cargo information to identify high risk consignments, the use of non-intrusive detection equipment for outbound inspection and cooperation with business partners meeting appropriate security standards are crucial elements, which, once implemented, will give customs the tools to meet the challenges posed by transnational crime and international terrorism in the twenty-first century.

39. The universal implementation of the SAFE Framework of Standards would provide uniformity and predictability to the global trade environment by safeguarding the end-to-end security of the trade supply chain and facilitating the passage of legitimate goods. This instrument has been endorsed by the Council of the WCO, and a great majority of the WCO 169 member customs administrations, which have also formally indicated their intention to implement its provisions.