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REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1. The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmits to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and to the nineteenth session of the General Assembly a report on the Committee's deliberation on all questions before it for the period 21 January 1964 to 17 September 1964.
2. Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America.

I. General and complete disarmament

3. The Committee has continued consideration of general and complete disarmament. Measures of the first stage of a treaty on general and complete disarmament regarding: nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, conventional armaments and nuclear disarmament together with appropriate control measures (ENDC/52) were discussed. These discussions continued to give primary consideration to a revised draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 26 November 1962 (ENDC/2/Rev.1, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 10 April 1963,^{1/} as amended on 4 February 1964, ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1*), and to the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world submitted by the United States on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 31 May 1962,^{2/} ENDC/30/Add.1 and

* Asterisk indicates Conference documents which are attached as annex I.

^{1/} A/5408-DC/207.

^{2/} DC/203.

ENDC/30/Add.2, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 7 September 1962,^{3/} and ENDC/30/Add.3, transmitted as part of annex I of the Committee's report of 29 August 1963^{4/}.

4. On 14 September 1964, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic presented separate memoranda containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on general and complete disarmament which were discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/144).*

II. Measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament

5. The Committee, in its efforts to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date, continued consideration in its plenary meetings of such measures as could be agreed to prior to, and as would facilitate the achievement of, general and complete disarmament.

6. On 21 January 1964, at the 157th meeting, the United States submitted a message of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/120).* The United States also submitted that day the text of a letter from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR delivered on 18 January 1964 (ENDC/119).*

7. On 19 March 1964 at the 176th meeting, on 16 April 1964 at the 184th meeting, on 25 June 1964 at the 193rd meeting, on 27 August 1964 at the 211th meeting and on 10 September 1964 at the 215th meeting, the United States made additional proposals elaborating its proposals for a verified freeze on the numbers and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles, for a verified cut-off of production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons, for a verified mutual destruction of B-47 and TU-16 bombers, and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

^{3/} DC/205.

^{4/} A/5488-DC/208.

8. On 21 January 1964, at the 157th meeting, the USSR submitted replies by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, to questions put to him by Mr. H. Shapiro, Chief Correspondent of the United Press International Agency in Moscow on 31 December 1963 (ENDC/118).*
9. On 28 January 1964, at the 160th meeting, the USSR submitted a memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension (ENDC/123).*
10. On 25 June 1964 at the 193rd meeting, on 16 July 1964 at the 199th meeting and on 13 August 1964 at the 207th meeting, respectively, the USSR made additional proposals elaborating on item 3 (Reduction of military budgets), item 8 (Elimination of bomber aircraft) and item 6 (Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons) of the aforementioned memorandum of the Government of the USSR, dated 28 January 1964.
11. On 13 February 1964, at the 166th meeting, Brazil submitted a working paper of the Brazilian delegation for an agreement on the application of savings on military expenditures (ENDC/126).*
12. On 26 March 1964, at the 178th meeting, the United Kingdom submitted a paper on observation posts (ENDC/130).*
13. On 21 April 1964, at the 185th meeting, the USSR submitted a statement by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, announcing a decision of the Soviet Government: (1) To stop straightaway the construction of two new large atomic reactors for the production of plutonium; (2) During the next few years to reduce substantially the production of uranium-235 for nuclear weapons; (3) To allocate accordingly more fissionable materials for peaceful uses (ENDC/131).*
14. On 21 April 1964, at the 185th meeting, the United States submitted excerpts from an address by President Lyndon B. Johnson in which he stated that he had ordered a further substantial reduction in the United States production of enriched uranium, to be carried out over a four-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an over-all decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 per cent, and of enriched uranium by 40 per cent (ENDC/132).*

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15. On 21 April 1964, at the 185th meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom announced that his Government was pursuing a policy along similar lines in this matter.

16. The Committee, in the communiqué issued at the close of the 185th meeting, noted "with great satisfaction" the statements by the representatives of the USSR and the United States concerning the announcements on 20 April by President Johnson and Chairman Khrushchev of steps which their Governments are taking to reduce fissionable materials production for weapon purposes, and the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom.

17. On 25 June 1964, at the 193rd meeting, the United States submitted a working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cut-off (ENDC/134).*

18. On 29 July 1964, a list of General Assembly resolutions referring to tasks of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, prepared by the Secretariat, pursuant to the decision of the Committee at its 202nd meeting on 28 July 1964, was circulated (ENDC/139).* These resolutions, including resolution 1909 (XVIII) on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and resolution 1910 (XVIII) on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests, were discussed at several plenary meetings.

19. On 6 August 1964, at the 205th meeting, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States submitted a joint statement by their Governments on the first anniversary of the signing of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (ENDC/140).*

20. On 7 August 1964, the USSR submitted replies by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, to questions put to him by the editorial staff of the newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestiya" on 4 August 1964 (ENDC/141).*

21. On 14 September 1964, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic presented separate memoranda containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on collateral measures which were discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/144).*

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22. On 14 September 1964, the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic submitted a joint memorandum on the question of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests (ENDC/145).*
23. In general the questions before the Committee were discussed in a thorough and concrete manner. All the participants in the Committee took an active part in this discussion. Many interesting proposals were put forward.
24. Thus far, the Committee has not reached any specific agreement either on questions of general and complete disarmament or on measures aimed at the lessening of international tension.
25. The Committee expresses the hope that the useful discussions and exchange of views during the period covered by the report will facilitate agreement in the further work of the Committee.

III. Meetings of the Co-Chairmen

26. During the period covered by this report, the representatives of the United States of America and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, held numerous meetings. The schedule of and procedure for the work of the Conference, general and complete disarmament, and measures aimed at the lessening of international tension, the consolidation of confidence among States, and facilitating general and complete disarmament, were discussed and developed.

IV. Procedural arrangements

27. Sixty-one plenary meetings took place between 21 January 1964 and 17 September 1964.
28. The Committee, at an informal meeting on 23 April 1964, agreed to a recess beginning 28 April 1964, and to a resumption of work in Geneva on 9 June 1964.
29. The Committee, at its 212th meeting on 1 September 1964, decided to adjourn this session of the Conference following its plenary meeting on 17 September 1964. The Committee decided to resume its meetings in Geneva as soon as possible after the termination of the consideration of disarmament at the nineteenth session of the General Assembly, on a date to be decided by the two Co-Chairmen after consultation with the members of the Committee.

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V. Conference documents

30. Transmitted as annex II to this report is a list of all documents and verbatim records of the plenary meetings.

31. This report is submitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

17 September 1964

(Signed) S.K. TSARAPKIN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(Signed) William C. FCSTER
United States of America

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ANNEX I

List of documents attached to the Report

- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1
Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertaining thereto.
- United States of America: ENDC/120
Message of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
- United States of America: ENDC/119
Text of a letter from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR delivered on 18 January 1964
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ENDC/118
Replies by Mr. N. S. Khrushchev to Questions put to him by Mr. H. Shapiro, Chief Correspondent of the United Press International Agency in Moscow on 31 December 1963
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ENDC/123
Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension
- Brazil: ENDC/126
Working Paper of the Brazilian Delegation for an Agreement on the Application of Savings on Military Expenditures
- United Kingdom: ENDC/130
Paper on observation posts submitted at the 178th meeting of the Conference
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: ENDC/131
Statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, on 20 April 1964
- United States of America: ENDC/132
Excerpts from President Johnson's Address to the Associated Press Luncheon in New York, on 20 April 1964

United States of America:

Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cutoff

ENDC/134

List of General Assembly resolutions referring to tasks of the
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

ENDC/139

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and
United States of America:

Joint statement by the Governments of the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty banning
nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and
under water.

ENDC/140

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Replies by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Mr. Khrushchev, to questions put to him by the editorial staff
of the newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestiya" on 4 August 1964

ENDC/141

Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
Sweden, United Arab Republic:

Memoranda of the Delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India,
Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic containing
a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each
delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures
discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament.

ENDC/144

Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden,
United Arab Republic:
Joint memorandum

ENDC/145

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1
4 February 1964

ENGLISH
Original: Russian

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertaining thereto

1. In Article 5, paragraph 1, at the end of the first sentence replace the word "second" by the word "third".
2. In Article 21, delete the words: "to conclude the destruction of all military rockets capable of delivering nuclear weapons which were retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America after the implementation of the first stage".
3. In Article 22, paragraph 1(a), in the first sentence, after the words "types and capacities" add the words: "with the exception of the warheads pertaining to missiles temporarily retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America under Article 5, paragraph 1 of this Treaty".
4. In Article 22, paragraph 1(a), in the second sentence, after the words "extracted from" delete the word "such".
5. Delete Chapter V A (Article 23A "The Destruction of Rockets Capable of Delivering Nuclear Weapons which were Retained after the First Stage").
6. In Article 30, add a new sentence: "The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America undertake to complete the total elimination of all the missiles and the nuclear warheads pertaining thereto, which remained at their disposal under Article 5, paragraph 1 of this Treaty".

7. After Article 35 add a new Article 35A:

"Elimination of Missiles and of Nuclear Warheads pertaining
thereto, retained until the End of the Third Stage

"1. At the end of the third stage there shall be carried out the elimination of all intercontinental missiles, anti-missile missiles and anti-aircraft missiles in the ground-to-air category retained by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 1 of this Treaty, together with the nuclear warheads, launching devices and guiding systems.

"2. Inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization shall exercise control over the implementation of the measures referred to above in paragraph 1."

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/120
21 January 1964
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Message of President Lyndon B. Johnson
to the
Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament

There is only one item on the agenda of this Conference - it is the leading item on the agenda of mankind - and that one item is peace.

Already this Conference has led to more concrete and effective results than any disarmament conference in modern history.

Your efforts and deliberations laid the groundwork for the nuclear test ban treaty - for the communications link between Washington and Moscow - and for the UN General Assembly action against nuclear weapons in space.

Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year's genuine gains have given us new momentum. Recent Soviet and American announcements of reductions on military spending, even though modest, have brightened the atmosphere further. Let us pray that the tide has turned - that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead - and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace.

Specifically, this nation now proposes five major types of potential agreement:

First, as Chairman Khrushchev and I have observed, the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or country. In consultation with our Allies, we will be prepared to discuss means of prohibiting the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly - whether by aggression, subversion, or the clandestine supply of arms - to change boundaries or demarcation lines; to interfere with access to territory; or to extend control or administration over territory by displacing established authorities.

Second, while we continue our efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, we must first endeavor to halt further increases in strategic armaments now. The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. For our part, we are

convinced that the security of all nations can be safeguarded within the scope of such an agreement and that this initial measure preventing the further expansion of the deadly and costly arms race will open the path to reductions in all types of forces from present levels.

Third, in this same spirit of early action, the United States believes that a verified agreement to halt all production of fissionable materials for weapons use would be a major contribution to world peace. Moreover, while we seek agreement on this measure, the US is willing to achieve prompt reductions through both sides closing comparable production facilities on a plant by plant basis, with mutual inspection. We have started in this direction - we hope the Soviet Union will do the same - and we are prepared to accept appropriate international verification of the reactor shut-down already scheduled in our country.

Fourth, we must further reduce the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or surprise attack. In consultation with our Allies, we will be prepared to discuss proposals for creating a system of observation posts as a move in this direction.

Fifth, and finally, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to nations not now controlling them, let us agree:

- (A) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards;
- (B) That the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and
- (C) On the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.

Each one of these proposed steps is important to peace. No one of them is impossible of agreement. The best way to begin disarming is to begin - and the United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in these areas and to consider any other reasonable proposal. We shall at all times pursue a just and lasting peace - and with God's help, we shall achieve it.

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CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/119

21 January 1964

Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Text of a letter from the President of the United States
to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
delivered on 18 January 1964

I welcome the stated objective of your December 31 letter and agree with much of its contents. It is my hope that we can build on these areas of agreement instead of merely emphasizing our well-known disagreements. This nation is committed to the peaceful unification of Germany in accordance with the will of the people. This nation, which has fundamental commitments to the Republic of China, has for many years sought the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait. This nation's forces and bases abroad are for collective defense, and in accordance with treaties and agreements with the countries concerned.

Let us emphasize instead our agreement on the importance your letter places on preserving and strengthening peace - and on the need to accompany efforts for disarmament with new efforts to remove the causes of friction and to improve the world's machinery for peacefully settling disputes. In this spirit, let us both present new proposals to the Geneva Disarmament Conference - in pursuit of the objectives we have previously identified:

- to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- to end the production of fissionable material for weapons;
- to transfer large amounts of fissionable materials to peaceful purposes;
- to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- to place limitations on nuclear weapons systems;
- to reduce the risk of war by accident or design;
- to move toward general disarmament.

I am sure you will agree that our task is to work hard and persistently on these and other specific problems and proposals - as you and President Kennedy did on the Test Ban Treaty - instead of confining ourselves to vague declarations of principle that oppose some wars but not all.

Your letter singles out the problem of territorial disputes and concludes that "the use of force for the solution of territorial disputes is not in the interest of any people or any country." I agree, moreover, the United States proposes guidelines to implement this principle which are even broader and stronger than your own.

First, all governments or regimes shall abstain from the direct or indirect threat or use of force to change

- international boundaries
- other territorial or administrative demarcation or dividing lines established or confirmed by international agreement or practice;
- the dispositions of truce or military armistice agreements; or
- arrangements or procedures concerning access to, passage across or the administration of those areas where international agreement or practice has established or confirmed such arrangements or procedures.

Nor shall any government or regime use or threaten force to enlarge the territory under its control or administration by overthrowing or displacing established authorities.

Second, these limitations shall apply regardless of the direct or indirect form which such threat or use of force might take, whether in the form of aggression, subversion, or clandestine supply of arms, regardless of what justification or purpose is advanced and regardless of any question of recognition, diplomatic relations, or differences of political systems.

Third, the parties to any serious dispute, in adhering to these principles, shall seek a solution by peaceful means - resorting to negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, action by a regional or appropriate United Nations agency or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Fourth, these obligations, if they are to continue, would have to be quite generally observed. Any departure would require reappraisal; and the inherent right of self-defense which is recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter would, in any event, remain fully operative.

You will note the basic similarities in our position. Agreement should not be impossible on this or other propositions - and I share your hope that such agreement will stimulate disarmament and peaceful relations.

The prevention of wars over territorial and other disputes requires not only general principles but also the "growth and improvement" to which you refer regarding the machinery and methods for peaceful settlement. The United States believes that the peace-keeping processes of the United Nations - and specifically its Security Council - should be more fully used and strengthened and that the special responsibilities and contributions of the larger countries - particularly the permanent members of the Security Council - deserve greater attention in solving its financial problems.

In consultation with our allies, we shall offer specific proposals along these lines in the weeks ahead. Both the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the United Nations are appropriate places for such discussions.

Mr. Chairman, let me assure you that practical progress toward peace is my most fervent desire. This requires not only agreements in principle but also concrete actions in accord with those principles. I believe this exchange of letters offers real hope for that kind of progress - and that hope is shared by all peace-loving men in every land.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/118
21 January 1964
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Replies by Mr. N.S. Krushchev to Questions put to him
by Mr. G. Shapiro, Chief Correspondent of the United Press
International Agency in Moscow on 31 December 1963.

QUESTION: Have the people of the Soviet Union any New Year message for the people of the United States of America?

ANSWER: The peoples have always connected the New Year and New Year greetings with new hopes for the coming year and, in general, with thoughts of the future. Habitually, at the end of the day, when people part in the evening, they bid each other "good-night", and at the beginning of the new day they greet each other with the words "good-morning". It is obvious that this custom originated in the earliest times, when man, under the influence of his harsh circumstances, experienced a feeling of alarm at sunset and nightfall, not knowing whether he would see the dawn. That is why people exchange good wishes when they part or meet. The same thing happens on New Year's Eve. In seeing out the old year and greeting the new, people everywhere wish each other well-being and happiness and turn their thoughts to the future, trying to see into the days ahead and making conjectures about what the coming year will bring them and what they will be called upon to do.

In different countries the New Year is greeted in different ways. In some countries there is hard frost, while in others it is blazing summer. There are differences in the New Year toasts and greetings, but one wish is expressed everywhere, irrespective of tradition or of the language in which it is uttered. That is the wish for peace, for a peaceful and happy life.

That is the wish which I send to the people of the United States of America, on behalf of the Soviet people and from myself personally.

We wish that in the coming year relationships of peaceful co-operation, good neighbourliness and friendship will develop between the peoples of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union. This is important for our countries and is also important for other peoples.

The Soviet people is entering upon 1964 with grandiose plans for peaceful construction. Throughout our country from east to west, the New Year will see hundreds of new plants, electric power stations and factories which were created by the hands of Soviet citizens in 1963. And in 1964 our people are full of determination to create even vaster industrial installations and to achieve further successes in science and technology.

In order that these grandiose plans may become reality, the Soviet people need peace. They know that peace is not a New Year present from Father Christmas, nor a pretty toy which can be taken from the Christmas tree just by stretching out a hand. Peace must be fought for, and the Soviet Union is consistently and steadfastly seeking to strengthen peace and is bending all its efforts to achieve the relaxation of international tension.

We believe that the American people also does not want war. The Soviet people note with satisfaction that many people in the United States of America, including prominent public figures, consider it essential to seek a way towards mutual understanding and towards achieving agreement and the peaceful settlement of outstanding problems. Here I would recall the words of the late President Kennedy, who lost his life so tragically, to the effect that our countries need a better weapon than the hydrogen bomb, a more effective weapon than ballistic missiles or nuclear submarines, and that this better weapon is peaceful co-operation. We welcomed with satisfaction the statement of Mr. Johnson, the new President of the United States of America, that he intends to continue in his foreign policy the line of peaceful settlement of international problems, of improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and of the cessation of the "cold war".

We too are in favour of this. If the efforts of our countries and other States are united in the interests of peace, the coming year 1964 can undoubtedly become a decisive turning point in the direction of improving the whole international situation.

QUESTION: Can the world hope that greater international understanding and further relaxation of tension will be achieved in the New Year?

ANSWER: It is difficult to give a definite reply to this question. My answer will express our understanding of the matter and will reflect the efforts that the Soviet Government is making to ensure peace. But the strengthening of peace does not depend on one side only, but on all the sides and on all States.

In any case, I should like to say that the hopes for the relaxation of international tension which were raised in the outgoing year make it possible to forecast that in this regard the coming year may be no worse than the outgoing one.

A good deal has been done in the past year. After the dissipation of the crisis in the Caribbean area, the most dangerous crisis of all the post-war years, it became possible to conclude an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests and to agree not to place in orbit any devices carrying nuclear weapons and, hence, to achieve some general improvement in the international atmosphere. There is also something new in Soviet-United States relations. Not very much, but all the same it is something: wider contacts and communications have been made between representatives of our States, - public figures, scientists and journalists - and our peoples have come to know more about each other's culture. Some seeds have been sown which have given United States business circles an idea of the advantages which both sides could derive from an expansion of commercial ties. Briefly, things are gradually beginning to move and seem to be advancing.

I should like to express my satisfaction at the decision taken by the United States Congress which may be regarded as the beginning of a departure from discrimination in certain matters connected with commercial transactions between the United States and the socialist countries. It is true that this is as yet a small step, but it gives rise to hope for the development of relations between our countries in the right direction.

Of course, if we are to speak frankly, in actual fact there has been no trade between our countries for a number of years, but the Soviet Union continues to live and, as is obvious to everybody, it is not living badly. We are not suffering either economically or politically from the absence of trade with the United States. But the cause of peace and the mutual relations between our two countries do suffer, because the absence of trade represents an abnormal situation and is consequently a source which feeds the "cold war". It is precisely in that light that I regard the decision of the United States Congress to which I have just referred as encouraging - if, of course, it is given its practical development.

To ensure peace means to strengthen peaceful co-existence among States with different social and political systems. Peaceful co-existence is not the result of treaty relations or the consequence of any agreement. It is a phenomenon of an historical nature; the very development of history gives rise to the necessity

of peaceful co-existence. This is due not to subjective wishes, but to the objective laws of the development of human society. Some people find it difficult even to pronounce the words "peaceful co-existence", but the fact that there is no war between us means that we are co-existing peacefully in practice.

This is the only way of living in peace on our planet given the existence of two social systems - capitalism and socialism. With the present balance of forces there can be no question of destroying one of these systems by war. If peaceful co-existence were infringed, both systems would suffer from a military clash. Of course, we are convinced that mankind would survive and that, in any event, our socialist system would be preserved. But we do not want to build the future on the ruins of human culture in the conditions where the lives of millions of people will have been destroyed. We believe that the progress and development of our own system are ensured in the peaceful economic rivalry of the two systems.

Men should not liken themselves to animals. In zoos, animals which, to put it mildly, have no liking for each other, sometimes live in adjacent cages. The cages are separated by bars. There are also boundaries between States, but that is not the point. The main thing is that people should realize that everyone should have a reasonable understanding of the existing balance of forces and a correct appreciation of the consequences which mankind would encounter, if the world were to be plunged into a thermo-nuclear war.

That is why I say that if we have recently succeeded in making some initial progress towards better international relations, why not go further along this path and develop the success?

By nature I am an optimist. With us, Marxists, optimism is based on a realistic approach to things, and for us the hope of strengthening peace is not a groundless day-dream of an unrealizable future.

The task of ensuring a lasting peace is now so vital for every human being that it cannot remain the preserve of statesmen and diplomats alone. In these days, the foreign policy of States is shaped under the active influence of the public opinion of all countries and all peoples. Questions of war and peace affect every family and are discussed in every human community, in wide forums and at international meetings. Thus the policy of States is subject to the unremitting control of millions and millions of people who appraise according to its merit whatever is being done

in the interests of peace, and are sure not to overlook whatever hinders the strengthening of peace. The maintenance of peace depends to a large extent on the active struggle of the broad masses in every country.

QUESTION: Is there any reasonable prospect of reaching agreement in 1964 on any questions or in any fields?

ANSWER: I am convinced that there is a whole series of such questions. First and foremost, the wide field of measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and further reducing international tension. They comprise the reduction of armed forces, cuts in military expenditure, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear armaments and on the creation of nuclear-free zones. Another useful measure would be the reduction of the number of foreign troops in the territories of other countries and a great triumph for all countries and, moreover, without any damage to anyone even in the military sense, would be the withdrawal of all foreign troops to the territories of their own States.

We believe that we should try to limit the armaments race step by step, so as to prepare the most favourable conditions for a radical solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

I should also like to point out that whereas the solution of some of the questions referred to require the conclusion of appropriate international agreements, others can be dealt with by a different approach. Take, for example, the question of military budgets. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR has already decided to reduce our military appropriations under the 1964 budget. It would be a good thing if other States acted in a similar way. I am convinced that the peoples of the world would whole-heartily approve such a policy - I would call it a policy of reciprocal example - in the matter of reducing of the armaments race.

Take the question of reducing the size of the armed forces. I said recently that we are considering the possibility of further reducing the numbers of the armed forces of our country. It is hardly necessary to explain in detail that if similar action were taken by the other side as well, it would open up new possibilities for further constructive measures to relieve international tension.

But in this connexion I must stress that if certain steps in the field of the reduction of armed forces, military expenditure, etc., can be taken at the present time and unilaterally, as an initial impetus, so to speak, the cessation of the

armaments race depends on the whole on both sides. Obviously, if we reduce our armed forces unilaterally, let us say - and we are already doing so - while others increase the numerical strength of their armed forces, this will in no way be a stimulus to such actions.

If we are to speak about the urgent problems which we consider ought to be resolved during 1964, of course we must mention in the first place the problem of liquidating the remnants of the Second World War in Europe. In this regard the main thing is to reach agreement and to find a way to a peaceful settlement of the German question and on that basis to achieve an agreement on the normalization of the position in West Berlin. All States which really make it their aim to improve the international situation and finally to put an end to the "cold war" must apply their efforts to solving the problem of a peaceful settlement of the German question. It would be unwise, nay dangerous, to defer this matter to the future. The peoples of the whole world, and not merely any single country, are interested in a rapid solution to this problem.

There are also possibilities of resolving many other international problems through peaceful negotiations.

In 1963 hope for an improvement of the international situation was awakened in the peoples of the world. Let those on whom an improvement depends do everything this year to ensure that this hope grows stronger so that it may be possible at the next New Year's Day to carry a stage further the cause of peace. The Soviet Union is willing to consider any proposals likely to contribute to promoting good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and the United States.

In conclusion I want to thank the United Press International Agency for giving me the opportunity on the eve of New Year's Day of expressing the Soviet Union Government's views concerning certain international problems. I also take this opportunity through your Agency of sending my New Year greetings and best wishes to the American people.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

19619 23

ENDC/123
28 January 1964
ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures
for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing
international tension

As a result of the joint efforts of all men of good will, it has been possible to achieve a certain relaxation of international tension; this has been reflected in the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water and in an agreement not to place in orbit objects carrying nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government considers that more favourable conditions have now been created for agreeing upon and carrying out other measures aimed at a further relaxation of international tension. If the efforts of all governments and peoples are united in the cause of peace, 1964 may become a turning point towards an improvement in the whole international situation.

The Soviet Government, which considers that the main task of governments is to achieve the speediest possible agreement on general and complete disarmament, at the same time proposes that agreement be reached on the implementation of measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and further lessening international tension.

1. Withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories
of other countries

The question of the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the territories of other countries to within the boundaries to their national territories is now acquiring particular importance and urgency.

The presence of foreign troops in the territories of other countries is one of the principal sources of international tension and gives rise to conflicts fraught with danger to the cause of the peace and the security of the peoples. As recent events in various parts of the world have shown, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries is becoming increasingly imperative and urgent. Of particularly important significance would be the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of European States, where the troops and armaments of the NATO countries, on the one hand, and of the Warsaw Treaty countries, on the other, are concentrated in large numbers.

Agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops would not cause detriment to either side, since this would not disrupt the general balance of forces between the States belonging to the two groups, namely NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. After all, the military leaders of the NATO countries themselves, to judge by their statements, take as their starting point the assumption that the total number of NATO forces is not less, but is even greater than the number of troops of the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The Soviet Union proposes the most radical way of solving this question, namely, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from all foreign territories and that not a single foreign soldier should be left anywhere, in any part of the world. On its part, the Soviet Union is prepared to withdraw all its troops from the territories of foreign States where they are now stationed, if the Western Powers will do likewise. If, however, the Western Powers are not as yet prepared for such a radical solution of this important question, the Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached immediately that the number of armed forces in foreign territories should first be reduced on a basis of reciprocity, and afterwards it will be possible to lead up gradually, step by step, to their complete withdrawal to within the boundaries of their national territories. The Soviet Union is prepared to set about such a reduction of its troops in the territory of the German Democratic Republic and other European States, if the Western Powers begin to reduce the number of their troops in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries.

The implementation of these measures would undoubtedly lead to the normalization of the situation in Europe and would thereby contribute to the strengthening of universal peace.

2. Reduction of the total numbers of the armed forces of States

The Soviet Government has always declared itself in favour of the reduction of the armed forces of States, and the Soviet Union has on a number of occasions undertaken a considerable reduction of its army even unilaterally. At the present time, more favourable possibilities have come about for settling this important question on a reciprocal basis, without waiting for the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament to begin.

As Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, has stated, the Soviet Union has now set about further reducing the number of its

armed forces. The Soviet Government is prepared to go in the direction of reducing the numbers of its armed forces still further, if the governments of the Western Powers show willingness to take similar measures.

3. Reduction of military budgets

Being anxious to put an end to the unbridled growth of military expenditure which is a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples, the Soviet Government has on a number of occasions made proposals for the reduction of military budgets. As is well known, the Soviet Union has recently shown initiative in solving this question by unilaterally reducing its military budget for 1964 by 600 million roubles. It is also known that the United States Government in its turn is taking measures for a certain reduction of its military expenditure. Thus there now exist favourable pre-conditions for agreement on a further reciprocal reduction of military budgets. The Soviet Government proposes that agreement be reached to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent.

4. Conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries

The Soviet Government considers it essential to agree to conclude a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO. The conclusion of such a pact would in no way disrupt the existing balance of forces between the two groups and, at the same time, would introduce into international relations the element of stability and calm which is so much needed.

In the years which have elapsed since the Soviet Government first put forward a proposal for the conclusion of such a pact, this idea has met with the support of statesmen and public figures in many countries. The time has come to discuss this proposal in a businesslike way and to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. Moreover, this is called for by the commitments laid down in the joint communiqué of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of 25 July 1963. The Soviet Government reaffirms its willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with the States members of NATO.

With regard to the form that the non-aggression pact should take, the Soviet Government considers that this question can be solved without any particular difficulty.

5. Establishment of denuclearized zones

The Soviet Government attaches great importance to the establishment of denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. This idea has met with universal response and approval during recent years. Proposals have been put forward for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Central and Northern Europe, in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, in Africa and Latin America, as well as in other regions of the world.

In supporting the plans for the establishment of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world, the Soviet Government attaches special importance to the formation of such zones in those regions where the danger of nuclear conflict is greatest, and first and foremost in Central Europe.

The Soviet Government, on its part, will be prepared to give an undertaking to respect the status of denuclearized zones wherever and whenever they are established.

6. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons

As the stocks of nuclear weapons increase, and the methods of manufacturing them are improved, and as ever new types of such weapons are being devised, the question of preventing their further dissemination becomes increasingly important. A widening of the circle of States possessing nuclear weapons would increase many times over the danger of the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. At the same time a widening of the circle of nuclear States would also make it much more difficult to solve the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Government notes that at present there is an increasing awareness throughout the world of the danger threatening mankind in connexion with the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is the duty of all governments to make every effort to avert this danger before it is too late. It is particularly important from the point of view of the interests of peace to close all the channels, whether direct or indirect, through which nuclear weapons could come into the hands of those who twice during this century have caused the conflagration of a world war and who are now actively striving to obtain nuclear weapons.

In order to shut off all possibilities for the spread of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Government proposes that an agreement on this question should contain, besides the prohibition to transfer such weapons or to give information on their

manufacture to any particular government, also provisions to guarantee that such a transfer of nuclear weapons or access to them shall not take place indirectly, through military blocs, for example, through the so-called multilateral nuclear force of NATO.

7. Measures to prevent surprise attack

The Soviet Government has declared itself and continues to declare itself in favour of taking active and effective measures to prevent surprise attack. As is well known, for this purpose the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for the establishment of a network of observation posts in the territories of the countries belonging to the two opposing groups of States in conjunction with certain measures for lessening international tension such as a reduction in the numbers of foreign troops in the territories of European countries and an undertaking not to station nuclear weapons in the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet Government considers that, if unaccompanied by these concrete measures for the lessening of international tension and the limitation of armaments, the establishment of observation posts could not lead to the achievement of the desired aim, namely, the growth of confidence between States, and thereby a lessening of the danger of war. On the contrary, it might even lead to an increase of mutual suspicions and to the aggravation of international relations.

The establishment of a system of observation posts may prove to be useful only in conjunction with concrete measures for reducing the threat of war. Practical steps for a real lessening of the possibility of an outbreak of military conflict in Europe and observation posts would in that case be two complementary aspects of a single process - the lessening of tension in the danger zones where the armed forces of the two opposing groups face each other.

8. Elimination of bomber aircraft

Bomber aircraft, though obsolete, still remain one of the powerful means of carrying on a war of aggression, used to deliver nuclear weapons many thousands of kilometres from their bases in order to inflict massive blows in the territories of other States. The elimination of this type of armament would diminish the risk of war and help to strengthen the security of all peoples. The Soviet Government is prepared to examine this question.

9. Prohibition of underground nuclear tests

The Soviet Government declares its readiness, as before, to reach agreement on extending the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, to underground testing.

Actual experience has fully confirmed that no special international control need be organized to detect underground tests any more than it is needed to detect tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

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The Soviet Government assumes, of course, that in concluding agreements providing for measures of actual disarmament, agreement must be achieved on appropriate, mutually acceptable forms of control over the implementation of these measures.

In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the implementation of the measures enumerated in this Memorandum would lead to a further considerable lessening of international tension and would constitute an important step forward towards solving the main problem - general and complete disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/126

13 February 1964

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

BRAZIL

Working Paper of the Brazilian Delegation for an Agreement on the Application of Savings on Military Expenditures

The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

CONSIDERING the desire often reiterated by the General Assembly of the United Nations as well as by the large majority of those responsible for the conduct of human affairs that immediate and practical results be attained in the discussion of disarmament problems,

NOTING WITH SATISFACTION the sustained interest shown by the General Assembly of the United Nations in the proposals submitted to that effect and the insistence of its recommendations that such proposals enter upon a stage of effective implementation with a view to responding to the manifest desire for peace and progress common to all the peoples of the world,

CONSCIOUS of the tangible and beneficial changes which the international political climate has been undergoing since the signature of the Moscow treaty on the partial nuclear tests ban,

INSPIRED by the General Assembly Resolutions 1931 (XVIII) and 1837 (XVII), the latter adopted under the heading "Declaration on the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources released by Disarmament", both of which acknowledge, inter alia, that the resources at present allotted to military purposes might be progressively channelled towards peaceful ends, thus greatly benefiting all countries by virtue of an improvement in the economic and social standards of their peoples,

COGNIZANT of the necessity to initiate, on an international scale, appropriate steps towards the progressive conversion of an economy of war into an economy of peace in order to forestall the dangerous consequences that might arise from a non-planned suppression of military expenditures for both the countries having a centrally planned economy and those having a free enterprise system, in conformity with the conclusions arrived at by the Economic and Social Council embodied in its Resolution 982 (XXXVI), stemming from the studies made by a group of experts appointed in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1516 (XV),

HAVING IN MIND General Assembly Resolution 1710 (XVI), which, upon establishing the "Decade of the United Nations for Development", requested the submission of proposals related to the eventual utilization of resources released by disarmament in economic and social development programmes, particularly in the under-developed countries,

CONVINCED that the reduction in the military expenditures of the Great Powers would be a decisive contribution towards enabling millions of human beings, in developing countries and in economically depressed areas of those countries already showing a high degree of industrialization alike to attain levels compatible with their legitimate aspirations,

CONVINCED, further, that the struggle against misery in the world will encourage the economic development of the world as a whole, rendering possible the creation of new markets, of new and better opportunities for work, of a substantial increase in the production of goods in all countries and facilitating and intensifying the commercial exchanges between the various areas of the world,

PERSUADED that the vast economic and social imbalance now prevailing in the world represents, through the social tensions it entails, a serious threat to international peace and security,

TAKES NOTE with deep appreciation of the reductions in the military budgets already officially declared by the two main armed powers - the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America - and of the proposals put forth with a view to effecting even more substantial cuts in the years to come,

REQUESTS all Governments to endeavour to demonstrate by practical measures their desire for peace, by carrying out reductions of the same nature in their respective military budgets,

RECOMMENDS the application of the resources thus released in projects leading to the conversion of an economy of war into an economy of peace and in projects aimed at developing economically and socially all regions and areas markedly affected by poverty and by under-development,

STRONGLY RECOMMENDS that a sum not below 20% of the global value of the reductions in military budgets already effected or which will be effected in the future by all countries be credited to an "Industrial Conversion and Economic Development Fund", to be established at the earliest possible opportunity with the

purpose of financing projects of the aforesaid scope to be implemented in the developing countries, due regard being given to an equitable geographical distribution,

ESTABLISHES IMMEDIATELY and within the framework of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament a working group composed of the representatives of the Powers which have already declared a reduction in their military budgets and in addition by the representatives of three other Powers to be appointed by the Conference, to study and make recommendations to the Committee, concerning the structure and the functioning of the Fund.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/130
26 March 1964
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED KINGDOM

Paper on observation posts submitted at the 178th meeting of the Conference

The possibility of establishing observation posts as a way of increasing the likelihood of detecting possible preparation for aggression has formed a subject for study since 1955. In the following paper suggestions as a basis for further discussion are put forward outlining a system of observation posts, which in our view would contribute to peace and stability and thus by the consequent increase of confidence lead to progress on further measures of disarmament.

Circumstances in which war could occur

2. The circumstances in which observation posts could assist are: war by accident; war by miscalculation; and surprise attack.

- (a) "War by accident" is defined as an unpremeditated incident which does not of itself amount to deliberate aggression but which is of sufficient significance to create a risk of rapid escalation to war. Observation posts would be useful if they provided any evidence which suggested that a particular incident was the result of an accident and was not associated with preparation for war;
- (b) "War by miscalculation" could arise from a misappreciation by one side of the extent of the other side's interests involved; or of the other side's resolve and ability to defend them. If observation posts could improve, during periods of heightened tension, both sides' knowledge of the extent to which the other was or was not making overt military preparations, they could serve a useful purpose;
- (c) "Surprise attack" is considered as aggression on any scale without overt warning. Observation posts would be of value in reducing the amount of covert reinforcement and preparation that could be undertaken without detection and thus make an aggressive military move more hazardous.

The effectiveness and location of an observation posts system

3. The choice of one particular system as opposed to another will involve a number of factors which are inter-related: the coverage of the system; the degree of mobility accorded to the observers; the probability of detecting certain movements or preparations; the military importance of the movements or preparations to be observed. In assessing the merits of any system of observation posts it is first necessary to define the system, for different systems will give different results. The probability of detecting a given pattern of movement will vary, and so will the size of movement detectable with a given degree of certainty. If, for instance, a rapid knowledge of even minor movements is sought, a very large system of posts will be needed. On the other hand, if it is intended that they should detect preparations for a land attack, then a more modest network will suffice.

4. The posts would need to cover a variety of movements. For instance, they should be sited to observe movements on the railway system, since railways remain the quickest and most efficient way of moving armour. For this, posts would best be located at, for example, main railway junctions.

5. In addition, observation posts will need to watch road networks. Static posts on roads are by themselves of relatively little value as they are easily by-passed. Posts with some agreed limited area of action, covering, for example, a local road network, will have less chance of being by-passed and hence an increased chance of detecting abnormal patterns of movement.

6. It may be desirable to provide for the observation of air activity. In that case posts would best be sited on a selection of those airfields likely to be employed in some way in preparing for air action in support of land operations.

7. For the observation of maritime activity posts should be established at main ports in order to detect, for example, maritime reinforcement and support of ground forces.

Organization and operation of an observation posts system

8. A system of observation posts will have little military value unless the individual posts can carry out their essential observations efficiently and communicate their results with certainty and speed. Any agreement should include workable arrangements for supervision and manning, method of operation and communications. Each side should be enabled to set up quick and efficient

arrangements for collating information from posts in various regions so that the reports of different posts can be compared and checked. Collation might be necessary at two levels: in the first instance, by collating reports from observation posts on a regional and functional basis, and secondly, on a centralized basis to examine the full range of military activity.

Supervision and manning

9. There will have to be an organization on which the participants from both sides are represented to supervise the general operation of the observation posts agreement and to ensure that the observation posts are gathering the information they are designed to gather and are not being impeded in transmitting it back. Each side should be invited to notify this organization in advance of any significant military movements since this could guard against misinterpretation and facilitate the achievement of the objectives of an observation posts agreement.
10. Initially manning should be organized on an adversary basis. It is not intended, however, to exclude the participation of international observers as progress towards wider measures of disarmament develops.

Method of observation

11. There would have to be agreement on the area of action of observation posts, on the freedom of movement and the access of observers to facilities within the agreed area, on other suitable mobile means for carrying out permitted observation, and on the use of appropriate detection devices. These rules must of course be strictly defined in the agreement and strictly adhered to by both sides in a spirit of reciprocity.

Communications

12. It is essential that adequate communications for the exclusive use of the observation posts system should be provided. The agreement should also provide that messages would be transmitted in an agreed code by which the host nation would be able to understand the messages. Any interference, delays or amendments of transmissions would be regarded as a direct breach of the agreement. It would also be necessary to arrange some system of authentication in order to ensure that transmission was not being interfered with.

The size of a system of observation posts

13. The numbers should be based on considerations of balance and mutual interest. In our view the posts should be established by mutual agreement at appropriate locations in North America, the United Kingdom, Europe and the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

14. The establishment of a system of observation posts on the above lines would, in our opinion, do much to ease international tension, and thus lead the way both to other collateral measures and also offer better prospects for progress on general and complete disarmament.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/131

21 April 1964

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR
Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, on 20 April 1964

Recently as a result of the active and persistent efforts of all the peace-loving States and peoples some relaxation of international tension has been achieved. One can say with complete certainty that a great role in this regard was played by the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water - the first agreement in history aimed at checking a further intensification of the nuclear arms race.

The peoples also welcomed with great satisfaction the achievement of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, corroborated by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, the United States of America and a number of other States have taken steps to reduce to some extent their military budgets for 1964.

All this has contributed to a certain strengthening of confidence in the relations between States and to the creation of more favourable conditions for the adoption of further measures that would lead to the cessation of the arms race and to the solution of the main problem - the problem of disarmament.

In advocating the speediest possible solution of the disarmament problem and the implementation of effective measures to end the race for armaments, especially nuclear armaments, the Soviet Government is anxious to avail itself of any opportunity for achieving in international affairs a mutual understanding with other States in regard to the necessity of avoiding a nuclear war.

On behalf of the Soviet Government I wish to state that an opportunity for improving such a mutual understanding has now arisen in connexion with the question of the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons.

It is well known that plutonium and uranium-235 are the source materials for the fabrication of nuclear weapons. It is within their atoms that the chain reactions arise which bring about devastating nuclear explosions. Over a good many years the nuclear Powers have been incessantly increasing their stocks of plutonium and uranium-235, vying with one another as to which of them has the most of these materials for nuclear weapons, and incurring in doing so exceedingly great expenditures, since the production of plutonium and uranium-235 is carried out on the basis of complicated technical processes and requires costly equipment and great expenditures of energy.

The armaments race and the rivalry of the nuclear Powers in stockpiling fissionable materials were not started on the initiative of the Soviet Union. We were not the first to include in military arsenals this monstrous weapon of mass destruction. But we are bound to show care for safeguarding the security of our country and of all the socialist States and to do so on the scale which the situation requires.

Now the time has come when an opportunity has emerged to take steps to reduce the production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The Soviet Government has considered the question of to what extent in the present correlation of nuclear power in the world arena our country can go in this direction without in any way weakening the defence capacity of the Soviet Union and the solidity of the nuclear missile shield which reliably safeguards the security of all the countries of the socialist community.

Having carefully weighed up all the data relating to the nuclear potentials of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and of the nuclear Powers - members of NATO, on the other, and having analysed all the circumstances of the matter, the Soviet Government has taken the following decision:

1. To stop straightaway the construction of two new large atomic reactors for the production of plutonium.

2. During the next few years to reduce substantially the production of uranium-235 for nuclear weapons.

3. To allocate accordingly more fissionable materials for peaceful uses - in atomic power stations, in industry, agriculture, medicine and in the implementation of major scientific-technical projects, including the distillation of sea water.

The President of the United States of America, Mr. L. Johnson, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Sir Alexander Douglas-Home, have informed me that they will make announcements on the practical measures in regard to reducing the

production of fissionable materials for military purposes, which will be taken accordingly by the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

We are confident that this new step, although it still does not represent actual disarmament, will be appreciated by the peoples as a continuation of the policy adopted in concluding the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests and that it will help towards further improving the international situation. But it is necessary to go farther. It is the deep conviction of the Soviet Government that increased efforts must be made in searching for a solution of the main problems of disarmament and in adopting ever more effective measures for strengthening universal peace. This is called for by the vital interests of all States and of all peoples. The Soviet Government is prepared to take such further steps in agreement with the other Powers.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/132
21 April 1964
Original: ENGLISH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Excerpts From President Johnson's Address to the Associated Press Luncheon in New York, on 20 April 1964

"I am taking two actions today which reflect both our desire to reduce tensions, and our unwillingness to risk weakness. I have ordered a further substantial reduction in our production of enriched uranium, to be carried out over a four-year period. When added to previous reductions, this will mean an overall decrease in the production of plutonium by 20 per cent, and of enriched uranium by 40 per cent. By bringing production in line with need,.... we think we will reduce tension while we maintain all the necessary power.

".... In reaching these decisions, I have been in close consultation with Prime Minister Douglas-Home. Simultaneously with my announcement now, Chairman Khrushchev is releasing a statement in Moscow, at two o'clock our time, in which he makes definite commitments to steps towards a most peaceful world. He agrees to discontinue the construction of two big new atomic reactors for the production of plutonium over the next several years, to reduce substantially the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons, and to allocate more fissionable material for peaceful uses.

"This is not disarmament. This is not a declaration of peace. But it is a hopeful sign and it is a step forward which we welcome and which we can take in hope that the world may yet, one day, live without the fear of war. At the same time, I have reaffirmed all the safeguards against weakening our nuclear strength which we adopted at the time of the Test Ban Treaty".

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/134
25 June 1964
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cutoff

I. INTRODUCTION

A. This paper describes the inspection of nuclear powers under a cutoff of fissionable material production for use in weapons.

B. The possibility should be explored of application by the IAEA of the procedures described below for the inspection of declared facilities, as might be agreed in consultation with that organization. It is recognized that such a programme would require the strengthening of IAEA organization and procedures. Inspection to provide assurance that activities contrary to the agreement were not being conducted at undeclared facilities would be conducted on an adversary basis.

II. NATURE OF CUTOFF

A. Production of fissionable material for use in weapons will be prohibited. Production of fissionable material will be permitted for purposes other than use in weapons, such as research, power and propulsion reactors, explosions for peaceful purposes, and foreign non-weapons uses.

B. Facilities such as fuel fabrication and chemical processing plants will remain in operation to the extent necessary to support allowed production and use.

III. VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

A. Inspection of a nuclear power should provide a high degree of assurance that no violation could take place that would result in a significant increase in its existing stockpile of material available for use in weapons. Under a cutoff agreement, many of the existing fissionable material production plants of the nuclear powers would be shut down. The inventory and yearly production of fissionable material necessary for allowed uses would be small relative to present stocks of fissionable material, and hence diversion or illegal production for weapons uses would have to be substantial in order significantly to increase existing stocks.

B. As peaceful uses grow over a period of time and involve substantially larger quantities of fissionable material, or if existing weapons stockpiles are substantially reduced, a given amount of undetected diversion or illegal production may represent a greater security risk; hence, periodically the inspection outlined here will have to be reviewed to determine the need for revision, both as to inspection provisions and facilities subject to inspection.

IV. INSPECTION PROVISIONS

A. Declarations

1. Each nuclear power will declare, with annual revisions as appropriate:

(a) By individual identification and location, all U-235 separation plants, chemical separation plants, and reactors, with the initial declaration of reactors to consist of those of 100 or more thermal megawatts.

(b) The production of fissionable material required for allowed uses and schedules for production at each operating facility.

2. Each nuclear power would have the right to question the declaration of any other nuclear power and, if the other party does not justify its declaration to the satisfaction of the questioning party, to withdraw from the agreement.

B. Inspection Procedures

1. Shutdown Production Facilities

(a) The inspection of a shutdown facility is comparatively simple and foolproof. The start-up and shut-down of a significant part of a production complex are difficult and time consuming operations, and inspections carried out with little (at most a few days) advance warning should suffice to detect any effort to change the status of these facilities.

(b) An initial inspection would be made to identify each plant in this category and ensure that it has in fact been shut down. After confirmation by the initial inspection that the plant has been shut down, subsequent inspections would be made at appropriately spaced but irregular intervals with little advance warning to ensure that the plant continued in a shut-down status.

2. Operating Facilities

(a) Mines and Refineries

No declaration or inspection of mines or refineries would be made.

(b) U-235 Separation Plants

(i) A U-235 separation plant capable of producing enriched U-235 can represent a potential for diversion or illegal production or significant amounts of fissionable material suitable for use in weapons. The inspection objective would be to ensure that only declared U-235 separation plant buildings are operating and that they are operating within the declared levels; i.e., that only agreed quantities of material of stated enrichment are being produced.

(ii) Inspection would involve: (1) Ground access at the perimeter of the process buildings, with continuous examination of the perimeters; (2) measurement of electrical power input to the plant; and (3) measurement of perimeter uranium input and declared product output, and uranium tails, for uranium content and U-235 content.

(iii) This inspection will permit an estimate of the U-235 production potential adequate at present to assure against diversions which would be significant relative to existing stocks. Measurement of U-235 product would provide current information concerning the quantities available for allowed uses.

(iv) If the U-235 produced is stored until it is needed, the storage sites would be monitored and the U-235 input and output would be recorded.

(c) Reactors

(i) The nuclear powers would agree to accept on a phased basis IAEA inspection* or similar inspection of their reactors, starting with reactors of 100 or more thermal megawatts.

(ii) All fissionable material discharged from reactors would be processed in declared chemical separation plants.

(d) Chemical Separation Plants

(i) The products of chemical separation will be plutonium or U-233 produced during operation of reactors and the uranium not consumed during its use as fuel. The plutonium, the U-233, and possibly the uranium fuel (depending upon its enrichment) are potentially useful in weapons, and hence close monitoring of this activity is required.

* This provides for declarations of reactor characteristics, design review, specific activities of inspectors, and a frequency of inspection and reporting adequate to ensure that fissionable material is not diverted to prohibited uses.

(ii) Inspectors at the chemical separation plant would have complete access at all times to the facility. The inspection and control procedures would provide for (1) the review of the design of the facility from the viewpoint of assuring that it will permit effective inspection; (2) the maintenance of an adequate system of records and the submission of reports on materials and use of the facility; and (3) inspections to account for material and to detect diversion. Plutonium, U-233, and enriched uranium output would be stored and monitored or used under safeguards consistent with those in this paper.

(iii) Alternatively, the purpose of the inspection can be fulfilled by the placement under international safeguards of material of the same type not previously subject to international safeguards in an amount at least equal to that contained in the material to be processed. The inspectors would make an independent measurement of the material to be processed to determine the amount required to be placed under safeguards.

3. Undeclared Facilities

(a) There would be agreed rights to conduct a limited number of inspections of suspected undeclared facilities on an adversary basis. The objective of an inspection of a suspected undeclared facility is to provide assurance that no U-235 separation plants, reactors, or chemical separation plants are in operation in violation of the agreement. That objective could be met by internal inspection of the facility or, in the case of a particularly sensitive facility, by appropriate external inspection procedures such as environmental sampling, external observation of the structures, or the measurement of electrical power and other utilities within a radius of a few miles.

(b) The inspected country would be permitted to take all reasonable precautions to assure that the inspectors did not observe any sensitive activities it did not wish observed, so long as it permitted the inspectors to observe such characteristics of a facility or perform such measurements as would permit determination that prohibited activities were not occurring.

(c) A procedure for initiation of an inspection would need to be developed, and specification of the rights of the country requesting the inspections and the obligations of the inspected country would need to be developed prior to detailed negotiations.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/139

29 July 1964

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

**LIST OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS REFERRING TO
TASKS OF THE EIGHTEEN NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT**

(Prepared by the Secretariat pursuant to the decision of the Committee
at its 202nd meeting on 28 July 1964)

Document	Date of Adoption	Tasks
Resolution 1722 (XVI). Question of disarmament	20.XII.1961	Recommends that ENDC undertake negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Requests ENDC to submit reports.
Resolution 1762 A and B (XVII). The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	6.XI.1962	Requests ENDC to resume negotiations on cessation of nuclear testing and on general and complete disarmament and to report to General Assembly. Urges ENDC to seek conclusion of treaty on cessation of all tests.
Resolution 1767 (XVII). Question of general and complete disarmament	21.XI.1962	Calls upon ENDC to resume negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Recommends urgent attention be given to collateral measures. Requests periodic reports to General Assembly.
Letter from the President of the General Assembly to ENDC (ENDC/65). Condemnation of propaganda favouring preventive nuclear war	27.XI.1962	Refers question to ENDC for consideration.

Document	Date of Adoption	Tasks
Resolution 1908 (XVIII). Question of general and complete disarmament	27.XI.1963	<p>Calls upon ENDC to resume negotiations on general and complete disarmament and recommends it encourage widening areas of agreement.</p> <p>Urges ENDC to make efforts to seek agreement on collateral measures.</p> <p>Requests ENDC to submit an interim report at early date and a comprehensive report not later than 1 September 1964.</p>
Resolution 1909 (XVIII). Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons	27.XI.1963	<p>Requests ENDC to study question of convening a conference for purpose of signing convention and to report to General Assembly at 19th session.</p>
Resolution 1910 (XVIII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests	27.XI.1963	<p>Requests ENDC to continue negotiations to achieve discontinuance of all tests for all time and to report to General Assembly not later than at 19th session.</p>

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/1722 (XVI)
3 January 1962

Sixteenth session
Agenda item 19

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[on the report of the First Committee (A/4980/Add.2)]
1722 (XVI). Question of disarmament

The General Assembly,

Noting with concern that the continuing arms race is a heavy burden for humanity and is fraught with dangers for the cause of world peace,

Conscious of its responsibilities, under the Charter of the United Nations, for disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959, in which it called upon Governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and expressed the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control would be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time,

Being deeply concerned that the objectives of that resolution be achieved as early as possible,

I

Noting with satisfaction the report submitted to the General Assembly by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America following their exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of negotiations in an appropriate body,^{1/}

1/ A/4879

/...

1. Welcomes the joint statement of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations included in that report;

2. recommends that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based upon those principles;

II

Deeming it essential that negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control be resumed at the earliest possible time,

Recognizing that all States have a deep interest in disarmament negotiations,

1. Endorses the agreement that has been reached on the composition of a Disarmament Committee, whose membership will be: Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America;

2. Recommends that the Committee, as a matter of the utmost urgency, should undertake negotiations with a view to reaching, on the basis of the joint statement of agreed principles and taking into account, inter alia, paragraph 8 of those principles, agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

3. Requests that the Committee submit to the General Assembly a report on such agreement as soon as it has been reached, and in any case submit to the Disarmament Commission, not later than 1 June 1962, a report on the progress achieved;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and provide the necessary services to the Committee.

1085th plenary meeting,
20 December 1961.



UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED
A/RES/1762 (XVII)
7 November 1962

Seventeenth session
Agenda item 77

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/5279)]

1762 (XVII). The urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests

A

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned with the continuation of nuclear weapon tests,

Fully conscious that world opinion demands the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests,

Viewing with the utmost apprehension the data contained in the report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,^{1/}

Considering that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests is an important factor in the acceleration of the arms race and that the conclusion of an agreement prohibiting such tests would greatly contribute to paving the way towards general and complete disarmament,

Recalling its resolution 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961, whereby the States concerned were urged to refrain from further nuclear weapon test explosions pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements with regard to the cessation of tests,

Noting with regret that the States concerned have not responded to the appeal contained in the aforementioned and in other relevant resolutions and that, despite its efforts, the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/5216).

on Disarmament, referred to in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, is not yet in a position to report agreement on this vitally important issue,

Recalling that in resolution 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961 the General Assembly reaffirmed that an agreement prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests would inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and would contribute to the reduction of international tensions,

Noting that, among the States represented in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, basic agreement now prevails as regards the question of control of tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,

Noting further that the proceedings of the Eighteen-Nation Committee indicate a somewhat enlarged area of agreement on the question of effective control of underground tests,

Considering that the memorandum of 16 April 1962, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic,^{2/} represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests,

Welcoming the intention to find a speedy settlement of the remaining differences on the question of the cessation of nuclear tests, declared in the letter dated 27 October 1962 from Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to Mr. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, in the letter dated 28 October 1962 from Mr. Kennedy to Mr. Khrushchev, and in the letter dated 28 October 1962 from Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to Mr. Khrushchev,

Convinced that no efforts should be spared to achieve prompt agreement on the cessation of all nuclear tests in all environments,

1. Condemns all nuclear weapon tests;
2. Asks that such tests should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963;
3. Urges the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to settle the remaining differences between them in order to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing by 1 January 1963, and to issue instructions to their representatives on the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to achieve this end;
4. Endorses the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 as a basis for negotiation;
5. Calls on the parties concerned, taking as a basis the above-mentioned memorandum and having regard to the discussions on this item at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, to negotiate in a spirit of mutual understanding and concession in order to reach agreement urgently, bearing in mind the vital interests of mankind;
6. Recommends that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission;
7. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to reconvene not later than 12 November 1962, to resume negotiations on the cessation of nuclear testing and on general and complete disarmament, and to report to the General Assembly by 10 December 1962 on the results achieved with regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

1165th plenary meeting,
6 November 1962.

/...

B

The General Assembly,

Believing that a cessation of nuclear weapon tests is the concern of all peoples and all nations,

Declaring it imperative that an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests for all time should be concluded as rapidly as this can be done,

Recalling its resolutions 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961 and 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961,

Profoundly regretting that the agreements called for in those resolutions have not yet been achieved,

Noting that the endeavour to negotiate a nuclear test ban agreement has been taking place at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,

Noting that the discussions and negotiations in Geneva are based on the draft treaty submitted on 28 November 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,^{3/} the memorandum submitted on 16 April 1962 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic^{4/} and the comprehensive and limited draft treaties submitted on 27 August 1962 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,^{5/}

1. Urges the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to seek the conclusion of a treaty with effective and prompt international verification which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in all environments for all time;

2. Requests the negotiating Powers to agree upon an early date on which a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests shall enter into force;

3. Notes the discussions and documents regarding nuclear testing contained in the two reports of the Conference;^{6/}

^{3/} DC/203, annex 1 (ENDC/11).

^{4/} Ibid. (ENDC/28).

^{5/} DC/205, annex 1 (ENDC/58, ENDC/59).

^{6/} DC/203 and DC/205.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee the records of the seventeenth session of the General Assembly relating to the suspension of nuclear testing.

1165th plenary meeting,
6 November 1962.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/1767 (XVII)
22 November 1962

Seventeenth session
agenda item 90

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/5303)]

1767 (XVII). Question of general and complete disarmament

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Convinced that the aim of general and complete disarmament must be achieved on the basis of the eight agreed principles recognized by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI),

Reaffirming its responsibility for disarmament under the Charter of the United Nations,

Taking note of the two interim progress reports of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament,^{1/} the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,^{2/} and the outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, submitted by the United States of America,^{3/}

^{1/} LC/203, A/5200-DC/205

^{2/} A/C.1/867.

^{3/} A/C.1/875.

/...

Noting with regret that during six months of negotiations at Geneva little agreement was achieved on vital problems of disarmament,

Expressing its appreciation to the participants in the Eighteen-Nation Committee engaged in disarmament negotiations at Geneva for their perseverance in trying to reach agreement,

Welcoming the spirit of compromise which prompted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to introduce certain modifications into their two draft treaties on disarmament,

Recalling hopefully the letters exchanged recently between Mr. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, and Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in which they expressed their readiness to resume disarmament negotiations with renewed determination and vigour,

Determined to avert the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear confrontation, on which the recent crisis focused attention,

1. Reaffirms the need for the conclusion, at the earliest possible date, of an agreement on general and complete disarmament based on the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, submitted on 20 September 1961 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America^{4/} and endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1722 (XVI).

2. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume at Geneva its negotiations on general and complete disarmament, with effective controls, expeditiously and in a spirit of constructive compromise, until agreement has been reached;

3. Recommends that urgent attention should be given by the Eighteen-Nation Committee to various collateral measures intended to decrease tension and to facilitate general and complete disarmament;

4. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report periodically to the General Assembly on the progress of its work and, in any case, not later than the second week of April 1963;

^{4/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

5. Transmits to the Disarmament Commission, and requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the documents and records of plenary meetings of the General Assembly and meetings of the First Committee at which the question of disarmament was discussed.

1173rd plenary meeting,
21 November 1962.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

PRIVATE

EMDC/65

30 November 1962

Original: ENGLISH

Letter dated 27 November 1962 from the President of
the General Assembly of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen
of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
referring item 93 on the General Assembly's agenda to the Conference.

- - - I have the honour to inform you that the General Assembly, at its 1177th plenary meeting held on 27 November 1962, decided that item 93 on its agenda, namely, "Condemnation of propaganda favouring preventive nuclear war", be referred to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for its consideration.

Accept, etc.....

(Signed) Zafulla Khan
President of the General Assembly

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/1908 (XVIII)
29 November 1963

Eighteenth session
Agenda item 26

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the First Committee (A/5571/Add.1)^{1/}

1908 (XVIII). Question of general and complete disarmament

The General Assembly,

Conscious of its responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Convinced that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control is the surest safeguard for world peace and the national security,

Recognizing that mankind demands with increasing urgency that decisive measures be taken towards the realization of that goal,

Recalling its resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961 and 1767 (XVII) of 21 November 1962,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament of 29 August 1963,^{1/}

Expressing its satisfaction that agreement has been reached on a partial test ban treaty and on the establishment of a direct communications link between Moscow and Washington, and over the expressions of intention recorded in its resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 17 October 1963 not to station in outer space or place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,

^{1/} A/5488-DC/20.

Noting that all signatories to the partial test ban treaty have proclaimed in its preamble, as their principal aim, the speediest possible achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control, and that they have emphasized the advisability that the partial test ban should be followed by other initial steps,

Noting further that the Eighteen-Nation Committee, in fulfilment of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII), has under consideration various proposals for other collateral measures,

I

1. Calls upon the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to resume, with energy and determination, its negotiations on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in accordance with the joint statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations^{2/} and in a spirit of goodwill and mutual accommodation;

2. Recommends the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue to encourage the widening of the areas of basic agreement or similarity in the principal parties' approaches to the fundamental issues of general and complete disarmament;

II

Urges the Eighteen-Nation Committee to make efforts to seek agreement on measures which could serve to reduce international tension, lessen the possibility of war and facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament;

III

1. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to submit to the General Assembly an interim report on the progress of its work at an early appropriate date, and a comprehensive report not later than 1 September 1964;


2. Commends the Secretariat of the United Nations for its services to the Eighteen-Nation Committee and requests the Secretary-General to continue to make available to the Committee the necessary assistance and services.

1265th plenary meeting,
27 November 1963.

^{2/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 19, document A/4879.

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/1909 (XVIII)
29 November 1963

Eighteenth session
Agenda item 27

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

[on the report of the First Committee (A/5617)]

1909 (XVIII). Question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons

The General Assembly,

Recalling the declaration on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, contained in its resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961,

Cognizant that the subject can be speedily and effectively studied by the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva,

1. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons and to report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the present resolution and all other relevant documents to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

1265th plenary meeting,
27 November 1963.

/...

UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY



Distr.
LIMITED

A/RES/1910 (XVIII)*
29 November 1963

Eighteenth session
Agenda item 73

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

On the report of the First Committee (A/5597 and Corr.1)]
1910 (XVIII). Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and
thermo-nuclear tests

The General Assembly

Fully aware of its responsibility with regard to the question of nuclear weapon testing and of the views of world public opinion on this matter,

Noting with approval the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, signed on 5 August 1963 by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, and subsequently by a great number of other countries,

Noting further with satisfaction that in the preamble of that treaty the parties state that they are seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and are determined to continue negotiations to this end,

1. Calls upon all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions;
2. Requests the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble to the Treaty;
3. Requests the Eighteen-Nation Committee to report to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date and, in any event, not later than at the nineteenth session;

* This version includes the correction issued under symbol A/RES/1910 (XVIII)/Corr.1.

4. Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Eighteen-Nation Committee the documents and records of plenary meetings of the General Assembly and meetings of the First Committee at which the item relating to nuclear testing was discussed.

1265th plenary meeting,
27 November 1963

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/140
6 August 1964

ENGLISH
Original: ENGLISH, RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, UNITED KINGDOM
AND UNITED STATES

Joint Statement
By the Governments of
the United States, the United Kingdom
and
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
on the First Anniversary
of the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests
in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water

One year ago today the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed by the representatives of the US, UK, and the USSR.

This treaty moved our planet toward a further strengthening of peace. It helps restrict the arms race. It gives all men and women confidence that they and their children will be breathing purer air and living in a healthier, a less contaminated world. The states taking part in the disarmament negotiations at Geneva made their contribution to this cause. The positive role played by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, in the conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the three elements is worthy of note.

Since the signing of the treaty, most of the world's states - more than 100 - have joined the three original signatories. Since then, also, additional - if limited - steps have been taken to reduce nuclear hazards to mankind. Such are the Resolution of the General Assembly of October 17, 1963, on the banning of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the steps taken by the United States, the UK and the USSR in the early months of this year to cut back production of plutonium and enriched uranium.

These have been significant and valuable steps, but only first steps; serious problems and differences remain to be dealt with in order to achieve a downturn in the arms race, effective disarmament and secure peace. With a sincere concern for the true interests of all nations and through a constructive effort to achieve agreement consistent with those interests, we can seek to move along the road to understanding and to peace.

In marking the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, we declare our intention to do everything possible for the solution through negotiations of unresolved international problems in order to strengthen general peace, the benefits of which would be enjoyed by all states, big and small, and by all people.

* * *

August 5, 1964

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/141

7 August 1964

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Replies by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR,
Mr. Khrushchev, to questions put to him by the editorial staff
of the newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestiya"
on 4 August 1964

Question: On 5 August 1963 the Governments of the Soviet Union, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain put their signatures to a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. What can be said in connexion with the anniversary of the signing of that treaty?

Reply: With the signing of the Moscow Treaty its immediate result has already been evident - the cessation of the contamination by radioactive fallout of the air which man breathes, and of the food on which he lives. Today, a year later, we see more clearly the positive effect of the Treaty, to which over 100 States have become parties, on the international situation as well. The signing of the Moscow Treaty has contributed to the relaxation of international tension. Following the banning of nuclear tests in three environments, it was possible to bar the access of nuclear weapons into outer space and to reduce to some extent the flood of fissile materials flowing into the nuclear arsenals of States.

It can be said that the significance of the Moscow Treaty has already been recognized. It must be stressed, however, that neither that Treaty nor the achievement of agreement on the other questions I have referred to solves the basic problems of disarmament; they are still far from doing so. They merely help to get closer to those positions from which it is easier to set about the solution of that most important problem.

Question: How would it be possible, in your opinion, to strengthen the course directed towards easing international tension, which has appeared as a result of concluding the Moscow Treaty?

Reply: It is necessary that States, without stopping at what has been achieved, should concentrate their attention on other unresolved questions, on which depends in the first place the improvement of the international climate. Above all, it is a matter of putting finis to the last war by achieving a German peace settlement. Without that it is difficult to approach the problem of general and complete disarmament, the importance of solving which is recognized by literally everyone. Another matter that comes to the fore is the conclusion of an international agreement on the renunciation by States of the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes and questions of borders. It is necessary to extinguish the hotbeds of tension existing in the area of the Caribbean Sea, in South East Asia, in Cyprus and in the Arabian peninsula.

In my view, the year which has passed since the day the Moscow Treaty was concluded has enriched international life with new experience: with the creation of a certain fund of confidence it is possible to move further towards reducing international tension and achieving agreement in various fields, and not only by concluding official agreements but also on the basis of a policy of "mutual example". For this reason it is particularly important to protect this fund of confidence and not allow it to be exhausted but, on the contrary, to strengthen and extend it in every way.

In a word, much work still needs to be done in order to get rid of international tension and to consolidate world peace in the proper way, the blessings of which would be enjoyed in equal measure by all States large and small and by all peoples. In this noble field any delay, I can say quite firmly, will not be on account of the Soviet Union.

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

ENDC/144

14 September 1964

ENGLISH

Original: English/French
Spanish

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO,
NIGERIA, SWEDEN, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Memoranda of the Delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

BRAZIL

Summary of speeches made by the Delegation
of Brazil in the Eighteen Nation Committee
on Disarmament

I. General and complete disarmament

The delegation of Brazil considers that the time has come to pass from simple and general consideration to a systematic examination of the concrete points contained in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament.

To overcome the technical difficulties which will doubtless appear, it will be necessary to consider the setting up of technical bodies, either permanent or ad hoc, to meet the practical needs arising in the discussions.

The delegation of Brazil is firmly convinced that the work could be considerably expedited and lead to practical results if political negotiations and technical discussions could be conducted simultaneously; because in many cases the lack of a political decision is merely a consequence of lack of adequate technical knowledge. (9 June, PV.188, p.8.).

The delegation of Brazil considers perfectly adequate the working method suggested by the Swedish delegation for establishing the terms of reference of the proposed working group to study the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. (6 August, PV.205, p.20).

The delegation of Brazil considers it essential to keep in touch with realities and study the possible effects on peace and security of the Committee's decisions. It believes that all disarmament measures should go hand in hand with adequate controls ensuring that the agreements will be respected, however partial and limited these may be. Control should not, however, be made an obstacle to disarmament. When it is clear that a specific ad hoc is not necessary for the adoption of certain disarmament measures, it does not seem logical to insist on that control (9 June, PV.188, pp.7-9).

II. Collateral measures

(a) General proposal

The delegation of Brazil considers that there have been enough general discussions on collateral measures and that it is now necessary to select those on which agreement would appear easiest and examine them one by one. (9 June, PV.188, p.8).

It would be important to specify more clearly the purpose of some of those collateral measures, in order to determine how far they are related and could be combined in practice, so as to achieve some concrete results which, though modest, would represent effective progress towards a reduction in international tension and create favourable conditions for the disarmament process. The system adopted by the Committee, consisting in the separate study of proposals which in practice should be complementary, has hampered its work and prevented a better understanding.

The Committee could entrust that task to a working group whenever it considered that certain collateral measures could be studied jointly. It might seek to combine the study of the "principles" of reducing military budgets and of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons - which all delegations support - with that of "concrete measures" for a decreasing production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the destruction of bomber aircraft, and a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles, all of which have so far been discussed separately (6 August, PV.205, p.20).

(b) Reduction of Military Budgets and Economic Development

The delegation of Brazil considers that the Conference should examine possible methods of establishing a link between a reduction of expenditure on armaments and international co-operation for the economic development of the peoples of the world. The Eighteen-Nation Committee, without of course excluding the various organs of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, is an adequate forum for the formulation of such methods. There can be no doubt that world public opinion, particularly in the developing countries, expects the Conference itself to determine the means of allocating to economic development the resources released by a reduction in the manufacture of arms. (9 June, PV.188, p.9)

The delegation of Brazil believes that its suggestion for creating a special fund for that purpose would inevitably strengthen the peace-keeping machinery provided for in the San Francisco Charter. (6 August, PV.205, pp.20, 21)

(c) Underground tests

As in the past, the delegation of Brazil continues to hope that that part of the preamble of the Moscow Treaty which calls for a continuance of negotiations in order to ban underground tests will be translated into reality as speedily as possible. It is sure that the problems of control, detection and identification are not insoluble but can be solved within the framework of the possibilities of technical process. It is also

convinced that the smaller risk of radioactive contamination from underground tests does not diminish their intrinsic danger, for they are at present the only way of perfecting weapons of mass destruction. (6 August, PV.205, p.18)

The delegation of Brazil believes it possible to study an immediate ban on underground tests capable of detection and identification by national systems. Scientific data would be necessary for the study of this possibility. If the Conference did not accept the idea of studying this information itself, it could refer it to a technical sub-committee appointed for the purpose. (9 June, PV.188, p.9)

The delegation of Brazil therefore considers that any progress towards even a partial ban of underground tests - in accordance with the suggestion which it has already made - would constitute a decisive new step towards improved relations among the great Powers. It would be a practical demonstration, of concrete example, given by them to the non-nuclear nations that security must be sought, not through the unlimited accumulation of increasingly dangerous armaments, but through a step-by-step and controlled process of general and complete disarmament. (6 August, PV.205, pp. 18, 19)

BURMA

Positions of Burma on the main questions of Disarmament

Nuclear Disarmament:

The offer of the Soviet Union to extend the so called nuclear umbrella to the end of the third stage of disarmament constitutes the most important move that has yet been made in the field of nuclear disarmament. (PV/161,p.8)

The agreement by the two co-chairmen to set up a working group to consider the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles was welcomed and appeals made to the two co-chairmen to continue discussions on the terms of reference for the working group. (PV/208,p.13)

Collateral Measures:

(1) Note with satisfaction the reduction of military budgets for 1964 by the United States and the Soviet Union and express the hope that agreement will be reached to reduce military budgets of the big powers from 10 to 15 per cent. (PV/161,p.6)

Suggest that military budgets of the main armed powers be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent. (PV/168,p.7)

Welcome the Soviet Union's suggestion to reduce the military budgets of the big powers.

(2) Suggest the Committee should consider the United States proposal of a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. (PV/168,p.8)

Suggest that the proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive missiles, the proposal for reduction in military budgets and the destruction of bombers be considered in combination. (PV/178,p.32)

(3) Suggest that steps be taken to prevent the further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

(4) Support for the proposed non-aggression pact between Nato and Warsaw Pact countries.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty:

Consideration of UNGA resolution 1910 with appropriate priority proposed. (PV/161,p.9)

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Suggest reactivation of the Sub-Committee on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. (PV/178,p.36)

Suggest that underground tests above a certain range be banned. (PV/178,p.36)

Working procedure:

Favour informal ad hoc working groups or parties. (PV/161,p.10)

10 September 1964

(Sain Bwa)
Delegation of Burma

ETHIOPIA

Position of Ethiopian Delegation

I. Working Methods

The Ethiopian Delegation suggested that the best way of proceeding with the work of the committee was that while continuing with the examination of the two draft treaties submitted by the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union for general and complete disarmament, the committee should adopt a programme concentrating on such partial measures as the prevention of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, military budgets, the restriction of all fissionable materials and their transfer to peaceful uses.

(ENDC/PV.162 ; PV.166;PV.189)

II. Nuclear Test Ban

The Ethiopian Delegation emphasised that as long as the ban already achieved is partial, the future of the treaty is threatened for, if a few countries continue the nuclear arms race by testing underground others might well claim to test in the prohibited environment.

It also pointed out that some improvement in the means of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions could have taken place during the last year that might enable to bridge the narrow gap that divided the two sides in their effort to devise an acceptable measure of inspection which could ensure the carrying out of a ban of underground tests. (ENDC/PV.209)

III. General and Complete Disarmament:-

Working group for studying the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

The Ethiopian Delegation proposed that the working group should discuss the concept of the minimum nuclear deterrent in all its aspects and implications. The principal object of the working group should be to examine and appraise all proposals, explore the areas of agreement and devise measures acceptable to both sides on the level to be retained during the processes of disarmament. (ENDC/PV.194)

The Convening of an International Conference
for the purpose of signing a convention on the
prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons

The delegation proposed to the conference of ENDC on Disarmament to recommend to the 19th session of the General Assembly the convening of an International Conference for the purpose of signing a convention on this prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. (ENDC/PV.209)

INDIA

Suggestions made by Indian Delegation
on various proposals discussed in the
last two sessions of ENDC

A. General and complete disarmament: Elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles

While we are totally opposed to the use, manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons, we realize that an agreement is necessary to bring about their elimination. We have welcomed the Gromyko proposal, not because we regard retention of some limited stocks for a limited period as a progressive step in itself, but because this has narrowed the gap between the two sides and might make an agreement on disarmament easier. We cannot, however, support the idea that the limited stocks retained for a limited period, or the so-called umbrella, or minimum deterrent, may be actually used in some given circumstances. As the term "umbrella" is capable of being misunderstood, we would prefer the use of the term "lowest agreed level" in its place.

Our broad approach to the disarmament problem is that the first stage of disarmament must be a substantial one. We have welcomed the proposal for the formation of a working group to study matters of detail in connexion with the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. Our suggestion is that the terms of reference of the working group may be drafted somewhat as follows:

"A working group shall be established to consider proposals for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles to the lowest agreed levels at an early stage of the disarmament process, leading to the total elimination and destruction of all stocks."

There has been no agreement during the session between the two Co-Chairmen on the terms of reference of the working group. We have suggested that the two Co-Chairmen might seek the assistance of the non-aligned countries in framing the terms of reference.

B. Collateral measures:

We recognize the importance of collateral measures which aim at lowering international tension, keeping the improvement in the international situation alive and reducing the dangers of the arms race. Various measures were discussed during the last two sessions:

(i) Reduction in military expenditure:

We have welcomed the unilateral cuts made by the Soviet Union and the USA. We would welcome further cuts by the major military powers, either unilaterally, or by agreement. So far as India is concerned, while we agree in principle that military expenditure should be reduced, wherever possible, we ourselves are facing a threat of aggression and it is not possible for us at the present time to make a commitment in regard to cuts in military expenditure. In fact, we have been obliged to increase our military expenditure for purposes of defence. We suggest that savings accruing from cuts in military expenditure by the major military powers may be diverted to the maximum extent to the less developed countries for development purposes so that the serious tensions caused by the growing gap between the rich and the poor nations may be reduced.

(ii) Elimination of bombers:

We have welcomed the US proposal for elimination of obsolete types of bombers which can be used as carriers of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union has proposed that all such bombers should be eliminated by the major military powers under an agreement. In our view, there should be a phased programme for the elimination of all bombers which can be used as carriers of nuclear weapons. This should start with the destruction of obsolete types, simultaneously with the stoppage of production of all types. For this purpose, there should be a comprehensive agreement which would lead to the elimination of all bombers which can be used as carriers of nuclear weapons.

(iii) Verified freeze of production of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, etc:

While we agree that a freeze will help to reduce the nuclear arms race, we think that an agreement might be easier if the freeze is not restricted to types of nuclear delivery vehicles in which one side may be stronger than the other, but is extended to all types. We also think that an agreement on verification might be easier if the freeze could be linked with some concrete measures for the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

(iv) Verified freeze of production of fissionable material for weapons use and transfer of material to peaceful use:

We have welcomed the unilateral cuts by the nuclear powers in fissionable material production for weapons use. We would welcome further steps in this direction, whether by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example, or on the basis of an agreement. We also agree that the use of nuclear energy for production of weapons should be prohibited under international control and supervision. However, we cannot agree to any measures which might have the effect of restricting the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, or establishing some form of control which would be detrimental to the interests of the less developed countries, or would discriminate against them. The control should be restricted to plants which produce fissile material so as to prevent any country, whether developed or less developed, from making nuclear weapons in any significant manner. The present system of IAEA safeguards should not be extended to equipment and devices serving a peaceful purpose as this would widen the gap between the developed and the less developed countries.

We would welcome the transfer of fissionable material stocks, in increasing quantities, to peaceful use.

(v) Non-dissemination agreement:

We attach great importance to measures for the prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons. Our suggestions are as follows:

(a) Negotiations for an agreement on non-dissemination should be started without delay by the nuclear powers. If a joint declaration, as suggested by the UAR, is likely to cause delay, substantive negotiations could start even without such a declaration.

(b) There should be a clear understanding, or agreement, that while negotiations are proceeding, no change should be made by either nuclear side in any arrangement that may exist at the present for the control, use, possession, or transfer of nuclear weapons, or for the training of nationals of non-nuclear States in the use of such weapons, and that all existing arrangements should be frozen on each side.

(c) The negotiations should be completed with the least possible delay and a target date might be agreed upon for the completion of the negotiations, if necessary. In the course of the negotiations, such threats or fears as may have led to some demand, or to suggestions, for a change in existing arrangements on either side, should be fully examined and efforts should be made to reduce, or to remove, the legitimate fears of each side.

(d) The negotiations should be directed to the conclusion of an agreement, or treaty, on non-dissemination and all States should be invited to sign it.

(vi) Comprehensive test ban:

We welcome the undertaking given by the nuclear powers that they will continue their negotiations for extending the Moscow Treaty to underground tests. We consider it vitally important that all nuclear weapons tests should be discontinued and prohibited. Our suggestions are as follows:

(a) States which have not signed the Moscow Treaty should be invited to sign it immediately.

(b) We regret that the negotiations, if any, between the nuclear powers for the banning of all tests have not yet led to any results. We realize that there are differences among the nuclear powers on the question of identification and verification of underground tests. We consider it imperative, however, that all underground tests should be discontinued immediately, either by unilateral decisions based on the policy of mutual example, or in some other appropriate way, while negotiations are going on for reconciling the differences between the nuclear powers.

(c) The nuclear powers might also take steps towards the conclusion of a formal treaty on the cessation of underground tests by stages. Thus, another partial treaty might be entered into for cessation of tests above a limited threshold. For establishing such a threshold, it might be necessary for the nuclear powers to exchange scientific and other data. The threshold could be lowered subsequently as a result of the continuing exchange of scientific and other data and other negotiations.

(vii) Convention on prohibition of use of nuclear weapons:

We have supported the Ethiopian proposal for convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. However, we have also expressed the view that, if the convention is to be effective, it will require the active support of all States and more particularly of States which possess such weapons. Without the participation of all States, the proposed convention will not, in our view, be effective. Some delegations have pointed out that the proposed convention will have the effect of undermining security.

Suggestions have also been made that, in the absence of means of control, or measures of disarmament, such a convention will not be useful at the present time. Our suggestion is that if such a conference is convened, all such matters could be considered in the conference.

C. Other measures of disarmament and collateral measures:

Our position on other measures has been explained in previous sessions of the Conference. There is no change in the position and we are not repeating our views.

D. Working methods of ENDC:

(a) We welcome the proposal for setting up working groups to examine matters of detail on various proposals under discussion. The groups should be set up by agreement and should have a clear directive and clear terms of reference. They should report to the Committee whose political responsibility will in no way be affected by the setting up of working groups.

(b) We consider it important that the Committee, under the guidance of the two Co-Chairmen, should frame an orderly agenda for the consideration of various proposals.

MEXICO

I. WORKING METHODS

The delegation of Mexico supported on 16 June (ENDC/PV.190. pp. 45, 46) the suggestion that the Conference should lay down an order of discussion of the various subjects before it, and draw up a working programme to obviate discussion of the commencing dates of its series of meetings.

II. GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

At the meeting held on 7 July 1964 the Mexican delegation supported (ENDC/PV.196, pp. 5 et seq.) the idea of setting up a working group to study the problem of the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to a minimum which, on the one hand, would maintain the balance between the nuclear Powers and, on the other, stop as early as possible the increase in the number of these weapons.

Concerning the terms of reference of the working group, the Mexican delegation, on the same occasion, expressed the opinion that these should be both precise and flexible, so that the proposals of both sides for the "minimum" which is apparently desired by all could be considered.

III. NUCLEAR TESTS

The Mexican delegation considered that the Moscow Treaty was not an epilogue but merely a prologue, whose immediate sequel should be a ban on underground nuclear tests.

It considered that, although underground nuclear explosions may not contravene the letter of the Treaty, they certainly contravene its spirit and that of General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII).

It regretted that negotiations have not been conducted between the nuclear Powers in compliance with the urgent request made by the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament.

It considered that the condemnation by public opinion of those countries which have not ratified the Treaty of Moscow would not have sufficient moral effect or power of dissuasion unless it were delivered by an international community which had pronounced itself absolutely against nuclear tests per se and in all media (ENDC/PV.205, pp. 13, 14).

IV. COLLATERAL MEASURES

A. Reduction of military budgets

The Mexican delegation considered it incumbent on the nuclear Powers, and on those countries whose military budgets are disproportionate to their national incomes, to reduce their military expenditure appropriately (ENDC/PV.186, p. 26).

B. Freeze of strategic nuclear weapon vehicles

The Mexican delegation does not consider this a disarmament measure but believes that it would be a useful measure aimed at halting the arms race and preventing the development of more destructive weapons than now exist (ibid.).

C. Destruction of bombers

The Mexican delegation suggested that an agreement to destroy B-47 and TU-16 bombers might well include destruction of later models as well, to give the measure greater meaning (ibid., p. 27).

It also holds that in such an agreement the parties should undertake not to replace the destroyed weapons with later types, or the agreement would be worthless.

D. Non-Dissemination

The Mexican delegation considered that the only visible obstacle to reaching agreement on the subject was the apprehension with which the socialist countries viewed the creation of a multilateral nuclear force by a group of NATO countries.

It pointed out the need and urgency of an agreement which would prevent dissemination of nuclear weapons to countries which at present do not possess them, and called attention to the danger that, if a multilateral nuclear force were to be created -- whoever the creators might be -- other nuclear Powers might in their turn decide to create similar forces. That would usher in a new arms race which would leave its predecessors in the shade, for it would be a nuclear and multilateral arms race (ENDC/PV.201, pp. 20, 21).

E. Resolution on the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons

The Mexican delegation considered that General Assembly resolution 1909 (XVIII) gave the Committee an unequivocal and inescapable mandate on this question.

Even though the present time is apparently not the most propitious for holding a conference, it believes that continued study of the problem is necessary in order that the favourable factors may be considered.

It also held that any resulting international instrument must be signed by the majority of States and by all those possessing nuclear weapons.

The Mexican delegation likewise maintained that resolution 1653 (XVI), which declares that the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is contrary to the letter and aims of the Charter of the United Nations, itself declares the need to raise it to the status of an international treaty.

The delegation also declared that the Declaration contained in that resolution became at the moment of its adoption a part of international law having the same force as other General Assembly declarations, such as the Declaration of Human Rights (ENDC/PV.213).

N I G E R I A

Resume of the views, ideas and suggestions made by the Nigerian Delegation during the 1964 sessions of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament

SECTION A: General and Complete Disarmament

The Nigerian delegation at the 187th plenary meeting, expressed the view that the somewhat differing approaches to the solution of the general and complete disarmament problem are in a sense complementary, but stressed the need for recognizing additional criteria for the negotiations: such as the necessity of eliminating early the threat of a nuclear and thermo-nuclear holocaust hanging over humanity. From this standpoint it could be possible to effect a radical cut in certain categories of armaments and a percentage cut in others without adversely affecting the balance of power. Underlining the three main elements - and their interdependence - that constitute the core of the problem, nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, control and the institution of an effective peace-keeping machinery, the Nigerian delegation advocating another scrutiny of the agenda suggested an intensified concentration of efforts on each of these elements. It also felt that it would be helpful to have more informal meetings possibly with competent technical advisers present to offer the necessary clarification.

At the 192nd plenary meeting the Nigerian delegation stated that it adheres to two cardinal principles in its approach to the problem of general and complete disarmament. The first is that no agreement should result, especially during the process of implementation, in a radical disruption of the balance which appears to exist at the moment. This applies not only to the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, but to conventional armaments and other components of present day military power. The Nigerian delegation therefore sees a clear link between the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the elimination of other components of military power. Conversely any agreement, say, on conventional armaments, not directly related to a plan for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and especially, their means of delivery would be artificial. Secondly the problem of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery not only deserves priority but belongs to a special category. The Nigerian delegation therefore sees no difficulty in approving even the most radical proposal, provided that such a plan would rid the world of the present nuclear nightmare and in a manner which would not dangerously upset the balance of power during the process of general and complete disarmament.

Drawing attention to the fact that both plans, as a result of the latest Gromyko proposals, now envisage a form of "nuclear umbrella" at a point in the disarmament process, the Nigerian delegation, to resolve the deadlock over the establishment of a working group to consider the problem of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles, suggested for consideration by the Committee, the following formula - "the acceptance of the concept of a "nuclear umbrella" at the earliest possible point in the disarmament process, to be eliminated at the end of the

disarmament process, coupled with a firm undertaking to eliminate all other means of delivering nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time". The Nigerian delegation made it clear that what it wanted was an appropriate forum which would consider the problems involved thoroughly and from which a solution would emerge confirming the soundness of one plan or the other, or, even more likely and appropriately a realistic compromise solution.

At the 198th plenary meeting the substance of this formula was made more precise and tabled as a working document of the Conference (ENDC/136). The Nigerian delegation also requested the two co-Chairmen to consider the possibility of calling in other members of the Committee to assist them in their negotiations for a mutually acceptable and clear terms of reference for a working group.

SECTION B: Collateral Measures

(a) Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

The Nigerian delegation attaches the utmost importance to an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, which it considers an ever-crying necessity, as each moment of delay increases both the difficulty of reaching such an agreement and the danger of more countries acquiring control of such weapons thereby further complicating the task of reaching and implementing, agreement on general and complete disarmament. It therefore feels that doubts regarding the creation of the Multilateral Nuclear Force or any other doubts need not stand in the way of a consideration of this measure. Discussion could well resolve such doubts and in any case a truly effective agreement on non-dissemination could well limit, if not eliminate the very nature of some of the present obstacles to agreement.

At the 213rd plenary meeting the Nigerian delegation called on either (or both) sides to provide a draft treaty embodying elements which it considered necessary in such an agreement and drew the attention of the Committee to the report of working group 2 of the 12th Pugwash Conference which stated inter alia "that an agreement on non-dissemination must contain a provision that all nations presently possessing nuclear weapons should jointly undertake not to transfer these weapons or technical information relating to them to any other States or group of States". To make it possible for the necessary negotiations to be conducted expeditiously and under the proper atmosphere, the Nigerian delegation suggested that it might also be helpful if the arrangements which are at present contemplated and which are considered as obstacles to agreement are suspended for a period of time, to be limited by agreement between the two super Powers and, covering the period during which the negotiations would be conducted.

The Nigerian delegation also pointed out that the life of a non-dissemination agreement would, in fact, be dependent on among other things such factors as:

- (a) that the armaments race should not continue unchecked; that its pace should be reduced, and that it should be halted if possible;
- (b) that serious efforts should be made towards nuclear containment;
- (c) that physical destruction of some armaments, including missiles, should be undertaken;
- (d) that the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons should be prohibited.

(b) Freeze on Strategic Vehicles

The Nigerian delegation views the United States proposal with considerable favour as it is convinced that in order to begin disarmament it is first necessary to stop the arms race and would like to see such an agreement materialise. It is of course aware of difficulties that might arise, such as verification and balance. The Nigerian is however of the strong opinion that the general approach of the United States proposal is a sound and timely one and accordingly welcomes the United States proposal as it would welcome any proposal aimed at halting, in any way, the armaments race.

(c) Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Materials

The Nigerian delegation welcomed the cut back in production of fissionable materials for weapons uses announced by the nuclear Powers in April and was of the opinion that there is now no reason to delay an agreement in this field.

(d) The United States and Soviet proposals for the destruction of Bomber Aircrafts

The Nigerian delegation does not consider the two proposals as being necessarily exclusive, but in fact one could be a step leading to the other. The Nigerian delegation sees some value even in the destruction of obsolete and obsolescent armaments, if for no other reason than to prevent a proliferation of such bombers and armaments. It therefore welcomes the U.S. proposal but feels that to strike the right psychological note the United States proposal should be enlarged to include other categories of bombers than those proposed, as well as some missiles if possible. Serious study should therefore be given to the super Powers so as to strike a mean between the two approaches. The Nigerian delegation all wonders whether it is realistic to expect all States to destroy all their bombers at this stage as a collateral measure - especially if these constitute their primary means of defence.

(e). Reduction of Military Expenditure:

The Nigerian delegation at the 159th plenary meeting warmly welcomed the reduction of military budgets by the United States and Soviet Union through the policy of mutual example. But in so doing felt constrained to point out, albeit most humbly, that the further perfection of newer and more deadly weapons still continued apace, though perhaps not at the same rate as hitherto, and that even with these reductions in military spending, the vast sums appropriated for military purposes was still not only staggering, but vastly out of proportion with requirements for peaceful times and with provisions for peaceful purposes not only for developing countries but for the super Powers themselves.

The Nigerian delegation stated that it would be squint-eyed to regard its interest in this subject as being motivated, either solely or partly, by self interest - that is, by the so-called aid to developing countries. It is true that the astronomical sums now, unfortunately, appropriated for military purposes by the major Powers and their allies are almost equal to the gross national product of almost all the developing countries put together. But it is equally true that even in some of the most developed countries themselves there are pockets of squalor and abject poverty which require instant relief and would most certainly benefit from the freezing and cutting of military expenditures.

While hoping that this reduction by mutual example initiated by the two great nuclear Powers would be vigorously promoted and reciprocated, the Nigerian delegation trusts that it would be possible to embody them in more formal commitments in the nature of agreements at the appropriate time.

The Nigerian delegation advocated a freeze and reduction of military expenditures which, it called not only immoral but almost criminal folly in a world ravaged by hunger, disease and want, and plagued by technological backwardness. It therefore looks forward to more substantial reductions of military expenditures by the great Powers in particular, though this is not to be restricted to them alone, and also looks forward to the time when the vast sums now appropriated to military purposes will be channelled to more peaceful endeavours.

The Nigerian delegation sees in the proposal for a reduction in military expenditures a reasonably realistic and courageous approach to the problem of slowing down the arms race. In its view, a reduction in military expenditures would appear to be most appropriate at this stage of the Committee's work, for, while it would have a definite and considerable impact on the over-all armaments of States, it would still leave the Powers concerned the choice of deciding to which aspect of their military resources they should direct the axe. Thus, while a global reduction in military expenditures would be effected, a State could retain the types of armaments "mix" it considers desirable and the balance of power, which we consider essential, need not be disturbed.

The Nigerian delegation does not consider the problems of verification of this measure to be insurmountable and is confident that an expert body could find a solution to this problem.

The Nigerian delegation drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that a freeze and reduction of military budgets has very close, and indeed inextricable relationship with some of the proposals advanced by the U.S. such as the freeze on the characteristics and numbers of strategic delivery vehicles, the cut-off or/and cut-back of production of fissionable materials for weapons uses and the destruction of bomber aircraft. It stressed the need to ensure that the funds released by these proposals are not utilised in developing newer armaments.

(f) Measures to reduce the risks of war:

The Nigerian delegation pointed out that there would appear to be considerable common ground in the two proposals of the Soviet Union and the United States and that the Committee could concentrate on this with profit. The Nigerian delegation noted that the main obstacle to agreement is the fact that the measures proposed by the Soviet Union are made contingent on a reduction of troops in the territories of the two German States. While it could welcome such a reduction of troops in this area of great tension, if mutually agreed, the Nigerian delegation sees considerable intrinsic value in the mere establishment of observation posts etc., and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would agree even to such a limited measure.

SECTION C: United Nations General Assembly Resolutions:

Resolution 1910 (XVIII) - Urgent need for the Cessation
of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapon Tests

At the 159th plenary meeting the Nigerian delegation drew attention to this resolution and stated that a limited test ban treaty, though significant in itself is by no means the end of the road and that the need for such an agreement becomes somewhat more urgent when reputable scientists appear to feel that underground tests are not so free of radioactive debris and contamination. The Nigerian delegation is also opposed to all nuclear weapon tests as they ensure a continuation of the armaments race.

Drawing attention to the commitments of the nuclear Powers under the preamble of the Moscow Treaty, as well as the injunctions of the General Assembly to conclude a comprehensive test ban agreement, the Nigerian delegation regretted the fact that the nuclear Powers apparently had no specific plans in mind to realise these objectives. It therefore suggested the reactivation of the Nuclear Sub-Committee, with, possibly, scientific experts participating so that a really productive negotiation would result. It also requested the nuclear Powers to make available the results of the research carried out by them over the past year in respect of detection and identification of underground tests. The Nigerian delegation also suggested the exploration of the possibility of a threshold agreement on underground tests - and enlargement of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests above a magnitude which can be detected and identified without any international control.

At the 213th plenary meeting the Nigerian delegation expressed the hope that during the period of recess necessitated by having to report to the United Nations General Assembly, the nuclear Powers would take steps to reach a comprehensive tests ban agreement either through bipartite or tripartite negotiations as they did in the winter of 1962.

United Nations Resolution 1909 (XVII)

The Nigerian delegation as long ago as 24 January 1964 drew the Committee's attention to this most important resolution and was therefore obliged to regret at the 213th plenary meeting the fact that the resolution had not received the serious consideration it deserved. It agrees that the most effective guarantee against the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons lies in the elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of States. Nevertheless such a Convention would have a most salutary effect and indeed would be a useful precautionary and preliminary measure. The Nigerian delegation emphasized the importance of convening a Conference to sign a Convention for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and indeed of signing such a Convention. It felt that in addition to the various cogent reasons given in the Resolution 1653 (XVI) which form the basis of discussions on this subject and the views expressed by the Nigerian Government and Nigerian delegation both at the United Nations and at the Disarmament Committee on the usefulness of such a Convention, the Convention would have a most positive effect in buttressing an agreement on non-dissemination. The Nigerian delegation, which is opposed to the use of nuclear weapons in whatever context (although it noted the implication of a statement by the United Kingdom delegation that the use of nuclear weapons might be restricted to nuclear Powers alone), stressed that unless steps are taken to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, it would be difficult to restrain present non-nuclear Powers from seeking to acquire such weapons once they have attained the necessary industrial basis - and if they continue to be menaced by nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the present nuclear Powers.

The Nigerian delegation suggested that if necessary, such a Convention could be linked with a NATO/Warsaw or/and other regional or multilateral non-aggression pacts to ensure that the Convention would not be an incentive for the unleashing of an aggression by any State.

SWEDEN

1. General and Complete Disarmament.

Working group for studying the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

The Swedish delegation pointed out (28 July) the considerable area of agreement already existing between the two main negotiating parties: that certain nuclear weapons and their means of delivery should be retained all through the disarmament process so as to provide "nuclear shields".

The delegation hailed the idea of setting up a working group and suggested that the group should focus first on what kind of such nuclear shields should exist at the end of the disarmament process, in Stage III. The second, later, task would be to study how to reach that new "mix" of nuclear weapons, retained by the main Powers, taking up the questions of timing, phasing, and methods of eliminating the residual means of delivery.

The delegation stressed the importance that, simultaneously with the study by the working group on the "shields" the Committee should urgently proceed to a consideration of the establishment of international peace-keeping forces.

Later (25 August) the Swedish delegation, as an alternative to the above suggestions, pointed to the possibility of reaching agreement on a preliminary working group by reducing the scope of its activities to a scrutiny of the methods to be utilized for analyzing the size and composition of a suitable shield.

2. Collateral measures.

Military budgets.

The Swedish delegation recommended (12 March) that the Committee should discuss the problems surrounding indirect control of limitations of armaments via budget statistics and to make these problems the subject of closer examination by some kind of informal working party. The delegation considered that it might be worth while to explore the possibilities to observe and analyse, through study of budgetary statistics and other available economic data, the trends in allocations of resources for military purposes. It might be useful if methods could be developed to follow - indirectly and unobtrusively - what is happening in the disarmament field.

3. Working methods.

The Swedish delegation suggested (28 Jan.) the setting up of ad hoc informal working parties for exchange of views on technical questions. This should enable the Committee to multiply its effective working hours and to secure opportunities for intensive discussion of details.

The Swedish delegation also recommended (9 June) that the Committee decide to establish a time schedule based in principle on recurring sessions of about three months, interrupted by recess periods.

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

A Synopsis of Various Suggestions presented by the
United Arab Republic to the 18-Nation Committee Concerning
General and Complete Disarmament, Collateral Measures, and
Underground Nuclear Test-Ban.

21 January - 17 September 1964

I General and Complete Disarmament

(1) Nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and its method of reduction and
elimination

United Arab Republic:

In conformity with the theory of varied ratios of reduction of different categories of armaments, the U.A.R. proposed that both parties would possibly agree on a certain size of "Nuclear Umbrella", where the numbers to be agreed upon would be less than enough to unleash a nuclear war and more than enough to guard the security of each party. Also in order to ensure that the existing balance would not be affected and that in implementing such reductions there would be no advantage for either side and that security would be safeguarded during the disarmament process, the U.A.R. proposed that it would be of great importance, in deciding on the size of the "Nuclear Umbrella", to consider, for instance, the strike capability in terms of power and range of every type of the retained missiles. (25 February 1964, PV.169, p.58)

(2) Establishing an appropriate Working Group to consider questions related to the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles

United Arab Republic:

A systematic formulation of the appropriate items to be referred to the Working Group in the form of an agreed outline of a plan for the elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons, has been proposed by the U.A.R. which contains the following topics:

(1) Reaffirmation of the principle of the elimination and cessation of production of nuclear delivery vehicles;

(2) retention of an agreed quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles which would serve the purpose of a minimum nuclear deterrent during the disarmament process; and this would entail a definition of:

a) the precise purpose and aim of the retained means of delivery;

b) the kind and number of the retained means of delivery;

c) the deployment of the retained means of delivery on the territories of both sides;

(3) the method of eliminating the means of delivery of nuclear weapons at the earliest practicable stage;

(4) other questions which are relevant to the problem and which would facilitate the implementation of the plan within the framework of the programme of general and complete disarmament and in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. (14 July 1964, PV.198, pp. 16-17)

II Collateral Measures or Measures aimed at
the Lessening of International Tension, the
Consolidation of Confidence among States, and
Facilitating General and Complete Disarmament

- (1) Measures designed in general to decelerate the arms race, and
to provide against surprise attack

The United Arab Republic

proposed two groups of those measures that in its view are complementary and may together provide a balanced "package deal" acceptable to both of the great Powers:

Group "A": The following measures are those to be considered to halt the arms race, as a most important prelude to disarmament:

- (1) Halting production of fissionable materials for use in weapons;
- (2) the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons by prohibiting accessibility to them and regulating future disposal of nuclear materials for peaceful uses;
- (3) freezing the production of strategic armaments by adopting appropriate measures which should not compromise the security of either party.

Group "B": The following measures are those to be taken against a possible surprise attack by one party or the other:

- (1) the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States members of NATO;
- (2) effecting a physical disengagement at the most critical and dangerous points of contact. This may be achieved by establishing atom-free zones, by immediate or gradual withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and by the establishment of observation posts on both sides to a depth consistent with the objective in view.

(30 January 1964; PV.151, pp.26-27)

As some of the collateral measures might be ripe to be agreed upon independently, the U.A.R. presented some ideas and suggestions with regard to the most important and most urgent of those measures.

(2) Non-Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons

The United Arab Republic:

(A) As the concept of non-dissemination itself, is a kind of freeze of the deployment of nuclear weapons by other States, and as the United States proposal for a freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles includes a freeze of their deployment the U.A.R., therefore, suggested that the United States plan for a verified freeze of strategical nuclear weapons be applied to the creation of the multilateral force. On such an assumption would the Eastern countries accept reaching independent agreements on both the non-dissemination issue and the question of freezing strategical weapons under control measures acceptable to both sides, having in mind that the Eastern countries do not object to the idea of the freeze in itself. (9 April 1964, PV.182, pp.5-10)

(B) In view of the fact that the principle of non-dissemination is not only desired by both sides but also agreed upon, the U.A.R. submitted for consideration the following three ideas which might overcome the obstacles to agreement:

(1) The nuclear Powers should engage in negotiations with a view to issuing a declaration on non-dissemination, based on the Irish Resolution (A/RES/1665 XVI) which will bar any access to nuclear weapons and in which both sides undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons, from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons and from transferring the weapons themselves to those States.

(2) Parallel to the negotiations on this declaration, the Nuclear Powers might engage in a discussion of a technical nature in a body of experts which, in our opinion, might be in a better practical position to state whether the multilateral force leads to dissemination and whether the fingers of the other State are on the firing trigger or on the safety catch.

Pending the result of the work of that technical body, in order to facilitate the discussion, the existing arrangements should not be developed beyond the present stage, and both sides should refrain from taking any action which might jeopardize the success of an eventual agreement on non-dissemination. That technical discussion would of course be limited to a reasonable time or have a fixed target date.

(3) The declaration of the Nuclear Powers should be transformed in due course into an appropriate international treaty to be concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, and open to all States to become parties to it.

(13 August 1964, PV.207, p.10)

(3) Verified Freeze of the Number and Characteristics of Strategic Nuclear Offensive and Defensive Vehicles

United Arab Republic

The simplest way to halt the arms race, which is probably a most important prelude to disarmament, would be by making a verified halt of the development and production of armaments and to shut down the plants. Nuclear weapons and their vehicles of delivery should take first priority in this respect, with the adoption of appropriate measures which should not compromise the security of either party. (30 January 1964, PV.161, p.13)

(4) Halting Production of Fissile Material for Weapon Use
and the Question of Inspection and Control

The United Arab Republic

Believes that the use of nuclear energy for the production of nuclear weapons should be halted at once, with the additional transfer of all stockpiles to peaceful uses, and agrees that appropriate and effective verification should be applied to prevent the use of fissile material in weapons. (9 April 1964, PV.182, p.9).

(5) Destruction of Aircraft Bombers

The United Arab Republic

In the light of close analysis of both the Soviet Union's proposal for the destruction of all bombers (ENDC/123), and the United States proposal for the destruction of B47 and TU-16 bombers,

The United Arab Republic suggested for discussion and consideration by the Committee the following three interrelated items:

- 1 - the cessation of production of all bombers;
- 2 - the destruction of all bombers;
- 3 - the establishment of a carefully phased programme for the destruction of all bombers, which would start with the United States proposal for the destruction of B-47, TU-16 and other bombers (ENDC/PV.182, pp.18-21 - 19 April 1964)

(6) Reduction of Military Budgets

The United Arab Republic

Suggested that the Committee should make an appeal to all the major Powers, whether represented in our Committee or not, and not merely to the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unilaterally to reduce or to continue to reduce their military budgets in the future on the basis of mutual example. The Eighteen-Nation Committee could be used as a sort of clearing house by both Parties for proclaiming their intention to reduce their military budgets in the future, while specifying the amount they want to reduce each year and where the cuts will be made.

As to the field where reductions should be made first, we suggest to begin with the resources earmarked for the most destructive weapons, which are the nuclear weapons. (ENDC/PV.182, pp.26-27 - 9 April 1964).

III Underground Nuclear Tests

The United Arab Republic

(a) Re-emphasized again the importance of the improvement in the detection techniques to reduce the number of on-site inspections and ultimately eliminate such inspections, and that goal could be reached by improvement either unilaterally or by exchanging scientific information bilaterally and multilaterally.

(b) In view of the fact that both sides in 1960 included in their negotiations the idea of banning all tests, including underground tests above seismic magnitude 4.75, we believe - in view of the recent development in the detection and identification systems - that the Committee should call upon the nuclear powers to enlarge the partial test-ban treaty in order to cover the banning of underground tests, at least of the above-mentioned seismic magnitude.

(c) We think that scientific cooperation under the formula we suggested before could help improve the capabilities of detecting and identifying smaller underground tests, and the threshold could be progressively lowered to match such improvements. This could be on the whole another step towards banning all tests for all time.

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IV Procedure (Level of the Conference)

The United Arab Republic

Reiterated its support to the idea of convening the conference at the level of Foreign Ministers, whose meeting together could advance and invigorate the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and open a firm path towards a meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the nations composing this Committee. (25 February 1964, PV.169, p.56).

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/145
14 September 1964

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

BRAZIL, BURMA, ETHIOPIA, INDIA, MEXICO
NIGERIA, SWEDEN, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Joint Memorandum

In response to world public opinion, and to the express will of the United Nations as embodied in various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, a treaty was signed at Moscow in July, 1963 for the banning of nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This treaty has been welcomed by the world as a whole. It has reduced the hazard of increased radio-activity resulting from nuclear fall-out. It has also contributed to the relaxation of international tension and the building of greater confidence.

The delegations of the eight non-aligned States participating in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, welcome the fact that the treaty has been signed by more than one hundred States. However, effective elimination of the threat of radio-activity resulting from nuclear fall-out requires that all States adhere to the treaty. These delegations express the hope that the treaty will be acceded to by all States as called for in operative paragraph 1 of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII).

The delegations of the eight non-aligned States have taken note of the United Nations General Assembly resolution (A/RES/ 1910 - XVIII) which requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of the treaty, that is the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times.

The delegations of the eight non-aligned States have also noted that the major nuclear Powers, who are the original signatories to the treaty, have expressed their determination to continue such negotiations. These delegations, however, express their regret that no progress in this direction has been made during this year's sessions of the Conference. They also recall in this connexion that the General Assembly in the first operative paragraph of its resolution 1762 (XVII) has condemned all nuclear weapon tests.

The delegations of the eight non-aligned States appreciate the fact that there are differences among the Nuclear Powers on the question of identification and need for verification of underground tests. They, nevertheless, do not consider such obstacles as insurmountable and would, therefore, urge the Nuclear Powers to take all immediate steps towards an agreement to ban all nuclear weapon tests and to discontinue all such tests. Such steps could, in their view, be facilitated by the exchange of scientific and other information between the Nuclear Powers or by the improvement of detection and identification techniques, if necessary.

Geneva, 14 September, 1964.

The expression "non-aligned States" used in this memorandum is understood by the Delegation of Brazil to have the specific sense in relation to Brazil of "States which do not belong either to NATO or to the Warsaw Pact" and to refer only to the participation of Brazil in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee.

Geneva, 14 September, 1964.

ANNEX II

CHECK-LIST OF DOCUMENTS ISSUED BY THE CONFERENCE

(20 January 1964 - 17 September 1964)

Part A - Verbatim records of the Conference ENDC/PV.- series

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
157th meeting to 217th meeting	21 January 1964 to 17 September 1964	ENDC/PV.157 to ENDC/PV.217

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Part B - Documents of the Conference ENDC/- series

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Additions and amendments to the Soviet draft Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control (ENDC/2/Rev.1) in conformity with the proposal for the retention by the USSR and the USA until the end of the third stage of an agreed number of missiles together with the warheads pertaining thereto	4 February 1964	ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1
Letter dated 13 January 1964 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting Resolutions 1908 (XVIII), 1909(XVIII) and 1910(XVIII) of the General Assembly	20 January 1964	ENDC/116
Letter dated 13 January 1964 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting Resolution 1884(XVIII) and Resolution 1911(XVIII) of the General Assembly	20 January 1964	ENDC/117
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Replies by Mr. N.S. Khrushchev to Questions put to him by Mr. H. Shapiro, Chief Correspondent of the United Press International Agency in Moscow on 31 December 1963	21 January 1964	ENDC/118
United States of America: Text of a letter from the President of the United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR delivered on 18 January 1964	21 January 1964	ENDC/119

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: Message of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	21 January 1964	ENDC/120
Brazil: Communique from the Government of Brazil on the resumption of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament	21 January 1964	ENDC/121
Nigeria: Letter dated 24 January 1964 from the Representative of Nigeria to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations requesting the circulation of resolution 1931 (XVIII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations as a document of the Conference	24 January 1964	ENDC/122
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension	28 January 1964	ENDC/123
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 3 February 1964 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary- General of the United Nations	3 February 1964	ENDC/124
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Representations by the Soviet Government to the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany	6 February 1964	ENDC/125
Brazil: Working Paper of the Brazilian Delegation for an Agreement on the Application of Savings on Military Expenditures	13 February 1964	ENDC/126
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Answers by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, to questions put to him by the corres- pondent of "Izvestiya" on 2 March 1964.	4 March 1964	ENDC/127
<u>ibid</u>	6 March 1964	ENDC/127* English only

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
United States of America: Text of U.S. Department of State Statement on Mr. Gromyko's interview with "Izvestiya".	5 March 1964	ENDC/128
Corrigendum to the document ENDC/128	6 March 1964	ENDC/128/Corr.1 Russian only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Communication from the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences.	20 March 1964	ENDC/129
United Kingdom: Paper on observation posts submitted at the 178th meeting of the Conference.	26 March 1964	ENDC/130
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Statement made by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Mr. N.S. Khrushchev, on 20 April 1964.	21 April 1964	ENDC/131
United States of America: Excerpts from President Johnson's Address to the Associated Press Luncheon in New York, on 20 April 1964.	21 April 1964	ENDC/132
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter dated 12 June 1964 from the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations	12 June 1964	ENDC/133
United States of America: Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cutoff.	25 June 1964	ENDC/134
<u>ibid</u>	17 July 1964	ENDC/134* Russian only
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and United States of America: Letter dated 30 June 1964 addressed by the Co-Chairmen of the Conference to the Special Representative of the Secretary- General of the United Nations transmitting a letter from the Secretary-General dated 19 June 1964, as well as a resolution of the Seventeenth World Health Assembly dated 19 March 1964.	1 July 1964	ENDC/135

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Nigeria: Working Document on Nuclear Delivery Vehicles	14 July 1964	ENDC/136
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Notes addressed by the Soviet Government on 11 July 1964 to the Governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany respectively.	15 July 1964	ENDC/137
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Item of the agenda: "Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons". Statement by TASS dated 24 July 1964.	27 July 1964	ENDC/138
List of General Assembly resolutions referring to tasks of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.	29 July 1964	ENDC/139
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and United States: Joint statement by the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.	6 August 1964	ENDC/140
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Replies by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, to questions put to him by the editorial staff of the newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestiya" on 4 August 1964.	7 August 1964	ENDC/141
United States of America: United States reply to Soviet note on MLF.	10 September 1964	ENDC/142
Communication from the delegation of Burma dated 14 September 1964, on behalf of the delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic concerning a Memorandum of the Eight Delegations.	14 September 1964	ENDC/143

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic: Memoranda of the Delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic containing a brief resumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.	14 September 1964	ENDC/144
Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic: Joint Memorandum:	14 September 1964	ENDC/145
<u>ibid</u>	16 September 1964	ENDC/145* French and Spanish
Draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (recommended by the co-Chairmen).	14 September 1964	ENDC/146
Revised draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (recommended by the co-Chairmen)	15 September 1964	ENDC/146/Rev.1
Second revised draft report to the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly (recommended by the co-Chairmen)	16 September 1964	ENDC/146/Rev.2
United States of America: Message of President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Conference of the eighteen-nation Committee on Disarmament	17 September 1964	ENDC/147

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Part C - Documents containing information of an administrative nature
/ENDC/INF. - series/

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Basic information* for Delegations on Conference arrangements and documentation	21 January 1964	ENDC/INF.1/Rev.4
<u>ibid</u>	10 March 1964	ENDC/INF.1/Rev.4/ Add.1
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	21 January 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.12
<u>ibid</u>	10 February 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.13
<u>ibid</u>	26 February 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.14
<u>ibid</u>	10 March 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.15
<u>ibid</u>	17 April 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.16
Corrigendum to the List of Members of Delegations to the Conference.	27 April 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.16/ Corr.1
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference.	9 June 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.17
<u>ibid.</u>	10 July 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.18
<u>ibid.</u>	5 August 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.19
Corrigendum to the list of Members of Delegations to the Conference	24 August 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.19/ Corr.1
List of Members of Delegations to the Conference	2 September 1964	ENDC/INF.2/Rev.20
Check-List of documents issued between 20 January and 31 January 1964	1 February 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.25
Check list of documents issued between 1 February and 1 March 1964.	2 March 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.26
Check list of documents issued between 2 March and 31 March 1964.	1 April 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.27
Check list of documents issued between 1 April and 29 April 1964.	30 April 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.28
Check list of documents issued between 30 April and 8 June 1964.	9 June 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.29

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
Check list of documents issued between 9 June and 30 June 1964	1 July 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.30
Check list of documents issued between 1 July and 31 July 1964.	1 August 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.31
Check list of documents issued between 1 August 1964 and 31 August 1964	1 September 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.32
Check list of documents issued between 1 September 1964 and 17 September 1964	17 September 1964	ENDC/INF.4/Add.33

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Part D - Non-governmental communications / ENDC/NGC/ - Series 7

<u>Title of document</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Symbol</u>
List of communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 30 August 1963 - 21 January 1964	21 January 1964	ENDC/NGC/12
List of Communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the period 22 - 31 January 1964	31 January 1964	ENDC/NGC/13
List of communications received by the secretariat of the Conference during the month of February 1964	29 February 1964	ENDC/NGC/14
List of communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference during the month of March 1964.	31 March 1964	ENDC/NGC/15
List of communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference from 1 April to 28 April 1964	29 April 1964	ENDC/NGC/16
List of communications received by the Secretariat of the Conference from 29 April to 30 June 1964	30 June 1964	ENDC/NGC/17
List of communications received by the secretariat of the Conference from 1 July to 15 August 1964.	21 August 1964	ENDC/NGC/18
List of communications received by the secretariat of the Conference from 16 August 1964 to 17 September 1964	17 September 1964	ENDC/NGC/19

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